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**TOWARDS SUCCESSFUL POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION: CASE STUDIES OF AFGHANISTAN AND
RWANDA**

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ABSTRACT

Conflict-torn countries need efficient reconstruction plans to get back on the path of development. Even though more and more efforts are undertaken to get sustainable peace and long-term development to conflict-torn countries, still some of the reconstruction projects fail. To understand why the success of post-conflict reconstruction varies and what can be done to make post-conflict reconstruction more efficient research of the post-conflict reconstruction must be done. Research of the topic is done by process-tracing method, which combines analyse and comparison of the theories and case studies. Theories of the post-conflict reconstruction show that after a conflict security-, political-, economic- and social reconstruction are needed. Also, foreign aid is usually required to implement reconstruction strategies. However, case studies of Afghanistan and Rwanda's reconstruction show that it is more important to pay attention to social reconstruction and its sequencing, to succeed in post-conflict reconstruction. This is because of grievances between different groups are usually one of the main causes of the conflicts. It is also important to concentrate on anti-corruption work because corruption prevents effective reconstruction. Finally, also the role of foreign aid should be cooperative rather than controlling, to achieve sustainable outcomes of the reconstruction.

Keywords: conflict, civil war, post-conflict reconstruction, social reconstruction, corruption, foreign aid, Afghanistan, Rwanda

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIA	Afghan Interim Authority
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANPDF	Afghan National Peace and Development Framework
ANSF	Afghanistan National Security Forces
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ATA	Afghan Transitional Authority
FDI	Foreign direct investment
GoA	Government of Afghanistan
GDP	Gross domestic product
GoR	Government of Rwanda
ICTJ	International Center for Transitional Justice
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NPP	National Priority Program
NURC	National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
ODA	Official development aid
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PRP	Poverty Reduction Plan
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
UN	United Nation
WB	World Bank

INTRODUCTION

The majority of the world's fragile states are countries which are in conflict or have experienced conflicts in the past. (Fragile States 2014... 2014) This shows that conflicts, such as civil wars, genocides, intercommunal violence and coups affect the state making it more prone to fragility. Usually the longer the conflict takes, the more deep-seated are the causes of it. Since conflicts are usually accompanied by protracted instability the risk of relapse of the conflict is also high in conflict-torn countries. To overcome conflict status and fragility, a conflict-torn country needs an efficient reconstruction plan. However, foreign aid is usually needed to finance the reconstruction agenda and consult locals with the reconstruction process, because of the fragility and weakness of the post-conflict state.

Because of this, international actors such as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank (WB), the IMF, the OECD and various development agencies and governments have taken post-conflict reconstruction on their agendas. For example, the UN has 37 ongoing peacekeeping – and political missions and good office engagements for countries which have faced conflict recently or where the conflict is ongoing (United Nations Peace... 2018). The objectives of the post-conflict reconstruction agendas for conflict-torn states, but also for the international community, are usually economic reconstruction, institution building, democratization, transitional justice, and reconciliation. Together these objectives aim sustainable peace and long-term development, which are the main goals of post-conflict reconstruction.

Despite the high number of civil wars in the past decades and involvement of the different actors on post-conflict reconstruction there is still no universal strategy how to build sustainable peace after a conflict. Also, even though many conflict-torn states have conceived strategies how to reconstruct the state after a conflict, with the help of the international community or not, many of them have failed in that process. For example, international community got involved in the Afghanistan conflict in 2001 and since that country has received billions of dollars for the reconstruction and national development plans has been launched. Still, despite of that Afghanistan suffers from poverty, violence and fragility.

In turn, Rwanda has managed to reach sustainable peace and economic growth with the help of the international community and successful social reconstruction after a massive genocide in 1994. Due to the variation of the success of the post-conflict reconstruction this thesis will examine why some post-conflict reconstruction projects fail and others not and how to improve post-conflict reconstruction to build sustainable peace and get conflict-torn country back to the path of development after conflict. It is valuable to research this topic because every failure of a post-conflict reconstruction process means waste of time and resources. In the worst cases failure of the post-conflict reconstruction leads the state back to conflict and then human lives are threatened again. This research is also valuable because there are still ongoing conflicts and on some day they will need efficient reconstruction plans.

As a hypothesis this thesis assumes that reconstruction fails because of bad sequencing of the projects, complexity of the strategies used and a too controlling role of the donors. To verify this, this thesis uses a pluralistic qualitative research methodology. This is because of this thesis combines different qualitative methods and aims to answer multiple research questions. In addition, to answer to the research questions multi-dimensional understanding of the post-conflict reconstruction theories and case studies are needed. Therefore, this thesis provides theoretical and empirical parts, which both consider political-, economic-, social- and foreign aid aspects of the reconstruction.

As a method this thesis uses process-tracing method, which combines analyses and comparison between post-conflict theories and two different case studies. Process-tracing method is used to find out what are the recommended strategies for successful post-conflict reconstruction and how recommended post-conflict reconstruction theories play out in actual post-conflict cases. This means that first this thesis researches different suggested theories of the post-conflict reconstruction, and then goes through how these suggested theories were implemented in the case studies. Analyses of the case studies are provided to discover what were the main causes, which lead to success/failure of the reconstruction. After that, it is possible to compare the cases and theory to each other, and then generalize the findings for future recommendations. These methods enable this thesis to answer to the research questions of why not all post-conflict reconstruction processes succeed and what can we do better to make all reconstruction processes to succeed. Information for this thesis was gathered from books, articles, and from reports made by the governments of Afghanistan and Rwanda and by different international organizations which have been involved in the reconstruction processes.

The outline of the thesis is as follows: In the first part, theories of post-conflict reconstruction are presented. In more detail, the theoretical part concentrates on institutional/political -, economic -, social- and security reconstruction and the role of foreign aid in the reconstruction process. There are different views of which are the main objects where post-conflict reconstruction should concentrate, how external actors should be involved in post-conflict reconstruction and how foreign financial assistance should be targeted in reconstruction process. Due to these controversies a few hypotheses of the successful reconstruction strategy are provided in the end of the theoretical part.

The second part of this thesis is empirical, which shows post-conflict reconstruction in action in Afghanistan and Rwanda. This part consists of five sub-chapters, which go through backgrounds of the conflicts, how political-, economic- and social reconstruction were implemented after the conflict, and what was the role of foreign aid in the reconstruction process in these two conflict-torn countries. Also, analyses and comparison of the reconstruction processes in the case studies are provided in every sub-chapter. These case studies are chosen because Afghanistan represents case where we can say that post-conflict reconstruction failed, and Rwanda represents a case where we can say that post-conflict reconstruction succeeded. In addition to that, these case studies are chosen because of their similar backgrounds since both conflicts were caused by ethnic divisions and economic hardships. Going through these two different case studies it is possible to find out which strategies and policies seem to work out in post-conflict reconstruction and which do not and this way answer to the research question.

In the end conclusion summarizes the whole thesis. In more details, conclusion summarizes why reconstruction process failed in Afghanistan and succeeded in Rwanda. Conclusion tells also what we can learn from post-conflict reconstructions in Afghanistan and Rwanda. Based on that, this thesis provides an answer to the main research questions of why some reconstructions succeed and the others fail, and how post-conflict reconstruction should be improved to make it more efficient.

1. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

Between 1940 and 1990 more than 50 per cent of the combatants of civil wars who were participating in negotiations were said to be willing to return to war (Misra 2002, 9). Also, according to Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 563-573), there is a high risk of recurrence of conflict in states which have experienced the breakdown of the state and the larger society. This is because of policy-related pre-conflict and structural risk factors. This means that pre-conflict conditions of the state, especially economic and social inequalities remained after the conflict which led to slow development which in turn led to high risk of reoccurrences (Collier, Hoeffler 2001). Due to that, there is a high need of an efficient post-conflict reconstruction after conflicts to prevent recurrence of the conflict. Post-conflict reconstruction is needed to prevent combatants to end up to a conflict again and this happens usually by observing the main causes of the conflict and the fields which suffered the most in the conflict. According to Léonne Ndikumana (2016, 145) “emphasis must be on correcting past practices of exclusion and discrimination that may have been the root causes of the conflict”. In this way it is possible to succeed in post-conflict reconstruction.

Post-conflict reconstruction considers a broad range of actions since there usually are several factors which caused the conflict and several consequences of the conflict. These actions are not universal but depends always on the conflict itself, its scale and duration (Addison *et al.* 2016, 32). Therefore, it is extremely important that every post-conflict reconstruction process is seen and planned as an individual process. However, it is generally agreed that successful post-conflict reconstruction maintains peace in the short-term and brings development in the long-term. Also, many experts agree that post-conflict reconstruction should concentrate on security, reconciliation and development. (Vos *et al.* 2008, 1) Due to that, the main targets of post-conflict reconstruction are usually reorganization of state’s institutions, rebuilding the state’s economy and social reconstruction. It is believed that in this way sustainable peace is achieved and the state can move on to the path of development.

1.1. Reconstruction of institutions

In post-conflict reconstruction it is important to consider what kind of measures are needed and in which order. Usually in conflict-torn countries social order is missing, they lack basic institutions to keep security and justice and there is no participatory governance to manage state building. To maintain peace strong political and security initiatives and institutions are needed. Vos, Kozul-Wright and Fortunato (2008, 1) argue that the most important measures once the fighting stops are delivery of humanitarian relief and the creation of an effective military and/or police presence to rebuild and maintain basic levels of order and physical security. This strengthening of security forces quickly extends to a process of rebuilding domestic civil authority, which is also needed after a conflict. In addition, Del Castilla argues that after a conflict ‘security transition’ is needed to bring crime and violence under control. This happens by establishing institutions for public security (Del Castilla 2016, 51). However, after the conflict country’s own security and police forces might be limited and therefore foreign peacekeeping troops are usually needed to maintain security. According to Misra (2002, 15) it is generally believed that a strong external peacekeeping force can help to prevent violence escalating in conflict zones. They can play an important role in arms decommissioning, in controlling the influx of weapons and they can help to temper a militant mood and curb vendetta action.

Without strong institutions and political order, pre-conflict inequalities continue, and the state might relapse into conflict again. However, there are no best practices how to strengthen institutions and their capabilities in the most efficient way. Therefore, post-conflict countries are usually advised to promote “good governance” such as democratizing, liberalizing, decentralizing, privatizing etc. which are key issues for political stability and sustainable economic development in donor countries (Ndikumana 2016, 150). According to Del Castilla (2016, 15), in successful political reconstruction repressive governments must give way to the rule of law and participatory governance, both at the national and local level. This means that pre-conflict power sharing among local and national political elites must make room for democratic system where all citizens are involved. Also, Vos, Kozul-Wright and Fortunato (2008, 2) suggests that “strengthening of state institutions requires political choices shaped by local values and conditions rather than technocratic solutions”. Due to these arguments it can be said that in political reconstruction reconciliation and involvement of the locals is needed to achieve good governance. This transition of political power is possible to make by decentralization and establishing institutions that foster

power-sharing. Due to that it is also important to pay attention how post-conflict institutions are formed.

According to Ndikumana (2016, 145), establishment of institutions that foster power-sharing are needed, because power sharing institutions ensure integration and representation of all segments of the population. Also, Darby and Mac Ginty (2003, 195-209) note that power-sharing institutions are good options for the transition of the post-conflict state because they are established through negotiations where all parties of the conflict are involved. In addition, power-sharing settlements reflect the interest and expectations of the parties, they seek to resolve uncertainties of the new rule and they create institutions that are broadly inclusive of all major mobilized groups in society. However, Darby and Mac Ginty (*Ibid.*) also note that while power-sharing is necessary as an immediate exit to conflict, it still is not viable long-term solution. This is because of power-sharing requires consensus in policy making and when parties are unable to make consensus governance stagnated and policy making drifts, which can lead to new tensions between parties. Thus, these arguments suggest that power-sharing institutions are best for transition period of post-conflict countries because they prevent authoritarian rulers and local elites to control the whole state, but they are still not long-term solutions.

Even though political reconstruction, such as promoting good governance and power-sharing institutions have gained support among experts of the field there are still opponents of the theory. According to Misra (2002, 16) democracy and good governance are difficult to promote in a nation emerging from a civil war without external policing. However, external policing brings a risk of the whole project being constructed as a form of colonialism. Therefore, promoting good governance does not work in a post-conflict country because it can be seen as superiority of external countries.

1.2. Economic reconstruction

Strong institutions and political order are also needed to provide basic services to society. These basic services are for example public sector services from sewage and electricity to health care and education, but also jobs. However, this cannot be done without a viable economy and therefore strengthening of institutions and political order must operate tandem with the reconstruction of the economy.

Conflicts affect a state's economy negatively. Usually conflict-torn economy becomes mismanaged, largely illegal and highly depended on foreign aid. High unemployment rates, mismanagement of allocations and stagnated economy are also common for conflict-torn countries. According to Collier (1999, 8) a country's economy declines around 2.2 per cent annum on average during civil war. This means that after a decade of conflict a state's economy is 20 per cent lower than it would have been without conflict. Also, Voz, Kozul-Wright and Fortunato (2008, 1) argues that "The size of government revenue relative to gross domestic product (GDP) in war-torn societies is typically far below the average for other countries with similar per capita income ". Due to these reasons reconstruction of economy in a post-conflict years is extremely important to ease tensions and to get a country back to a path of development.

Ndikumana (2016, 157) notes that mobilizing domestic revenue is one of the main objectives in "economic reconstruction". This is because of revenue mobilization enables government to strengthen its institutions and deliver public services, which in turn will build state legitimacy and credibility. In addition to that, economic reconstruction should include modernization or creation of a basic macro- and microeconomic framework to create employment opportunities. These actions are necessary for the reintegration of former combatants and civilians into productive activities (Del Castillo 2016, 55). Also Voz, Kozul-Wright and Fortunato (2008) agree that the most crucial issue in the economic reconstruction process is to build state capacity to mobilize domestic revenue and to use it most effectively. By these arguments mobilizing domestic revenues and allocating it to benefit the whole society are the main objects of economic reconstruction.

1.3. Social and judicial reconstruction

In addition to institution strengthening and political- and economic reconstruction, social reconstruction and justice for the victims are needed. Social reconstruction means that all the social confrontations, such as ethnic, religious and class confrontations, which might have been causes of the conflict, must give in to national reconciliation. In this way former enemies could return to the same cities and villages and to coexist in peace (Del Castillo 2016, 51). The main objectives in social reconstruction are both the rebuilding of social relations and inter-group trust and the healing of psychological traumas and mental-health problems.

One key part of the social reconstruction is then judicial reconstruction, so especially social relations and inter-group trust can be rebuilt. According to Jelena Subotić (2012) judicial

interventions are the gold standard in providing justice. These judicial interventions are for example trials, truth commissions and reparations programs. Non-judicial truth commissions seek to determine the facts, roots and consequences of the past human rights violations through the testimony of the victims. This way they provide recognition and survival to the most affected (Truth Commissions 2018). Jamie Rowen (2016, 203) explains that commissions that investigate, document and publicize violence have emerged as one of the more popular approaches to bridge divides after a conflict. This is because of purposes of these commissions are to create shared narrative of violence.

1.4. The role of foreign aid in the post-conflict reconstruction process

As is shown in this paper, conflict-torn states face enormous needs but have very limited resources to fulfil them. Therefore, the international community, e.g. governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international development organizations get involved in post-conflict reconstruction by providing financial and technical assistance to conflict-torn countries. Ndikumana (2016, 145) states that the main objectives of foreign aid are similar as post-conflict reconstruction theories suggest: consideration of peace and state building and prevention of conflict recurrence. In addition, it is also important that foreign aid ensures that aid is distributed fairly to the different political, social and regional entities, paying attention especially to groups which were actively involved in conflict, considers capacity constraints in post-conflict countries and focuses on just a few reconstruction objectives and sequences aid properly to achieve maximum impact (*Ibid.*). According to Del Castillo (2016, 63) in the long-run it is important that foreign direct investments (FDI) and net exports start to replace the foreign aid. To reach this, aid should target “investment opportunities that use local capabilities, land and natural resources to increase the productive capability of the country and its people” (*Ibid.*). Burnside and Dollar (2000) point out that the impact of aid on growth depends more on the policies which were used in a conflict-torn country rather than the amount of the given aid. Therefore, it is extremely important to pay attention to which instruments are used when giving financial aid and where the aid is used to use it in the most efficient way.

Single governments can give financial aid as Official development assistance (ODA) to promote reconstruction targets. ODA can be provided bilaterally from donor to recipient, or it can be channelled through multilateral development agencies, such as the UN and the WB who decide

where the aid is used (OECD, Net ODA... 2018). According to Ndikumana (2016, 143-144) the most commonly used aid instruments are budget support, trust funds and aid for regional public goods. In budget support foreign aid is given directly as ODA to conflict-torn country's budget where country itself allocates it, usually, according to national development agenda. Through budget support, the donor has no ability to target aid to specific outcomes because aid is fungible with other government resources. This increases the risk of misuse of the aid because it is difficult to coordinate where aid is specifically used when it is spent through national budget. Second key instrument to give foreign aid is trust funds. These trust funds pool resources from multiple donors to one fund where the aid is allocated further to different reconstruction objectives. Usually these funds are administered by agents, such as the UN or the WB, who coordinate allocation. Through this instrument donors lose again the power to control where its assistance is used. On the other hand, these trust funds facilitate aid coordination and provide increased opportunity for recipient to control its post-reconstruction agenda. They also increase sustainability of external financing in a long-term. Third key instrument to give foreign aid is regional public goods. Through this instrument donor's aid is used to trust fund which support regional post-conflict reconstruction initiatives. In addition to these three key instruments donors use aid also for financing specific reconstruction projects. In this way donors have full control over their own resources.

Voz, Kozul-Wright and Fortunato (2008) suggest that aid should be channelled mainly through budget support rather than financing specific projects. Also, Del Castillo (2016, 64) suggests that donors should channel their aid through the recipient's national budget, rather than off-budget according to donor's own agenda. This way reconstruction aid considers local conditions and local needs and is effective. In turn, Panic (2005) argues that to get the most out of foreign aid it should be used to fulfil both donor's and recipient's common interest and the allocation of the aid should be strictly coordinated. If both, donor's and recipient's interests, are not met the aid would be used only for donor's interest and would do little to solve the actual reconstruction problems. Panic recommends that international organization should coordinate the activities of various donors to "avoid the waste and the risk of failure caused by inconsistencies between the objectives and policies, duplication of effort and uncoordinated completion of projects" (2005, 16). Also, if there is a sign that aid is misused due to corruption in national or international level giving aid should be stopped (*Ibid.*). Due to these arguments it is important to think which aid instruments to use by considering how the state institutions are functioning. If the state institutions are not working properly and are for example corrupted it is unsustainable to allocate aid through them. On the

other hand, if they are working properly then it would be good to allocate aid through them, so the state can take ownership of its development.

Many post-conflict reconstruction projects have failed even though donors have information of how foreign assistance could and should be used to get the most out of it. This is mainly because donors want “value for their money” and due to that have controlled too unilaterally how the aid is used. Reconstruction made only by donor’s interest fails often because reconstruction strategy is not adapted by local circumstances and because the state has not the needed capacity to implement it (Ndikumana 2016, 150). In these cases, foreign aid fails because it is used unsustainably. The lack of local involvement in donor funded reconstruction processes can lead also to “two sets of dynamic processes.” This means that external and internal actors both work on reconstruction simultaneously, but without any contact or cooperation even if cooperation would make the whole reconstruction process more efficient. (*Ibid.*)

Main controversies of foreign aid in between donors and recipients are related to sovereignty and the control where the assistance is used. Donor countries want to control where their aid is used and recipient countries want to retain their sovereignty and keep control of reconstruction projects. According to Misra (2002, 16), civil, military, political or humanitarian intervention is a form of interference which undermines autonomy of an individual, society or state. This controversy emphasizes the need of cooperation in post-conflict reconstruction in all levels and in all objectives.

1.5. Summary of the theoretical part

The theoretical part shows that the main objectives of post-conflict reconstruction are state building and economic -, security- and social reconstruction, which each have many sub-strategies. Success of the reconstruction projects seem to vary a lot and this might be because of several reasons. First, variety might occur because of the different sequencing of the post-conflict reconstruction projects. Differences in sequencing might explain the variety of the success, because of every reconstruction process is implemented in their own ways. As a second hypothesis the success of reconstruction projects may vary because of the strategies which are used for reconstruction are too complex. Logically, concentration on the main causes and consequences of the conflict would get the country back onto the path of development. In contrast, if there are many

parties doing their own reconstruction projects without coordination the whole reconstruction of the state might fail. Due to that, excessive complexity of the strategies used can be the cause of the failure in post-conflict reconstruction. As the last hypothesis, success of post-conflict reconstruction might vary because of donors taking too big role in conflict-torn country's reconstruction strategy. This means that when giving aid conflict-torn country's own development agenda is ignored and locals' opinions are not heard. Due to that locals do not have an ownership of their own development, which in long-term result as unsustainable reconstruction

2. CASE STUDIES OF THE AFGHANISTAN WAR AND RWANDAN CIVIL WAR AND GENOCIDE, AND THEIR RECONSTRUCTION PROCESSES

2.1. Backgrounds of the conflicts

2.1.1. Backgrounds of the Afghanistan war

Afghanistan has been continuously in conflict since 1970s. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to spread communist ideology. It managed to ally with government of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to fight a guerrilla war against the mujahideen, Afghan military groups engaged in Jihad. Secular and socialist Democratic Republic of Afghanistan controlled mostly cities, whereas religiously orientated mujahideen controlled mostly rural areas.

Even though Soviet troops left the country in 1989 conflict in Afghanistan continued. War led to a strong center-periphery division and a weakened economic and development opportunities. These in turn led to a high polarization between different ethnic groups, such as Pashtuns, Tajiks and Hazaras, which escalated to a civil war. According to Misra (2002, 9), center-periphery division separated so called élites from a significant proportion of the population that was economically backward and lived beyond the immediate confines of the state's authority. Due to that, it can be said that one of the main causes of the conflict was center-periphery division, but also divisions between different ethnic groups.

In addition, there was a strict control of national resources and they were distributed ineffectively, and the country could not provide economic opportunities, such as jobs, which led the increase of unemployment and informal economy. Misra (2002) notes that arms smuggling, and narcotics production became common among rural minorities and communities, and the state wilfully ignored that. Actually, from the beginning of 1990s Afghanistan supplied more than 90 per cent of the world's illicit opiates. This huge informal narcotic economy employed up to 400 000 persons, used 1/3 of the arable land and crowded out the traditional agricultural production (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2016, 7).

In the 1990s during the civil war the Taliban started to gain power against former warlords, who controlled cities and due to that also politics. However, after 9/11 in October 2001 US troops invaded Afghanistan in means of war against terror. That operation managed to drive the Taliban from power. In December 2001, the UN launched the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to maintain the peace in Afghanistan after the conflict. This was followed by the peace conference in Bonn which was held also in December 2001. It can be said that the post-conflict reconstruction started from the Bonn Agreement. According to Goodhand (2010), even though Bonn agreement boosted political reconstruction it stayed very weak in terms of economy and security reconstruction. After 2001, in addition to ongoing ISAF many new reconstruction programs and projects were launched in Afghanistan. However, the main say in post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan has remained in the hands of international community.

2.1.2. Backgrounds of the Rwandan civil war and genocide

Ethnic segregation between two main ethnical groups Hutu and Tutsi has fueled Rwandan politics for decades since Belgium divisive colonial rule. After 1960s, Hutus gained power from Tutsi elites and became the majority ethnic group in Rwanda. This was followed by widespread ethnic pogroms against Tutsi, and Hutu elites' power in a centralized government. Strong representation of Hutus discriminated Tutsi minority group, fueled polarization further and forced some Tutsis as refugees to neighboring Uganda. According to Nat J. Colletta and Michelle L. Cullen (2000) during the Hutu rule, Tutsis' rights were violated and they were institutionally excluded from educational and employment opportunities. In addition to ethnic hatred, also Rwanda's economy started to sink by increasing debt and government corruption. Also, Herman Musahara and Chris Huggins (2005) note that poverty and unequal land distribution fueled tensions between two ethnic groups. Decades-long grievances between two ethnic groups, discrimination of the minority group and economic weaknesses led Rwanda into a civil war in 1990.

In the beginning of the 1990s, Tutsi led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) through its armed wing Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) attacked against Hutu-led government and this was the beginning of the four-year-long civil war. In 1993 Hutu-led-government and RPF managed to negotiate a ceasefire in peace mediation called Arusha Accords. However, the ceasefire lasted only about one year. In the spring of 1994 an airplane which was carrying Rwanda's President Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down killing both of the presidents. President Habyarimana was Hutu and among Hutus it was believed that Tutsis were behind the incident. As a consequence Hutu-led-government started genocide against Tutsi and

moderate Hutus. However, after the three-month-long brutal genocide RPF forces managed to take over the country and end genocide and civil war. Around 800 000 Rwandan were killed in the genocide (Musahara, Huggins 2005, 271), two million Rwandans fled as refugees to neighboring countries and one million Rwandans were internally displaced (Colletta, Cullen 2000, 39).

In addition to human losses, conflict caused social disintegration and economic decline. Oscar Kimanuka (2009, 39-40) notes that genocide resulted in the destruction of the country's social fabric, its human resource base, institutional capacity and economic and social infrastructure. For example, economic activity declined about 50 per cent. Due to that it can be said that civil war and genocide affected dramatically to the whole Rwandan society. Despite the tragic civil war and genocide, post-conflict reconstruction efforts started immediately after the end of the conflict. A new government was formed and the international community, mainly the UN and the World Bank, became involved in the reconstruction of the country. Reconstruction strategies concentrated mostly on poverty reduction and national unity.

Backgrounds of the Afghanistan war and Rwandan civil war and genocide show that both of the conflicts were caused by ethnic divisions and economic hardships. Also, both of the countries have managed to start reconstruction processes with the help of the international community. Even though many years and billions of aid dollars have been used for reconstructions, still not both of the reconstruction processes has succeed. To get an idea of why the reconstruction process has failed in Afghanistan and has succeed in Rwanda it is necessary to look in more details reconstruction efforts in different fields. These fields are state building and political -, economic -, social reconstruction and the role of foreign aid.

2.2. Political reconstruction

2.2.1. Political reconstruction in Afghanistan

The Bonn Conference started the reconstruction in Afghanistan and the first reconstruction initiative was the creation of a political system. With the help of international community, a centralized system of government with a two-chamber legislature was created in Afghanistan. This new administration was called Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) and with a six-month mandate it was followed by Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA) which lasted the next two years. In Bonn it was agreed that after ATA, in 2004, first presidential elections were going to be held. AIA

consisted up to 30 members and a chairman, who was Hamiz Karzai. In the first presidential election in 2004 Karzai was elected to the first president of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. At the same time with AIA there was also renewal of the constitution to ease ethnic divisions of the country, which were one cause for the long-lasting conflict. The new constitution provided a strong centralized government with broad presidential power. Also, IMF report shows that power-sharing arrangement was considered when various ministries were named to present different ethnic groups (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2016, 13).

In addition to administrative political reforms, Government of Afghanistan (GoA) launched Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) as a development strategy for security, governance, economic growth and poverty reduction. However, ANDS was launched only in 2008, six and a half years after the Bonn Conference. Other established post-conflict reconstruction strategies were National Priority Programs (NPPs) and the Afghan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF). Idea of the NPPs is that GoA sets the development strategies and donors can choose the projects they want to finance. Main goal of both these programs was to transfer responsibility of peace reconciliation, good governance, economic development, regional and global cooperation from international partners to the Afghan government and civil society (National Priority Programs 2018). However, also NPPs and ANPDF were launched many years after Bonn, in 2010 and 2017. Also, according to ATR Consulting (2018, 17) donors largely chose what was best fit in implementing the NPP which lead to a lack of local ownership in the end.

Despite the initiatives which were made for political reconstruction there are still arguments that the reconstruction has not been sustainable and efficient. Darby and Mac Ginty (2008, 206) argue that power-sharing remained unequal, because of for example Taliban were excluded from institution building. Also, Taliban were excluded from power-sharing, even though it is suggested to have all groups of the conflict in decision making to ensure peace settlement. This exclusion might be the cause for renewed armed conflicts in Afghanistan (*Ibid.*). In turn, Timor Sharan and John Heathershaw (2011) argue that state building failed in Afghanistan because of competition of elite networks over the state, which is caused by long-standing elite fragmentation. According to them, Afghanistan has been divided into politically constructed ethno-regional factions and these ethno-regional networks have been competing over power for decades. This fragmentation continued also in post-Bonn era when the President Karzai was elected as a president in 2004, and thus his network controlled politics in Afghanistan. Sharan and Heathershaw argue also that

foreign aid has feed this division further and made possible for President Karzai to extend his patronage networks into all institutions and organizations of the state (*Ibid.*).

It is also argued that very high corruption rate has affected negatively to sustainable and efficient political reconstruction and institution strengthening. According to SIGAR “corruption cut across all aspects of the reconstruction effort, jeopardizing progress made in security, rule of law, governance, and economic growth” (Corruption in conflict... 2016, 2). In 2005 Afghanistan was ranked as 117th corrupted country out of total 159 (Corruption Percentage Index 2005). Integrity Watch Afghanistan explains that the Afghan government failed to fight against corruption because of lack of political will and inappropriate institutional arrangements (Bandow 2017). In turn, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation notes that high levels of aid together with limited absorptive capacity and poorly functioning public administration were the causes of increased corruption (*Ibid.*). Due to these reasons corruption level has worsened in Afghanistan during the post-conflict reconstruction. In 2017 Afghanistan was the 177th uncorrupted country out of 180 countries (Corruption Perceptions Index 2017). This shows that corruption has been a problem during the whole reconstruction process and been even worsened.

2.2.2. Political reconstruction in Rwanda

Civil war ended in 1994 when Hutu-led government was overthrown by Tutsi-led RPF, which formed a Government of National Unity. The aim of this government was to bring parties which did not participate in genocide to work together to reconstruct the country and to include citizens in decision making. This was because Rwanda had had highly centralized government which had excluded Rwandan people from participating in decision-making after colonial and postcolonial rule. According to Kimanuka (2009), in 1997 Government of Rwanda (GoR) adopted a transition program to consolidate the fragile socioeconomic recovery and laid the basis for national reconstruction, sustainable growth, participatory decision making and poverty reduction. After a few years, in 2003 a new constitution was formed, and democratic multiparty parliamentary elections and presidential elections were held. Paul Kagame was elected as a President of Rwanda and since then he has governed the country.

The GoR recognized that development of the country in the 21st century requires a focus on people through empowerment, broad participation, improvements in education, health and capacity building, and the meaningful employment of the people. By these efforts Rwanda started to achieve one of the main reconstruction goals, national unity. Therefore, with the rule of President

Kagame old order in managing public affairs was changed to involving citizens in matters affecting everyday life. Also, Rwanda's main development plans such as Vision 2020 and the poverty reduction plan (PRSP) were developed in consultation with the people of Rwanda and because of that they enjoy broad support of civil society (Kimanuka 2009). Collette and Cullen (2000) note also that attempts to place Hutu in government positions have been made to balance power. Both examples show that power-sharing efforts were implemented to political reconstruction strategy in Rwanda and political reconstruction plans were implemented correctly.

In addition to power-sharing, Kimanuka (2009) notes that the government of Rwanda has adopted a policy framework to guide Rwanda's strategic decisions toward development. This framework includes also guide for donors. This shows that Rwanda took ownership of its own reconstruction and development. In Rwanda's reconstruction strategy also corruption was taken into account. In 2003, an Ombudsman was hired to fight against corruption and injustice. In 2005 Rwanda was ranked as 84th uncorrupted country out of 159 (Corruption Percentage Index 2005). In contrast, in 2017 it was ranked already as 48th uncorrupted country out of 180 due to efficient anticorruption policies (Corruption Percentage Index 2017). These figures reflect efficient anti-corruption efforts.

2.2.3. Analyses

The section of political reconstruction in Afghanistan after 2001 shows that many reconstruction efforts have been undertaken to achieve stability in the country. However, new political system could not create sustainable change. Reasons for that were long-lasting ethnic divisions between Afghans and strong elite fragmentation, which in turn prevented power-sharing. In theoretical part it was argued that successful political reconstruction requires power-sharing and decentralization. Still, the practice has been totally opposite in Afghanistan, and this has divided further different ethno-regional groups and elites. In contrast to Afghanistan, power-sharing was considered in Rwanda, and due to that, all Rwandans were included in decision-making. Political system was transferred also from old centralized system to a decentralized model, which resulted to a positive political reconstruction. This all was done, because GoR set national unity as the foundation of the reconstruction in Rwanda.

Also, the way how corruption was handled in the political reconstruction differs between Afghanistan and Rwanda. Rwanda started to fight against corruption which apparently led to the positive state building. Unlike Rwanda, Afghanistan did not try to tackle corruption. Due to that it

has remained as one of the world's most corrupted countries. Afghanistan's high level of corruption can be considered as one of the main causes of the unsuccessful political reconstruction.

When it comes to the national development strategies governed by the Afghans, these strategies were established relatively late. ANDS was the first Afghan governed reconstruction strategy and it was started only in 2008, seven years after the Bonn. This shows that reconstruction was fully in the hands of international community in the first years after Bonn. This implied a limited place for Afghans' ownership of reconstruction. It is also argued that the way how foreign aid was handled in Afghanistan's political reconstruction is problematic, since aid fed elite fragmentation and corruption, making the reconstruction efforts ineffective. This shows how foreign aid has had negative impact on Afghanistan's reconstruction. In contrast, in Rwanda political reconstruction was made by following only few reconstruction strategies, where the first one was started already in 1997. More importantly, from the beginning the GoR together with citizens had the ownership of the reconstruction, which led to a foreign aid only a role to finance the reconstruction. This ownership of the reconstruction led to positive results in the political reconstruction.

Due to both case studies it can be argued that successful political reconstruction requires decentralized politics and that all ethnic groups are involved in decision making. Also, in case of corrupted country, corruption must be tackled in all levels of the state. To succeed, post-conflict state must also take ownership of its own reconstruction, even though the help of foreign aid is usually needed. In this way reconstruction efforts serve the best the needs of the locals and this way result successful reconstruction.

2.3. Economic reconstruction

2.3.1. Economic reconstruction in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has suffered from economic hardships, such as poverty, high levels of unemployment and low levels of trade since 1970s. In addition to that, illegal narcotics trade has dominated the country's shadow economy for decades. After the Bonn Conference, in 2002 GoA decided to invest in reconstruction of the economy, even though political reconstruction was priority. Market based economy was written in the Constitution noting that "the State should encourage and protect private capital investments and enterprises based on the market economy and guarantee their protection in accordance with the provision of law" (Afghanistan National Development...2008,

73). Due to that, the main objective for economic reconstruction was development of the private sector. In 2008, when ANDS was launched, the main development goals in the economic sector were poverty reduction and, again, ensuring sustainable development through a private-sector led market economy. (*Ibid.*) Strategy was made for the next five years and it was supposed to end in 2013. To achieve the main goals of the strategy, also other reconstruction efforts should be done. These were for example elimination of the narcotics industry, increase of foreign direct investments, reduction of corruption and strengthening of governance. (*Ibid.*)

World Bank's statistics shows that GDP increased from 2,46 billion USD in 2001 to 19,47 billion USD in 2016 (The World Bank In... 2018). Also, domestic revenue tripled in ten years between financial years 2008/2009 and 2017/2018 (ATR Consulting 2018, 3). These figures might look like good improvements, but when the share of domestic revenue in country's budget is compared to the share of foreign aid in the same budget the result is not that attractive anymore. In financial year 2017/2018 around 66 per cent of country's budget was financed by foreign aid (ATR Consulting 2018, 7). This shows that even though domestic revenue has increased foreign aid still covers the biggest share of the country's budget. Also, after 2001 aid flows to Afghanistan increased a lot which in turn explains the GDP growth (OECD, Creditor Reporting System 2018). Goodhand and Sedra (2011, 55) argue that heavy reliance on foreign aid is partly the consequence of the state's incapability to collect revenue from the shadow economy.

After 17 years of reconstruction, the illicit economy is still flourishing in Afghanistan and Afghanistan has remained the world's leading producer of opium (Quarterly report to...2018). IMF report shows that after 2010 opium cultivation started to increase again. Also, same report notes that recent studies estimate that opium exports are at 15 per cent of non-opium GDP, or about as large as the licit agriculture (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2016, 7). These figures show that Afghans are still dependent on opium trade and that country has not been able to transfer poppy cultivation to legal agriculture. This is because of foreign aid and corrupted GoA have not been able to provide sufficient tools and incentives to replace poppy cultivation by legal agriculture (Goodhand, Sedra, 2011). ART Consulting (2018) suggests that this in turn is because of donors largely choose what they see as the best fit and what is in their best interest, and without a local consultation aid does not usually meet the local needs. This has led to the situation where narcotics trade is still flourishing, because it has lacked replacement efforts. Also, most of the development programs concentrated on cities, letting rural areas to survive on their own. Therefore, the lack of attention to rural areas' development has fed narcotics trade further.

In addition to the failure to reconstruct large-scale shadow economy Afghanistan has not been able to attract foreign investment, which was one of the reconstruction objectives and could have boosted the economy. Failure of the economic reconstruction has led to increasing poverty rates. According to ANPDF (2017, 6) nearly 40 percent of the population has fallen below the 1,25 USD/day global poverty threshold.

2.3.2. Economic reconstruction in Rwanda

Prior to civil war and genocide, Rwanda was one of the poorest countries in the world, it enjoyed substantial flows of external aid and was an agriculture-based economy. The country suffered also low economic activity and poverty. According to Kimanuka (2009), conflict affected to Rwanda's economy and increased foreign aid flows dramatically. Inflows of foreign aid increased from 1970s level of tens of millions USD to hundreds of millions during the conflict years (OECD, Creditor Reporting System 2018) Also, in 1994, GDP fell by 50 percent, inflation was about 64 per cent and almost all economic sectors collapsed (Kimanuka, 2009). Despite of these hardships which conflict years caused to Rwanda's economy the country has still been able to reconstruct its economy quite well.

After the conflict GoR and donors took poverty reduction and economic development of Rwanda on their reconstruction agendas. A centerpiece of GoR's strategy was the poverty reduction plan PRSP. According to it, poverty could be reduced, and economic growth could be achieved by rural development and agricultural transformation, improving economic infrastructure and human development, good governance and decentralization, private sector development and institutional capacity building (*Ibid.*). Even though PRSP showed that improvements were needed in many fields, still Rwanda has managed to meet those targets. According to the IMF investments in fertilizers, improved seed, electrification, irrigation and rural roads and better provision of social services were made. That led to inclusive growth, which benefitted especially the rural poor (Del Castillo 2016, 68).

Efficient economic reconstruction led to GDP growth and stabilized inflation. The average GDP growth between 1995 and 2004 was about 8 per cent in year and in the same period inflation decreased also to the level of 10 per cent (Kimanuka 2009). Due to the rapid economic growth, Rwanda transitioned from conflict status to sustainable development, already in 1998. This boosted Rwanda to develop itself from an agriculture-based economy to knowledge-based

economy by 2020 and this goal was written to Rwanda's development plan for the 21st century, called VISION 2020. Del Castillo (2016, 68) notes that due to effective reconstruction, poverty was also reduced from about 60 per cent in 2000 to below 45 per cent in 2010-11. She also argues that decrease in poverty has affected positively the peace dividend enjoyed by Rwandans. This means that efficient economic reconstruction did not only boost the economy but also maintained sustainable peace in Rwanda.

Despite the economic recovery, Rwanda is still dependent on foreign aid. In the financial year 2015/2016 35 per cent of budget revenue and 45 per cent of development budget were from external resources (Rwanda Official Development... 2017). However, the share of ODA of external resources is decreasing and the share of foreign direct investments is increasing (*Ibid.*). This again reflects a positive change. Also, since the anticorruption policies were implemented, foreign aid has reached the targets which needed it the most.

2.3.3. Analyses

Economic reconstruction has differed in few ways in Afghanistan and Rwanda after the conflicts. In Rwanda clear economic reconstruction strategies were accepted together by GoR and donors, which resulted to successful economic reconstruction. In contrast, in Afghanistan decisions concerning the economic reconstruction efforts was made mostly only by the donors. These decisions were best fit for donors and lacked local opinions. Therefore, development of the rural areas was ignored. Due to this, one of the main economic struggles in Afghanistan before the conflict, the illegal narcotics trade, has not been tackled during the reconstruction.

Also, in Afghanistan after the Bonn, the main goal of economic reconstruction was market-based economy and development of the private sector. It was believed that by those reconstruction objectives, it was possible to achieve poverty reduction. Similarly Rwanda targetet poverty reduction as the main goal of the economic reconstruction. However, in Rwanda it was believed that poverty reduction could be achieved by development of the rural areas and agriculture. As shown in the case studies Rwanda managed to achieve successful economic reconstruction by its strategies and Afghanistan not. Due to tha it can be argued that successful economic reconstruction should affect directly to citizens and target the poorest.

As shown in the theoretical part, economic and political reconstrucion are dependent on each other to succeed. Successful political reconstruction and institution strengthening provides boundaries

for economic development, and in turn successful economic reconstruction creates revenues by which state building can be provided. Therefore, it is important that both reconstruction projects are started at the same time. However, Afghanistan has not been able to mobilize domestic revenue. This in turn, is partly because of the failure of the political reconstruction which have not been able to provide incentives for poppy cultivators to transfer legal agriculture. Also, as shown in the political reconstruction part strengthening the governance and tackling the corruption did not succeeded in Afghanistan and this in turn led to the struggles in economic reconstruction too. Due to that in can be said that failed political reconstruction correlated strongly with economic reconstruction. In addition, Afghanistan has remained highly dependent on foreign aid because it has not been able to mobilize domestic revenue and attract FDIs.

On the contrary, in Rwanda successful political reconstruction supported economic reconstruction and vice versa. Due to effective political- and economic reconstruction Rwanda was able to upgrade itself from the conflict status to sustainable development already in 1998. Successful economic reconstruction has increased the share of FDIs of external resources in Rwanda, which makes the country less dependent on ODA. Economic reconstruction in Rwanda shows that in successful reconstruction it is extremely important that the reconstruction concerns locals, the ownership is once again in the local hands and that the political reconstruction is successful too.

2.4. Social reconstruction

2.4.1. Social reconstruction in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has always been divided into many different ethnic and cultural groups. This fragmentation followed also to post-Bonn era affecting the climate of mistrust to the whole country. After Bonn ethnic divisions followed to the state politics, which divided different groups further (Sharan, Heathershaw 2011). Afghans felt betrayed not only by their leaders but also by their neighbours, and they saw each other as a continuing threat (Misra 2002). Despite the ethnic cleavages social reconstruction has not been provided. Misra (2002) argues that if such reconstruction was available to Afghans on a large scale the potential for inter-ethnic or inter-group violence would be dramatically reduced. This shows that social reconstruction should have been prioritized in Afghanistan from the beginning of the reconstruction process, because one cause for the conflict was ethnic divisions.

In addition, not only the ethnic and cultural divisions affected to the psychological warfare, but also the international invasion. Misra (2002) notes that leaders of Afghanistan have always been scornful about Western involvement in the internal affairs of the state throughout the modern history. Afghans are protective of their sovereignty and independence and that's why international involvement to the conflict and presence of foreign soldiers can be seen as an occupation among Afghans. Also, imposing Western values and rules is counterproductive. Therefore, Misra suggests that donors should take it slow, develop a sound perspective, make informed decisions on how the situation can be halted and then prescribe suitable cures.

2.4.2. Social reconstruction in Rwanda

Unlike in Afghanistan, GoR acknowledged that national unity is needed to achieve sustainable reconstruction and a long-term development of the country after the conflict. This was because of ethnic division was one of the main causes of the conflict and with efficient social reconstruction old grievances could be tackled and trust between citizens could be achieved. Rwanda took ownership of its social reconstruction and the goal of national unity was included in many reconstruction strategies. For example, civil courts called gacaca courts, which are traditional mechanism for dispute mediation and distributive justice, were established to bring justice for victims. According to Eugenia Zorbas (2004, 36), gacaca's goals are to promote reconciliation and healing by providing a platform for victims to express themselves and facilitating the coming together of both victims and perpetrators. Gacaca courts represented also local justice system and due to that ownership remained in Rwandans hands. Also Idi T Gaparayi (2001) notes that justice helps the process of reconciliation.

Goal of national unity was written also into the VISION 2020. In VISION 2020 it is stated that the aspiration is to become modern, strong and united nation, without discrimination between its citizens (Rwanda VISION 2020... 2000, 2-3). Also, The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) was established in 1999 to "mark a major milestone in changing, fundamentally, effects of a bad governance based on discrimination and exclusion" (NURC Background 2018). Mission of NURC was "to promote unity, reconciliation and social cohesion among Rwandans and build a country in which everyone has equal rights and contributing to good governance" (Mission of NURC 2018). According to Kimanuka (2009), establishment of NURC showed the prominence of the government's role in post-genocide reconciliation efforts. He also states that the momentum of unity and reconciliation created continued stability to Rwanda, which in turn is the key element of successful reconstruction. (*Ibid.*)

2.4.3. Analyses

Case studies shows that social reconstruction after the conflicts was different in Afghanistan and Rwanda, even though both of the countries suffered strong ethnic divisions. In addition to ethnic divisions there was also a climate of a mistrust towards neighbours and leaders, but also to the international community's involvement in Afghanistan. Despite of that, no efforts on social reconstruction was made. As case study showed, if Afghanistan would have put more effort on social reconstruction, violent acts could have been reduced. Also, as mentioned in the earlier parts, donor countries have mainly acted following their own interest in reconstruction process in Afghanistan. This in turn have probably made the social reconstruction even more complex for Afghan people. Due to that it can be argued that international community's involvement in Afghanistan is one cause for the failure of the post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan.

On the contrary, Rwanda took social reconstruction seriously after the conflict and put effort on it right after the conflict ended. Social reconstruction in Rwanda has focused on the roots of the conflict and therefore national unity has become the main goal of the reconstruction strategy. National unity is needed for sustainable peace, but also to achieve long-term development. Social reconstruction has stabilized the country due to national gacaca courts and government's effective acts to develop national cohesion. Thus, it can be said that Rwanda took an ownership of its social reconstruction. The Rwandan case shows also that social reconstruction should be one of the first reconstruction efforts in a conflict-torn country since it is needed to achieve other development goals.

2.5. The role of the foreign aid in the reconstruction process

2.5.1. The role of foreign aid in Afghanistan

After the Bonn Conference international support to Afghanistan expanded. Donor countries started to assist Afghanistan financially, but also giving technical and security assistance. Afghanistan has received about 60 billion USD as ODA between 2002 and 2016 (OECD, Creditor Reporting System). In 2002 Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) was established. Its purpose was to coordinate financing mechanism for GoA's budget and national investment projects. ARTF was a single account administrated by the World Bank, where donors could transfer aid and from where ARTF Management Committee allocated aid further to ANDS and NPPs made by GoA. Since its establishment 34 donors have contributed over 10,6 billion USD to ARTF, making it the largest

single source of on-budget financing for Afghanistan's reconstruction (The Afghanistan Reconstruction ... 2018).

Even though ARTF was planned to be the main instrument for assistance it still did not succeed. According to Goodhand and Sedra (2011, 51), for example in 2005 less than 30 per cent of all expenditure were channeled through the trust funds to the Afghan government's budget. This means that over 70 per cent of the total aid was given through off-budget methods. These off-budget methods are for example financing and implementing specific projects according to their own interests or disbursing aid through development partners, UN agencies and NGOs.

With the help of foreign aid lot of reconstruction efforts have been made in Afghanistan. However, main reconstruction objective among donors has been security reconstruction and after the Bonn it has actually been mainly in the hands of donor countries. Donors have targeted aid especially on the fight against terrorism. According to Goodhand and Sedra (2011) in the first year after Bonn, 84 per cent of international aid was allocated towards fight against al-Qaeda and Taliban. In contrast, reconstruction and development issues were the most important matters among candidates for the parliamentary elections, meaning among the Afghans (*Ibid.*). Due to this, there has been a clear controversy of where the aid should be allocated between Afghans and donors.

In order to reach the security objectives few security related programs were launched in Afghanistan with the leading role of donors. In 2001, United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom to counter terrorism. This was followed by NATO led multinational ISAF, mandated by the United Nations. The mission of ISAF was to train Afghanistan's own military and police forces Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). In addition to that, ISAF was supposed to give support to Afghan Government (ISAF's Mission in Afghanistan 2015). In 2005, ISAF launched 21 multinational Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRTs) whose task was to secure ongoing reconstruction work. According to NATO, PRTs helped Afghan authors in institution strengthening by requiring them to follow rule of law and good governance. PRTs were governed by different NATO countries, which each had own conditionalities for the implemented project (*Ibid.*).

Despite Afghanistan has received a lot of foreign aid it still has been criticized that the aid has been unsustainable and inefficient for few reasons. First, according to Waldman (2008, 10) "a large proportion of aid has been prescriptive and supply-driven, rather than indigenous and responding to Afghan needs. It has been heavily influenced by the political and military objectives of donors

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Second, Morrison-Métois (2017) notes that also short-term aid programs might have had negative effects on Afghanistan’s development, because donors rarely considered locals’ capacity to handle large amounts of aid. It was generally believed that quick results will help stabilization and due to that large inflows of aid were quickly spent ignoring the fact that local institutions have often limited absorptive capacity to use it. According to her, these large amounts of aid, with lack of local knowledge how to use it, potentially fuel corruption and heighten the risk of doing more harm than good (*Ibid.*). Also, IMF report notes that according to SIGAR “massive military and aid spending overwhelmed the Afghan government’s ability to absorb it. This coupled with weak oversight, created opportunities for corruption” (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2016, 8). Also, every new development project add pressure to Afghanistan’s budget because maintenance of the project in the long-term remains usually in the hands of Afghans (Quarterly report for ... 2014).

Third, some foreign aid funded projects have been simply planned unsustainably and inefficiently which have resulted in overall bad reconstruction in Afghanistan. For example, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) started a housing project called Alice-Ghan for thousands of Afghan refugees to get them back to Afghanistan. However, after five years of the start of the

project it turned out that housing was built in the most arid land where was no access to water, subsistence agriculture could not be practiced, there was no schools and clinics and the nearest jobs were 50 miles away in Kabul. Due to these, in the end most of the residents moved away and the village Alice-Ghan tilted towards ruin (Del Castillo 2018). In addition to that, even though security reconstruction was the main object among donors the country has still faced 19 995 separate incidents since 2001 (Barret 2018). Until the mid-2016 these conflicts have caused around 110 000 casualties, of which 31 000 were civilians (Crawford 2016). This shows that even though donors put most of the effort on security reconstruction security could not be provided and violent acts continued.

2.5.2. The role of foreign aid in Rwanda

Inflows of foreign aid increased a lot in Rwanda in the beginning of the 1990's. The country has received over 8 billion USD as ODA between 1995 and 2016 (OECD, Creditor Reporting System 2018). In addition to financial aid also technical assistance was provided. Unlike in Afghanistan, no general fund was created. Main instruments for giving aid have been budget support and project funding and these instruments have remained the same until today. According to Rwanda Official Development Assistance Report in the financial year 2015/2016 share of budget support was 32 per cent whereas share of project funding was 68 percent. (Rwanda Official Development... 2017) Also, according to Hayman (2011), in the first years after the conflict, foreign aid was provided with conditionalities which were for example good governance and accountability between government and the citizens.

The dominance of project funding can be explained by the fact that with project funding donors have better control of their own resources and they can allocate the aid exactly where they want it. This in turn is because politically donors want success stories about their assistance and project funding serves best their own interests. Due to the donors' large interest to control their own resources the aid was provided mostly with conditionalities after the conflict years. However, Hayman notes that an increasing number of donors are providing aid through budget support, which is a sign of increased confidence in the public accountability mechanisms of the state and confidence in the development agenda of the government. (*Ibid.*) This shows donors trust on Rwanda and its ownership of the reconstruction and development, which in turn is a sign of a successful reconstruction.

2.5.3. Analyses

Both of the case studies prove that foreign aid is needed from the beginning of the post-conflict reconstruction. However, more important is the way how foreign aid is used rather than the amount of given aid. Case study of Afghanistan showed that Afghanistan could not handle the large amounts of given aid and maintain the projects which were started by the donors, which led partly to the failed reconstruction. Therefore, in successful reconstruction it is important to consider what kind of projects are implemented and how.

Also, according to the theoretical part, foreign aid should be given through budget support to get the most out of it. This way aid would meet recipient's development targets and recipient could keep the partial ownership of the development. Despite of that, in Afghanistan and Rwanda most of the foreign has been allocated through off-budget. Still, Rwanda case showed that, if the recipient country can prove that it can do efficient reconstruction by itself, and stays accountable for its citizens and donors, the more ownership of the foreign aid it can get. In Rwanda increasing number of donors are providing aid through budget support and this proves that Rwanda has managed to do successful reconstruction in the all sectors.

Also, case study of Afghanistan shows that coordination for international aid and donor funded projects need to be improved. There have been over 30 donors, each implementing their own reconstruction strategies without a common coordination. Due to that it can be argued that this complexity of the strategies used reflects to the inefficiency of foreign aid spent in Afghanistan. In addition to that, to make reconstruction most successful donors must also give in of their own interests, cooperate with locals and distribute the aid fairly. Still, despite of that, donors used conditionalities for aid and preferred project funding to keep control of their own resources. This reduced recipient's ownership of the reconstruction process, which affected negatively to the whole reconstruction. In Afghanistan most of the financial and technical aid were spent to the security reconstruction, in more details to the fight against terrorism. Therefore, the aid did not meet the most urgent local needs, which were development and reconstruction. Even though the donors targeted the security reconstruction, violent acts have not ended. This shows again how important it is to hear also recipient's opinion in the reconstruction process in order to achieve successful reconstruction. In contrast to Afghanistan, as this thesis has proved, Rwanda has managed to keep enough ownership of its reconstruction and this has led successful reconstruction.

CONCLUSION

An efficient post-conflict reconstruction strategy is needed to bring sustainable peace and long-term development to a conflict-torn country. According to post-conflict reconstruction theories these strategies include political-, economic-, security-, and social reconstruction of the country. Also, since conflict-torn countries suffer usually large-scale fragility, foreign financial and technical aid is needed for reconstruction process. Still, some reconstruction processes seem to fail, even though the theories which suggest how to make reconstruction successful are provided. Through an analysis of the post-conflict reconstruction theories and two case studies this thesis has found out why the success of post-conflict reconstruction varies.

According to theoretical part this thesis set few hypotheses of why success of reconstruction process varies. These hypotheses were complexity of the reconstruction strategies, sequencing of the different projects and too controlling role of the foreign aid. To evaluate these hypotheses and validity of the reconstruction theories this thesis researched one failed – and one successful reconstruction project, Afghanistan and Rwanda.

According to case study of Afghanistan it can be said that post-conflict reconstruction failed there mostly because of the high level of corruption, bad political reconstruction which correlated with economic reconstruction, lack of social reconstruction and too controlling role of the foreign aid. One of the main causes of the conflict was ethnic division between Afghans. Due to that strong social reconstruction would have been needed, to create cohesion and trust among all Afghans after the conflict. However, this was not done. Social reconstruction should have been prioritized as one of the first reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and therefore it can be said that sequencing of the reconstruction efforts affected to the result of the whole reconstruction. Also, another cause of the conflict was low economic activity and large-scale narcotics trade, but still economic reconstruction could not tackle these problems. This was because of bad political reconstruction, high level of corruption and too centralized reconstruction efforts. Political reconstruction turned out to centralized political system, which is governed by one elite group. Also, power-sharing was not executed in action, even though power-sharing initiatives and including all citizens to reconstruction are recommended in the post-conflict reconstruction theories. Afghanistan case

proved how dependent political and economic reconstruction are on each other, how corruption affects negatively to the whole reconstruction, how power-sharing is needed and how social reconstruction should be prioritized in the reconstruction.

In addition, the role of foreign aid has been too dominant in Afghanistan. Donors implemented many reconstruction projects without a local consultation and this led to limited ownership for Afghans of their own reconstruction. In addition, donors failed reconstruction because they implemented many reconstruction projects at the same time, which Afghans could not continue after the donors left the country. Also, even though Afghanistan has received tens of billions of USD for its reconstruction, the country is still struggling with the same problems as in 2001. This shows how large amounts of development aid do not necessarily bring development to the country, as it was argued in the theoretical part. Due to that it is extremely important to pay attention to what kind of projects are implemented and how, to get the most out of the financial aid. Due to all these reasons, Afghanistan case showed that post-conflict reconstruction can fail because of too centralized politics, high-level of corruption, bad sequencing of social reconstruction and especially lack of local ownership.

Similarly, as in Afghanistan, also Rwanda's civil war and genocide were caused by ethnic division and low economic opportunities and activities. However, in contrast to Afghanistan, it can be argued that reconstruction in Rwanda has succeeded. This was because of social reconstruction was prioritized in Rwanda right after the conflict ended. This means that national unity became as one of the main targets of the whole reconstruction process. In addition to effective social reconstruction, also political reconstruction was started. Decentralized democratic political system was created to include every Rwandan in decision-making. Also, former combatants, both Hutus and Tutsis, were represented in the government. In contrast to Afghanistan, corruption was taken seriously in Rwanda and due to that anti-corruption work was started. This led to decreased corruption level. It can be argued that all these efforts affected positively to the reconstruction of the country.

Both case studies showed that foreign financial aid is needed for the post-conflict reconstruction. However, due to efficient reconstruction Rwanda has managed to increase the share of FDIs of its foreign aid inflows, which has decreased the share of needed ODA. It has also managed to upgrade itself from the conflict status to the sustainable development. Both examples tell about Rwanda's successful reconstruction, which was achieved by the local ownership of the reconstruction

process and cooperative relationship with donors. Therefore, it can be argued that ownership of the conflict-torn country of its own reconstruction and cooperative role of donors make post-conflict reconstruction successful. In addition, in Rwanda effective social reconstruction and the fact that it was sequenced to one of the first priorities of reconstruction made the whole reconstruction succeed. At last, as showed above, democratic decentralized political system and anti-corruption work led to the successful reconstruction in Rwanda.

All in all, attention to few reconstruction objectives must be paid to make post-conflict reconstruction successful in the future. First, in the reconstruction process it is extremely important to focus on the causes of the conflict. Since there are usually some kind of grievances between citizens more attention should be paid on social reconstruction and it should be prioritized among the first reconstruction efforts. Social reconstruction creates national unity and sustainable peace. Therefore, it is one of the most important reconstruction efforts. Second, as the case study of Afghanistan showed high level of corruption affects to the reconstruction process negatively. Due to that, to achieve successful reconstruction corruption should be tackled. Third, donors should pay more attention to their role in the reconstruction process. To succeed, donors should take cooperative role rather than controlling role, in the way that ownership of the reconstruction stays in a conflict-torn country. Finally, these suggestions will lead to more efficient and sustainable outcomes of the post-conflict reconstruction.

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