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**IMPLEMENTATION OF A HASH FUNCTION
FOR PORTABLE EXECUTABLE BASED ON
STRUCTURAL INFORMATION**

Master's thesis

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Author's declaration of originality

I hereby certify that I am the sole author of this thesis. All the used materials, references to the literature and the work of others have been referred to. This thesis has not been presented for examination anywhere else.

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Abstract

Malware is big security threat on the Internet in current epoch. Anti-virus and security companies receive large number of malware samples every day. Malware samples need to be classified and grouped for further analysis. There are different types of malware analysis, clustering and classification methods available.

This thesis focuses on static analysis of malware by implementation of hash function for Portable Executable based on structural information of file introduced by Georg Wicherski from RWTH Aachen University. Main idea is to use selected properties of file headers and complexity of section contents in PE file for hash. Even if algorithm was described, example of implementation was given in pseudo code. Source code from author was never published. In addition, it does not have a strict definition and examples of test usage.

Goals of this work are trying to correctly implement pehash algorithm in python programming language, make a strict format definition, analyze and adapt algorithm for latest PE file examples and make it public with example of usage.

This thesis is written in English and is 47 pages long, including 6 chapters, 11 figures and 21 tables.

Annotatsioon

Räsifunktsiooni juurutamine kaasaskantav käivitatava failil struktuurse informatsiooni baasil.

Õelvara Internetis on meie ajastu suureks ohuks. Viiruse-tõrje ja IT-turvalisuse firmad iga päev saavad suure hulka kahjuvara näiteid. Järgse analüüsi õelvara pead olema klassifitseeritud ning grupeeritud. õelvara analüüsimiseks olemas erinevad meetodid, näiteks grupeerimine ja klassifitseerimine.

Antud diplomitöö fokuseeritud õelvara staatilise analüüsile räsi funktsiooni juurutamisel kaasaskantav käivitatava failile struktuurse informatsiooni põhjal mis on kehtestatud Georg Wicherski poolt RWTH Aachen Ülikoolist. Põhi idee on kasutada failipäise valitud omadused ja PE faili sektsiooni sisu keerukust räsi jaoks. Isegi kui algoritm oli kirjeldatud, juurutamise näite oli rakendatud pseudokoodis. Autor pole kunagi lähtekoodi avaldanud. Samuti definitsioon ja test kasutamine ei ole rangelt määratud.

Töö eesmärgiks on katsetada õigesti juurutada PE räsi algoritmi Python programmeerimiskeeles, rangelt määrata definitsiooni, analüüsida ja kohendada algoritmi hiljemalt PE faili näited ning avalikustada..

Lõputöö on kirjutatud inglise keeles ning sisaldab teksti 47 leheküljel, 6 peatükki, 11 joonist, 21 tabelit.

Table of abbreviations and terms

Abbreviation	Definition
COFF	Common Object File Format
MD5	Message Digest Algorithm
PE	Portable Executable
PE+	Portable Executable 64 bits version
SHA1	Secure Hash Algorithm 1
SHA256	Secure Hash Algorithm 256
VA	Virtual Address

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1. Introduction

As described in "Symantec 2016 Internet Security Threat Report Vol. 21" [1] which provides an overview and analysis of the year in global threat activity, Symantec discovered more than 430 million new unique pieces of malware in 2015, up 36 percent from the year before. As real life and online become indistinguishable from each other, cybercrime has become a part of our daily lives.

Every day of the week, there are thousands of new viruses annoying to put in danger your computer. However, from other side, rarely someone writes new malware from scratch. Most frequently, they are so named mutating and polymorphic malware or the new malware is just some transformation of previously written malware, thus it is usually similar to its predecessor. Finding this similarity is like to malware classification, which allows detecting malware family and then effectively finding the activities for it.

Nowadays we have different hash types for executable files like classical MD5, SHA-1, and SHA-256. More interesting for malware analyze are hash functions based not directly on the file's bits stream but on selected structural information fields of executable file. Most public well-known hashes of such type are "peHash" and "Import Hash".

"Import Hash" (imphash) was created and implemented by Mandiant and is a hash based on library/API names and their specific order within the executable. [2] It has a good definition and is implemented in python language and submitted as a patch to Ero Carrera's pefile. [3] It enables the calculation of the imphash value for a given PE. Imphash used in VirusTotal [4] and in lots of open-source malware analysis frameworks and utilities [5].

"peHash" (pehash) was introduced by Georg Wicherski in the paper "peHash: A Novel Approach to Fast Malware Clustering" [6]. "peHash" is a function for binaries in the Portable Executable (PE) format that makes hash of the structural information. Central idea is to use selected properties of file headers and complexity of section's contents in PE file for hash.

The main goal of this thesis is to make correct and good defined variant of implementation of hash function for Portable Executable based on pehash algorithm suitable for the task of malware classification.

2. Portable Executable File Format

The PE (Portable Executable) file format is used for executable files on 32 and 64-bit Windows platforms. Not only EXE but also, for example, DLL, SYS and SCR files have the PE file structure, which is a modified version of the COFF format [7]. The PE file header consists of a MZ-DOS header and MS-DOS stub, the PE signature, the COFF (PE) file header, and an optional header, the file headers are followed by section headers and sections. Typical PE file layout shown on Figure 1.




Figure 1. PE file format structure. [7]

2.1. MZ header and DOS stub

The first two bytes within the MZ-DOS header are always “MZ”, followed by some fields containing additional information and the offset to the actual PE header - *e_lfanew* (offset 0x3c). This is the PE header offset (in bytes) from the beginning of the file. This must point to the first byte of the PE signature, PE\x0\x0, aligned using the double-word boundary. In case the file is executed in DOS mode, the MS-DOS stub will be ran and will print out a sentence like “This program cannot be run in DOS mode”.

2.2. PE Signature

At the file offset specified at *e_lfanew*, is a 4-byte signature that identifies the file as a PE format image file. This signature is “PE\0\0”

2.3. PE (COFF) File Header

A standard PE (COFF) file header is immediately after the PE signature of an image file. Format of this header shown in Table 1. [7]

Offset	Size	Field	Description
0	2	Machine	The number that identifies the type of target machine. More details in Table 2.
2	2	NumberOfSections	The number of sections. This indicates the size of the section table, which immediately follows the headers.
4	4	TimeDateStamp	The low 32 bits of the number of seconds since 00:00 January 1, 1970 that indicates when the file was created.
8	4	PointerToSymbolTable	This value should be zero for an image because COFF debugging information is deprecated.
12	4	NumberOfSymbols	This value should be zero for an image because COFF debugging information is deprecated.
16	2	SizeOfOptionalHeader	The size of the optional header, which is required for executable files but not for object files. This value should be zero for an object file.

Offset	Size	Field	Description
18	2	Characteristics	The flags that indicate the attributes of the file. For specific flag values. More details in Table 3.

Table 1. PE (COFF) File Header

2.3.1. Machine Types

The Machine field has one of the following values that specifies its CPU type. Format of this field shown in Table 2. [7]

Constant	Value	Description
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_UNKNOWN	0x0	The contents of this field are assumed to be applicable to any machine type
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AM33	0x1d3	Matsushita AM33
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AMD64	0x8664	x64
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_ARM	0x1c0	ARM little endian
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_ARMNT	0x1c4	ARMv7 (or higher) Thumb mode only
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_ARM64	0xaa64	ARMv8 in 64-bit mode
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_EBC	0xebc	EFI byte code
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386	0x14c	Intel 386 or later processors and compatible processors
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64	0x200	Intel Itanium processor family
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_M32R	0x9041	Mitsubishi M32R little endian
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_MIPS16	0x266	MIPS16
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_MIPSFPU	0x366	MIPS with FPU
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_MIPSFPU16	0x466	MIPS16 with FPU
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_POWERPC	0x1f0	Power PC little endian
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_POWERPCFP	0x1f1	Power PC with floating point support
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_R4000	0x166	MIPS little endian
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH3	0x1a2	Hitachi SH3
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH3DSP	0x1a3	Hitachi SH3 DSP
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH4	0x1a6	Hitachi SH4
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH5	0x1a8	Hitachi SH5
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_THUMB	0x1c2	ARM or Thumb (“interworking”)

Constant	Value	Description
IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_WCEMIPSV2	0x169	MIPS little-endian WCE v2

Table 2. Machine Types.

2.3.2. Image Characteristics

The Characteristics field contains flags that indicate attributes of the object or image file. The following flags are currently defined. [7]

Flag	Value	Description
IMAGE_FILE_RELOCS_STRIPPED	0x0001	Image only, Windows CE, and Windows NT® and later. This indicates that the file does not contain base relocations and must therefore be loaded at its preferred base address. If the base address is not available, the loader reports an error. The default behavior of the linker is to strip base relocations from executable (EXE) files.
IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE	0x0002	Image only. This indicates that the image file is valid and can be run. If this flag is not set, it indicates a linker error.
IMAGE_FILE_LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED	0x0004	This flag is deprecated and should be zero.
IMAGE_FILE_LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED	0x0008	This flag is deprecated and should be zero.
IMAGE_FILE_AGGRESSIVE_WS_TRIM	0x0010	This flag is deprecated for Windows 2000 and later and must be zero.
IMAGE_FILE_LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE	0x0020	Application can handle > 2-GB addresses.
	0x0040	This flag is reserved for future use.
IMAGE_FILE_BYTES_REVERSED_LO	0x0080	This flag is deprecated and should be zero.
IMAGE_FILE_32BIT_MACHINE	0x0100	Machine is based on a 32-bit-word architecture.
IMAGE_FILE_DEBUG_STRIPPED	0x0200	Debugging information is removed from the image file.

Flag	Value	Description
IMAGE_FILE_REMOVABLE_RUN_FROM_SWAP	0x0400	If the image is on removable media, fully load it and copy it to the swap file.
IMAGE_FILE_NET_RUN_FROM_SWAP	0x0800	If the image is on network media, fully load it and copy it to the swap file.
IMAGE_FILE_SYSTEM	0x1000	The image file is a system file, not a user program.
IMAGE_FILE_DLL	0x2000	The image file is a dynamic-link library (DLL). Such files are considered executable files for almost all purposes, although they cannot be directly run.
IMAGE_FILE_UP_SYSTEM_ONLY	0x4000	The file should be run only on a uniprocessor machine.
IMAGE_FILE_BYTES_REVERSED_HI	0x8000	This flag is deprecated and should be zero.

Table 3. Image Characteristics

2.4. Optional Header

Optional header specifies the structure of the page image in more detail. The term “optional” is not an appropriate choice for this header because it does not reflect reality. In fact, the file cannot be loaded without this header. This header is mandatory, not optional! This header has 3 parts. [7]

Offset (PE32/PE32+)	Size (PE32/PE32+)	Header part	Description
0	28/24	Standard fields	Fields that are defined for all implementations of COFF, including UNIX. Table 5.
28/24	68/88	Windows-specific fields	Additional fields to support specific features of Windows. Table 6
96/112	Variable	Data directories	Address/size pairs for special tables that are found in the image file and are used by the operating system (for example, the import table and the export table). Table 9

Table 4. Optional header structure.

2.4.1. Standard fields

These fields contain general information that is useful for loading and running an executable file. They are unchanged for the PE32+ format. [7]

Offset	Size	Field	Description
0	2	Magic	The unsigned integer that identifies the state of the image file. 0x10B identifies it as a PE executable. 0x107 identifies it as a ROM image, 0x20B identifies it as a PE32+ executable.
2	1	MajorLinkerVersion	The linker major version number.
3	1	MinorLinkerVersion	The linker minor version number.
4	4	SizeOfCode	The size of the code (text) section, or the sum of all code sections if there are multiple sections.
8	4	SizeOfInitializedData	The size of the initialized data section, or the sum of all such sections if there are multiple data sections.
12	4	SizeOfUninitializedData	The size of the uninitialized data section (BSS), or the sum of all such sections if there are multiple BSS sections.
16	4	AddressOfEntryPoint	The address of the entry point relative to the image base when the executable file is loaded into memory. For program images, this is the starting address. For device drivers, this is the address of the initialization function. An entry point is optional for DLLs. When no entry point is present, this field must be zero.
20	4	BaseOfCode	The address that is relative to the image base of the beginning-of-code section when it is loaded into memory.
24	4	BaseOfData PE file only, absent in PE32+	The address that is relative to the image base of the beginning-of-data section when it is loaded into memory.

Table 5. Optional header standard fields.

2.4.2. Windows specific fields

Fields are an extension to the COFF optional header format. They contain additional information that is required by the linker and loader in Windows. [7]

Offset (PE32/ PE32+)	Size (PE32/ PE32+)	Field	Description
28/24	4/8	ImageBase	The preferred address of the first byte of image when loaded into memory; must be a multiple of 64 K.
32/32	4	SectionAlignment	The alignment (in bytes) of sections when they are loaded into memory. It must be greater than or equal to FileAlignment. The default is the page size for the architecture.
36/36	4	FileAlignment	The alignment factor (in bytes) that is used to align the raw data of sections in the image file. The value should be a power of 2 between 512 and 64 K, inclusive. The default is 512. If the SectionAlignment is less than the architecture's page size, then FileAlignment must match SectionAlignment.
40/40	2	MajorOperatingSystemVersion	The major version number of the required operating system.
42/42	2	MinorOperatingSystemVersion	The minor version number of the required operating system.
44/44	2	MajorImageVersion	The major version number of the image.
46/46	2	MinorImageVersion	The minor version number of the image.
48/48	2	MajorSubsystemVersion	The major version number of the subsystem.
50/50	2	MinorSubsystemVersion	The minor version number of the subsystem.
52/52	4	Win32VersionValue	Reserved, must be zero.
56/56	4	SizeOfImage	The size (in bytes) of the image, including all headers, as the image is loaded in memory. It must be a multiple of SectionAlignment.
60/60	4	SizeOfHeaders	The combined size of an MS-DOS stub, PE header, and section headers rounded up to a multiple of FileAlignment.

Offset (PE32/ PE32+)	Size (PE32/ PE32+)	Field	Description
64/64	4	Checksum	The image file checksum. The algorithm for computing the checksum is incorporated into IMAGHELP.DLL. The following are checked for validation at load time: all drivers, any DLL loaded at boot time, and any DLL that is loaded into a critical Windows process.
68/68	2	Subsystem	The subsystem that is required to run this image. Table 7
70/70	2	DllCharacteristics	DLL Characteristics. Table 8
72/72	4/8	SizeOfStackReserve	The size of the stack to reserve. Only SizeOfStackCommit` is committed; the rest is made available one page at a time until the reserve size is reached.
76/80	4/8	SizeOfStackCommit	The size of the stack to commit.
80/88	4/8	SizeOfHeapReserve	The size of the local heap space to reserve. Only SizeOfHeapCommit is committed; the rest is made available one page at a time until the reserve size is reached.
84/96	4/8	SizeOfHeapCommit	The size of the local heap space to commit.
88/104	4	LoaderFlags	Reserved, must be zero.
92/108	4	NumberOfRvaAndSizes	The number of data-directory entries in the remainder of the optional header. Each describes a location and size.

Table 6. Optional Header Windows-Specific Fields.

Subsystem

Values for the Subsystem field of the optional header determine which Windows subsystem is required to run the image. [7]

Constant	Value	Description
IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_UNKNOWN	0	An unknown subsystem
IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_NATIVE	1	Device drivers and native Windows processes
IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI	2	The Windows graphical user interface (GUI) subsystem

Constant	Value	Description
IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_CUI	3	The Windows character subsystem
IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_POSIX_CUI	7	The Posix character subsystem
IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_CE_GUI	9	Windows CE
IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION	10	An Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) application
IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_DRIVER	11	An EFI driver with boot services
IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_RUNTIME_DRIVER	12	An EFI driver with run-time services
IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_ROM	13	An EFI ROM image
IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_XBOX	14	XBOX

Table 7. Optional header Windows Subsystem.

DLL Characteristics

Values defined for the DllCharacteristics field of the optional header. [7]

Constant	Value	Description
	0x0001	Reserved, must be zero.
	0x0002	Reserved, must be zero.
	0x0004	Reserved, must be zero.
	0x0008	Reserved, must be zero.
IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_DYNAMIC_BASE	0x0040	DLL can be relocated at load time.
IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_FORCE_INTEGRITY	0x0080	Code Integrity checks are enforced.
IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_NX_COMPAT	0x0100	Image is NX compatible.
IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NO_ISOLATION	0x0200	Isolation aware, but do not isolate the image.
IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NO_SEH	0x0400	Does not use structured exception (SE) handling. No SE handler may be called in this image.
IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NO_BIND	0x0800	Do not bind the image.
	0x1000	Reserved, must be zero.

IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_WDM_DRIVER	0x2000	A WDM driver.
IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE	0x8000	Terminal Server aware.

Table 8. Optional header DLL characteristics.

2.4.3. Data directories

This is one of the most important structures in the optional header. It is the array of directory structures with pointer and size. Each data directory gives the address and size of a table or string that Windows uses. Structure defined as: [7]

```
typedef struct _IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY {
    DWORD VirtualAddress;
    DWORD Size;
} IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY, *PIMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY;
```

Figure 2. IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY structure. [7]

The data directories fields are: [7]

Offset (PE/PE32+)	Size	Field	Description
96/112	8	Export Table	The export table address and size (Image Only).
104/120	8	Import Table	The import table address and size.
112/128	8	Resource Table	The resource table address and size.
120/136	8	Exception Table	The exception table address and size.
128/144	8	Certificate Table	The attribute certificate table address and size. (Image Only).
136/152	8	Base Relocation Table	The base relocation table address and size (Image Only).
144/160	8	Debug	The debug data starting address and size.
152/168	8	Architecture	Reserved, must be 0
160/176	8	Global Ptr	The RVA of the value to be stored in the global pointer register. The size member of this structure must be set to zero.
168/184	8	TLS Table	The thread local storage (TLS) table address and size.
176/192	8	Load Config Table	The load configuration table address and size.
184/200	8	Bound Import	The bound import table address and size.
192/208	8	IAT	The import address table address and size.

200/216	8	Delay Import Descriptor	The delay import descriptor address and size.
208/224	8	CLR Runtime Header	The CLR runtime header address and size.
216/232	8	Reserved, must be zero	

Table 9. Optional header Data directories.

2.5. Section Table (Section Headers)

The section table, which holds an entry for every section of the file, its location is always determined as “the first byte behind the header”. The number of entries in the section table is given by the NumberOfSections field in the file header. Entries in the section table are numbered starting from one (1). Each section header (section table entry) has the following format, for a total of 40 bytes per entry. [7]

Offset	Size	Field	Description
0	8	Name	An 8-byte, null-padded UTF-8 encoded string. If the string is exactly 8 characters long, there is no terminating null. Long names in object files are truncated if they are emitted to an executable file.
8	4	VirtualSize	The total size of the section when loaded into memory. If this value is greater than SizeOfRawData, the section is zero-padded.
12	4	VirtualAddress	For executable images, the address of the first byte of the section relative to the image base when the section is loaded into memory.
16	4	SizeOfRawData	The size of the section (for object files) or the size of the initialized data on disk (for image files). For executable images, this must be a multiple of FileAlignment from the optional header. If this is less than VirtualSize, the remainder of the section is zero-filled. When a section contains only uninitialized data, this field should be zero.
20	4	PointerToRawData	The file pointer to the first page of the section within the COFF file. For executable images, this must be a multiple of FileAlignment from the optional header. When a section contains only uninitialized data, this field should be zero.
24	4	PointerToRelocations	The file pointer to the beginning of relocation entries for the section. This is set to zero for executable images or if there are no relocations.

Offset	Size	Field	Description
28	4	PointerToLinenumbers	The file pointer to the beginning of line-number entries for the section. This value should be zero for an image because COFF debugging information is deprecated.
32	2	NumberOfRelocations	The number of relocation entries for the section. This is set to zero for executable images.
34	2	NumberOfLinenumbers	The number of line-number entries for the section. This value should be zero for an image because COFF debugging information is deprecated.
36	4	Characteristics	The flags that describe the characteristics of the section (Section Flags).

Table 10. Section table entry

2.5.1. Section Characteristics

The section flags in the Characteristics field defined as: [7]

Flag	Value	Description
	0x00000000	Reserved for future use.
	0x00000001	Reserved for future use.
	0x00000002	Reserved for future use.
	0x00000004	Reserved for future use.
IMAGE_SCN_TYPE_NO_PAD	0x00000008	The section should not be padded to the next boundary. This flag is obsolete and is replaced by IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_1BYTES . This is valid only for object files.
	0x00000010	Reserved for future use.
IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE	0x00000020	The section contains executable code.
IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA	0x00000040	The section contains initialized data.
IMAGE_SCN_CNT_UNINITIALIZED_DATA	0x00000080	The section contains uninitialized data.
IMAGE_SCN_LNK_OTHER	0x00000100	Reserved for future use.
IMAGE_SCN_LNK_INFO	0x00000200	The section contains comments or other information. The <code>.directve</code> section has this type. This is valid for object files only.

Flag	Value	Description
	0x00000400	Reserved for future use.
IMAGE_SCN_LNK_REMOVE	0x00000800	The section will not become part of the image. This is valid only for object files.
IMAGE_SCN_LNK_COMDAT	0x00001000	The section contains COMDAT data. This is valid only for object files.
IMAGE_SCN_GPREL	0x00008000	The section contains data referenced through the global pointer (GP).
IMAGE_SCN_MEM_PURGEABLE	0x00020000	Reserved for future use.
IMAGE_SCN_MEM_16BIT	0x00020000	For ARM machine types, the section contains Thumb code. Reserved for future use with other machine types.
IMAGE_SCN_MEM_LOCKED	0x00040000	Reserved for future use.
IMAGE_SCN_MEM_PRELOAD	0x00080000	Reserved for future use.
IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_1BYTES	0x00100000	Align data on a 1-byte boundary. Valid only for object files.
IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_2BYTES	0x00200000	Align data on a 2-byte boundary. Valid only for object files.
IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_4BYTES	0x00300000	Align data on a 4-byte boundary. Valid only for object files.
IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8BYTES	0x00400000	Align data on an 8-byte boundary. Valid only for object files.
IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_16BYTES	0x00500000	Align data on a 16-byte boundary. Valid only for object files.
IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_32BYTES	0x00600000	Align data on a 32-byte boundary. Valid only for object files.
IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_64BYTES	0x00700000	Align data on a 64-byte boundary. Valid only for object files.
IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_128BYTES	0x00800000	Align data on a 128-byte boundary. Valid only for object files.

Flag	Value	Description
IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_256BYTES	0x00900000	Align data on a 256-byte boundary. Valid only for object files.
IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_512BYTES	0x00A00000	Align data on a 512-byte boundary. Valid only for object files.
IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_1024BYTES	0x00B00000	Align data on a 1024-byte boundary. Valid only for object files.
IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_2048BYTES	0x00C00000	Align data on a 2048-byte boundary. Valid only for object files.
IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_4096BYTES	0x00D00000	Align data on a 4096-byte boundary. Valid only for object files.
IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8192BYTES	0x00E00000	Align data on an 8192-byte boundary. Valid only for object files.
IMAGE_SCN_LNK_NRELOC_OVFL	0x01000000	The section contains extended relocations.
IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE	0x02000000	The section can be discarded as needed.
IMAGE_SCN_MEM_NOT_CACHED	0x04000000	The section cannot be cached.
IMAGE_SCN_MEM_NOT_PAGED	0x08000000	The section is not pageable.
IMAGE_SCN_MEM_SHARED	0x10000000	The section can be shared in memory.
IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE	0x20000000	The section can be executed as code.
IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ	0x40000000	The section can be read.
IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE	0x80000000	The section can be written to.

Table 11. Section Characteristics field.

2.6. Section Data

Typical sections contain code or data that linkers and loaders process without special knowledge of the section contents. A section consists of simple blocks of bytes. However, for sections that contain all zeros, the section data does not need to be included. The data for each section is located at the file offset that was given by the `PointerToRawData` field in the section header. The size of this data in the file is

indicated by the `SizeOfRawData` field. If `SizeOfRawData` is less than `VirtualSize`, the remainder is padded with zeros. In an image file, the section data must be aligned on a boundary as specified by the `FileAlignment` field in the optional header.

3. peHash function design

Generic hash function for Portable Executable files that generates a per-binary specific hash value based on structural data found in the file headers and structural information about the executable's section data was described in the paper "peHash: A Novel Approach to Fast Malware Clustering" [6]. The following Portable Executable properties are taken into account as well:

- **Image Characteristics:** General flags for the Portable Executable, e.g. whether the given file is a DLL or can only be run on a single processor machine. (Table 3)
- **Subsystem:** Indicates the Windows Subsystem this binary is to be run in, such as GUI, CLI or device driver.(Table 7)
- **Stack Commit Size:** The initial size of program stack to be allocated in bytes. This value is rounded up to a value divisible by 4096, Windows' page boundary, before inclusion in the hash as the Windows Portable Executable Loader does the same.(Table 5)
- **Heap Commit Size:** Initial size of program heap to be allocated, also rounded up to page boundary size. (Table 5)

For each section in the Portable Executable, the following structural information is included:

- **Virtual Address:** The address, the section's content is going to be loaded. (Table 10)
- **Raw Size:** Size of the section in the Portable Executable file itself; can be smaller than the actual size occupied in memory after loading due to rounding to page boundaries. (Table 10)
- **Section Characteristics:** Section flags describing initial privileges for the allocated memory, such as reading, writing and execution of code. (Table 11)
- **Result** of bzip2 compression ratio of section data scaled to [0 ... 7].

The following pseudo-code describes the exact generation for the hash value from the global properties, where $v[8..24]$ means bits 8 to 24 of value v and \oplus means XOR: [6]

$$\begin{aligned}
hash[0] &:= characteristics[0..7] \\
&\oplus characteristics[8..15] \\
hash[1] &:= subsystem[0..7] \\
&\oplus subsystem[8..15] \\
hash[2] &:= stackcommit[8..15] \\
&\oplus stackcommit[16..23] \\
&\oplus stackcommit[24..31] \\
hash[3] &:= heapcommit[8..15] \\
&\oplus heapcommit[16..23] \\
&\oplus heapcommit[24..31]
\end{aligned}$$

Figure 3. Pseudo-code for header. [6]

Additionally, for each section, the following sub-hash is appended to the hash:[6]

$$\begin{aligned}
shash[0] &:= virtaddress[9..31] \\
shash[2] &:= rawsize[8..31] \\
shash[4] &:= characteristics[16..23] \\
&\oplus characteristics[24..31] \\
shash[5] &:= kolmogorov \in [0..7] \subset \mathbb{N}
\end{aligned}$$

Figure 4. Pseudo-code for section. [6]

The last step is to calculate the SHA1 value of the above hash buffer and use this as the final hash value.

4. Implementation and issues

There are some public implementation of this hash where made, but looks like there are programming and algorithm mistakes in the code realization. In the current implementation, quality for clustering instances of the same polymorphic malware is lower in comparison with the original idea.

Probably the first public usage and code implementation in python of peHash was made by #totalhash [8], currently this blog post is not available online, but it can be accessed by Google cache [9]. Later, some other frameworks [10] include pehash implementation based on #totalhash into code base. Most known are Viper Framework [11] and CRITs Services Collection [12]. Also one standalone implementation not based on #totalhash was found - pehashd from GitHub user endgameinc. [14] Let us look what the problems are in #totalhash implementation.

4.1. Incorrect padding

As far as implicit variant (*bitstring.BitArray(hex(X))*) is used for converting integer value to bits string, for fields "image characteristics" and "subsystem" wrong padding method is in place. When value of *X* in *bitstring.BitArray(hex(X))* is smaller than 256, then XORing parts of result will fail, as far as result will be 8 bits. Padding is for byte boundary only. An example of step by step execution shown on Figure 5.

```
>>>
>>> #image characteristics
>>> img_chars = bitstring.BitArray(hex(240))
>>> #pad to 16 bits
>>> img_chars = bitstring.BitArray(bytes=img_chars.tobytes())
>>> img_chars.bin
'11110000'
>>> img_chars_xor = img_chars[0:8] ^ img_chars[8:16]
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "<input>", line 1, in <module>
  File "C:\MyFiles\PE Hash\bitstring.py", line 1130, in __xor__
    raise ValueError("Bitstrings must have the same length ")
ValueError: Bitstrings must have the same length for ^ operator.
>>> img_chars[0:8], img_chars[8:16]
(BitArray('0xf0'), BitArray(''))
```

Figure 5. Incorrect padding.

As result, getting pehash will fail for many files.

4.2. Issue in bitstring module

Third-party python *bitstring* [13] module have some issues when handling output of `hex()` function with argument greater than 2147483647 (0x7fffffff). An example is shown on Figure 6.

```
>>> 0x7fffffff
2147483647
>>> bitstring.BitArray(hex(2147483647))
BitArray('0x7fffffff')
>>> bitstring.BitArray(hex(2147483647+1))
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "<input>", line 1, in <module>
  File "C:\MyFiles\PE Hash\bitstring.py", line 3047, in __new__
    y = Bits.__new__(BitArray, auto, length, offset, **kwargs)
  File "C:\MyFiles\PE Hash\bitstring.py", line 786, in __new__
    x._datastore._appendstore(Bits._init_with_token(*token)._datastore)
  File "C:\MyFiles\PE Hash\bitstring.py", line 1219, in _init_with_token
    b = cls(**{_tokenname_to_initializer[name]: value})
  File "C:\MyFiles\PE Hash\bitstring.py", line 796, in __new__
    x._initialise(auto, length, offset, **kwargs)
  File "C:\MyFiles\PE Hash\bitstring.py", line 817, in _initialise
    init_without_length_or_offset[k](self, v)
  File "C:\MyFiles\PE Hash\bitstring.py", line 1910, in _sethex
    raise CreationError("Invalid symbol in hex initialiser.")
CreationError: Invalid symbol in hex initialiser.
```

Figure 6. Issue in bitstring module.

As result, getting pehash will fail for small amount of files.

4.3. Wrong value for field "Subsystem"

Field *"Subsystem"* has wrong value. It has value from `FILE_HEADER.Machine` of PE file instead of `OPTIONAL_HEADER.Subsystem` as shown on Figure 7.

```
#subsystem -
sub_chars = bitstring.BitArray(hex(exe.FILE_HEADER.Machine))
.....
```

Figure 7. Wrong value for field "Subsystem" [10] [12]

4.4. Missing round up

Missing rounding up to a value divisible by 4096 for `SizeOfStackCommit` and `SizeOfHeapCommit` fields

4.5. Incorrect slicing

Another issue is in incorrect slicing. `peHash` pseudo-code means slicing as of bits in multi-byte fields. In `#totalhash` implementation, we can see that the same slicing order used for `BitArray` structure. That structure is in Big Endian format, as far as implicit method used for conversion from integer to `BitArray` and Python slicing working from index 0 for inerrable object. Result of slicing looks like:

- pseudo-code: `X[0:7]`, [closed Interval], 8 Least Significant bits
- python: `X[0:8]`, [half-closed intervals), 8 items from index 0

As shown on Figure 8 Python slicing start from left to right and does not maps to pseudo code meaning.

```
>>> x=bitstring.BitArray(hex(0x03020100))
>>> x
BitArray('0x3020100')
>>> x[0:8], x[8:16], x[8:16], x[16:24], x[24:32]
(BitArray('0x30'), BitArray('0x20'), BitArray('0x20'), BitArray('0x10'), BitArray('0x0'))
```

Figure 8. Slicing of multi-byte BitArray.

Totalhash implementation does not take care about that for `SizeOfStackCommit`, `SizeOfHeapCommit`, `VirtualAddress` and `SizeOfRawData` fields. As result, Least Significant Bits are NOT ignored. PE files with small different in `RawSize` value will have different hash. Example - virus [15] has made changes by adding into value of "RawSize" field incremental numbers in section header (second section), note that hashes are different, but they should be the same:

peHash	File name
b2e0cb11d4f398d98dfd3e05a398de39e4a69204	.\Backdoor.Win32.Agent.adwz
dfc119cf023c3ba276a87af20e81b21aa09b4861	.\Backdoor.Win32.Agent.+16.adwz
4fee405c231f2dc0f9e33033099d26eac3caa34b	.\Backdoor.Win32.Agent.+32.adwz

peHash	File name
61a6f71c1154dfda7fbad57667a41207d4396f44	.\Backdoor.Win32.Agent.+48.adwz
4cf16f817d1d106b6eca1b8d23ab200c09f279eb	.\Backdoor.Win32.Agent.+64.adwz

Table 12. Hashes for modified file.

4.6. Compression ratio scaling

Another issue with implementation is related to missing scale up of the result of the bzip2 section data compression ratio up to 7 (Figure 9).

```

#entropy calculation
address = section.VirtualAddress
size = section.SizeOfRawData
raw = exe.write()[address+size:]
if size == 0:
    kolmog = bitstring.BitArray(float=1, length=32)
    pehash_bin.append(kolmog[0:8])
    continue
bz2_raw = bz2.compress(raw)
bz2_size = len(bz2_raw)
#k = round(bz2_size / size, 5)
k = bz2_size / size
kolmog = bitstring.BitArray(float=k, length=32)
pehash_bin.append(kolmog[0:8])

```

Figure 9. Compression ratio. [10], [12]

Even more, incorrect float format for converting into BitArray is in place. Therefore slicing for bit presentation of float value is incorrectly used too. As result, value of this field have only 4 variants, instead of 8 as shown in Figure 10.

```
>>> for x in range(10):
...     print x/10.0, bitstring.BitArray(float=x/10.0, length=32)[0:8]
...
0.0 0x00
0.1 0x3d
0.2 0x3e
0.3 0x3e
0.4 0x3e
0.5 0x3f
0.6 0x3f
0.7 0x3f
0.8 0x3f
0.9 0x3f
```

Figure 10. Slicing of float value.

5. Proposed implementation

5.1. Corrected improper implementation

Implementation based on original idea with fixed known issues was made [appendix 1] [17]. Hash buffer defined as file header data and one or more section data as shown in Table 13 and Table 14. Sections are sorted by VirtualAddress, that friendly done by “pefile” module. All multi-byte values stored as unsigned integers in Big Endian format. Result of peHash function is SHA1 hash in hex-digest format of that buffer.

Field length in bytes	Value
1	Image Characteristics, bytes are XOR-ed.
1	Subsystem, bytes are XOR-ed.
1	Stack Commit Size, rounded up to a value divisible by 4096, one least significant byte is discarded, all other bytes are XOR-ed.
1	Heap Commit Size, rounded up to a value divisible by 4096, one least significant byte is discarded, all other bytes are XOR-ed.

Table 13. peHash buffer for file header.

Field length in bytes	Value
3	VirtualAddress, right shift by 9 bits.
3	SizeOfRawData, right shift by 8 bits (one least significant byte is discarded).
1	Characteristics, right shift by 16 bits, (two least significant byte are discarded), all other bytes are XOR-ed.
1	Complexity, compression ratio of section data, scaled up to 7: $complexity = \text{int}(\text{round}(\text{lenCompressedData} * 7.0 / \text{lenData}))$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 0 if SizeOfRawData is 0 - 7 if complexity > 7 - Complexity

Table 14. peHash buffer for section properties.

5.2. Extended implementation

In addition to the original idea, some changes and enhancements are proposed. Main goal is to make fine-tuning for properties used in hash and add some new ones that can be changed only by relinking object files.

- **Image Characteristics field** – masking of deprecated and reserved bits was added. (Table 3)
- **Section Characteristics** – masking of reserved and not used for PE image file bits was added. (Table 11)
- **Remove XOR-ing** bytes for values of Image Characteristics, Sybsystem, Stack Commit Size, Heap Commit Size and Section Characteristics to prevent collisions.
- **SizeOfRawData** – do not skip eight least significant bits (1 byte) but round value up to 512 bits boundary. SizeOfRawData can be directly edited and data added up to 512 bits boundary value (to be correct – up to FileAlignment value) without relink object files.
- **VirtualAddress** - do not skip nine least significant bits but round value up to 512 bits boundary.
- **Compression ratio for section data** – fixed value 8 added for situation when size of compressed data is bigger than size of data itself.
- **SectionAlignment** and **FileAlignment** fields added into hash. The values rounded down to power of two. Round down selected to prevent overflow of four bytes integer. These values cannot be changed without relink object files. Default values are 4096 and 512 bytes.
- **Data Directories** (Table 9) status added into hash. Value is a bit flags, bit set to 1 when VirtualAddress for data directory is not zero, else set to 0. Data directories entries with index 7, 8, 15 ignored, as far as index 15 is reserved and system loader ignores indexes 7 and 8.

Hash buffer is defined as file header data and one or more section data as shown in Table 15 and Table 16. Sections are sorted by VirtualAddress, that friendly done by “pefile” module. All multi-byte values stored as unsigned integers in Big Endian format. Result of peHash function is SHA256 hash in hex-digest format of that buffer.

[Appendix 2]

Field length in bytes	Value
2	Image Characteristics, masked for unwanted bits. mask: 0b0111111100100011
2	Subsystem.
4	SectionAlignment, rounded down to power of two
4	FileAlignment, rounded down to power of two
8	SizeOfStackCommit, rounded up to a value divisible by 4096.
8	SizeOfHeapCommit, rounded up to a value divisible by 4096.
2	Data Directory Status, masked bit flags for data directories with index from 0 to value of NumberOfRvaAndSizes -1, but not bigger than 15 : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1 if VirtualAddress for directory is not 0 - 0 if VirtualAddress for directory is 0 - Mask: 0b0111111001111111

Table 15. peHashNG buffer for file header.

Field length in bytes	Value
4	VirtualAddress, rounded up to a value divisible by 512.
4	SizeOfRawData, rounded up to a value divisible by 512.
1	Characteristics, right shift by 24 bits, (3 least significant byte are discarded).
1	Complexity, compression ratio of section data, scaled up to 7: $complexity = lenCompressedData * 7.0 / lenData$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 0 if SizeOfRawData is 0 - 8 if complexity > 7 - int(round(complexity))

Table 16. peHashNG buffer for section properties.

6. Statistics and conclusions

Currently we have two implementation of pehash – one correct (I hope) “peHash” [17] implementation based on original idea and one extended “peHashNG” [18]. During development of extended version, Windows 10,500 system files with 38,000 sections and collection of 235,000 malware PE examples [18] with about 1 million sections total were analyzed.

For Image Characteristics in Table 17 we can see counters of unique values in windows system and malware files. XOR-ing of bytes in this field has many collisions, so the masking of unwanted bits for this field is better for clustering.

Type of data	Malware	Windows
Raw (as is in the file)	102	22
XOR-ed (as in peHash)	22	6
Masked (as in peHashNG)	37	18

Table 17. Image Characteristics unique counters

The same story is with Subsystem, collisions again, so we will store raw values into hash (Table 18).

Type of data	Malware	Windows
Raw (as is in the file)	8	4
XOR-ed (as in peHash)	2	1

Table 18. Subsystem unique counters.

SizeOfStackCommit and SizeOfHeapCommit fields - with round up only we have more accurate clustering (Table 19, Table 20)

Type of data	Malware	Windows
Raw (as is in the file)	93	21
Round up and XOR-ed (as in peHash)	58	20
Round up only (as in peHashNG)	72	21

Table 19. SizeOfStackCommit unique counters.

Type of data	Malware	Windows
Raw (as is in the file)	53	3
Round up and XOR-ed (as in peHash)	35	3
Round up only (as in peHashNG)	40	3

Table 20. SizeOfHeapCommit unique counters.

SectionAlignment and FileAlignment fields - for Windows 7 PE system files in “sysnative” and “sysWOW64” directories we have only eight combinations of Section and File alignments. For malware collection, the number of combinations increased to 35. Therefore, we have additional stable parameters for clustering in peHashNG.

Data Directory field is another interesting and useful one for clustering. It is very important for PE file area. In, probably, all cases of any incorrect data in it, system loader will fail to load PE file. Note, that we do not store values from Data Directory into hash, we only detect – is that directory existing (used by PE) or not by checking VirtualAddress. If VA is not zero we set bit flag to 1 for this directory, otherwise – set it to 0. Windows and malware files statistic for Data Directory status is shown on Figure 11. As we can see, this data can be useful for clustering. Unused by system loader and reserved directory numbers are ignored by masking bits.




Figure 11. Data Directories usage.

Comparison of counts of hashes with different numbers of files in cluster is shown in Table 21. As we can see even if peHashNg has a more strictly algorithm for hash, total count of hashes and count of clusters with one file are smaller than ones for totalhash. At the same time counts of hashes for clusters with 2...100 files are bigger, so we can make a conclusion that grouping files by peHashNg is more accurate in comparison with totalhash.

Hash	1 file in cluster	2...10 files in cluster	11...100 files in cluster	> 100 files in cluster	Total hashes
#totalhash	113815	21024	1832	62	136733
peHashNg	106061	23059	2011	50	131181

Table 21. Counts of hashes with different numbers of files in cluster.

Implementation is made using Python programming language. Source code of peHash and peHashNG hashes is published on GitHub. [17], [18]. That hash can be used independently or in cooperation with "imphash" [2] and classical bits stream (black/white lists) hashes for quick classification of PE files.

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Appendix 1 – peHash source code

Listing of "pehash.py" file:

```

#!/usr/bin/env python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
pehash, Portable Executable hash of structural properties

@author: AnyMaster
https://github.com/AnyMaster/pehash
"""
__version__ = '1.1.0'
__author__ = 'AnyMaster'

from hashlib import sha1
from bz2 import compress

from pefile import PE
from bitstring import pack

def get_pehash(pe_file):
    """ Return pehash for PE file, sha1 of PE structural properties.

    :param pe_file:    file name or instance of pefile.PE() class
    :rtype : string    SHA1 in hexdigest format
    """

    if isinstance(pe_file, PE): # minimize mem. usage and time of execution
        exe = pe_file
    else:
        exe = PE(pe_file, fast_load=True)

    # Image Characteristics
    img_chars = pack('uint:16', exe.FILE_HEADER.Characteristics)
    pehash_bin = img_chars[0:8] ^ img_chars[8:16]

    # Subsystem
    subsystem = pack('uint:16', exe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.Subsystem)
    pehash_bin.append(subsystem[0:8] ^ subsystem[8:16])

    # Stack Commit Size, rounded up to a value divisible by 4096,
    # Windows page boundary, 8 lower bits must be discarded
    # in PE32+ is 8 bytes
    stack_commit = exe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.SizeOfStackCommit
    if stack_commit % 4096:
        stack_commit += 4096 - stack_commit % 4096
    stack_commit = pack('uint:56', stack_commit >> 8)
    pehash_bin.append(
        stack_commit[:8] ^ stack_commit[8:16] ^
        stack_commit[16:24] ^ stack_commit[24:32] ^
        stack_commit[32:40] ^ stack_commit[40:48] ^ stack_commit[48:56])

    # Heap Commit Size, rounded up to page boundary size,
    # 8 lower bits must be discarded
    # in PE32+ is 8 bytes
    heap_commit = exe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.SizeOfHeapCommit
    if heap_commit % 4096:
        heap_commit += 4096 - heap_commit % 4096
    heap_commit = pack('uint:56', heap_commit >> 8)
    pehash_bin.append(
        heap_commit[:8] ^ heap_commit[8:16] ^

```

```

    heap_commit[16:24] ^ heap_commit[24:32] ^
    heap_commit[32:40] ^ heap_commit[40:48] ^ heap_commit[48:56])

# Section structural information
for section in exe.sections:
    # Virtual Address, 9 lower bits must be discarded
    pehash_bin.append(pack('uint:24', section.VirtualAddress >> 9))

    # Size Of Raw Data, 8 lower bits must be discarded
    pehash_bin.append(pack('uint:24', section.SizeOfRawData >> 8))

    # Section Characteristics, 16 lower bits must be discarded
    sect_chars = pack('uint:16', section.Characteristics >> 16)
    pehash_bin.append(sect_chars[:8] ^ sect_chars[8:16])

    # Kolmogorov Complexity, len(Bzip2(data))/len(data)
    #  $(0..1] \in \mathbb{R} \rightarrow [0..7] \subset \mathbb{N}$ 
    kolmogorov = 0
    if section.SizeOfRawData:
        kolmogorov = int(round(
            len(compress(section.get_data()))
            * 7.0 /
            section.SizeOfRawData))
        if kolmogorov > 7:
            kolmogorov = 7
    pehash_bin.append(pack('uint:8', kolmogorov))

assert 0 == pehash_bin.len % 8
if not isinstance(pe_file, PE):
    exe.close()

return sha1(pehash_bin.tobytes()).hexdigest()

if __name__ == '__main__':
    import sys
    if len(sys.argv) < 2:
        print "Error: no file specified"
        sys.exit(0)
    print get_pehash(sys.argv[1]), sys.argv[1]

```

Appendix 2 – peHashNG source code

Listing of "pehashng.py" file:

```

#!/usr/bin/env python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
peHashNG, Portable Executable hash of structural properties

@author: AnyMaster
https://github.com/AnyMaster/pehashng
"""

import logging
from bz2 import compress
from hashlib import sha256
from struct import pack

from pefile import PE, PEFormatError

__version__ = '1.0.0'
__author__ = 'AnyMaster'

def pehashng(pe_file):
    """ Return pehashng for PE file, sha256 of PE structural properties.

    :param pe_file: file name or instance of pefile.PE() class
    :return: SHA256 in hexdigest format, None in case of pefile.PE() error
    :rtype: str
    """

    if isinstance(pe_file, PE):
        exe = pe_file
    else:
        try:
            exe = PE(pe_file, fast_load=True)
        except PEFormatError as exc:
            logging.error("Exception in pefile.PE('%s') - %s", pe_file, exc)
            return

def align_down_p2(number):
    return 1 << (number.bit_length() - 1) if number else 0

def align_up(number, boundary_p2):
    assert not boundary_p2 & (boundary_p2 - 1), \
        "Boundary '%d' is not a power of 2" % boundary_p2
    boundary_p2 -= 1
    return (number + boundary_p2) & ~ boundary_p2

def get_dirs_status():
    dirs_status = 0
    for idx in range(min(exe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.NumberOfRvaAndSizes, 16)):
        if exe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.DATA_DIRECTORY[idx].VirtualAddress:
            dirs_status |= (1 << idx)
    return dirs_status

def get_complexity():
    complexity = 0
    if section.SizeOfRawData:
        complexity = (len(compress(section.get_data())) *
                     7.0 /
                     section.SizeOfRawData)

```

```

        complexity = 8 if complexity > 7 else int(round(complexity))
    return complexity

characteristics_mask = 0b0111111100100011
data_directory_mask = 0b0111111001111111

data = [
    pack('> H', exe.FILE_HEADER.Characteristics & characteristics_mask),
    pack('> H', exe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.Subsystem),
    pack("&> I", align_down_p2(exe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.SectionAlignment)),
    pack("> I", align_down_p2(exe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.FileAlignment)),
    pack("> Q", align_up(exe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.SizeOfStackCommit, 4096)),
    pack("> Q", align_up(exe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.SizeOfHeapCommit, 4096)),
    pack('> H', get_dirs_status() & data_directory_mask)]

for section in exe.sections:
    data += [
        pack('> I', align_up(section.VirtualAddress, 512)),
        pack('> I', align_up(section.SizeOfRawData, 512)),
        pack('> B', section.Characteristics >> 24),
        pack("> B", get_complexity())]

if not isinstance(pe_file, PE):
    exe.close()
data_sha256 = sha256("".join(data)).hexdigest()

return data_sha256

if __name__ == '__main__':
    import sys
    if len(sys.argv) < 2:
        print "Usage: pehashng.py path_to_file"
        sys.exit(0)
    print pehashng(sys.argv[1]), sys.argv[1]

```