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DEVELOPMENT OR MIGRATION:
THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE SAHEL

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

This thesis studies the European Union's aid to the Sahel, and the effects of the mid 2010's migration crisis in Europe on the EU's approach to this aid. The study is premised on the research question of "how the migration crisis in Europe has influenced the EU's development cooperation with the Sahel". This paper answers the research question by applying the relevant EU strategies and numerical data on development aid in the Sahel to the Securitisation theory. It concludes that an increased focus on migration related sectors in the development aid can be attributed to the EU's response to a securitisation of migration in Europe. This response, mainly in the official strategies, act as a speech act on the EU's part as it signals the relevant stakeholders in Europe that the EU is responding to the pressure to act on migration. However, the use of development aid in this way has unfortunate consequences on the EU as a development aid actor, as it diverts attention and funding towards programmes that are not optimal for poverty reduction – the aim stated in the Treaty of Lisbon. The use of development aid to advance goals that rise from internal politics in Europe risks harm being done to the EU's reputation as a development cooperation partner.

Keywords: European Union, development aid, migration, Sahel, securitisation.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACP – African, Caribbean, and Pacific states

AQIM – Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

EDF – European Development Fund

EEAS – European External Action Service

EU – European Union

EUTF – The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa

GDP PPP – Gross domestic product at purchasing power parity

GNI – Gross national income

IMF – International Monetary Fund

NGO – Non-governmental organisation

OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

UN – United Nations

INTRODUCTION

The European Union member states and the EU institutions together make up the world's largest development aid actor when measured by amount of money donated (OECD) – spending no less than 84 billion euros in 2018 (EU Aid Explorer). This begs the question how this money is spent and what kind of factors influence the decision to spend on development aid in faraway places. Since these questions are very diverse in the fields they cover, it is necessary to narrow the topic down much further in order to be able to answer in detail. Therefore in this research, I have decided to narrow it to the effects of the European migration crisis of the mid 2010's – as it was one of the defining European events of the decade and had strong influence in politics across the continent. I will further narrow the geographic scope of the development aid to the Sahel region as defined by the EU in the Sahel Strategy (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad), because the region is considered by many scholars as a "laboratory of experimentation" for the EU (Venturi 2017; Lopez Lucia 2019). The region functions as a place of transit for migrants from other parts of Africa and has a long and poorly supervised border with the European Southern Neighbourhood countries of North Africa.

Therefore, this bachelor thesis sets out to study the EU's development aid to the Sahel, with the aim of answering research question of "how the migration crisis in Europe has influenced the EU's development cooperation with the Sahel". During the course of this research will I come to the conclusion that an increased focus on migration in the Sahel is attributable to the migration crisis in Europe – even though the Middle East was the main region of origin for migrants during the crisis. This is because migration was securitised in Europe following the train of thought of the Copenhagen School's Securitisation theory. The EU uses its development aid to the Sahel as a way to respond to this securitisation, which however is not very effective – and perhaps even counterproductive in terms of the EU's development goals.

The research is primarily based on official numerical data on development aid to the region, and the EU's publicly available official documents that concern either development aid, the Sahel, or both. It chiefly focuses on the 2011-2018 period, however noting official strategies that were made before or after this period but that still are relevant for the research. The year 2011 is chosen

because it is the year when the EU began applying its first strategy on the Sahel, while the year 2018 is the final year with reliable numerical data on development aid in the dataset used. This research applies qualitative data from the official documents, and quantitative data from EU Aid Explorer (and from Oxfam in the case of the EUTF aid instrument), to the Securitisation theory, and makes conclusions based on this application. The research takes a European standpoint in its analysis as it does not try to study the effects on the ground in the Sahel – given the region's complexities and nuances I am not familiar enough. Instead the research focuses on the act of giving aid, and what effect it has on the EU as a development actor in the Sahel and elsewhere.

This paper is structured as follows:

Chapter one will explore the EU's approach to the development cooperation with the Sahelian states by analysing the currently relevant policy documents of the EU, ranging from its Global Strategy to the Sahel specific strategies. It follows a chronological order to highlight the change in the EU's approach which has taken place over time, from a focus on the economy to more wider approach that also includes governance, security among others. In addition, the EU has developed a special focus on migration which is apparent in the most recent documents, though this will be discussed more in depth in the later chapters.

Chapter two focuses on the practical side of the EU's development approach to the Sahel. It begins by describing the most relevant EU aid instruments in the Sahel – followed by analysis of the total EU aid to the Sahel. It uses the data provided by the European Commission at EU Aid Explorer as well as data compiled by Oxfam. It highlights the practical side of change in the EU's approach which was seen in the previous chapter. It finds that the EU increasingly gives more aid to security and migration-oriented programs, while more traditional aid sectors have stagnated in growth or received less aid in relation to the total amount aid given.

Chapter three introduces the Copenhagen School's theory of Securitisation which helps us understand the change in the EU's approach to the Sahel that was outlined in the previous two chapters. It then applies the migration crisis of the latter half of the 2010's to the theory in an attempt to explain the overarching change in its view on migration, which has influenced its approach to development aid in the Sahel as well.

Chapter four discusses the securitisation of migration in the context of the Sahel. It begins by synthesising chapters two and three with the theory of securitisation discussed in chapter four and argues that the previously demonstrated change can be attributed to the more general securitisation of migration in the EU. It sees the EU's response in the Sahel as part of a speech act by the EU that responds to the securitisation pressure back in Europe.

Chapter five addresses the EU's response's effects on the development cooperation with the Sahel and the effectiveness of this response to address migration. It concludes that – notwithstanding the speech act's effects in Europe – the approach is misguided in its efforts to restrict migration flows from the Sahel to the EU. Furthermore, it decreases the amount of funding available for traditional development goals and diverts attention from programs that would work most effectively towards poverty reduction, to programs that are more responsive towards issues related to migration. There exists a risk of harm being done to the EU's reputation as a development actor by this.

1. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S APPROACH TO THE SAHEL

This chapter analyses the relevant European Union (EU) strategies that apply to the development aid to the Sahel and are available for the public. The Sahel region is defined by the EU as Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. The chapter follows a chronological order which allows us to see how the EU's approach has changed over time. It begins with the Cotonou Agreement which forms the basis of a large portion of EU's development aid to the world, followed by the EU's Sahel Strategy which outlines the EU's objectives in the region. It then continues to the Sahel Regional Action Plan – a follow-up to the Sahel Strategy crafted during the heyday of the migration crisis in Europe. After this, it studies the EU's Global Strategy – a 2016 grand strategy that outlines the EU's objectives in the world politics and the methods of pursuing them. This chapter finalises with a quick note on the upcoming Africa strategy. However, before beginning with the Cotonou Agreement, it is important to make a note of the constrictions in the EU's foreign policy.

The room the EU has for its external action – or foreign policy in other words – in the Sahel is quite narrow, as seems to be the norm for the supranational organisation everywhere outside Europe, as foreign policy is exclusive competence of the member states. In the Sahel, its objectives are generally defined by the member states, especially by France, which still has considerable interests in its former colonies in the region, including the five Sahelian states. As Mattelaer (Gstöhl, Lannon 2016) put it, the EU's Sahel strategy can be characterised as the "lowest common denominator of European support for French designs in the region" – though he points out that there are common European interests at play as well, notably security and migration – along with the commitment to the promotion of liberal ideas such as democracy and human rights (EEAS 2016 a, 33). Taking into account the multiple and diverse motivations each member state has in the region – from France's geopolitical considerations to the Nordics' development priorities (Lopez Lucia 2019), addressing migration seems to be among those few things they can readily agree on. However, migration became a European priority in the region only after the Sahel Regional Action Plan in 2015 as we will see later on.

1.1. 2000 – The Cotonou Agreement

The Cotonou Agreement is an agreement between the EU member states and sub-Saharan African (including the Sahelian states), Caribbean, and Pacific states (also know as the ACP) signed in 2000 which directs the usage of the European Development Fund. The agreement is focused strongly on development, economic, and trade cooperation, with poverty reduction at its core. This aim is crystallised in the agreement as following: "The partnership shall be centred on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy." (Council of the European Union 2020) The Cotonou Agreement also touches the topic of migration, however only briefly and in the context of early 2000's, meaning that the focus is on (legal) migrant workers, and the attention given to illegal migration is only in the context of facilitating their easy return to their countries of origin. (European Commission 2014) However as it will be evident in the later documents, migration increases its importance for the EU and will become a dominating topic in the later documents.

1.2. 2011 – European Union's Sahel Strategy

Though France has been active in its former colonies, there are few events which have directed the EU's attention towards the Sahel. In 2007, Niger and Mali both experienced a Tuareg rebellion in their northern provinces in the Saharan desert along with the continuation of an almost decade long Islamist insurgency in the whole Sahel region, featuring many separate organisations such as al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, and later Islamic State. Especially a military coup d'état in Niger in 2010 linked to the Tuareg rebellion and the kidnappings of European citizens and the death of a German directed the European attention towards the region (Gstöhl, Lannon 2016; EEAS 2011) which quickly became a top priority for the EU (Lebovich 2018). This attention manifested itself in the first EU Strategy for the Sahel in 2011 (Gstöhl, Lannon 2016), which initially covered Mauritania, Mali and Niger, and was expanded to include Burkina Faso and Chad in 2014. This research uses these five countries as the definition of the Sahel. The Strategy featured four lines of action:

1) "development, good governance, and internal conflict resolution";

2) "political and diplomatic" action;

3) "security and rule of law";

4) "the fight against violent extremism and radicalization". (EEAS 2011)

The strategy also emphasises local solutions and local ownership, as well as their sustainability. Besides these, the Strategy has several features that would be included in the Comprehensive Approach – the Integrated Approach's predecessor that be discussed later. Most significant of those were the establishment of a connection between development and security; developing a common vision and shared analysis; and rejecting one-size-fits-all solutions for the multitude of problems the Sahelian countries face. The EU, on its website and in subsequent documents related to the Sahel, still hails this strategy as the "key framework" in its engagement with the region and with the individual Sahelian states (EEAS 2016 b; Council of the European Union 2015). However, after the beginning of the migration crisis and a surge in terrorist attacks in the mid 2010's in Europe, a change of priority for the EU is apparent, thus side lining these lines of action to a degree. Some scholars, such as Venturi (2017), have gone as far as to argue that some parts of this strategy have become outdated.

The connection between development and security is premised on the idea that there cannot be development if the country suffers from instability, while also there cannot be security if the widespread poverty creates conditions for destabilising forces such as the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM for short) – which according to the EU's fact finding missions in the region that form the basis of the strategy, can provide financial opportunities for the youth or radicalize them. The Maghreb is a region in the north western Africa that generally is considered to encompass Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania, and the disputed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (also known as Western Sahara), though the AQIM operates in the Sahelian states as well. The transnational threats exemplified by the AQIM cause the EU to call for transnational response in areas such as military, police, customs, and border management. Here, border management is mentioned four times and only in the context of regional, cross-border security problems, while in the Regional Action Plan, border control and migration in general becomes a dominating topic.

1.3. 2015 – European Union's Sahel Regional Action Plan

As the general situation in Sahel worsened, and as Mali experienced a separatist and Islamist insurrection in its north and a subsequent military coup in its capital in 2012, the Europeans were poised to react. After the civilian rule had been restored, an EU military training mission (EUTM Mali) for Malian security forces ensued. It was supported by French Operation Serval, which

aimed to halt the Islamists advancement to buy time for the EUTM. (Gstöhl, Lannon 2016) In this case, and as in many other rebellions around the world, the northern Tuareg rebels were motivated by lack of employment opportunities and marginalisation in Malian politics. This, combined with the armaments and combat experience they had brought with them from the first Libyan civil war, they were able to easily overrun the poorly managed Malian military. (Ibid.)

Partly influenced by these events, and only three years after the adoption of the Sahel Strategy, the EU adopted the Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015–2020. The Sahel Regional Action Plan reiterated the relevancy of the 2011 Strategy for the Sahel and the EU's commitment to its objectives and implementation, however stating the need to focus on selected issues, most of which pertain to migration or security. (Council of the European Union 2015, 10) It further introduced new priorities serving as "strategic focus" that are:

1) "preventing and countering radicalization";

2) "creating appropriate conditions for youth";

3) "migration and mobility";

4) "border management, and the fight against illicit trafficking and transnational organized crime". (Ibid., 13)

Unlike the 2011 Strategy for the Sahel, which had only two mentions on migration – one was in the context of drugs smuggling and organised crime and the other on poverty's impact on migration, this new Regional Action Plan featured migration as one of the four priorities – as the topic had become one of the dominating topics of European politics by that time and a strong motivator for EU's external action. Also the second and fourth priorities – conditions for youth and border management – could be seen to complement curbing irregular migration as well, because they target why and how the youth and other migrants migrate. It also brought forward countering Islamic radicalisation that has been a large cause of violence in the region, and promoting economic opportunities for youth, as the lack of can cause instability and direct the youth towards armed groups. This is especially important since nearly half of the population in all of the five countries are under 15 years old (CIA World Factbook). Though the rebellion were facilitated by combat experience and armaments brought from Libya, the EU's seems to be focusing more on migrants with their ultimate goal in Europe, instead of migrants migrating within Africa, as can be seen in the Global Strategy and in the EU's action as we will see further on.

1.4. 2016 – European Union's Global Strategy

The EU's approach to foreign aid, as part of the European External Action Service's (EEAS for short) competence, adheres to the 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy (EEAS 2016 a). This strategy identifies five priorities: security of the EU; state and societal resilience; Integrated Approach to conflicts; cooperative regional orders; and global governance. According to this strategy, the EU aims to promote "education, communication, culture, youth and sport to counter violent extremism" in its partner countries, though the Global Strategy offers only little in terms of concrete lines of action other than that. However, the EU's approach to the Sahel seems to have different, more migration focused priorities. Global Strategy states that the EU will invest in Africa as an investment to Europe's "own security and prosperity" (Ibid., 36), preceded by a call for an approach that is equally idealistic in its quest for a "better world" as well as realistic in its analysis of the "strategic environment" called "principled pragmatism" (Ibid., 8). Rather unsurprisingly – given the beginning of the migration crisis and a surge in terrorist attacks in western Europe the year before this strategy was published – security is the first of the list of priorities, with terrorism being at the helm of the chapter elaborating on security as well.

In the chapter on state and societal resilience, the focus is on strengthening the EU's partners' capacities to function as a state – which includes strengthening the security services of the state and economic development. The strategy mentions the origin and transit countries of migrants as "a special focus" and pinpoints development instruments along with diplomatic efforts as the means to address migration in these countries. The way the EU's development instruments are increasingly infiltrated by security and migratory concerns is reflected in the call for the development policy to "become more flexible and aligned with our strategic priorities".

The chapter on Integrated Approach to Crises and Conflict is worth elaborating on – though it is not in the core of this research – because it demonstrates how the EU seeks to utilise all the resources it has in its external action with the developing world, including development aid. The integrated approach to conflicts and crises is premised on the idea that development, security, and governance are inherently intertwined and there cannot be one without the two others. It seeks to unify the EU institutions, member states, and the actors on the ground in third countries, into mutually coherent actors that share the responsibility together, to address the multitude of aspects a conflict may have, such as governance, gender, security, and economy. To do this, the EU aims

to use "all available policies and instrument" in "all stages of the conflict cycle". Applying this to the Sahelian context would mean that the "all available policies and instruments" would also include development policy and the development instruments that will be discussed later, while the "all stages of the conflict cycle" would apply for example to the aftermath of the Tuareg rebellions or to managing the ongoing Islamist insurgency among the other conflicts in the region.

1.5. 2020 – European Union's proposal for an Africa Strategy

In a proposed basis for a new Africa Strategy for the EU on March 2020, the EEAS envisions a strategy that builds on five partnerships – including one on migration and mobility, and another on peace and governance (European Commission 2020). The rest of the partnerships are on green transition and energy access, digital transformation, and sustainable growth and jobs. In the proposal, the EEAS pledges to pursue a "whole-of-route" approach on migration, which can be interpreted as a continued importance of the Sahel for the EU, given its role as a transit hub for migrants on their way to Europe (Raineri, Rossi 2017). Because this is still only a proposal, and the final text likely evolves – it will be discussed in autumn 2020 in the EU institutions (European Commission 2020), this proposal will not be explored further in this paper. However, understanding the contemporary European approach to the Sahel, its laboratory, helps us to better understand this strategy and its effects once it is finalised and adopted.

2. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S AID TO THE SAHEL

This chapter introduces the EU's two most important aid instruments for this research, and how they are used in the Sahel. It begins with the EU's largest development instrument, the European Development Fund, followed by an instrument called EUTF (the acronym stands for European Union Emergency Trust Fund, though it has an even longer full name). It then proceeds to analyse numerical data on the aid to the Sahel, and their developments that follow the changes in the strategies that were covered in the previous chapter.

2.1. The European Union's main instruments

This section introduces the two most important aid instruments for this research, and briefly their magnitude in terms of aid donated. Even though the amount of aid donated through these instruments is also included in the figures of chapter 2.2., but because the EU Aid Explorer does not sort aid by the instrument used, it is useful to make the distinction here.

2.1.1. The European Development Fund

The European Development Fund, EDF for short, is the EU's largest development aid instrument measured in amount of money dispersed. The EDF is funded directly by the EU member states, instead from the EU's multiannual financial framework or the annual budget, as many other development instruments are, giving the member states a direct role in the programming of the funds and in the monitoring its implementation in the capacity of the EDF Committee (d'Alfonso 2014). This instrument is the EU's implementing hand of the Cotonou Agreement and thus its main objective is to pursue poverty reduction in the recipient countries. However, this does not necessarily exclude security related aid (border management issues are often related to the region's security issues), as according to the approach in the Cotonou Agreement "peace and security" are required for development and the other way around, and with the inclusion of good governance from the Integrated Approach.

The total portion allocated to security-related priorities for the Sahelian five in the 2014-2020 EDF were as follows: 280 million euros out of 615 million for Mali (46%), while 100 million out of

Niger's 686 million (15%) is focused on security, governance, and the consolidation of peace. Most of the Malian funding is distributed as budget support, which means it is tied to progress in certain indicators – in this case including reforms in the security sector (Lopez Lucia 2019). The EU provided 21 million in migration management and security development for Mauritania (European Commission 2018 b) which is 11% out of total 195 million (Lopez Lucia 2019). For Chad, 15% of the 442 million euro envelop is focused on governance – that has the objective to strengthen the weak central government and guarantee "the protection of people" (Schuman Associates). The envelop of Burkina Faso is mainly focused on traditional development issues. However, many EU officials have told that even the traditional development projects of the EDF have been increasingly characterised by European security concerns, such as addressing radicalisation in justice system reform (Lopez Lucia 2019).

It is important to note that the EDF is restricted by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee's criteria for development aid (Lopez Lucia 2019), which limited its ability to address the Europe's rapidly risen concern for migration and terrorism in 2015 and onwards. For this purpose, and to address other problems with the responsiveness and the flexibility in the EDF, the EU created in 2015 the EUTF.

2.1.2. European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa

The EUTF's full name is "European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa". The instrument gets 70% of its funding from the EDF (Oxfam 2017). The advantage of the EUTF over the EDF is that it does not need to be pre-planned nor its usage needs to be initiated by the receiving country. Instead its programmes can be proposed by the member states or by the EU Delegations on the ground, making it a much more responsive instrument to European priorities than the multiannual EDF governed by the Cotonou agreement. The recipient African governments have no official role in the process of deciding the projects and their funding. They have been relegated to only comment and consult as observers (Ibid.), having little power over the priorities and the aims of the instrument. However, as they are sovereign nations, they can accept or reject what gets implemented within the confines of their borders.

This instrument is further divided into three geographical regions, North Africa, Horn of Africa, and the Sahel and Lake Chad area. The latter region includes the Sahel as defined by the EU, along with Cameroon, The Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria, and Senegal. It has 38 indicators to assess the

effectiveness of its funding programs, 11 of which directly address migration – such as "number of early warning systems on migration flows create" and "number of individuals trained on migration management", and eight indicators on state capacity building that include indicators such as "number of border stations supported to strengthen border control" and "number of staff [...] trained on security, border management, etc.". The 16 other indicators address issues like food security and economic growth, while three indicators focus on research of the aid programs. (Altai Consulting 2020)

According to a study conducted by Oxfam (2017), 22% of the EUTF's total funding is directed towards migration management, and 13.5% for security, peacebuilding, and preventing and countering violent extremism, while the rest goes for development cooperation (63%) and research and monitoring (1.5%). Development cooperation funds are mainly implemented in countries that the EU considers sources of migration, while migration management and security related funds are allocated to areas of transit. Since the Sahel is primarily a transit region for migrants, the funding for migration management merits a closer look: altogether 97% of the funds for that sector aim to prevent and control migration, and facilitate returns of migrants to their home countries, while only 3% is allocated to safe migration. The 97% is composed of migration management, raising awareness about the dangers of irregular migration, implementing policy reforms for returns, and improving the identification of nationality – which facilitates migrants returns to their countries of origin. (Ibid.)

2.2. The European Union's total aid to the Sahel

This section analyses the data from EU Aid Explorer – a tool by the European Commission that collects the official development aid (ODA for short) donated by the EU and its member states. The data used in this research is based on the "EC+OECD" dataset that combines the data from European Commission with European Investment Bank's and the member states' data published to OECD. This is the most complete dataset out of the three options provided and it is verified by OECD as a third party. This data includes all of the EU's aid instruments used, including the EDF and the EUTF.

The temporary scope of this study is limited to the eras of the Sahel Strategy and the Regional Action Plan as they are the main EU strategies that concern the region, though the data for 2019

and 2020 are incomplete in the dataset and therefore are left out of this study. The aid during the Sahel Strategy and the Regional Action Plan are further studied by dividing the study period into two corresponding eras: 2011-2014 and 2015-2018. The averages of each aid sector during these two areas are then calculated to account for the somewhat strong yearly fluctuation in each sector, and to account for the multiannual scope of the EU's largest development instrument, the EDF (see the third appendix).

I have decided to limit this study to the 15 largest recipient sectors in the Sahel, because these already represent 62% of the total aid during the study period. The rest of the 190 items individually constitute only one and a half percent, or less, of the total aid – thus keeping the study in a manageable size. This limit also serves the purpose to keep the data clear and from being cluttered with aid sectors that have received funding only for a year. In terms of growth, it also rules out sectors that would seemingly experience significant changes in their funding such as "industrial policy and administrative management" which experienced tenfold increase between the two study periods. However this was because there were only two years when the EU had made a donation to this sector – 22 thousand euros in 2011 and 231 thousand euros in 2015 – which are rather insignificant sums when compared to the tens and even hundreds of millions of euros of the 15 largest sectors.

2.2.1. The five largest aid sectors

The EU and its member states have dispersed more than 12.5 billion euros in development aid to the five Sahelian states since 2011, with steady increase of yearly disbursement from 1.19B in 2011 to 1.82B in 2018 (EU Aid Explorer). Since 2011, 16.3% of all the aid were classified as general budget support-related aid, 6.6% for material relief assistance, 6.3% for emergency food assistance, 5.0% for road transport, and 4.1% for basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation. See the tables in the first and second appendices for all figures. Together the top five sectors cover almost two fifths of the EU's total aid to the Sahel. The four last ones are fairly traditional development aid items, with material relief, emergency food assistance, and basic drinking water assistance addressing the basic human needs – something that is in dire need given the large portion of the Sahel's inhabitants living in poverty. Between 38% and 50% of the Sahelian states' population lives in extreme poverty (1.90 USD per day or less) – with the exception of Mauritania's 6% (World Bank a), though 22% of Mauritanians still live below the 5.50 USD poverty line (World Bank b). Many EU officials have said that even the traditional development projects of the EDF

have been increasingly characterised by European security concerns, such as addressing radicalisation in justice system reform cooperation (Lopez Lucia 2019).

2.2.2. Average changes

In terms of growth in the averages of the Sahel Strategy (2011-2014) and Sahel Regional Action Plan (2015-2018) the five sectors with the most growth among the 15 most funded sectors were agricultural policy and administrative management with 592% increase; civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution with 196% increase; security system management and reform with 178% increase; public sector policy and administrative management with 66% increase; and decentralisation and support to subnational government with 61% increase. These all strongly outpaced the 22% increase in the total amount of aid given to the region. (EU Aid Explorer) See the table in the third appendix for the growth of all of the fifteen most funded items.

These follow the change in the EU's priorities, as discussed earlier, as "agricultural policy and administrative management" is in line with creating opportunities for the youth, and addressing possible causes for migration and conflict, as the region has very high portion of its young population economically dependent on agriculture (Doso, 2014). This is especially important given that the region is severely threatened by land degradation and climate change (Ibid.) that likely would cause migratory push factors such as famine that force people to migrate in the future.

The other four of the five sectors with the strongest growth are more directly security related, which highlights the increasing importance the EU places on security in its engagement with the Sahel after the adoption of the Regional Action Plan in 2015. Decentralisation and support to subnational government -sector is part of efforts to build state resilience and the efforts to extend and strengthen the state's presence in its peripheries (European Commission 2017) where non-state actors such as the Tuareg rebels could otherwise fill the power vacuum and create another source of forced migration. Furthermore, strengthening states capacities allow them to control their border better to combat human trafficking and migration, alongside smuggling and transborder crime and militant organisations, as the EU aims to address migration in "all its aspects" (European Commission 2018 a).

2.2.3. A shift in priorities

The shift away from traditional development priorities and increased focus in sectors that address security issues (such as border control) can be seen in the way how the following items: civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution; security system management and reform; public sector policy and administrative management; and decentralisation and support to subnational government – have increased their total portion of the money the EU provides to the five Sahelian states. Together these four items cover 10% of the 6.5 billion euros the EU has provided to the Sahel in 2015-2018, while during 2011-2014 these four were given only 6% of the total amount – nearly doubling their share. When taking into account the all 190 different sectors, the money these four receive is highly unproportional. Out of the fifteen best funded sectors – or the fifteen most prioritised – these four received 17% of the total sum in 2015-2018, with the peak of 22% in 2017. (EU Aid Explorer)

Out of the five largest development aid items of all aid to the Sahel, all five of them – except for "material relief assistance and services" – experienced increase from the 2011-2014 average to the 2015-2018 average. However, during this period the average amount the EU has given material relief assistance has decreased by 33% – nearly 40 million euro in absolute terms. In addition to this, the share of the total aid given in 2011-2014 and 2015-2018 in the sectors of budget support and drinking water related assistance decreased by 17% and 8% respectively, while the share of emergency food assistance stagnated. This lack of progress in the four of the five largest aid sectors demonstrate that there has been a shift in the EU's approach, which can be traced back to the events in Europe in the mid 2010's and the Sahel Regional Action Plan as we will see later.

3. THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL'S THEORY OF SECURITISATION

This chapter introduces the Copenhagen School's theory of Securitisation, and applies it to the EU in the context of the migration crisis in mid 2010's Europe.

3.1. Theory of Securitisation

In order to understand this shift in the EU's strategies and the priorities in its development aid, it is useful to understand the underlying motives of the EU and what their causes are. A useful tool in understanding the EU's motivations is the theory of Securitisation which helps us to explain how an issue such as migration, that is not traditionally in the domain of security dominated by states and military considerations, can become a security issue. The theory helps us understand how some aspects of security can be socially constructed.

The Copenhagen School's theory on Securitisation – drawing from the works of John Austin and John Searle – is premised on the idea that speech is an act itself, which has tangible consequences. This speech act is an illocutionary act, meaning that there is a meaning behind the words which are being said, and what is being said is not just a plain statement or question. (Taureck 2006) For example, by saying "do you have water?" can also be a request to be handed water, instead of plain question.

In the theory of Securitisation, this speech act, by a securitising actor, has to claim that something poses an existential threat to a referent object. The referent object has to be something very important – such as the peoples' way of life in a given country, and the securitising actor has to justify extraordinary measures to protect the referent object. Thus, securitising something allows the audience – the political decision makers for example – to break the established convention and take measures that are not taken in normal circumstances – as for example allocate funding differently in order to respond to the securitised issue. (Buzan et al. 1998; Taureck 2006)

This theory is very versatile which also poses some challenges for it, as it risks that almost anything could be labelled as security issue by almost anyone, and thus risk diluting the term 'security' into a meaningless buzzword. To counter this, there are three restrictions in how a successful securitisation happens. Frist, the securitising actor has to be successful in convincing its audience of the existential gravity of the threat. As Buzan and his co-authors Wæver and de Wilde wrote, if the threat goes unaddressed, "everything else will be irrelevant" "because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way" (Buzan et al. 1998, 24). Second, for the securitising move to be convincing for the audience, the securitising actor has to have good access to its audience. Thirdly, the audience has to be able to address the threat (Ibid.): there is no point for a goldfish in an aquarium to convince the other fishes in the tank that the water is poisoned, since they cannot jump out nor change the water.

The theory has been also criticised for being applicable only in democracies, and the European Union for being undemocratic. However, for the purpose of this research, I would consider the EU to be responsive enough towards its citizens concerns, given that the Union's development aid policy is a shared competence, which in this case means that the democratic member state governments hold significant influence in its overall implementation. In the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union's fourth article, the EU is permitted to "carry out activities and conduct a common [development aid] policy" which "shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs." Therefore, the EU's policy cannot conflict with the member states' aim and thus the member states define the general direction of the EU's policy. This is especially true in the European Development Fund – the largest development instrument of the EU in terms of money – since the member states fund it directly, and thus have a significant role in monitoring and implementing the aid.

3.2. Applying the securitisation theory to the migration crisis in the European Union

3.2.1. The migration crisis of the mid 2010's

The European Union and its member states have been through a lot since the turn of the millennium, with a series of challenges for the European project beginning with the sovereign dept crisis in 2009, followed by a strong increase in migration to the EU member states and a twofold increase in asylum applications in 2015 (Eurostat). The year 2015 also coincides with a significant

increase in terrorism related deaths in western Europe, after a nine-year period of relative calm –
with the exception of the 2011 attacks in Norway (Ritchie et al 2019). This series of events fuelled
the campaigns of parties that already previously had worked on Eurosceptic and restricted
migration platforms, such as Lega Nord in Italy and National Assembly in France (Leonard,
Torreblanca 2014). However, despite these parties' electoral success, few studies (Vergani et al.
2019; Stockemer et al. 2019) have shown that there has not been a significant change in
individuals' ideological attitudes towards migration nor a change in opinion over the preferability
of European integration because of these events.

This fits well into the application of the securitisation theory as the voters did not become more
hostile to migration itself, but instead migration was increasingly seen as an issue of the security
domain in the political debate. As Nail (2016) proposed, the small timeframe between the rise in
migrants coming to Europe and increase in terrorist related deaths in western Europe forged an
image of a migrant as a possible perpetrator of terrorist attacks in the European political discourse
(Ibid.). Due to this securitisation of migration in the debate, and likely due to a contagion effect
proposed earlier by van Spanje (2010), the mainstream parties were under pressure to adopt similar
stances on migration. These developments and the continued inflow of migrants into Europe had
resulted into political pressure for the European policymakers in the EU and in the member states
alike to do something to this perceived security threat – or at least be perceived to be doing
something.

3.2.2. Migration crisis through securitisation

To apply the Securitisation theory to the migration crisis, it is useful to use a phrase used by Ole
Wæver himself – a professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen and a key
figure in the formulation of the Securitisation theory. He crystallised the Securitisation theory in a
video lecture as follows: "[Securitisation] is a situation where a referent object depicts an
existential threat and justifies to the relevant audience the use of extraordinary measures" (Open
University). In this case, the referent object represents the security of the European citizens, which
is perceived to be threatened by the inflow of terrorists who have the aim of committing violent
acts amongst the refugees and other migrants. The securitising act of depicting migration as a
threat has mainly happened through the electoral success of parties that campaigned on the grounds
of curbing migration and the subsequent contagion effect on the mainstream parties. The audience
– the European Union, its institutions, and the member state governments (in the capacity of
Council of the European Union) – have heard and taken measures to address these concerns. These

measures have been exceptionally extensive for EU's external action in terms of policy and geographic scope, as well as they have amounted to becoming an obsession to the EU – as Bernardo Venturi (2017), a researcher at the Instituto Affari Internazionali, noted.

It is this narrative change – from migrant fleeing war in order to have a secure life to a potential security threat to Europeans – that made it possible to talk about the flow of migrants as a crisis, which then unlocked the option to use development aid to address this extraordinary situation (Shenfeldt 2018, 10). This "tactical solution", devised by the European leaders, was used to decrease flow of migrants into Europe in the short term, which also has had the effect of politicising development policy to serve the European aims (Ibid.). This includes the aid to Sahelian states as seen previously, despite the main sources of migration towards Europe being from the Middle East (BBC 2018).

4. EUROPEAN UNION'S ACTIONS IN THE SAHEL THROUGH THE LENS OF THE SECURITISATION THEORY

This chapter synthesises the previous three chapters, and as a result, sees the change in the EU's Sahel approach as a response to the securitisation of migration in Europe. It sees the change – especially in the strategies – as a speech act signalling back to Europe that the EU is addressing the issue which has become a hot topic in European politics.

4.1. Regional Action Plan as a response to the securitisation of migration

As Libya is still entrenched in a bloody civil war with multiple centres of power claiming to be the legitimate government for the whole of territory, the EU's cooperation in migration faces significant challenges there. (Tadesse Abebe 2019, 7) Unfortunately for the EU, Libya has a pivotal role in the central Mediterranean route of migration, as it is the place where the routes from western and eastern Africa converge (Funk et al. 2017). The Libyan chaos therefore has created a need for the EU to work with countries further down the migratory routes if it wishes to address the issue. As Mattelaer put it in his chapter in a book edited by Gstöhl and Lannon (2016, 47), the Sahel "constitutes a geopolitical frontier" for the EU's southern neighbourhood, given the regional states' porous borders and its interconnectedness with the Arab countries to their north. The Sahelian states therefore play an important role in the EU's approach to migration in the western Africa. Lebovich (2018, 2) even noted that "it is in the Sahel that some EU members believe they must fight a key battle for the future of the European project". This stems from the idea that curbing migration and terrorism outside Europe is an effective way to respond to populist movements' pressure against the EU at home as I will discuss in this chapter.

The EU's change of perspective is strongly visible in the contrast between the 2011 Strategy and the 2016 Regional Action Plan. Prior to the events of the mid 2010's, the EU focused on development and security in the Sahel, while after the onset of the migration crisis, in its Regional Action Plan, the EU began emphasising combatting the spill-over from the regions problems by addressing migration, mobility, and border management as a response to the securitisation of migration. The Regional Action Plan highlights this as it considers smuggling of migrants,

radicalisation and violent extremism serious threats that "have potential spill-over effects" in the EU. The Regional Action Plan continues with a call for more cooperation between the Sahel, the Maghreb (essentially the countries north of the five Sahelian states – see page 12 for the list of states in the Maghreb), and the EU (Council of the European Union 2015), which coincides with the migratory routes going through the Sahel. This is highlighted further in the way migration is mentioned 20 times throughout the 24 pages of the main text of the Regional Action Plan while development was mentioned 47 times (the "main text" excludes the tables of the addendums). In contrast migration was mentioned only once in the Sahel Strategy while development was mentioned 43 times – that is roughly the same amount in a much shorter document (a nine-pager). The contrast between amounts of mentions serves as a tangible demonstration on the increased interest in curbing irregular migration, and a relative shift away from emphasising development in the Sahel. The traditional development cooperation's relative shift decrease in importance for the EU is also seen in the lack of progress in the four of the five largest aid sectors, compared to general increase in amount of aid given, which demonstrates that there has been a shift in the EU's approach. This shift can be further seen in the fifteen most funded programs as security and state capacity building related sectors increased their share of the aid allocated (see appendix three).

4.2. European Union's response as a speech act

This change is the EU's response to the securitisation of migration in the European policy debates, and its actions could be seen as a speech act with the audience being the EU's population and the European political debates. Though it is important to remember that in the securitisation model of the previous chapter, the EU is the audience and not the securitising actor. This however does not exclude the EU form making speech acts related to migration. In this illocutionary speech act, when the EU speaks about migration in its strategies, it signals to the European population through media and national policymakers that something is being done, and that the EU is being responsive to the securitising actor's calls. This view was echoed also by an NGO representative interviewed in a study by Shenfeldt (2018, 6): "By reducing the number of migrants coming to Europe they can show the public and the media that they are doing something about the problem." An European Commission official highlighted the pressure to respond to the securitisation of migration and the role of development aid (Ibid., 7): "At the political level there is a lot of pressure … to ensure that development projects also contribute to the resolution of the perceived migration crisis". This is likely intended to take some of the wind off the eurosceptics' sails, as the supranational union

demonstrates its ability to address migration – an issue at the core of several Eurosceptic parties. The call to use development aid in migration management are part of the measures enabled by the securitisation of migration that the EU would not be able to take in "normal" circumstances.

When looking the Regional Action Plan's four priorities through the lens of curbing irregular migration towards Europe, all of them seem tailor-made for that purpose – even though the European dimension is not always stated in them. This is for example because the developmental priority of "creating appropriate conditions for youth" has the stated goal of preventing radicalisation, and given that the section on migration and mobility explicitly points the Nigerien town of Agadez as a priority, along with another town called Arlit. Approximately more than half of the migrants who reached Lampedusa, Italy – an important entry point for migrants and the closest EU territory to Libya – passed through Agadez on their way to Europe (Raineri, Rossi 2017). Therefore addressing migration here sends a strong signal back to the European stakeholders that the EU is acting on migration. Further on, the focus on border management and preventing and countering radicalisation, for example, are rather self-explanatory in terms of what the desired effect for Europe is: preventing radicalisation prevents potential migrants from radicalising, and stronger border management prevents potential terrorists from leaving the country to migrate to Europe. The speech act's illocutionary effect to signal that the EU is acting against migration is accentuated in the Global Strategy as the EU states that it will invest in Africa as an investment to Europe's "own security and prosperity" (EEAS 2016 a, 36).

5. THE RESPONSE'S EFFECTS ON DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITH THE SAHEL

This chapter discusses the effect the EU's response on the securitisation of migration has on the EU's development cooperation with the Sahel. It takes issue with the idea of addressing "root causes of migration" from the development aid perspective – beginning with how the concept is misguided, and followed by the effects on development aid caused by this concept and the EU's changed development aid approach.

5.1. Misguided efforts to reduce migration

Even though the stated aim of the EU is to address the root causes of migration – in other words the push factors of migration, there exists no academic consensus on what they are in the Sahel. However, it can be said that non-forced migration is a strategy to attain better livelihood and a "response to an unequal distribution of resources" (Neumann, Hermans 2015). As Rainieri and Rossi (2017) noted, the policy debates in the EU have centred around the idea that the less there is development, the more there is migration. This is caused by lack of opportunities such as employment and by lack of ability to cater human needs. The policy debates however tend not to take into account the large costs that are inhibited in transnational migration and the actual capacity of the world's poorest to cover these costs that inhibits them from leaving. As de Haas (2010) noted, migration is a U-shaped curve, where the world's poorest and richest stay put, and those in between are able, and possibly willing, to migrate. Furthermore, migration tends to decrease only after sustained period of economic growth in a given country (Neumann, Hermans 2015). Therefore the EU's approach in the Sahel seem to be misguided, as the five Sahelian countries can be found at the bottom of almost any rankings measuring economic prosperity, such as GDP PPP per capita (IMF), or the poverty index (World Bank b).

Thus, besides signalling to the European voters and media, the EU's approach to curb migration towards Europe using development aid instruments seems to be poorly founded. Though it is good to keep in mind that these efforts make use of instruments that were readily available for the EU at the onset of the crisis when there was need for rapid action. Even if this would work, this would

have effects only in medium term, leaving the EU's need to address migration flows in the short term unanswered. To this end, the EU had devised the EUTF which also will be addressed in the next subchapter.

5.2. Diverting funding and attention from developmental goals

As Shenfield (2018) noted based on her interviews of EU officials, the European development aid has experienced a general reorientation towards addressing migration. The traditional development programs have been imbued with migration related agenda, and some programs have been re-branded to address the root causes of migration – something that Shenfield considers an euphemism for "curbing migration flows to Europe." (Ibid., 5).

Given how the EU's organisational set-up constrains its ability to conduct foreign policy, as it is mostly the competence of its member states – with the exception of development policy being a shared competence – and taking into account the role of the EU and its member states combined as the world's largest donor of development aid, and the EU institutions alone as the fourth (Statista), it is rather logical that the EU would use development aid to further its migration related goals in the Sahel. The Regional Action Plan further suggested that "an important part" of the Sahel countries portion of the European Development Fund could be used to implement the four security oriented priorities of the Action Plan, thus siphoning funds from the goals of the Cotonou Agreement which are focused on developing the recipient countries' economies instead of benefiting the donor's security needs. Shenfeldt (2018) considered the general reorientation of development aid towards migration management and its use as a leverage over the recipient countries as a "violation of a number of European commitments", most notably the Treaty of Lisbon Article 161, which stipulates poverty reduction as the main goal of EU's aid. It is also questionable in regard to the commitments made in the Cotonou Agreement.

Besides the EUTF's aim to address the "root causes of migration" in the light of it being byword for curbing migration – a telling sing of who is this instrument aimed to serve is the fact that the recipient African governments have no official role in the process of deciding the projects and their funding. They have been relegated to only comment and consult as observers (Oxfam 2017), having little power over the priorities and the aims of the instrument, which goes against the EU's Sahel Strategy that emphasises local ownership. In accordance with the pressure the EU faces to

respond to the securitisation of migration, and what Venturi (2017) called an emerging policy of externalising EU's security, the EUTF seems to be part of the efforts to stop migrants in the middle of their route towards Europe, without paying much attention to providing official and safer routes to Europe – given the 3% for safe migration. In the Sahel, migration management constituted 25% of the total funding to the region (Oxfam 2017). Since 70% of the EUTF's funding comes from the EDF, a significant amount of money is used to advance EU's aims and not the development goals agreed in the Cotonou Agreement.

Finally, the embedment of migration related objectives in the EU's development aid has launched the phrase "root causes of migration" into policy discourse inside the EU's development work. As Shenfeldt (2018) noted, it has become a useful method of mobilising funding for a particular program. This drives the attention of the development programs towards the sources of migration and thus decreasing their impact on poverty reduction. This is because the people who are capable to migrate internationally do not belong to the poorest strata in the Sahel (the U-shaped curve) and therefore are likely not in the greatest need of development aid. While the EU strives to reach the UN goal of 0.7% of the gross national income (GNI) as development aid, it risks diluting its development efforts with development aid programs that actually answer to the EU's security interests arising from its internal politics, instead of the local Sahelian priorities that development cooperation is supposed to address. This in turn hurts the EU's credibility as a coherent development partner: its development aid is based on the Lisbon Treaty Article 161 which stipulates that the EU's aid's primary objective is poverty reduction, and in long term its eradication, while the EU's current actions speak of different objectives. As the EU itself highlighted in the Global Strategy, "the EU's credibility hinges on … the effectiveness and consistency of [its] policies, and adherence to [its] values." (EEAS 2016 a, 10)

CONCLUSION

As the EU spends billions of euros around the world on development aid every year – especially when the yearly disbursements have doubled in the past ten years – it is hard not to understate the magnitude of the EU's role in the world of development cooperation. This research has taken part on the important literature of the EU as a development actor, and despite its narrow scope, it takes part in the larger efforts to understand the EU's motivations and methods of achieving those, as well as what effect does this have on the EU's role in the development cooperation sector.

As this research has set out to shed light on the research question of "how the migration crisis in Europe has influenced the EU's development cooperation with the Sahel", it has found out that there has been a significant change of tone in the EU's official documents regarding migration and the use of development aid. It is followed by a noticeable increase in the amount of development aid money spent in the Sahel on sectors that cater to migration management and a disproportionately slow growth in traditional development aid sectors when compared to the total aid growth.

In this research I propose that the theory of Securitisation can be used to explain this change in the EU's approach. This is because following the migration crisis in Europe, migration was securitised in the political discourse that created pressure for the EU to address migration in the Sahel as well. I further apply the theory's concept of a speech act to the EU's response in the Sahel and conclude that the aforementioned changes represent a speech act themselves – though not in the sense of an attempt to securitise something, but in the sense of responding to the securitisation of migration and communicating back home that something is being done to address the issue.

This, however, is quite problematic in terms of the EU as a development actor because it utilises the funds reserved for pursuing development priorities that pertain to poverty reduction. Exemplified by the EUTF, it risks the EU diluting its commitment to the UN development aid goal of 0.7% of GNI with aid that has goals that cater to the EU's own priorities – and is suboptimal in terms of poverty reduction, instead of aid that is suited for the purpose and to the priorities of which were agreed in the Cotonou Agreement. This is furthered by the introduction of addressing

"root causes of migration" into the EU's development discourse as means of easier mobilisation of funding, which drives the focal point towards issues that relate to migration. This in turn is problematic in terms of poverty reduction as international migration tends to follow a U-shaped curve, which means that those segments of the Sahelian societies that can and are willing to migrate are not in the greatest need of development assistance. The incoherence between the EU's commitments in the Treaty of Lisbon and the Cotonou Agreement, and the use of development aid to achieve its own priorities risk doing harm to the EU's reputation in the field of development cooperation.

Therefore, the text can be simplified and summarised as follows:
- The EU has begun to emphasise migration in its strategies and development aid concerning the Sahel.
- This is a response to pressure caused by the recent migration crisis in Europe.
- As the EU uses development aid in its response, it risks diverting funding and attention from poverty reduction.
- This risks damage to the EU's reputation as a development aid partner.

As the EU is currently working on the new Africa Strategy, understanding the EU's actions in its "laboratory of experimentation" provides useful insight on what we may expect from the upcoming strategy. Given the increase in migration related objectives in the last five years in the Sahel, we can expect to have migration being featured heavily on its approach to the whole continent as well. Further on, understanding the EU's priorities in the region helps the NGO sector to know what strings to pull with their advocacy work with the EU – though hopefully not directing the EU's development aid's focus further towards migration in the process.

A shortcoming of this research has been the lack of assessing the effects on the ground of the EU's response to the securitisation of migration. However, I believe that the confines of a bachelor thesis would not suffice to cover the European and the Sahelian aspect at the same time, therefore warranting its own research. Further study on the decision making process in the EU and analysis of other outputs like speeches in a national or the European Parliament, along with press statements and interviews of EU officials – instead of only the official strategies and documents – would provide interesting and very applicable information that merits a research on their own right.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1. Table of the 15 largest aid sectors to the Sahel

The following is oredered by the total contribution between 2011 and 2018, in a descending order.

All figures are in millions of euros.

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
General budget support-related aid	218.62	180.08	292.72	251.67	268.88	235.83	258.40	195.80
Material relief assistance and services	79.57	128.60	149.57	108.11	69.06	102.73	51.82	90.11
Emergency food assistance	53.88	84.54	92.65	95.35	103.45	93.79	89.86	114.12
Road transport	45.45	47.51	68.53	85.21	96.28	91.47	55.97	85.71
Basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation	52.62	54.36	65.91	57.98	64.04	49.17	71.35	76.30
Food assistance	32.20	104.05	53.76	41.91	58.75	32.82	45.58	103.24
Agricultural development	24.79	25.83	34.70	35.71	30.04	45.32	41.52	74.35
Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution	6.23	9.22	25.04	20.13	25.86	28.14	53.41	72.18
Agricultural policy and administrative management	8.37	5.91	10.05	5.54	10.48	50.44	65.78	79.85
Decentralisation and support to subnational government	19.89	16.73	30.94	40.47	35.10	44.99	41.91	51.55
Security system management and reform	6.46	7.24	27.07	22.57	29.05	46.54	45.25	55.25
Higher education	35.43	34.24	32.27	32.13	31.03	29.32	32.33	33.54

Public sector policy and administrative management	35.67	24.59	17.06	16.62	25.21	22.96	78.73	29.05
Debt forgiveness	35.05	33.94	29.13	26.10	73.41	22.40	18.56	17.40
Rural development	22.47	19.08	22.15	33.27	24.06	26.29	24.50	31.68

Source: EU Aid Explorer

Appendix 2. Table of the 15 largest aid sectors' change from the year 2011

This table follows the same order as table one for easier reading. All figures are in precentages.

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
General budget support-related aid	-17.63	33.89	15.11	22.99	7.87	18.19	-10.44
Material relief assistance and services	61.61	87.98	35.87	-13.21	29.10	-34.87	13.24
Emergency food assistance	56.91	71.96	76.98	92.01	74.09	66.78	111.81
Road transport	4.54	50.78	87.48	111.82	101.25	23.14	88.57
Basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation	3.29	25.25	10.18	21.68	-6.57	35.58	44.98
Food assistance	223.11	66.95	30.13	82.43	1.90	41.54	220.59
Agricultural development	4.19	39.94	44.01	21.16	82.80	67.44	199.87
Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution	47.89	301.85	223.06	314.99	351.58	756.92	1058.11
Agricultural policy and administrative management	-29.41	20.13	-33.80	25.21	502.96	686.28	854.40
Decentralisation and support to subnational government	-15.86	55.59	103.50	76.53	126.26	110.75	159.21
Security system management and reform	12.06	318.92	249.18	349.54	620.05	600.18	754.87
Higher education	-3.34	-8.91	-9.29	-12.42	-17.24	-8.75	-5.33
Public sector policy and administrative management	-31.06	-52.17	-53.39	-29.33	-35.64	120.73	-18.55
Debt forgiveness	-3.16	-16.90	-25.54	109.44	-36.09	-47.04	-50.36
Rural development	-15.07	-1.41	48.06	7.07	16.99	9.03	41.00

Source: EU Aid Explorer, author's calculations

Appendix 3. Table of the 15 largest aid sectors' shares of the total aid in 2011-2014 and 2015-2018

This table follows the same order as table one for easier reading. All figures are in precentages.

	2011-2014	2015-2018	Growth between 2011-2014 and 2015-2018
General budget support-related aid	17.68	14.71	-16.83
Material relief assistance and services	8.73	4.81	-44.92
Emergency food assistance	6.12	6.15	0.54
Road transport	4.63	5.05	9.22
Basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation	4.33	4.00	-7.59
Food assistance	4.35	3.69	-15.22
Agricultural development	2.27	2.93	29.24
Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution	1.14	2.75	142.29
Agricultural policy and administrative management	0.56	3.17	465.77
Decentralisation and support to subnational government	2.03	2.66	31.41
Security system management and reform	1.19	2.70	127.37
Higher education	2.51	1.94	-23.01
Public sector policy and administrative management	1.76	2.39	35.78
Debt forgiveness	2.33	2.02	-13.23
Rural development	1.82	1.63	-10.15

Source: EU Aid Explorer, author's calculations

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