

TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

School of Business and Governance

Department of Law

Tiina Purru

**THE NEIGHBOURS VIEW ON CHINA: THE CASES OF JAPAN,  
VIETNAM, AND TAIWAN**

Master's Thesis

Programme International Relations and European-Asian Studies

Supervisor: Peeter Mürsepp, PhD

Tallinn 2017

I declare that I have compiled the paper independently and all works, important standpoints and data by other authors have been properly referenced and the same paper has not been previously presented for grading.

The document length is 15 154 words from the introduction to the end of summary.

Tiina Purru 15/01/2017

.....

(signature,date)

Student's code: 152753TASM

Email address: tpurru@gmail.com

Supervisor Professor Peeter Müürsepp:

The paper conforms to requirements in force.

.....

(signature, date)

Chairman of the Defence Committee

Permitted to defence

.....

(Title, name, signature, date)

## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

INTRODUCTION .....	5
1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .....	8
2. INTERACTION WITH THE PRC .....	13
2.1. Japan .....	15
2.1.1. Sino-Japanese treaties and disputes .....	17
2.1.2. Sino-Japanese security policies .....	18
2.1.3. Sino-Japanese economic relations .....	20
2.2. Vietnam .....	22
2.2.1. Sino-Vietnamese treaties and disputes .....	24
2.2.2. Sino-Vietnamese security policies .....	26
2.2.3. Sino-Vietnamese economic relations .....	27
2.3. Taiwan .....	28
2.3.1. Sino-Taiwanese treaties and disputes .....	29
2.3.2. Sino-Taiwanese security policies .....	30
2.3.3. Sino-Taiwanese economic relations .....	32
3. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TOWARDS THE MAINLAND .....	38
CONCLUSION .....	45
LIST OF REFERENCES .....	47

## **ABSTRACT**

Since this thesis will be analysing China's neighbours case by case, the current work is divided into three main themes in accordance with the case studies. The core idea of using secondary sources and comparing the states' foreign policies and strategies is to draw out different alternatives on viewing the bilateral relations between China-Japan, China-Vietnam, and China-Taiwan. These three countries were selected as the case studies because they all have a historically complicated relationship with China and are involved with the ongoing conundrum in maritime disputes, whether it is in the South China Sea or the East China Sea. What can be considered as a novelty is the focus point: the relations between these three states and China is described through the neighbours' perspective.

The centre of interest is on the similarities and differences of the case studies on how they "handle" China and whether they implement public diplomacy. The thesis will endeavour to describe whether public diplomacy would be successful concerning the relationship between those countries and China, and if not, what they lack in analysis.

Keywords: China, Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, neighbours, foreign policies, public diplomacy, constructivism.

## **INTRODUCTION**

There are numerous research papers written that aim to explain what might be the ultimate goal for the People's Republic of China (PRC). Is it to change East Asia into Chinese hegemony or beating the US in their own game of being world's policeman? Although pursuing an explanation of what China does next or what are the motivations behind each action is worthy to explore deeper, it is not the purpose of this paper. Instead, the current research's objective is focusing on what China's neighbours have been up to and how do they assess the latter's foreign policy. That is to say, in lieu of trying to figure out what is China planning to do in the world politics, this thesis will focus on how three of China's neighbouring countries position themselves around China.

The People's Republic of China is notorious for not getting along with its neighbours. Taiwan, Japan, and Vietnam all have a historically complicated relationship with the PRC. These states were chosen to be studied partly because of that. The maritime disputes around the South and East China Seas combined with national uptake on foreign policy and economic ties illustrate the dynamic interaction between the countries.

But it is not the only territorial disputes involving China and its neighbours that is currently the criteria for selection of making observations. Two case studies - Japan and Taiwan- can be regarded as distinctive states in international relations since both of them have unique restrictions set for conducting security policies. Taiwan itself wants to be recognised by the rest of the world as an independent unity from the PRC, whilst economic cooperation with the latter has been on a rise creating integration between two economy markets. Japan is also a special case with its National Constitution of 1947 Article 9 committing to pacifism. For more interesting insight, Vietnam as a fellow communist state has also been included to be observed as a case study along with the two aforementioned countries. Following the regional unipolarity that influences the relationship, foreign policies of Japan, Vietnam, and Taiwan will be explored. Description of the relations these

three countries have established with the PRC will be by creating a comparison of economic ties and security circumstances. These elements can be used in analysing how the case study countries have planned to handle China with the usage of soft power. For the output of the soft power public diplomacy in specific has been chosen to be observed, as the PRC itself has been noted to use this form of diplomacy quite ingeniously.

Through analysing what other researchers have already found, there are certain loopholes. Whether it is about the South and East China Sea disputes or the question of hegemony in the East Asia region, what is not described explicatively the roles that China's neighbours take upon themselves to influence the relations. They are often treated as a reactive, not active participant in states' communication. The effectiveness of Public Diplomacy used and the differences between the usages amongst the three needs to be studied. To show trends in attitude in the relationship with China more clearly, the following research questions are to be answered:

1. What are the similarities and differences between Japan, Vietnam, and Taiwan, when it concerns foreign policies about China?
2. What is being implemented in relations with the PRC?
3. What are the current key factors for the trio's public diplomacy when dealing with the PRC?

The first part will be about methodology, where besides secondary literature analysis, the countries' foreign policies are examined by using constructivist paradigm. Constructivism will demonstrate the perceptions on what the countries have over China, as the main idea of constructivism is that agents act toward other agents on the basis of meanings the other agents have for them (Blumer 1969, 2). The core idea of it is the striving force of implementing public diplomacy. Therefore, this research paper will analyse perceptions and how the relationship between either China and Japan, Vietnam, or Taiwan is affected.

In the second part of the research paper, the case studies will be presented. Description of the states and what has been written already will give an overview of the relationship from the three countries' perspective. Ongoing cooperative ventures and dispute areas are depicted together with economic relations and security policies providing short description what methods have been implemented in communication with the PRC.

The third part will be about public diplomacies that the states have used with China, giving the preliminary to how to answer the research questions. In this part of the research paper, further analysis is done according to the methodology to describe what are the factors influencing most the relationship, and what are the similarities and differences in the foreign policies of public diplomacy adhered by the three case studies.

In short, the thesis will combine analysis of states behaviour through evaluation of official documents and secondary sources, which are explaining influential factors like economic ties and historical background. The states' relations are observed throughout different stages and methods of communication and diplomacy.

# **1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

The methodology used for this research is a combination of literature analysis and constructivism. The comparative methodology is naturally implemented to enquire into case studies. In this instance, it also assists observing soft power usage between the states. Constructivism is widely used in international relations. The popularity behind it can be explained as the University of Manchester Professor Maja Zehfuss puts it, “it is precisely a certain unproblematic acceptance of reality which has made the constructivist ‘success story’ possible” (2002). Not setting rigid frames to what can influence the states’ relations means using different factors which are influencing foreign policy as a basis for a socially constructed instrument like public diplomacy can also be dissected within the theory.

Constructivism was first coined by Florida International University’s Professor Emeritus Nicholas Onuf, using the term to describe the socially constructed nature of international relations (1989). But constructivism only reached a larger circle of audience within international relations starting from the early 1990s, when the Ohio State University’s Mershon Professor Alexander Wendt published the article “Anarchy is what states make of it” in 1992. It laid the theoretical groundwork for dominating schools of neoliberalism and neorealism be under scrutiny, creating a path for studying how actors co-determine each other.

Constructivism builds its theory on social interactions, basing it on a belief that, “(...) the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” (Wendt 1999). In other words, for international relations, this means it is the people who determine the fate of the state. Loosely employing Wendt’s interpretation of constructivism we can approach more social side of states’ relations and take into consideration the states’ subjective use of their own identity as a “property of intentional actors that generates



motivational and behavioural dispositions” (*Ibid.*), making it into a potential soft power tool for promoting foreign audience’s perception.

Moving onto the term ‘soft power’, which was first used by Harvard University Professor Joseph Nye, whilst using different influences which have an impact on society, like economy or culture, as a persuasive method of communication between countries (Nye 1990). The attraction represented in the soft power would be used as a tool by the state’s representation of culture, political ideals, and policies to other nations. That can be recapitulated into Wendt’s use of identity: if we have self-identity (as a state), then we also make a distinction between who are labelled as ‘others’ (Wendt 1999). By making clear what is the identity of the state, specific interests can determine the difference and similarities from others, which also insinuates states as actors need to have knowledge how others perceive them. Since the identity of the actor’s self by Wendt’s theory can be a reflection of others’ diplomatic gestures (*Ibid.*), states can introduce their point of interests to the affected actor. What states are interested in also shows what motivates them in decision-making. In this social constructivist perspective, the actor’s own identity could also *vice-versa* be used as a soft power instrument as in relations states co-determine each other. Therefore, here soft power would foremost be a method to reach the intended target or objective in international relations through socially constructed methods.

This brings us to Korea University’s Professor Shin-Wha Lee definition of soft power as “a form of national power that is based on ideational and cultural attractiveness, which is intentionally or unintentionally realized by actors in international relations to achieve strategic imperatives “(2011). Coercion by force or bribing, on the other hand, is called ‘hard power’. One could argue that compared to hard power, soft power holds little influence over states’ affairs, but a nation with a large amount of soft power and good reputation in terms of its identity can avoid costly hard power expenditures (Purushothaman 2010). In spite of that, effective influence with soft power on another state isn’t something that can be produced quickly. It is long-term process, where the attraction’s value of the state’s identity must be close to a stable state.

The power states can attribute now is more flexible on how it is attained. Relations are less hierarchical, which results having increased potential for interaction with more political and

diplomatic importance (Rawnsley 2012). But for soft power to present attractiveness which could influence a large state like the PRC points out social construction's weakness as well. To make an impact on foreign policies, it has to be something that could be defined as common, shared, and intersubjective for other states (Zehfuss 2002). Though relations using soft power can be less hierarchical, a smaller state has to gain recognition from a legitimate great power. In Gerry Simpson's definition of 'legalised hegemony', legitimate great powers are a powerful elite of states whose superior status is acknowledged by minor powers. As a political statement, the existence of certain constitutional privileges, rights, and duties and whose relations with each other are defined by belief in a rough principle of sovereign equality. (Simpson 2004, 68) Minor powers are very well aware that when it comes to influencing with soft power, the powerful states have an advantage. Yet, at the same time, gaining equal social treatment is also easier.

One of the outlets for soft power - public diplomacy - can be summarised as states' communication-based actions together with state-sanctioned actors aimed at non-state groups in other countries planning on achieving foreign policy goals and objectives. Within this reference, public diplomacy is an extension of a foreign policy tool to traditional diplomacy in terms of the actors and objectives. (Sevin 2015) A constructivist public diplomacy is then based on the assumption that social constructs inside norms, values, and identities in international relations are not defined by material power sources (Van Ham 2002; Sevin 2015). It might seem that military prowess and economic infrastructure in constructivism carry little relevance, but in reality, these cannot be excluded as both do influence decision-making. Conversely, constructivism also empowers social constructions, which enables more significance for public diplomacy.

From the perspective of empirical research studies, using socially constructed facts allows constructivist researchers to expand the range of permissible variables, so that not only materialistic interests can be taken into account, but also norm and value-based ones (Wendt 1999; Weber 2014). Economic relations with foreign states do carry influence in policy decisions, and economic welfare could be seen as an attraction to export in public diplomacy. All in all, this insinuates that if public diplomacy were to be successful, it would need to work in multiple angles.

South Korea's Korean Wave<sup>1</sup> Initiative is a good example of using soft power within public diplomacy to increase its positive influence with other states. The South Korean government has been aiding its cultural development ever since the 90s with a purpose of exporting its entertainment industry in specific. And it has paid off- Korean contemporary culture fans abroad (and especially from China) have contributed significantly to the soft power South Korean State now holds and has leverage over. Nye has acknowledged it in his analysis of South Korean soft power that South Korea has an impressive soft-power arsenal (2009). When comparing military prowess with the PRC or the US, South Korea will undoubtedly be the losing side. But bring in soft-power resources to the equation, and the answer might not appear as clear. The South Korean way has given encouragement to Japan to create their own cultural initiative called Cool Japan, but that is described afterwards in the following analysis.

Attraction is also not the only thing that public diplomacy can induce. Using public diplomacy can create 'benefit of the doubt' on the targeted issues, and when trying to influence legislators, it can become a useful tool for lobbying (Sevin 2015). Therefore, constructivism in public diplomacy is not a paradigm that describes fixed relationships between the social and the material. The movement of it proves to be more fluid.

As an example of how socially constructed ties have developed increasingly important is how the Internet and social media has become the new norm in contacting the civil society. Soft power can conveniently find usage there. To create reasonable doubt or represent the state's own side of the story has become more convenient, since contacting the targeted foreign community has become easier. (Chang *et al.* 2013, 153) Public diplomacy can directly influence social constructs of another country by promoting curiosity and discussions on various issues. To be able to do that, it has to operate within multiple purposes and identities in foreign relations. Or as Rawnsley has put it, "the bottom line here is that public diplomacy must involve interaction and building relationships with the public: communication means dialogue, and the more open, transparent and meaningful the dialogue, the greater the impact on soft power projection." (2012)

---

<sup>1</sup> Also known as *Hallyu*.

Oxford Martin School's Deputy Director of the Institute for Science, Innovation and Society Javier Lezaun's writing has excellently summarised the theory to public diplomacy, "constructivism can tell us what to look at when we are trying to understand actions and structures. It can direct our analytical efforts toward constitutive elements of international order that often have been overlooked in traditional IR. The more sophisticated our constructivist instruments, the richer the image of the international system we will be able to produce." (2002) Therefore, to gain a better overview of public diplomacy usage, covering areas that influence it must be carried out.

As for the studying the cases, comparative methodology used in comparing case studies emerged after the Second World War, according to former Brandeis University's Professor Roy Macridis, and deals with "abstract and concrete situations to determine criteria of relevance of the particular components of social and political situations to the problem under study" (2000). Comparative analysis reveals the similarities and differences the states have necessary to conduct case study comparison for a clear overview how are their current relations with the PRC.

In the following analysis, public diplomacy is included as a soft power tool giving the states the opportunity to stand on a more equal footing. But, to objectively define when a state has been accorded 'equal social treatment' by other 'legitimate great powers' can be tricky, as it is dependent on cognitive perceptions. (Suzuki 2008: 48) To constructivist, accepting subjectivity is essential. That, and acknowledging materiality both are an intermediate area for the theoretical side itself (Onuf 1998; Zehfuss 2002). Therefore, admitting its weaknesses, can constructivism offer "fundamentally behavioural conception of both process and institutions: they change behaviour but not identities and interest" (Wendt 1992). Constructivism sees common social influence areas to be useful in communication with other states as by getting a hold on by their respective interest groups. The society or culture itself could be used as a leverage to gain more influence, basing it on the idea that international relations operate on structures and identities which are socially created. Thus, managing to have efficient tools to influence this social desirability can be seen as a source of power. (Van Ham 2010; Sevin 2015) But for social desirability to actually to carry the actor's strategic imperatives in terms of branding its identity with a foreign audience, it would require other structures of power besides social relations to be relatively stable as within direct conflict soft power would difficult to induce, to which the following chapter will be committed.

## 2. INTERACTION WITH THE PRC

Three different countries, three different attitudes towards their neighbouring state the People's Republic of China. Compared to the three case study subjects - Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam - China has a large body of land with 14 5000km- 32 000km<sup>2</sup> coastline. All three have an ongoing maritime dispute with China. And although territorial disputes are not uncommon, every state interacting with PRC becomes extra vigilant due to its massive size in land, population, and military. The territorial matters are also made more complicated because of the shared history that Japan, Vietnam, and Taiwan share being under the Chinese supremacy at some point in the past. The Mainland's imperial rule within the region turned the surrounding states into vassals paying regular tributes until the fall of Qing dynasty (1644-1911). Supporters of Sinocentric<sup>3</sup> view concerning the PRC's foreign policy would say the imperial ambitions have been passed on to the current rule. Hence, to reach a better comprehension of the PRC's influential areas for other states' foreign policies will be shortly covered, making public diplomacy of the respective states also interdependent on these factors.

Therefore, Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam have been chosen in part due to their ongoing disputes and historical background in relations with China. What made Japan and Taiwan even more compelling case studies is how both states are regarded unique because of the way their foreign policies are being limited. In the 1947 Constitution of Japan, a clause renouncing the use of military force and declares Japan as not possessing any war potential.<sup>4</sup> This means Japan's foreign policy relies on more soft power usage to avoid confrontations. Taiwan as well: since it lost formal recognition as an independent state from most states that want to avoid the PRC's disfavour. And yet it still functions as a Westphalian sovereignty (Atanassova-Cornelis 2013). Vietnam, on the other hand,

---

<sup>2</sup> Depending on the source, the coast line length varies. In Chinese (the PRC), it is currently stated that the mainland coastline is 18 000 km, but with the 'islands' it is 32 000km.

<sup>3</sup> Sinocentrism is belief from the imperial times, where China is seen as the centre of the world.

<sup>4</sup> Only the minimum level of armed force is allowed for self-defence. Collective self-defence yet again is prohibited.

despite also sharing similar state ideology with the PRC, which could make one assume the relations would be more cooperative with each other, was the most recent one out these three countries which was at a war with the PRC in 1979. As a consequence, Vietnam was included as a case study in addition to create more compelling comparison between the states.

All three countries are currently facing the dilemma of whether to be under the US protective shield or become more independent from the US foreign policy directions. Japan and Taiwan especially have close ties with the US. Japan is under its nuclear umbrella for defensive purposes, and Taiwan is in possession of the US commitment for defence assistance under the agreement of 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). In recent years, Vietnam has also started cosyng up to the US, signing a Bilateral Trade Agreement in 2001. Vietnam and Japan are also connected to Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), with Vietnam being a core member and Japan being involved within ASEAN Plus Three (APT) co-operation, whilst Taiwan is an active exporter country for the member states, wanting to become an official partner.

From the economical point of view, these case studies have at least regionally come up with concrete goals in terms of cooperation, including with the PRC. Although, it should be mentioned that the regional centre of interest is mostly based on economic gains: ASEAN is focusing on strengthening surveillance mechanisms and developing domestic financial systems; APT's focus on regional economic surveillance, reserve pooling, and bond market development. (Pekkanen 2012) But the solution for disputed areas probably won't be reached with the help of ASEAN, as most members are involved in the South China Sea dispute. It has been tried in the past, when in 1992, 25<sup>th</sup> ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila was agreed on a Joint "Spratly Declaration" to reach for a peaceful settlement (ASEAN 1992) but hasn't had much impact on resolving the issue at hand.

At the present time, Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and China now all share the same area of conflict of interest – the aforementioned territory of South China Sea. So, naturally, it is a serious security concern in the Asia Pacific region. The South China Sea is believed to have large oil and gas deposits, fisheries, and most importantly - major portion of world's trade passes happen there, making it an obvious conflict of interest when the claims over the territory clash in a way, where "China physically controls the Paracel Islands and seven reefs among the Spratly Islands. Territory claimed by China is also claimed in part by Brunei, Malaysia, the

Philippines, and Vietnam, and in entirety by Taiwan, with the fiercest territorial disputes being those between China and Vietnam and China and the Philippines.”(Chakraborti 2012)

The marine navigation through the South China Sea, especially the chokepoints of the Taiwan Strait in the north and the Straits of Malacca in the south, is a key location to the region’s geo-strategic role in connecting the northeast Asia’s sea lanes with the rest of the world. Therefore, the South China Sea is essential for commercial and strategic passage purposes. Besides, safety while navigating through the waters, unobstructed aviation over the area are of value to external powers like the US as well. (*Ibid.*)

Japan is not involved with the South China Sea dispute directly, but together with South Korea, it also has a maritime dispute with the PRC over the East China Sea’s Senkaku islands. In contrast to the territorial dispute, the Taiwan issue hasn’t been a source of tensions in Japan’s relations with China in recent years (Atanassova-Cornelis 2013), although given the historical background it could be one of the conflict areas.

## **2.1. Japan**

In the 1980s, Japanese foreign policy split into two schools of thought, one concentrating on the East Asia region, the other the one on Asia-Pacific region. The first supported the creation of ASEAN Plus Three (meant including Japan, Korea, and China), whereas the latter supported the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The APEC side focused on economics and multilateralism led by the US. The ASEAN Plus Three focused on being involved in the East Asia region. (Inoguchi 2011, 236) Together with increasing multilateral relations instead of bilateralism with the US, Japan also started to build up its own military stance (Nye 1990). The necessity was imminent after Tiananmen Incident in 1989 and the end of the Cold War era in 1991, which meant its biggest ally concentrated more on the former Soviet Union States’ issues.

With the first Gulf War in 1991 following, Japan was ready to have a nationwide discussion about where Japan is positioned on the global point of view and what should the preconditions for its foreign policy be (Inoguchi 1993; Iwanaga 1996; Hagström 2005). Japan also started to see

China's development increasing security risk in economy, military build-up, and its conduct of foreign policy (Hook *et al.* 2005; Malafaia 2016). The opposition to the Self-Defence Forces (SDF or *Jieitai* 衛隊) on a national level met gradual decline, as the Socialist Party fell out of favour (Hagström 2005; Cox, Rosenbluth 1995). Since then pacifism as a foreign policy has slowly started to erode. Japan had started looking in other directions besides the US for protection.

University of Manchester associate professor Shogo Suzuki connects contemporary Japan to the debates on hierarchies in international society since moving towards becoming independent from the US foreign policy. Using the English School approach, Suzuki demonstrates that the existence of socially legitimated great powers results in the emergence of 'frustrated great powers'. Those, in turn, are dissatisfied with their status in international society. By analysing the participation of China and Japan in United Nations peacekeeping operations Suzuki argues that 'frustrated great powers' can play 'recognition games'. Furthermore, they attempt to persuade their peers that they are worthy of 'legitimate great power' status. (2008) Suzuki's findings also demonstrate the need to pay greater attention to the intentions of 'frustrated great powers', and put forward an alternative framework for examining these states. That, of course, is obvious. Curiously, the author highlights the similar view most scholars have on Japan-China foreign policies: both countries are dissatisfied with their current international standing and seek greater power because they feel insecure. Suzuki questions why those two countries should still feel insecure when they obviously meet the criteria for great power. He acknowledges that accepting a country into the 'legitimate great powers' league is besides being a political process also a subjective one. This also brings out that using UNPKO both China and Japan have tried to develop their international image further, and questions if both of the countries are truly challenging the 'hegemony of the US'.

The 'frustrated power' concept also corresponds with British sociologist Ronald P. Dore's observation: "There is a strong desire among the Japanese public for an advancement in national dignity to become, along with security and economic advantage, a major objective of Japan's foreign policy – probably stronger than among the publics of any other major country" (1997). If Japan is seeking more concrete place amongst other great powers, then the most reasonable option would be gaining social recognition from members of international society. Nowadays, Japan



hasn't dismissed the US presence on its soil, but the concept of the US-Japan relations has been elevated into 'special friendship' status, allowing the term to become closer to equal partners.

On the other hand, Chair of Contemporary China Institute School of Oriental and African Studies editors and professors Robert Ash, David Shambaugh and Seichiro Takagi argue that Japan's perspective in foreign policy is limited to the economic point of view (2007). Senshu University professor of Development Economics and East Asian Studies Hideo Ohashi takes it further with a compelling point on how the Japanese scholars that focus on "China-watching" have a tendency to describe the Mainland's domestic and economic issues while the non-China specialists focus on the external dimensions of China's economic development (2007). The economic perspective and relations are naturally seen as a security risk, but for different reasons. It would be sensible to describe the current status of Japan's interests with the PRC.

### **2.1.1. Sino-Japanese treaties and disputes**

After the end of the Fifteen-year War (1931-1945)<sup>5</sup> the Textbook Incident in 1982, is often regarded as the first large-scale diplomatic conflict between China and Japan. The Textbook Incident presented itself when the governments of the PRC and the Republic of Korea among others, accused the Japanese government of trying to rewrite the history of World War II in Japanese school textbooks. (Fogel 2000; Beal *et al.* 2001; Yang 2010) Tracing from that time onwards, the problems related to the history of the war have become a widely disputed element in Sino-Japanese relations (Yang 2010).

As for compliance with territorial integrity, the Sino-Japanese relations are continuously disrupted by the East China Sea area dispute. Both countries claim sovereignty over Senkaku (or Diaoyu) islands. The tension over the disputed area has been high since the government of Japan bought three private islands there. For China, this meant that Japan was 'nationalizing' the islands which brought Chinese vessels presence in the area into the 12 nautical miles of coastal waters. (Chakrabarti 2012) In 2013, China established airspace restrictions (the East China Sea Air

---

<sup>5</sup> The 15-year War is historically called the turbulent time period of 30s-40s in Japan, starting with the invasion of Manchuria on September 1931.

Defence Identification Zone) around the area. Any aircrafts flying over the islands has to notify the authorities. China's active presence taxes Japan's economy besides being an active security risk with restrictions over both sea and air routes.

In 2016, it was reported that China is building a 544 million USD military base nearby Wenzhou, which happens to be the closest place on the mainland territory to the Senkaku islands. Close to Nanji islands around Wenzhou coastal area, a warship tier has been reported which wasn't there previously. It was also monitored, that large inflow of Chinese fishing boats started to go into the area while being accompanied by state's vessels. The Foreign Ministry of Japan immediately scorned China's actions. (Mollman 2016) Japan has been slowly distancing itself from its previous diplomacy of being 'subservient'<sup>6</sup> (Suzuki 2015) and has become increasingly strong-willed pursuing its interest in state defence.

Current list of treaties and communiqués Japan has made with China that are still effective:

- The Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China, signed in Beijing on 29 September 1972.
- Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China, signed in Beijing, 12 August 1978. Entered into force on 23 October 1978.

### **2.1.2. Sino-Japanese security policies**

After the WW II, the status of Japan's Self Defence Forces (SDF) status has been the focused on by the government, especially during the occupation in 1947, when a new constitution was enacted.

Article 9 contains a clause about renunciation of war:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. (Promulgated in 1946)

---

<sup>6</sup> Also known as *yowagoshi gaiko* (よわごし がいこ) and kowtow diplomacy *dogeza gaiko* (どげざ がいこ).

This basically means that Japan renounces war and leans towards pacifism. So, the Self Defence Forces were originally more about peace keeping. The SDF however, cannot be called land, sea and air forces because article 9 prohibits the State from maintaining military forces (Umeda 2006). In 2014, the Japanese government approved reinterpretation to give more power to the SDF, allowing them to defend its allies in case of war. The attitude towards China, however, has officially stayed the same after the start of East China Sea dispute, concentrating on peaceful means reflected on Japan's Basic Policy toward the People's Republic of China:

- (a) Support for China's open and reform policy (implementation of economic cooperation, support for China's early accession to the WTO, etc.)
  - (b) Promotion of bilateral and multilateral dialogue and cooperative relations (high-level exchanges, Japan-China security dialogue, ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC, etc.).
- (MOFA 2012)

While examining the case of the Senkaku Islands, the United States government assured Japan of its commitment to Japanese security in principle, but it previously has maintained a policy of not taking sides when a territorial sovereignty issue is involved. Article five of the Japan-United States Security Treaty states that the United States defends places where Japan has effective administrative control, but it does not mention territorial sovereignty. (Inoguchi 2011, 238) The US' ambiguous behaviour doesn't offer the assurance of their backing, so Japan aspires for more recognition as a legitimate power to attain more rights and social support from international communities. Furthermore, the 2002 agreement reached by the bilateral meeting between foreign and defence ministers' states that the United States Armed Forces will intervene only to help Japan when the Japanese SDF is engaged in defence in combat areas (*Ibid.*).

Japan's Ministry of Defence has recently achieved changing its status from agency level to ministry level and in 2016, they requested a record budget of approximately 51 billion USD for 2017 fiscal, keeping up with the rest of Asia and Oceania region's military expenditure expansion (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2017). There's a drift from soft powers to demonstrate military capacity in lieu of the PRC throwing its weight around territorial disputes. This makes the Sino-Japanese relations even more ambiguous because economic cooperation is still going strong despite the disputes leading to the next topic.

### 2.1.3. Sino-Japanese economic relations

After the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, Japan has worked its way around to develop economic ties with the Mainland. Even though it was a communist state, the Japanese government highlighted how Japan and China are close historically, economically, and culturally. (Inoguchi 2011) To have an access to such large market, politics needed to be separated from economics.

One of the earlier Sino-Japanese economic cooperation platforms was Official Development Assistance (ODA). To have leverage over Beijing after Deng Xiaoping started his reforms or the “Open Door” policy (开放政策 *kaifang zhengce*) in 1978, Japan initiated ODA that became an influential tool in relations with the PRC for decades to come before the PRC’s economy leapt to become a new economic power. Prior to that, China needed ODA’s funding, and Japan wanted to gain upper hand inside the region’s economy market. During that time, political disagreements played little relevance to the trade between these two states. For example, the Textbook Incident influenced the trade between the countries only temporarily. A year after the incident, the trade with China topped \$10 billion in 1983, and Japan's economic cooperation was seen to be proceeding smoothly in a variety of forms including yen loans, grant assistance, and technical cooperation. During Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to China, it was announced Japan’s will to cooperate with new yen loans for priority projects in fiscal 1984 and beyond in the transportation, telecommunications, and energy fields. (MOFA 1983) Thus, Sino-Japanese relations made favourable economic developments. But as China criticized Japan again in connection with Japan's school textbook inspection in June 1986 and a Japanese court decision on the Koka student dormitory in February 1987<sup>7</sup>, Japan and China still managed to develop their economic relations. But the development had resulted in Japan's large trade surplus with China. As the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s 1987 Blue Book noted:

The year 1986's Japanese surplus declined from the previous year's \$6 billion and was still as large as \$4.2 billion. Two-way Japan-China trade in 1986 fell about 18% from the previous year to \$15.5 billion. The trade balance remained in favor of Japan. The Japanese surplus was about \$4.2 billion. China curbed automobile and television set imports from Japan in the year after a sharp increase in 1985 and expanded textile and food exports to Japan. But a sharp fall in prices of oil, which accounts for a major part

---

<sup>7</sup> Osaka Courthouse ruled the ownership of a dormitory bought by the Taiwanese government in 1952 still belonged to Taiwan even after the official diplomatic relations were cut.

of Chinese exports to Japan, led to the large Japanese trade surplus with China. Oil captured 34% of Chinese exports to Japan in 1985.

In 1992, problems slowly started brewing in Japan. The World Bank supported its economic development model that even some other countries started to follow. Japan became one of its biggest investors, and for a short while the Japanese structural adjustment and control of expenses was preferred over the IMF's and the States' method. (Malafaia 2016) That was until the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 hit the markets. Japanese investors had made extensive investments in the East Asia region, and at the first signs of upcoming problems, pulled all money out at once. That caused other investors do the same, leaving the local markets in tatters. (Malafaia 2016; Terry 2002; Cai 2010) Meanwhile, the Chinese markets had started attracting foreign investors all over the world due to cheap labour, huge internal market, and less regulated laws for environmental protection. Hong Kong was soon to be returned to China as well, which under British rule became vital stock-exchange location in Asia. To not to lose investors, Beijing promised to try deregulating some of the market. (Malafaia 2016) ODA's financing had outlived its role. Japan had used it as reparations payment of sorts, changing China's attitude to more ODA accepting, but also less grateful as the PRC saw donations as something that was owed to them. (Drifte 2006) Political dichotomy couldn't be separated from ODA, which led to its demise later on when the PRC's economy made a big leap and did not need the grants offered by Japan. From 1979 until ODA's end in 2005, Japan had injected over 3.13 trillion yen to the PRC's market (*Ibid.*), but now China's economy had started to strengthen Japan lost the tool to influence the PRC through ODA.

The Great Regression which started in 2007, also hit Japan hard. The Diet had to implement policies like credit-guarantee programs for exporters, expansionary fiscal policies, national banks support, and purchase of commercial paper (Malafaia 2016; Fuji, Kawai 2010). Japan's national debt rose to the point, where government debt surpassed over 200% GDP mark in 2011 (Ministry of Finance 2015). With China's economic strengthening, any political leverage here is also rapidly declining. Other soft power methods should be implemented to reduce the damage as any hard monetary constructions would either damage Japan also or if too weak, it would be affecting the PRC like punching soft cotton.

## 2.2. Vietnam

Moving forward to Vietnam, Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Professor Ian Storey has interestingly described Vietnam's relationship with China amongst ten core members of the ASEAN as "the most complicated, multifarious, tense, and conflict-prone" and "laden with historical baggage" (2008). Having intermittently been a vassal state to imperial China from the time the Han dynasty (206 BC-220 AD) won the Han-Nanyue War in 111 BC until France conquering Vietnam in 1885, Vietnam's historical background is full of animosity and deference<sup>8</sup>.

University of New South Wales Emeritus Professor Carlyle A. Thayer has written how China – Vietnam relations is can be described as a case of tyranny: "The "tyranny of geography" dictates to Vietnam that it judiciously apply the levers of cooperation and struggle through various party, state, military and multilateral structures in order to better manage its relations with China" (2011). Thayer analyses Vietnamese strategies planned to constrain China in the South China Sea. Using University of Virginia Cumming Memorial Professor Brantly Womack's theory of asymmetry as a framework for analysing bilateral relations, Thayer gives a realist point of view to the relations: "Mature asymmetry exists when the weaker state gives deference to the more powerful state in return for the stronger state's recognition of the weaker state's autonomy." (*Ibid.*) this insinuates Vietnam and China have been in imbalanced power relations for a longer period of time, stagnating status quo, but is it truly so?

Vietnam's foreign policy with China can be seen as an attempt to achieve balance through a process of "struggle and cooperation" on key issue areas. The policy pursues three strategies to manage its relations with China: semantic development of bilateral relations through high-level visits by the party and state leaders; enmeshment of China in a web of cooperative relations including economic ties; and self-assistance, particularly military modernization. Thayer analyses the Vietnam-China relations as mechanisms that structure political, economic and defence relations. The party mechanisms include summit meetings, exchange visits by party commissions and ideological seminars. It also mentions that the *vis-a-vis* meetings are managed by a Joint

---

<sup>8</sup> I.e. Emperor Gia Long, founder of the last Vietnamese dynasty Nguyen (1802-1945), called Vietnam at some point 中國 *Trung Quốc*, meaning Middle Kingdom just like China - 中國 (in simplified 中国) *Zhōngguó*.

Steering Committee at deputy prime minister level. (*Ibid.*) Comprising of a dense network of ministerial exchanges seem like most cooperation initiatives need personal ‘shaking hands’ in Sino-Vietnamese relations.

But there are also scholars, who describe the diplomacy as paternal after Confucianism, where Vietnam as a vassal state follows the PRC’s guidance (Ibrahim 2010). Considering that Vietnam also sees the South China Sea as a part of its territory, and yet has strong economic ties with China, the relations are more dynamic in its complexity even if one does not bring the historical background to the equation. Head of Research Group “Traders, Markets, and the State in Vietnam” Kristen W. Endres has analysed the Sino-Vietnamese relationship being in the progress of ‘post-war normalization’ (2015). For the relations to become normalised, the borders must be stable enough for the population occupy the land nearby. Endres shows that the border in the past Sino-Vietnamese conflict area has become stable enough to grow economic market between the states (*Ibid.*). The national self-identity around the borders has become ambiguous as a result.

Uppsala University Peace and Conflict Research Associate Professor Ramses Amer also sees the importance of partnership with China on Vietnam’s side, in addition, the “geo-strategic” challenges concerning South China Sea issue. Amer summarizes Vietnam’s action plan in 2014 during the high peak of conflict of interests regarding drilling and fishing around the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos that Vietnam deters as their exclusive economic zone with: “It repeatedly requested negotiations and kept up diplomatic pressure on China through bilateral channels as well as by attempts to gain international support for its position not only on the issue of the drilling rig, but also more broadly relating to the status of the Paracel archipelago.” (2015) Vietnam has been seen to be using and combining multiple methods: economic restrictions, rule of law, and international support to contain China in their area of interests. The method supports the constructivist idea better than realist as Vietnam’s way of acting and the relationship itself isn’t all black and white. Vietnam and China standoff is especially interesting case, as in theory one would assume that as they both are “red” countries supporting collectivism outside territorial disputes, but Vietnam seems to be treating the PRC as a friendly enemy.

### **2.2.1. Sino-Vietnamese treaties and disputes**

Two characteristics have been brought up by Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Professor Alexander Vuving on how the Vietnamese have traditionally dealt with China, summing it up to “military resistance” and “diplomatic deference” (Vuving 2006, 809). Similarly to Thayer’s idea, deference here means that Vietnam as the weaker party in that relationship does not dare to pursue its interests in a way that goes against the stronger party’s -China’s- wish. Rather than that, it will avoid direct conflict and follows correspondence to superior status.

After the World War II, the Vietnamese revolution against the French rule had influence over the Southeast Asia region as the anti-colonial movement. The Chinese communists saw an opportunity in that, trying to spread the Chinese way of communism through Vietnam to other nearby states. (Chakraborti 2012) In the 70s, China was also the biggest ally to North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, providing military equipment and training, but the local communist leaders perceived due to China’s attitude towards Vietnam that the ally at the time was also the biggest threat to Vietnam’s sovereignty. In 1974, China and Vietnam had a naval battle in the Paracels. The threat became even more imminent especially when the Vietnam War ended in 1975 after 20 years of fighting with the US.

After a short while of recuperation, the Vietnamese Communist Party decided to invade Cambodia in 1978. Using the momentum, China invaded Vietnam for a month or so, which time-wise was a clever move. As the old saying goes - hunter is the weakest when it’s hunting. And yet at the same time, China was Vietnam’s closest ally. Vietnam’s economy was in shambles, but China helped Vietnam with its economic construction during the latter’s liberation struggle against the US. (*Ibid.*)

In 1988, China and Vietnam fought the second naval battle in the Spratlys. China overpowered Vietnam, resulting in its occupation of the Paracels and its entry into the scramble for the occupation of the Spratlys (Odgaard 2003, 16; Chakraborti 2012). After over a decade of hostility following the 1979 border conflict, Vietnam and China resumed normal relations in 1991 (Guan 1998; Chakraborti 2012). The Joint Declaration of 1999 signed by the two, was an attempt for mutual understanding in relation to the South China Sea. Both sides agreed to keep the same



method for negotiation on the sea issues and strive to find a permanent solution through non-aggravating means. The normalisation continued until the 2000s, when from time to time, fishermen around the Paracel and the Spratly Islands crossed hypothetical borders of the states. To find common ground, there were mutually acceptable delimitation agreement talks in process.

Relations started to go awry again when in 2009, China made a decision to establish local governing bodies in the Paracel Islands. That was objected by Vietnam but such actions have become regular events in the South China Sea region. Besides this, in 2010, the Chinese authorities arrested Vietnamese fishing boats over trespassing, which recreated tensions between the states. (Chakraborti 2012) The relations seem to have deteriorated ever since then as reports about maritime-surveillance vessels surveying the territory without prior notification have increased.

In 2011, Hanoi reported that a Chinese maritime-surveillance vessel ‘cut the exploration cables of Binh Minh 02 seismic vessel of Vietnam National Oil and Gas Group (PVN)’. Beijing responded with a counter-report on how Vietnam’s oil and gas explorations have undermined China’s interests and jurisdictional rights in the South China Sea area (*Ibid.*). Ironically, in the same year both states had signed the agreement on Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement of Sea-Related Issues, which was previously created to specifically avoid such incidents. A year later, China officially established a city called Sansha on Woody Island. It is enlisted under the greater Hainan Province, allowing more actions to be taken around the South China Sea. Having an administrative office is a tool for establishing a hub for maritime law enforcement, the maritime militia, and surveillance and information networks. (Yamaguchi 2017) The PRC has continued creating artificial islands around the region, which in the last two years has also been taken up by Vietnam as a tactic to gain more national territories in the region. The impact of this has not yet been inclusive, but relations-wise it can only accumulate more tensions.

Sino-Vietnamese treaties in effect:

- The Treaty of Land Border between China and Vietnam is signed in Hanoi on December 31, 1999.
- Joint Statement on All-round Cooperation in the New Century Between the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam signed in Beijing on 25

December 2000.

- Joint Communiqué between the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was signed on 8 October 2004 in Hanoi.
- The Joint Maritime Seismic Understanding (JMSU) signed in Manila on 14 March 2005.
- The Agreement on Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement of Sea-Related Issues was signed in Beijing, 2011.
- Joint Statement on Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Cooperation Between China and Viet Nam in the New Era, Action Plan for the Implementation of China-Viet Nam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Cooperation, the Agreement on Cooperation in Border Defense all signed in 2013.

### **2.2.2. Sino-Vietnamese security policies**

Since 1975, Vietnam has claimed territorial area of the Paracel and Spratly islands on historical and archaeological claims as well as portions of the South China Sea (Emmers 2010; Burgess 2003; Chakraborti 2012). In 1977, Vietnam also established an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles according to what is said in UNCLOS (Emmers, 2010), to legitimise the territorial claim.

Vietnam joined Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) in 2005. Originally, a joint initiative of China and the Philippines was meant to be a landmark agreement to explore the EEZ of South China Sea. The scientists believe there are immense reserves of oil and gas hidden below the sea floor, which made the joint initiative important- allowing the scientists to conduct research in the area<sup>9</sup>. Vietnam claimed it had joined the JMSU in the interests of upholding regional stability, but the planned survey zone didn't cover China's nor Vietnam's territory, lessening the risk for conflict between the two states (Storey 2008). The latest court decision about the area was the Hague international tribunal's on July 12, 2016, which declared China's extensive maritime claims are illegal. That favours Vietnam's claim to the South China Sea territory, but China isn't ready to abandon its ambitions within the area yet.

In 2009, the Vietnam People's Navy (VPN) on February 28 deployed the last of six Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines ordered from Russia. Doing so, the VPN became the owner of the large

---

<sup>9</sup> But nothing was done in the end due to the Philippines' opposition at the time being against it, thus lacking political support.

submarine fleet in Southeast Asia, making them more technologically advanced than those belonging to the South Sea Fleet of China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) (Truong, Nguyen 2017). The quantity, however, is still smaller compared to China.

In 2015, Vietnam set a new regulation for the coast guard. Starting from 20 October 2015, Vietnamese coast guard vessels are permitted to use on-board weapons to deter and repel foreign boats. Though weapons against foreign vessels in Vietnam's waters is allowed, it hasn't specified whether it is allowed to use weapons in EEZ as well. (Panda 2015) And while most of East Asia's countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have developed bilateral security alliance with the US to have a counter-balance to China, Vietnam hasn't done so for the exact same reason of not wanting to provoke China (Tønnesson 2009, 8). The furthest the bilateral relations have come officially, is signing the U.S.-Vietnam bilateral trade agreement, which came into force in 2001<sup>10</sup>. Previous President Obama's visit to Vietnam, however, rose expectations that in the near future it might happen. But compared to the previous case with Japan, Vietnam is more proactive to respond to the PRC's actions in disputed areas with hard power to warn the latter without much of a result.

### **2.2.3. Sino-Vietnamese economic relations**

Both Vietnam (through *Doi Moi* or the 'renovation process' in 1986) and China (after the 'Open Door Policy' under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 1978) have had similar economic model for progress - the two transformed their economies from centrally planned command economies to a market-oriented structure while resolving their hitherto outstanding issues (Chakraborti 2012). Now Vietnam has become one of the fastest growing economies with the annual GDP growth rate of 5.2% (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2017), after slowly re-emerging from the war-ridden economical stagnate and inflation rate.

In the early 90s, Vietnam started to develop a new policy and ideology to match market economy with a hint of socialism (Fforde 2016). But the long history of corruption and class segregation

---

<sup>10</sup>Vietnam also signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement (TPP) in 2016, but since the current head of the US is against TPP, the situation for the partnership looks bleak.

under the regime had not been dealt with successfully. In 1997, Former Prime Minister Vo van Kiet and General Secretary Do Muoi both stepped down to lead the leadership transition and remove their candidacy from the National Assembly seats, while rural unrest was brewing, leading to open protests in Thai Binh against corruption. After surviving the crisis, Vietnam was on its way to become integrated into the international market.

Although Vietnam wants to keep good grace with China due to profitable market trade, China is not the main economic partner. Ever since the bilateral trade agreement, the US has been the main export country (38.1 billion USD), while the biggest importer has been China (49.8 billion USD) (OEC 2015). Vietnam has made a skyrocketing progress, and the business is booming between the states. But compared to Taiwan and Japan, it is still catching up with its 'frenemy', meaning if someone has leverage over another via economy, it would be the PRC. The balance of Sino-Vietnamese relations appears dangerously fragile, as both states have taken upon themselves more aggressive tactics in dispute areas.

### **2.3. Taiwan**

In 1949, the two "Chinas" officially separated at the end of the Civil War (1946-1949). Unsurprisingly, since then the countries have a strained relationship between them. One could argue on whether Taiwan should be viewed as a part of China or not. Rhodes College Emeritus Professor of International Studies John F. Copper wrote in 2003, bringing out a very interesting fact that with the concern of Taiwan being a national or international situation, the historic reasons wouldn't be useful. The reason being dates back to the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when in reality Taiwan had been a part of China for only four years. (Copper 2003) Despite that afterward, for a number of years Taipei took upon itself to represent the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China, claiming legal jurisdiction over it. Taipei claimed that the government in Beijing was illegitimate. It also points out that although Taiwan has agreed to "One China policy", under which China is a part of Taiwan, the idea of it is seen less and less over time. As the time goes on, the less "one with Mainland" thought is seen. This is similar to this thesis that sees Taiwan as a separate entity.

After the split in 1949, in comparison to the PRC, Taiwan has emerged from forty years of one-party authoritarian rule and could be described as maturing liberal-democratic state (Rawnsley 2012; deLisle 2014). Taiwan's political system definitely qualifies for the thin democracy concept by having regular free and fair elections, freedom of speech, adult suffrage, and with the authority be allowed to make or change laws and policies. For example, former President Chen Shui-Bian was investigated for corruption and proven guilty by the rule of law, thus sending a clear signal that in modern Taiwan no-one can buy their way out. Taiwan's domestic and international behaviour as a democracy with political culture and values should be attractive in foreign policy.

According to Contemporary Chinese law and politics expert Jacques deLisle, Taiwan should use its democracy as an attraction, as the existence of cosmopolitan norms of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law influence the international acceptance of state and state-resembling disposition. Therefore, it can elevate Taiwan's capability to accomplish its objectives through value-based appeals. (2014) Taiwan's development has been remarkable after democratization. Even if most states cannot openly support its independence, it is certainly not a fragile state which cannot succeed implementing policies nationally.

### **2.3.1. Sino-Taiwanese treaties and disputes**

In the past, the US carried the burden of being the middle-man for the two states' relations and led talks between Taiwan and PRC. This led to the Three Joint Communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances. The US has played a big role being the go-between for the two states, and has kept the relations between Taiwan going unofficially instead of completely shunning them despite the PRC's scorn. In 2016, President Tsai and back then President-elect Donald Trump held an unprecedented phone call, but the US, like other states, cannot support Taiwan's independence *de jure*, in order to not to agitate China.

List of documents and oral commitments where the US played a part (Lawrence 2013, 29):

- The Shanghai Communiqué (Joint Communiqué, of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China), dated February 28, 1972.
- Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, dated January 1, 1979.

- The August 17th Communiqué (Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China), dated August 17, 1982.
- The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) (P.L. 96-8), enacted April 10, 1979.
- “The Six Assurances,” conveyed by the Reagan Administration to Taiwan in 1982, during the negotiations between Washington and Beijing over the August 17th Communiqué.

Being aware of the adoption of UNCLOS 1982, the Taiwanese government knew its importance for ocean governance which also affects them, and put together a Task Force for the study and ascertaining of basepoints, baselines, EEZs, and Territorial Sea Laws in 1989. In 1998, the “Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Republic of China” and the “Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the Republic of China” were accepted. The first set of baselines, and the outer limits of territorial sea and contiguous zone, were announced in the following year. The aims of these laws are to announce and declare Taiwan's right on its territorial sea and contiguous zones. However, the EEZ limits could not be announced because of delimitation disputes of the maritime boundary between Taiwan and neighbouring countries. (Huang, You 2013)

Although the territorial waters, contiguous zone, and EEZs of Taiwan were established from the previously mentioned laws, unsolved territorial sovereignty conflicts between Taiwan and its surrounding countries like Japan, Philippines, and China, still remain, particularly the conflicts of interests such as the Senkaku islands and the South China Sea. The water surrounding the Senkaku islands is a source of conflict among three parties. Japan's “Territory Sea Act” in 1997, the “People's Republic of China Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone” in 1992, and Taiwan's “Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Republic of China” in 1998 all claimed the Senkaku islands as their territory (Pan 2007; Su 2005; Huang, You 2013). Tensions have risen again, as China has been regularly flying over these territories, sometimes armed with bombs. These air force drills are threatening to become a new normality to the states' relations.

### **2.3.2. Sino-Taiwanese security policies**

The Republic of China Armed Forces (*Zhōnghuá mínguó guó jūn* 中華民國國軍) has been conservative, as the defence expenditure was described to be declining before 2015, where the and

now the funds were increased by 2.6% (Glaser, Mark 2015). The main policy of the National Military Strategy is to, of course, avoid war to ascertain stability in the region. At the same time, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) released “Taiwan’s Military Capacities in 2025” (2025 年台灣 軍事防衛能量) defence policy in 2015, shortly before the DDP got presidential seat. It straightforwardly stated that the security risk Taiwan immediately needs to take care of is the former president’s flawed military service policies such as the Yong Ku (勇固) program to downsize the military.

Planned military service policy will be in the following five directions according to Taiwan’s defence policy (2015):

- (1) There will be no change for the time being to the current four-month compulsory military training requirement for all males of service age. We will raise the efficiency of military training and provide opportunities for trainees to work with volunteers.
- (2) Examine the human power structure of the military. Reduce the required number of volunteers by measures such as civilian employees, defense officials, or outsourcing. Recruiting channels and salary of volunteers will be differentiated according to their professions and training period.
- (3) Create a “selection” recruit channel for young talents who have professional potential and provide incentives for them joining the armed forces. A combined military and civilian professional education will enable the long-term cultivation of leadership talent.
- (4) Augment the current reserve forces system by creating units of local reserves made up of volunteer officers and soldiers.
- (5) In order to preserve the competent cadre in the military, any further force downing such as “Yong Ku Program” will be suspended before the completeness of a comprehensive assessment of operational concepts and force size. Re-education programs should be provided to inculcate professional skills in demand in the private sector, targeting as priority the officers who are anticipated to leave the service within the next five years.

By reading through these, it appears Taiwan is taking steps toward more permanent military capacity in terms of personnel. In 2016, Taiwan asked Google to blur satellite images what some have suggested might be new military buildings on one of the islands in the disputed South China Sea (Reuters 2016, 22 September), showing seldom seen activity on Taiwan’s side in the South China Sea. It is speculated that the new constructions are for the military purpose, but no official

statement has been made. But that doesn't necessarily inhibit Taiwan to opportunity for a dialogue with the PRC. When the US Congress passed the 2018 National Defense Authorisation Act, where re-establishing regular navy ports at Kaoshiung would be taken into consideration, to which Taiwan's Foreign Ministry immediately released a statement that Taiwan's objective is still peaceful relations with the PRC (MOFA 2017).

### **2.3.3. Sino-Taiwanese economic relations <sup>11</sup>**

Nowadays, the economy comes first before politics for Taiwan as a legacy from President Ma's time<sup>12</sup>, but it wasn't always so. The economic relationship between Taiwan and China was practically non-existent after the civil war ended. Therefore until the late 1980s, they had minimal, if not no direct contact between the citizens at all. And when the trade between two countries took place, they used primarily Hong Kong as a stop-between the transaction. (Clark 2002) Yet together with the 70s, the Cross-Strait relations were influenced by two important events that would allow the link between two economies be created directly again.

The problematic relationship between the two countries started to change when Deng Xiaoping started his reforms in 1979, which meant changing PRC into a globally competing country on market. China also adopted a new policy "one country, two systems" in 1984, and in 1987 Taiwan government announced that one of the longest martial laws, otherwise known as the White Terror (白色恐怖 *baise kongbu*), would be abolished (NY Times 1987). That also meant that Taiwanese would be allowed to visit their families on the mainland (the PRC), which before was a privilege only few could use. Although the visits were meant for humanitarian purposes, the government soon expanded the scope of legal contacts, which also included indirect trade and investment in the mainland. This provided an opportunity to bring the labour-intensive production to the mainland, as Taiwan had lost the competitiveness it had in the 60s through the beginning of the 80s in manufacturing and export (Clark 2002). That also fit the PRC's "coastal development strategy" (as a part from "open-door policy) (Tzeng 1991), which meant to attract foreign capital and technology from Hong Kong and Taiwan areas to the mainland. Thus Taiwan's export to China more than tripled between 1987 and 1990: from 1.2 billion US dollars to 4.4 billion US dollars. In

---

<sup>11</sup> Previously an unpublished essay for a lecture written by the author.

<sup>12</sup> Presidential term from 2008 to 2016.



1992, Taiwan and China also came to an agreement that there is only one China, both the mainland and Taiwan belong to it, but both sides would define the one China part according to their own will. This is also known as “1992 Consensus” (*Jiu er Gongshi* 九二共識). Thus, the export by 1995 quadrupled to 19.4 US dollars. Beijing also had a directive to strengthen the bond between the two countries, as it established so-called “three links” in the 70s: trade, transportation and investment. Moreover, when the Taiwan Strait crisis<sup>13</sup> took place in 1995, Beijing reassured the Taiwanese companies doing business in China that it would not let political hostilities spill over into economic affairs. (Zhao 1997) Then it stabilized at 20 billion US dollars when Taipei and Beijing exchanged hostilities together with the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998.( Clark 2002) During this time Taiwan’s and PRC’s direction of trade was imbalanced, as Taiwan’s exports to the mainland were usually at least eight times the value of its imports, creating a huge trade surplus. This imbalance was caused by Taiwan’s sharp limits on imports from China and the investment-driven nature of Cross-Strait trade. And the nature of the foreign investment started to change as well. By the mid- to late 1990-s, the mix of Taiwan investment in the mainland began shifting from mostly small business in labour-intensive exports to much larger businesses seeking to penetrate the Chinese market in heavy industry and consumer goods. Geographically as well the investments started to expand. In the beginning, the Taiwanese investment was mostly concentrated in Fujian and Guangdong provinces. Now investments also involved most regions in China. Even state corporations became involved in major deals. (Baum 1997)

Therefore, by the mid-90s the economic integration was developing between Taiwan and southern coastal China (especially Fujian province). This geographical economic integration was also encouraged by “offshore shipping centre” regulations in 1997, where Taiwan relaxed strict prohibitions and allowed limited direct shipping between Fujian and Taiwan (Offshore Shipping centres 1997). That is why the two economies could be considered integrated because China and Taiwan were not just exchanging goods and services but were developing a functionally linked economy that was integrated into the global division-of-labour in what Duke University’s Professor of Sociology and Director of the Centre on Globalisation, Governance & Competitiveness Gary Gereffi has termed a “commodity chain”- that is, interlinked production processes spanning several nations (1998).

---

<sup>13</sup> In June 1995, Taiwan’s president visited USA over the objections of the Mainland. Beijing interpreted that as an attempt to promote Taiwanese independence and claimed that this violated the principle of „one China“.

So basically, the 90s were all about Taiwanese businessmen investing or opening new factories in China, where with imported machinery and more sophisticated components (from Taiwan) production of goods took place to be exported to third markets like the US (Clark 2002). It has been estimated that at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century close to 75% of China's information technology exports came from Taiwanese factories (Kuo 1995). This integration of economies also scared the Taiwanese government, which actually encouraged its investors to slow the pace of economic activities with China, to avoid the Mainland's influence and dependency on its economy. But as the government's influence was limited, and less than 5 million US dollars investments didn't need government's approval, limiting investment to the Mainland was a failure (Hudson 1997).

By 2000s, that kind of economic integration began to generate another round of economic interactions between the mainland and Taiwan. At the year 2000 alone the Cross-Strait trade jumped more than 20%, from 25.7 billion US dollars to 31.2 billion US dollars. So did the investment which reached by 2001 up to 80-100 billion US dollars. (Chandler 2001) This intensification took place where most Cross-Strait relations were in political crisis, which was boosted by ROC's President Lee Teng-Hui's<sup>14</sup> declaration of "special state-to-state relations" and then the election of Chen Shui-Bian<sup>15</sup> as his successor (Clark 2002). But it was thanks Chen Shui-Bian, that after 50 years of ban on direct trading it was officially abandoned in 2001. At that time period Taiwan's economy was growing, and the high-tech part of Cross-Strait relations benefited as they got 2/3 of the new investment projects approved in the electronic industry. One of those projects was a major one involving both sons of Jiang Zemin, who at that time was General Secretary of the Communist Party and Y.C. Wang, the head of the Formosa Plastics Corporation in Taiwan. (Chandler 2001) The other part was the earthquake in 1999 and the global recession that hit Taiwan in the fall of 2000, which led many domestically oriented Taiwanese businesses to try to expand to the mainland to make up the deteriorating economic situation.

---

<sup>14</sup> Lee Teng-Hui is sometimes referred as "father of Taiwan's democracy".

<sup>15</sup> As first president from the Democratic Progressive Party Chen later calmed the interaction between the two countries down by proclaiming „Five No's“ : 1. No declaration of Taiwan independence. 2. No change in the name „Republic of China“. 3. No adding „special state-to-state relations“ to the Constitution. 4. No referendum on Taiwan's political status. 5. No abolition of the National Unification Council as long as China did not invade militarily.

Those economic ties led to creating “Taiwan communities” in bigger cities in China. In Shanghai, for example, the 300,000 to 500,000 people belonged to the local Taiwanese community.(Bolt 2001) Over the period of integration also means that economically Taiwan had become dependent on the Mainland, as companies had moved there to establish new businesses or bring manufacturing there. That also means new job posts are going to the Mainland, not Taiwan, so people have to move or start hiring locals. As a result, Taiwan now faces the challenge of maintaining and enhancing employment opportunities and capabilities for innovation and growth on its own territory (Berger 2015). There is also more competition for foreign businesses in China than 20 years ago and some have already started to move out of China to a cheaper manufacturing country, as the wages have started to rise. So production in China isn’t the most profitable anymore. But back in 2003, according to Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) survey of Asian senior executives pointed out that a third of them saw the potential of China’s growing domestic market (*Ibid.*). So it only made sense to expand there. So by 2004, three ports in Taiwan and all the ports in China were open for direct shipping services (Mainland affairs office 2004). And four years later even more ports were ready to trade directly.

In 2008, when Guomindang ousted Democratic Progressive Party in the presidential polls, relations between the governments have stayed relatively stable. Then once again, both parties agreed to follow China’s “1992 consensus” about one China. This lowered tensions and boosted the Cross-Strait economic ties. It was necessary to both sides, as that year global recession hit everybody. But now the Mainland investors were allowed to invest in Taiwan’s money markets (Sin 2015). Not all economic decisions have been accepted by the general public.

In 2010, Taiwan and the PRC signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which caused a major debate in Taiwan as 40 000 people marched to oppose it (Brown et al. 2010). It was also the year, when the Taiwanese government called the Mainland to dismantle missile batteries, that they had created tension with in the early 2000s. The US administration also came forth with a promise to sell Taiwan 6.4 billion US dollars worth of antimissile systems, helicopters, and other military hardware to Taiwan. The Mainland retaliated with cutting all military ties with the US and threatened the normal cooperation would become complicated (Sin 2015). Thus the

economic relations between Taiwan and China would be too important to be influenced by political rub-offs.

In 2013, Taiwan and PRC signed Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA 海峽兩岸服務貿易協議 *Haixia Liang An Fuwu Maoyi Xieyi*), which is aimed at liberalizing trade in services between the two economies. It still has to be ratified by Taiwanese legislature, but under the terms of treaty service industries such as banking, healthcare, tourism, film, telecommunications, and publishing would be open to investment and businessmen would be able to obtain indefinitely renewable visas. It would also make opening branches and offices in each other's territories easier. But why it hasn't been ratified, is because of the Sunflower Student Movement in 2014 and the general opinion that this treaty could give the Mainland opportunity to control the economy or the biggest publishers (therefore use censorship). (反黑箱服貿20社團上凱道 2013) Otherwise, while economic growth slowed down in China started to slow down (to 7.4%), the trade values between the two countries reached 198.31 billion US dollars, as imports from Taiwan to the mainland summed up to 152 billion US dollars (Yang 2013). To sum it up, the Cross-Strait economic relations until today remain quite skewed as Taiwan's side has invested and traded more. There is also the fact that Taiwan still has limits to the inflow from China on security risk basis.

What is to be expected in the future? According to the World Bank regional growth in East Asia and Pacific is expected to ease further to 6.7 % in 2015 and remain flat thereafter. This reflects a continued slowdown in China that is offset by a pickup in the rest of the region. The growth in China is projected by the World Bank to moderate to 7.1% in 2015 and 6.9% in 2017, reflecting policy efforts to achieve a more sustainable growth path. (World Bank 2015) It is helped by low fuel prices in the region.

Although the forecast seems to be good, there is always a risk of a setback, as China's and Taiwan's economies are vulnerable to trading partner slowdowns and large exchange rate shifts, including US dollar appreciation. In Taiwan's case, although the economy has been relatively stable for many years, there was a need to stay more alert with the recent change in power. Chinese leaders sent warnings to Taiwan's opposition party. If clear commitment to the notion that there is only one China is not met, then after few years of calm the tensions between the countries will rise again.

But the policy changes in China and the DDP winning in Taiwan have not influenced much the economic relations between the countries drastically.

After going through the three states' relations of economy, territorial disputes, and security policies with China, trends can be drawn. All of them have started to invest more in more hard-lined methods of persuasion when it comes to territorial disputes, as if taking precaution. At the same time, economic relations have developed to become too interdependent, to implement any drastic measures for gaining an upper hand. Japan and Taiwan both have been in recent history more of an economic boost helpers for the PRC, having more influence over it but as the PRC's economy grew, it could not be contained with Japan's nor Taiwan's tools of control. There's a separation between economic cooperation and politics. Cultural persuasion of public attitudes can be the golden middle way with less risk as military-wise tensions are only rising.

### **3. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TOWARDS THE MAINLAND**

After describing the current positioning of the three states with China, we can start estimating what are the perceptions and how dynamic are the states' relations. Relationship of the actors is by common conception a mutual communication, whereas here we'll be only taking a closer look how the PRC's neighbouring states have conducted themselves and what are their characteristics of soft power implementation. In specific, their public diplomacy towards China will be perlustrated.

Public diplomacy is usually seen as a tool used to achieve the practitioner state's ambitions within the set targets of foreign policy (Djerejian 2003; Sevin 2015), meaning it is applied on the international level of state affairs. According to USC Annenberg School's director Nicholas J. Cull, public diplomacy in foreign relations can be defined as an "influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies." It goes further than diplomacy in a traditional sense, focusing on the government-led cultivation of public opinions on foreign soil. This also covers the interaction of private groups and interests, how foreign affairs are reported and communicated. (Cull 2006) In other words, it means to establish communication with foreign state's people, spreading information affluence by the actor's views or even propaganda, in order to have influence within the foreign public. Practitioner countries can use a variety of public diplomacy projects such as international broadcasting networks and student exchanges, or any other communicative ways for the state to advance its foreign policy interests (Plavsak 2002). It should be emphasised, that the role of power dynamics and conceptualization of public diplomacy as an instrument that governments use depends on how to "communicate with and attract the publics of other countries, rather than merely their governments" (Nye 2008, 95). Otherwise, when a country neglects the management of its image and reputation may struggle to attract economic and political attention (Van Ham 2001; 2002). For the stratagem be implemented in international

communications, the state can go with the immeasurable amount of options to promote the actor's self-identity in a favourable light.

Depending on the directive and which group is targeted, the government can turn to state-owned media outlets consumed by foreign audiences. Or finance private owned entertainment companies setting certain conditions what should be broadcasted and developed to match the government's vision. Advertising the state and its culture is a must for the tourism industry in any case, and going a bit further from there, why not develop public relations campaigns to offer the imago intended for the international community. Swaying the public opinion to win general support for the state advertised or damaged by negative events to influence the respective governments might turn into a win-win situation if executed flawlessly. The state can gain the public's sympathy and a boost in economy via tourism and promoted local goods export with less GDP spent on the military. In short, public relations can serve as a relationship-building method, creating commonalities among nations (Yang, Klyueva, Taylor 2012, 655). This soft power stratagem sets criteria for the state to understand the targeted public in order to create a connection successfully. However, if there's a miscommunication with the audience, the public diplomacy will go to nought. Ungranted, for a triumphant self-promotion to other states, this soft power method would also require the actor and recipient state to have functional relations in place with each other.

We've previously established that communication as a foreign policy method aligns with constructivism, where social constructions determine the relations of states. Apart from that, economic relations can actually also be more tied to social constructions as one might think. Over time, the political influence Japan and Taiwan could use has been slowly overturned by the fast-growing economy of the PRC. Economic ties have become independent from political disturbances for the most part since both case studies would see the high-cost following with it more like a double-edged sword. But, having created close connection with their neighbouring state in Sino- Taiwanese and Sino-Vietnamese economic relations, it was the people themselves initially who were the driving force of interlinking the two economies together in the 90s. In terms of economy, all three case studies have created concrete goals in terms of cooperation, building them on economic gains for their own respective nations. Forming behavioural dispositions of their identity within the economic ties (or integration in Taiwan's case) would grant the states a beneficial access to proceed with public diplomacy.

Initially using its economic model as a tool for foreign policy to build more connections in the region and facing setbacks, Japan has made its public diplomacy into a lucrative business. The ODA model itself failed, but it didn't stop Japan moving on to other means like cultural attraction. The soft power public diplomacy entitles doesn't limit the usage of other foreign policy methods at the same time. The former Prime Minister of Japan Taro Aso<sup>16</sup> used nationally popular contemporary culture such as manga, anime, and J-pop as an attraction to increase Japanese presence in international public. Culture became an export material to liven up the economy. Similarly to the previously mentioned South Korean example, Japan started to support its cultural products on a national level with a purpose to export it. Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry reported in 2012 as well that with diplomatic effort, Japanese popular culture such as anime, manga, and arts has become popular in Europe, Asia, and the United States. To stay on top of the game globally, the Initiative of Cool Japan strategies were: 'unearthing of domestic demand,' 'incorporation of foreign demand,' 'transformation of industrial structure.' (2012) And it certainly has been effective. For example, when visiting popular Chinese media websites like *Youku*, *QiYi*, etc., one can find Japanese cultural exports on the front page. Foreign policy influence happens through opinions among the mass public (Goldsmith, Horiuchi 2012, 560), and Japan has used it to its advantage.

When comparing the three case studies in their usage of soft powers in public diplomacy we find Japan unsurprisingly to be the most proactive. Having previously mentioned, how the states' promotion of their self-identity in public diplomacy be brought to foreign audience, we will take a look what actions the case studies have taken in developing the Chinese interests. The key factors were divided accordingly into:

- a) Studying the national language, similarly to the PRC's establishment of the Confucius Institute for studying the Chinese language.
- b) Broadcasting state media targeting Chinese speaking audience.
- c) Promoting living in their country.
- d) Actor states' public policy leading figures interaction with the PRC's diplomats.
- e) Exporting culture.

---

<sup>16</sup> Aso was Prime Minister of Japan between 2008-2009. Also known in Japan as Rozen Aso after his favourite contemporary literature (manga).



In 1994, Japan set the Japan Foundation in Beijing (*Rìběn guójì jiāoliú jījīn huì běijīng rìběn wénhuà zhōngxīn* 日本国际交流基金会北京日本文化中心)<sup>17</sup> (Japan Foundation 2017), which is equivalent to the PRC's Confucius Institute (*Kǒngzǐ xuéyuàn* 孔子学院), promoting language studies and cultural exchange. On the other hand, Vietnam hasn't taken up the initiative to establish the Vietnamese language centre in China. In Taiwan's case, the states' share the language but speak different dialects. Taiwan was actually established its own language institute for foreigners first in 1956 (TLI 2017). It was called the Taipei Language Institute, which could be considered as a predecessor to the Confucius Institute. There's another rival to the PRC's Confucius Institute in the face of Huayu (華語), but it is mostly dealing with offering grants for language studies.

Another key point for reaching the target audience is whether the state has an output media that represents its views for the targeted group. Japan, Vietnam, and Taiwan -all three states have established their own state-owned media outlets for the Chinese speaking audience. Japan has NHK (*Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai*) 中文 and NHK World TV, Vietnam *Yuetongshi* (越通社), and in Taiwan's case we found Radio Free Asia (RFA), that has a specific target audience of Cantonese dialect speakers in South China.

The identity of the state can also be enhanced and shown in an amiable light when the state is promoted as a great place for living. Japan and Taiwan both have taken the initiative to offer grants for students and workers to come live in their country. Japan Foundation has grant programs like Japanese Studies Projects, investment promotion and protection agreement between Japan, South Korea and China. Taiwan has established the Taiwan Fellowships & Scholarships (TAFS) initiative for students and academics, but outside of that employment in Taiwan for the mainland Chinese tends to be complicated (Scott 2006). Vietnam, however, has not state-funded initiatives to attract people to live there.

In contrast, Vietnam's high-level officials that also carry significance in public diplomacy in appearance how close the relations are in terms of frequent visits. In Japan's case, in the last decade, there have only been two occurrences: when prime minister Shinzo Abe visited Beijing in 2006,

---

<sup>17</sup> There's also NIHONGO Partners dispatched in ASEAN 10: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

and when foreign minister Fumio Kishida went over in 2016. Same for Taiwan- the meetings have not been as frequent as compared with Vietnam. Taiwan Affairs Office Minister Zhang Zhijun visited China in 2014, and President Ma went to Hong Kong in 2016. Taiwan and Japan are more distant when it comes to ministerial exchanges.

As for cultural export, Japan’s initiative ‘Cool Japan’ was mentioned earlier. Vietnam hasn’t announced any similar plans, but Taiwan has recently started multiple collaborations under the Rainbow & Lazurite Initiatives (Ministry of Culture 2017), to promote contemporary culture and call attention to the minority to rights.

Table 1. Comparison of public diplomacy initiatives

	Japan	Vietnam	Taiwan
State language institute abroad	Japan Foundation in China	-	Taipei Language Institute & <i>Huayu</i>
State’s media outlets in Chinese	NHK NHK World TV	越通社 <i>Yuetongshi</i> Vietnam News Agency	*Cantonese Radio Free Asia (RFA)
Work/Study promotion	Japan Foundation Grant Programs, i.e. Japanese Studies Projects	-	The Taiwan Fellowships & Scholarships (TAFS)
Officials visiting China	PM Abe in 2006 FM Fumio Kishida in 2016	At least once a year	TAO Minister Zhang in 2014 Hotline established in 2015. President Ma in Hong Kong in 2016.
Cultural export	‘Cool Japan’	-	The Rainbow & Lazurite Initiatives

Source: author’s calculations based on sources listed in the paragraph before.

As we can see, Vietnam hasn’t taken so much of an initiative to develop its public diplomacy compared to the other two. It seems in relations with the PRC, Vietnam’s public- connecting skills are more related to the appearance of close collaboration in ministers taking action in person, and

in the soft power dynamic is more like the one being influenced. But Vietnam's foreign policy itself has started to move in a more dynamic way. Before, it accommodated the PRC and had little diplomatic interaction with the US until the bilateral trade agreement. Both Vietnam's and Taiwan's soft power resources and tactics, when used, are reactive measures to Beijing, not preventive.

Taiwan has a concentrated selection of public diplomacy initiatives in action and hasn't turned to addressing the mass yet like Japan. Taiwan is still cautious in promoting its own cultural values with a risk of disturbing the thin balance Taiwan has with the PRC. On the other hand, Taiwan has established its own governmental Public Diplomacy Institute in 2012 and sees challenges to the current foreign policy from both the US and PRC side:

- a) New government personnel, policies, and global strategy under US President Donald Trump.
- b) Mainland China's continued effect on our foreign relations and international participation.
- c) Threats to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific- North Korea's continuous nuclear weapon testing.
- d) Impact of rising calls for trade protectionism on regional economic integration- Brexit's influence on globalization. (2017)

The current core of Taiwan's public policy is to focus on the new US government, making sure it will follow the standards of diplomatic relations foremost. Urging them to follow the security pledges towards Taiwan on the basis of the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances comes after that. Taiwan's public diplomacy is directed towards other democratic states, enlisting a sense of solidarity and compassion as it emphasizes itself as a democratic value follower. Both Taiwan and the PRC interdepend on their economic relations, yet as it was Japan, the PRC's economic progress exceeds the leverage financing had over it once.

In Japan's case, the state's Foreign Policy Directive of 1983 clearly tells how their foreign policy should follow soft power methods: "(...) Japan should tackle its foreign policy tasks comprehensively and coherently in such fields as security, economy, economic cooperation and cultural exchange and expand its international responsibilities from the economic field around." Japan's military strength even with the recent steps to militarise, fails to be compared to its soft

power handling. Compared to some other East Asia states, Japan has always managed to attract people who could do the public diplomacy for them, be it academics, politicians, or civilians, and call attention to what is happening and attract publicity abroad. In comparison, Vietnam has not received. For instance, when going through secondary literature, research work and coverage about Vietnam was seemingly smaller than Japan and Taiwan. Although pacifism as a foreign policy might have shifted to a less subservient communication, the basic principle of attraction has stayed the same, with its economy market becoming more integrated with China.

Engaging in public diplomacy is considered to be an effective way to build a country's soft power if the state participates actively in building communication with the foreign public. The ability to influence other nations without economic or military intimidation in a case of failure does not have a heavy impact in comparison to hard power methods. But, for the soft power, or public diplomacy to have success, time is needed with a great comprehension what could be used as an attraction for the target state. The state needs to be a brand, which has a clear vision of its strengths and weaknesses. That is why public diplomacy is handy- it does not require great military power, on the contrary- military power-wise weak state can take advantage of public diplomacy without aggravating possible security threats to the State itself.

## CONCLUSION

In the beginning of thesis, three questions were proposed to discover the People's Republic of China neighbours' coping methods with their next-door economic and military giant. By the studying how dynamic are the relations between Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan, and the PRC, we can describe the state of them.

All three states- Taiwan, Japan, and Vietnam- have territorial disputes with China. Although in the South China Sea's dispute the Hague justice court has decided that China has no effective claim over the desired area, the decision has been blatantly ignored. For territorial disputes, the states have implemented their own methods to claim sovereignty over the territory: Japan purchased islands while China and Vietnam were just creating them. For all case studies the military prowess has also been seen necessary to grow. Japan especially, has started become active extending its military capacities despite the long history of pacifism and subservient diplomacy.

Communication as a foreign policy method aligns with constructivism under the conclusion that social constructions determine the relations of states. In this day of age, social constructions are becoming more determining factors for policy changes. Economic relations are also becoming more socially tangled. So, public diplomacy can be effective when the State knows its strengths and weaknesses. And yet, public diplomacy cannot replace military power or economic restrictions, but it can be a complementary method when a State's reputation in foreign policy is otherwise known to have stable behaviour. In today's era, news travel fast, therefore to have a great military capacity and effective public diplomacy at the same time, one must uphold positive image in foreign public's eyes. As it is now, Japan and Taiwan have proven to have functional public diplomacies, but public diplomacy alone hasn't been altering the PRC's behaviour to align with their foreign policy agendas.

Socially constructed cultural attractions can be ‘personalised’ to each state’s own needs and it isn’t risky tactic. But for it to be effective, the state needs to be clear about what its brand is. Japan exports its cultural attractions, Taiwan highlights the state governance form being democratic ‘being the traditional Chinese culture’, and Vietnam’s public diplomacy compared to the other two is still in kids shoes.

## LIST OF REFERENCES

### Monographs

- Ahern, Emily M. and Gates, Hill. eds. (1981). *The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 89-124.
- Amer, Ramses. (2015). *Vietnam in 2014: Crisis with China Makes Headlines*. Southeast Asian Affairs, vol. 1, pp. 385-401.
- Anholt, Simon. (2010). *Public diplomacy and place branding: Where's the link?*. In Places, pp. 94-102. Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- Ash, Robert, David Shambaugh, and Seiichiro Takagi, eds. (2007). *China watching: Perspectives from Europe, Japan and the United States*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Atanassova-Cornelis, Elena. (2013). *Shifting Domestic Politics and Security Policy in Japan and Taiwan: The Search for a Balancing Strategy between China and the US*. Asia-Pacific Review, 20, vol. 1, pp. 55-78.
- Baum, Julian. (1997). Strait Talking. Far Eastern Economic Review.
- Beal, Tim; Nozaki, Yoshiko and Yang, Jian. (2001). *Ghosts of the Past: The Japanese History Textbook Controversy*. New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, no. 3, pp. 177–188.
- Berger, Suzanne; Lester, Richard K. (2015). *Global Taiwan: Building Competitive Strengths in a New International Economy*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Bolt, Paul J. (2001). *Taiwan-China Economic Cooperation: Ties that Bind?* Kenneth Klinkner ed. The United States and Cross-Straits Relations: China, Taiwan and The US Entering a New Century. Center for East Asian and Pacific Studies.
- Burgess, J. Peter. (2003). *The politics of the South China Sea: Territoriality and international law*. Security Dialogue 34, no. 1, pp. 7-10.
- Cai, Kevin G. (2010). *The politics of economic regionalism: explaining regional economic integration in East Asia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Chang, Alex; Chu, Yun-han and Welsh, Bridget. (2013). *Southeast Asia: Sources of regime support*. Journal of Democracy 24, no. 2, pp. 150-164.

- Chandler, Clay. (2001). *Taiwan's Tech Firms Shifting to Mainland*. Washington Post, Nov.30.
- Chakraborti, Tridib. (2012). *China and Vietnam in the South China Sea Dispute: A Creeping 'Conflict-Peace-Trepidation' Syndrome*. China Report, 48/3, pp. 283-301. Sage Publications.
- Chen, Dung-Sheng. (2001). *Taiwan's social changes in the patterns of social solidarity in the 20th century*. The China Quarterly 165, pp. 61-82.
- Chiang, Min-Hua and Gerbier, Bernard.(2013). *Cross-strait economic relations: recent development and implications for Taiwan*. *Revue de la régulation. Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs* 13.
- Clark, Cal. (2002). *The China-Taiwan Relationship: Growing Cross-Strait Economic Integration*. Elsevier Science Limited.
- Cox, Gary W., and Rosenbluth, Frances. (1995). *Anatomy of a split: the Liberal Democrats of Japan*. Electoral Studies 14, no. 4, pp. 355-376.
- Copper, John Franklin. (2003). *Taiwan: Nation-state or province?*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- DeLisle, Jaques. (2014). *Taiwan and soft power*. J.-P. Cabestan and J. deLisle (eds), Political Changes in Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou: Partisan Conflict, Policy Choices, External Constraints and Security Challenges. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 265-295.
- DeLisle, Jacques. (2016). *Taiwan's Quest for International Space: Ma's Legacy, Tsai's Options, China's Choices, and US Policy*. Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs 60, no. 4, pp. 550-574.
- Dore, Robert P. (1997). *Japan, Internationalism and the UN*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Dinnie, Keith, and Lio, Ada. (2010). *Enhancing China's image in Japan: Developing the nation brand through public diplomacy*. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 6, no. 3, pp.198-206.
- Djerejian, Edward (2003). *Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for US Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World*. Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World. Submitted to the Committee on Appropriations US House of Representatives, no 20.
- Drifte, Reinhard. (2005). *Japan's security relations with China since 1989: from balancing to bandwagoning?*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Drifte, Reinhard. (2006). *The ending of Japan's ODA loan programme to China—All's well that*



- ends well?*, Asia-Pacific Review 13, no. 1, pp. 94-117.
- Eldridge, Robert D. (2014). *No Need for Modesty Here: Enhancing Japan's Public (Intellectual) Diplomacy*. Asia-Pacific Review 21, no. 1, pp. 79-87.
- Emmers, Ralf. (2010). *The changing power distribution in the South China Sea: Implications for conflict management and avoidance*. Political Science 62, no. 2, pp. 118-131.
- Endres, Kirsten W. (2016). *Constructing the Neighbourly "Other": Trade Relations and Mutual Perceptions across the Vietnam–China Border*. 'SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 30, no. 3.
- Fforde, Adam. (2016). *Vietnam: Economic Strategy and Economic Reality*. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35, no. 2, pp. 3–30.
- Fogel, Joshua A. (2000). Book Review, Journal of Japanese Studies, no 26.
- Fuji, Mariko and Kawai, Masahiro. (2010). *Lessons from Japan's banking crisis, 1991-2005*. ADBI Working Paper Series. No 222, June. Asian Development Bank Institute.
- Guan, Ang Cheng. (1998). *Vietnam-China relations since the end of the cold war*. Asian Survey 38, no. 12, pp. 1122-1141.
- Gereffi, Gary. (1998). *More than the Market, More than the State: Global Commodity Chains and Industrial Upgrading in East China*. Chan, S. Clark, C. Lam, D. Beyond the developmental state UK, The Ipswich Book Company Ltd.
- Goldsmith, Benjamin E., and Yusaku Horiuchi. (2012). *In search of soft power: does foreign public opinion matter for US foreign policy?*. World Politics 64, no. 03, pp. 555-585.
- Hagström, Linus. (2005). *Japan's China Policy: A Relational Power Analysis*. London and New York Routledge.
- Hook, Glenn D.; Gilson, Julie; Hughes; Christopher W.; and Dobson, Hugo.(2005). *Japan's international relations: politics, economics and security*. Second Edition. London/New York: Routledge.
- Huang, Hsiang-Wen, and You, Mei-Hui. (2013). *Public perception of ocean governance and marine resources management in Taiwan*. Coastal Management 41, no. 5, pp. 420-438.
- Hudson, Christopher, ed.2013 (1997). *The China Handbook*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Ibrahim, Sheriff Khali. (2010). *Chinese Diplomacy in the South-East-Asia-Region: An Eagle View of Inter-State Party Relations of Mainland-China and Three Communist States (North Korea, Vietnam and Laos)*. Medwell Journals- The Social Sciences, 5/1, pp. 33-44.
- Inoguchi, Takashi. (1993). *Japanese politics in transition: a theoretical review*. Government

- and Opposition 28, no. 4, pp. 443-455.
- Inoguchi, Takashi. (2011). *Japanese Ideas of Asian Regionalism*. Japanese Journal of Political Science 12, no. 02, pp. 233-249.
- Iwanaga, Kazuki. (1996). *From passive to active foreign policy*. Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet, pp. 15-39.
- Kastner, Scott L.(2016). *Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan*. International Security 40, no. 3, pp. 54-92.
- Kuo, Cheng Tian. (1995). *The Political Economy of Taiwan's Investment in China*. Inherited Rivalry: Conflict Across the Taiwan Straits, pp. 153- 169.
- Lawrence, Susan V. (2013). *U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues*. Congressional Research Service.
- Lee, Shin-wa. (2011). *The theory and reality of soft power: Practical approaches in East Asia*. In Public diplomacy and soft power in East Asia, pp. 11-32. Palgrave Macmillan US.
- Lezaun, Javier. (2002). *Limiting the social: constructivism and social knowledge in international relations*. International Studies Review 4, no. 3, pp. 229-234.
- Macridis, Roy C. (2000). *Comparative Analysis: The Search for Focus. Comparative Politics. Notes and Readings*, Fort Worth: Harcourt College Publishers.
- Nye, Joseph S. (1990). *Soft power*. Foreign policy 80, pp. 153-171.
- Nye, Joseph S. (2008). *Public diplomacy and soft power*. The annals of the American academy of political and social science, 616, no 1, pp. 94-109.
- Odgaard, Liselotte. (2003). *The South China Sea: ASEAN's Security Concerns about China*. Security Dialogue 34, no. 1, pp. 11-24.
- Onuf, Nicholas. (1989). *World of Our Making* .Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Onuf, Nicholas. (1998). *Constructivism: a user's manual*. International relations in a constructed world 59.
- Pan, Zhongqi. (2007). *Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The pending controversy from the Chinese perspective*. Journal of Chinese Political Science 12, no. 1, pp. 71-92.
- Park, Se Jung, and Yon Soo Lim. (2014). *Information networks and social media use in public diplomacy: a comparative analysis of South Korea and Japan*. Asian Journal of Communication 24, no. 1, pp. 79-98.
- Pekkanen, Saadia. (2012). *Investment regionalism in Asia: new directions in law and policy?*.

- World Trade Review 11, no. 1, pp. 119–154.
- Plavsak, Kristina. (2002). *Communicative Diplomacy for the 3rd Millennium: Soft Power of Small Countries Like Slovenia?* Journal of political marketing 1, no. 2-3, pp. 109-122.
- Purushothaman, Uma. (2010). *Shifting Perceptions of Power: Soft Power and India's Foreign Policy.* Journal of Peace Studies 17, no 2&3, pp. 1-16.
- Rawnsley, Gary. (2012). *Approaches to soft power and public diplomacy in China and Taiwan.* Journal of International Communication 18, no. 2, pp. 121-135.
- Scott, Simon. (2006). *Taiwan's Mainlanders: A Diasporic Identity in Construction.* Revue européenne des migrations internationales 22, no. 1, pp. 87-106.
- Shannon, Vaughn P., and Kowert, Paul A., eds. (2011). *Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations : An Ideational Alliance.* Ann Arbor, US: University of Michigan Press.
- Sevin, Efe. (2015). *Pathways of connection: An analytical approach to the impacts of public diplomacy.* Public Relations Review 41, no. 4, pp. 562-568.
- Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. (2002). *Realism and the constructivist challenge: Rejecting, reconstructing, or rereading.* International Studies Review, pp. 73-97.
- Storey, Ian. (2008). *Conflict in the South China Sea: China's relations with Vietnam and the Philippines.* The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, no 30.
- Simpson, Gerry. (2004). *Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 68.
- Su, Steven Wei. (2005). *The territorial dispute over the Tiaoyu/Senkaku Islands: An update.* Ocean Development & International Law 36, no. 1, pp. 45-61.
- Suzuki, Shogo. (2008). *Seeking 'Legitimate' Great Power Status in Post-Cold War International Society: China's and Japan's Participation in UNPKO.* International Relations 22, no. 1, pp. 45-63.
- Suzuki, Shogo. (2015). *The rise of the Chinese 'Other' in Japan's construction of identity: Is China a focal point of Japanese nationalism?,* The Pacific Review, 28:1, 95-116.
- Thayer, Carlyle A. (2011). *The tyranny of geography: Vietnamese strategies to constrain China in the South China Sea.* Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 33, no. 3.
- Terry, Edith. (2002). *How Asia got rich: Japan, China and the Asian miracle.* Armonk/New York/London: Pacific Basin Institute Books & M. E. Sharpe.
- Tønnesson, Stein. (2009). *What is it that best explains the East Asian peace since 1979? A call for a research agenda.* Asian Perspective, pp. 111-136.

- Tzeng, Fuh-Wen. (1991). *The Political Economy of China's Coastal Development Strategy: Preliminary Analysis*. Asian Survey, 31, no 3, pp. 270-284.
- Van Ham, Peter. (2001). *The rise of the brand state: The postmodern politics of image and reputation*. Foreign affairs, pp. 2-6.
- Van Ham, Peter. (2002). *Branding territory: Inside the wonderful worlds of PR and IR theory*. Millennium 31, no. 2, pp. 249-269.
- Van Ham, Peter. (2010). *Social power in international politics*. Routledge.
- Vuving, Alexander L. (2006). *Strategy and evolution of Vietnam's China policy: a changing mixture of pathways*. Asian Survey 46, no. 6, pp. 805-824.
- Zhao, Suisheng. (1997). *Economic Interdependence and Political Divergence: the emerging pattern of relations across the Taiwan Strait*. Journal of Contemporary China 6, no. 15, pp. 177-197.
- Zehfuss, Maja. (2002). *Cambridge Studies in International Relations: Constructivism in International Relations : The Politics of Reality*. Cambridge, GB: Cambridge University Press.
- Wang, Jian, ed. (2011). *Soft power in China: Public diplomacy through communication*. Springer.
- Weber, Martin. (2014). *Between 'isses' and 'oughts': IR constructivism, Critical Theory, and the challenge of political philosophy*. European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 2, pp. 516-543.
- Wendt, Alexander. (1992). *Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics*. International organization 46, no. 02, pp. 391-425.
- Wendt, Alexander. (1999). *Social theory of international politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Yang, Aimei, Anna Klyueva and Maureen Taylor. (2012). *Beyond a dyadic approach to public diplomacy: Understanding relationships in multipolar world*. Public Relations Review 38, no. 5, pp. 652-664.
- Yang, Chan. (2010). *Ruthless Manipulation or Benevolent Amnesia? The role of the history of the Fifteen-year War in China's diplomacy towards Japan before the 1982 Textbook Incident*. Modern Asian Studies 50, no. 05, pp. 1705-1747.

### **Internet articles**

- ASEAN. (1992). *Singapore declaration of 1992*. Accessible:

[http://asean.org/?static\\_post=singapore-declaration-of-1992-singapore-28-january-1992](http://asean.org/?static_post=singapore-declaration-of-1992-singapore-28-january-1992) (14.01.2017)

Brown, Kerry; Hempson-Jones, Justin; Pennisi, Jessica. (2010). *Investment Across the*

*Taiwan Strait: How Taiwan's Relationship with China Affects its Position in the Global Economy*. Accessible: <http://www.kerry-brown.co.uk/files/website-8.pdf> (13.01.2016)

Cull, Nicholas J. (2006). „Public Diplomacy“ before Gullion: the evolution of a phrase. *USC*

*Public Diplomacy*. Accessible: <http://usepublicdiplomacy.org/blog/public-diplomacy-gullion-evolution-phrase> (14.01.2017)

反黑箱服貿20社團上凱道. 蘋果日報. Accessible:

<http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/headline/20130728/35182002/> (10.03.2016)

Glaser, Bonnie; Mark, Anastasia. (2015). *Taiwan's Defense Spending: the Security*

*Consequences of Choosing Butter Over Guns*. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. Accessible: <https://amti.csis.org/taiwans-defense-spending-the-security-consequences-of-choosing-butter-over-guns/> (14.01.2017)

Global Security on Taiwan's defense budget. (2016). Accessible:

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/taiwan/budget.htm> (13.01.2017)

Japan Foundation in Beijing. 关于我们. (2017) Accessible: [www.jpfbj.cn/about/](http://www.jpfbj.cn/about/) (15.12.2017)

Malafaia, Thiago C. (2016). *Japanese International Relations: an assessment of the 1971-2011*

*period*. Accessible: [http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci\\_arttext&pid=S1981-38212016000100207](http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1981-38212016000100207). (01.0.2017)

Mollman, Steve. (2016). *Japan and China's maritime tensions in the South China Sea are*

*resurfacing World War II-era wounds*. Accessible: <https://qz.com/780317/japan-and-china-are-ramping-up-maritime-tensions-in-the-south-china-sea-and-east-china-sea/> (01.05.2017)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2011). *Agreement on the Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement*

*of Maritime Issues Between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the People's Republic of China*. Accessible: [biengioilanhtho.gov.vn/eng/agreementonthebasicprinciplesguiding-nd-0e80c28a.aspx](http://biengioilanhtho.gov.vn/eng/agreementonthebasicprinciplesguiding-nd-0e80c28a.aspx) (06.08.2017)

Ministry of Culture. (2017). *The Rainbow and Lazurite Initiatives*. Accessible:

- <http://english.moc.gov.tw/> (05.08.2017)
- New York Times. (1987). *Taiwan ends 4 decades of martial law*. Accessible:  
<http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/15/world/taiwan-ends-4-decades-of-martial-law.html>  
(13.03.2016)
- Nye, Joseph. (2009). *South Korea's Growing South Power*. Accessible:  
<http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/south-koreas-growing-soft-power> (17.02.2017)
- OECD. (2015). *Vietnam profile*. Accessible: <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/vnm/>  
(01.05.2017)
- Offshore Shipping Centers. Ministry of Transportation and Communication, Taiwan, April  
(1997). Accessible: <http://www.iot.gov.tw/public/data/7122111234871.pdf>. (13.03.2016)
- Panda, Ankit. (2015). *Watch Out China: Vietnam's Coast Guard Will Fight Back*. The  
Diplomat. Accessible: <http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/watch-out-china-vietnams-coast-guard-will-fight-back/> (01.05.2017)
- PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC). (2017). *The Long View: How will the global economic  
order change by 2050?* Accessible: <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/world-2050/assets/pwc-the-world-in-2050-full-report-feb-2017.pdf> (01.05.2017)
- Sin, C.(C.Y.), *The economic fundamental and economic policy uncertainty of Mainland  
China and their impacts on ...*, International Review of Economics and Finance (2015).  
Accessible: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2015.02.026> (10.01.2016)
- SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. (2017). Accessible:  
<https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-transfers-and-military-spending/military-expenditure> (30.11.2017)
- Taipei Language Institute. *Brand Story*. (2017) Accessible:  
[http://www.tli.com.tw/tw/about/tli\\_brand\\_story.aspx](http://www.tli.com.tw/tw/about/tli_brand_story.aspx) (15.12.2017)
- Truong, Minh Vu and Nguyen, The Phuong. (2017). *The Modernization of the Vietnam  
People's Navy: Grand Goals and Limited Options*. Accessible:  
<https://amti.csis.org/modernization-vietnam-navy/> (01.05.2017)
- Umeda, Sayuri. (2006). Japan: Article 9 of the Constitution. Accessible:

<https://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/article9.php> (15.01.2017)

Wu, J.R. 22.09.(2016). *Taiwan asks Google to blur images showing new South China Sea*

*facilities*. Reuters. Accessible: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-taiwan-idUSKCN11R109>. (23.09.2016)

Yamaguchi, Shinji. (2017). *Creating facts on the Sea: China's Plan to Establish Sansha City*.

Accessible: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. <https://amti.csis.org/chinas-plan-establish-sansha-city/> (01.05.2017)

Yang, Bai, ed. (2015). *Momentum of growing CPC, KTM dialogue irreversible*. Accessible:

<http://english.cntv.cn/2015/01/19/ARTI1421623816656286.shtml> (13.01.2016)

## **Policies and constitutions**

The Constitution of Japan. (1947). Accessible:

[http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution\\_and\\_government\\_of\\_japan/constitution\\_e.html](http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html)  
(14.01.2017)

Ministry of Finance of Japan. (2015). Accessible:

<http://www.mof.go.jp/english/jgbs/reference/gbb/> (01.05.2017)

MOFA -Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2012). Japan-China Relations. Accessible:

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/data.html> (13.01.2017)

MOFA- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (1983). Promoting Relations with Specific

Countries. Accessible: [http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1984/1984-3-1.htm#Section1.Promoting Relations with Specific Countries](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1984/1984-3-1.htm#Section1.Promoting%20Relations%20with%20Specific%20Countries) (01.05.2017)

MOFA- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (1983). Basic Tasks of Japan's Foreign Policy.

Accessible: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1983/1983-1.htm> (03.05.2017)

MOFA- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (1987). Accessible:

[http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1987/1987-3-1.htm#Section 1. Asia](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1987/1987-3-1.htm#Section%201.%20Asia)  
(01.05.2017)

MOFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan. (2017). Accessible:

<https://www.ocac.gov.tw/OCAC/Eng/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=329&pid=649172>  
(10.12.2017)

新境界文教基金會 國防政策諮詢小組 .(2015). 2025 年台灣 軍事防衛能量 " *Taiwan's*

*Military Capacities in 2025*". Accessible: [http://www.ustaiwandefense.com/tdnswp/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/20150526\\_DPP\\_Defense\\_Blue\\_Paper\\_9.pdf](http://www.ustaiwandefense.com/tdnswp/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/20150526_DPP_Defense_Blue_Paper_9.pdf). (03.05. 2017)

MOFA- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan. (2017). Report by H.E. David Tawei Lee,

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan), at the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee of the Legislative Yuan. Accessible:  
[http://www.mofa.gov.tw/Upload/RelFile/1114/160524/Report%20by%20H.E.%20David%20Tawei%20Lee,%20Minister%20of%20Foreign%20Affairs%20of%20the%20Republic%20of%20China%20\(Taiwan\),%20at%20the%20Foreign%20Affairs%20and%20National%20Defense%20Committee%20of%20the%20Legislative%20Yuan%20on%20March%206,%202017%20.pdf](http://www.mofa.gov.tw/Upload/RelFile/1114/160524/Report%20by%20H.E.%20David%20Tawei%20Lee,%20Minister%20of%20Foreign%20Affairs%20of%20the%20Republic%20of%20China%20(Taiwan),%20at%20the%20Foreign%20Affairs%20and%20National%20Defense%20Committee%20of%20the%20Legislative%20Yuan%20on%20March%206,%202017%20.pdf) (03.05.2017)