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**SMALL STATES AND THEIR STRATEGIC
PARTNERS**

SOUTH CAUCASIAN CASE STUDY

Master`s Thesis

Supervisor: Professor Peeter Müürsepp

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I declare I have written the master's thesis independently. All works and major viewpoints of the other authors, data from other sources of literature and elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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ABSTRACT

Master thesis “small states and their strategic partners” aims to show that existing theories about alliance creations, balance of power and Economic dependence theories concerning bandwagoning strategy are not adequate enough to draw the full picture of strategic decisions small states make in South Caucasus. Case studies from three small state show that they are more likely to balance the sources of external threat rather than choose bandwagoning strategy.

For solving the problem of the research, questions that are provided in thesis are to understand and estimate what provides formation of unions? What factors are important for states when they choose strategic partners? Which way of alliance formation is more common: Balance or Bandwagon strategy? These questions are one of the few in other essential questions that have been raised and discussed during the history of International Relations and Political Science. Research will debate around the foreign policy of South Caucasian states and its priorities as well as draw a behavior of states choosing strategies against the foreign threat.

Aim of the research is to analyze the formation of alliances and choosing strategic partners by small states. Case study depends on three South Caucasian countries. Research paper is divided into two parts: First, theoretical and the second part- empirical.

Research that is conducted below is qualitative and uses case study approach. Case studies are independent and vary within the case study as well. The main goal of research is to test the thesis main hypothesis and find alternative results and answers to the research question. Case studies depend on different methodological techniques such as: secondary source analysis and content analysis.

Research is divided into two parts: Theoretical and empirical parts. General theoretical assumptions, as well as key concepts are defined in the first part and empirical part is based on the analysis from the foreign affairs of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

First part of the research is about the formation of the alliances by small states and reviewing different scientific literature and scientific consensus, which exists about the actions of small state foreign policy in International Relations theory. Moreover, theoretical approaches about

alliance formation in International Relations theories are discussed in first part. In particular, analysis of balance of power, balance of threat and economic interdependence theories and their arguments within international politics.

The second part of a research paper is about analyzing the foreign policy actions of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. On the third chapter of the paper, we will discuss about dynamics of Georgian foreign policy since the day of independence. The fourth chapter is about the Azerbaijan foreign policy, and the fifth chapter about Armenian foreign relations analysis. The final part of the paper is result summary and discussions.

Keywords

Small states, South Caucasus, Alliances, Bandwaggoning, Balancing, Economic Dependence

INTRODUCTION

This thesis presents theories of international relations about alliances and explores why different small states choose different strategies for choosing diplomatic partners. The thesis demonstrates that measuring and framing behavior of small states choosing partners in foreign policy is not efficient for assessing small states foreign policy.

This thesis consists of two parts: theoretical and empirical. Theoretical part demonstrates theories of small states' foreign policy actions about choosing strategic partners. And by presenting case study of South Caucasian states this thesis argues that popular scientific consent in international relations does not always follow the strategy of bandwagoning but there are cases when small states in specific geopolitical and international environment choose to balance the powers. Theoretical conclusions are demonstrated in the empirical part as well as in conclusion.

Main goal of the paper is to revise the assumptions of three theories based on the case study about three South Caucasian countries. Moreover, three influential theories of International Relations will be discussed and analyzed in the first part of the paper. On the basis of creating assumptions about the theories, the empirical part analysis which theory explains better the ongoing process of Regional policy from the independence till modern times. Three theories that will be discussed below are: Balance of power theory, balance of threat theory and economic interdependence theory.

The reason why I have chosen these three theories are: First, These three theories are the most powerful about formation of alliances in International Relations. Second, based on the literature, balance of power is the most common for analyzing the processes in region. Also, balance of threat theory and economic interdependence theories are less analyzed and discussed under the framework of the Caucasus region. That's why it became more interesting to learn the environment through these theories. The research is based on two basic research questions:

1. Which factors do the states take into consideration while choosing strategic partners?
2. Which strategies do the small states prefer towards the foreign threats: Balance strategies or bandwagoning?

Why the empirical case depends on South Caucasus? Choosing this region was influenced by different factors. First of all, the region plays very important role in contemporary international politics. Hence, these facts give theoretical as well as a practical value to the research that is conducted in the paper. Second, the research that was conducted has already been realized based on the cases from Middle East states, south-east Asia and different post-soviet states. It must be considered that during the assumptions of the theories, it is rational to consider temporal and spatial approaches, which means that if a theory can explain the processes that are scattered into the space and time, it has a higher chance to consider that theory works. For this reason, the main method of theory verification is case study method. And results are more valid if the case studies are multiple and different. If the theories are considered as valid based on the case studies from Caucasus region and if it coincides with the results taken from Middle East and South-Asian regions, theories become provable under the criteria of Time and Space.

The second, empirical part is analysis and description of three south Caucasus states foreign policies. However, it is time to mention that analysis is made by the general picture of foreign policy of a state and accents are only made on the empirical data, which coincides with the research.

Methodology

The research paper examines two empirically important questions:

First, what process do the small states undergo choosing their strategic partners? And Second, Which strategy is favorable for small states: balance of power or bandwagoning strategies? These questions make it clear that the main topic of a research is to examine the issues which explain the actions of the small states in international anarchic system and the reasons why these actions are taken. Moreover, except the empirical functions (case studies of South Caucasian foreign policies), theoretical function is important for the research as well. Aim of the research is to verify if the three theories that are mentioned here are valid through the time and space, which

will show the quality of a theory. Results that are made out of the research will show if have a general concept in different case studies and if they are valid in different regions of the world. This approach according to the scientific viewpoint makes the research results more relevant. However, it creates important methodological barriers. Basic methodological barriers can be characterized as, how it can be possible and relevant to generalize theories based on three empirical evidences. It is a significant question methodologically, so during the empirical analysis, the barrier is considered and discussed how the effects methodological barriers are diminished. Although the research is based on certain amounts of data, methodologically it is considered into the qualitative research category and uses case-study method for basic methodological approach. As it is mentioned above, theories that are analyzed are based on the foreign policy actions of three south Caucasian states from the independence till 2012. On the assumption of the fact that three cases might raise legitimate questions about the generalization of the theories, each cases are divided into additional research case, which means that under the framework of each case, episodes where independent and dependent variables are experiencing changes (within case variation) are identified and analyzed as separate cases. Accordingly, these separate cases are considered as additional cases. According to these approaches, research is based on more than three cases for theory verification. Moreover, in order to overcome the obstacles of generalization, so-called least likely cases are used. These approaches implicates that results from least likely cases are easier to be generalized on the cases where it is highly possible that theory is justifiable. However, methodology which the research is based does not fully deduct the effects of methodological obstacles, but clearly reduces them.

Moreover, Research is based on the methodological techniques of data collection and analysis such as:

1. Analysis of Primary sources- Content analysis of official documents about foreign and security policy, as well as national security concepts, foreign policy strategies, threat evolution documents and conceptual and strategic documents;
2. Analysis of secondary sources-scientific literature, which exist around the research topic. It contains theoretical type of literature, as well as research conducted about the region;

General theoretical assumptions

This part of the research is about key terminology definitions and presents general theoretical assumptions, which is analyzed in the research.

“Scientific consensus” on the basis of research about small states- main goal of the research is to analyze what techniques small state refers to when they choose strategic partners. Hence all three south Caucasian countries are small states; research is based on two main theoretical assumptions:

1. States are Unitarian actors, which foreign policy actions are influenced by structure of international system and other actors of the system;
2. Research is based on so-called “Scientific consensus” and the level of international system is chosen for the level of analysis, as it is the most relevant level for evaluation of the foreign policy actions of small states.

Research level is based on international system level and identification of outcome causal analysis refers to the variables that implies to the state interaction.

Key terminology definitions

Alliances- analyzing a concept of union, research is based on the basic definition. According to Glen Snyder alliance theory, definition of alliances should come from the phenomena of „Alignment”- which refers to some expectations that states might have from each other and definition should not be framed in formalized characteristics (Snyder 2001). The essence of these expectations can be characterized by the questions: who will defend who? Who will be a supporter in specific situation? Debates about alliance formation are abundant in international relations. In overall,

scientists have concluded that restrictions on the studies about alliances do not describe their real essence. As a clear example, we can describe the relations between USA and Israel. Although there is not a formal agreement between these two states, it is not doubtful that these two countries are alliances. For this reason, research is based on general concept of alliance and the terms such as alliances, unions and allies are used as interchangeable. Balance-joining alliances in order to balance against other powers or sources of threats. According to the balance theory, states prefer to detain power or threat by the balance of power. As Stephen Walt claims, this tendency can be described in two ways. First of all, it is more reliable strategy to detain threat by balancing it, rather than bandwagon and hope for the goodwill. Second, becoming allies with a threat (bandwagon) creates asymmetric relations within the allies and the free choices of actions are limited for the state who sticks to its threat. However, according to the analysts, balance strategy is more valid for big countries rather than small ones. (Walt 1983)

Bandwagoning- strategy occurs when state aligns with source of threat. Research discusses balance and bandwagoning strategies as opposing to each other. First is defined by making alliance against the source of threat, while second- creating alliance with the source of threat. However, for broadening the definition of bandwagoning, sometimes it does not have a negative significance and the actions might have a positive motivation, according to Randal Sheller (Sheller 1997). So, bandwagoning can have two meanings: it might cause a “capitulation” against the source of threat or integrating with opposing alliance for additional profit. Bandwagoning can have both motivations in specific situations. For example, bandwagoning strategy of Finland with Soviet Union is a negative comprehension of the strategy, while Stalin’s strategy to bandwagon with Germany, which was fulfilled with Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is a positive example of the strategy. In consequence of the bandwagoning strategy, Soviet Union got some part from Poland, as well as time to prepare military actions against Germany.

It is mentionable that balance and bandwagoning strategies are theoretical models so real actions of the states might not follow the exact theoretical models. State that chooses balance strategy might as well find the way to normalize the relations with the source of threat. Bandwagoning with the source of threat and normalizing the relations are totally different realities. The concept of *détente* is more adequate than bandwagoning in this situation. Also, it is possible that a state which forms an alliance with its source of threat, can also try to find another allies for the balance strategy.

1. REVIEWING SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE ABOUT ALLIANCE FORMATION ACCORDING TO SMALL STATES

Theories of international relations traditionally are more oriented to the analysis of the importance of powerful states, rather than foreign policy actions of small states. However, it is still possible to show two scientific consensuses about the foreign policy actions of small states in academic literature.

First, according to the broad analysis about small state foreign policy actions, the most relevant approach is to use so called International system level of analysis. According to the consensus, analyzing small state actions, it is useful to use “black box” approach, which gives an opportunity to comprehend the decisions of small states and its foreign policy priorities without taking into consideration additional factors (domestic policy, role of political elites, political culture, and interest groups). According to Michael Handel, “international system gives a small chance of choice to small states. The fact that small states do not have rights to make mistakes and their main issue is survival makes their foreign policy ambiguous (Handel 1990, 38). Hence, the third level of analysis by Kenneth Waltz is the most relevant level”. The same idea is presented by Rosenau, when he claims that International system level of analysis is more relevant for small states, rather than big ones. He considers that domestic political factors play bigger roles for big countries and they are not influential for smaller states. (Rosenau 1995). The same idea is presented by the famous scholar of international relations, Jack Snyder, who claims that the security environment puts more restrictions on smaller states (Snyder 2001).

According to the second popular approach in scientific circles, small states use bandwagoning strategy more than balance, unlike big states. Nonetheless, structural realists (neorealist) claim that small states usually choose balance strategy, they still stress on the fact that balance strategy is more suitable for big states, rather than small ones. “Hypothesis about the balance strategy” is more common for big states” says Jack Levy (Levy, 2001). “Big states balance potential hegemonies, and small states, which are situated near the hegemonies, act for their own survival. They bandwagon with more powerful states, rather than been balance”. The same idea is used by famous scholar of international relations an alliances, Stephen Waltz: “In general, the weaker state is, it is more like it will choose

bandwagon strategy. Balance cannot be a right strategy, because allies might not support rapidly. Small states which are closer to the source of threat and are far away from potential political allies are forced to use bandwagoning strategy. (Waltz 1998)

It is notable that arguments by famous structural realist scholar in International Relations, author of levels of analysis in theories of International Relations, Kenneth Waltz about analysis of foreign policy, use of international system of analysis is not unambiguous. Waltz, structural realism theorist, who was developing his own theories based on the system level, was doubtful that analyzing foreign policy actions only from system level would not be relevant. “Neorealist theory of international politics” says Waltz. “International factors influence the foreign policy of a state; however he does not mention the importance of domestic factors. In lot cases, theory of international politics cannot make thorough conclusion about the foreign policy. Though he criticizes first (individual level) and second (state level) based theories, he also claims that without putting the first and second level theories, It will be hard to make proper analysis of foreign policy. (Waltz 1998)

Other scholars discuss role of economic factors as important in foreign policy. Some scholars think that economic dependence, especially energetic dependence influences the political trajectory of small states. According to these arguments, if the economic dependence of a regional hegemony is high, balance strategy from dependent state might be difficult and dangerous. Paul A. Papayoanou claims that when economic dependence is high, states who prefer maintaining status quo, cannot handle to use balance strategy against revisionist states (Papayoanou 1999).

According to Eric Miller empirically supports this assumption based on the foreign relations of post-soviet states. Miller assumes that when the economic dependence on Russia is high, post-soviet states choose bandwagoning strategy. Based on this logic, the actions of the states depend on the assumed political and economic harm the states can face, if they choose undesirable political actions against Russia. Except the foreign policy significance, this argument has domestic political and economic implications as well. In particular, the states who are economically dependent on Russia threaten their own economic and political stabilization if they act against it. Economic sanctions from Russia could considerably worsen economic situation, which would reflect on the stability of political system. That means rising dissatisfaction of the population on the political elite. Worsening economic situation and defamation of political elite negatively reflects on the stability of political elite and their chances in the future elections. In worst case, worsening economic

situation and political destabilization can cause regime transformation as well. Existing literature in international relations show that small states are secondary actors in International politics and their actions are influenced by the most influential actors of international system. Results that can be made from the analysis introduced above:

First of all, analyzing the political actions of small state, it is clear that the most relevant level of analysis is the international level of analysis, as the security environment is main variable, which impedes the freedoms of actions for small states, as well as makes their actions easily predictable. According to this approach, if a research owns a thorough picture of a state's security environment boundaries, it becomes clear to comprehend what type of foreign policy does state has. Moreover, following the same logic, if multiple states are operated in the same security environment, their foreign policy actions might be similar. It is evident that the approach, which imparts the security environment as the key variable is a relevant research level of analysis as a security environment foresees the influence of the variables, such as individual traits of a leader, domestic policy, political culture etc.

Second, small states use the strategy of bandwagoning unlike bigger states. This argument is a logical continuation of an assumption that international system plays an important role in small state foreign policy actions. Unlike big states, which determine the boundaries of a system by themselves, situation for small states is different. As some studies reveal, the quality of economic dependence, as systemic dimensional variable, determine the choice between a balance and bandwagoning strategy.

Goal of analysis that was presented here was to review the basic discourse, which exists in scientific discipline of international relations for small states. In following chapters of the research paper, presented analysis will contradict the scientific consensus in the discipline. Based on the case studies from South Caucasian countries, it will develop alternative hypothesis about the foreign policy actions of small states.

1.2. Alliances in theories of international relations

Discipline of international relations is full of theories about alliances, which try to analyze the phenomena of international politics from different angles. Glenn H. Snyder chooses some of them: social coalition theory, as well as theories that are based on “rational choice” model. (Snyder 2001). However, these theories were partially analyzing causes of alliance formations. For this reason, the research questions about alliances are analyzed from the three most powerful theories that are: structural balance of power theory, economic dependence and balance of threat theory. The first theory, balance of power is mainly connected to the famous structural realist, Kenneth Waltz and is considered under the neorealism school of theory. The final formation of the theory is presented in Waltz’s book “theory of international politics” that was published in 1979. Second theory, which emphasizes economic factor influence in international politics, is part of liberal paradigms of international relations. Debates about importance of economic factors were most popular in 70-90th which was framed under the controversy between neorealism and neoliberalism theories. Supporters of the theory of economic dependence tried to empirically prove the relevance of the theory, assuming that economic factors could play a positive role in international politics. Third theory which is identified in the research, balance of threat theory is also connected with the famous scholar from realism school, Stephen Walt. Theory of balance of threat was created by reviewing assumptions about balance of power theory. Existing theory, which is presented from realism school paradigms, has more characteristics from postclassical or neoclassic realism (neorealism). Next subchapters of a research review theories mentioned above and their analysis.

1.2.1. Balance of power theory

~ In order to better understand the balance of power theory it is important to shortly review the main assumptions of neorealism according to Waltz in the point of international politics. Waltz builds its theory on the level of international system and presents a concept of systemic structure, as an analytical mechanism. In particular, system structure has three elements: Anarchy (nonexistence of central government in the world), functional similarity between states and distribution of

power. The logic of the theory is exceptionally thrift. As Anarchy is a constant value of an international system, and the fact that states create mutual-help system and care about its own survival (constant), the most important elucidative variable in the system is distribution of power. Power of a state is measured by material factors. Theory of structural balance of power relies on measurable variables, such as: military capabilities, size of GDP (gross domestic product), size of population and the geographical location, which might encourage or impede power rejection of the military capabilities in international system. Moreover, while analyzing structural balance of power theory, it relies on ratio analysis of distribution of power and not on absolute criteria. So, according to logic, distribution of power is more important in international system rather than measuring the power capabilities of a state. According to balance of power theory, security of each state mostly depends on comparative power with other states. Main aim of alliance formations or integration in existent alliances is to balance the most powerful state on a regional or international level. Theory of balance of power claims that it is more beneficial to join less powerful side. In theory of balance of power is directly related to the threat. Concept of power implies that one state's power does not only create discomfort, but is a source of threat for other states. Following logic of these theories, decision makers usually manage with the tendencies of the power distribution in regional or international system while assessing threats. Secondary states subscribe to less powerful state, as the most powerful threatens them (Waltz 1998). The same opinion is developed by John Mearsheimer, when claiming that more power a state possess, more threat it spreads to its neighbors (Mearsheimer 2003). Scholars who are proponents of balance of power theory (Classical, as well as contemporary realist theorists) do not dissociate concepts of power and threat from each other. In their opinion, variable of power is enough to measure threats. Balance of power theory, which tries to explain the motivation of joining alliances by the states, may satisfy the main value of a theory-frugality, but according to Robert Keohane, it is not fully convincing. (Keohane 1986)

1.2.2. Economic dependence theory

As we mentioned above, economic dependence theory offers us assumptions about the state political actions. According to the theory, qualities of economic interdependence between two states significantly determine the quality of political relations and trajectory. The main argument of the

theory is that if state A's economy considerably depends on B state, (Asymmetric dependency in economic relations), there is a high chance that state A will execute politics that are acceptable for state B. The same argument is usually used in academic and analytic circles for describing relations between Russia and EU. Publications based on this subject usually discuss that the main determining factor in EU-Russia relations is EU energetic dependence on Russia. According to the theory, economic dependence impedes the political freedom for a state and makes foreign policy of a state easily predictable. So, more a state is economically dependent on another state, more the foreign policies of both states are compatible. As we mentioned above, empirically proven examples are taken from post-soviet states. Main research argument of Eric Miller is that strategies that post-soviet states choose and choices they make between balance of power or bandwagoning mostly depends on the quality of economic dependence on Russia. Miller claims that more post-soviet state is dependent on Russia economically, more it tries to reject the possibility of balance of power politics and bandwagon with Russia. According to Miller, choices of states are caused by economic and political calculations. If states act against Russian political interests, there is a high chance that economically dependent states on Russia will be victims of economic controls that Russia will use against them. And the economic sanctions against "disobedient" states can greatly create problems of the political and economic stability. Therefore, according to the argument, governing political elites try not to make stiff measures against Kremlin foreign policy priorities and become more compatible in order to maintaining electorate and popularity (Miller 2006). For measuring economic dependency, scholars use three indicators:

Volume of trade:

Volume of trade relations- export-import ratio with a state in overall trade. According to the theory, more ratio state A has in overall trade, B state will be more dependent on a state economically. So, state B will try to bandwagon state A, rather than try a balance strategy against it;

Energetic dependence:

Second independent indicator of economic measurements is energetic dependence. In this case, energetic resources includes natural gas, electric energy and oil. They are the resources, which are vitally important for infrastructure functioning. Logic of the theory is similar with trade relations. Existence of alternative markets:

Existence of this variable defines what kind of effects trade and energetic dependence variables can have. For example, if a country has an opportunity to take alternative markets for import-

export from another country, than effects of energetic and trade dependence variables can be different. For this reason, existence of alternative markets makes easier to choose balance strategy by a state.

1.2.3 Balance of threat theory

The structural power theory determines balancing and sticking policies as material/tangible resources. Hence balance implies joining the alliance in weak position while sticking implies taking the strong side position. Although this view has serious limitations as it does not take into account other factors which may be considered by decision makers of a state. No doubt that power is quite significant component to be taken into account but it is not the only one. Correspondingly it will be more precise to say that it is more likely that a country creates alliance with the country or against the country which represents the bigger threat to it. For example, the coalition created during the I and the II World War against Germany and its allies possessed much more materials resources than the alliance against which it was created. The theory of power balance is weak with regards to this case but the theory of threat balance justifies that despite the relative weakness of Germany, the alliance against it was created as a result of perception that it represented the hazard for the other countries. The same point of view is developed by Michael Sheehan: “Countries do not join alliances only against a power. The perception of threat is required for it. The power of the United States of America after 1945 did not cause fear among the countries of Western Europe, while the Soviet Union by its aggressive actions did.” (Sheehan 1996).

According to Edwin Fedder the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created as a result of the threat coming from the Soviet Union while the threat itself was assessed based on the capacities and intentions of this country (Fedder 2013). Consequent from the above the supposition to be made is as follows: the power variable is not enough to adequately measure the threat. Power is significant of course, though not the most significant factor. Let us review the variables which give opportunity to measure threats more precisely. These factors/variables are:

Power: The more powerful a state is the more potential threats it carries for other countries. When a comparative power of a state is growing other states perceive it as a possible threat for them. Correspondingly, the comparative growth of strength of a country may encourage the tendency of

alliance formation as a source of the power balance. Thus the theory of power balance is rather incomplete than completely wrong. Power is not the only but is one of factors and not the most important which increases the tendency of power balance. Apart from Waltz, who considers that unbalanced power whoever possesses it represents a threat for other countries Walt considers that power is only one of the components of threat perception. (Waltz 1998)

Allegedly the power variable has its role in the theory of threat balance. The logic in this case is as follows: the power being not the most significant factor is still important variable to measure threats, since, if a country is so weak that it has no resource to implement aggressive policy or threat it is less hazardous in relation to other countries. For example, a powerful but non-aggressive state does not represent a threat while a weak but aggressive country represents a minor threat. It is important to take into account what country is the aggression directed against. If a weak state threatens a big country (which is very rare) then the object of the threat does not perceive the aggressor as a serious threat. In case a weak country threatens another weak country then the last one perceives it as a serious threat. The major argument for the theory of threat balance is that it is impossible to make threat assessment based only on power variable. Given the fact that a state can use its power in two different ways (to threaten another state, or not to threaten another state) it becomes important to consider additional factor which will enable adequate assessment of a threat.

Geographic proximity: The countries located in the close proximity potentially create bigger threat than the country located in remote proximity. Geographic proximity is a potential mechanism of threat quality increase. In particular, the closer two countries are located to each other the more the probability that they perceive threat from each other. Though it should be kept in mind that this is just one component of threat assessment and it creates a threat only in combination with other components. For instance, Iran and the United States are located in a big distance though it does not prevent these states from perceiving the threat from each other. Hence the argument is as follows: geographic proximity does create a structure of threats and opportunities which a priori cannot define the relationships as conflict or cooperative.

Aggressive intentions: The states which are clearly aggressive are potentially balanced by other states. For examples, the alliance which was created against Germany and its allies was predetermined by its aggressive actions and not by its material strength. The assessment of

intentions is a particularly important factor in the process of selection of allies. By adding this variable Walt acknowledges that it is impossible to identify the threat carrier state only based on power allocation. (Walt 2013)

1.2.4 Preliminary theoretical assumptions/hypotheses

In this part of the thesis assumptions of the theories of power balance, economic dependence and balance of threat are presented to be studied and formulated as hypotheses. The proposed approach gives us possibility to empirically cross-check the efficiency of the theories in relation with little countries in the process of strategic allies' selection and determination of balance or bandwagoning strategies preference. This part of the thesis presents the observable hypothesis which will be double-checked on the basis of empiric research.

Assumptions/hypotheses of power balance theory:

- H1. The motivation of countries to join alliances is the target to balance strongest country in an international or regional system;
- H2. The countries balance the strongest actors of international or regional systems by creating alliances with the weaker actors;
- H3. The stronger the power concentration in one of the countries of the system becomes, the more effort of formation alliances from the weak actors against the strong ones is done aimed at creation of a balance.

Assumptions/hypotheses of economic dependence theory:

- H4. Economic dependence limits the independence of a country to implement its free foreign policy;

H5. The more/less economically dependent is one country on another one the more/less compatible are the priorities of foreign policy of these countries;

H6. Changes in the priorities of foreign policy of a country depend on the changes of volume of its economic dependence on other country. Consequently, the more the quality of economic dependence of a country grows the more limited the quality of foreign policy independence of a subordinate country becomes and, vice versa, the less the quality of economic dependence is the better the quality foreign policy independence of a subordinate country becomes;

Assumptions/hypotheses of balance of threat theory:

H7 The states are not ruled by the motivation to balance the power (the strongest country in the international or regional systems) when selecting alliance countries but rather are moved by the motivation to balance the country which represents the biggest threat for them;

H8. In case of an international threat any state will create alliance with other states to balance the sources of the threat;

Assumptions/hypotheses regarding international policy of balance/bandwagoning strategy chosen by small states:

H9. Small countries choose the strategy to balance the source of threat rather than bandwagon to it;

The countries choose the bandwagoning strategy in the following external conditions:

H10. The weaker the country is the bigger the chance it chooses the bandwagoning strategy;

H11. A state chooses the bandwagoning strategy when it has no alliances and has no other choice;

H12. A state chooses the bandwagoning strategy when it believes that by that act it will appease the source of threat.

After the basic theoretical assumptions and notions are defined, the main arguments of alternative theories are reviewed and the preliminary assumptions are formulated the main task to be done is

to assess the level of justification of presented hypotheses by the empiric part of the thesis. The remaining part of the theses will be devoted to this task.

2.1. Foreign policy of Georgia from the independence restoration date

We may define several fundamental stages in foreign policy of Georgia. The first stage starts from the Zviad Gamsakhurdia coming to power – independence declaration and lasts until 1992. * The second stage coincides with return of Eduard Shevardnadze and international recognition of independence of Georgia and lasts until 2003. But particular number of researches also marks out two sub-periods in foreign policy of Georgia within Shevardnadze governing period. The First is 1992-1995 period, when Country was defeated in war in Abkhazia and joint Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The beginning of the second sub-period coincides with adoption of Constitution and lasts till 2003. The third stage in foreign policy of Georgia starts in 2003, after change of Government, as the result of Rose Revolution and with election of Mikhail Saakashvili as the President of Georgia, which continues so far.

2.1.1. 1991-1992 period

Foreign policy of Zviad Gamsakhurdia within his governing period was defining International relations of Georgia by several factors. Among them we may specify three factors: first, Zviad Gamsakhurdia himself and his attitude to foreign and home policy. Second, political situation within a Country. And the third, unfavorable geopolitical reality for Georgia in that period, which in that period has been generally identified only by Russian Federation. As it was mentioned Georgia within Gamsakhurdia governing period has not been recognized by International Society as the sovereign entity. According to the opinions of some researches that period Georgian Foreign Policy has not been envisaging strategic estimations and relevant evaluation of existent geopolitical situation, and was distinguished only by so called “Strategic Idealism”. Gamsakhurdia governing period is characterized by so called “Populism phenomenon” as in home as well as in

foreign policy. Populist attitude to the policy has caused two contradictory phenomenon typical for immature democracy. First, Gamsakhurdia populist attitude as to home as well as to foreign policy at the very beginning gave him ability to get huge support. And second, according to the researchers' opinions his methods of governing very soon brought country administration to authoritarianism. According to the opinion of Ronald Grigor Suny, Gamsakhurdia raising authoritarianism induced estrangement of lot of leaders not only of different ethnic origin but also from national movement. (Suny 1994)

Despite the fact that one of the main indicators of the Government politics was lack of experience, we may see efforts for definition of foreign political priorities during Gamsakhurdia period. At least we can mark out one of those priorities. It was effort of that period Georgia to avoid Russia and receive assistance from other countries. Some steps have been made in this context. Gamsakhurdia has tried to gain USA interest and for this purpose has sent his representative to Washington in March 1990. But this visit had no positive results. Foreign Policy of Gamsakhurdia period Georgia is notable with the fact that despite pressure from Russia, which on one hand has been revealed in encouragement of separatist regimes and on the second hand assistance of internal opponents, Gamsakhurdia had not been taking decision to joint Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

2.1.2. 1992-1995 first stage of Shevardnadze Foreign Policy - joint to Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

In 1992 after the subversion of Zviad Gamsakhurdia Government Eduard Shevardnadze returns to Georgia. After his return Georgia has been recognized as sovereign State by the significant part of International Community. Foreign Policy of Georgia within 12 months starting from Shevardnadze coming to power and until joining Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and fall of Sukhumi, is characterized by resistance against return to sphere of influence of Russia. Despite that Shevardnadze Policy, with respect to Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), at the initial stage has not been radically different against his predecessor, according to the opinion of Helena Frazier, it was more pragmatic with respect to the necessity of relations normalization with Russia. However Shevardnadze continued resistance to the demand to join Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and put question on Russian troops leave from the territory of Georgia. (Frazier 1997).

In that period Shevardnadze has even demonstrated that political and military integration in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) contradict with interests of Georgia. During the same period brutal diplomacy of Russia has been conducted in several directions. The first, Russia has been encouraging separatists during Abkhazian conflict. Since Russia has been assisting separatists in Abkhazian conflict Shevardnadze has been publicly identified this conflict as conflict between Georgia and Russia. The second, the strategy was application of economic blockade, which has been realized with blocking of natural gas supply and cessation of telecommunications. Also Russia has refused Georgia to provide credits while providing credits to other former Soviet Republics. And the third, Shevardnadze has had serious suspicions that Russia has been providing military assistance to the followers of Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Russia has been also encouraging separatists in “South Ossetia”, where conflict has been escalated in 1991-1992. One part of analysts have been publicly speaking on Russia interests in this conflict, they have been even declaring that Russia was directly participating in military operations. But the other part of analysts have been considering disputable direct participation of Russia in the conflict and have been explaining it by the fact that within that period, when conflict has been started, Russian foreign policy in respect to cooperation with Georgia has not been respectively conditioned yet

. However Russian interest in Georgia and processes, which have been taking place in the region, became noticeable in May-June 1992. In particular, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chairman of Supreme Board of Russia and Vice-President Aleksander Rutskoy initiated talks on annexation of “South Ossetia” to Russia. According to Khasbulatov announcement “Russia will use any force in order to exclude violation of their citizens’ rights”. In this announcement Chairman of Supreme Board of Russia meant “South Ossetia” and people living at this territory considered as citizens of Russia. Even more, Khasbulatov has threatened Shevardnadze with bomb attack on Tbilisi, in case Georgian side would not cease military activities in “South Ossetia”. Facing strained relations with neighboring countries Shevardnadze carried out policy of so called “two Russia”. He thought that accountable person for the existed situation from Russian side has not been President Yeltsin or anyone from the President Administration, but the Supreme Board and especially militaries. During the same period it became obvious that in the center of political confrontation between Georgia and Russia were militaries and the keys for relationship were in their hands. Shevardnadze Government has been waiting for support from the west to reduce and solve consequences of civil and ethnic war. However this hope has not been justified and Shevardnadze has slowly started

following policy of approach with Russia. On September 27, 1993 against internal and international tension Shevardnadze sends Boris Yeltsin, President of Russia, telegram with consent to join Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Lately Shevardnadze described this decision as “Kneeling of Georgia”. This decision resulted in dislocation of four Russian military bases at the territory of Georgia and Treaty on “Friendship, Neighborliness and Cooperation” has been executed between Georgia and Russia in May 1994. During the same period Russian Government applies sanctions against Abkhazia, what was revealed by closing of northern border of Abkhazia and Sukhumi airport. In to opinions of many analysts this decision made by Shevardnadze has been evaluated as unconditional surrender.

However if we analyze this decision in depth, we will reveal that such choice of adherence to the source of danger should not be considered completely in negative sense. Specifically Shevardnadze has used joining to Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in two directions. First, he has appeased foreign aggressor and the second, using the same foreign committer he achieved comparative stability in the country and provision of his regime viability. Joining to Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was the classical case of adherence to the source of danger. It would be logical to ask: were the admissions in respect of adherence to the strategy provided by the theoretical part of this scientific research justified? Before answering this question we have to recall once more those general theoretical estimates, which were stated in respect to such adherence. Adherence to the source of international danger is the least desirable choice for the country. Thereafter this explains initial negative attitude of Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze with respect to joint Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). If we revert to the assumptions in the theoretical part of this scientific research with respect to adherence policy, we will reveal that anticipatory assumptions/hypothesis have come true. The State chooses adherence strategy when (1) it is weak, (2) it does not have other ally, possible to help in balance of the threat, (3) it considers that source of danger will become appeased. In case of 1992 period Georgia all these 3 conditions prevailed. First, during the whole this period Georgia was represented as weak State.

According to Bruno Coppieters opinion during the first part of 1990s Georgia was not only weak State, but under occurrences in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as due to ongoing political confrontations it was drowned in the weakness subcategory, what is “known under name of failed State”. (Coppieters 2001) Also the second theoretical admission with respect to adherence policy has come to true: State chooses adherence strategy, when it does not have other ally and does not have any other choice. During Abkhazian conflict Shevardnadze has applied to

UN General Secretary for dislocation of peacemaking forces in conflict zone, however UN reply was that it was not relevant time to implement such project. This situation was also supplemented by the fact that until the middle of 1990s Europe and USA did not have developed their own policy with respect to this region. For this reason Zeyno Baran mentions the fact that significant part of USA politicians and analysts hardly knew this region (baran 2002). ‘

According to Svante Cornell opinion in 1991-1994 USA active involvement in the processes taken place in Caucasus along with numerous matters (among them consequences prevalent in Balkan Peninsula and Somali) was prohibited by the fact, that Washington hasn't had yet considered his national interests in respect to this region. (Cornell,2005) David Mark goes much further in this respect and thinks that South Caucasus has been generally ignored by western countries during last 300 years, except the great attention during Crimea and World War periods (Mark 1997). Apparently envisaged theoretical estimations became real. Georgia, which during all that period was weak, had no ally and thought that by joining Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) would appease aggressor, chooses adherence strategy. However from the second part of 1990s situation has changed. If until 1995 Russian influence in South Caucasus was limited due to the conflict in Chechnya, from 1995 Russia has faced western States as evident competitors in the region.

2.1.3.1995-2003 – the second stage of Shevardnadze Foreign Policy

From 1995 beginning of new epoch in Foreign Policy of Georgia coincides with adoption of constitution and establishment of comparative stability within country. Alexander Rondeli thinks that from 1995, despite Russian pressure and unsolved conflicts in Abkhazia and “South Ossetia”, Georgia still enables itself to manage Foreign Policy orientation to Pro-Western. (Rondeli,2001). Starting from this period Shevardnadze as much as possible initiates diplomatic activity with western countries. In 1995 February Shevardnadze in the frame of visit to Great Britain meets Queen Elisabeth II, Prime Minister John Mayer and other politicians. Under the protocol of this meeting Georgia and Great Britain execute Declaration on “Friendship and Cooperation”. Also cooperation with NATO becomes more intensive, which has been resulted in introduction of Georgia into NATO Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. Within the same program in 1997 February NATO General Secretary Javier Solana visited Georgia. He had private sessions with Eduard Shevardnadze,

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defense. Also the second period of Foreign Policy coincide with entering of Georgia into European Commission (1999), what has been evaluated as significant declaration of European orientation. In 1999 April Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan together renounced participation in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) agreement on “Collective Security”. In 2002 November at NATO Prague Summit Shevardnadze announced aspiration of Georgia to joint Alliance.

From 1995 the general aim of Foreign Policy of Georgia was balancing of foreign threat coming from Russia. In order to achieve this goal Shevardnadze has been trying to obtain security guaranties from the west, what concurred with growth of interests of western States, specifically with interests of United States in regards to Caspian oil. In the same period construction projects of two pipe lines - Baku-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan were initiated under US support. All this period is characterized with intensity in relations between Georgia and Russia. However this tension has reached its maximum at the beginning of the second military campaign in Chechnya. Tatiana Antonenko thinks that in contrast to the first war in Chechnya, which brought together positions of Georgia and Russia, the second war caused escalation of existent crisis and reached its maximum in 2002 summer due to the incident occurred in Pankisi.

2.1.4. Pankisi crisis

It is especially important that Pankisi events should be considered against the background of September 11 terrorist acts. After the terrorist acts in New York US interest in South Caucasus gets beyond the oil factor and US considers this region as one of the important components in cooperation with Middle East and anti-terrorist policy. This period coincides with Russian assistance to US in counter terrorist campaign, what has been concluded in execution of declaration between Putin and Bush, where both presidents declared their common interests in preservation of stability and territorial integrity in Central Asia and South Caucasus region. However very soon it became obvious that Russia has been intending to use element of fight against terrorism for realization of its own interests in Chechnya and Pankisi. In 1999-2000 approximately 7000 Chechen refugee entered Pankisi gorge. Moscow have been permanently demonstrated their confidence that besides peaceful citizens Chechen terrorist have been located in Pankisi. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of that period Russia Igor Ivanov has been even supposed that Osama Bin Laden has been hiding in the gorge. As the result Georgian air space has been repeatedly

violated by Russian Air Forces. Minister of Defense of Russia Sergey Ivanov has been saying that since Georgia was not able to keep order in Pankisi then Russia by military intervention would destroy this “nest” of terrorism. On the background of degraded relations, when threat from Russia became real, Shevardnadze activates diplomatic relations with western countries and authorizes Government Commission to develop program on military, political and economic integration into NATO until November 2002. Nearly in the same period Putin has made statement that he was ready to “help” Georgia and fulfill joint Georgian-Russian military operation in Pankisi for neutralization of terrorists settled down in this gorge. But Georgian party has refused this proposal and stated that it was against any foreign forces to intervene in Pankisi issue. In contrary Shevardnadze has been asking for help from USA in order to solve Pankisi crisis. This was the period coinciding with initiation of so called “Training and Equipment program” implemented by

US in Georgia, in the frame of these program approximately 200 US military experts came to Georgia to conduct training of Georgian military personnel. Negative reaction of Russia has caused first breach in post 9-11 friendship between Washington and Moscow. But Russia had to get used with US militaries visit to Georgia. It has realized that it was unable to carry out aggressive policy at this stage and Russia stepped back. In 2002 October Shevardnadze and Putin have even come to the agreement that they had to normalize tense relations between their countries. This decision made by Shevardnadze showed classical case to attempt appease foreign aggressor. This case is well explained in the balance of threat theory. In contrast to Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), when Georgia has decided adherence to the source of threat, in the circumstances of Pankisi crisis Georgia has chosen strategy of foreign threat balancing. There were several reasons for that. The first, despite that Georgia during this period has been attributed to the category as weak States; political situation within the country has been more stable than during the first part of 1990s. The second, in contrast to the period of joining Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) US interests with respect to Georgia were definite and Georgia had ally, which would help it in balancing of foreign threat. And at the end, if we compare theories of force and threat balancing the superiority of the last one is ultimate. Georgia has preferred balancing of much weak, geographically neighboring and aggressive country by means of strong and geographically outlying country.

According to the opinions of particular part of researches, Shevardnadze at the end of his governing period once again tried to alternate political vector of Georgia in favor of Russia. Although this effort has not been such evident, as it was in previous years. According to Bruno Coppieters opinion this alternation of foreign political course was concerned with alternation of US security policy orientation. In 2003, during existent internal political crisis within the country US has evidently preferred government came to power after the “Rose revolution”. In 2003, when the country was in an internal political crisis, America clearly sympathized the government which came to power after «Rose Revolution». Shevardnadze's attraction towards the Russia may be considered as anomalous towards the balance of threat and balance of power theories. In fact, the level of threats coming from Russia, during this period, was the same as it was in the past years. There was no change in the interest of America towards Georgia and the Region itself. Accordingly, the last correction attempt of foreign policy course is better explained by the so called “Omni balancing theory” then balance of threat and balance of power theories.

2.1.5. 2004-2008 Foreign policy of Georgia after “Rose Revolution”

In 2003, after “Rose Revolution” Shevardnadze was forced to resign. In 2004, after the presidential elections, new government immediately announced the willingness of normalization of relations with Russia. In Inaugural speech, President Saakashvili announced, that his political course is neither “Pro-Russia” nor “Pro-American”, but “Pro-Georgian”. Initially Russia preferred the waiting politic towards new Government of Georgia. President Putin met the above mentioned statement of Saakashvili positively and announced, he kept hope, that new Government will be able to restore the traditional friendship between two countries and there is no other purpose for Russia to be driven towards the Georgia. Despite this, Russia’s position did not change. This is confirmed by the fact, that two days after Putin gave his speech; Russian’s officials began quadripartite talks with the leaders of Abkhazia,

South Ossetia and Adjara, which was followed by the irritation in Tbilisi. After “Rose Revolution”, in May of 2004, after the beginning of humanitarian-military hostilities in “South Ossetia”, the relations between Russian and Georgia thoroughly complicated. The Government of Saakashvili, which made the peaceful resolution of Adjara issue, tolerated his whole attention towards the South

Ossetia and was sure that it was possible to repeat the success of Adjara in South Ossetia. But, unlike the case of Adjara, the Government of Georgia was not able to avoid the military confrontation and casualties. The Georgian side was forced to withdraw troops from conflict zone and finish the military confrontation. This strategy did not work. It not only contributed to the resolution of conflict, but much more complicated the existing situation and determined the impairment of relations.

Russia is also irritated by the striving of Georgia for the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations. Vladimir Putin, as many other politicians in Russia, openly declared that it is true that he has no wish of recovery of Communism, but feels regret over the collapse of USSR. The main foreign policy of Saakashvili's Government was the country's accession to NATO. Serious steps were made in this direction. In 2004 Georgia joined the NATO Partnership Action Plan individually (IPAP). From 21 September of 2006 Georgia cooperates with NATO with the format of Intensified dialogue. Complicated Georgian-Russian relations became tenser in September of 2006 when Georgian side arrested 4 Russian spies. In return Russian recalled its ambassador, and Sergei Ivanov declared that "dimension of Georgia is crime". This is the period of violent diplomacy of Russia towards Georgia- economic blockade and sanctions low. Russia has tried to use economic leverage with political pressure to influence the foreign policy choices. In that time Russian market was the important export market for the Georgian products such as: citrus fruits, alcoholic beverages and mineral waters. In 2006 Russia ousted Georgian products from Russian market, as a result of the embargo of Georgian products to the quality claim. Before the embargo of 2006 Russia was Georgia's main trading partner and only Russia accounted for the foreign trade of about 20% of Georgia. It also must be mentioned that from 2003 to 2006. The year of embargo, Russian-Georgian trade relationships were characterized of growing dynamics. The loose of Russian export market damaged the balance of imports-exports and adversely affected the country's trade deficit.

Despite the fact that the Georgia's trade balance was not positive before the close of Russian market, the difference between export and import significantly grow after embargo. For example: in 2003 Georgia's import was higher than export 2.4 times. After the Russian embargo, in 2007 this difference became higher on 4.2 times. According the date, the Imbalances in 2012 has not been overcome. 136 Despite the fact that after the economic blockade Georgia made the diversification of foreign trade, it became impossible to replace the export potential of the Russian

market. Russia used energy leverage of Georgia alongside with embargo on Georgian products. Before 2006 Russia was the only natural gas supplier in Georgia. Natural gas imports accounted for 100% of the Russian Federation. Russia doubled the price of gas for the purpose of political pressure and also carried out acts of sabotage of gas pipes and electricity transmission lines. Georgia and Azerbaijan, mainly to get out of this crisis and also partly through Iran, was able to develop its own energy resources. The Georgian government called " political decision "from Russia in the direction of doubling natural gas prices. For Georgian politicians it was a positive pressure and the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili thanked Russian President Vladimir Putin for the improvement of quality of Georgian wine.

Before the Bucharest summit in 2008 Russia activated its relations towards the Georgian separatist regions. In August 7 of 2008, the confrontation was culminated, when Georgia and Russia were involved in a full-scale military action. After the 5 day war Russia became the winner and occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia and in two weeks the regions were recognized independent unilaterally. For gaining the international legitimacy of the decision, Russia began active campaign in the direction of gaining international recognition. Russia was supported by Nauru, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Vanuatu only. At the same time after the war, Russia openly began the development of military infrastructure in the occupied regions and deployed significant number of troops. According the different sources of information, Russia has about 10-12 thousand troops serving in Abkhazia and of South Ossetia " areas. Russia deployed he offensive and defensive weaponry, in particular the short-range ballistic missiles SS-21 and S-300 air defense systems in occupied regions. The war of 2008 worsened the security environment in Georgia. In strategic and military directions, today, Georgia is in more complicated situation then before the war in August of 2008. The transformation of security environment was also reflected in the new National Security Concept of Georgia. And in the document of the Threat Assessment. Expert Zurab Abashidze agrees that the war significantly worsened the security environment. "Our security has become more fragile.

Territorial integrity has become more problematic, still not removed the risk of renewed conflict." Tbilisi State University professor Corneli Kakachia shares the words of Expert Zurab Abashidze." The war has clearly influenced. It is essentially negative. Now supports more widespread security dilemma. As if frozen in the NATO integration issues, there seems to be no shift. In general, the more deteriorated the security situation '. Bakur Kvashilava views the war as a result of negatively changed security environment neither from political nor from military point

of view: “The security environment has changed negatively as a militarily and politically. In military terms, the number of troops in the occupied territories has increased, the occupied territories, in terms of radically changing the positions before the war in August, compared to a little occupied territories before the war. According the view of Giorgi Meladze, the wars not only impact the security environment, but also led to understanding of safety and environmental threats:

“Overview of everything concerning the state security was the result of the war, understanding of the thread in new context. If we will look back we will see that they was the possibility of avoiding open war, that many powerful friend will try this, but it did not happen. Much more must be done for the prevention of threats within the country. ”

Despite the deterioration in the security environment, the Georgia's foreign policy depends on balancing of the threats coming from Russia. This opinion is shared by a number of experts. Changes in the security environment should encourage rapprochement with Russia, or at least its bandwagoning policy, but the empirical reality is the opposite. By the opinion of Member of Parliament David Darchiashvili, 2008 Russian-Georgian war and the security environment as a result of a change in foreign policy does not affect the choice, but more clearly outlined the impact on regional policy of Foreign policy. " Did not cause drastic changes, but changes can be nuanced. Strategic vector is Brussels and Washington, but also to think intensively supporting the foreign policy tools, including our role in the region more clearly outlined, as well as the deepening of relations with the EU. After 2008, it became more intense relations with Brussels.

If we sum up the foreign policy of the Rose Revolution, It can be concluded that Georgia was his strategy on external balances. Unlike Shevardnadze's foreign policy, balancing only when the country is relying on external resources, balancing the government's dual strategy of foreign and domestic policies addressed. Foreign balancing to achieve it with the US ally and NATO commitment to implement the internal balance of the country's military defense capabilities. Georgia prefers a stronger alliance with the powerful country against more aggressive, the balance of forces in the theory that only the power of a variable based on trying to explain the formation of alliances and allies in a selection of items, cannot take account of the important factors in the decision-makers take into account when choosing their allies. The danger is much more complex phenomenon and its measurement of only the variable power is not enough. The same refers to Saakashvili's statement, which he outlined in his annual parliament in February 2005: "The case

has the world's most powerful and most aggressive, maybe not the strongest, but undoubtedly the most aggressive forces".

Generalization of stages of Georgian foreign policy theory development, showed the advantage of the balance of threats theory against the balance of power theory. In addition, it became obvious, that in contrast to the prevailing approach, the small states prefer balancing strategy then bandwagoning. The last is rare, and only in case of appropriate ambient conditions, is to be chosen by the state: if the state is weak, and if the state has no other allies and if it believes that the source of the threat, which it is bandwagoning, appease. Joining of Georgia to the Commonwealth of Independent States was a classic case of bandwagoning and for that period, all three of the above circumstances existed. However, despite the accession to the Commonwealth of Independent States, Shevardnadze gradually activates the diplomacy with respect to West.

Since 1995, the main goal of the foreign policy of Georgia was the balancing of foreign aggressor. Under the circumstances of Pankisi crisis in 2002, in difference with joining the Commonwealth of Independent States, Georgia preferred balancing than bandwagoning, because the ally that could help it in balance of threats had already existed in the face of United States of America. Pankisi crisis, in addition to the proof of explanatory advantage of the balance of threat theory with respect to the balance of power theory, it also assured us in the independent role of the aggressive intentions variables. Namely, when operationalizing, we supposed that if the variable had been chosen correctly, then an aggressive policy of one country against another, in case of balancing of the aggressor or existing of appropriate conditions, would have promoted the tendency of bandwagoning it. That is what happened under the circumstances of Pankisi crisis. Aggressive policy of Russia extended the motivation and efforts of Georgia in balancing the aggressor. In addition, the foreign policy after the Rose Revolution shows that in contrast to the prevailing approach that small countries support the strategy of bandwagoning more than that of balancing is not true. Despite the fact that the Russia-Georgia 2008 August war has significantly worsened the safety environment in Georgia, still attempts to balance Russia via further intensification of relations with the United States and European countries. If we generalize the foreign policy of Georgia from 2003 to the present, there is no doubt that Georgia is trying to balance the geographically nearby located, aggressive state via allying with the most influential country in the international system and aspiration of membership to the NATO membership.

In addition, the foreign policy dynamics after the Rose Revolution is difficult to be explained for the economic dependency theory. While based on the logic of the theory, the economic relations between Georgia and Russia would have significantly restricted the freedom of foreign policy of Georgia, and make it more compatible with the interests of Russia, the empirical reality shows the opposite. Despite the fact that Russia was the leading economic and energy partner for Georgia, bandwagoning to Russia did not take place. This case clearly shows that the economic dependence variable do not have any independent explanatory abilities and gains its importance only in the context of other variables.

3.2. Foreign Policy of Azerbaijan

Three major periods can be distinguished in the foreign policy of independent Azerbaijan. First phase that covers the period of 1992-1993 and coincides with the presidency of Abulfaz Elchibey. The second phase began with the presidency of Heydar Aliyev and continued until 2003. Third period of foreign policy of Azerbaijan began in 2003, when Ilham Aliyev came to power, and continues to this day.

3.2.1. 1992-1993 - Foreign policy of Azerbaijan, during Abulfaz Elchibey's governance

Upon independence, Azerbaijan was headed by pro -Russian, former first secretary of the Communist Party Ayaz Mutalibov, however, his rule did not last for a long time, because of internal political situation and military actions in Armenia. In February 1992, after the Khojaly tragedy, Mutalibov had to resign. In June of the same year, leader of the People' Front Abulfaz Elchibey was elected as the president of Azerbaijan. It should be noted that in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Khojali case is a point of reference, as exactly after it guerrilla war transformed into the open hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

To the opinion of many analysts, Abulfaz Elchibey, miscalculated the interests of neighboring great states with respect to the region and made serious geopolitical mistakes, which cost him the presidency. As Elchibey adhered to the pro-Turkish foreign policy orientation from the very beginning caused the irritation of Iran and Russia. At the same time, it should be noted, that Azerbaijan was the first post-Soviet state that has successfully managed the withdrawal of the Russian troops and border forces. Elchibey also opposed to Russia's demand joining Independent Azerbaijan to the Commonwealth, claimed that Azerbaijan's joining to the CIS meant return to the Russia's sphere of influence. That time Russia was considered as one of the main threats for independence and statehood of Azerbaijan. At the same time, relations between Azerbaijan and Iran worsened seriously. The reasons for it can be found in actions of both countries - Azerbaijan and Iran. Since his coming to power, Elchibey openly stated that one of his main foreign policy goals was the unification of "split Azerbaijan" which must have happened in five years. At the time, the idea of unification of Azerbaijan became an integral part of national idea of Azerbaijan. Though these statements made by Elchibey, have not supported the activation of nationalistic feelings in Iranian Azeri but undoubtedly it caused, that Iran perceived Azerbaijan as a real threat for its territorial integrity.

As for Iran, three main reasons prevented the development of good neighborly relations between two countries. First- during the Karabakh war and then Iran gave the military assistance not to Shi'ite Azerbaijan, but to Christian Armenia. It is a well-known fact that Iranian volunteers fought on the side of Armenia in the Karabakh war. Iran wanted Azerbaijan to be involved in the conflict with Armenia, because unstable Azerbaijan would be less attractive to the Iranian Azerbaijanis. Such actions took by Iran, twice as much increased perception of Iran as the source of the threat in Azerbaijan. Second - Iran, has contributed to the pro-Islamic activities in Azerbaijan, such as religious schools, bookstores and cultural centers, send missionaries and Islamic fundamentalism incitement, especially in the south of Azerbaijan, near the border of Iran, where the population is mostly Shiite Islam follower. Finally, the Caspian Sea legal status and distribution of natural resources comparatively later became the subject that posed serious risk to the possibility of cooperative relationship between the two countries.

However, during Elchibey's governance relations of Azerbaijan with Turkey were significantly intensified. Having good relations with Turkey from the beginning was due to several factors. First, Elchibey believed that to create the Azerbaijani national idea secular Turkey was estimable

not Islamic Iran. When speaking about National Front ideological tendencies, Elchibey openly said, "First, we are Turks and then Muslims". Elchibey even stated that Azerbaijan and Turkey was "one nation, two states". In addition, Turkey was considered as a bridge connecting with the West. Second, Turkey was the first country, which recognized the independence of Azerbaijan and third, Turkey's support for Azerbaijan's positions regarding Karabakh conflict created thorough and favorable conditions for alliance between the two countries. But in 1993, since Elchibey could not keep his two main promises given to the public, particularly carrying out the democratic reforms and ending the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with the victory, the country sank in political and economic chaos. From internal political reasons, that caused Elchibey's failure it is particularly noteworthy a few mistakes he made. One of them was that after he came to power he did not hold the parliamentary elections, retained the old parliament, where the representatives of old and new (National Front) equally divided the seats. In addition, he was unable to deal with old bureaucracy and most of them were replaced by inexperienced staff. As for foreign relations, explicitly pro-Turkish, anti-Iranian and partially anti-Russian foreign policy of Elchibey's government damaged

Azerbaijan, particularly with respect of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is noteworthy that strongly pro-Turkish orientation and as a result, irritation of Iran and Russia even Turkey became thoughtful, which was well aware that with its resources available, it cannot really compete with Russia and Iran. In addition, a total failure of Azerbaijan in the war with Armenia, as well as Elchibey's prominently corrupt government, made a serious blow to the Pan-Turkism idea. Another big factor is that, Elchibey could not assess the Turkish cultural heritage and not only Russia and Iran but also the ethnic minorities (in early 1990s about 14 percent of the entire population) even inside the country, feel themselves left out. As a result of this chaotic internal and external political situation, General Surat Huseynov launched a military coup against Elchibey, which ultimately ended in his removal from power. In June 1993, Elchibey, who was considered by the Azerbaijani society as naive and inexperienced politician, was removed from the government and former Communist leader Heydar Aliyev took his place.

Foreign policy of Azerbaijan during Elchibey's governance allows us to make several conclusions.

First - withdrawal of Russian troops from Azerbaijan by Elchibey; his opposition to joining CIS by Azerbaijan; and his foreign policy, that relying on Turkey and hoping on support from the West, tried to balance Russia, Iran and Armenia, clearly points to the fact that unlike the scientific consensus, even small countries prefer balancing strategy against the foreign threats. These facts

underscore once again the assumption expressed in the theoretical part of the work that small states would prefer to balance the foreign threat, rather than adhered to it.

As for priority between the balance of power and balance of threat theories, it should be noted that in spite of the fact that Russia, Iran and Armenia alliance was more powerful than that of Turkey-

Azerbaijan, Elchibey' government still supported the balance of threat and not only that of the power. Threat - which was coming from a variety of actors and had different meanings. Armenia was perceived as a state which directly threatened the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and seized about a fifth of its territory after the Karabakh conflict; Iran - a threat as both an Islamic state and ally of Armenia; and finally Russia, which was a danger as Armenia's ally and as a state that had some complaints with Azerbaijan regarding the Caspian Sea legal status.

3.2.2. 1993-2003 Heydar Aliyev's foreign policy

Since Heydar Aliyev's coming to power it was revealed that he was much more pragmatic politician than his predecessor. His main foreign policy strategy became a normalization of relations with Russia and Iran aim of which was fostering of more balanced foreign policy of Azerbaijan. In September 1993, Aliyev visited Moscow and signed the CIS Charter, and joined the Collective Security Treaty. Despite the fact that at the initial stage Azerbaijan's membership in the CIS was assessed as concession to Russia, it should be noted that under this decision Aliev had the more pragmatic calculations. Aliyev supposed that following such step Russia would help to restore the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. In addition, after accession to the Collective Security Treaty, Aliyev demanded that to activate the treaty with its members (in this case with Armenia) and the Karabakh conflict. It should be noted that in spite of the fact that Aliyev wanted to normalize relations with Russia, he was still opposed to return Azerbaijan, under the influence of Russia. In particular, Aliyev refused to sign many of the military-political treaty, which limited the freedom of action of Azerbaijan. In addition, Aliyev refused to Russia's demand regarding disposition of Russian military units on the Iran-Azerbaijan border.

Azerbaijan's joining the CIS was a classic example of adhering to the source of threat. How true are in this case the views expressed with regard to bandwagoning? If we return to the conditions under which the state chooses the strategy of bandwagoning, then we can conclude that the prior theoretical expectations came true. State chooses the strategy of bandwagoning when (1) it is weak, (2) has no other ally, (3) when it considers that this step may help to appease the source of the threat. At that time, in case of Azerbaijan, as well as in the case of Georgia all three listed circumstances existed. In the light of military actions with Armenia and internal conflicts, Azerbaijan was a classic example of a weak state. In addition, Aliyev knew well that at that point, he would have had less hopes regarding support of the West, particularly of the United States, and only hope for Turkey, he could not carry out the balancing policy against Russia. Finally, by joining CIS, Aliyev took into account imperial ambitions of Russia, appeased the foreign aggressor and prepared the basis for stable relations with the West. However, in spite of joining the CIS, Aliyev did not make great concessions to Russia. He continued opposition regarding disposition of Russian troops on the territory of Azerbaijan and despite his consent to Russia to be a mediator in the Karabakh conflict, he declined the placement of Russian peacekeepers in the conflict zone. Finally, despite the fact that many in the West believed that Aliyev would take more pro-Russian orientation, he, despite the joining the Commonwealth, did not go far in dialogue with Russia. At that time, Russia considered Aliyev's foreign policy as excessively independent.

In subsequent years, the relations between Azerbaijan and Russia have deteriorated even further in regard with disagreement on legal status of the Caspian Sea. In 1997, one of the major attack to the bilateral relationships was so-called Duma scandal, which revealed that Russian military units handed about a billion dollars' worth weapons to the Armenian army. Tensions between the two countries lasted until the end of Yeltsin's governance and it was relatively improved after Putin came to power. At the time, many Russian officials believed that their aggressive anti-Azerbaijani policy led to nothing, but to the strategic country's estrangement. As a symbol of efforts for coming out from the phase of tensions in relations between the two countries became Putin's visit to Baku in January 2001. During this visit, Aliyev managed to postpone the issue of the visa regime with Russia, and Russia refused its demand regarding disposition of the Russian troops on Iran-Azerbaijan border. However, within the same agreement Aliyev gave consent to Russia to rent out the Gabala radar station for 10 years, for which Russia would pay to Azerbaijan \$ 2 million

annually. As a result, at the end of Aliyev's governance, the Russian-Azerbaijani relations relatively improved.

Aliyev also tried to normalize relations with Iran, because he believed that better relations with Iran would help him, first of all, in settlement of the Karabakh conflict in favor of Azerbaijan. Therefore, the relations between Azerbaijan and Iran in the early years of Aliyev's governance, developed in comparatively positive direction, rather than during Elchibey's rule. As the first sign of improved relations became a visit of then President of Iran Rafsanjani in Baku, in October 1993. During the visit, up to 14 agreements were signed between the two countries. In the next year, this was followed by a return visit made by Aliyev to Tehran, however, the visit took place after Aliyev had completed his official visit in Turkey and in other leading Western countries, which clearly reflected that relations with Iran was not a top priority for the Azerbaijan government.

3.2.3. Caspian Sea crisis

However, the calmness of the Iran-Azerbaijan relations did not last for a long time. Events, took place in 1995, deprived the positive development of relations between the two countries. On November 11, 1994, Azerbaijan and Iran signed an agreement under which Azerbaijan gave to Iran 25 percent of the international consortium, which aims to operate and transport of oil from Azerbaijan. However, a few months later, at the insistence of the United States, Iran's state oil company was excluded and the contract was terminated. This experience completely deprived the basis for stable development of the relations between the two countries. Although Aliyev began his presidency with intentions of normalization of relations with Iran, relations between the two countries remained strained. Tensions in bilateral relations reached its peak in 2001, when the Iranian warships attacked the Azeri vessel, which was carrying out researches in the southern part of the Caspian Sea. Following the incident, the Iranian warplanes repeatedly violated the air space of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan's government assessed such action of Iran, as a violation of the air space, borders of the territorial waters of Azerbaijan, and as an aggression against Azerbaijan from the foreign actor's side. During this crisis, Azerbaijan applied to Ankara and Washington for help, after which Washington sent its military experts to Azerbaijan for providing the safety on the Caspian Sea and carrying the trainings of Azerbaijan navy units. Caspian crisis and reaction of Azerbaijan to Iran's aggressive intents proves again the explanatory advantage of the balance of threat theory towards the balance of power theory. In parallel to the

perception of the threat, the states address to the strategy of balancing the existed threat or that of bandwagoning it. The greater is the threat or its perception, the more it growth the attempts for alliance with or against to the source of the threat and conversely, the lower is the perception of threat, the less is a motivation for alliance. During Caspian crisis, Azerbaijan has tried to balance the existed threat via a stronger state, which comes in direct contradiction to the main assumption of the power balancing theory. Azerbaijan preferred clearly the threat balancing strategy to the power balancing strategy, because in this case the balance was carried out against not only the power, but also the threat, that in this particular situation was due at least in combination of two factors: geographic proximity and aggressive intentions.

In light of tense relations with Russia and Iran, Aliyev activates diplomacy with the West as well. Realizing that to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict it was necessary to deter Russia – Armenia alliance, it became a priority for Azerbaijan to activate economic and political ties with the West especially with the United States and NATO. From the mid-1990s, Azerbaijan actively cooperates with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In 1994, Azerbaijan joined the NATO's Partnership for Peace Program. In 1999, for the first time took part in NATO peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. In 2000, after long negotiations Azerbaijan became a member of the Council of Europe, which has been assessed as one of the major achievement of Azerbaijan's pro-Western orientation in the post-communist era. As for relations with the United States, at the initial stage it was greatly influenced by Amendment 907 and pressure of the Armenian lobby on Congress. At the same time, Azerbaijan's oil resources conditioned the interest of United States. Despite the fact that

Amendment 907 to the Freedom Support Act denies US government direct military and political support to Azerbaijan, due to the United States' economic interests, many American oil companies involved in oil exploration and transportation in Azerbaijan. Real turning point in relations between the two countries took place after the September 11 terrorist attacks, when the US interest in Azerbaijan and whole region no longer confined only by oil and held the important place in anti-terrorist campaign as pro-American Islamic state with a geographical location of vital importance. Clear manifestation of the increased interest was the annulation of 907 Amendment by Congress in 2001. In 2002 the first Azerbaijani-American consultations held in Baku, which was mainly focused on the security of Caspian Sea and training of Azerbaijani forces. Heydar Aliyev, in the last few years of his presidency, managed to more or less balanced foreign policy with foreign actors, especially with regard to Russia. However, tension and mutual distrust in the

relations between these states remained. Due to his health condition, Aliyev had to resign, and after the winning of the presidential elections in October 2003, his son Ilham Aliyev took his place.

3.2.4. 2003-2012 Ilham Aliyev's foreign policy

Ilham Aliyev's foreign policy does not differ much from that of its predecessor. However, at the same time we can say that the president is no less daring cooperating with the West, in particular, the United States of America and Azerbaijan receives a considerable political, economic and military support from America. In 2004, Washington provided 10 million dollars to the government of Azerbaijan to ensure the security of the border and to train border guards. As well as the United States and Azerbaijan have conducted joint military trainings in the Caspian Sea to train Azerbaijan navy and military fleet.

Main foreign policy target for Ilham Aliyev`s government is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the relations with Armenia. However, no serious and significant changes have taken place in this direction. As Aliyev stated Azerbaijan has tried to regulate the conflict by diplomatic means for 13 years, and he is not going to wait for the next 13 years. In case of non-regulation of the conflict peacefully, Azerbaijan does not exclude the military operations against Armenia. Today, Azerbaijan has one of the world`s fastest growing military budgets. Ilham Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan's military budget has increased at least eight-fold in the last four years. Azerbaijan`s rapid militarization deepens the factor of security dilemma with Armenia and reduces the possibility of peaceful resolution of conflict. Azerbaijan's relations with Russia and Iran have improved somewhat, which is clearly proved by visit of President Vladimir Putin in Baku in October 2006.

However, despite the improvement of these relations, the lack of trust between these states remains. Once we have reviewed the stages of development of Azerbaijan's foreign policy priorities, we can make several conclusions. First, if we follow the stages of development of Azerbaijan's foreign policy we will see that during Elchibey`s governance strategy of balance of threat was clearly predominant with respect to bandwagoning. Elchibey, who considers Armenia, Russia and Iran, and their alliance as main foreign threat for Azerbaijan, tried, in order to balance these threats, gain the support from Turkey and the West. After Heydar Aliyev came to power, the situation changed somewhat. Aliyev, who turned out to be much more pragmatic politician than his predecessor had

been, having realized what the role of Russia and Iran in the Karabakh conflict was - he tried to make foreign relations of Azerbaijan more balanced. Joining of Azerbaijan to the CIS was a classic case of bandwagoning. However, Aliyev used CIS for purposes that are more pragmatic and in 1999, left the Collective Security Treaty. During that period, Aliyev also realized that in conditions of 907Amendment and pressure on Congress by the Armenian lobby, the alliance with the United States for balancing of Russia, Iran and Armenia was the less realistic strategy. How explains the balance of threat theory and the opinions expressed in theoretical study in relation to balancing strategy, period of Heydar Aliyev's rule? At first glance, Azerbaijan's foreign policy during Heydar Aliyev's presidency is quite difficult case for the theory. However, it should be noted that one of the valid way to check the explanatory ability of the theory is to analyze the number of cases (complicated cases), which, at first glance, come out of explanatory frames of the theory. In the theoretical part of the study we mentioned, that growth of attempt of states in balancing is in direct correlation with the degree of perception of the threat. The greater is the threat, the greater is a motivation to balance the source of the threat or in case of appropriate conditions, motivation of bandwagoning. At the initial stage improved relations with Russia and Iran was the main factor that let Aliyev carry relatively balanced foreign policy. However, during the Caspian crisis, as Iran actually threatened Azerbaijan by military actions in the Caspian Sea, it immediately revealed the motivation of balancing. Caspian crisis underscores once more, two major theoretical assumptions of the study. First, in parallel with the growth of foreign threat, the states prefer its balance rather than bandwagoning; and second, the threat balance theory prevails with respect to the power balance theory, as Azerbaijan addressed to the United States, the most powerful state in the international system, for support in order to balance geographically near located aggressive state.

Naturally, in Azerbaijan's foreign policy today, the attempts of external balancing of foreign threat are less clear than in case of Georgia. However, balance of threat theory gives answers here. Georgia considers Russia as greater threat than Azerbaijan considers Russia and Iran, taking into account-improved relations. If we follow the logic of theory and past experience (we mean the Caspian crisis), then we can assume that in case of Iran and Russia's aggressive actions, Azerbaijan will strengthen efforts to balance, just as he did during the Caspian Sea crisis. As for Armenia, with respect to this country, Azerbaijan relies on the internal balancing strategies and improves its military capability at the expense of economic growth.

As for importance of economic dependence in the foreign policy of Azerbaijan, in comparison with Georgia, situation is different. Despite the fact that Azerbaijan is economically more independent than Georgia is, pro-Western foreign policy vector in Azerbaijan's foreign policy is not so clear, as in the case of Georgia. While Georgia declares that its goal is to become a full member of the European and Euro-Atlantic organizations, such as NATO and the European Union, Azerbaijan, states that cooperation with NATO is important, however, to join the alliance for now is not on the agenda. Azerbaijan's National Security Strategy emphasizes that Azerbaijan is conducting a multi-vectored and balanced foreign policy. Despite the fact that the European Union is more important trading partner for Azerbaijan than it is for Georgia, pro-Western vector in the foreign policy of Azerbaijan is less clear e than in the case of Georgia.

In addition, Azerbaijan economically less depends on Russia than Georgia was before embargo of 2006. Accordingly, this fact proves once again that the variable of economic dependence does not have the independent explanatory capacity and gains the value only in the context of other factors. For example, according to the official data of the Statistics Service of Azerbaijan, in 2011, among leading trade partners of Azerbaijan, share of Russia was only 7.8%, whereas in some EU countries, Turkey and the United States it was - 54.4% (including Italy - 26.4%, France - 12.8%, USA States - 6.7%, Turkey - 4.8%, Germany 3.8%). In addition, unlike Georgia, Azerbaijan's trade balance (the difference between exports and imports) is positive, which is one of the important preconditions for economic independence and sustainable development. For example, according to data of 2011, export in Azerbaijan was 3.8 times higher than the import. While in the case of Georgia, import is 4.2 times higher than export. These data reveals that the economic dependency theory, which argues that the countries subordinate their foreign policy priorities to the economic interests is powerless to explain the different foreign policy priorities of Azerbaijan and Georgia. According to the logic of economic dependency theory, as the significant part of overall foreign trade for Azerbaijan falls on EU and NATO countries, the pro-Western vector in case of Azerbaijan should be clearer than the case of Georgia. In addition, less dependence on Russia, as well as trade in terms of energy, gives to Azerbaijan possibility to carry more independent foreign policy, but in recent years, and especially after Ilham Aliyev came to power, the relations between Azerbaijan and Russia are developing and deepening significantly.

4.3. Foreign Policy of Armenia

After the restoration of independence of Armenia, we can identify three phases of development of its foreign policy. The first phase began from the period of Ter-Ter-Petrosyan's and Armenian National Movement rule and lasted until 1997. The second phase - coincides with the period when Robert Kocharyan came to power and lasted until the beginning of 2008; and the third phase coincides with the election of Serge Sarkisian as President and continues to this day. It should be noted that foreign policy of all three administrations is characterized by continuity and similarities than by differences and changes. During these three administrations, foreign policy of Armenia has clearly focused on the alliance with Russia. Naturally, there were some differences between the foreign policy priorities of three leaders, though key issues of the foreign policy, such as security and selection of strategic allies remained unchanged in the case of all three leaders.

4.3.1. 1991-1997 years - Ter-Petrosyan's foreign policy

At an early stage of development of the foreign policy of Armenia, several factors which identified that still defines main priorities in foreign relations of this state. Among them, it is particularly important the geographic isolation of Armenia mainly from the neighboring states (Azerbaijan and Turkey), because of lack of diplomatic relations and land locking. As well as historical experience, this undoubtedly has a great influence on and defines the relations of Armenia, especially with Turkey. Finally, the Karabakh conflict - that is the most important factor in the foreign policy priorities of this state.

Armenian National Movement, which came to power in 1990, was based on the revisionist view of the foreign policy development of Armenia. According to this vision, hard historical experiences between Turkey and Armenia should not obstruct the development of pragmatic relations between the two countries. Two motives were the basis of this view: (1) Turkey is a big neighbor country of Armenia, which means that, Armenia should come to the agreement with it; (2) Modern Turkey is quite different from the Ottoman Empire; it rejected the pan-Islamist and pan-Turkism ideas and clearly took the European orientation. In addition, in light of the Karabakh conflict, Armenia's then-administration was well aware, that if Armenia was able to undertake the economic and trade relations with Turkey and used it as connecting transit bridge to Europe, it would promote not only

softening of effects of geographically vulnerable location of Armenia, but also solve the genocide issue over time. Ter-Petrosyan and his administration, especially in the first years of their rule, follow this revisionist vision and considered the normalization of relations with Turkey one of the priorities of foreign policy. Ter-Petrosyan was aware that the achievement of this goal should be started by refusing to recognize the genocide. In this regard, a number of significant steps have been taken. Ter-Petrosyan was opposed to the request to enter the recognition of the genocide in the Declaration of Independence of Armenia. However, majority of the legislative body of representatives and parties of the Diaspora opposed this idea. These parties, apart from the question of recognition of the genocide, had certain territorial claims against Turkey. At the time, politicians that were more nationalistic considered that the genocide should be an integral part of the Armenian foreign policy and relations with Turkey must have been defined by the recognition of genocide. Ter-Petrosyan's revisionist foreign policy visions were met with great opposition, both by the parties working inside the country, as well as by Diaspora. Especially active in this regard were the representatives of Diaspora. They considered that relations between Armenia and Turkey should not be improved as long as Turkey did not recognize the genocide. In contrast to the Diaspora representatives, Ter-Petrosyan and Armenian National Movement considered that Turkey poses no threat to Armenia. Correspondingly, normalization of relations between the two countries was in the interests of Armenia, in that period. Such a strategy of Ter - Petrosyan had worked even partially. Turkey was one of the first states that recognized the independence of Armenia after collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition, in 1992, Turkey temporarily open the border with Armenia for transit of humanitarian aid. In the same year Armenia signed an agreement with the Turkish government, which would provide electricity from Turkey to Armenia.

However, in 1993 before the implementation of the agreement, by objections from Baku and internal opposition Turkish government had to cancel the agreement. Despite Ter-Petrosyan's attempt to improve the relations with Turkey, this process, besides the internal objections, which came from the internal opposition and representatives of Diaspora and made obstacles to then-government of Armenia, was impeded by several steps of Turkey. First – Turkey's position regarding the genocide hindered the development of stable relations between the two countries. Second – during the Karabakhi war and after it, Turkey protected the positions of Azerbaijan and tried to isolate Armenia, which much more deepened the mistrust that was nourished by the historical narratives; and finally, at the beginning of 1990s, rising of pan-Turkism ideas in Turkey and Azerbaijan,

created an additional barrier in development of good neighborly relations between two countries. When evaluating the Turkish – Armenian relations, it is noteworthy as an assumption, that despite the attempts of Armenia's first administration to discharge the historically hostile relations between the countries, significant results in this regard have not been reached. For the next years, estrangement between the two states deepened more. In differ with Turkey, Armenia's relations with neighbor Iran, in light of absence of psychological and historical barriers, developed more positively.

In relations between the two countries, positive contribution made several strategic and economic factors as well. First, Iran could have the function of connecting Armenia with the outside world and thus more or less soften the results of the blockade and isolation by Turkey and Azerbaijan. Second, from the beginning Iran became a valuable economic partner and, most important, it was able to provide Armenia energy resources. Third, Iran and Armenia have similar position with regard to Azerbaijan. Armenia, in that period, considered Azerbaijan as a main threat to its statehood; and Iran considered the existence of independent Azerbaijan as the main threat to its own security, which especially in the period of Elchibey's government had some territorial claims to Iran. Finally, at the beginning of the 1990s, Turkish-Israeli ties, added by the fact that Azerbaijan had close relations with Israel, also increased the motivation for the development of close relations with Armenia from the side of Iran. Allied relations existed between Armenia and Iran, which had deepened further in the next few years, highlighting the fact that the religious solidarity of the allies are less important factors in the decisions to select the ally. Muslim, Shiite Iran, having considered the threat from Shiite Azerbaijan, assisted Christian Armenia against Azerbaijan. At the same time, Armenia's relations with the West became active, especially with the United States. However, a major determinant of these relationships is the influential Armenian Diaspora in the United States than the strategic interests of US regarding Armenia. As a result of Diaspora's activities, Congress adopted 907Amendment to the Freedom Support Act, which has determined the US relationship with Azerbaijan for quite a long time.

However, Armenia's relation with the West and in particular with the United States has not extended beyond a particular level. One of the most important issues, regarding which the Armenian and Western interests and views did not coincide with, it was Turkey's regional role. While the United States and the West, in that period, considered Turkey as a key partner and wanted to spread Turkish influence in the Caucasus, Armenia had different positions in regard

with this issue. Also an issue, regarding which the visions of Armenia and the West were different - it was the role of Iran in the region. While the United States sought to isolate Iran in the region and to reduce its influence there, on the contrary, Armenia perceived Iran together with Russia as a power, which would help it to balance Turkey and Azerbaijan and threats perceived from them. This was also enhanced by the fact that Armenia considered that the policy of the West towards Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was more pro-Azerbaijani, because Western states supported the principle of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and wide autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh, but within the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Armenia's relations with Russia developed in a positive direction from the outset. In the period of Ter-Petrosyan's rule, under threats, mostly from Azerbaijan, Armenia's main ally, which would ensure a balance of perceived external threat, became Russia. However, Ter-Petrosyan's administration initially did not have an explicitly pro-Russian orientation. After, Yeltsin came to power in Russia and pro-Turkish nationalist Elchibey came to power Azerbaijan, Armenia is gradually starting to move closer to its former metropolis. Among former Soviet republics, Armenia was the first, which signed the CIS Charter and the Collective Security Treaty, in the hope that it would be able to activate the security system within the CIS in confrontation against Azerbaijan. For its part, Armenia became the main ally of Russia in the South Caucasus. Since 1993, for extension of its military capacity, Russia has initiated the transfer of weapons and military equipment to Armenia and Karabakh, it was the so-called Duma scandal in years of 1996-1997. Armenia's militarization by the foreign actors confirmed Armenia's then Minister of Defense Serge Sarkisian, when he said, "in recent years we have doubled our military capabilities, so that we spent nothing from our budget ". In next years of Ter-Petrosyan's governance, Armenia's relations with Russia, especially in the military field, deepened more. In addition to the signed agreements between the two countries within the Commonwealth of Independent States, a number of other bilateral agreements were signed. In 1995, Armenia signed a military agreement with Russia, under which Russia was authorized to deploy up to 20,000 soldiers at two military bases in Armenia. In 1997, the two countries signed an agreement named as "friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia." Based on this agreement for the first time in the post-Soviet history, Russia was taking the responsibility to protect allied from foreign aggression. This agreement was followed by the treaty under which

Russia could deploy an additional 5,000 soldiers on the territory of Armenia, which was ratified in 1997 by the Armenian Parliament.

The close relations between Russia and Armenia in the military sphere, has deepened further in subsequent years. In the light of existed geopolitical situation, Armenia considered Russia as the main guarantor of its own security. Relations of Russia and Armenia, was a classic case of a formal alliance between the two states. To measure the entry in alliance with Russia, Eric Miller offered three indicators: (1) whether the State has signed the CIS Collective Security Treaty; (2) whether it allowed disposing the Russian troops on its territory; (3) whether it signed a bilateral security agreement with Russia. In case of Armenia, all three indicators are evident. Despite the fact that Ter- Petrosyan tried to make Armenia's foreign policy priorities more diversified, in fact, the function of main ally that would help to balance the external threat, was Russia.

In the light of the internal political confrontation, in 1997, Ter-Petrosyan had to resign and the Prime Minister of Nagorno-Karabakh, Robert Kocharyan took his place. The most important fact in the period was not only Ter-Petrosyan's resignation, but also the context, which was the basis of this event. Ter-Petrosyan's resignation was due to his relatively moderate approach to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and was justified by the imperatives of national security. Period of Ter-Petrosyan's rule, Armenia's foreign policy has been clearly focused on the alliance with Russia. If we return to the views expressed in the theoretical part of the study regarding explanatory advantage between balance of power theory and the balance of threat theory, then, the success of the last is evident.

Armenia has balanced the threat by alliance with more powerful state, which it faced from Azerbaijan and Turkey. According to logic of balance of power theory, which says that states identify the source of the threat only by powerful variables, then Armenia would not have chosen as an ally Russia, because Russia was much stronger than the ties between Azerbaijan and Turkey. In addition, the opinion expressed in the theoretical part of the study regarding balance and bandwagoning strategies is proved. Balance of the threat source is a preferred choice for state, rather than the bandwagoning. The greater perception of threat is, the more is a tendency to find the ally for balance. If in the early years of Ter-Petrosyan's rule motivation for balance against Turkey was less clear, it is only because the Armenian National Movement and Ter-Petrosyan at the time, did not consider Turkey as a real threat. Simultaneously with starting an aggressive, pro-Azerbaijani policy by Turkey, Armenia activates its relations with Russia. Instead of

bandwagoning with source of the threat, Armenia prefers to balance it. In conclusion, it should be noted that the tendency of balance of threat and establishing of closer relations with Russia, becomes even clearer during governance of Armenia's next president, Kocharyan.

4.3.2. 1998-2008 - Robert Kocharyan's foreign policy

In April 1998, after the presidential election, Robert Kocharian became a President. Kocharian continued the foreign policy of his predecessor and fundamental strategic changes did not take place. Despite the fact, that many people thought that Kocharyan would take a tougher stance towards Karabakh conflict, but there was not an essential difference between him and his predecessor. The new administration has stated that it would agree to the way of regulation of the conflict, which should be acceptable for Karabakh Armenians. However, Kocharian's administration initially tried to incorporate the political purposes of Diaspora in its foreign policy priorities. From the very beginning, it was evident that Kocharian's administration would revise the certain part of Petrosyan's foreign policy priorities. A prominent example of this adjustment became the statement made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia; Vartan Oskanian said that Armenia would put on the agenda of relations with Turkey the Genocide recognition issue. Attempt of partial changes in foreign policy is proved by the fact that Ter-Petrosyan administration legalized the radical-nationalist Dashnaktsutyun party in May 1998. So, Kocharian's coming to power confirmed that Armenia's relations with Turkey would be more deteriorated than during Ter-Petrosyan's rule; also relations with Azerbaijan worsened. In the early years of his presidency, Kocharian did not want to meet Heydar Aliyev face to face to discuss the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh and he claimed that Aliyev would conduct negotiations directly with administration of Nagorno-Karabakh. In August 2002, Heydar Aliyev offered Armenia restoration of economic relations, but in return of four territories near the border of Iran occupied by Armenia.

However, President Kocharyan's refusal to consider such a proposal, on the one hand, has further complicated relations between the two countries, on the other hand, assured the administration of Azerbaijan, that the only way to resolve the conflict was a military intervention. Kocharyan's presidency was important the fact that Armenian Diaspora's influence on foreign policy has increased more. However, in light of the complicated relations with Azerbaijan, Armenia deepened political and economic relations with Iran, and in 2002, Ministers Defense of Iran and Armenia during the meeting in Yerevan started to speak openly about the prospects of military cooperation.

During Kocharian's governance it was also further strengthened the relations between Russia and Armenia, both in military and economic fields. In 2001, Armenia, at the CIS summit held in Yerevan, joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which was founded by President Putin's initiative. In the format of this Organization, Armenia together with Russia, conducts military trainings regularly. In November 2003, a new agreement was signed between Russia and Armenia, under which Russia was allowed to use all the Armenian military bases and modernize Armenian military units. In addition to the military cooperation achievements, in the next years of Kocharian's governance it has greatly increased Armenia's economic dependence on Russia, especially in the energy sector. Today more than 80 percent of Armenia's electricity power plants is owned or controlled by the Russian companies. In conclusion, it should be noted that during Kocharian's governance foreign policy of Armenia clearly remains focused on alliance with Russia. Moreover, of the relations between the two countries deepened in this direction. Armenia deemed the alliance with Russia as essential pre-condition for security of Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite the fact that then-administration called Armenia's foreign policy as multilateral, it is clear that the cornerstone of foreign policy was still the alliance with Russia and based on this alliance balance of external threats.

3.3.3 Serzh Sarkisian's administration foreign policy

As a result of the 2008 presidential elections, Serzh Sarkisian becomes the President of Armenian. As expected, Sargsyan's foreign policy is characterized more by continuity rather than changes. The cornerstone of the foreign policy of Armenia remains Karabakh conflict and the relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as to strengthen relations with Russia, which is considered as the main guarantee of Armenia's national security.

Under new administration relations between Russia and Armenia is getting stronger. Armenia is continuing cooperation with Russia in the field of security. In addition, Armenia is becoming more dependent on Russia in terms of economics. Russian state-owned companies have substantially increased their shares in strategically important sectors such as railways, telecommunications and energy; and the growing dynamics of Russian investments in Armenia is observed. For example, in 2007, the Russia invested 1 billion US dollars, while the trade between the two countries totaled \$ 800 million. Beyond the growing dynamics of investment and trade, Russia is Armenia's major

economic partner because of the record level of remittances. Armenian diaspora living in Russia remittances in amount of about 1 billion US dollars sent to Armenia every year. Despite the intensification of economic relations with Russia, also should be noted that Armenia, according to the aggregated data, trade more with the EU than with Russia. For example, by the data of 2010, 27.5% of Armenian imports fall on the EU countries in, while in case of Russia it was 22.3%. In terms of exports, the difference is even clearer. 48.1% of Armenian exports in 2010 fall on EU countries, and on Russia - 15.4%. Of course, this statistics does not diminish the economic importance of Russia for Armenia, however, it is also clear that in terms of the aggregate data the European Union is more important trading partner for Armenia than Russia.

If we sum up the dynamics of foreign policy of Armenia, we make in a few generalized conclusions. After restoration of independence, several key issues conditioned priorities of Armenia's foreign policy. First - conflict with Azerbaijan regarding Nagorno-Karabakh; second - the issue of recognition of the genocide, which directly affected and still has an influence on Armenia's relations with neighboring Turkey. Third - influence of the Diaspora on the country's foreign policy. Combination of these factors contributed to the major directions of Armenia's foreign policy and imposed certain limits for all three administrations of Armenia. Foreign policy revisionist visions of Ter-Petrosyan and People's Movement of Armenia initially conditioned even comparatively normal development of relations with neighboring Turkey. However, despite the efforts made to normalize relations with Turkey, Armenia's main foreign ally was Russia. At the initial stage, Ter-Petrosyan, tried to adjust relations with Azerbaijan, but because of Karabakh conflict, the great achievements in this direction failed. How the balance of threat theory explains Armenia's foreign policy actions during Ter-Petrosyan's governance? Before we answer this question, we get back to the opinions expressed in the theoretical part of the study regarding balance and general theoretical models. We have noted that both balance and bandwagoning are the theoretical models, which main function is to generalize and simplify the picture of reality. Chosen of balance of threat strategy against the source of the threat does not mean the refusal to normalize relations with such source of the threat. The state, which addresses to the balance of foreign threat strategy via finding allies, may care to normalize the existed relations with the source of threat. Such a strategy had chosen Ter-Petrosyan. Having recognized the regional role of Turkey, and the fact that the absence of diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey would have caused nothing but enhance of the isolation of Armenia, he tried to make foreign relations of

Armenia comparatively comprehensive. However, at the same time, Armenia was deepening his ties with Russia in the military sphere, which clearly proved by the agreement of "friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between Russian Federation and Republic of Armenia", mutually signed by the two countries in 1997, which raised the relations between Russia and Armenia at formal and institutionalized level. As for Kocharyan's governance period, it should be noted that at that time, the balance of foreign threats motivation was heightened more, which is implemented by Armenia, in alliance with Russia and Iran.

Finally, unlike Georgia and Azerbaijan, foreign policy of Armenia has been focusing on balance of threat strategy and not on bandwagoning. Here, too, if we return to the opinions expressed with respect to the bandwagoning, the theoretical assumptions come true. Armenia, unlike Georgia and Azerbaijan, from the very beginning had a foreign partner, which would help to balance the foreign threats. In addition, review of Armenia's foreign policy reveals that the variable of economic dependence does not have the independent explanatory ability. Despite the fact that EU is more important trade partner of Armenia than Russia is - cornerstone of Armenia's foreign policy is the strategic alliance with Russia. This situation once again demonstrates that the states subordinate economic interests to the imperatives of security and they plan and implement their foreign policy strategy accordingly.

In addition, if we generalize the development of Armenia's foreign policy since the restoration of its independence, it is obvious the preference of balance of threats theory with respect to the balance of powers theory. If the states identify the source of threat only relying on the variable of power, then Armenia would have allied not with Russia, but against it. However, because the power is one, not necessarily, the most important component, in perception of threat, Armenia chooses to enter alliance against those states that are concept as the greatest threat.

CONCLUSION

The goal of the current thesis is to study the factors taken into account by little countries in the process of selection of allies through revision of power and risk balance and the assumptions of economic dependence theories. The last conclusive part of the research was dedicated to the review and summary of the research results. The summary task is presented in two parts. In the first part the theoretical conclusions obtained as a result of the research are once more presented; the second part generalizes the processes occurring in the South Caucasus region and summarizes the empiric results. To summarize the theoretical part of the research let us once more review its basic hypotheses the revision of which represents the major task of the work:

H1. The strongest balancing country in an international or regional system is considered a motivating and ruling factor for other countries in the process of selecting allies;

H2. The countries balance the strongest actors of international or regional systems by creating alliances with the weaker actors;

H3. Aiming at creation of a balance, the stronger one of the countries of the system becomes, the more effort of formation alliances from the weak actors is done against the strong ones.

H4. Economic dependence limits the independence of a country to implement its free foreign policy;

H5. The more economically dependent is one country on another one the more compatible are the priorities of foreign policy of these countries;

H6. Changes in the priorities of foreign policy of a country depend on the changes of volume of its economic dependence on other country. Consequently, the more the quality of economic dependence of a country grows the more limited the quality of foreign policy independence of a subordinate country becomes and, vice versa, the less the quality of economic dependence is the better the quality foreign policy independence of a subordinate country becomes;

H7. The states are not ruled by the motivation to balance the power (the strongest country in the international or regional systems) when selecting alliance countries but rather are moved by the motivation to balance the country which represents the biggest threat for them;

H8. In case of a threat any state will create alliance with other states to balance the sources of the threat;

H9. Small countries choose the strategy to balance the source of threat rather than stick to it;

H111. The countries choose the bandwagoning strategy in the following external conditions:

H.10. The weaker the country is the bigger the chance it chooses the sticking strategy;

H11. A state chooses the bandwagoning strategy when it has no alliances and has no other choice;

H12. A state chooses the bandwagoning strategy when it believes that by that act it will appease the source of threat.

Taking into account the results from the research with regards to the crosschecked theories it is possible to make several theoretical conclusions. It is evident from the empiric part of the thesis that the theory of the balance of structural powers does not adequately justify the decision made in the South Caucasus regarding the choices of strategic alliances. As it was already mentioned, according to this theory countries balance the most powerful states in international or regional systems. Though, as it is proved by the empiric analysis the power concentration is not a major factor in favor of alliance selection strategy of the South Caucasus States. Accordingly the hypotheses made as a result of the observation in previous paragraphs and, in particular, and are not proved with regards to the power balance theory. Apart from the theory of probability of balance of power the empiric analysis showed that states choose more complex approach in threat risk assessment when selecting strategic alliances than the factors of power concentration and power allocation. The same could be said with regards to the hypotheses of economic dependence theory which were not proved.

The thesis revealed that the economic dependence variable is not elucidative and cannot explain different foreign political priorities of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Based on the variable selected to determine the level of economic dependence (trade and power economy dependence) the statistical data showed that there is no link between the real foreign policy priorities/behavior and indicators of dependence. Until 2006 Georgia, being a country significantly dependent on Russia in trade and natural resources, does not subordinate its foreign political priorities to the interests of Russia. At the same time it is obvious that in 2003-2006 despite the growing dependence of Georgia on Russian economy these years are distinguished for active relationships with the United States of America, NATO and European Union. According to the logic of economic dependence theory Georgia was expected to behave opposite way i.e. consequent from the economic interests of the country the relationships between Russia and Georgia should be deepened. The same could be said about Azerbaijan. Despite that, apart from Georgia, Azerbaijan

trades more with European Union and less with Russia the foreign policy of Azerbaijan is more balanced rather than pro-European. The same situation is with Armenia. It is natural that Russia is a significant economic partner of Armenia though based on the data European Union is more important trading partner for Armenia on the aggregated level. Despite these circumstances the foreign policy of Armenia is less pro-European than the one of Georgia and is distinctly oriented to political and military alliance with Russia.

Consequent from the above on the basis of the empiric analysis it is possible to make several conclusions about elucidative reliability of economic dependence theory: the first - the expectations related to the mentioned theory are not proved as a result of empiric cross-check; the second – the variable of economic dependence does not represent the key factor from the point of view of political interrelationships between the states; and the third – besides the fact that there is no connection between the economic dependence variable and actual foreign political priorities and behavior of countries the theory of economic dependence is also unable to explain the difference between the foreign political priorities of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The empiric analysis justifies that the hypothesis made on the basis of balance of threat theory is more adequate with regards to the processes occurring in South Caucasus. In particular, the argument that in the process of strategic alliance selection countries use more complex model which is a combination of power, aggressiveness and geographic proximity variables expressed in the theoretical part of the thesis was proved. The empiric research justified that the hypothesis H7 and H8 were proved. Correspondingly the theory of balance of threat is more adequate in justification of the strategic alliance selection by the countries of South Caucasus than the theory of power balance and economic dependence theory. The difference of the foreign policy priorities of these countries could be explained rather by the difference in assessment of threats than only by the variables of power allocation and economic dependence. It was proved by the research that to adequately measure the threat is not valid only to rely only on power variable. Threat is a complex phenomenon requiring the consideration of such additional factors as geographic proximity and aggressiveness to assess it.

This theoretical conclusion gives the basis to make one more interesting supposition regarding the power balance theory of Walt. The ground for the theory by Walt is Hobbes' vision (the war of all against all "bellum omnium in omnes") (Walt,2013). Consequently, he believes that countries must balance the *strength* rather than the *intentions* in the international anarchic system, because *intentions* could

quickly change, i.e. given the fact that a today's friend could become an enemy tomorrow it is more relevant and reliable to use the strategy of power balance.

Though, based on the current and other researches, 261 countries behaved different way apart from the theory of Walt. Countries balance threats rather than power. Hence the theory of structural power balance with regards to the international politics is more Walt's subjective attitude than a theoretical model reflecting empiric reality. This conclusion may sound controversial moreover that Walt used the positivistic ground to his theory and thus confronting both the normative theoretical models (what the world has to be) and those scientists (Morgenthau, Curry, Thompson, Bull, White and others) which studies the international relations based on traditionally (historical) methodology. (Walt 2013)

The dominating approach of considering that little countries with regards to the foreign threats choose the strategy of bandwagoning rather than the strategy of balance was also not proved by the thesis. In reality the empiric analysis revealed the opposite. The foreign policy of these three states with regards to the foreign threat/threats is oriented to the strategy of balance rather than bandwagoning. The theory of bandwagoning to the source of threat is relatively rare phenomenon and is usually accompanied by concrete preconditions of selecting this strategy. Accordingly, the cases of bandwagoning strategy revealed in the process of empiric analysis are rather exclusions and can be easily explained in the bandwagoning strategy hypothesis of theoretical part of the thesis. In particular, the hypothesis H10, H11 and H12 define the preconditions in favor of selecting bandwagoning strategy. Besides the above there is one more interesting fact revealed during the research process. One of the strategies of alliance creation can hardly be called the bandwagoning strategy. It is obvious from the empiric part of the thesis that despite the bandwagoning strategy to the source of threat neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan created alliance with Russia. Hence the strategy of bandwagoning to the threat source could be more considered as the response to the geopolitics or internal politics rather than a way of alliance creation. As for the empiric part of conclusions there are several ideas to be mentioned: the first – the countries (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) randomly selected as an empiric cases do not use the variable of power allocation and selected the alliance based on the readiness of the partners to support to balance the threat; the second – the regional countries perceive their direct neighbors as the source of major threat (it is one more proof of independent role of geographic proximity variable); the third – each state in the region considers the strong external actors the main guarantors of their

security and alliances against their neighbors. And, the fourth – the fact that these states have different perception of threats has not only theoretical justification but it has another very significant and at the same time negative explanation. The difference in perception of threats is one of the main factors creating obstacles for the formation of identity of the states and preventing them from perspective of cooperation with each other.

And finally the current research analysis was accomplished based on only one level of study of the causes of formation of existing alliance in the South Caucasus region. Hope this work will facilitate the scientific debates and will cause interest in the processes described in the thesis among the interested readers.

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