TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
School of Economics and Business Administration
Department of International Relations
Chair of European Studies

Janne Hakala

FRENCH AFRICA STRATEGY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Bachelor's Thesis

Supervisor: Professor Ton Notermans

Tallinn 2016

I declare I have written the bachelor's thesis independently.

All works and major viewpoints of the other authors, data from other sources of literature and elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

Janne Hakala …….
Student's code: A122729
Student's e-mail address: jannealeksanterihakala@gmail.com

Supervisor Professor Ton Notermans:
The thesis conforms to the requirements set for the bachelor's theses

……
(signature, date)

Chairman of defence committee:
Permitted to defence

……
(Title, name, signature, date)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

France has traditionally used its Sub-Saharan African sphere of influence as a leverage in order to maintain her position among the world's great powers. However, as French capabilities to manage this policy alone are limited, Paris has striven to harness the European Union to pursue its ambitions. Accordingly, in studying how France uses the European Union to back its interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, the research found out that the French strategy in the EU manifests itself mainly within two policy fields of the EU: In the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as in the Union's trade and aid policies in the form of different trade agreements and the European Development Fund (EDF). Regarding the CFSP, the research argues that France's Europeanisation efforts benefit Paris by increasing the operations' legitimacy and lowering their expenses. On the other hand, French actions lose in autonomy as well as in reactivity, because a unanimous support for common operations is required in the European Council, which is a laborious and time-requiring effort. At the same time French efforts to mount common operations have continuously been thwarted by other member states despite efforts to convince them of their necessity. This intergovernmental nature of the EU is also present in trade and aid policy, thus enabling France to exert strong influence over communitarian policies. When it comes to trade, France has traditionally been the main beneficiary of different agreements with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), which is likely to continue with the new Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) regime. Also within the EDF Paris has considerably benefited by winning tenders in stark contrast to its initial contributions to the fund, and today the EDF is all the more needed due to the strained French bilateral aid budgets. Moreover, concerning both trade and aid, the French need for the EU is underlined by the fact that emerging powers are currently challenging France's position in its traditional sphere of influence.

Keywords: France, Sub-Saharan Africa, the European Union, great power politics

INTRODUCTION

After the Second World War France hardly fulfilled the criteria of a world power anymore (Bozo 1997, 5), which meant that the country crucially needed its African empire to contribute to its recovery (Rempe 2011, 1). The French did not however manage to hold their empire together, which is why France under the leadership of President Charles de Gaulle, strove to grant its African colonies independence with the condition that it takes place within a *French context* (McNamara 1989, 69), which eventually resulted in a neocolonial relationship between France and her former African colonies (Rempe 2011, 1). What led the French decision makers to pursue such a policy was the role Africa played (and still plays) regarding France's role in the world – Africa being an important French leverage in world politics (Barrios 2010, 4).

At the same time the other leverage has been Europe. However, contrary to the views of how the beginning of the European Community would lie in the abstract vision of a united Europe, this research follows the tradition of British Historian Alan Milward who argues that European states agreed to integration for national self-seeking purposes (Milward 2010) which necessitates the research to also take a look at French political history. Hence, in accordance with Milward's thinking, having realized that France all by itself cannot be a key international power, the country has been pushing for a Europe with the capacity to act as a global power by at the same time underpinning French foreign policy goals (Särg 2014, 37). With this in mind, the research question of the study is *how France uses the European Union to back its interests in Sub-Saharan Africa*.

Although the main focus is on former French colonies, French policy outside of this region is also studied as since the 1990s French political engagement has sought to move beyond the traditional sphere of influence to reach out to emerging former Portuguese and English colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa (Melly, Darracq 2013, 16). Also, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo – both former Belgian colonies – are included in the geographical definition because they have been part of the French African sphere of influence since their independence (Meredith 2011, 493, 525), although the case of Rwanda has later

been questioned after the installation of a Tutsi regime in the country in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide (Rossignol 2014).

Paris, having realized the gap between its real capacities and goals, has been a key motor in developing the EU's CFSP (Särg 2014, 37). This explains why France considers the pursuing of common European operations as essential, and in this respect Africa has its role as the country has an extensive network of military bases in the continent from where it is possible to initiate operations that can contribute to the common European efforts as well (Melly, Darracq 2013, 12). Thanks to this capacity to act and the resulting relative ease to conduct operations, Africa works as a zone where France can effectively further the CFSP (Särg 2014, 46).

The paper will also study the other instrument of France to pursue its Africa-policy via the Union, namely trade and development aid policy. Already during the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome, France insisted on the establishment of the EDF together with a Euro-African free trade area - with ensuing economic benefits (Bossuat, Cummings 2013, 33). However, with the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) the non-reciprocal preferences accorded to the ACP countries needed to be abolished (Affre 2014), and hence France has been promoting the WTO – compatible EPAs (European Commission 2015). At the same time French budgetary constraints have increasingly started to emphasize the importance of the EDF for the country's development aid policy (Melly, Darracq 2013, 14).

What the research argues is that the intergovernmental nature of the EU's decision making helps France to continue her neo-colonial practices by using the EU as a leverage in the two identified fields of policy. Regarding the CFSP, pushing for common European operations in Sub-Saharan Africa is seen to provide France two major benefits: Firstly, with the Union France acquires a suitable label of multilateralism to avoid accusations of neo-colonialism, and secondly, the EU helps to cover part of the African operations' expenses. On the other hand, Europeanisation results in a loss of autonomy and reactivity for French operations as their authorization is struggled through intergovernmental negotiations. At the same time other member states have often been unwilling to follow French lead in African security policy. Regarding the European development aid policy, the French have been able to win most of the tenders within the EDF, while simultaneously the fund has helped France to gain allies in Africa. In fact, today the EDF is all the more needed due to the increasing competition from the part of the emerging powers together with the limited capability of Paris to provide aid bilaterally. The same trend is also visible in the field of trade where France has traditionally been the main beneficiary of different Euro-African trade agreements, but where

most notably Chinese competition has now begun to rival French economic interests. The competition has been most notable in the more important French sectors of infrastructures and natural resources, which together with French domestic economic problems explains the French desire to push forward the EPAs with ACP countries.

1.0 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Hans Morgenthau's neoclassical realism has been chosen as the theoretical framework of the study. Morgenthau sees that men, by their inherent nature, are power hungry – a state of affairs that necessarily brings them into a struggle in which the modes of acquiring, maintaining and demonstrating power determine the technique of political action (Morgenthau 1965, 195). Hence, the international political system ultimately constitutes a form of anarchy in which the possibility of war (as the most extreme expression of a conflict of interests) is always looming on the horizon, if someone can reap such calculable gains from it that they cover the ensuing calculable costs. Hence, recourse to whatever means necessary – such as the use of arms – is ultimately justified. This human lust for power signifies that people look for an advantage over others and, moreover, want a secure political sphere in which they can live free from the political rule of others – which implies the necessity of an independent state (Jackson, Sörensen 2010, 66-67).

In fact, regarding France's relation to the EU, the question of autonomy is of great importance as it presents two conflicting goals: How to maintain France's national independence by at the same time gaining maximal influence via the EU – a dilemma with which already de Gaulle was struggling (Van Herpen 2004). In a broader context, and especially in France's relation to the United States, France could not accept a minor appearance of being subordinate - an attitude that was well crystallized by de Gaulle, according to whom: "*…with regard to the United States – rich, active and powerful – [France] found herself in a position of dependence. France constantly needed its assistance in order to avoid monetary collapse. It was from America that she received the weapons for her soldiers. France's security was dependent entirely on its protection…. [T]hese undertakings in the guise of integration were automatically taking American authority as a postulate. This was the case with regard to the project for a supranational Europe, in which France as such would have disappeared… a Europe without political reality, without economic drive, without a capacity to defense, and therefore doomed, in the face of the Soviet bloc, to being nothing more than a dependent of that great Western power, which itself had a policy, an economy and a defense – the United States of America*" (Kissinger 1994, 605). De

Gaulle's understanding of the importance of national independence for state survival therefore certainly influenced his decision of maintaining France's dominance in Sub-Saharan Africa, which made it possible for France to continue its neo-colonial policy in the region (Chafer 2002, 1), which in turn has helped France to maintain her independence in great power politics.

Morgenthau argues that private and public morality should under no circumstances be confused, as did the American President Woodrow Wilson who intended to install private morality as the foundation of international political order (Morgenthau 1965, 180). As was argued already by Niccolò Machiavelli and cardinal de Richelieu, if a ruler operates in conformity with his altruistic Christian rules, he puts himself into a terrible risk as his adversaries can be working on a totally different ethical basis or without ethical hindrances at all. Moreover, and probably most importantly, such a policy is highly irresponsible and careless as it exposes to danger all those who depend on it (Jackson, Sörensen 2010, 67). These differences in points of view were apparent for example concerning the disputes between France and the United States during the Cold War: The United States tended to naively take the uniformity of interests for granted and saw consultation as the cure for all disagreements. Furthermore, the Americans saw their alliance with Europe as a kind of a corporation in which influence would reflect each member's contribution to the common effort. However, for de Gaulle and France functioning relations among nations depended on calculations of interests and not on formal consultations for dispute settlement. Hence, harmony was not to be viewed as a natural state of affairs but as something that needed to be wrested out of a conflict of interests (Kissinger 1994, 603-604).

A great part in France's Africa policy is played by what Morgenthau would describe as policies of prestige since colonialism has been an essential cornerstone in building French great power status (Pham 2008, 258, Chafer 2002, 10-11). Morgenthau argues that a state pursues the policy of prestige in order to demonstrate its power, which in turn should halt possible perceptions about its estimated decline. The desired effect of this is that assertiveness would preserve the country's influence in the world while at the same time minimizing possible related costs and risks (Bell 2013, Chafer 11). However, France has also traditionally striven to buttress its economic power via Africa as well as Europe, and also today France desires to economically harness Sub-Saharan Africa in order to ameliorate its poor economic condition. This is arguably in accordance with Morgenthau's view about the autonomy of political action as a distinct field that cannot be reduced to economics, as economic strength

is not seen as an absolute value, but more as a tool to support France's political power (Jackson, Sörensen 2010, 69).

Moreover, France's conduct of its Africa policy has not been an issue in the political left-right axis. Although at the outset of the acquisition of the overseas empire the left and centre-left opposed such an enterprise, later on in the course of the 20th century they actually became supporters of a colonial empire and the French civilizing mission was embraced by the political left as well (Chafer 2002 84). In fact, the French IVth Republic established in October 1946, and led by politicians with strong leftist affiliations, attempted to unify overseas territories into a greater France – or the French Union (*Union française*) (Simpson, 2001 285-286, McNamara 1989, 57) and eventually engaged into colonial wars, the maintenance of France's great power status as its goal (Chafer 2002, 7, 84-85). This approach has been clearly demonstrated by François Mitterrand, a socialist president of the Vth Republic, who crystallized his view about Africa in his statement of how "*without Africa, there will be no history for France in the 21st century*" (Mathias 2014, 25). Therefore, being devoted to his philosophy, Mitterrand decided to provide military support to Hutus in the Rwandan genocide (Meredith 2011, 519). A similar realist stance is also visible in the engagement of the current president François Hollande in Africa (Noirot, Tarrit 2014, 47). In fact, only the French Communist Party and far-left organizations have at times questioned France's Africa policy. They have however never wanted, nor been able, to organize French public opinion as massively as was the case of the American war in Vietnam, which explains why French Africa policy has benefited from a certain constancy and stability (Bakong 2012, 44). This continuous affirmation of French Africa policy regardless of political affiliations then coincides with Morgenthau's thinking of how the end justifies the means in spite of religion or ideologies (Jackson, Sörensen 2010, 66-69).

What Morgenthau's classical realist theory would at the first glance have a hard time to explain is the French devotion to the civilizing mission (as according to Morgenthau, state leaders should abandon all idealism as harmful regarding the attainment of political objectives) (McNamara 1989, 127, Jackson, Sörensen 2010, 69). Although it can be argued that French efforts to assimilate colonial populations (something in which only the Chinese have historically been more successful) to French culture and values would have been based more on idealism than anything else, it is undeniable that the francophone elites created by France has essentially contributed to the close ties between France and her ex-colonies. Furthermore, it is conceivable that it is indeed the position that France possesses as the central francophone power that contributes to the preservation of her status as a great power, which

also explains why French development aid has traditionally for most part concentrated on the francophone sphere (McNamara 1989, 128, de Montclos 2005).

2.0 FRANCE AND THE WORLD

2.1 France's global standing

This research follows the tradition of Alan Milward, who in his work "*the European Rescue of the Nation State*" explains why European countries accept their integration within a common framework after 1945. The author challenges the notion of the European Economic Community as the beginning of the end of the nation state and that the process would end in a European federal state (European Parliament, 2016). Instead, what Milward argues is that integration happened because it was in the interests of nation states to pursue it as Europe was seen as a means to improve social peace and cohesion through prosperity. Hence, without the integration process, the states of Western Europe might not have retained the support of their citizens who yearned for economic security, which is why the European Union has actually buttressed the position of nation states and delivered what they no longer were able to achieve on their own. This explains why Milward mocked people such as Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet for preaching visions of an idealized European unity instead of the member states' calculations of self-interest who make concessions to their sovereignty only if that is required for their survival (Milward 2010, European Stability Initiative 2010, 389).

In that same spirit, the research argues that France perceives the EU as a means to strengthen itself as a nation state – a standpoint that helps to understand the French policy regarding the European Union and Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, to understand why France has embarked on such a policy requires taking a look at French political history and thinking as well.

The most defining moment for modern France is arguably the French revolution of 1789 (McPhee 2014, 379-396), which had its origins in the 17th and 18th centuries' enlightenment philosophy (La France au Cambodge, 2015). A significant document that was composed at the time of the event, namely the *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* of 1789 (Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen), is nowadays one of the fundamental

texts of the French constitution (Oliva, Giummarra 2014, 11). For the concern of the study its significance arises from its universality, as the slogans of 1789 – *liberté*, *égalité* and *fraternité* - were meant not only for the French people, but also for the rest of the world (Letteron 2002, 146).

When thinking about the current French political standing in the world, the Second World War can be taken as the starting point for the discussion as it shook France's economy and resoluteness (McNeill 2003, 450) and de facto decreased France's global power status (Bozo 1997, 5); After the war France did not anymore match up to the criteria of a world power as its economy was cut in half, its infrastructure was destroyed and military forces exhausted (Bozo 1997, 3, 5). Furthermore, the war had a significant impact on the collapse of the French colonial empire, as during the war French troops who originated from the colonies learned modern warfare skills while allied as well as axis war propaganda declared that the time had come to get rid of the colonial masters. Hence, in the course of the war Syria and Lebanon became independent from France whereas in post-war Indochina the French tried to reinstall their power after the defeat of Japan, without success however (McNeill 2003, 450-451).

Interestingly enough, the French emphasis on universal values stands in stark contrast to another prevalent tendency of French foreign policy – *raison d'état* – which was formulated in accordance with Machiavellian principles by cardinal de Richelieu, First Minister of France from 1624 to 1642. According to this notion, the well-being (or the national interest) of the state justifies whatever means to further it, hence replacing the medieval notion of universal moral values as the cornerstone of policy. Accordingly, Richelieu's only criterion when making alliances was that they served France's interests, thereby concluding treaties with Protestant Sweden and the Muslim Ottomans. By doing so, he initiated the policy of a calculation of risks and rewards that France would follow for the following centuries. Hence, after having originated under Richelieu, these principles of modern statecraft were later followed also by De Gaulle, whom Henry Kissinger describes as a disciple of the cardinal (Kissinger 1994, 58-60, 62, 65, 602, 603).

Accordingly, as France did not accept the demands for independence by Ho Chi Minh, the French authorities started bombing the city of Haiphong and thus began the First Indochina War in 1946 (Ruscio 2011, 64). However, since France was not able to contribute both to Southeast Asia's and Europe's defense simultaneously in accordance with the American policy of containment, the United States started financially supporting French military efforts in Indochina. The decision was however without a doubt influenced by the fact that the center of gravity in the American strategy had moved towards the Far East with Mao's takeover in

China and the Korean War (Bozo 1997, 19-20, 25). However, in 1954 the war ended for the French as they eventually were defeated at the battle of Dien Bien Phu (Ruscio 2011, 64). Basically the same that happened in Indochina, happened also in Algeria (McNeill 2003, 451). The year the war in Indochina ended, the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) launched a series of coordinated attacks across Algeria (which as a *département*, was an integral part of France), thereby embarking on a struggle for independence. However, after eight years of war and a half a million dead[1], France eventually left Algeria due to its inability to win and the harmfulness of the war to its national cohesion (Meredith 2011, 44-57, 72-74). Losing Algeria was a crucial blow to the French African empire because manpower from the Maghreb had become essential for the maintenance of the empire (McNeill 2003, 451).

However, the event that finally deprived France of her great power status was the Suez Crisis in 1956 (Kissinger 1994, 524-549): After Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Franco-British Suez Canal, the United Kingdom and France (with Israeli help) decided to take it back by force[2] (Bozo 1997, 27). Despite the fact that the operation was a success in military terms, politically it was disastrous as the Soviet Union threatened Paris and London with nuclear weapons whereas the United States financially compelled the allies to retreat[3]. Hence, the French dependence on the US and the resulting impotence led to a complete revaluation of the French foreign policy as her vital interests - even in her traditional sphere of influence, the Middle-East - were not taken into consideration by the American policy makers (Bozo 1997, 29). From now on France would opt for a reinforced co-operation with Germany and thus for a foreign policy independent from the United States – a view that was expressed by a French daily, Le Populaire, in its article from November 9, 1956: "*The French government will without doubt take the decision shortly to manufacture nuclear weapons… The Soviet threat to use rockets has dissipated all fictions and illusions*" (Kissinger 1994, 547).

Today, France is anxious to regain its global status (Lakomy 2011, 134) that for a long time has been on the decline. However, ever since the Second World War the essential dilemma of the French foreign policy has been to fulfill its will to be a great power with a limited set of resources (Bozo 1997, 3, 5). Traditionally France has seen that this position could be regained in a multipolar world (Van Herpen 2003) – an approach that is still visible for example in France's willingness to reform the UN Security Council in order to better

[1] The Algerian estimate being around one million (Stora 2005, 23)

[2] Although an additional reason for the French was that Nasser was at the same time supplying Algerian rebels with military advisers and weapons (Clarke 2011, 596)

[3] The US did this by refusing to provide the UK the needed loans to help it to defend the value of the sterling (Meredith 2011, 42)

respond to the changing global order (Aggad-Clerx 2013), by which France can also better justify its own position in the council when more countries are included as well (Saliou 2015, 694-695).

In general, French global standing can be seen to be based on various factors. In territorial terms, thanks to her colonial past, France is present all over the world via its overseas territories which endow France with the world's second largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ). France's diplomatic network is also the second largest in the world (France-examen 2012, 1-2). Furthermore, despite its current problems (Pelli 2016), economically France is among the world's strongest (World Bank 2015, 1) while militarily France is among the world's most capable ones as well – ranking 6th in a comparison made by Business Insider (Bender 2015) with its military spending amounting to €46,947 billion in 2014 (SIPRI 2015) – nuclear weapons being a guarantor of the country's independent foreign policy (Van Herpen 2004). France has also been a crucial economic force in the EU, and France's global role is bolstered through other international organizations (Siradag 2014, 100-101), such as NATO (France-Diplomatie 2014), its permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations being however the most important asset as it gives France a say in all important questions all over the globe (France-Diplomatie 2013). Finally, France's relations with its former colonies are also seen as an essential vehicle for French global power (Mbabia 2012, 119).

2.2 France and Africa

In addition to Europe, also the African continent was perceived as a potential French leverage in global relations (Verschave 2004, 10). In order to maintain her relations with Sub-Saharan African countries, France signed bilateral co-operation agreements with local states including assistance in diplomatic, defense, economic, financial as well as commercial terms (McNamara 1989, 137). Hence, French troops were stationed across the continent in accordance with the defense agreements in order to protect regimes friendly to French interests. France also managed a broad intelligence system in the continent that was being controlled from the Élysée Palace by de Gaulle's entrusted specialist on African issues, Jacques Foccart (Meredith 2011, 70). What gave France the possibility to practice this policy was the framework of the Cold War through which France could justify its actions in the continent by leaning on the logic of East-West confrontation according to which oppression was tolerated as long as the African countries were maintained outside of the communist sphere (Glaser, Smith 2005, 30). As argued by François-Xavier Verschave (2004, 10), France had its role, by following a kind of a logic of subcontracting in relation to the United States, to maintain francophone Africa within the anticommunist camp. Also, Sub-Saharan Africa was regarded as an important provider of strategic natural resources, such as uranium and petrol: Whereas for instance Gabon ruled by the French puppet Omar Bongo was a prominent supplier of oil (Bernard 2009), significant amounts of uranium were and still are extracted from Niger. In fact, in course of time uranium has become a prominent French economic asset exploited by the French state-owned enterprise Areva. Even more importantly, francophone Africa has traditionally provided France with voting support within the United Nations regarding important questions to France while at the same time better justifying France's seat in the Security Council (Glaser 2014, 13-16, 85-104). Nevertheless, despite the possible questionability of the French involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa, French-controlled Africa was relatively more stable and less violent, also referred to as "*une zone de relative stabilité*" (Glaser, Smith 2005, 85).

However, even though it could be assumed that the most important aspects for the French decision to maintain its connection with Africa were purely pragmatic, this was not necessarily the French view. On the contrary, a major impact was played by a genuine

idealistic French commitment to a civilizing mission – the French language being its cornerstone (McNamara 1989, 127-128). In order to institutionalize French cultural influence in Africa, the Organisation internationale de la francophonie was founded in Niger in 1970 (Barrios 2010, 2). Accordingly, French Africa was considered by the French as an exclusive *pré carré* (sphere of influence) that it jealously protected from the influence of foreign powers (Meredith 2011, 70) – and not only from the Soviets, but also from the so called Anglo-Saxons (the Americans and the English) (Glaser, Smith 2005, 31).

When Nicolas Sarkozy became the French president in 2007 he sent mixed messages to Africa (Melly, Darracq 2013, 4): To begin with, Sarkozy seemed to have a clearer vision regarding the Maghreb region with the envisaged Mediterranean Union while his vision about French engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa appeared to be rather unclear (Melly, Darracq 2013, 4). This approach was manifest in his Dakar speech (which led to rising anti-French sentiments in Africa [Koungou 2009, 170]) as well as in his decision to significantly diminish French military presence in the continent (Hart 2011), because in military terms Africa was not seen as a region necessitating major French attention (MEDEA 2009), while in economic terms Sarkozy declared that France does not need Africa anymore (Michel, Beuret 2009, 147). However, in his Cape Town speech of 2008 Sarkozy implied that his country would continue its engagement in Africa by reinforcing security in the continent and by re-creating bilateral relations on the principle of transparency (Melly, Darracq 2013, 4).

In recent years there has been substantial economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (The Economist 2013): In 2014, GDP growth in the continent surpassed 6,1%. Moreover, as estimated by the African Development Bank, the current one billion inhabitants of the continent are expected to grow to 1,9 billion by 2050, which implies the emergence of 330 million new consumers. What this means is that in future the continent will become the biggest reservoir of workforce and of consumers together with China (Augé 2014, 97). Therefore, France regards it essential to contribute to the economic growth of Europe by firmly connecting it to the economic growth of Africa, which is why Sub-Saharan Africa is considered too important to let it be ravaged by conflicts (Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 474-475). Accordingly, the idea is that by contributing militarily to the stabilization of the region, the resulting social development would lead to economic growth, thereby offering France as well as Europe growing economic possibilities (Rossignol 2014). In this respect, the scale of the French military intervention in Mali in 2013 has been seen as a measure of Africa's significant rise in the priority list for French policy-makers (Melly, Darracq 2013, 1, 4-5) – or even as a

manifestation of a new Scramble for Africa (ERR 2015) – a phenomenon that would prompt France to harness Europe to prop up its interests in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Especially the central region of Sub-Saharan Africa is considered to be of particular importance for France. However, a functioning business climate requires a stable and secured environment that most of the national armies in Central Africa do not manage to guarantee, which is behind the initially French, and currently Europeanized operation (EUFOR RCA) in the Central African Republic. And even though French interests in the Central African Republic would not be that considerable (the volume of trade not even exceeding €52 million), its neighboring countries are a lot more important economically. This is the case especially of Gabon, where the French oil company Total together with 120 other French companies are firmly installed, which explains why the trade between the two countries amounted to €868 million in 2012. At the same time letting instability spread in the CAR would risk rendering it a sanctuary of Islamist groups from Chad and Sudan (Augé 2014, 97-98).

Another economic issue concerns the piracy that endangers energy supply routes off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea (Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 354). Regarding the former, the harmfulness of piracy to maritime transit has a potentially damaging effect on European trade – as circa 20% of global trade passes through the Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, the problem is coupled with the potential risk of co-operation between pirates and Islamic terrorists (Särg 2014, 61). Hence, an anti-piracy operation (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) has been launched in order to progressively eradicate piracy in the region (Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 364). This is the case also regarding the Gulf of Guinea, where maritime piracy is damaging international commerce while terrorist groups are acting in order to destabilize the region, Nigeria as its centre. Boko Haram as the most notable of them has announced the creation of a caliphate and has approached the ISIL in the Middle-East, which is partly why France is currently conducting a ground operation in the region (*opération Barkhane*) as well as a maritime operation (*opération Corymbe*). However, what makes the region particularly important are the natural resources located there, such as uranium, iron, manganese and petrol. Especially the investments of Western oil companies are very high and around 13% of all oil and 6% of gas imported to Europe comes from this region (European Commission 2013). Furthermore, the Gulf of Guinea constitutes a means to diversify European oil supply and to diminish dependence on traditional suppliers in the Middle-East, Algeria and in Russia, which is why it is essential for France and Europe to secure the region and most notably its maritime routes which permit the countries in the region to export their resources (Lorgeoux, Trillard, Bockel 2015, 7-11, 24).

In the end, current French diplomacy is suffering from two handicaps: Firstly, from the weakening of its economic strength and the consequent budgetary difficulties that also negatively impact its military expenditures and hence the country's force projection. The second handicap is the weak Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, which France needs to provide itself with a so-called multiplier effect in order to exit its relative marginalization on the international scene (Haski 2013). Therefore, it is indeed in Sub-Saharan Africa where such a medium-sized power as France with continuous economic problems can best practice its great power ambitions – taking into consideration France's experience, contacts, already established businesses, linguistic bonds as well as the military bases located in the continent (Bell 2014). This explains why, despite the promises of ending the paternalistic Franco-African relations during his presidential campaign (Tchaleu 2012, 7), the current French President François Hollande has on the contrary initiated two new military operations in Mali and in the Central African Republic in 2013 (Larivé 2014), in addition to stressing the importance of the continent to the French economy (France24 2013).

3.0 THE CFSP AND FRENCH GOALS IN AFRICA

3.1 The EU as an independent foreign policy actor

The purpose of this chapter is to study how France uses the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU to pursue its African ambitions – a strategy that Paris began to apply during the Chirac administration (Särg 2014, 43-44). France basically argues that in order to contribute to the development of a coordinated Common Security and Defense Policy within the CFSP, it needs to pursue European military operations in Africa (Lasserre, Oberlé 2013, 230-230). This is seen to benefit the EU as a whole if the European states want their values and goals[4] to be heard and taken into consideration in the changing international political order. As indicated by the White Book (*Livre Blanc*, which defines the French foreign policy objectives and the means to achieve them) of 2013, developing a common defense policy is even more necessary due to the rebalancing of the American military capacities towards Asia-Pacific (Ministère de la Défense 2013, 13, 64-65), meaning that the military umbrella provided by the United States is on the retreat from Europe (Lasserre, Oberlé 2013, 234). Essentially the American retreat provides France with more room to further the CFSP, which in turn is seen as a means to strengthen France's standing in relation to the so called American hyperpower (*hyperpuissance américaine*) - regarded with a mixture of repugnance and envy by the French (Van Herpen 2003).

In fact, France's willingness to stand in an independent relation to the US can be seen as a key when explaining the French vision of the EU as a foreign policy lever. This policy was initiated by Charles de Gaulle, who strenuously pursued France's political independence – something that he simultaneously saw as a means to restore the French people's identity. France's defeats in 1940 and the subsequent colonial wars had mauled an entire French generation, which meant that de Gaulle judged policies also to a large extent as to whether they would contribute to the restoration of French self-esteem (Kissinger 1994, 602-603). At

[4] Which, as listed in the Lisbon Treaty, are almost identical to the principal policy preferences of the Vth Republic (Lakomy 2011, 139)

the same time his insistence on a major French global role was intended to appeal to the pride and nationalism of the French people as a means to unify the nation in order to make the country less fractious and more governable (Lancaster 2006, 163) – a problem of French government officials throughout French history (Martin 2007). Hence, since the Americans did not agree to de Gaulle's demands for a status equaling that of Great Britain in their reciprocal relations, de Gaulle ordered the removal of American nuclear weapons from France, withdrew the French fleet from the integrated NATO command and in 1966 withdrew France from the organization's military structures (Kissinger 1994, 612). As increasing France's global role through Transatlantic relations was not an option anymore, it was via Europe that de Gaulle now envisaged France to increase her international standing: The objective was to be attained by unifying the continent on the basis of states in which France would have a dominant role – similar to Otto von Bismarck's Prussia's role in Germany (Kissinger 1966, 606). In de Gaulle's vision Europe was to play a third role in a bipolar world divided by the East-West confrontation – while at the same time preventing France's marginalization on the political arena (Pinatel, Amir-Aslani, Mongrenier 2013). This explains why ever since its foundation the CFSP has been an integral part of France's ambition to regain its status on a global level: In other words, the policy contributes to the French desire of creating a multipolar international order, in which a Europe led by France would be among its most defining actors (Lakomy 2011, 134). This approach is in fact confirmed by the White Book, according to which France considers the construction of a common defense aspect of the Union a priority foreign policy objective (Ministère de la Défense 2013, 64).

However, before going in to the issue more in detail, we first take a look at the development and principles of the EU's CFSP in order to understand the significance of this communitarian policy for France and in its relation to Africa. In fact, the common European dimension in the fields of foreign and security policy is not a new phenomenon, as already during the Cold War there were different initiatives to build common European structures in this field: In the 1950's the French Prime Minister René Pleven proposed the European Defence Community, which France itself came to reject (Bozo 1997, 25). Later in 1961 de Gaulle proposed the Fouchet Plan with which he intended to create an intergovernmental Europe encompassing cooperation in the fields of defence and foreign affairs. The plan was however rejected by the Netherlands and Belgium (Van Herpen 2004). Some projects in this policy field are nevertheless still functioning, such as the Eurocorps (a European army corps of 65, 000 men) (Eurocorps 2016) and also indirectly the Western European Union (WEU),

since its tasks as well as institutions were later incorporated in the Treaty of Lisbon (WEU 2010).

The current foundation of an international security aspect of the EU can be traced back to the end of the Cold War and the Yugoslav wars, which demonstrated the EU's inability to act in crisis situations even in its own continent. Thus, the European Union had to gain a capacity to respond to such circumstances. Consequently, with the Maastricht treaty in 1992 a Common Foreign and Security Policy was initiated, and after the war in Kosovo in 1996-1997 the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was launched at the Cologne Summit in 1999 (Ruonala 2011, 80, Särg 2014, 5). Later the Treaty of Lisbon (which came into force in 2009) consolidated the base for strengthening the EU's external action. With the treaty the ESDP (which now changed its name to CSDP) was to be integrated into the CFSP due to the fact that Europe was facing increasing expectations concerning the responsibility for security on its own continent as well as in its neighborhood (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2015, 37). The objectives of the CSDP are double-barreled: Firstly, to further internal institutional development allowing for coherent cooperation and thereby a greater role in international security-related issues. Secondly, it is designed to give the Union autonomous means to intervene in conflicts (Särg 2014, 5). Nevertheless, the Union is still not a global power in foreign and security policy the way it is in, say, economic policy (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2015, 37).

Since member states have kept control over their national foreign and defence policies, the CSDP has remained an intergovernmental policy, its decisions being made in the European Council, meaning that the policy is dependent on each member state's independent will and resource allocation. Consequently, what this means is that individual states can have a strong impact on common European policies. Furthermore, as the EU has grown from a Union of 12 member states (at the time of the Maastricht Treaty) to a set of 28, finding a unanimous position has become increasingly difficult (Särg 2014, 5-6, 34). This is especially problematic when a situation necessitates swift actions, as was the case with the French intervention in Mali in 2013. Hence, regarding the EU's relation to Africa, the Lisbon Treaty with its CSDP has not fundamentally changed the situation as due to a lack of any real political will there is to this writing no European Africa – policy (Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 356, 365).

However, despite the problems resulting from domestic considerations regarding the use of armed forces abroad as well as the difficulties caused by the system based on unanimity, since 2003 the EU has executed approximately 30 military and civilian crisis management operations (predominantly in Sub-Saharan Africa [Särg 2014, 5-6]). The Union's crisis

management activities have particularly supported the stabilisation of conflict areas in Europe, in its neighbourhood, and in Africa. The most recent military crisis management operations of the EU are in Mali (EUTM Mali) and the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA) (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2015, 37). In these operations - especially in francophone Africa - France has often been the framework nation and the main architect of missions (Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 364).

3.2 How France benefits from Europeanisation

The Europeanisation of France's operations in Sub-Saharan Africa is seen to offer two main benefits: Stronger legitimacy and lower expenses (Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 366). The principal reason why France needs to bestow its operations with more legitimacy is that unilateral intervention could be seen as problematic in countries where France has considerable historical baggage. In fact, after the Cold War, the French paternalistic Africa-policy started suffering from a legitimacy crisis, which was further worsened by the country's complicity in the Rwandan genocide in the form of substantial military support to the genocidal Hutus in order to prevent the country from falling under Tutsis (who the French considered to be sympathetic towards the English-speaking Uganda) (Noirot, Tarrit 2014, 84, Meredith, 2011, 493). This event together with the shootings at Abidjan in 2004 ultimately made the French officials taking a more distant approach towards African affairs (Hugon, 2013, 105, Glaser, Smith 2005, 11-24) and showed that uniquely Franco-African confrontations need to be avoided due to possible backlashes to France's reputation (Koepf 2010, 8).

As suggested in a report of the French Senate, French interventions should henceforth be performed in accordance with international legality, that is to say under the mandate of the United Nations. Furthermore, French military presence in Africa is seen to be needed to increasingly develop towards multilateralism. This France strives to attain first via Africanisation (cooperation with regional African organisations, principally the African Union), which usually has manifested itself as logistic support to African peacekeeping operations. The second way has been through the Europeanisation of France's military actions (Noirot, Tarrit 2014, 87-88), which has become possible as the EU has gained capacities for common operations. Therefore, the EU acting as a whole (although with considerable French

influence behind it) helps France to avoid accusations of neo-colonialism and self-seeking pursuit of interests (Särg 2014, 43-45, 67).

The other major benefit provided to France by the Europeanisation of its operations in Africa concerns the lowering of the operations' expenses by sharing their burden (in material, budgetary or human terms) with France's European allies. This is especially significant in light of the current French economic problems (Noirot, Tarrit 2014, 132-133, 214) – a state of affairs that also reflects to the financing of the French armed forces: From 1980 to 2015, the French defence budget has diminished by 20% to the current level of approximately 1,5%[5] of Gross Domestic Product (Pouchard 2015, Lasserre, Oberlé 2013, 237). Currently, the French military presence in the continent costs annually from €400 to 450 million, but for example the French government planning estimated that a long-term presence in Mali would cost around €300-400 million, hence considerably adding to the initial costs (Melly, Darracq 2013, 13). Accordingly, the White Book argues that budgetary constraints concerning all European countries should lead the Union to look for better efficiency in security and defense expenditure, thus encouraging to see the budgetary constraints as an opportunity to organize interdependencies between European armed forces (Ministère de la Défense 2013, 67).

However, there are also counter-effects regarding France's efforts to Europeanize its Africa-policy, the first one being the loss in autonomy (Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 366). In fact, the question of autonomy (balancing between the conflicting goals of independence and multilateralism) is one of the most essential ones regarding France's foreign policy projection via the EU (Särg 2014, 40), which is why France has traditionally opted for having a strong EU with weak institutions (in accordance with the Gaullist thinking) (Van Herpen 2004). Hence, regarding the actual interventions in Africa, if France intends to act via Europe, it needs to get the support of all the members of the Union in accordance with the principle of unanimity, therefore rendering the launching of operations under the banner of the EU considerably more laborious and uncertain (Särg 2014, 6, 38).

The other counter-effect of the Europeanisation process is the loss of reactivity due to the difficulty of getting all the EU member states to agree on common efforts (Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 366), which stands in stark contrast to the prerogatives of the French President who alone can decide about the initiation of foreign interventions in conflicts of low intensity (*conflit de faible intensité*)[6] (Oliva, Giummarra 2014, 157). This is especially harmful in

[5] Which is seen as the threshold under which it is impossible to maintain efficient armed forces capable to defend France's interests in Africa and in the world (Lasserre, Oberlé 2013, 237)

[6] Article 15 and 35 of the French constitution (Oliva, Giummarra 2014, 157)

situations that require robust and rapid actions, as demonstrated by the case of Mali (which was close to becoming a state controlled by an Islamist regime at the heart of Western Africa at the gates of Maghreb and Europe [Lasserre, Oberlé 2013, 20-21]). Hence, due to the urgency of the situation, France did act before getting its European partners on board, this being the case also in the CAR where the situation was close to a genocide and a humanitarian crisis, therefore requiring quick preventive actions (Koungou 2014, 3).

3.3 French ambitions and other member states

Contrary to the general tendency in the EU, France regards Sub-Saharan Africa as a zone of priority interest (*zone d'intérêt prioritaire*) for the EU as a whole, thereby urgently necessitating a common vision of the risks and threats lying therein. The French see that deeper co-operation should be higher on the European priority list due to the fact that the American and Canadian allies expect Europe to take the main responsibility in Africa (Ministère de la Défense 2013, 55-56). However, the United Kingdom and Germany have been less interested in getting involved in these operations. Usually Germany has been willing to support a common foreign policy, but it has not exercised a strong leadership. Instead, its interests regarding military operations have been more limited due to constitutional limitations and its pacifist political culture, while at the same time its focus has concentrated more on economic issues. The reasons behind the UK's reticence are at the country's intractable relation to the EU and the emphasis on basing its security on a Transatlantic foundation together with the United States[7] (Särg 2014, 35). Furthermore, the British armed forces are still suffering from expeditionary fatigue after their efforts in Afghanistan and in Iraq. At the same time the priority of foreign policy of Northern and Eastern Europe lies in Russia and the ex-Soviet Union in general (Lasserre, Oberlé 2013, 232-233). Finally, the 22 EU member states who simultaneously are part of NATO tend to estimate that it is in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance where external security efforts should be channeled (Koungou 2014, 2).

Therefore, in order to promote the European Union supporting its African operations France strives to suggest that they serve the interests of the Union as a whole. First of all, with

[7] To the extent of blocking the establishment of a common permanent European military headquarters (Ricard 2011)

reference to *Opération Serval* (the Mali operation) in 2013, the French Minister of Defense, Jean-Yves Le Drian, argued in his speech to the CSIS (Center for Strategic & International Studies) how, with the sacrifice of some of French servicemen, "*we were able to save an African capital, Bamako, and we destroyed a Jihadist sanctuary, at Europe's doorstep*" (Le Drian 2014, 2), thereby arguing how France via its actions altruistically protected the whole continent from the rising Jihadist threat. Accordingly, France also stresses the significance of its efforts in fighting Islamists by emphasizing the geographical proximity of Africa, which would thus necessitate stronger common European efforts to counter it (Lasserre, Oberlé 2013, 24). This view is also written in the French foreign policy doctrine, which states that African security is a key interest for the EU as a whole (Melly, Darracq 2013, 13). It is argued that unified European responses to crises would be more effective than unilateral ones, which should reflect the worsened security environment at Europe's neighbourhood from the Sahel to the Middle-East and Balkans. Furthermore, France likes to present itself as a European expert in African questions – something from which other member states can benefit (Ministère de la Défense 2013, 64-65), together with France's permanent military presence in the continent. Especially the base in Libreville, Gabon, is considered to be crucial for (European) security operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Chad and the CAR (Melly, Darracq 2013, 12).

Regardless, France's European allies tend to think that Paris eagerly wants to use the EU in its African operations – thanks to the label of multilateralism and prestige it provides - when it is seen to be fitting France's interests (Barrios 2010, 5). In Germany for example a fear has been expressed about Europeanisation hiding French post-colonial aspirations. Thus what people often have in mind is that in Sub-Saharan Africa France is practising its selfish great power policy under the cover of Europe. Because German politicians tend to have a negative view of France's policy in Africa and especially towards its neo-colonial practices as well as its unilateral interventions, German support to French African policy has consequently been limited. This explains why German decision makers tend to be prudent when the French are discussing Europeanisation, because after all, Berlin is not sure what essentially has changed when it comes to French positions vis-à-vis democracy, human rights, as well as political and commercial interests. Sometimes the Germans also tend to have the feeling that French act according to the arrogant principle of what is good for France is good for Europe (Mehler 2009, 2-3).

In fact, the reasoning behind the reluctance of Germany and the UK to pursue an active role in African security is not far-fetched – as demonstrated by France's actual behaviour

(Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 365): For example, regarding the European mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006 (EUFOR RDC 2006), the request for intervention by the UN created strong suspicions as a French diplomat – Jean Marie Gúehenno - was the Undersecretary-General for peacekeeping at the UN secretariat who, moreover, launched the operation without first contacting either the government of the DRC nor the African Union (Adebajo, Whiteman 2012, 335). Also, during the operation in Chad in February 2008, the intervention of the soldiers taking part in the operation *Épervier* in support of the country's president Idriss Déby gave France's partners the impression of being used by Paris in order to maintain one of its African allies in power. Hence, some of the EU members considered bringing back their troops (Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 365) while Germany refused to send soldiers as it believed that France's intentions to intervene were not only humanitarian (Ward 2008). The German refusal also made the United Kingdom to refuse to send troops to the operation (Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 365). However, the intervention was not blocked on the EU level due to the so called spirit of *quid pro quo* (meaning that the EU governments are unwilling to instantly oppose another member state's favourite undertaking whenever possible in order to get their own core interests heard when needed). Hence, the operation was carried out under the EU mandate, although without the participation of Germany and the UK (Särg 2014, 58). Therefore, after the intervention in Chad in 2008, it took six years until the next European deployment of ground forces in 2014 in the CAR (Koungou 2014, 2). The time gap was on the one hand due to the French pressure in respect to the Chadian mission and on the other due to the economic crisis in Europe. Also the position of the EU that a humanitarian crisis in itself does not suffice to begin a communitarian intervention, but also a mix of low risk to European forces and willingness to increase power as well as status of the Union is needed has arguably influenced as well (Särg 2014, 63, 67).

The difficulty of getting other member states to contribute to common military operations is also well demonstrated by the intervention in Mali in 2013, Paris having worked for a couple of months in order to mount a common European operation, in vain however[8] (Lasserre, Oberlé 2013, 231). In a similar fashion, regarding the French intervention in the CAR, despite many factors that fulfilled the provisions (article 21 as an example) included in the Treaty of Lisbon regarding the use of common military force abroad, the Union was fairly reluctant to provide help to France, which has given rise to French suspicions about the extent to which the EU perceives the threats in Sub-Saharan Africa to be relevant as compared to the

[8] Although afterwards the EU has contributed help to French efforts in the region in the form of EUCAP Sahel and EUTM Mali (Noirot, Tarrit 2014, 132-133)

so called immediate neighborhood. Nevertheless, while big European countries wanted to distance themselves from the operation, Estonia (followed by Lithuania) was due to its fear of Russia the first ally to offer troops to the EU mission. The act was seen as a counter service to France's large contribution to NATO's Steadfast Jazz military exercise held in Poland and in the Baltics in 2013 (Gourdin 2014, McNamara 2016). However, despite the difficulties of getting member states to join the operation, Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the CFSP, declared that "*the launch of this operation demonstrates the EU's determination to take full part in international efforts to restore stability and security in Bangui and right across the Central African Republic…*" (EU at the UN 2014).

Regarding the French desire to share the costs of its operation in the CAR, president François Hollande affirmed even before launching the intervention that they would partly be covered by the European Union. However, during a meeting of the European Council in December 2013 other member states – most notably Germany– reminded Hollande that only operations that are commonly accepted by the member states can be considered European and thus be commonly financed (Noirot, Tarrit 2013, 132-133). Nevertheless, France insists on the establishment of a permanent European fund to finance military interventions for situations of urgency until they are moved under the status of United Nations peacekeeping operations (La Tribune 2013). Hollande however argued that his requests for European funding do not imply that France would intend to be the armed force (not to mention the mercenary of Europe), saying that France acted in the CAR due to deteriorating conditions and that if France had not intervened, no other country would have done it (Mevel 2013).

Be that as it may, together with the (French-initiated) operations Europe has been able to find new terrains of experimentation for its common defense policy (Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 365), as for the Union these operations have provided practical experience with the use of force (Barrios 2010, 5). For instance, regarding EUFOR RDC that was deployed in 2006 by the request of the UN to ensure the security of local elections, although France was the principal contributor with 1090 troops out of a total of 2466 (Särg 2014, 50, 52), the headquarters were located in Potsdam and the operation commander was German (Barrios 2010, 5). In a similar fashion, since the beginning of the crisis in the CAR in March 2013, French activism has aimed not only to materialize the politico-diplomatic presence of the EU, but also to give consistency to the operational and military wing of the CSDP (Koungou 2014, 2).

Despite all difficulties, having understood that acting alone does not suffice to attain its desire of being among the world's central powers, Paris has been pushing the EU to become

a global power (Lakomy 2011, 134). This is also manifested in relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, where France urgently needs the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU in order to pursue its ambitions. Hence, the French desire to Europeanise its operations is visible in the recent invoking of the European Union's mutual assistance clause (article 42.7) for the first time in November 2015 in the aftermath of the Paris attacks. As argued by the French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, France cannot do everything in the Sahel, in the CAR and in the Middle-East, which necessitates taking some burden off. In this respect, something about France's volition to further the common foreign and defence aspect of the EU tells that Paris decided to recourse to the EU, despite that the strikes could have triggered a common NATO action similarly to 9/11 (Emmott, Siebold 2015).

4.0 EUROPEAN TRADE AND AID POLICY IN FRENCH AFRICA

4.1 Principles

This chapter aims to study the European trade and development policy, which is considered to be the second major means of France to use European Union to its benefit in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, in order to better understand the French approach within this policy, we first have to take a look at the functioning of the European trade and aid policies. Accordingly, as the EU member states decided to establish a customs union together with communitarian arrangements for external imports, a common trade policy was needed (EUR-Lex 2016). It is one of the areas where cooperation between the EU and its member states is the most advanced. Commercial policy differs significantly from, say, the CSDP, in that the Union has almost exclusive competency for trade issues. This is why initiatives related to common trade issues are all made by the European Commission, who negotiates agreements with third parties and defends the EU in the WTO. Nevertheless, despite the Commission's predominant role, decisions regarding trade issues are ultimately made in the European Council. Also the Trade Policy Committee (TPC) of the Council of the EU, where all member states are represented, has a central role as an advisory organ. Furthermore, a consensus is usually looked for even though decisions in the Committee can be made by qualified majority vote (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2015). What this means is that, despite the Commission's prominent role in trade issues, member states via the European Council and the TPC can still exert a strong influence. This eventually makes France, who sees the common commercial policy as a strategic economic and foreign policy instrument, a major actor (Représentation permanente de la France auprès de l'Union européenne 2015).

At the same time the European Union is the world's leading donor by providing over 50% of the world's development aid. Within the framework of the policy and faithful to its values, the EU intends to promote democracy, human rights, good governance and the rule of

law in its relations with its partners (European Commission 2016). Today, European development aid is financed partly from the communitarian budget, and partly from the EDF (the latter being €30,5 billion for the period from 2014 to 2020), thus providing 95% of the aid to the ACP countries (France-Diplomatie 2015). The total amount available for the period 2014-2020 amounts to around €82 billion, €30,5 billion coming from the 11th EDF and €51,5 billion from the EU budget (European Commission 2016). Accordingly, the EDF has remained outside the EU budget, which is why the fund works on an intergovernmental basis, its negotiations being made in the Council of the EU (European Commission 2016, European Parliament 2014, 1). Moreover, unlike trade policy, the member states have retained their own development policies and their respective agencies. Therefore, the member states and the Union are trying to reconcile their policies (Bossuat, Cummings 2013, 200-201) and are thus working towards joint programming, meaning that they together define which donor should work in which sector and in this respect the EU is assigned to the role of coordinator (European Commission 2016).

European colonial history is still today visible in the EU's trade and aid policy by influencing for example the conditions under which the EU trades with some countries as well as its priorities of who are being helped, how much and by what means (Salminen 2011). Since France at the time of the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome still managed a colonial empire with its own common market, it therefore insisted on the association of its overseas territories as a condition for its membership in the Communities. In order to preserve its close relationship with the colonies, Paris required the following from its interlocutors:

I. *The European Development Fund*, which had to share the costs associated with financing development in its colonies.
II. *A Euro-African free trade area* with colonies having preferential access to the EEC market: Tariff barriers were to be gradually decreased, while exports from the African countries would not be subjected to the Common External Tariff (CET).

The above mentioned secured France economic guarantees with significant political implications, as finishing the customs union with its African territories would have led to their economic separation from France and thus to their political independence, which was something that the French were not willing to contemplate (Bossuat, Cummings 2013, 18-20, 32-35, 67-69). However, as the French empire in Sub-Saharan Africa disintegrated in 1960 (Meredith 2011, 69), three years later in 1963 the first Yaoundé Convention was signed between eighteen newly independent African colonies and the EEC, which extended the

association regime for a period of five years (La Documentation française 2005). Although with the introduction of the Yaoundé Convention the preferential tariff margin that the associated states enjoyed in relation to the rest of the world was being cut due to the reduced ECT, no major changes were made and eventually the free trade area turned out to be economically very beneficial for France. For example, in 1966 France had imported 45% of the associated countries' exports to the EEC and had sold 67% of the EEC's exports to these countries (Bossuat, Cummings 2013, 37-39, 48-50).

Later in 1975, Yaoundé was followed by the first Lomé convention signed by nine EEC and 46 ACP countries (La Documentation française 2005), and thus the European association was extended to include English, Spanish and Portuguese speakers, meaning that the amount of partners for the communitarian aid grew significantly (Bossuat, Cummings 2013, 136-137). What was notable with the Lomé was that the treaty took into account international economic asymmetries, meaning that commercial relations were organised according to a system of non-reciprocity accorded to the ACP countries (Hugon 2013, 109-110). Thus, products originating from the ACP countries were allowed to enter the European Community free of duties and quotas – something that was not required from the part of the ACP countries (La Documentation française 2005). Probably the most important provision of the Lomé was the STABEX (*Système de Stabilisation de Recettes d'Exportation*) – a compensatory finance system aimed at stabilising commodity prices, which had its origins in British and French colonial policies. The idea was that - given the dependence of many ACP countries on the income generated from exporting raw agricultural commodities - the system would assist them to attain a sustained growth of their economies. Hence, Lomé made funds to those ACP countries whose main products faced shortfalls in export revenues (Sissoko, Osuji, Cheng 1998, 9), which is why the Lomé system was considered to be a means to protect the world's poor countries from the full force of globalisation (Mouradian 1998).

4.2 France and European trade

What helped French companies to maintain a firm position in the region were the institutions established between France and her ex-colonies. For example, the Franc zone[9], defense and commercial accords, as well as the Coface (established in 1946 to guarantee the risks of French exporters) are advantages from which French companies still today benefit in the continent (Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 243, Noirot, Tarrit 2014, 165). However, although these firms benefited from tied aid until the end of the 1990's, this is not anymore the case as France has to a large extent untied its aid in the framework of the OECD. Hence, today's French economic presence in Sub-Saharan Africa is still considerable, although largely concentrated in the francophone sphere (Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 245, 247).

In 2011, the African continent accounted for 17% of French exports and 13% of imports. The latter consisted mainly of petrol and gas as well as nuclear fuels – and in fact these two represent almost 55% of all French imports from the region. At the same time French exports consist mostly of high-technology products (aeronautics and pharmaceutics) that allow France to maintain competitiveness vis-à-vis its competitors in the continent; Despite Chinese competition, the market shares of French aeronautics in Africa progressed from 21,7% between 2000 and 2010. France is also the first supplier of grains to Africa and the country exports a lot of material enabling the discovery and exploitation of natural resources. All in all, in 2010 France extracted with its African trade a surplus of around €3,2 billion. In terms of French investment flows, Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for around a bit less than €5 billion a year (Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 243, 245).

Currently around 20 companies make for most of French economic interests in the continent (Barrios 2010, 3): The French group Bolloré is solidly settled in strategic sectors of railway, harbors and logistics, and also envisages to stretch its activities towards East Africa via Ethiopia (Mbabia 2012, 123). However, as indicated by the import figures, the most important French economic interests lie in a set of companies that are prominent in the African sectors of energy and construction: The French oil company Total is present in 50 African countries with its traditional interests in Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville, but has also invested

[9]Including Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic and the Comoros (BCEAO 2012, BEAC 2011)

massively in Angola and Nigeria (Barrios 2010, 3). The company extracts 31% of its oil from Africa, and accordingly the importance of the continent to Total is expressed by its former CEO, who stated that: "*Economically Total needs Africa. We are not only the largest French company, but also, and above all, the first French investor in Africa. And Total has a lot more interests in Africa than in France*" (Magnan 2013). Both Bolloré and Total have benefited from preferential access to markets and won key African contracts for oil and gas as well as for harbor constructions (Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 246). In the field of nuclear energy production, the French company Areva's actions range from uranium prospecting, mining and refinery to the delivery of civil energy. The company and its needs also significantly influence France's policy in Niger and the DRC (Barrios 2010, 3). At the same time big French banks – such as Banque nationale de Paris, Société générale and Crédit Lyonnais - represent 70% of activities in banking sector within the Franc zone (Mbabia 2012, 123).

However, while Western geopolitical as well as economic interests were on the wane in the 1990s, China has become involved in Africa with a growing ambition as it started seeing great economic opportunities in this traditionally European backyard in accordance with its plan, *zhou chuqu* (go global, meaning that China encourages Chinese companies to explore new export markets) (Meredith, 2011, 696). Hence, the increasing involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa from the part of the so called rising powers - most notably China, but also India, Brazil and Turkey – has been a striking development for France, the United States and United Kingdom (Melly, Darracq 2013, 4-5).

Thus, as shown in Figure 1, in the 21st century China has become Africa's largest trading partner due to its demand for the continent's energy and mineral resources (Chen, Dollar, Tang, 2015) and in 2012 Sino-African trade amounted to $200 billion (Melly, Darracq 2013, 5). Characteristic about the relations between China and Africa is that they are essentially economic and founded on the principle of mutual win-win with a post-colonial tone: Africa exports raw materials whereas China exports manufactured products and, as the second consumer of petrol in the world, Africa provides China with 25% of its supply (Hugon 2012, 112). However, it has been said that Chinese interests in Africa would have only a limited impact on European economic interests as European and Chinese companies are not competing in the same sectors and, furthermore, Chinese companies generally concentrate on products of inferior technological quality. Still, when it comes to infrastructures and natural resources, Chinese competition starts to have an impact (Mbabia 2012, 117, 123), which is particularly noteworthy when considering that the most important French economic interests in Africa lie exactly in these two fields (Barrios 2010, 3). Moreover, the instability of the

Middle-East and Russia render African reserves of petrol and gas an even more important strategic asset in terms of diversifying European energy sources. In Nigeria and in Angola - from where France buys oil - concessions have however been made to Chinese companies, at the same time when in Ivory Coast the development of new oil fields is assured by Sinopec. Chinese competition is equally observable for Nigerien uranium, for which the French state-owned company Areva has traditionally held a monopoly (Mbabia 2012, 117, 123). For France this is particularly noteworthy as, in addition to the fact that the company extracts one third of its uranium supply from the country, Nigerien uranium is a highly strategic asset also for French nuclear forces and the country's nuclear deterrence (Glaser 2014, 87).

The increased Chinese influence in Africa and on the other hand the decreased influence of France is also visible when considering that an estimated one million Chinese have moved into Africa as entrepreneurs, technical experts, medical staff, farmers and prospectors (Meredith 2011, 697). Out of these 60 000 are in Angola – which is already more than the 50 000 French who were living in Ivory Coast in the 1980's. Also the market share of the French companies in Sub-Saharan Africa has gone down from 16% to less than 10% in 2010, whereas during the same time the number for Chinese companies has climbed from 4% to 14%, and often Chinese companies win tenders for projects with prices 30% lower than what the French are able to offer (Glaser 2014 215-216). Hence, as France has seen its share of the African market decline while China and other emerging powers have increased their investments, François Hollande called on French business leaders to double their trade with Africa as doing so would create arguably around 200 000 jobs in France. This reflects the French view of how Africa is currently seen as a way to relieve France from its economic plight. As stated by the former French Finance Minister Pierre Moscovici: "*We have to speak the language of truth: African growth pulls us along, its dynamism supports us and its vitality is stimulating for us*" (France24 2013).



Figure 1. Market Share of the 5 biggest exporters to Africa in 2010
Source: (Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 243)

Under these circumstances Paris has strongly been pushing forward the Economic Partnership Agreements (Sagna 2014). Their history lies in the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement (known as the Cotonou agreement) (European Commission 2010), which has its roots at the end of the Cold War when there was an effort to introduce greater transparency to France's relations with Sub-Saharan African countries. These efforts culminated in the European Union Common Position on human rights and democracy in Africa, which became the basis of the good governance conditions in the Cotonou treaty, of which article 96 links European development aid to the extent to which ACP countries respect European ideals about governance and human rights (Melly, Darracq 2013, 12-13). The treaty was signed in 2000 and concluded for a period of 20 years lasting until 2020, and it is the most comprehensive partnership agreement between developing countries and the European Union - and ever since its signing it has been the framework for the EU's relations with 79 ACP countries. With the agreement the ACP-EU relationship is supposed to address new challenges, such as climate change, food security, regional integration[10] and aid effectiveness (European Commission 2016). The EPAs are also aimed at promoting sustainable development and growth, poverty reduction and the gradual integration of ACP countries into the world economy. Hence, the ACP EPA countries are grouped into seven regions, as it helps the agreements to take better into account the particularities of individual countries (European Commission 2010), thereby helping them to be suited to specific regional circumstances (European Commission 2015). Moreover, the European Commission strives to ensure the effective implementation of the agreements by putting in place mechanisms with its African partners to contribute to

[10] For example, out of Ghana's exports less than 3% go to neighboring Benin in comparison to 49% going to the EU (European Commission 2010)

developing reforms in the fields of rule of law and good governance (ICTSD 2015), which is also intended to contribute to the juridical security of European investors in the region (European Commission 2015).

What is significant about these agreements is that, unlike the previous ones between the EU and ACP, they are reciprocal Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) with different transition periods (European Commission 2015, WTO 2016): What this means is that in exchange for a progressive opening of the African markets to European imports, the European Union commits to eliminate all tariffs starting from the coming into force of an EPA (Cheyvialle 2014). This change was done due to the necessity to adapt to the rules of the World Trade Organization (Affre 2014). Hence, France asked and obtained an exemption from the WTO to maintain the Lomé system until 2008 in order to allow for the European Union to have time to negotiate the EPAs for its ACP trade regime (La Documentation française 2005, Bossuat, Cummings 2013, 194-196). The EPAs have however been a target of a lot of criticism as the EU has been accused of a desire to dominate African markets through transnational co-operation that seeks to exploit economies of scale at the expense of regional developmental goals (Madela 2010, 5). Hence, it was argued that African countries would be deprived of the possibility of protecting sectors that they want to develop in order to improve the living conditions of their habitants (CONCORD 2015) and that they presented a risk of a too rapid opening in relation to vulnerable economies, which is why the EPAs were largely refused by the end of 2008 (Hugon 2013, 110). Regardless, the EPAs include a set of safeguard clauses that can be used if the imports of liberalized products increase too fast by perturbing local markets. Also, regarding an EPA concluded with West Africa, the EU has accepted not to subsidize European agricultural exports towards the region (European Commission 2015).

Above all, the EPAs should be seen in the context of the European Union's (and especially France's) economic problems, as well as the growing influence of the emerging powers in Africa. In order to boost economic growth, the EU is negotiating free trade accords such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the United States as well as the less mediatized EPAs. Hence, despite initial difficulties, the EU eventually succeeded in concluding an agreement with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which consists largely of former French colonies (Cheyvialle 2014) as well as Nigeria, which is considered to be one of the priority African countries in economic terms by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Melly, Darracq 2013, 16). At one point the negotiations between the EU and the ECOWAS were blocked due to a disagreement concerning the European products to be liberalized as well as the transition period of African countries. Paris however

pushed Brussels for an alleviation in order to accelerate negotiations and hence the EU, which aimed for a liberalization of 85% for its exports, consented to a liberalization of 75% with a longer timeframe than what was initially envisaged (Cheyvialle 2014).

Fundamentally, what is at stake for France and the EU is to increase their competitiveness vis-à-vis China and other emerging countries and in this respect a useful asset is the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause obtained by the EU. Although a common feature of international law, what this means is that if the ECOWAS came to sign an even more favorable accord with another state (say China) it would be obliged to apply the same principles to the EU (Cheyvialle 2014, UNCTAD 2010, 1). Hence, the MFN reduces the flexibility of African countries to diversify their trade partners (Bazin 2014). French companies also strongly benefit from the €6,5 billion EPA Development Programme (funded by the EU) which for example finances investments in regional infrastructure – such as railways, roads, energy and telecoms interconnections – fields in which France is highly competitive in the African continent (Giros, Sevaistre 2014, Melly, Darracq 2013, 2). In the end, in their entirety the EPAs between the EU and ACP countries would cover 1,35 billion people, 20% of the world's total land, and a €80 billion in trade - thus rendering it a major global trading bloc (European Commission 2010). However, the negotiation process with all the seven regions is still to this day unfinished (European Commission 2016).

4.3 France and European aid

Regarding European aid, with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 the economic development of underdeveloped countries – and more precisely the management of the association system and launching the EDF - fell under the responsibilities of the European Commission and its Directorate General of Overseas Development (DG VIII)[11]. Therefore, France secured the post of development commissioner in order to safeguard her interests in the communitarian sphere: The first to hold the post was Robert Lemaignen who previously had been an important French colonial administrator (Bossuat, Cummings 2013, 33-35, 60-62). Though the DG VIII had to justify its existence by being a functioning and non-colonialist institution (paradoxically) specifically former French colonial administrators were recruited to the Directorate-General. This was thanks to their African networks and skills acquired at *École coloniale*, which is why they presented themselves as the real experts on African development – and hence their background gave them legitimacy to influence the mission, methods and identity of the DG VIII. Thereby the French came about, so to say, colonising this Directorate General, as former French colonial administrators were now dominating the examination of development project proposals, submitting funding proposals to the EDF committee and ensuring that European companies had an equal share in the contracts awarded via calls for tenders from the associated countries (Carta 2012, 58, Bossuat Cummings 2013, 58-60, 62-63).

Accordingly, with the extension of the association agreements by the Yaoundé Convention, the EDF was increased from $581,25 to 730 million (Bossuat, Cummings 2013, 37-39, 48-50). At the same time, the percentage of contracts and orders for the supply of goods which went to France was considerably higher than France's initial contributions (Hayter 1966, 212). Most of the tenders went to French companies due to their advantage over European countries because of its historic ties with the African continent. Hence, France having contributed the same amount to the EDF as Germany ($200 million respectively), in 1966 the former won 43,85% of the tenders in a stark contrast to the 9,14% of the latter (Bossuat, Cummings 2013, 16-18, 37-39, 48-50).

[11] Which today is known as Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) (European Commission 2016)

What was characteristic to the functioning of the DG VIII was that aid was provided based on profound pragmatism (what was called *adapting to African reality*), hence adapting to local circumstances and customs. In practice this meant the absence of specific criteria regarding the distribution of funding, which was made possible by the vague objective of the Treaty of Rome; that is, to further the prosperity of the peoples of the ex-colonies in order to lead them to such a social and cultural development *they themselves wish*. What this meant was the lack of any political conditionality, which explains why aid was offered equally to all regimes, including those of Jean-Bédel Bokassa and Léopold Senghor (both French African allies). This approach was for a great part attributable to French (and European) political realities posed by the Cold War, meaning the necessity to not to let these countries slip under Soviet influence. Accordingly, this principle was followed in the Yaoundé and Lomé conventions until the 1990s (Bossuat, Cummings 2013, 64-67).

Eventually, the end of the Cold War led to a certain deterioration of the geopolitical importance of Africa (Hugon 2013, 106) as Western governments did no longer consider it to be in their strategic interests to support repressive third world regimes (Meredith 2011, 87). Therefore, the French Africa policy considerably lost in legitimacy, as it owed much to the cover provided by the East-West confrontation (Noirot, Tarrit 2014, 84). This atmosphere was manifest at the speech held by François Mitterrand at a Franco-African summit at La Baule in 1990, where the French president declared how aid would henceforth be tied to efforts towards political liberalization, and how countries failing to embrace democracy by instead continuing on the path of authoritarianism would face the cooling off of the French (bilateral) development aid (Meredith 2011, 387). However, already with the enlargement of the Yaoundé to include former British colonies (La Documentation française 2005), a more transparent system was envisaged. This was due to a contemplation on the instigation of the UK to restrict the actions from the part of the Directorate General in operating the EDF, and to make sure that aid is being shared proportionately between French and British ex-colonies. Hence, some African state leaders, such as Omar Bongo and Senghor asked the French president to prevent the reforms – without success - and eventually conditionality measures were included in the Lomé IV and later in Cotonou conventions. These measures specified new commitments, such as respect for democracy, human rights and good governance – which the ACP countries had to accept with the possibility of sanctions if deviating from the rules (Bossuat, Cummings 2013, 74-76). Also a new instrument was introduced, namely the European Commission governance incentive tranche (ECGIT), which, in accordance with the EU's positive conditionality strategy, consisted of supplementary funding to states who

credibly enough committed to governance reforms (Molenaers, Nijs 2008, 7, Roth 2014, 8). At the same time the EDF was accorded a budget of 3 billion ecus over a five-year period (Bossuat, Cummings 2013, 136-137). Nevertheless, similarly to previous EDF's, Germany was the second largest provider of funds after France in the Lomé EDF. However, the biggest share of tenders was taken by French companies that were running (although a decreased amount when compared to 1966) a quarter of all EDF projects (Mouradian 1998).

Today, the vision that the West has of the continent is challenged by the growing influence of the emerging powers (Mbabia 2012, 113); Although the French have traditionally considered the Anglo-Saxons as rivals in their Africa-policy, these countries have however been capable of following some common rules (such as aid conditionality since the 90's) due to the fact that they share some values as well as interests in the continent (Melly, Darracq 2013, 4-5). For instance, the EU strives to promote democratic values in Africa by rendering its assistance programmes conditional, thereby rewarding those who adhere to human rights, democracy and good governance (Roth 2014, 8). However, this policy does not necessarily converge with the views of African states, which has generated discontents towards European aid conditionality, the slowness that characterizes aid distribution and the heaviness of related procedures, which explains why Sub-Saharan African countries turn more and more towards countries like China. For example, concerning the EU's suspension of aid to Zimbabwe in 2002, the Zimbabwean government turned to China which eventually accorded Robert Mugabe substantial loans (Mbabia 2012, 116). Therefore, Western critics have eagerly pointed out the disadvantages of China's progress in the continent, arguing that whereas the West concentrates on developing democracy (which the EU sees as a precondition for a country's development), China weakens these efforts by doing so called 'no strings attached' deals with dictators and other dubious regimes (Meredith 2011, 697). Hence, in addition to economic benefits, in diplomatic terms China has benefited from its policy as during recent years eleven sanction proposals in the United Nations relating to human rights have been blocked thanks to the support of African states (Mbabia 2012, 43) when at the same time Paris has been struggling to retain the support of its traditional partners on international discussions: Although it is difficult to assess the extant influence of the emerging powers, on Libya in 2011 countries such as Mauritania, Niger and Burkina-Faso were hesitant in recognizing the National Transitional Council despite strong French pressure (Melly, Darracq 2013, 18).

In bilateral terms, France has traditionally been one of the major donors of aid, and in 2009 around 76% of commitments by the *Agence Français de Développement* (AFD) in Sub-Saharan Africa were allocated to 14 mostly francophone states (Melly, Darracq 2013, 16).

This is because the French Overseas Development Assistance is designed to further France's diplomatic, economic and cultural influence, which explains this emphasis on the Francophonie. Accordingly, in 2011 Africa received 55% of the French aid (€3338 million) in comparison to Asia's 12% (€747 million), the biggest African recipients being the DRC, Ivory Coast and Morocco (France-Diplomatie 2016, France-Diplomatie 2013). The roots of this approach are arguably in the French colonial vocation of wanting to teach their subjects French language and culture – thereby making them French as well. Especially during the Cold War, it was argued that it was France's position at the center of French-speaking countries that earned her the global standing as a near-great power (McNamara 1989, 127-128). Accordingly, this view was promulgated by Georges Pompidou in 1962 while serving as the French Prime Minister: "*Of all countries, France is the country which cares most about exporting its language and culture… …Our co-operation is undeniably oriented and ought fundamentally to be so, towards this expansion of our language and culture*" (Hayter 1966, 9-10). Moreover, in the future warm relations with the francophone sphere are all the more important when considering the significant population growth in French-speaking Sub-Saharan Africa, which is why it is predicted that French would be the most spoken language in the world by 2050 (Hunter 2015).



Figure 2. Geographic distribution of the French Overseas Development Aid (ODA)
Source: (France-Diplomatie 2016)

However, as French development aid budgets have been under pressure for many years, and will also remain so, it is unlikely that in the near future Paris would increase its aid spending to the UN target of 0,7% of GDP. Notwithstanding, in 2013 François Hollande stated

that aid for economic development would be tied to political criteria and how democracy is a prerequisite for development rather than its goal. It is not clear, however, how far Hollande will be ready to go in this respect in the face of the increasing influence of China and other powers. For example, when the AFD finances infrastructure projects in Africa, it has to accept that Chinese construction companies are competitive in price and likely obtain the tender (Melly, Darracq 2013, 14-15, 21, 24) - a state of affairs that underlines the importance of the EDF.

Accordingly, the French contribution for the 11th EDF in 2014 amounts to 19,55% - or €5,4 billion (France is the second largest contributor to the EDF after Germany) (France-Diplomatie 2015). However, when considering the competitiveness of French companies in the continent today (Melly, Darracq 2013, 2), as well as in the framework of previous agreements (Mouradian 1998), it is likely that French companies are still going to win a considerable share of tenders within the EDF. European aid is also a means to alleviate the strained French development aid budget: Since France as the second most significant contributor to the EDF has an important say regarding the allocation of the European aid (Salminen 2011, Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 255), Paris can seek to direct it to those African countries it desires (such as its traditional partners as well as other emerging non-francophone states, as South Africa and Ethiopia [Melly, Darracq 2013, 16]). In this respect, France succeeded in setting the emphasis of the European Consensus on Development in 2005 on Africa, and in 2010 the African continent received 43% of the net European aid - although for example Great Britain and Germany tend to prefer other regions for its allocation (Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 318, 357).

This policy would no doubt have a positive impact on Franco-African political as well as trade relations. In fact, already during the time of the EEC France was able retain the gratitude of African states who saw in France their strongest champion within the Community (McNamara 1989, 102). Although more recently it has been suggested that the multilateralization of French aid via the EDF would result in lesser visibility for France in Africa (in contrast to bilateral aid), the problem can however be avoided by emphasizing the French contribution to the EDF and especially by gaining a certain leadership on ground when aid is being delivered in the recipient countries (Lorgeoux, Bockel 2013, 324-326). Hence, the EDF is an important tool that helps France to maintain her position in its African sphere of influence, which on the other hand buttresses her traditional great power ambitions – a

notion well stated by the French Minister of State for Cooperation[12], Jacques Godfrain: "*Africa offers us [France] a formidable leverage. Small country with small strength, we can lift the planet because we are in intimate and friendly relations with fifteen or twenty African countries*" (Glaser, Smith 2005, 22).

[12] Currently Minister of State for Development and Francophony (France-Diplomatie 2016)

CONCLUSIONS

The central foreign policy goal throughout French history has been the affirmation of its position as a great power. As a result, the country decided to engage in bloody colonial wars, developed its own nuclear deterrent and has promoted a multipolar world in opposition to American hegemony. Accordingly, through historical process, the research found out that Paris considers the European integration as a way to buttress its own political standing: As the French means do not match its goal of being a great power, the Vth Republic has been willing to make concessions to its sovereignty. Accordingly, the question of autonomy (balancing between integration and independence) is of central importance in France's relation to the EU, as on one hand according power to the Union contradicts the country's pursue for political independence, but on the other acquiring greater political influence on the international scene requires it.

As France still has major economic and political interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, Paris today needs the EU to contribute to its ambitions related to the region. This results partly from the fact that the justification for the French African military policy considerably eroded especially in the 1990s. That is why French political leadership understood that French African operations need to increasingly develop towards multilateralism in order to gain justification and to avoid possible backlashes to French reputation. Thus, as the EU acting as a whole is seen to be less problematic in countries where France has considerable historical baggage, Communitarian operations are today the way through which Paris strives to operate in Africa. Furthermore, in light of the French economic problems as well as the constant decrease in the French defence budget since the 1980's, the Union is also seen as a way to alleviate the costs related to its operations.

This approach is however not without problems due to two main counter-effects related to France's Europeanisation efforts - the first one being the loss of autonomy - as acting under the EU banner requires the approval of all member states in the European Council. The other major hindrance is the loss of reactivity resulting from the difficulty of getting all member states to agree about common intervention in a quick timeframe, which is in essentially stark

contrast to the prerogatives of the French executive. This has led France to initiate operations and only subsequently getting them under the EU banner.

Furthermore, unlike other member states, France considers Sub-Saharan Africa as a zone of priority interest for the Union as a whole – a perception that it strives to justify for example by emphasizing the Islamist threat and the continent's geographical proximity. At the same time Paris sees common African operations as a means to develop the CFSP, which Paris argues to be necessary if the EU wants its values to be heard in the changing international political environment. Other member states have however been reluctant to pursue common African interventions, which for a large part is the result of the (albeit justified) view that Paris wants to use the EU in Sub-Saharan Africa for its own neo-colonial purposes. Nevertheless, as Paris has desired, these operations have provided the Union practical experience with the use of force and have thus contributed to the development of the common foreign and defence aspect of the Union.

The other aspect of the research, namely European trade and aid policy with the ACP countries, has longer roots regarding France's approach to Africa than the CFSP, as it dates back to the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The same aspect of intergovernmentalism is also present regarding this policy: Although trade policy is different in that the initiatives related to common trade together with foreign negotiations are made by the Commission, the ultimate decisions are still made in the European Council while the policy is largely being prepared by the TPC. The same goes for the EDF that has remained outside the EU budget, which is why the fund works on an intergovernmental basis, its negotiations being held in the Council of the EU.

Traditionally France has been the main beneficiary of the EU-ACP trade agreements, which has been helped by the firm position of French companies in the region. Hence, for instance, in 2010 France extracted a surplus of around €3,2 billion with its African trade, the country's imports consisting primarily of oil and gas as well as nuclear fuels while its exports included mostly high-technology products. Altogether, the most important French economic interests lie in a set of companies that are prominent in the sectors of construction and energy.

Ever since the end of the Cold War the French economic position has increasingly been challenged by the growing influence of emerging powers, and accordingly China has become Africa's largest commercial partner due to its demand for the continent's energy and mineral resources. It is said that Chinese interests in the continent would not have a considerable impact on European economic interests – a questionable statement as in reality Chinese competition starts to have an impact in the fields where the most important French economic

interests lie. Nevertheless, amidst the increased competition, France views Africa as a way to relieve its economic plight. It is thus under these circumstances that Paris has been pushing for the EPAs between the EU and the ACP countries. What is at stake for France and the EU is to increase competitiveness in relation to the emerging countries and accordingly an EPA negotiated with the ECOWAS offers France such prospects.

Regarding European aid, with the Treaty of Rome the economic development of underdeveloped countries fell under the responsibilities of the European Commission and its DG VIII which was quickly manned by former French colonial administrators. Accordingly, for instance within the Yaoundé the percentage of contracts and orders which went to France was considerably higher in comparison to France's initial contributions to the fund – a state of affairs that has continued also with subsequent accords. What was characteristic to the DG VIII was that aid was provided without political conditionality equally to all regimes, including French African allies. Nevertheless, with the end of the Cold War, positive conditionality measures were included in the Lomé IV. This approach has however coincided with the growing influence of the emerging powers that has challenged the European position in the continent as the African countries are now able to avoid conditionality measures by relying on countries like China, thereby eroding European efforts with 'no strings attached' deals. The Chinese policy has also arguably weakened French diplomatic standing among African countries.

In bilateral terms, France has traditionally been a major aid donor, although primarily to the francophone Africa. This is because Paris sees that distributing aid should contribute to the country's diplomatic, cultural and economic influence. Hence, despite the declarations of how French development aid would be tied to democratic conditions, it is questionable to what extent Paris actually is ready to follow such a policy in the face of the strained French development aid budget and the increasing competition from the part of the emerging powers. In this respect the EDF for the period from 2014 to 2020 is an important asset since France as its second contributor can seek to direct it to those countries it wishes and where it has won a considerable share of tenders. This policy also helps France to improve her relations with the recipient countries, in condition the French contribution in contrast to other European countries is emphasized clearly enough.

It is yet to be seen to what extent France is capable of continuing its Africa policy in the future - even with the harnessed power of the European Union. In the new scramble of Africa, the influence of new competitors is ever increasing as they develop – backed by their demographic as well as economic force - from their position of a developing country to that

of a developed, to which the stagnating France and Europe might have a hard time to answer. Accordingly, there is already significant competition among external powers for the favor of African powers be it in the voting of the United Nations Security Council or for various business deals including constructions of infrastructure or rights to exploit natural resources. Nonetheless, it is difficult to see how for instance an exclusively Chinese dominance in the continent would be in African interests, and therefore it is imaginable that Europe together with its reputation of standing for democratic values would eventually be more welcomed in Africa – especially when the living standards in the continent rise to such a level that such issues begin to be topical for their populations.

Especially regarding the EDF, the French desire of allocating common European funds towards Africa is likely to be heard by other European powers due to the strategic need for the European Union to secure its position in the rising continent. However, the emergence of Sub-Saharan Africa could also have unexpected consequences for France: It remains to be seen what the increasing power of French-speaking Africa would mean to the position Paris has as the central francophone state, especially when considering the estimates about their significant demographic growth. Thus, it is not unimaginable how France's position among the Francophonie could actually be thwarted alongside much more populated and economically stronger African countries.

In the field of security, the French together with Europe do not face noticeable competition as for example the influence of China in the continent has thus far manifested itself only in the economic sphere and not as a projection of military force. This state of affairs is likely to remain as long as there is no need for such efforts and the flow of raw materials to China continues undisrupted. However, an interesting question is whether the long desire of the French Vth Republic of creating a multipolar world is actually in French interests. Traditionally the French have jealously protected their African sphere of influence from the Anglo-Saxon influence, but today the influence of the emerging powers in Africa – a manifestation of an increasingly multipolar world - can actually be considered as a far greater threat to French interests than what the English speaking world actually represents. This then questions the conception of a multipolar world better guaranteeing French interests, which in turn should incite the French to reverse their strategy to more co-operate with the Anglo-Saxons in order to better respond to the influence of the emerging powers in Africa.

REFERENCES

Adebajo, A, Whiteman, K. (2012). The EU and Africa – from Eurafrique to Afro-Europa. London: Hurst & Company, pp. 335.

Affre, V. (15.05.2014). Le Moci: UE/Afrique : où en sont les Accords de partenariat Économique (APE).
http://www.lemoci.com/actualites/pays-marches/ueafrique-ou-en-sont-les-accords-de-partenariat-economique-ape/ (March 2016)

Aggad-Clerx. (16.12.2013). Al-Jazeera: France: Out of Africa and back?
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/12/france-out-africa-back-20131214112634946877.html (February 2016)

Augé, A. (2014). Revue Défense Nationale : Forces françaises en Centrafrique: defendre la paix et les intérêts économiques, pp. 97-98.

Bakong, P. (2012). La Politique Militaire Africaine de la France - Forces sociales et changements récents. Paris: L'Harmattan, pp. 44.

Barrios, C. (2010). FRIDE: France in Africa: from paternalism to pragmatism.
http://fride.org/download/PB_58_Eng_France_in_Africa.pdf, pp. 3, 5. (March 2016)

Bazin, M. (03.03.2014). Survie: Afrique de l'Ouest: Alerte à l'APE!
http://survie.org/billets-d-afrique/2014/233-mars-2014/article/afrique-de-l-ouest-alerte-a-l-ape-4697 (March 2016)

BCEAO. (2012). Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest.
http://www.bceao.int/-03-Etats-Membres-.html (May 2016)

BEAC. (2011). Banque des États de l'Afrique Centrale – Institut d'émission des États membres de la Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale.
https://www.beac.int/ (May 2016)

Bell, D. (14.01.2014). Foreign Affairs: Double Entendre – The Paradox of France's Humanitarian Interventions.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2014-01-14/double-entendre (Feburary 2014)

Bender, J. (03.10.2015). Business Insider: RANKED: The world's 20 strongest militaries.
http://www.businessinsider.com/these-are-the-worlds-20-strongest-militaries-ranked-2015-9 (Feburary 2016)

Bernard, P. (09.06.2009). Le Monde: Omar Bongo, president du Gabon.

http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2009/06/09/omar-bongo-president-du-gabon_1204722_3212.html (February 2016)

Bossuat, G, Cumming, G. (2013). France, Europe and Development Aid – From the Treaties of Rome to the Present Day. Paris: Open Edition Books, pp. 18-20, 37-39, 48-50, 67-69, 194-196, 200-201.

Bozo, F., (1997). La politique étrangère de la France depuis 1945. Paris, pp. 3, 5, 19-25, 27, 29, 33.

Brautigam, D. (2009). The Dragon's Gift – The Real Story of China in Africa. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-19.

Carta, C. (2012). The European Union Diplomatic Service: Ideas, Preferences and Identities. New York: Routledge, pp. 58.

Chafer, T. (2002). The End of Empire in French West Africa – France's Successful Decolonization? New York: Berg, pp. 1, 7, 10-11, 84-85.

Chen, W, Dollar, D, Tang, H. (03.09.2015). Brookings: China's direct investment in Africa: Reality versus myth.
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2015/09/03-china-africa-investment-trade-myth-chen-dollar-tang (April 2016)

Cheyvialle, A. (02.04.2014). Le Figaro: L'UE pousse les accords de libre-échange avec l'Afrique.
http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2014/04/02/20002-20140402ARTFIG00002-l-ue-pousse-les-accords-de-libre-echange-avec-l-afrique.php (April 2016)

Clarke, S. (2011). 1000 Years of Annoying the French. London: A Random House Group Company, pp. 596.

CONCORD. (2015). A qui profite l'Accord de partenariat economique entre l'Afrique de l'Ouest et l'Union europeenne?
http://www.alimenterre.org/sites/www.cfsi.asso.fr/files/886-a-qui-profite-lape-ue-afriquedelouest.pdf (April 2016)

De Boni, M. (11.04.2014). Le Figaro: "La mano dans la mano": après l'anglais, Hollande massacre l'espagnol.
http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/le-scan/insolites/2014/04/11/25007-20140411ARTFIG00124-la-mano-dans-la-mano-apres-l-anglais-hollande-massacre-l-espagnol.php (March 2016)

de Montclos, M-A. (2005). France-Diplomatie: La face cachée de l'aide internationale.
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/Revue_des_revues_200_1002D0.pdf (May 2016)

Emmott, R, Siebold, S. (17.11.2015). Reuters: France requests European support in Syria, Iraq and Africa.

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-shooting-eu-defence-help-idUSKCN0T611Z20151117 (January 2016)

ERR. (7.12.2015). ETV: Välisilma dokk Varisõda Saharas (Africom, guerre de l'ombre au Sahara, Prantsuse 2014).
http://etv.err.ee/v/dokumentaalfilmid/valisilma_dokk/saated/4a2af963-4b83-4cb9-b9d5-04991309a9a7/valisilma-dokk-varisoda-saharas-africom-guerre-de-lombre-au-sahara-prantsuse-2014 (December 2015)

EU at the UN. (01.04.2014). EU military operation at the Central African Republic launched.
http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_14829_en.htm (February 2016)

EUR-Lex. (30.04.2016). Common commercial policy.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Aa20000 (May 2016)

Eurocorps. (14.04.2016). Leaflet – Highly Operational.
http://en.calameo.com/read/002395265eae2af67d563 (April 2016)

European Commission. (24.03.2016). About International Cooperation and Development – DG DEVCO.
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/general_en (March 2016)

European Commission. (29.03.2016). ACP – The Cotonou Agreement.
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agreement/index_en.htm (March 2016)

European Commission., (06.05.2010). Countries and regions – Africa, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP).
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/africa-caribbean-pacific/ (May 2016)

European Commission (13.10.2015). Economic partnerships.
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/economic-partnerships/ (April 2016)

European Commission. (30.04.2016). European Development Fund (EDF).
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/funding-instruments-programming/funding-instruments/european-development-fund_en (March 2016)

European Commission. (30.04.2016). European development policy.
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/european-development-policy_en (March 2016)

European Commission. (18.09.2015). L'Accord de Partenariat Economique avec l'Afrique de l'Ouest.
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153036.pdf (January 2016)

European Commission. (10.01.2013). New EU initiative to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-14_en.htm (February 2016)

European Commission. (2016). Overview of EPA negotiations.
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144912.pdf (March 2016)

European Commission. (30.04.2016). Programming.
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/funding-instruments-programming/programming_en (April 2016)

European Commission. (30.04.2016). Where does the money come from?
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/about-funding-and-procedures/sources-funding_en

European Parliament. (2014). European Development Fund – Joint development cooperation and the EU budget: out or in?
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-IDA-542140-European-Development-Fund-FINAL.pdf, pp. 1 (April 2016)

European Parliament. (2016). The European Rescue of the Nation State.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/100books/fi/detail.html?id=60 (May 2016)

European Stability Initiative. (2010). Alan Milward: The EU as the saviour of the nation state.
http://www.esiweb.org/enlargement/?cat=89 (May 2016)

France-Diplomatie. (01.05.2016). France and Overseas Development Assistance.
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/Text_APD_ENG_0813_access.pdf (May 2016)

France-Diplomatie. (2013). France and the United Nations.
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/united-nations/france-and-the-united-nations/ (March 2016)

France-Diplomatie. (16.12.2013). French Official Development Assistance (ODA).
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/development-assistance/french-official-development/ (April 2016)

France-Diplomatie. (2014). La France à l'OTAN: La place de la France dans l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN).
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-la-france/defense-et-securite/la-france-et-l-otan/ (February 2016)

France-Diplomatie. (2015). La France et les instruments de la politique européenne de développement.
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-la-france/aide-au-developpement/la-france-et-la-politique/article/la-france-et-les-instruments-de-la (March 2016)

France-examen. (2012). Corrigé bac 2012.
http://www.france-examen.com/annales/voir/corrige/3627, pp. 1. (February 2016)

France24. (04.12.2013). France 'must double' trade with Africa, Hollande says.
http://www.france24.com/en/20131204-france-must-double-trade-ties-africa-hollande-economy (February 2014)

Giros, E, Sevaistre, P. (2014). European Centre for Development Policy Management: Trade Prospects Between France and Africa: the EPA and the Private Sector.
http://ecdpm.org/great-insights/economic-partnership-agreements-beyond/trade-prospects-france-africa-epa-private-sector/ (March 2016)

Glaser, A. (2014). AfricaFrance - Quand les dirigeants africains deviennent les maîtres du jeu. Librairie Arthème Fayard, pp. 13-16, 87, 214-216.

Glaser, A, Smith, S. (2005). Comment la France a perdu l'Afrique. Calmann-Lévy, pp. 11-24, 30, 31, 85.

Gourdin, P. (04.04.2014). Études Géostratégiques: La Politique de l'Union européenne face à la crise en République centrafricaine.
https://etudesgeostrategiques.com/2014/04/04/la-politique-de-lunion-europeenne-face-a-la-crise-en-republique-centrafricaine-2/ (February 2016)

Hart, A. (11.08.2011). SlateAfrique: "Armée francaise, allez-vous en!".
http://www.slateafrique.com/23609/armee-francaise-diplomatie-senegal-tchad-centrafrique-gabon (February 2016)

Haski, P. (24.11.2013). Le Nouvel Observateur: La France reste une grande puissance… en Afrique.
http://rue89.nouvelobs.com/2013/11/24/france-reste-grande-puissance-afrique-247795 (February 2016)

Hayter, T. (1966). Overseas Development Institute: French Aid.
http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8078.pdf, pp. 10, 212. (April 2016)

Hoerber, T. (2015). Journal of Contemporary European Research: The European Rescue of the Nation-State.
http://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/viewFile/707/550, pp. 389. (May 2016)

Hugon, P. (2013). Géopolitique de l'Afrique. Armand Colin: Paris, pp. 109, 110.

Hunter, I. (19.12.2015). Daily Mail: C'est impossible! French set to be the world's most commonly spoken language by 2050 because of soaring population growth in sub-Saharan Africa.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3367012/C-est-impossible-French-course-world-s-commonly-spoken-language-2050.html (May 2016)

ICTSD. (22.10.2015). The EU's new trade strategy paints a "redefined" relationship with Africa.
http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/the-eu%E2%80%99s-new-trade-strategy-paints-a-%E2%80%9Credefined%E2%80%9D-relationship-with (April 2016)

Jackson, R, Sörensen, G. (2010). Introduction to International Relations: Theories & Approaches. 4th edition. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 66-69.

Kissinger, H. (1994). Diplomacy. New York: Touchstone, pp. 58, 524-49, 602-606, 612.

Koepf, T. (2010). German Institute for International and Security Affairs: France and EU Military Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa – No (more) hidden agenda.
http://www.ies.be/files/Koepf-F5.pdf, pp. 8. (February 2016)

Koungou, L. (2009). Le Monde Diplomatique: Ranskan menetetty valta. Helsinki: Into. 2nd ed, pp. 170.

Koungou, L. (2014). Revue Défense Nationale: Union européenne: la Pesc en recherché de consistence en Centrafrique.
http://www.defnat.com/site_fr/pdf/Koungou%20-%20Union%20europ%C3%A9enne,%20la%20Pesc%20en%20recherche%20consistance%20en%20Centrafrique%20(T542).pdf, pp. 2, 3. (February 2016)

La Documentation française. (01.06.2005). Union européenne: l'aide au développement des pays ACP (Afrique, Caraïbes, Pacifique).
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/dossiers/d000116-union-europeenne-l-aide-au-developpement-des-pays-acp-afrique-caraibes-pacifique (March 2016)

La France au Cambodge. (23.07.2015). Les grands axes de la politique étrangère de la France.
http://www.ambafrance-kh.org/Les-grands-axes-de-la-politique-etrangere-de-la-France (March 2016)

Lakomy, M. (2011). CJISS: French Foreign Policy and the EU's CFSP.
file:///C:/Users/Janne/Downloads/cejiss_5_2_lakomy+ch+5%20(1).pdf, pp. 134, 140. (February 2016)

Lancaster, C. (2006). Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 163.

Larivé, M. (03.10.2014). The National Interest: Welcome to France's New War on Terror in Africa: Operation Barkhane.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/welcome-frances-new-war-terror-africa-operation-barkhane-11029 (February 2016)

Lasserre, I, Oberlé, Thierry. (2013). Notre Guerre Secrète au Mali: Les Nouvelles Menaces Contre la France. France: Fayard, pp. 20-21, 24, 321, 232, 234.

La Tribune. (14.12.2013). Opérations militaires : il faut « un fonds européen permanent » (Hollande).

http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defense/20131214trib000800966/operations-militaires-il-faut-un-fonds-europeen-permanent-hollande.html (March 2016)

Le Drian, J-Y. (24.01.2014). Restoring Peace in Africa, Revitalizing European Defense, and Renewing NATO: The View From Paris.
http://ambafrance-us.org/IMG/pdf/CSIS-2.pdf, pp. 2 (February 2016)

Letteron, R. (2002). L'Universalité des Droits de l'Homme: Apparences et réalités.
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/FD001351.pdf, pp. 146. (February 2016)

Lorgeoux, J, Bockel, J-M. (29.10.2013). Sénat – Rapport d'Information: L'Afrique est notre avenir.
http://www.senat.fr/rap/r13-104/r13-1041.pdf, pp. 243, 245, 255, 316, 318 324-326, 354, 356-357, 361, 364, 366, 474-475. (May 2016)

Lorgeoux, J, Trillard, A, Bockel, J-M. (15.04.2015). Sénat: Golfe de Guinée: La prevention des conflits à l'épreuve de Boko Haram.
http://www.senat.fr/rap/r14-410/r14-4101.pdf, pp. 7-11, 24. (February 2016)

Madela, M. (6.1.2010). From the Lome Convention to the Economic Partnership Agreements: an assessment of trade relations between the ECOWAS and the EU.
http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/8568/From%20the%20Lome%20Convention%20to%20the%20Economic%20Partnership%20Agreements%20An%20assessment%20of%20trade%20relations%20.pdf?sequence=1, pp. 5. (March 2016)

Magnan, P. (27.05.2013). FranceTV: Qu'appelle-t-on les "intérêts" français en Afrique?
http://geopolis.francetvinfo.fr/quappelle-t-on-les-interets-francais-en-afrique-16803 (February 2016)

Martin, T. (08.09.2007). The Telegraph: A land of 246 kinds of cheese.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/non_fictionreviews/3667789/A-land-of-246-kinds-of-cheese.html (March 2016)

Mathias, G. (2014). Les guerres africaines de François Hollande. France: Éditions de l'Aube, pp. 25.

Mbabia, O. (2012). La Chine en Afrique: Histoire, Géopolitique, Géoéconomie. Ellipses, pp. 43, 113, 115, 116, 119, 123.

McNamara, E. (2016). Foreign Policy Research Institute: France and Germany Must Work With The US On Baltic Security.
http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/01/france-and-germany-must-work-with-the-us-on-baltic-security/ (February 2016)

McNamara, F. (1989). France in Black Africa. National Defense University Press, pp. 57, 68, 102, 127-128, 137.

McNeill, J.R, McNeill, W.H. (2003). Verkottunut ihmiskunta - yleiskatsaus maailmanhistoriaan. Tallinna: Vastapaino, pp. 450, 451-452.

McPhee, P. (2014). A Companion to the French Revolution. 1st ed. Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 379-396.

MEDEA. (29.05.2009). Ouverture d'une base militaire francaise à Abu Dhabi. http://www.medea.be/2009/05/ouverture-dune-base-militaire-francaise-a-abu-dhabi/ (February 2016)

Mehler, A. (2009). Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: Les interventions européennes en Afrique : moment-phare pour l'Europe et la coopération franco-allemande ? http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/paris/06558.pdf, pp. 2. (February 2016)

Melly, P, Darracq, V. (2013). Chatham House: A new way to engage? French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande. http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0513pp_franceafrica.pdf, pp. 1, 3, 4, 5, 12-13, 16, 18, 23. (February 2016)

Meredith, M. (2011). The State of Africa - A History of the Continent Since Independence. Simon & Schuster UK Ltd, pp. 44-57, 69, 70, 72-74, 387, 493, 519, 525, 696, 697.

Mevel, J-J. (13.12.2013). Le Figaro: Un soutien européen pour "Sangaris". http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2013/12/13/01003-20131213ARTFIG00606-un-soutien-europeen-pour-sangaris.php (March 2016)

Milward, A. (09.11.2010). The Telegraph: Professor Alan Milward. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/culture-obituaries/books-obituaries/8120701/Professor-Alan-Milward.html (May 2016)

Ministère de la Défense. (2013). Livre Blanc - Défense et Sécurité Nationale. http://fr.calameo.com/read/000331627d6f04ea4fe0e, pp. 55-56, 64-65, 67, 135-136. (March 2016)

Michel, S, Beuret, M. (2009). La Chinafrique - Pékin à la conquête du continent noir. Librairie Arthème Fayard/Pluriel, pp. 147.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. (2015). Review on Finland's security cooperation. Grano Oy, pp. 37, 40.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. (23.06.2015). Common Commercial Policy of the EU. http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=49306&contentlan=2&culture=en (May 2016)

Molenaers, N, Nijs, L. (2008). University of Antwerp: The Bumpy Road from Paris to Brussels: The European Commission Governance Incentive Tranche. http://www.ucsia.org/objs/00192839.pdf, pp. 7. (April 2016)

Morgenthau, H. (1965). Scientific Man Versus Power Politics. University of Chicago Press, pp. 180, 195.

Mouradian, A-M. (1998). Le Monde Diplomatique: Divisions in Europe over relations with the south – The Lomé Convention under threat.
http://mondediplo.com/1998/06/08lome (March 2016)

Noirot, T, Tarrit, F. (2014). Francafrique - La Famille Recomposée. Éditions Syllepse: Paris, pp. 47, 87, 132-133, 141, 165, 214, 387.

Oliva, É, Giummarra, S. (2014). Droit constitutionnel. Sirey. 8th ed, pp. 11, 157.

Pelli, P. (27.02.2016). Helsingin Sanomat: Ranska pettyi vasemmistopresidenttiin – ovea kolkuttaa kova oikeisto.
http://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/a1456458477902 (February 2016)

Pham, J. (2008). What is the national interest? Hans Morgenthau's Realist Vision and American Foreign Policy.
http://www.jmu.edu/nelsoninstitute/National%20Interest.pdf, pp. 258. (May 2016)

Pinatel, J-B, Amir-Aslani, A, Mongrenier, J-S. (17.11.2013). Atlantico : Moyen-Orient, Etats-Unis, déclassement stratégique: la politique étrangère de la France est-elle en train de changer?
http://www.atlantico.fr/decryptage/moyen-orien-etats-unis-declassement-strategique-politique-etrangere-france-est-elle-en-train-changer-jean-bernard-pinatel-900182.html/page/0/1 (February 2016)

Pouchard, A. (29.04.2015). Le Monde: En euros constants, le ministère de la défense a perdu 20% de son budget en 25 ans.
http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2015/04/29/le-ministere-de-la-defense-a-perdu-20-de-son-budget-depuis-vingt-cinq-ans_4625187_4355770.html (April 2016)

Rempe, M. (2011). Decolonization by Europeanization? The Early EEC and the Transformation of French-African Relations, pp. 1.

Représentation permanente de la France auprès de l'Union européenne. (06.02.2015). La politique commerciale de l'Union européenne.
http://www.rpfrance.eu/La-politique-commerciale-de-l.html

Ricard, P. (19.07.2011). Le Monde: Le Royaume-Uni fait échec au projet de creation d'un quartier general militaire européen à Bruxelles.
http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2011/07/19/le-royaume-uni-fait-echec-au-projet-de-creation-d-un-quartier-general-militaire-europeen-a-bruxelles_1550364_3214.html (February 2016)

Rossignol, R. (01.03.2014). Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l'École Militaire.
file:///C:/Users/Janne%20Hakala/Downloads/Rossignol%20-%20Fiche%20AFRIQUE%20%20(1).pdf (March 2016)

Roth, S. (2014). Political Conditionality in European Union Development Assistance - Assessing Effectiveness and Consistency.

http://www.ie-ei.eu/IE-EI/Ressources/file/memoires/2009/ROTH.pdf, pp.8 (April 2016)

Ruonala, M. (2011). Ulkoasiainministeriö: EU-perusteos. 2nd edition. Sastamala: Vammalan Kirjapaino, pp. 80.

Ruotsalainen, M. (15.09.2005). Elinkeinoelämän valtuuskunta: De Gaullen Ranska – Suomen suuri kummisetä.
http://www.eva.fi/blog/2005/09/15/de-gaullen-ranska-%E2%80%93-suomen-suuri-kummiseta/ (April 2016)

Ruscio, A. (2011). Le Monde Diplomatique: Indokiina 1945-1975: vuosisadan pisin sota. Helsinki: Into Kustannus, pp. 64.

Sagna, G. (05.12.2014). Le Quotidien : Les accords de partenariat économique (Ape) symptômes de la crise du capitalisme ? La Francophonie et les Ape au secours de la France en crise.
http://www.lequotidien.sn/index.php/opinions-debats/les-accords-de-partenariat-economique-ape-symptomes-de-la-crise-du-capitalisme-la-francophonie-et-les-ape-au-secours-de-la-france-en-crise (April 2016)

Saliou, M. (14.10.2015). Persée: La France et l'ONU. Des ambitions mondiales.
file:///C:/Users/Janne/Desktop/Koulu/TT%C3%9C/France%20et%20la%20Chine%20en%20Afrique/La%20France%20%C3%A0%20l'ONU.pdf, pp. 694-695. (February 2016)

Salminen, E. (14.03.2011). Kepa: Siirtomaa-aika näkyy yhä Euroopan ulkopolitiikassa.
https://www.kepa.fi/uutiset/8242 (March 2016)

Simpson, B. (2001). Human Rights and the End of Empire. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 285-286.

SIPRI. (03.11.2015). SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database (March 2016)

Siradag, A. (2014). Afro Eurasian Studies Journal Vol 3: Understanding French Foreign and Security Policy towards Africa: Pragmatism or Altruism, pp. 107.

Sissoko, M, Osuji, L, Cheng, W. (1998). The African Economic & Business Review: Impacts of the Yaounde and Lome Conventions on EC-ACP Trade.
http://theaebr.com/v1n1sp1998sissoko.pdf, pp. 9. (April 2016)

Stora, B. (2005). Les mots de la guerre d'Algérie. Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail, pp. 23.

Särg, L., (2014). An Insight to the EU Military Missions in Africa: French Leadership and Beyond, pp. 5, 37, 38, 40, 44-45, 57, 58, 60, 61, 63, 67.

Tchaleu, J., (2012). Francois Hollande et la Franafrique - Défi et la Rupture. Paris: L'Harmattan, pp. 7

The Economist. (02.03.2013). Africa rising - A hopeful continent.
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21572377-african-lives-have-already-greatly-improved-over-past-decade-says-oliver-august (April 2016)

UNCTAD. (2010). Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment.
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia20101_en.pdf, pp. 1 (May 2016)

Van Herpen, M. (2004). Chirac's Gaullism - Why France Has Become the Driving Force Behind an Autonomous European Defence Policy.
http://www.cicerofoundation.org/pdf/vanherpen_chirac_gaullism.pdf (February 2016)

Van Herpen, M. (14.05.2003). The National Interest: France: Champion of a Multipolar World.
http://nationalinterest.org/article/france-champion-of-a-multipolar-world-2345 (February 2016)

Verschave, F. (2004). De la Françafrique à la Mafiafrique. Bruxelles: Éditions Tribord, pp. 10.

Wallerstein, I. (02.12.2013). Al Jazeera: France's aggressive foreign policy.
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2013/12/france-foreign-policymilitaryintervention.html (March 2016)

Ward, J. (29.01.2008). Spiegel: The World from Berlin: Is the EU Chad Mission a Camouflage for French Interests?
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-is-the-eu-chad-mission-a-camouflage-for-french-interests-a-531792.html (March 2016)

WEU. (31.03.2010). Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU on behalf of the High Contracting Parties of the Modified Brussles Treaty – Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.
http://www.weu.int/Declaration_E.pdf (April 2016)

World Bank. (29.12.2015). Gross Domestic Product 2014.
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf, pp.1. (February 2016)

WTO. (2016). Scope of RTAs.
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/scope_rta_e.htm (May 2016)