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**RETHINKING COUNTER-RADICALIZATION MEASURES  
FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EUROPE**

Master's Thesis

Supervisor: Assoc. Professor Holger Mölder

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I declare I have written the master's thesis independently.

All works and major viewpoints of the other authors, data from other sources of literature and elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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## **ABSTRACT**

In recent years, mainstream media and common perception throughout Europe have been dominated by a string of terrorist attacks. In turn, such horrific events have also been directly correlated with an influx of Muslim immigrants and asylum seekers of Middle Eastern and African descent. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon and historically has had a global footprint that has been incredibly difficult to define. There is no such a thing as a classical profile that may help to pre-emptively identify a typical terrorist. The counterterrorism policies that have been developed over the years are at times complementary and at times overlapping but mostly have failed to focus on counter-radicalization. Thorough research reveals that Muslim asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants of Middle Eastern and African descent may be at a greater risk of radicalization and in turn terrorism if proper counter discrimination policies are not adopted. Research reveals that unless the European society does not integrate Muslim immigrants and accepts them as everyone else by hiring and educating them on an equal basis, regardless of the color of their skin and religion, then the likelihood of radicalization and in turn, Islamic terrorism will continue to be a problem for Europe at large. This master's thesis is a qualitative data analysis, discussing whether the increased number of immigrants from Muslim countries increase the risk of Islamic terrorist attacks in Europe and are immigrants likely to radicalize in Europe? Also, it will be examined what can European states do to prevent the radicalization and ensure the security of the citizens.

**Keywords:** political violence, terrorism, jihadism, immigration, radicalization, discrimination, integration, counter-radicalization, counter-terrorism, Europe.

## INTRODUCTION

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in New York City brought new challenges and signalled a turning point in the history of defence, security, foreign, and domestic policies of the Western world. When four passenger airliners were hijacked in the United States of America by 19 members of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization, the term “*Islamic terrorism*” quickly emerged as the most commonly used terminology of choice to associate with any acts of terror throughout world.

Viotti and Kauppi (2009, 256), however, aptly point out that terrorism itself is not a new phenomenon. While it can be said that there has always been some type of terrorism throughout the world, some of its roots can historically be traced as far back as the Roman Empire. The earliest historical references to the word *terrorism* itself in literature were first seen during a period of time known as the Reign of Terror, which occurred during the French revolution of 1789. This extremely brutal period of time in the European history led to the usage of the word *terrorism* for the first time in the context of the French revolution (Malkki and Paastela 2007, 22). However, the events that initiated the so-called modern day Global War on Terror were the terrorist attacks that were carried out on 9/11. These attacks then subsequently initiated an enormous international military campaign against what has become coined as Islamic terrorism. For almost two decades, this Global War on Terror has managed to keep the topic of Islamic terrorism as one of the main headlines throughout the various mainstream media sources and public debate.

The aftermath of 9/11 attacks and the Western led Global War on Terror have in turn then produced a civil war in Iraq and instability in Afghanistan. Moreover, a wave of change has also swept across various countries in the Middle East and North Africa in 2010 during what the mainstream media and the public has coned as the Arab Spring. In December of 2010, the revolution in Tunisia initiated the Arab Spring through a series of violent and non-violent protests that then swept across the Arab world. In some countries such as Tunisia, such rebellion has also produced democratic development (Bradley 2012, 21). Contrary to what many would label as a positive change in Tunisia in 2010, however, the Arab Spring did

not have the same positive effects throughout the Middle East. For instance, there is an ongoing bloody civil war in the Syrian Arab Republic. Such events combined with the currently ongoing civil war in Iraq and instability in Afghanistan along with the brutal dictatorships, civil wars and instability throughout the African continent, have collectively caused an unforeseen flow of asylum seekers throughout Europe since 2015.

In 2015, Europe also witnessed several terrorist attacks throughout major cities such as Paris and Brussels. These attacks were linked to Daesh, which is the official Arabic word used to describe what has been coined as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State (IS), and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Daesh is an abbreviation for this organizations' full Arabic name, تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في العراق و الشام and can be transliterated in the English language as Al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-'Irāq wa-sh-Shām. This word originates from the areas were many of the asylum seekers come from.<sup>1</sup> While words like ISIS and ISIL have become the most commonly used terminologies throughout the mainstream media and even various politicians and foreign policy experts, these words cannot accurately describe this movement in countries like Afghanistan. ISIS or ISIL as a terminology does not even geographically cover the rise of this movement in Afghanistan like the word Daesh would. Also, the word Daesh for the native Arabic speakers refers to something that is not acceptable. Even Barack Obama, the outgoing President of the United States of America has argued that the organization should be called by name Daesh instead of ISIS because of its derogatory meaning (Khan 2016).

Furthermore, it is vital to note that the perpetrators of the more recent terrorist attacks in Europe solely shared the same culture and religion with many of those who had just arrived in Europe as asylum seekers. In the mainstream media and in the public discourse, however, the terrorist attacks and the wave of the asylum seekers have often been linked and clustered together. One of the main arguments against the refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants in past two years in Europe has been that they are a threat to the European security and that they bring the Islamic terrorism to Europe. It has also been argued that Islam as a religion threatens

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<sup>1</sup> The use of the word Daesh in this thesis is also partly a conscious choice by the author because the mainstream media sources and the politicians throughout the world have started to use this word in response to this organization's hatred towards this word. The word Daesh itself is also similar to the Arabic word *daes* داعس which means "to crush" or "to trample down," which is highly disliked by the members of this organization.

the European culture and society because it tolerates such attacks as the one that was for instance, seen in Paris in November of 2015.

Therefore, it is critical to analyse these currently evolving trends and situation in order to determine whether asylum seekers do or do not pose an increase in the risk of terrorism throughout Europe. An unbiased and numbers driven analysis must be carried out in order to be able to determine the best path forward. As previously discussed, many of the Muslim immigrants have already been stigmatised with a very broad brush of Islamic terrorism and Global War on Terror labels within the past two decades. As a result, it is also vital to re-evaluate the past and offer an objective analysis of what has in the past years become a generalisation that that *as all terrorist are Muslims, all the Muslims are terrorists*. Consequently, it is hypothesised that prejudices and discrimination towards the mass numbers of asylum seekers and immigrants into European countries poses dangers and incentivizes immigrants and asylum seekers to join violent extremist causes or organizations in response to the ill-treatment they face throughout Europe and the world at large.

## **Overarching Outline of this Study**

The first chapters will lay the foundation for the objective analysis of this thesis by offering the reader an understanding of what the terms such as *political violence*, *terrorism* and *jihadism* mean. This is necessary in order to identify any re-occurring patterns, which may lead to the process of radicalization and subsequently the perpetration of an attack. Following this discussion, the concept of *immigration* as a phenomenon along with the reasons behind the 2015 refugee crisis will be introduced and briefly discussed in the context of this thesis. This discussion will also include a look at the various issues that are naturally associated with a transition and daily problems that an average immigrant will face along upon their arrival in Europe. Introduction of the reasons behind the refugee crisis also helps to enhance the understanding of the environment from which the asylum seekers come from. Understanding these problems is important because they play a significant role in the process of radicalization.

Next, this thesis will discuss the reasons for radicalization and will also focus on the risks that immigrants and asylum seekers may face. Therefore, it will be necessary to



introduce and analyse the profiles of some of the terrorists from the most recent attacks in Europe in order to enhance the overall understanding of the process of radicalization. This will be done in the context of France by conducting a small case study of the specific features of France. As France has faced many large scale attacks in recent years, it was the obvious choice for the case study.

Following this discussion, international documents and action plans that have been implemented to counteract terrorism will be introduced and discussed within the context of migration. This will be done first at the level of the United Nations (hereinafter UN) and then at the European level as a whole by first considering the European Union (hereinafter EU)'s point of view followed by the point of view of the Council of Europe. These implemented policies are vital to understand because they will provide a better understanding on how to counter terrorism, at an international level or whether counter terrorism policy should be entirely just left to the national authorities to prevent. Last but not least, the data in relation to the hypothesis will be discussed in order to objectively determine whether the hypothesis can or cannot be proven based on the data that has been provided in the earlier chapters.

## **The Aim of the Study**

The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether Islamic terrorism in Europe is linked to an increase in the number of asylum seekers and whether it is likely that the number of Islamic terrorist attacks will increase throughout Europe as a result of an increase in the number of Muslim immigrants. Most of the terrorists associated with the most recent attacks have not been recent asylum-seekers but rather second or third generation immigrants and the citizens of the EU who were born and raised in Europe. Thus, the assumption that an increase in the number of asylum seekers will lead to an increase in the number Islamic terrorist attacks seems to be factually incorrect. Therefore, the assumption that the asylum seekers that arrived in Europe in 2015 and 2016 are more likely to radicalize than those who are originally from Europe will be further investigated. This study will be done by examining the reasons for the radicalization. The research questions can be formed as following: Does the increased number of immigrants from Muslim countries increase the risk of Islamic terrorist attacks in

Europe? Are immigrants likely to radicalize in Europe? What European states can do to prevent the radicalization and ensure the security of the citizens?

The primary supposition for the hypothesis of this master's thesis is that an increase in the number of asylum seekers in Europe will not threaten the European security if the European states fully implement integration plans in accordance with the full respect for human rights and international law. The second supposition for this hypothesis is that radicalization is linked more to the socio-economic status and inequality between the immigrants and the native-born population in Europe rather than Islam as a religious belief or the cultural background of the immigrants. The assumption here is that the terrorists acting as members of various terrorist organizations are in good mental health and in most cases are not actually suffering from any mental health related conditions.

The other assumption is that the international legal documents such as the EU legislation or the UN resolutions alone are not effective enough to counter terrorism. This is because their sole concentration is focused on the prevention of terrorism after radicalization has already occurred rather than taking the necessary steps to pre-emptively counter it in the first place. This is because there has been very little attention given to the fundamental causes of radicalization. It is supposed in this thesis that the more effective way to prevent terrorism is to interfere with various social problems. For instance, xenophobia and alienation should be decreased and funding along with the necessary resources should be provided in order to counter balance economic inequality. This is believed to be the pathway forward that focuses on the root of the problem instead of the outcome linked to the problem. It is supposed that the introduction of new legislation that solely focuses on criminalising terrorist acts is not the answer to the root of countering terrorism.

On the other hand, the connection between immigration and terrorism has not been extensively researched in an academic context. This is in spite of the fact that it is vital to understand the connection between those two variables in order to be able to better counter and reduce the number of problems, which may lead to the radicalization and subsequently terrorist attacks.

In a research paper entitled "*Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?*" Bove and Böhmelt published extensive quantitative data from their research pertaining to the linkage between immigrant population's inflow and the number of terrorist attacks. Authors analysed attacks in 145 countries between the years 1970 to 2000, which offers one of the most

extensive published samples of analysed data. Examining the connection between terrorism and immigration, however, is a very rare approach. This is due to the fact that most of the researches in the field have mostly focused on how the different policies along with concepts like democracy may be spread by the immigrants around the world but not how the problems such as terrorism may spread (See for example, Simmons and Elkins 2004). Thus, it becomes more vital than ever before to focus more on the potential roots rather than the outcome of various terrorism and counterterrorism policies currently being implemented in Europe and the Western world at large.

## **The Limitations of the Study**

The research within the scope of this master's thesis is focusing on the organized Islamic terrorism in Europe. Even though this type of terrorism, which is based on radical Islam is relatively rare in Europe, many international organizations such as the Europol and Frontex deem Islamic terrorism as one of the central threats to the European se and give Islamic terrorism one of the highest priorities. During the course of the year 2000, the news from mainstream media about global jihad and radical Islam have become more and more frequently reported and also have received a more attention on front pages and major news networks. The topic of discourse amongst different people about jihadism and religiously inspired terrorism has become the norm throughout simultaneously as there has been an increase in the population of Muslim immigrants and asylum seekers throughout Europe. Meanwhile, this discourse has also increased while Daesh has been spreading the horror in around the world. The mainstream media has managed to paint a narrative about Daesh and Islamic terrorism as a public enemy #1 to the European civilisation and the world at large. These assumptions have been made without basing any of the arguments on facts. Such discourse even frequently goes viral and in the worst case scenario, spreads more terrorism by polarizing the Muslim population apart from the non-Muslim population due to an increase in xenophobia.

This research is geographically limited only to terrorism in Europe. The term Europe for the purpose of this thesis refers to the European Economic Area, which includes the member states of the European Union along with Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. When

talking about Europe, Russia and Turkey have been intentionally left out. This is mainly because of their special characteristics and different type of problems than the rest of Europe. Terrorism in Turkey is often related to internal politics of Turkey and conflict between Kurdish and Turkish populations. These attacks have more national rather than an international nexus to them. Also, being that Turkey is a neighbouring country of a civil war torn countries such as Syria and Iraq, it naturally faces a higher risk of terrorism than any EU member states. This is also due to the fact that Turkey serves as a buffer zone and a transit country for the inflow and outflow of the Daesh controlled areas in the Middle East. Also, the Turkish demographic is different than the rest of Europe, and it does not share the same cultural and religious background as that of the EU member states. Therefore, a comparison within the context of integration of the immigrant population would be more complicated and require supplementary research that is outside of the scope of this thesis.

Russia on the other hand also has a long history of Islamic terrorism in certain areas such as Chechnya and Dagestan. Terrorism in these areas is once again more often related to nationalistic and separatist movements than the international terrorism. Similar to Turkey, Russia is also very different than the European Union member states when it comes to politics, human rights, demographics and development. This is why Russia and Turkey are both excluded from this thesis.

## **Methodology**

The methodology of this master's thesis is a qualitative analysis of the data, based on the primary and secondary literature sources, and is thus observation-based method. Data for this thesis has been collected from the Internet, books and various mainstream media sources. The use of mainstream media sources for the completion of this research has been provided for the purposes of providing the latest and the newest information that has not been collected, collated, analysed and published in the academia. In this case, mainstream media offers the most commonly, easily accessible, and up to date information. In addition to the open source information provided by the mainstream media and published research, data has also been extracted from various authorities. This includes data provided by the EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (hereinafter TE-SAT), which is provided by the European law enforcement

agency, Europol. Europol's TE-SAT reports are central documents that also provide the most up to date and relevant statistics about Islamic terrorism in Europe. On the other hand, the data for the asylum seekers and refugees has been extracted from the Eurostat.

Chapter 3.4. also specifically includes a small case study, which focuses on the specific circumstances associated with the terrorism and immigration in France. The rationale behind choosing France to conduct this case study has been due to the fact that France has experienced several large scale attacks in recent years and it also happens to have one of the biggest populations of Muslims in Europe.

Other than the statistics and data provided by Europol and Eurostat, the primary literature sources that were used for the completion of this thesis are: 1) *Eurojihad* by Cheryl Benard and Angel Rabasa published in 2015, 2) *Vihatkoon kunhan pelkäävät: Näkökulmia terrorismiin ilmiönä* by Antti Paronen and Olli Teirilä published in 2014, and 3) *Terrorismin monet kasvot* by Leena Malkki and Jukka Paastela published in 2007. Even though a much larger scope of literature and open sources have been used for the completion of this thesis, the abovementioned sources were predominantly used to provide the theoretical background for proving the aforementioned hypotheses right.

# **1. POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

The chapters 1, 2 and 3 will provide the theoretical background of this research. The central concepts and phenomena will be discussed. This chapter is concentrating on the concepts of political violence and violent extremism, terrorism and jihadism, also known as Islamic terrorism.

## **1.1. Political Violence and Violent Extremism – what it is?**

To be able to study radicalization and the risk of increasing number of Islamic terrorist attacks in Europe, the terms political violence, violent extremism and terrorism must be defined first. These terms are highly debated internationally and there is no clear and unambiguous definition for any of these terms.

Political violence is violence, which is politically motivated, perpetrated either by the people or by the governance. It can take different forms, which can vary in form, severity and practice. Forms can include, for instance, terrorism, revolution, coup d'état and conventional warfare. Political violence can be practised either by the state or by private actors. State practiced political violence can occur as genocide, for example.

Zimmermann (2012, 1) defines political violence as a violence, which occurs within the political system and has political consequences. Even though the phenomenon of political violence is ancient, the research of this topic has just developed in 20th century, more precisely, in 1960s and 1970s. In 1970's Gurr (1970, 3-4) pointed out that political violence includes “all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors (...) including competing political groups as well as incumbents- or its policies”.

Violent extremism is a form of political violence, where the violence is based on ideology, such as right- or left-wing politics or religion. This ideology encourages and

justifies the use of violence for the persons who are radicalized. Ideology can be defined as a set or series of opinions, which guide an individual or a group. As Maynard (2014, 821) notes, it is not commonly accepted among the scholars what the term ideology precisely means. According to Fink and Bhulai (2016, 48), violent extremism can be both perpetration of acts of violence and the support for those acts. These acts of violence or the endorsement of such acts must support the socio-political agenda. Thus, violent extremism also includes, besides the direct violence, the support of such acts without directly perpetrating the attack itself. This kind of support can include financing or recruitment. The acts are not necessarily seen as acts of terrorism but can be also conventional crimes. Fink and Bhulai (2016, 48) highlight that all the terrorism is violent extremism but not all the violent extremism is terrorism. Thus, violent extremism is wider concept than terrorism.

Cohan (2006, 903) has pointed out that political violence can be sometimes supported by the international community. This is the case especially when the purpose of that violence is to achieve a generally accepted goal. Cohan (2006, 910) also emphasises that the purpose of the political violence is to overthrow hostile governments and thus it is aiming to legitimate aim.

## **1.2. Terrorism**

The word terrorism is originating from the French word *terrere*, to scare or to fright. First time it was used in the context of French revolution in 1789 (Malkki and Paastela 2007, 22). Oxford English Dictionary defined terrorism for the first time in 1795 as “government as intimidation” which purpose was to scare and spread horror among the public (Crawford 2013, 47). For long time, terrorism was seen as something that the governments practiced. This view remained as a dominating view until the Second World War and it was only after the war when the term terrorism expanded to refer to non-state actors (Malkki and Paastela 2007, 23).

There is no universal consensus how terrorism is defined. The term terrorism has strong political and moral stigma, which makes it difficult to define the term so that everyone would be satisfied with it. Malkki and Paastela (2007, 25) have stated that the way in which terrorism is defined depends on the political and moral beliefs of the person who is trying to

define it. For states it is important to define what terrorism actually means in order to be able to prevent it. Furthermore, Malkki and Paastela (2007, 29) have supported the view that it is important to distinguish the terrorism from conventional crime and conventional warfare, as terrorism often requires international cooperation.

### **1.2.1. Definition in the International Politics**

So obviously defining the terrorism varies, depending on, whether the term is defined for the purposes of diplomacy and politics or for the academia and research. In the international community, there has been disagreement about the definition of term terrorism since 1970s. There is no clear and legally binding definition of terrorism in universal conventions or other legal instruments. Even though there is no binding definition within the international community, the conventions and general assembly resolutions build a base for a common definition together with regional conventions and national legislation as well as with the international customary law.

The UN resolution 1373 from 2001 sets obligations for the UN member states to prevent and combat terrorism but the definition remains open. This is mainly because there is no consensus among the member states. United Nations Security Council resolution 1566 from 2004 defines terrorism in article 3 as

*“criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism”*

However, this definition is not legally binding. The definition in this resolution is limiting the terrorist attacks only to those attacks targeted to the civilians. Furthermore, the attack’s purpose must be to provoke a state of terror or intimidate people. It can also pressure the political decision-makers to act on certain ways. Interesting enough, the attacks must also



cause death or serious bodily injury or on the other hand, taking hostages. Always there is, in any case, the element of doing physical harm for the people, either by violence acts or restricting one's rights. According to that, attacks targeted, for example, against cultural heritage site, such as destruction of city of Palmyra in Syria by Daesh, is not seen as terrorism according to this definition even though the damages can be irreplaceable.

The European Union has defined terrorism in Council's Framework resolution 2002/475/JHA, article 1, as the intentional acts, which are also defined as offences under national law, and which may seriously damage a country or an international organization and committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population. It may also have the aim to excessively pressure a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing a certain act. Terrorist attack may also, according to the Council's Framework Decision's article 1, aim to "seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization."

Furthermore, terrorist acts are also the attacks upon a person's life or the physical integrity, kidnapping or hostage taking, causing comprehensive destruction to, for instance, a government, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, information systems, a public place or private property which is likely to endanger human life.

However, not only the human life is the key factor here, terrorism can also result in major economic losses, seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport, manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons or explosives. Furthermore, as well as the use, research and development of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions constitutes the act of terrorism. Such attacks must also likely to endanger human life or interfere with or disrupt the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource, which may result to endangerment human life. Only threatening to commit any of the acts listed above constitutes terrorism. As it can be seen, the definition of the terrorism is very wide in the context of the European Union. The definition is a lot more limited and more detailed than the definition within the UN's framework. One reason for this is that in EU there were only 15 member states when the Framework Decision in question was decided.

According to the definition in framework decision, the terrorism is the combination of two elements. There is the objective element, which includes the actual acts, such as killing or threatening to kill. On the other hand, there is the subjective element, which includes acts

committed with the objective of seriously intimidating a population, destabilising or destroying structures of a country or international organization or making a government abstain from performing actions. This definition in the framework decision is very exhaustive on international level. The definition is very detailed and it gives a clear picture what is actually terrorism on the EU level.

### **1.2.2. Definition for the Academic Purposes**

The definition for the academic purposes is slightly different. Often the national action plans and international documents to counter terrorism pay more attention *who* is a terrorist more than *what* is terrorism. When the need for the definition is only for the political purposes, the definition *what* is terrorism is not that important as defining who is a terrorist. For the academic research, wider definition is required because in order to identify a terrorist, one must know which actions actually constitute terrorism (Harle 2002, 31-33). In the diplomacy and politics, the definition is needed in order to prevent terrorism and find international consensus. In academic research, instead, the definition is required because the researchers must define his terms. In order to present a theory, the phenomena must be defined. On the other hand, the academic research must be neutral and not politically coloured. This is one of the biggest challenges in terrorism studies as terrorism is extremely political, and even moral, term. The question is, whether the terrorism even should be defined as an analytic term as it has such a political nature. One way to define terrorism in academic research could be defining the term through analysing how the term is used.

Like in politics and diplomacy, as well in the academic context, there are also several definitions of terrorism. According to Viotti and Kauppi (2009, 256), terrorism can be defined as politically motivated violence, which aims at achieving effect on publics and governments. The shock value is usually added by attacking the innocent people, which also sends the government a message that it is unable to protect its own citizens. Furthermore, Viotti and Kauppi (2009, 256) note that terrorism is not a new phenomenon but can be traced back to the Roman Empire and French Revolution of 1789.

Viotti and Kauppi (2009, 260-261) also introduce the possible causes for the terrorism. According to them, there are three different causes, which affect behind the terrorism. First of these three causes are the psychological factors. Terrorists may rebel against the social norms

they are expected to follow which can be seen as a psychological reason for terrorism. Such social norms may be, for instance, following the traditional culture of the family in modern world where it is not always possible, nor are they accepted by the society when they are trying to follow their own traditions.<sup>2</sup> The second cause for Viotti and Kauppi, is the ideological factors. The ideologies behind the terrorism can vary from the Marxism-Leninism to nationalism and fascism. The third cause is called environmental causes. These are, for example, the pressure from friends and family and the strategies the recruiters use when recruiting new fighters online.

Laqueur and Ganor have both summarized the problem of defining the term terrorism: “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” (Laqueur 1987, 302 and Ganor 2002). Laqueur (1987, 302) emphasises that the same act of violence can be seen differently, depending on who is defining the certain attack. As Ganor (2002, 288) argues, the definition of terrorism also depends on which country or which group of individuals, is defining it. It is notable that those countries with close relations to terrorist organizations and those financing such organizations tend to be willing for a definition, which leaves the organizations supported by them outside of the definition. Ganor (2002, 288) brings up a couple of countries, Syria, Libya and Iran, which have even requested the organization, which in general in West has been seen as terrorist organizations, to be defined as freedom fighters. These countries have asked the full power, *carte blanche*, for them to continue their co-operation and even financing of these organizations, because their goal, which they describe to be a legitimate goal, can be pursued by any means. As Whittaker (2002, 22) puts forward the view, the definition of the term highly depends on the user. Terrorism means different thing for the government on the one hand, and another thing for the terrorist organizations. Thus, Whittaker’s logic follows Laqueur’s and Ganor’s premise of “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”.

Current research appears to validate the view that all the definitions of terrorism seem to include two factors: 1) the use or threat of use of force and 2) political motive. The element of terror and violence seem to be the most crucial elements of terrorism, but, as Whittaker (2002, p. 152) has criticised, when in 2001 several US state offices received letters containing

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<sup>2</sup>For example, the ban of Islamic headscarves and latest, the burkini swimming suit ban in France, can be seen as such tradition which may have become more difficult to follow one’s own cultural heritage and religion

anthrax, the question was whether this kind of actions can be defined as terrorism? It does not include direct use of violence, but it is apt to cause several injuries and even deaths.

This definition varies a lot depending on the field of the researcher. One of the defining factors is whether the research is legal, political, sociological, psychological or military research. This affects to the definition of term as well. One of the main problems in academic definition of terrorism is that terrorism has been seen as a problem, for which the solution must be found. For this reason, the whole field of the research is politically coloured and often seen in negative light.

Toby Archer in the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA, Ulkopoliittinen Instituutti) published the research on terrorism after the 9/11 attacks according to which the two conditions must occur so that the terrorist can act. The first condition is that there is the chance, or the possibility to carry out the attack. The second condition is that there must be a reason for the attack. In addition, the terrorist must be motivated to carry out the attack and this affects to the decision where the attack is carried out. Like mentioned before, terrorism is defined differently in different context. Archer (2004, 8-9) also recognizes what has been discussed also in this thesis, that the term “terrorism” is always politically and morally coloured term. This refers again to the idea of one man’s terrorist being another man’s freedom fighter. Archer’s definition does not specifically mention the Islamic terrorism when it talks about the conditions for the terrorism, but this can be seen as a rule and thus also applicable to the Islamic terrorism. Archer’s division to the two conditions is important in the terrorism prevention. As it will be shown in the following chapters, the terrorism prevention on international level has been mainly concentrating on the prevention of the first condition. The prevention of the second condition, the actual reason to carry out the terrorist attack, is often forgotten.

As stated above, the terrorist needs a reason to act. In the context of migration it must be evaluated what can be the reasons why a person with an asylum seeker, for example, would radicalize. If these reasons cannot be recognized, it is impossible to prevent the radicalization. The question is, whether the humanitarian and economic migration that Europe is currently facing, create favourable conditions for terrorism. Even though there is no clear evidence that the immigration would create the favourable conditions for the terrorism, Lia (2005) notes that there has been found the connection between ethnic diversity and terrorism.

While the immigration increases the ethnic diversity, in this matter, it would be easy to think that migration directly increases the risk of terrorism.

Fink and Bhulai (2016, 49) raise the poverty among the most significant reasons behind creating the environment for the extremist groups to operate. On the other hand, Bakker (2015, 110-112) turns down this prediction by noting that some of the most famous terrorists in recent years, such as Osama bin Laden, have been extremely rich. Sageman (2004, 74) shows that most of the terrorists “were solidly upper or middle class, refuting the argument that terrorism arises from poverty”. For Bakker (2015, 110), the most significant issue is not whether someone is wealthy in comparison to whole population, but whether someone is wealthy or poor in comparison to their reference group, in this case whether the immigrants are wealthy in comparison to other immigrants.

By contrast, according to Gambetta and Hertog (2007, 3), many of the jihadists have been a lot more educated than the average immigrants are. For example, the mastermind of 9/11 attacks, Mohammed Atta, was an engineer. Actually, education of the engineer seems to be rather common among the terrorists; Gambetta and Hertog show that 78 out of 178 attackers they examined were engineers. Even though some of the terrorists have been highly educated, the radicalization may happen in any social class. However, the engineers have technical knowledge, which is beneficial for the organizations. The engineers can help to build the explosives or plan large scale attacks. These skills are important for the terrorist organizations, so they may aim their recruitment to these groups. Other this kind of highly educated groups, which may seem appealing for the terrorist organizations, is, for example, doctors and those who have received military or police training.

On the other hand, the final dirty job, the actual attack, is done by people who are willing to sacrifice their life. The educated professionals are too important for the organizations as they do a lot of the planning work. People from the lower social classes are more likely used as suicide bombers or perpetrating attacks which are otherwise risky. For Islamic terrorist, dying is better option than being imprisoned as dying in the name of God will directly take them to paradise.

### 1.3. Jihadism and Global Jihad – Islamic Terrorism

In this sub-chapter, the form of terrorism, jihadism or Islamic terrorism is discussed. Jihadism as a form of terrorism is not a new phenomenon even though it has become the hot topic in the West only in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Indian-Pakistani scholar Abul Al'a Maududi gave a speech in Lahore, Pakistan already back in 1939, which was published as a book called *Jihad in Islam*. *Jihad in Islam* (1939, 2-3) stated that the un-Islamic rule should be eliminated and worldwide Islamic state should be established. This is often what the Islamic terrorists see as their religious duty and as a justification for their actions.

For the development of jihadism in Europe, the work of Sayyid Qutb has been significant. Qutb was an Egyptian writer and leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. His work, *Milestones*, has been one of the significant jihadist writings. In *Milestones*, Qutb claims that the “Muslim world was -- in the state of ignorance that prevailed before the Prophet Muhammad’s revelation and that Muslim rulers were apostates.” (Rabasa and Benard 2014, 26) Qutb promoted the seizure of power by revolutionary troops that would impose Islamic rule from above to the non-Islamic societies and saw that the Islamic community was not limited to the certain area. For Qutb, Islam and nationalism were impossible to combine and he further argued that all the Muslims around the world should join the jihad in order to defeat the infidel governments (Gupta 2008, 112). Moreover, Qutb argued that the Islamic community would eventually spread all over the world and eventually include all the humanity.

It has been suggested that Qutb was a new moral framework for the Islamic politics and he still continues to inspire Muslims around the world (Calvert 2010, 17-18). Qutb’s idea that the Islamic rule is superior to others or that the Islamic community is not limited to the certain area is one of the reasons what works as an engine to the radicalization in the West as well. Also, overthrowing the governments which are seeing infidels on the one hand, and discriminatory and oppressive on the other hand, can seem a tempting idea for those who do not feel like that the government of their host country is legitimate. This may be dangerous as many of the Muslims in Europe feel like they are discriminated or inferior compared to the native-born Europeans.

The term jihadism is hard to translate exactly into English. In western everyday language, it often refers to the use of violence in order to establish a caliphate to the lands,

which traditionally belonged to Muslims where the true Islamic governance in accordance with Sharia law is practiced (Brachman 2009, 4). In the original meaning of the term *jihad* can be translated into English as struggle to defend one's religious ideas. On the other hand, it can also refer to the command of God to fight against the Western aggressors who are seeking to destroy the Islamic world (Brachman 2006, 246). Jihad as a term does not necessarily refer to terrorism at all. The term is not unambiguous, and means different things for different people, but it often refers to both internal and external struggle to be a good Muslim. In western media, it is often translated as *holy war* (Brachman 2006, 247) but jihad in the meaning of violent actions is rather rare form of jihad. More accurately, the holy war is more corresponding with the term of jihadism. *Jihadism*, as defined by Saltman and Winter (2014, 7), is "non-state violence used in the cause of Islamism. Just as Islamism is the politicisation of Islam, jihadists take the traditional concept of jihad and use it as a political and military tool to achieve a political end." Often the term *Islamic terrorism* is used instead of jihadism. This is the case in this master's thesis as well.

The global jihadism as an ideology developed in three phases. The first phase included so called original fighters who were fighting in Afghanistan in 1980s against the Soviet occupation. Many of these first wave jihadist knew personally Osama bin Laden who has been seen the father of *the modern jihadism* movement. Bin Laden was mainly motivated by and his ideological thinking was based on the ideas of Abdullah Azzam, whose work *Join the Caravan of Martyrs* is, according to Quiggin (2009, 18), still one of the most quoted piece of work by the jihadists.

"The best and brightest from the Middle East", as Mackinlay (2009, 107) has presented it, formed the second phase of the global jihadist movement. They were educated professionals who were radicalized in the West, such as the perpetrators of 9/11 attacks. The third wave, which is the current wave of jihadists, consists of the second generation immigrants, who have been committing petty crimes and living at the edge of society and have often been radicalized before joining any organization. In the first wave, the radicals shared the common experience of participating in the war in Afghanistan, and the group was more homogeneous and smaller than the third wave. The difference between the first and the third wave is that nowadays the group is more heterogeneous and less manageable. There is no common structure, and the group has become more globally spread and it consists of people from different backgrounds.

The origins of the global jihadist movement date back from the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, and Azzam's invitation for the Muslims around the world to join the jihad against the Soviet Union (Sageman 2006, 122). Similar pattern can be seen in the modern day jihadism as well where the Muslims around the world are invited to join in the jihad against the Western rule. The core of the global jihadist ideology is opposing the USA's rule and the actions especially in the Middle East. Also, opposing the apostate regimes in Middle East and around the Muslim world is one the goals of global jihadist movement. These regimes, such as Saudi Arabian or Pakistani regimes are seen as allies of USA and thus need to be overthrown. Terrorism for Al-Qaeda is "purposeful, instrumental, and intended to serve a variety of political, ideological, and organizational objectives" (Rabasa et al. 2006, 24-26). For example, opposing the USA's war on terror is such an ideological objective for Al-Qaeda.

According to Zabel (2011, 2) the global jihadist movement is often mistakenly defined as a synonym with Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda represents political and military organization with revolutionary goals. It gets its origin from Sunni Islam's marginal interpretation, which has roots in 1970-1980s when revolutionary movements tried to oppose secular governments by wishing to create one common Muslim state (Kaleva & Paronen 2014, 38). This seems to be the goal of Daesh as well as it has declared itself as an Islamic State or a Caliphate. However, in January 2014, Al-Qaeda explicitly noted that Daesh is not a part of Al-Qaeda organization. The disagreements between these two organizations, rooting from the same ideology, are connected to the Syrian civil war. However, for Al-Qaeda the goal is to fight against an enemy whereas Daesh is concentrating on building the caliphate. For Al-Qaeda building a caliphate is a goal as well, but the time for the caliphate is not here yet (Novenario 2016, 955). Both organizations, Al-Qaeda and Daesh represent the global jihadist movement, which is different from the traditional jihad; the global jihadist movement is concentrating on attacking against West and it pursues global geographical aims, whereas traditional jihadists are targeting against local adversaries in limited area (Rabasa et al. 2006, 1).

The jihadism that Daesh represent in Syrian civil war is different from Al-Qaeda's ideas in some aspects, even though they both represent the global jihadist movement. As Al-Qaeda has been concentrating on spectacular attacks, Daesh has, besides large-scale terrorist attacks, concentrating also on building a caliphate and is thus also using the conventional warfare techniques (Wong 2014). Daesh is also closer to traditional state than Al-Qaeda; it has area in its control, it has centralised administration and population living in its territory.



One of the features of Daesh is that it has been able to recruit fighters from West as well. If the foreign fighters fighting for Daesh in Iraq are also included, the number has been estimated to be more than 30 000, among them more than 3000 Europeans (Kaleva & Paronen 2014, 45). In 2016, it was estimated that there are 3,992-4,294 foreign fighters from Europe currently in Syria and Iraq but this includes all the foreign fighters fighting in different groups, not only in Daesh (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism 2016, 64).

Saarinen (2014, 50-51) makes an important note by stating that the national security authorities have been worried about the possible returns of these radicalized foreign fighters and it has been named one of the biggest threats to the European security. According to Malet (2013, 9), the foreign fighter means a person, who travels to the conflict zone in order to participate in armed conflict as a part of bigger scenario in a state for which he is not a citizen to. The difference between foreign fighters and mercenaries is, according to Kraehenmann (2014, 6), that the foreign fighter does not necessarily participate in a conflict as a part of military organization and also, does not get paid and their motivation is not usually connected to the money. Foreign fighters participate in the conflicts where a certain ideology, religious or political, is similar to their own, and this ideology plays significant role in the conflict. For Al-Qaeda, one of the main purposes of using foreign fighters is to train them to attack in their countries of origins. However, Saarinen (2014, 59) has pointed out that only one out of 9 returning foreign fighter is willing to try to perpetrate such an attack. The training of the foreign fighter to attack in Europe seems to be the strategy of Daesh as well and many of the perpetrators of recent terrorist attacks in Europe were trained in Middle East.

#### **1.4. Islamic Terrorism in Europe throughout the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

In the previous chapter, the terms political violence, terrorism and jihadism were explained. Therefore, it is now imperative to examine when, where and how often the terrorists carry out acts of terror.

According to Europol's Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) published in 2015, 201 terrorist attacks were carried out throughout the member states of the EU in 2014. However, only two out of 201 terrorist attacks were classified as religiously inspired or motivated (TE-SAT 2015, 18). These two religiously motivated attacks in relation to all of the

other terrorist attacks account for 0.995% or less than 1% of all the terrorist attacks throughout the EU in 2015. The same law enforcement authority reported no religiously inspired terrorist attacks throughout the EU in 2013 (TE-SAT 2014, 21). In 2012, Europol reported that there were only 6 religiously inspired attacks out of 219 and in these 6 attacks 8 people lost their lives (TE-SAT 2013, 16). Thus, these six religiously inspired terrorist attacks account for only 2.74% in relation to all of the terrorist attacks that were carried out throughout the EU in 2012. However, in 2015 the 17 attacks were classified as Islamic terrorism out of 211 attacks carried out in Europe during the year. This means that 8% out of all the attacks were Islamic terrorist attacks (TE-SAT 2016, 10 and 22). 15 out of those 17 attacks were directly connected to the two larger scale series of incidents in Paris. One of these terrorist attacks was carried out in January on the editorial staff of Charlie Hebdo, a police officer, and a Jewish supermarket. The other attack was carried out in November in several locations around Paris.

Throughout the EU, there were 774 people arrested in total for terrorism related offences in 2014 and 48% of those arrested were linked to having suspected memberships in terrorist organization. Altogether, 395 of those arrested out of 774 were arrested on the premises of having links to religiously inspired terrorism. Out of the reported 774 arrests made in 2014, 22% of those who were arrested were detained on the basis of having travelled or the intention of traveling to the conflict areas. Most of these people who were detained allegedly had religiously inspired motives as other types of terrorism do not usually require travelling to Middle East. It is important to note that in 2013, there were 216 arrests made, which were linked to religiously inspired terrorism and in 2012, the number of these types of arrests made was 159. This means that the number of religiously inspired terrorism arrest cases have risen up to 83% from 2013 to 2014. These numbers have more than doubled from 2012 to 2014 (TE-SAT 2015, 41). The numbers of terrorism related arrests compared to the number of Islamic terrorism arrests are visualized in the table 1.

Table 1: Number of all the terrorism related arrests and number of Islamic terrorism arrests in EU-28 in 2012-2015

| Year | Number of all the arrests | Number of Islamic terrorism arrests | Islamic Terrorism; % of all the arrests |
|------|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|
| 2012 | 537                       | 159                                 | 29.6%                                   |
| 2013 | 535                       | 216                                 | 40.4%                                   |
| 2014 | 774                       | 395                                 | 51.0%                                   |
| 2015 | 1,077                     | 687                                 | 63.8%                                   |

(Compiled by the author on the basis of data provided by Eurostat and Europol's TE-SAT reports 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016.)

As a whole, analysis of data reveals that the number of religiously inspired attacks as well as arrests have collectively increased significantly in 2015. There is a clear increase seen in the numbers of arrests made in connection to the religiously inspired terrorism. In 2014, that number was 395 and increased up to 687 in 2015. In 2015, more than half of these arrests or 377 arrests were made in France (TE-SAT 2016, 10).

However, it is interesting to note that the number of victims of terrorism as well as number of incidents throughout Europe in general have continually decreased since the year 1970 (Statista 2015). The peak year of terrorist attacks in Europe was 1979 with more than 1,000 incidents in total. The biggest number of fatalities in terrorist attacks occurred in the late 1970's and early 1990's. The nature of terrorism has, however, changed significantly since the 1970s and 1990s. According to the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland, the terrorist attacks in 1970s were more often carried out by nationalistic and separatist movements such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Ireland and the Euskadi at Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain. However, more recent cases of terrorism have been perpetrated more often by the Islamic terrorists as members of terrorist organizations. The general trend globally since the 1970s, however, has shown an increase in the number of terrorist attacks. The same general trend has shown a decrease in terrorist attacks throughout Europe and the United States of America (Jenkins, Willis & Han 2016, 5). This is connected to the decreased in the number of separatist attacks in Europe and an increase of Islamic attacks in other parts of the world. This is the fact that is often omitted from the European context even though majority of the Islamic terrorist attacks continue to happen outside of Europe. Also, despite an increase seen in the number of Islamic terrorist attacks throughout Europe, the

overall number of Islamic terrorist attacks is still relatively negligible and small compared to the other parts of the world. Statistically speaking, Islamic terrorism related attacks predominately occur within the Muslim countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria to name a few. Contrary to the Western beliefs, Middle East as a region still remains as primary area of interest for these terrorist organizations. Moreover, Jenkins, Willis and Han aptly stated that the terrorist organizations, which operated throughout Europe in 1970s, were significantly better organized than any of the latest Islamic terrorist groups in Europe (Jenkins, Willis and Han 2016, 6).

It is also vital to note that the overwhelming counter terrorism efforts and actions undertaken by the Western world throughout Europe and USA are making it a lot harder for the terrorist organizations to operate. This is notable especially in the USA where the terrorist organizations more often have no choice but to rely on the so-called home-grown terrorists rather than returning foreign fighters which mostly pose a threat throughout Europe. The intelligence budgets and funds throughout Europe and USA have also grown significantly as a result of the aftermath that resulted from the attacks that were carried out on 9/11. This in turn also makes it a lot harder to carry out any mid to large scale terrorist attacks. At the same time, it is important to note that while it has become more difficult to carry out an attack throughout the Western world, these attacks have become more lethal. One of the current and most urgent threats that is currently being anticipated by the West is that the terrorist organizations would attempt to acquire and then use a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Europe in order to carry out a large-scale attack (Jenkins, Willis & Han 2016, 9). Other than the use of a WMD, Europol has also stated that the nuclear power plants remain as sensitive targets of choice by the Islamic terrorist organizations in Europe (TE-SAT 2015, 11). An attack upon a nuclear power plant would constitute an unforeseeably massive destruction of Europe and thus may seem to be an attractive target for the terrorist organizations.

## 2. IMMIGRATION TO EUROPE

In recent years, immigration has become one of the most publically debated topics throughout Europe other than terrorism. Therefore, this Chapter will first discuss the current state of immigration as a phenomenon and its effects throughout Europe in section 2.1., the reasons behind the 2015 refugee crisis in section 2.2., and finally analyze the topic of immigration and terrorism in section 2.3.

### 2.1. Immigration as a Phenomenon

According to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 244 million people or 3.3% of world's population live outside of their country of origin. Around 63.9 million of these migrants have been identified as forced or irregular migrants, which are described as people who left their country of origin or are displaced within their own country because of war or persecution (UNHCR 2016a, 8). While the term migration describes “migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification” (IOM – Key Migration Terms), this thesis is solely focused on the concept of irregular migration, excluding the migrants moving from country to another on the basis of work, study or family reasons.

According to IOM's Key Migration Terms, the terminology *irregular migration* means any type of migration, which takes place outside of legal norms of transit. This means that the pathway taken by these migrants to depart from the country of origin or what is commonly referred to as the *sending country* in order to then travel to the recipient country or what is commonly referred to as the *receiving country*, does not happen within the confines of law. Irregular migration from the sending country also typically means that the refugee leaves the country of origin without the required and identifying documentation. On the other hand, irregular migration to the receiving country means that the immigrant enters into a foreign

country without the required documentation such as a Passport, Visa, or a Residence Permit. It is important to distinguish irregular immigration from illegal immigration. Seeking asylum is always legal even if the enter into country happens without required travel documents and asylum seeker cannot be punished for entering into the country without travel document.

Overall, the number of such forced or irregular migrants has increased every year. For instance, the number of forced migrants was 42.5 million people in 2011 and has increased to 65.3 million in 2015 (UNHCR 2016a, 8). The three most refugee producing countries worldwide are the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan and Somalia. These three countries collectively account for 54% of all refugees throughout the world. Also, 51% of all refugees amongst the regular and irregular migrants include kids under the age of 18 (UNHCR 2016a, 3) and this number is relevant within the context of terrorism because young people are often targeted by the recruiters of terrorist organizations.

Similarly, despite the public perception and an increase in public debate throughout the mainstream media about the burden of caused by refugees to the European countries, top 10 refugee receiving countries are all located outside of Europe, predominantly in Middle East, Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, Turkey is the largest host country and has 2.5 million refugees. Turkey is followed by Lebanon and Pakistan, which both host more than a million refugees (UNHCR 2016a, 15). It is also important to note that the numbers of these refugee hosting countries are skewed because of the long and protracted wars such as the various conflicts seen in countries like Afghanistan over the course of several decades. This has resulted in many Afghans living in countries like Iran and Pakistan for well over three decades, which means that there have been entire generations born and raised in exile. However, the repatriation numbers remain low and there have been no realistic solutions proposed to these conflicts anywhere on the horizon. This has also partly played a role in why the masses of refugees started to move towards Europe in the summer of 2015. People were waiting for the possibility to return home in the neighboring countries, however, there has been no real evidence for an end to any major conflicts in site. Therefore, these people decided to move into Europe in order to seek better living conditions.

To be clear, the term *refugee* is exhaustively defined in the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter 1951 Geneva Convention) where it, in article 1A(2), defines refugee as a person who is

*“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”*

Contrary to a refugee, however, *an asylum seeker* is a person seeking international protection and whose refugee status is yet to be determined by the national authorities or the UN’s refugee agency (UNHCR 2016a, 37). An asylum seeker turns into a refugee as soon as he or she is granted a refugee status in the country where he or she filed his or her asylum application in. In 2014, EU member states granted asylum to 185,000 people and in 2013, the EU member states granted asylum to 135,700 people. Thus, the number of asylums granted rose by 36%. In 2014, 627,000 asylum applications were registered and in 2013 the number of registered asylum seekers was 431,000. Thus, this number has increased by 44%. This means that it has become more difficult to be granted asylum in European Union. From 2014 to 2015, these numbers have increased even more. In 2014, 627,000 asylum applications were registered and in 2015 the number of first time asylum applications rose to 1.32 million asylum seekers (Eurostat 2016). According to the numbers provided by the Eurostat’s Asylum and Managed Migration Database, these numbers have increased significantly in the last decade. In 2005, the EU27 countries granted asylum to 46,725 people and in 2006, they granted asylum to 55,135 people.

In 2015, Europe faced an unforeseeable refugee crisis when more than one million refugees entered into this region. The top three nationalities of forced or irregular migrants that entered into Europe were Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis. This was followed by a large number of Eritreans. These four nationalities constitute 84% of all the asylum seekers in Europe. (UNHCR 2016a, 32) UNHCR (2016a, 34) reported that the European Asylum system was not prepared for such an influx. The problems of finding accommodations for an unexpected influx of people arriving into Europe were also compounded by the overwhelmed national immigrations services. Following this influx, several countries introduced the border controls within the Schengen Area and started to erect fences in order to protect their borders.

Furthermore, several countries also introduced legislation in order to restrict access to asylum systems and place limitations on family reunification.

As far as the positive decisions to asylum requests are concerned, the percentages of positive responses vary from country to country. For instance, more than 90% of applicants received a positive decision in response to their asylum applications in Bulgaria during their first attempt to stay in 2015. Meanwhile, 80% of applicants received rejections and negative decisions for their asylum applications in Latvia, Hungary and Poland (Eurostat 2016). This presents a major problem as the legal grounds for granting international protection should be based on parallel and similar legislation and applied in a unified way throughout the EU. Thus, the differences in the decision-making process and the positive outcomes therefore make some countries seem more appealing for the asylum seekers than others. Also the reputation of the country as well as the perceptions for employment play significant role when immigrants are deciding where to seek asylum. This has in turn resulted in uneven distribution of asylum applications. Meanwhile, no country wants to attract more asylum seekers by having more welcoming asylum policies in comparison to some of their other EU neighbors, further complicating this issue and making it more inconsistent. In turn, such inconsistencies have collectively led to the stricter immigration laws and amendments in several EU countries during 2016.

## **2.2. Reasons behind the 2015 Refugee Crisis**

In 2015, Europe received more than one million asylum applications and it has become clear that the European asylum system was not ready for such an unexpected large number immigrants. The reasons for why the people decided to leave their countries of origin vary a great deal. As previously mentioned, the top three contributing nations to the largest numbers of asylum seekers throughout Europe have been Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. It is notable that all these three countries are Muslim countries and they all have long history with strong terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda and Daesh in Iraq and Syria and Taliban in Afghanistan. Also, these countries are mostly presented in Western news in the light of war, terrorism and poverty. However, the reasons why these countries are producing so many refugees vary.



The mass migration and asylum applications by Syrians have to do with the Syrian Civil War, which has been going on since 2011. The war commenced shortly after the Arab Spring of 2011 when the demonstrations against president Bashar al-Assad turned into violent riots, which the Syrian security forces attempted to subdue and crush with force (Holliday 2013, 12). According to the UNDP, more than 12 million people have been displaced since 2011 and the crisis in Syria does not seem to have an end in sight. The refugees and asylum seekers that have stayed in countries such as Lebanon and Turkey have decided to move to Europe because they are typically not given the permission to work and go to school in those countries. The poor conditions of the refugee camps are also compounded by the lack of international humanitarian aid, which also impacts the quality of life for the refugees. Contrary to the European countries, almost all of the Middle Eastern countries have not ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention and do not grant refugee statuses for Syrians and are not obliged to abide by international law.

The Syrian Civil War also extends into Iraq where Daesh is operating in the northern region of Iraq and controls Mosul, which is the second largest city of Iraq with more than 1 million residents impacted by Daesh. These issues in Iraq are compounded by the fact that the corruption and lack of respect for human rights has increased since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, weakening the central government of Iraq. This in turn has caused Iraqis to consider leaving in hopes of a better life (Human Rights Watch 2016b). Furthermore, massive Iraqi population has also relocated to and has resided in Syria as a result of these prolonged conflicts and poor conditions in Iraq. The Iraqis also felt the pressure to leave Syria directly due to the instabilities caused by the Syrian Civil War once again in hopes of finding stability, food, security, and shelter elsewhere.

On the other hand, the reasons behind a mass exodus out of Afghanistan are also directly connected to the never-ending regional conflicts, mass casualties, lack of security, high unemployment rate, and high rates of inflation. The ongoing fighting between the Taliban and the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) forces have escalated in 2015 due to the change in posture by the U.S and NATO forces in handing the responsibility to GIROA. This has been attributed by the desperate attempts of the local populace to flee Afghanistan in hopes of a better life elsewhere (UNHCR 2016b). Human rights are virtually non-existent, which is also partly the reason for why a great number of Afghans have resided in Iran for many decades. A great number of Afghans ended up in

Europe via the Mediterranean route to Europe when it became opened in 2015 due to their bad living conditions and illegal status in Iran (Human Rights Watch 2016a).

The well-functioning route from Turkey to Greece was one of the reasons why the refugee numbers started rapidly increase in Europe in 2015. Consequently, migrant smuggling became a profitable business in countries like Turkey where this so-called Eastern Mediterranean route became a popular route for exodus. Furthermore, Turkey has granted visa waiver for many African countries in recent years. This is how many Africans can reach Istanbul by plane and continue their journey towards Europe by sea (Frontex 2016b).

### **2.3. Terrorism and Immigration**

In 2016, Bove and Böhmelt at the University of Warwick conducted a study in connection to the migration and terrorism. This study was based on a quantitative analysis of terrorism in 145 countries and various migration flows between those countries from 1970 to the year 2000. It is the first quantitative research of its kind, which has attempted to analyze the connection between migration and terrorism. The main result and outcome of this research was that migration may help terrorism to move from its country of origin to the country that serves as the recipient of the refugees, however, this study also concluded that migration itself does not increase the risk of terrorism (Bove and Böhmelt 2016). Immigrants may be used as an important vehicle for terrorism to move from one country to another. However, this study did note that usually the immigrants move from bad living conditions to those that are better. It is vital to note that Bove and Böhmelt also argued that terrorism is usually used as a tool when people cannot find any other ways to achieve their goals. Thus, the countries with autocratic or non-democratic governments that do not respect human rights and have much lower income levels are more prone to terrorism (Bove and Böhmelt 2016, 17). The belief reinforced by this study is that an increased respect for human rights and a reduction of income inequality may decrease the need for terrorism when the goals of the people can be achieved by legal and peaceful means.

In recent years, several European countries have expressed their concern that Daesh may use the refugee routes as a way to reach EU member states and try to influence the new immigrants using their propaganda (TE-SAT 2016, 28-29). In April 2016, Frontex published

its Risk Analysis for 2016 where it states that there is evidence that some of perpetrators of Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015 used the refugee flow as a route to enter Europe with fraudulent documents and registered as asylum seekers (Frontex 2016a, 7). Europol has supported this statement as well in the TE-SAT 2015 (2016, 29). TE-SAT offers extensive amount of quantitative data for any risks associated with terrorism and migration by refugees seeking asylum. The bigger concern throughout the European security establishments and society at large, however, appears to be that the returning foreign fighters would attempt to enter into Europe as asylum seekers and thus not to be noticed by the law enforcement. The actual asylum seekers with potential connections to the jihadist organization have not gained that much attention among the authorities. However, Europol and Frontex have expressed their concerns over the threat of smugglers of asylum seekers potentially using their incomes to finance terrorist organizations (TE-SAT 2016, 6).

Overall, very little attention has been given to the possible terrorists seeking asylum – for legitimate reasons or for cover to enter into Europe on terrorist purposes. There is a risk that the foreign fighters originally from Europe and the Middle East may travel to Europe in the event that Daesh loses those areas it has gained control over. This would in turn increase the likelihood of this sub-group of hardened fighters seeking the asylum in various countries throughout Europe or, in the case of returning foreign fighters, the possibility of their return back to their countries of origin. Foreign fighters may use falsified and forged documents in order to avoid the attention and scrutiny by the law enforcement as they pretend to act as legitimate asylum seekers. Pretending to be an asylum seeker in order to gain entrance into Europe is not a new phenomenon. For instance, Jamal Ahmidan entered in Europe by pretending to be an asylum seeker and was directly linked to the Madrid-bombings in 2004 (Rabasa and Benard 2014, 110).

The terrorism threat by Daesh is predominantly aimed at the anti-Daesh coalition, which includes Belgium, France, Italy and the UK. They are often the subject of their propaganda materials because they play an active role in the counter-Daesh efforts. According to the Europol (TE-SAT 2016, 6-7), terrorist cells preparing the attacks against the above mentioned list of countries are mainly domestic and are mostly based locally.

Interestingly, the Global Terrorism Index 2015 (GTI 2015) also noted that 70% of forced immigrants have been coming from 20 countries with the highest number of fatal terrorist attacks. These migrants include not only the refugees but also the internally displaced

people. On the other hand, GTI (2015, 59) highlighted that the biggest refugee hosting countries like Pakistan are also among the ten top nations impacted the greatest by the some of the highest levels of terrorism.

Thus, migration does not necessarily increase the risk of terrorism per say. Contrary to the popular belief, however, terrorism does increase the risk of migration. Based on quantitative assessments, the GTI (2015, 10) does consider countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria as the five countries which are the most impacted by terrorism. When looking at the numbers of asylum seekers in Europe, the three largest groups of nationalities are almost parallel and similar to the three countries that are impacted the highest by terrorism and include countries like Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq (GTI 2015, 59). Thus, many of the asylum seekers have also been previously directly impacted by terrorism itself. Some may even have connections to the various terrorist organizations or may have even participated in such activities in their countries of origin.

As presented in the chapters 1.4 and 2, the numbers of arrests related to religiously inspired terrorism and the number of first time asylum applications have both increased in the past 5 years in Europe. The numbers of first time asylum applications and the arrests related to the religiously inspired violence in Europe are illustrated in the table 2.

Table 2. First time asylum applications and arrests related to the religiously inspired terrorism crimes in EU-28 countries in 2011-2015

| Year | First time asylum applications | Arrests related to terrorist crimes |
|------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 2011 | 309,000                        | 122                                 |
| 2012 | 335,000                        | 159                                 |
| 2013 | 431,000                        | 216                                 |
| 2014 | 627,000                        | 395                                 |
| 2015 | 1,321,000                      | 687                                 |

(Compiled by the author on the basis of data provided by Eurostat and Europol's TE-SAT reports 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016.)

Even though the both variables have increased in the recent years, does that mean that the number of asylum applications have increased the terrorist related arrests? Not necessarily, because the number of arrests depends on many other factors than only the number of asylum seekers. For example, as presented in the chapter 1.4. the intelligence

budgets in European countries and EU have increased at the same time when the number of asylum applications and arrests have increased. When more resources are used to detect the possible terrorists, it is more likely that more arrests will be done as well. Also, the numbers of arrests include, for example, those arrests related to travelling to Syria or Iraq in order to join jihadist organizations. Taking into account the development of Syrian civil war and role of Daesh there, it makes sense that the number of those travels has increased as the conflict has prolonged.

However, number of arrests does not tell the whole truth about the potential terrorists in Europe. According to the Europol, in 2015, 198 jihadism related cases were decided in national courts. In 94% of these cases, the defendant was found guilty (TE-SAT 2016, 47). In 2014, the number of jihadism trials in courts of European countries was 99, but there is no data how many per cent of the defendants were found guilty (TE-SAT 2015, 45). In 2013, 58 jihadism trials and 99% of the defendants were found guilty (TE-SAT 2014, 49-50). Indeed it seems like the number of verdicts has increased as well. However, the numbers of verdicts are still very small compared to the number of arrests. The high number of arrests compared to the number of verdicts shows that the European police forces are taking the risk of terrorism seriously and arresting suspicious individuals with low threshold.

However, it is impossible to know the exact connection between the number of asylum seekers and terrorist related arrests because there are no data available that how many per cent of the individuals arrested were asylum seekers. This information would be crucial in order to know whether the asylum seekers have constituted a big percentage of the recent terrorist suspects.

### **3. RADICALIZATION PROCESS OF THE IMMIGRANTS**

Now when the terms terrorism and immigration have been introduced, the combining question is, are the asylum seekers potential terrorists? In order to examine this, it is necessary to have a look into the radicalization process. What makes the person a terrorist? In this chapter various reasons behind the radicalization are examined and discussed more closely in the context of the asylum seekers and immigration.

Radicalization, according to McCauley and Moskalenko (2008, 416), means “change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviours in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defence of the ingroup.” Furthermore, radicalization in political context means increased use of time and money to support the ideology, more risky behaviour and possible use of violence in support of a political cause.

Sageman (2004, 135) suggests that religious radicalization is three-step process. The first step is social affiliation. This is connected to the need of social networks, or the membership of a certain group, which will be examined shortly in chapter 3.3. in the context of Venhaus’ seeker –classification. The second step, according to Sageman, is the progressive intensification of beliefs and faith. The last step is the formal acceptance of the jihad and even the participation in violence. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has used four steps to describe the radicalization process. These steps are, according to FBI, pre-radicalization, identification, indoctrination and action. Pre-radicalization is affected by both external and internal forces and it varies from person to person. In the identification phase, the person isolates from former life and begins to accept the new social identity. In the third phase, indoctrination, the individual starts to believe that concrete action is needed to make change and achieve the goals. In the last phase, the individual knowingly participates in extremist actions (FBI 2006, 4).

According to Schmid religious fervour combined with poverty, social injustice and state repression form a dangerous combination, which may seem appealing for the potential terrorists. The promise for religiously inspired, more specifically for radical Islam, that the

martyr will end up in paradise with 72 black-eyed virgins waiting to be married to him can work as an incentive for someone to attack. (2004, 211-212)

According to Ranstorp (2016), the radicalization is a sum of several factors. He divides the factors to six basic factors and three other factors, which are working as a motor for radicalization. The basic factors are individual socio-psychological factors, social factors, political factors, ideological and religious dimensions, the role of culture and identity issues and trauma and other trigger mechanisms. Three other factors that are a motor for radicalization are group dynamics, radicalizers/groomers and the role of social media. In the scope of this research, it is not necessarily to go deeply into the psychological or socio-psychological factors, which would require deeper understanding of mental health and psychology.

### **3.1. Factors behind the Radicalization**

#### **3.1.1. Discrimination**

Discrimination and alienation are some of the factors, which may increase the anger among the asylum seekers. In Ranstorp's classification mentioned above, these factors fall into the category of social factors. Problems in everyday life make them feel outsiders and less worthy. The increased negative attitudes and racism towards Muslims in Europe after the recent terrorist attacks have increased. The common human experience is that the anger will be answered by the anger. When the people are facing the anger when they arrive in Europe, their attitude towards the natives is more likely negative, or at least very reserved, as well. Often the idea of winning hearts and minds of the people is the best way to prevent the radicalization. When the people are treated well, they will treat others well, too. O'Brien (2016, 202) points out that the Muslims in Europe who are most likely to be radicalized, are those who feel alienated from and mistreated by their host countries, often having a long history of living in Europe.

In the sociology this is explained by *the structural theory*; according to Martin, the state is in the key role here. It is the state on whose responsibility it is to ensure that it is not bringing the society to the brink of revolution by the alienation and popular discontent (2016,

43). Another sociological theory, *relative deprivation theory*, continues on the same traces. According to this theory, if a group has expectations to reach a certain status but these expectations are met by sustained repression or, like Martin (2016, 44) puts it, second-class citizen status, the counter-reaction to this can be political violence. Furthermore, according to Gupta (2008, 25), the anger among the bigger collective, such as the asylum seekers, can easily turn into violence in this kind of circumstances. This is an important note, when considering the radicalization of the asylum seekers. The European countries have in past years tried to reduce the social benefits and other support for the asylum seekers to make Europe less attractive destination. Still, hundreds of thousands asylum seekers arrive to Europe and do not face the idyll what they expected.

Furthermore, in several cases in Europe, as it will be discussed in chapter 5 in the context of France, the members of diaspora community feel that the Western countries do not grant them full citizenship and they are treated as 2<sup>nd</sup> class citizens. This creates an image that these countries are betraying their own principle of equal treatment and the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Waldmann 2010, 10-11). As O'Brien (2016, 201) proposes, guaranteeing the same rights to Muslims and treating them on the same way as Christians or any other religion in Europe is the best way to prevent terrorism. Mistreatment and alienation may create a motivation to attack against the host country. Usually in this case, the radicalization is autonomous and not caused by external organizations; however, the perpetrators may still claim that they are attacking in the name of a certain organization. Autonomous radicalization here does not necessarily mean that it is born in an empty space within the diaspora community but more that the idea and the deepest reason comes from the community in the host country (Waldmann 2010, 13).

Where does the anti-immigration attitudes and the discrimination by the host community stem from? The most tested theory here is the *human capital theory* (Rustenbach 2010, 56). According to it, the less educated natives will more likely have negative attitudes towards immigrants. This is to say, the education plays important role not only to prevent the radicalization of the immigrants directly by providing them better quality of life, but also by increasing the awareness among the natives which may lead to the decrease in discrimination and more positive attitudes towards the immigrants. However, one of the reasons why the natives with lower education have more negative attitude towards the immigrants is, that they see the immigrants more as a risk than natives with higher education. As the immigrants often



are working on the fields where very little education is needed, the natives working on the same fields see the immigrants as a threat and thus have negative attitudes towards them. This is a difficult problem to solve. However, it also reflects the problem of the integration of immigrants, especially of those who have arrived in the country as asylum seekers. They may be highly educated but not able to find a job corresponding to their education. This will be examined more closely in the chapter 3.1.2. in the light of OECD's data.

*The contact theory* is another way to try to explain the negative attitudes towards the immigrants. Rustenbach (2010, 58) has pointed out that the regular contacts with immigrants, without developing to the friendship, often develop hostility and suspicion towards the immigrants. This can help to explain why the attitudes in Europe towards immigrants have got more negative in recent years. The flow of asylum seekers has brought asylum seekers to new areas within the European countries. For example in Finland, the reception centres were opened in the towns where the number of residents with immigrants background was very low. If the asylum seekers in the reception centre are not included to the local community, the newcomers can be seen as a threat by the locals. However, developing the relationship with the natives and the asylum seekers helps both sides by decreasing the hostility and the negative attitudes. Through this, the discrimination can be decreased and the risk of radicalization diminished.

The terrorism prevention itself is often seen discriminatory. It has been argued that the European counter-terrorism measures are targeted towards only the Islamic terrorism and are thus, discriminatory. Eijkman and Schuurman have also noted that it is not only whether the measures really are discriminatory, but rather than how the people experience them (2011, 19). If the counter-terrorism measures are increasing alienation and stigmatisation, or are considered to be discriminatory among those who these measures are target towards, it may actually have a counter-effect; it may encourage people to use political violence (Gill 2009, 83). On the other hand, as the counter-terrorism measures are targeting, it is the nature of these measures which can be seen as discriminatory. There is a very fine line between the targeted counter-terrorism measures and ethnic profiling (Gill 2009, 92).

Several countries have imposed stricter immigration laws towards those from terrorism prone countries. An example of such a policy occurred in the United States in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 (Guild and van Selm 2005, 67). This can be seen discriminatory if it is de facto applied only to certain group of immigrants, in this case

Muslims. Such discriminatory legislation may increase the risk of terrorism as it makes people who it is aimed at that they are discriminated and treated as 2<sup>nd</sup> class citizens. When it comes to restricting the immigration legislation, the study conducted by Bove and Böhmelt (2016, 25) actually shows that the stricter immigration laws may increase the risk of terrorism. This is mainly connected what is presented above on the discriminatory measures taken by the state.

### **3.1.2. Integration Problems**

Refugees and asylum seekers face same problems as anyone who moves to new country without any existing networks. On top of that, many of them have traumatising experience from their countries of origins. That said, OECD (2013, 191) notes that the major obstacle for the integration of immigrants and also, for their children who may have been born in the host country, is the discrimination. OECD has noted that immigrants face more challenges in finding a job compared to those native-born citizens of the host country even if they hold the similar level of education. One of the explanations this can be that the education is acquired in a foreign country in a different language. However, this does not explain why the offspring of the immigrants face similar problems even if they have acquired their education in the host-country. According to OECD (2013, 192), these problems which 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation immigrants have in the labour market could be explained by the “differences in social and professional networks, soft skills, concentration in certain geographical areas or fields of study or other un-observed characteristics and personal traits such as motivation”. Also, OECD (2013, 219) notes that discrimination is one of the biggest problems behind the problems in integrating into the labour market. Cottey (2013, 222) has explicitly noted that the socio-economic tension between the majority population and the Muslim immigrants is a fact.

In 2014 International Migration Outlook report, the problem seems to remain, and OECD notes that the countries have problems to use the potential of educated immigrants, which is one of the main concerns for OECD when it comes to integration of immigrants. Furthermore, according to OECD (2014, 37-38), the people with a foreign name must submit twice as many job applications than the person with a native ring in his name. It is also essential to note that the integration to the labour market decreases other problems, which

immigrants face; it improves the language skills and reduces the costs of the immigration as working immigrants contribute for the host-country by paying taxes. It has been noted that the actually the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation immigrants may be in greater risk to be discriminated than those who have just moved in Europe (OECD 2015, 13). Moreover, the immigrants live more often in relative poverty and their employment rate is significantly lower than native populace's and if the immigrants work, they are often over-qualified for their work, which means that highly-educated immigrants have more difficulties to find a job which is corresponding to their education (OECD 2015, 31). In chapter 1.2., it was discussed how the extremist organizations have recruited engineers to their members. There can be seen a connection to this: engineers, who are not able to get a job, which is in accordance to their education, may get frustrated and become easy targets for the terrorist organizations. The organizations can offer them an opportunity to use their education.

Besides discrimination, immigrants naturally face the problems with language, lack of both private and professional networks, integration to foreign culture and homesickness. This is the case especially when the immigration is not based on academic or professional reason, but for humanitarian reasons. Hostile attitudes towards immigrants are also most likely to have negative impact on integration (OECD 2014, 41). This is an alarming phenomenon in Europe, where the xenophobic thinking has gained more support in recent years.

Bove and Böhmelt (2016, 18) also note that the increase in general economic well-being decreases the risk of terrorism in the country in question. Thus, improvement of economic well-being and conditions of the incoming immigrant population can help to ease their transition and integration into the society. In turn, this can reduce the likelihood of radicalization within the immigrant population. Especially the undocumented migrants are in the risk here. As these undocumented migrants have no right to work, their economic situation is highly dependent on illegal activities. This can include black market working or criminal activities, such as dealing drugs or thefts. By giving the migrants opportunities to earn their income by legal means, discourages them to commit crimes. In the aftermath of the refugee flow of 2015, several EU countries have introduced new, stricter immigration laws. The problem in several countries is that there is no effective system to remove the people with no residence permit from the country. When the country of origin refuses to take back the people who were not granted asylum, the country where he sought asylum, has no possibility to remove this person from the country. These people will often stay in this country illegally, if

the voluntary return is not attractive alternative for them. These undocumented migrants have neither right to work nor access to health care or social security services. Their possibilities to normal everyday life are very limited. This kind of position gives favourable conditions for the criminal activities and these people are easy targets for the recruiters of terrorist organizations. When people have nothing to lose, they are willing to take huge risks.

On the other hand, it is not only about the economic conditions, which are the benefit from the work. Work also gives people a meaning for life and something to do. For example, in Finland, the asylum seekers have argued that the biggest problem during the process is that they have nothing to do and they would like to work. In Finland, according to the Finnish Aliens Act 79§, the asylum seeker is allowed to work after 3 months he filed his asylum application if he has the travel document. If there is no travel document, he must wait 6 months to be able to work. However, even if the asylum seeker would have the right to work, they face huge burdens if they want to work before they have the residence permit. Banks are reluctant to open bank accounts for non-EU citizens, the employers find it risky to hire an asylum seeker as insuring them is more expensive. Obviously, problems in employment can be more commonplace; most of the asylum seekers have no required language skills and their educational background can be non-existing. Importantly, the idleness together with poor economic conditions and with very little hope for the future creates a good ground for the radicalization among the asylum seekers.

### **3.1.3. The Role of Diaspora**

The radicalization in Europe is clearly a youth movement. This approach can also be seen in the phenomena where young women are recruited to marry terrorists. More and more of the European travellers are women who move to Iraq or Syria in order to marry a member of organization. Their purpose is to give birth for the children who can be trained to be the next generation of terrorists (TE-SAT 2016, 6-7).

The main motivation for joining jihad in Europe seems to be fascination with the narrative: “the small brotherhood of super-heroes who avenge the Muslim Ummah” (Ranstorp

2016, 4). Foreign fighters have often adopted the Salafi version of Islam, which consists of simple don'ts and dos.<sup>3</sup>

The diasporas play significant role in the process of radicalization and especially in the recruitment. The terrorist organization is more likely to recruit someone the members already know, because thus they can trust that the new member will not betray them (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008, 421). The members of a terrorist organization may give a romantic picture of the membership and thus allure their acquaintances to join the organization. This may be tempting for those who have faced problems in their social relationships or who feel that they are left outside of the society. This comes to the issue of identity seeking which will be shortly examined further.

Waldmann (2010, 13-14) divides the radicalization of diaspora communities within the host country into two groups; attacks against the host country and attacks against the country of origin. In this context, the attacks against the host country are in the focus. This type of attacks can be divided into two groups as well. First group includes the rebellion in order to attain full citizenship. This is linked to the idea presented above that the immigrants, even if they are born and raised in West, often feel themselves as 2<sup>nd</sup> class citizens. This kind of rebellion can be rather easily seen in France and Belgium among the North African communities. The second group consists of frontal attacks against the host states. These kinds of attacks are more like large scale attacks in major European cities, which require funding from bigger organization and intense and professional training of the perpetrators.

The radicalization in diaspora communities is an important issue in the context of this research. If the attention is not paid to what happens in the asylum seekers' housing units and centres, the possible recruiters can easily try to spread radical ideas among those who they have found to be trustworthy and loyal. It is essential, that the asylum seekers are not left alone in their own communities, but they also should have contacts with the local populace as that helps them to integrate to the local community better and avoid unwanted connections to the radical organizations. In addition, the contacts with the local community are important in order to improve the language skills and create connections, which can help to find job and

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<sup>3</sup> Salafism is one interpretation of Sunni Islam. It is one of the interpretations of Islam which has gained a lot of support from radicals. Salafis believe that the right interpretation of Islam is authoritative and jihadism has two features that are common to salafis: firstly, they believe in the unmediated authority of the Quran and the Sunna and secondly, they believe that God is the only source of law and no human authority is able to alter God's law. (Rabasa and Benard 2014, 23-29)

thus improve the economic well-being. The contacts with the local community are also important in order to prevent the tension between the majority Europeans and the Muslim community. As Cottey (2013, 222) has presented, this tension can lead to the circle which is difficult to break. The tension feeds the racism and the racism feeds the radicalization, which again, feeds the tension between the Muslims and the non-Muslims.

#### **3.1.4. Criminal Background and Risk of Radicalization**

Several perpetrators of terrorist attacks in Europe in 2015 and 2016 had a background in petty crime. Many of the terrorists have been in prison at some point of their life for conventional crimes (Basra, Neumann and Brunner 2016, 18-20). This view is also supported by Waller (2006, 23) who notes that the Islamic radicalization in prisons is not a new phenomenon. According to Ranstorp (2016, 4), the extremist milieus, such as religious study groups or prisons, are important factors in the process of radicalization. When it comes to the radicalization in such circumstances, both membership of a certain group, in this case possibly radical religious study group, and the religious awakening play important role. Furthermore, it seems that the recruiters are especially aiming to those involved in petty crimes. In the United Kingdom, the recruiters have used slogan ‘sometimes people with the worst pasts create the best futures’ to attract the criminals to join the jihadist organizations.

Prisons still remain one of the most important places where the face-to-face recruitment takes place. According to research by Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016, 29), 45 out of 79 jihadist profiles examined, had been imprisoned prior their radicalization. At least 12 out of these 45 were radicalized in prison. Basra, Neumann and Brunner have suggested that the angry young men in prisons are easy targets for the recruiters and on the other hand, many of the new inmates are in vulnerable situation right after the imprisonment, so they might seek relief from religion or other comforting solutions.

One of the most significant problems in terrorism prevention in prison is, how to distinguish a religious conversation from jihadist recruitment? Human rights guarantee the freedom of religion for everyone, also for the prisoners. There is a right to practice one’s religion in prison as well, but the problem is, how the prison personnel can recognize potential jihadist recruiter? Islam is the fastest growing religion inside the prisons and many inmates are experiencing religious awakening in prisons. Also, Muslims are very over

represented in European prisons, in France it is estimated that even 80% of inmates are Muslims (Rabasa and Benard 2014, 112).

Prison recruitment is something that is not discussed significantly in public debates. However, more attention should be paid in prisons to the communication between those convicted of terrorism related crimes and those in prison because of conventional crimes. In some prisons the terrorist convicts are held in separate departments than those with background in conventional crimes and their communication with outside world is very restricted (Rabasa and Benard 2014, 115). In prisons, de-radicalization programmes should be launched and actively used to help former terrorists not only to leave organizations, but also to prevent their possible recruitment activities within the other prisons.

### **3.2. Social Media and Radicalization**

The problem of the recruitment by the terrorist organizations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is that the internet provides new kind of tool to recruit people. According to Kivinen (2014, 73), terrorist organizations find internet as a convenient tool for several reasons. First of all, there is very little supervision or control in internet. It is cheap to use and the message can be sent to unlimited amount of people. Earlier the organizations were dependent on commercial or state-owned communication networks. Thus, the spread of the message depended on the will of political decision makers or the will of commercial actors. Nowadays most of the young people are able to use social media channels and thus able to spread the message. Especially jihadism is a form of radical thinking, which has not traditionally recruited people through the traditional media, but after the development of social media the jihadist organizations have got a new tool to recruit people.

So-called Arab spring in 2010 was the turning point in the use of social media. After that many terrorist organizations started to use especially microblog service Twitter as their channel of communication (Hoffmann 2012). Daesh has been active on the social media as well. Yet, Daesh's recruitment activities – both online and offline – have been mainly concentrating on those who have been living in Europe for long time rather than those who just arrived.

Kivinen (2014, 72-75) has argued that social media can be used not only for recruitment by the organizations, but also radicalizing people who otherwise would not know about the ideology. Using the social media for spreading the propaganda is significant especially when it comes to the radicalization of so-called lone wolf actors. One of the biggest risks in social media is that when a person follows one account, the services automatically suggest him to follow similar accounts. This easily introduces new organizations and radical thinkers to the new users. In social media channels, the users can share the information provided by other users, so supporters of terrorist organizations can easily share the propaganda to their own followers. Also, special keywords, so called hashtags, make it easy for users to find information related to terrorism. The organizations can customize their message to certain cultural or linguistic groups to attract people by creating message with more personal characteristics.

The social media services have actively closed the accounts of terrorist organizations, but for example, in 2013 when organization Al-Shabaab attacked a shopping centre in Nairobi, Kenya, they reported in real time in Twitter. When Twitter banned their account, the new account was immediately created. This shows the problem of controlling internet. Even though the administration would delete an account, it is difficult to prevent the organization from creating a new account.

From the authorities' point of view, social media has both complicated and eased the fight against terrorism. On the one hand, the amount of material in online is so massive that it is impossible to control. YouTube alone is uploaded every minute 65 hours of new material. (Kivinen 2014, 80-81) The problem with deleting radical material from social media or preventing to even publish it, is that how to draw the line between freedom of speech and the censorship. Freedom of speech is one of the fundamental rights in democratic society. Attempts to try to monitor, follow and delete harmful material in social media can be easily seen as censorship and state intervention to the free speech. For example, YouTube has granted the British government so called "Super Flagger" rights to YouTube so they can delete material they find harmful. The human rights organizations have been criticizing this as it intervenes with fundamental human rights (Burton 2014). The state tightens its grip over the internet and gets tighter control over the material published. This has been seen controversial to the European values where the freedom of press and freedom of speech has been seen as core values of European society.



On the other hand, the authorities' presence in internet can be seen as a way to prevent crimes and terrorism. For example in Finland, the police have accounts in social media, where the people can report any suspicious actions. The police also have possibility to intervene and investigate the crimes online right after the possible crime has been detected (Poliisi.fi - webpage). However, the police is not the administrator of these sites, so they do not censor or delete any content. Furthermore, the purpose of the police's presence online is to present their own views to certain phenomena and correct wrong information.

When it comes to the immigration and seeking asylum, the pictures that former fighters have published in social media have affected to their possibilities to be granted asylum. When the chats and location updates are saved to the social media servers, it is easier to find evidences that a certain person may have radical ideas. This information has also become significant evidence in the trials. For example, Finland started criminal investigations on an asylum seeker, who had published pictures in Facebook where he was shaming a body together with other soldiers (Helsingin Sanomat 2016). As the Geneva Convention 1951, article 1F notes:

*“The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: (a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes; (b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; (c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”*

Thus, the activity related to terrorist activities in social media can be seen as evidence in the asylum process and the asylum will not be granted if there are serious reason considering that the applicant has participated such an activity. This is also a point, which is often forgotten in the public debate. The argument often is that European countries should not grant asylum for the terrorists. Having said that, very little attention is paid to the fact that according to Geneva Convention 1951, the terrorists are not granted asylum.

### 3.3. Four Groups of ‘Seekers’

John M. Venhaus conducted a study in United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in year 2010 about the motivation of foreign fighters to join the Al-Qaeda. The research was based on the interviews of 2032 detainees in Afghanistan, Iraq and Guantanamo Bay. The common features for these individuals who had joined to fight for Al-Qaeda was that there were no psychological problems, but rather most of the fighter made a conscious choice and sought out the membership themselves rather than were recruited or ‘brainwashed’ by the Al-Qaeda. Many of the interviewees had an inadequate understanding of Islam and religion had not played significant role in their lives before joining the organization. Furthermore, their socio-economic background varied a lot from long term unemployed persons to people with privileged backgrounds. (Venhaus 2010, 4-5)

Venhaus (2010) classifies the possible recruits to the four groups, which all have different motivations to join the terrorist organization. To prevent the radicalization, it is essential to understand the different reasons behind the membership of such an organization, or more accurately, the personal circumstances of each radicalized individual. All the four groups presented here have different motivations on joining violent extremists groups and thus, the counter-radicalization measures should be differentiated, and targeted according to which is the driving force or the personal motivation behind the radicalization.

According to Venhaus, the first group of these “seekers”, as he calls the potential recruits, are *the revenge seekers*. These recruits often feel that external force has caused their unhappiness and limits their possibilities to be successful. This group consist of angry young men that are looking for someone to be angry for. A large number of the interviewees noted that they are angry about the actions of USA and West in the Middle East and were seeking for revenge. Many of them had also had problems with their family members and neighbours. Altogether 30% of the interviewees mentioned the anger as a reason to join jihadist organization. For this group it is suggested to create ways to participate in the politics and thus encourage them to make the change on legal means. They also should be supported to aim their anger to creative arts and sport programmes so they can release their anger. (Venhaus 2010, 8-9)

In the context of migration, the anger is often present. The asylum seekers have faced violence and persecution in their countries of origin, are often traumatized and lost

everything. After that, they may spend years in the asylum process in the country, where they do not speak the language or have the ties to the local population, which makes integration difficult. They are often discriminated and there are fewer possibilities for them to be employed. The negative asylum decisions after that may awake negative feelings and anger towards the host country.

Thus, the fair, fast and open asylum process is the key factor in order to prevent the asylum seekers to build negative feelings towards the host country. During the process, the people must have a possibility to work and live normal life as far as possible. Restricting their right to move within the country, as suggested in some countries; or the possibilities to work or study is more likely to increase the risk of radicalization by increasing the negative feelings towards the surrounding society. This may, in Venhaus' terms, make them to seek revenge.

Venhaus argues that the best way to prevent this group of revenge seekers to join the jihadist organization is to create a space, where their voices can be heard. Venhaus emphasizes the meaning of creating a space where they can express themselves through music and arts or sport. Another option for Venhaus (2010, 13) to prevent this group to be radicalized is to partner them with a positive role model, who can help them to find these revenge seekers their place in the society. Giving the possibility to participate in sports gives the possible recruits a possibility to vent his aggression on fields and thus stay away from illegal and radical activities. This view is problematic. In Europe, there is a free access for everyone to ordinary sport clubs and no group is left out. Still, people do join the violent extremist groups. This group's most prominent reason to join the violent extremist organizations is that they feel like they are lacking the possibilities to be successful in life. For example, in Finland the problem has been that youth with immigrant background are not supported to apply for universities but rather pushed to working class profession despite of their success at school (Helsingin Sanomat 2015). This kind of indirect guidance towards lower socio-economic class is good example of practices which limit the possibilities of certain groups. Equal possibilities to study and work for all the social and ethnic groups would more efficiently prevent the alienation and frustration, which causes the willingness to revenge.

The second group of 'seekers', according to Venhaus' classification, are so called *status seekers*. The previous group, the revenge seekers, consists mainly of people coming from Middle Eastern societies located in Middle East or living only a short time in West. In

these societies, where honour and dignity play significant role, the revenge is seen as way to defence one's honour. The group of status seekers is more prevalent among the diaspora members in West. This is often connected to the expectations of having a better and more successful life in West. The common feature with these two groups of seekers is that both have experienced negative attitudes from other people. 25 per cent of interviewees wanted to improve their status through joining the jihadist organization. They saw that they have much more potential than the country where they live recognizes. As they have no possibilities to show this potential through legal ways, they must resort to illegal actions, where the terrorism is the most extreme form. As this group often has the roots in Middle Eastern societies as well, like the first group, they also value honour and dignity and thus can see that they have failed in their life if they do not reach certain level (Venhaus 2010, 9-10). There are certain achievements that the society considers important. For example, higher status in the eyes of the others may be this kind of goal. If there are no legal means to achieve it, the individual will resort to the illegal means.

One of the main ways to prevent this group to join the jihadist organizations is to reflect publicly to them that their efforts in society are appreciated and that they have the same possibilities than any other member of society. In this battle, also the support of local Muslim community is essential. If the community sets a high value on the martyrs and sees the jihadists as heroic figures, the younger members of the community easily adopt the same view. In this case, they see martyrdom as a way to gain respect from the community.

In the context of immigration, the group of status seekers is relevant, as many of the asylum seekers and refugees have left everything behind, many of them may have been successful, and starting from the bottom in the new country can be a shock. This is dangerous especially when the person has been living rather good life in his country of origin and ends up to live with social benefits in a country where he has no possibilities to find a job due to the poor language skills and everyday racism. The way to gain higher status may be then to join a radical organization. In this way, he can gain at least respect of the members of the organization.

The third group of seekers, according to Venhaus' classification, are *the identity seekers*. The main motivation for this group is to be a part of something. It is significant for one's personality to form a satisfying and functioning identity, and the support of the group is often important in this process. This is a common feature within the young people in most of

the societies and often pushes the youth to join different kind of groups, such as sport clubs and so on. Jihadist group is the most extreme option in this. In development of young people the acceptance of peer group is crucial. (Venhaus 2010, 10) Like discussed in the chapter 3.2., also Sageman has suggested that the membership of the group is one of the goals that people tend to pursue.

In the case of the people who feel outsiders in the society, due to their background or other personal reasons, the structure and the rules of the group and perspective of belonging to a group helps them to define not only themselves, but also their role, friends and interaction within the society. Waldmann's (2010, 10) view supports what Venhaus has presented. According to Waldmann, members of this group experience the dualism of living between two cultures and societies as a burden and a continuous strain. They see radicalism as a solution to their problems and feel that they finally belong to a group.

In order to prevent this kind of seekers to join the groups, it is necessary to offer viable alternatives and other kind of groups to join, so young men can find a group to join instead of terrorist organizations. Not any group fulfils the need of belonging to a group, but this group must be well-organized and structured. The symbols of a group will make identity seekers to feel that they are a part of a bigger entity (Venhaus 2010, 10).

For this group, in the context of migration, the integration to the population of the host country is crucial. Immigrants often connect with their fellow compatriots and find it difficult to make connections with local population. When the people are lacking the contacts with local population, it is more difficult to learn the local language and local culture. On the other hand, the integration may confuse one's identity and the identity seekers are often lost between two cultures. On the one hand, the receiving society is expecting the immigrants to integrate and behave in accordance to the social norms of that society. On the other hand, the immigrants may have born and raised in totally different culture and they do not want to give up on their own cultural heritage. In these cases, they end up between two, in some cases very different, cultures, which may cause confusion in identity. This is the case especially among the young people, who may face certain expectations from their families and then, other expectations from friends and school, for example.

The last group in Venhaus' classification consists of *the thrill seekers*, who account less than 5% of the interviewees. This group is significantly different from other three groups. As the common feature for other three groups is the feeling of disappointment and

disapproval, this group is more motivated and filled with energy. Their reason for joining the jihadist organization is to prove their manhood by accomplishing an arduous task or surviving a harrowing adventure. As other groups face challenges in their everyday life, this group feels like they do not have enough challenges and they want to find new ways to challenge themselves. This group comes usually from more privileged socio-economic background than the members of other three groups do. They are often attracted by violent videogames and movies. Another significant difference between this group and three other groups is that this group is more likely to quit the movement if they do not find what they were seeking (Venhaus 2010, 11).

### **3.4. Case Study: Muslim Segregation in France**

As previously discussed, radicalization is a sum of several factors that are often caused by different circumstances. Discrimination was cited as one the biggest reasons for the radicalization of these young forced or irregular refugees who happen to mostly be from Muslim countries. Consequently, this sub-chapter will focus on what sort of problems are currently being faced by France because it currently hosts the most Muslims in the entire European region. This sub-chapter will also introduce the criminal profiles of the perpetrators with directly established links to terrorism in France in order draw the parallels presented in previous chapters to the real world case cases. Lastly, several additional factors that are not linked to immigration but have been linked as important factors to the radicalization processes, which then led to recent acts of terrorism will also be presented.

#### **3.4.1. Immigration of Maghrebi Arabs to France**

France has one of the largest Muslim populations in the entire Europe with approximately 4 to 6 million Muslims. Approximately 6 to 10% of the French population is comprised of Muslims and these Muslims are predominantly comprised of North African Maghrebis, who are Arabs and Berbers that mainly come from Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. This number is constantly increasing as a result of immigration and higher fertility rates among this population of Muslims.

In comparison to other European countries, it is also vital to note that France has had a long history in Muslim countries. Some scholars speculate that the roots of radicalization amongst the youngsters in France is connected to the fact that France historically was an occupying colonial force within some of its former North African and Middle Eastern Muslim countries. For instance, France was faced with mass immigration from its former colonies to France in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. There were already half a million Algerians residing in France by the time Algeria got its independence in 1962. This was mainly due to the fact that the French domestic and foreign policy allowed Algerians to freely move to and from France between the years of 1946 to 1962 (MacMaster 2001, 183). Algerians were also granted the right to stay as a reward for their loyalty to France during the Algerian Independence War and were frequently employed within the various blue-collar fields in France such as the car manufacturing factories and other labor-intensive fields (Rabasa and Benard 2014, 9).

This is why France appears to provide an ideal environment for the analysis of radicalization due to the fact that there appears to be inequality and an income gap between the immigrants and the native population. However, it is important to note that the problems in France date back to its colonial days and not so much to the refugee crisis of 2015. During its colonial days, France was involved in the bloody struggles and wars where various Muslims countries in North Africa and the Middle East fought for their independence. As Fellag (2014, 3) notes, political, immigration, economic and psychological studies have shown that a lot of these Maghrebi youth and immigrants also have had many problems in the labor market and have also been unable to acquire education as easily. Furthermore, Fellag has shown that the segregation of Maghrebi people in France has been a direct result of the policies that have been created by the French government and not the Maghrebi community in France itself, which is often the recipient of this blame. It is constantly stated that the Maghrebi French do not adapt to the French society but it also appears that the domestic policies in France have fostered resentment by clearly segregating the Muslim identity apart from the French identity (Fellag 2014, 1). According to MacMaster (2001, 184), French Maghrebis have been targets of French racism since World War I. This has created an inner tension and a grudge between the native French and the French Maghrebis, which has lasted for well over a century to this day.

As Fellag (2014, 1) argues, the descendants of North African immigrants are also frequently trapped by being labelled a Muslim, which was also originally the label that was

given by the state of France to these groups of people during their colonial days. The descendants of the immigrants that are the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation immigrants, are also rather young compared to the rest of French population. The average age among the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation Maghrebi immigrants is 31.9 years of age in comparison to the entire population's average age of 40.5 years of age (Rabasa and Benard 2014, 10). In the light of the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, it appears that radicalization is a phenomenon more frequently seen amongst young men. This why the lower age groups of young men amongst the Maghrebis in France can be considered a significant factor in the radicalization process and may explain why France has recently faced so many attacks.

The presence of large number of Muslims in France has become a hot topic ever since three major incidents, which include the 2015 terrorist attacks, Calais refugee camp and the 2013 riots in Muslim neighborhoods. At the same time, the far-right movement has gained a lot of support throughout France by spreading propaganda that the 'white native French' will disappear (Lazaridis, Campani and Benveniste 2016, 73). It is also worth noting that France has received a modest number of asylum seekers in past years. For instance, around 76,000 asylum applications were filed in France in the year 2015. Also, the overall increase in the number of asylum applications was not as sharp in France as it was in several other European countries. According to Eurostat's (2016) report, the number of asylum applications has varied from 52,000 to 76,000 in past five years. In comparison to France, for example in the Netherlands, the number of asylum seekers has increased from 15,000 to 45,000 in and from 10,000 to 83,000 in Italy. Therefore, it seems abnormal that the recent terrorist attacks are often being connected with the number of asylum seekers because there countries like Germany, Hungary and Sweden with a large number of asylum seekers have not had any large scale or as many attacks as France has.

#### **3.4.2. The 2015 Attacks – Who were the perpetrators?**

In 2015, France faced several terrorist attacks that have caused mass casualties. In January 2015, French born brothers of Algerian decent by the names of Cherif and Said Kouachi, attacked the satiric newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris and shot several people to death. At the same time, Amedi Coulibaly shot a police officer and took hostages at a Jewish supermarket in Paris. Cherif Kouachi has served 18 months in prison from 2008 to 2009



because he had assisted French jihadists with their travels into Iraq. At the same time, Coulibaly had served in prison for an armed robbery. (SIPRI 2015, 253) Allegedly, the Kouachi brothers had travelled to Syria in summer of 2014 in order to receive training for perpetrating a large scale attack in Europe. Back in 2011, at least one of the brothers also travelled to Yemen where he had met several members of Al-Qaeda (NY Times Jan 17, 2015). However, it also appears that Cherif Kouachi and Coulibaly met Djamel Beghal, an Al-Qaeda affiliate, while serving time in prison (See for example, NY Times Jan 17, 2015).

Kouachi brothers as well as Coulibaly were all born and raised in France. However, Kouachis' parents were Algerian immigrants and Coulibaly was born into a Malian immigrant family. The Kouachi brothers were living in an orphanage as teenagers after their mother passed away so they had broken family background and allegedly low socio-economic status resulting from that (Independent 2015 and The Guardian 2015).

Another large-scale attack took place in Paris in November 2015, which resulted in mass casualties of 130 people and 350 wounded when the terrorists attacked a football stadium, a café and a concert hall. The main perpetrators and masterminds of the attacks, Salah and Ibrahim Abdeslam were French citizens who lived in Belgium. Both of them had served previous prison sentences because of their involvement in petty crimes. In addition, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, a Belgian citizen, was named to be one of the masterminds behind these attacks. He had got to know Ibrahim Abdeslam in prison. Out of eight identified perpetrators, six had previous criminal records, and four were suspected for terrorism prior to these attacks (BBC 2016). Two of the perpetrators still remain at large and completely unknown. French police said that they have most likely entered into Europe as asylum seekers by using stolen Syrian passports (NY Times Nov 15 2015). It is also important to note that Abdeslam brothers and Abaaoud all had Moroccan heritage, however, were born and raised in Europe (BBC 2015).

Therefore, it seems that the common factor for all of the attacks was that these perpetrators were either 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants or lived in Europe for a long time. Many of them had shown signs of radicalization prior these attacks and some of them were already being followed by the police due to terrorist connections. Many of them also had a background in petty crimes (Basra, Neumann and Brunner 2016, 18-20) and all of the perpetrators were young men. It is also important to note that there were pairs of brothers

involved in two of the biggest attacks. This was also the case in Brussels in March of 2016 when the terrorists attacked the airport and the local metro station. Daesh also took the full responsibility for these attacks (For Brussels attack, see NY Times March 24 2016).

### **3.4.3. France as a Part of the Anti-Daesh Coalition**

The interesting question is then why Daesh constantly continues to carry out its terrorist attacks in France? The number of attacks is not only connected to the large proportion of immigrants in France but also to that fact that France has been one of the most active EU member states in the Syrian Civil War and their fight against Daesh. Daesh has stated that the attacks in France have been an answer to France's actions against Daesh in Syria and also Iraq. In the eyes of Daesh and its leadership, this has become their way of seeking revenge against France because Daesh feels that Prophet Muhammad has been insulted (Muro 2015). In the aftermath of the November attacks in Paris, several world leaders blamed these terrorist attacks on the immigrants. For instance, the Hungarian president Viktor Orbán and French right-wing politician Marine Le Pen immediately lashed out with harsh comments against the incoming Muslim immigrants and asylum seekers (Wildangel 2015).

Moreover, the questions about the policy to ban the burqas or the burkini, which is a Muslim women's swimming suit and highly controversial in France, may have also partially played a role in incentivizing these attacks. These bans have been seen as unfair and discriminatory amongst the Muslims all over the world. However, among the Europeans, the burqa ban has been very popular (see for example in the Netherlands, Overbeeke 2013, 104). This has been mainly because non-Muslims have seen that wearing a burqa is evidence that the person has not integrated into the European society. On the other hand, it does become a matter of freedom of religion for those that are wearing the burkas.

When it comes to the Charlie Hebdo attack in January 2015, one of the motivations for the attack was allegedly the caricatures of the Prophet Muhammed, which it had published in a mocking way. This is not the first time when publishing the caricatures of the Prophet have caused counter-reactions amongst the Muslims but the attention around the newspapers and journal publications of the caricatures has gone on for more than 10 years. According to Islam's beliefs, picturing the Prophet is strictly forbidden. The question then becomes the limitation to the freedom of press and freedom of speech. On the other hand, there is the

dilemma of not offending a population of people that may consider something as blasphemous. The linkages between the burqa ban debate, the controversial caricatures of the Prophet Muhammed, and radicalization collectively incentivize the need to seek revenge. This is what was introduced in chapter 3.3., where it was clearly outlines that these kinds of events serve as a justification for such terrorist attacks and may cause one to seek revenge.

Subsequently, another interesting question comes up during such debates. Would such attacks be avoided if there were stricter immigration laws in place? The answer to this question is probably not. As previously mentioned, most of the perpetrators of these attacks in France were born and raised in Europe and were EU citizens. Thus, it becomes important to then ask as to what makes the European citizens join jihadist organizations? Why does the public mix up the difference between the incoming Muslim asylum seekers and Muslims who are born and raised throughout Europe? Why is the radicalization of the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation immigrants being clumped with the ongoing refugee crisis?

It does not appear that the immigrant background matters in the case of France and is not the determining factor in the radicalization process. The fact that France has faced several attacks committed by radical Islamists is linked more to their lower socio-economic status and the inequality imposed upon the Maghrebi French. These attacks can also be possibly seen as the counter-reaction to the possible xenophobia and rise of the far-right movements. Additionally, the French domestic policy that has banned the burqa and burkini along with the its anti-Daesh foreign and defense policy posture, which aligns France with its Western Coalition partners may be the determining factors for why radicalization has been seen.

## **4. TERRORISM PREVENTION AT THE INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LEVEL**

In previous chapters, terrorism and radicalization of immigrants as a phenomena were examined in more detail. In chapter 3.1.2., different types of problems that may be encountered by immigrants in their host countries and how such issues may lead to their radicalization were also discussed in greater detail.

This chapter will introduce and critically evaluate the international and regional counterterrorism tools within the frameworks of the United Nations, European Union and the Council of Europe. This Chapter will examine whether the tools used for the prevention of terrorism are truly addressing the reoccurring problems and the issues that stem from immigration. The purpose of this Chapter is also to try to prove that effective counterterrorism policies require multinational cooperation at regional level because it is understood that cooperation at a global level may not be feasible. Regional cooperation such as the European frameworks also play a significant role in counterterrorism efforts. Such cooperation also shows that the measures taken within the international community are not always necessarily addressing the actual root of the problems - at least in the context of Europe.

### **4.1. Terrorism Prevention on an International Level**

It is vital to note that an effective terrorism prevention strategy does not solely imply the prevention of the attacks themselves. An effective counterterrorism approach is one that prevents: 1) radicalization, 2) access to funds and weapons, 3) movements, and 4) access to vulnerable targets (OSCE 2014, 30). Within the context of immigration and terrorism, these above-mentioned four areas provide the pivotal focus areas and additional questions. International organizations have mainly been focused on the prevention of concrete acts, such

as financing, providing weapons and travelling for the purposes of training with or joining the terrorist organizations.

Several such counterterrorism tools have been developed within the United Nations system. There is an exhaustive compilation of materials associated with counterterrorism tools available via the United Nations websites, however, this study will mostly focus only on the newest and most important tools here. There are also currently several specialized agencies and organizations working on such counterterrorism related tools alongside the United Nations system such as United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) when it comes to the financing of such organizations. The scope of this examination will also only focus the resolutions by the Secretary General, General Assembly and the Security Council.

For instance, the Secretary General of United Nations published the Plan of Action for Prevent of Violent Extremism (A/70/674, hereinafter SG Plan of Action) in December of 2015. In paragraph 3 of this report, it stated that violent extremism is a concern to all the nations and countries in circumstances where actual or perceived injustice exists where human rights are being violated, good governance is ignored and people have no hope. Violent extremism is a common threat even though violent extremism is not defined as being legally binding within the UN. In this Action Plan, it has been stated that the violent extremism is a threat to the peace, justice and human dignity and thus should be prevented.

Even though the UN system mostly talks about violent extremism, it is also applicable to the prevention of terrorism. Paragraph 5 of the SG Plan of Action directly quotes and states that “violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism” in its sanctioned language. As previously mentioned, terrorism and violent extremism are two separate issues, however, terrorism is always correlated with and see as a form of violent extremism.

Therefore, one has to root out radicalization, recruitment and movements by such groups of people in order to prevent violent extremism and terrorism from occurring to begin with (UN SC Resolution 2178/2014). In addition, the SG Plan of Action notes that their plan is to prevent terrorist attacks, radicalization, and recruitment of individuals into terrorist groups in order to also prevent them from becoming foreign terrorist fighters. Furthermore, the resolution 2178/2014 demands that all of the UN member states combat terrorism and to fully comply with the Charter of UN. The problem with the resolution 2178/2014 is that it leaves the definition of terrorism open to interpretation by each and every member state. It

does not outline the legalese and is far too vague. In turn, this leads to the dilemma of “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” because when the terrorist organizations are closely connected to the state, state’s willingness to combat against this organization can be challenged. This also makes it more difficult to cooperate with the international community when there is no clear consensus as to who is fighting against who.

The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (hereinafter Counter-Terrorism Strategy) was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly in resolution 60/288 in 2006. This strategy to combat against global terrorism was built upon four pillars. According to this Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the first pillar was to combat terrorism by tackling the conditions that were deemed to be conducive to terrorism. Strengthening conflict prevention, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement, rule of law, peacekeeping and peacebuilding falls under this pillar. According to this strategy, the member states of the UN have noted that the various circumstances such as prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, non-existence of rule of law and violations of human rights as well as ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalisation, and lack of good governance collectively are the conditions that make it conducive for terrorism. Therefore, these are the conditions that need to be tackled and worked on in order to defeat global terrorism problems.

Discrimination and socio-economic marginalisation are one of the biggest problems that the immigrants face in Europe. If the European states would concentrate more on this first pillar of the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the root causes of terrorism could be diminished. Discrimination can lead to frustration and alienation by creating a barrier between the native population and the incoming asylum seekers. It is therefore the lack of legitimate means to accomplish something that leads people to use illegal means and even violence in order to obtain equality and non-discrimination.

The second pillar in the Counter-Terrorism Strategy of the UN is to prevent and combat terrorism by refraining from organizing, agitating, facilitating, participating in, financing, supporting or partaking in terrorist activities. Full cooperation in the fight against terrorism is also another requirement and this condition can be fulfilled by exchange of information or intelligence sharing by the public in order to prevent money laundering and illicit arms trade.

The third pillar is connected to the building capacity of at risk and developing nations in their fight against terrorism in order to strengthen the role of the United Nations system within these countries that are prone to terrorism. This needs to be done by involving the different agencies of the United Nations and various partners such as the IMF and the UNODC. The second and third pillar are only mentioned here because they do not play a central role in the context of immigration. For instance, money laundering can be an issue amongst the group of immigrants where the immigrants in Europe come from and then send money to their family members residing in countries that are at risk for terrorism. However, sending money to such countries alone should not be directly interpreted as financing terrorism because this can be seen as discriminatory as well amongst a vast majority that do so for the purposes of supporting their families. Discrimination like that can feed and fan the fires of motivations behind radicalization.

The fourth and last pillar requires member states and the UN to ensure that respect for all human rights and the rule of law remains fully intact while implementing counterterrorism pillars and measures. According to the Counter-Terrorism Strategy, this also includes the development and maintenance of an effective national criminal justice system that is based on the rule of law. This would ensure that anyone who has been involved in any terrorist activities is brought to justice on the basis of “the principle to extradite or prosecute, with due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2006, 9). On the other hand, it must also be ensured that acts of terrorism are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations. This is partly due to the fact that in Paragraph 7, the SG Plan of Action has openly stated that the first and the fourth pillar have often times been overlooked and that the UN shall re-calibrate its priorities in combating terrorism.

In Paragraph 7, Secretary General of the UN also stated that within the SG Plan of Action:

*“the creation of open, equitable, inclusive and pluralist societies, based on the full respect of human rights and with economic opportunities for all, represents the most tangible and meaningful alternative to violent extremism and the most promising strategy for rendering it unattractive.”*

The statement above is directly tied to the previous Chapter, which discussed the process of radicalization. Poor economic conditions, discrimination and inequality appear to play a key role in the radicalization process.

Lastly, it becomes important to ask the following: Is the UN terrorism prevention system is efficient enough? It appears that the central issues are quickly forgotten within the context of immigration. A great deal of attention is given to either who is a terrorist or what terrorism is and is not, making this a unilateral and not wholistic in its approach. Counterterrorism measures are predominantly focused on the prevention of financing, mobilisation and recruitment. Thus far, it appears that such suggested counterterrorism measures may have come too late. The radicalization, which is the pre-condition of the terrorism, has already happened before any of these processes were taken into account. Focusing on the prevention of *radicalization* rather than the prevention of *attacks*, would also prevent the concrete attacks. Likewise, it is vital to focus on the enhancement of good governance, functional human rights protection systems, and equality within the countries of origin from where the irregular or forced migrants come. This could potentially very well downsize the enormity of the problem throughout Europe. There would not be a reason to flee in the first place. Now the responsibility is on the European countries instead of the countries, which are the home of the terrorist organizations on the one hand, and the country of origin of the immigrants entering in Europe on the other hand.

## **4.2. Terrorism Prevention in Europe**

### **4.2.1. European Union**

Terrorism and terrorism related cases within the European Union were specified and detailed in the Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA. This is unusual because terrorism has not been defined by the international community in a unified way. The definition itself that has been presented within the framework decision, which was discussed in chapter 1.2. The framework decision itself and its amending decision 2008/919/JHA requires for the:



*“EU countries to align their legislation and introduce minimum penalties regarding terrorist offences. The decisions define terrorist offences, as well as offences related to terrorist groups or offences linked to terrorist activities, and set down the rules for transposition in EU countries.”*

Subsequently, this framework decision has had an impact on policies throughout Europe. For instance, this framework decision led to the introduction of a new legislation such as the 34a§ in the Finnish Criminal Code. This legislation makes it so that the actual terrorist attacks and acts such as: 1) public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, 2) recruitment, training, and theft for the purposes of terrorism, and 3) extortion or forgery with the aim of committing terrorist offences are all criminalized. Implementation of the framework decision into the Finnish law has in essence criminalized the preparatory nature of such acts with a particular focus on the duration of time prior to the commitment of a terrorist act. The process of preparation for criminal act was never criminalized prior to this framework decision in Finland.

Even though this framework decision was amended in 2008, it is more than a decade old. In March 2016, the Council of European Union agreed to start the negotiations to find the most up-to-date consensus and acquire the necessary fingertip feel for any changes via an issued Directive on combatting terrorism. The new directive would develop the up-to-date counterterrorism legislation within the EU. One of the most significant additions to the current counterterrorism legislation of EU would be the criminalization of the intent to or the actual act of travelling abroad for the purposes of terrorism, especially to areas deemed to be terrorism prone. This would be a welcomed addition to the currently existing legislation because many of the European terrorists have received the training in the conflict zones by various terrorist organizations.

Such changes would also develop the required legislation for countering any funding pivotal to any terrorist activities, which includes the money necessary to travel abroad for terrorism related activities such as training and/or fighting. The idea of a new Directive was first presented in the context of the Renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy by a Commission in response to an aftermath of Paris terrorist attacks that occurred on November 13, 2015. Furthermore, the new Directive would also take into account various non-EU

related documents such as the UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014), which was discussed earlier. Additional Protocol that was provided to the Council of Europe's Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism would also be considered, which will be discussed in the following Chapter.

It is also worth noting that the EU Commission published its first monthly Progress Report with respect to the effectiveness of the Security Union (COM(2016) 670 final) in October of 2016. The Commission noted that progress has been made in amending the processes of the Directive and it also hopes that a consensus will be reached by the ending of 2016 with respect to the new Directive on combating terrorism (COM(2016) 670 final, 3). Other than crafting and implementing a Directive on Combating Terrorism, the EU is also developing additional counterterrorism measures such as the Anti-Money Laundering Directive and the Regulation on Common Minimum Standards for Deactivation of Firearms and the Firearms Directive. In November 2016, the Commission will also adopt the new additions to the Regulation on the Marketing and Use of Explosive Material Precursors (COM(2016) 670 final, 4).

The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism (5643/5/14) was first adopted in 2005 and revised in 2013. In 2011, EU Commission established Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN), which builds a network of practitioners working on the daily basis with groups of people who are deemed to be at risk of radicalization. This includes groups of people such as the police and prison authorities but also groups of people who may not necessarily work in crime prevention but who may play a significant role in counterterrorism. This network includes various groups of people such as teachers, youth workers and healthcare professionals. Practitioners from the various EU member states that participate in these RAN Working Groups are able to share their experiences and discuss what works and what does not work with their peers. On the other hand, other initiatives such as the EU Commission's Horizon 2020 Program is a seven-year endeavor that aims to ensure the competitiveness of Europe as a whole with a focus on excellence in sciences and industrial leadership necessary to tackle societal challenges (What is Horizon 2020? –webpage). This program prioritizes counterterrorism and its ultimate aim is to use sciences and technology for counterterrorism related purposes throughout Europe throughout 2016 and 2017 in order to prevent attacks. This is partly due to the fact that new and novel technologies and capabilities are needed in order to fight and prevent crime, illegal

trafficking and terrorism. This includes a better and a constantly evolving understanding and tackling of terrorist ideas and beliefs.

However, it is vital to note that human rights and privacy should be of utmost importance and respected throughout these counterterrorism process. The requirement to respect human rights and privacy is potentially one of the biggest limitations for these counterterrorism measures. An override and a complete disregard for human rights and privacy could be the driving force that further fuels the deterioration and effectiveness of counterterrorism. Disregard for human rights appears to be one of the driving forces of what motivates people to seek terrorism as a tool to accomplish their intended goals to fight for their rights. Counterterrorism as a tool, however, is complex and needs a holistic approach from the entire society in order to counteract radicalization and extremism. This is not an easy task and will require a multidisciplinary approach and cooperation between different member states as well as professionals from different fields. The EU emphasizes that way forward to properly countering violent extremist and terrorism is through innovative and ethically sound solutions. Such solutions can include but are not limited to online and offline interventions. For instance, online interventions of radicalization can include monitoring and interfering with the potential outcomes associated with the YouTube videos, Twitter accounts and special forums. On the other hand, offline interventions can include Working Groups and discussion forums throughout schools or even include one-to-one interventions because as previously noted, a common trend typically actually involves young males and descendants of the sub-population of incoming asylum seekers and immigrants that feel slighted, frustrated, disenfranchised and humiliated by the remainder of the European society (Horizon 2020 - Working programme 2016-2017, 23). Therefore, human rights have been highlighted as being of utmost overt importance in the war against radicalization and terrorism other than countering such acts using covert means such as criminal investigations, surveillance and pre-emptive arrests.

The focus should therefore be the development of policy recommendations and practical solutions when trying to combat violent extremism and terrorism on the EU level as a strategy. Practical and grass-root level solutions and policies are vital and they provide concrete solutions, necessary to resolve such a complex task of dealing what is unseen and hard to identify in advance. Both terrorism and radicalization are complex and constantly evolving phenomena. In order to prevent these evolving phenomena, EU is supporting the

member states with the help necessary to also prevent and counter radicalization that stems from within the prison systems. As mentioned above, radicalization and recruitment is a significant problem in the European prison system and must be prevented. Thus, EU's attempts to pre-emptively tackle this problem is a step in a positive direction. The radicalization will be countered throughout the prison systems of Europe by increasing the education and training of the prisoners in order to distinguish the recruitment apart from the conventional religious conversations or conversions. These types of concrete grass-root level actions are important in order to prevent the spread of radical interpretation of Islam.

However, policy is typically lagging behind certain evolutions within the society and tends to be reactive rather than proactive. This is why there are very few EU regulations, projects or plans available to counteract radicalization of the asylum seekers. This is in spite of the fact that the EU has faced a massive influx of asylum seekers and immigrants from the troubled hot spots and areas of the world that are known for having terrorism related issues such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia over the past several years. For instance, there are no common and unified EU refugee integration guidelines or important tools available for the prevention of marginalization for those that migrate into Europe as asylum seekers. There are only a few and a small number of integration projects available through the NGOs. The only Commission level document that is also available is the Action Plan on the integration of third country nationals (COM(2016) 377 final, hereinafter Integration Action Plan) from June of 2016. This Integration Action Plan does not mention the risk of radicalization as a result of marginalization and discrimination. The Integration Action Plan states that the Commission will launch projects in order to promote the political participation of the third-country nationals and will attempt to prevent and combat discrimination. The Commission will also invest into action plans that combat the prejudices and stereotypes such as *not all the Muslims are terrorists, but all the terrorists are Muslims* – kind of thinking.

It is also important to note that the EU is bound by a treaty level that hold the EU accountable to the integration of immigrants. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, article 79.4. states that:

*“The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may establish measures to provide incentives and support for the action of Member States with a view to*

*promoting the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.”*

This creates the legal foundation for the specific integration measures at the EU level. However, the concrete measures for the integration of the third country nationals are still in the national competence of the member states and there is no common EU-wide regulation on the integration issues. More importantly, these measures only discuss the "integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories" and nowhere does this integration of third-country nationals is being based on illegal third-country nationals. Thus, the problems may occur in the cases where there may be an increased number of undocumented immigrants, such as those who have received negative asylum decision but decided to remain in Europe. Undocumented immigrants are targets of criminal organizations as they rarely have no legal means to earn their income. The risk is that the terrorist organizations start to aim the recruitment campaigns especially to those unsuccessful asylum seekers who are not willing to return their countries of origin but cannot remain in Europe legally either.

Besides the overt means to countering radicalization and terrorism, covert means will also play a vital role in counter-terrorism and radicalization that cannot be resolved using soft power and humanitarian means. Since 9/11, EU's counter terrorism budget has also been constantly on the rise in past 15 years. In 2002, the EU budget for counter-terrorism was only 5.9 million euros and in 2009 it has already increased up to 93.5 million euros. Also, it is hard to precisely estimate or calculate the real cost of counterterrorism programs because some of the costs associated with such programs are classified and are not available to the public. Even the budgetary numbers are deemed to be sensitive. Release of such numbers gives the enemy an idea of what the capabilities and the realistic capacities are when it comes to being able to perform various counterterrorism tasks. Thus, such programs and costs associated with them remain classified and vague to the public. However, one can still get an idea for such overall spending by looking at the broader 'Security and Citizenship' heading within the EU budget, where the counter-terrorism budget also falls under. Overall, this budget has increased from 2,522 million euros in 2015 to 4,052 million euros in 2016. Spending on counter-terrorism in EU, including all the counter-terrorism functions has almost doubled based on the available numbers (European Parliament 2016, 2).

Thus, an increase in the counter-terrorism budget can also be attributed to being one of the reasons why there has been an increase in the terrorism related arrests. When the police and the intelligence are targeting more resources for the sake of terrorism prevention, they are also more likely to catch more people involved in these types of activities.

#### **4.2.2. The Council of Europe**

After the UN Security Council adopted the resolution 2178 in 2014, the Council of Europe also adopted new regulations for counterterrorism. The original Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism was already introduced in 2005 shortly after the attacks on 9/11 and the Madrid train bombings. In 2015, the new Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS no.217) was introduced after the steering committee of Council of Europe and the Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER) held a planning session to evaluate the effects of the resolution 2178. After the proposal of CODEXTER, the committee of Ministers adopted the mandate for the Committee on Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Related Issues (COD-CTE). COD-CET prepared the additional protocol for the original Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. The additional protocol is intended to add provisions on the criminalization of a number of acts, which are related to terrorist offences and a provision on the exchange of information. However, by now (12th November 2016) the additional protocol has not entered into force. There are six additional ratifications that are needed in order for that to happen. Thus far, only Albania, Denmark and Monaco have ratified the additional protocol with regards to this matter (Council of Europe, 2016).

Article 1 of the protocol notes that the purpose of the protocol is to supplement the original convention and in order to prevent terrorism efficiently using various measures. This Article also states that such measures shall be implemented at the national level and through international co-operations. International co-operation is based on bilateral and multilateral treaties. The main provisions of the additional protocol are linked with the criminalization of certain terrorism related offences. Thus, this Article has very similar aims to that of the planned EU directive, which has been previously discussed. This additional protocol would require the criminalization of traveling abroad for terrorism related purposes, similar to the EU Directive.

It is important to note that the effects of criminalization of the act of travelling abroad for terrorism related purposes does not address the other aspect terrorism related cases such as the "home-grown terrorism" threat. However, based on such policy related changes, the question then becomes: Does criminalization of travelling abroad prevent terrorism efficiently? Certainly, training can be provided online and anonymity networks can be used in cases where the data traffic is controlled and there are hidden network services such as Tor available for such purposes. Training for using guns and explosives as well as religious training can be easily acquired online as well. However, it is also true that many of the recent perpetrators of Islamic terrorist attacks in Europe were trained in Middle East. Thus, a wholistic approach to counterterrorism cannot entirely disregard the legal justification for the intervention in traveling and criminalization of traveling to the terrorism prone areas for the sake of seeking training, provision or receipt of funding, and/or fighting for the Daesh or other evolving global threats and terrorist organizations.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

### **Inequality and Discrimination as Pushing Factors**

This thesis examined the connection between the Islamic terrorist attacks in Europe and the influx of Muslim immigrants and asylum seekers into Europe. As presented in the first chapter, the main research questions were whether an increase in the number of immigrants from Muslim countries increases the risk of Islamic terrorist attacks in Europe or not? Are immigrants likely to radicalize in Europe? What can the European states do to prevent radicalization and ensure the security of the citizens?

The hypothesis was that an increase in the number of Muslim asylum seekers in Europe is not directly a security threat to Europe if the immigrants are integrated well into the European society. Furthermore, it was assumed that prejudices and discrimination towards the mass numbers of Muslim asylum seekers and immigrants into European countries is what actually poses dangers. Discrimination is what appears to incentivize Muslim immigrants and asylum seekers to join violent extremist causes or organizations in response to the ill-treatment they face throughout Europe and the world at large. The role of the society that falls within the lower socio-economic class and their well-being along with the well-being of 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation immigrants were examined and discussed.

The data presented in this thesis provides evidence that validates the fact that the risk of the terrorism is not linked solely to the number of Muslim asylum seekers coming into the country. There are countries, which have received a large number of asylum seekers but have not faced any large scale attacks. On the other hand, countries like France where the number of asylum applications have been stable in recent years and not significantly higher in comparison to the rest of Europe have faced many more Islamic terrorist attacks in recent years. This suggests that the two issues are not directly linked. Also, it is well-established that



the fact that the perpetrators of the Paris terrorist attacks were not asylum seekers but 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants.

Moreover, as presented in the chapters 2, 3 and 4, the economic well-being plays a vital role in the radicalization. Discrimination, xenophobia and marginalization are some of the factors that push people with immigrant background to the violent extremist groups. Fewer possibilities of employment and education for the people with immigrant background may increase the risk of the radicalization. Stigmatizing all the asylum seekers as terrorists is not going to help their integration and will not reduce the risk of their radicalization.

In 2015, more than 1.32 million asylum seekers arrived in Europe. However, only 687 people were arrested for terrorism related crimes. Even if all the arrestees were asylum seekers, which was not the case, the total percentage of terrorism related cases would account for 0.05% of all the asylum seekers. As not all, most likely not even the majority, of the arrestees were asylum seekers, the actual percentage of Muslim asylum seekers and immigrants is even lower.

The increased number of asylum seekers requires the European states to create functioning action plans to integrate the immigrants by providing them sufficient language training and education. Such plans also need to diminish the obstacles for asylum seekers' entrance into the labour market. The full integration does not only require measures from the surrounding society but also from the asylum seekers themselves. The willingness to integrate is the key and this motivation must come from the asylum seekers themselves. However, the attitudes of the society such as non-discrimination and acceptance of immigrants as full members of the host community are more likely to help the progress of the integration.

## **Concentrating on the Real Problems**

It was previously discussed in Chapter 1.2.2. and explained that there must be two conditions that are met in order for the terrorist to be able to act and operate. First, there must be a chance or an opportunity to be able to carry out the attack. Terrorism prevention strategies discussed in the Chapter 4 concentrate on this as well. The second condition discussed in the Chapter 1.2.2. was that the reason to carry out an attack is often overlooked in the European

context. Counterterrorism prevention in Europe has been concentrating a lot on the prevention of terrorist attacks and not the radicalization of the potential terrorists.

On the international level, the framework presented in the UN and Europe along with the main documents and regulations are all focused on prevention of the attacks after the radicalization has happened. A lot of money and resources are put to prevent the arms trade, recruitment and travelling to the conflict zones for the purposes of training or fighting. Preventing such actions, albeit important for the purposes of preventing concrete attacks, are limiting the consequences and not preventing the actual root cause.

Therefore, it is important to note that the international instruments such as UN resolutions and action plans are not the best possible way to prevent radicalization throughout Europe. The root causes of terrorism in Europe varies entirely from the root causes of terrorism in the areas that are mostly affected by the Islamic terrorism. This research, however, has only focused on those reasons lead to radicalization throughout Europe. As previously mentioned in Chapter 4.1., the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism by the UN Secretary General stated that violent extremism is concerning to all nations and countries in circumstances where actual or perceived injustice exists, where human rights are being violated, good governance is ignored and people have no hope. Compared to the other parts of the world, Europe is has significantly better respect for human rights and a much better governance and rule of law. The UN terrorism prevention instruments are more focused on improving the basic human rights conditions, which are important in the other parts of the world but not as critical in Europe. All of the EU member states are democracies with high regard for the human rights. Political violence is not needed in order to accomplish basic human rights and freedoms as it may be the case in the Middle East and certain African countries.

Instead, more attention should be paid to increasing the economic well-being of those who are underprivileged in the society. This should not solely apply to the Muslim immigrants or asylum seekers but to the entire society at large. Often times due to the Islamophobia and discrimination, however, immigrants tend to face additional hardships when it comes to finding employment and tend to become members of the lower socio-economic status. This causes frustration and anger, which in turn can in very infrequent number of cases lead to violence and acts of terrorism. Recruiters from the rank and file of Islamist terrorist organizations also see these incoming Muslim immigrants as easy and vulnerable prey that is

ripe for recruitment. As previously mentioned, people will take enormous risks when they feel like they have nothing to live for and lose.

Another major issue is that the international and regional counterterrorism policies focus on sanctions and criminalization of terrorists instead of dealing with the root of the problem, which is radicalization. Despite the fact that there has been a shift towards a more grass roots approach, no concrete and practical steps have been taken towards the counter-radicalization process. Inequality, alienation, discrimination, and criminalization all continue to persist within the fabric of society and the European and global leadership at large. For instance, integrations should commence immediately upon the arrival of the new asylum seekers through comprehensive language and cultural training as part of an effort to include rather than exclude right away. This could alleviate the tensions associated with the inability to seek employment right away because language and culture or lack thereof tend to be the biggest impediments in seeking employment. One cannot even pursue a modern day lifer and open a bank account and let alone drive or do everyday basic things if a language barrier persists.

The long waiting periods for asylum decisions also cause the same effects as the discrimination in the later stages experiences, which typically turns into anger and frustration. Many have entered into Europe with high hopes of having a better future, however, the long asylum process typically deflates those expectations and causes a great deal of suffering. If the radicalization and in turn terrorism are to be tackled, a human being needs to be fully embraced and accepted by the society. People typically tend to have ambitions and dreams, which they are willing to pursue and accomplish in the long run. If there are no legitimate means for accomplishing such goals, illegitimate means become a tempting option. It is important to keep in mind that if an individual is from a part of the world where there are no civil rights, no rule of law, and complete chaos and anarchy, the state should consider providing integration courses. Otherwise, there could a real possibility where clash of different cultures may occur and lead to potentially horrible consequences. Thus, it becomes especially important to factor in where the Muslim asylum seeker is coming from because the psychological wounds and consequences of those wounds are not negligible and nor avoidable.

Overall, it is vital not to label or discriminate against any sub-group of incoming immigrants. Any stereotyped labels may increase the likelihood of marginalization and

decrease the likelihood of future success and employment and in turn lead to voluntary isolation and radicalization.

## **Recommendations for Further Research**

In conclusion, the increase in the terrorism related arrests is not necessarily connected to the increased number of asylum seekers. This means that there is not necessarily any causation between the two factors. The increased number of terrorism related arrests is directly influenced by the fact that there are more funds for counterterrorism related activities and are also partly due to the hyperawareness that is given by the public perception to terrorism related cases and the influx of Muslim immigrants and asylum seekers. The probability of reporting of suspicious activities by the incoming immigrants and 2<sup>nd</sup> to 3<sup>rd</sup> generation immigrants may possibly increase if the Muslim immigrants are humanely and equally integrated into the society as a whole.

Otherwise, the details of those who have been arrested should be further analyzed in order to determine if an increase in the number of asylum seekers has increased the number of terrorism related cases. It is critical to analyze the number of asylum seekers that have been arrested for terrorism related cases and not confuse and mince the words like 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> generation immigrant committing the crime with the words like a Muslim asylum seeker. Unfortunately, oftentimes, the numerical data does not tell us the whole picture and some information is still missing. For instance, information pertaining to who is a and who is not an asylum seeker amongst those who have committed terrorism related offenses in Europe is still missing. Thus, those precise numbers need to be further investigated and researched in order to further quantify and in turn validate any assumptions.

Furthermore, other approaches and methods should be researched from the sociological and psychological stand point of view. Every discipline offers a very different perspective and that also includes disciplines such as criminology and jurisprudence. Ultimately, all avenues should be pursued because terrorism is hard to define, hard to preemptively identify and neutralize in time. It is easier to speculate and theorize about a subject matter that has never been black and white and has a lot of grey areas. Terrorism related acts can simply strike fear into the hearts and minds of masses and demoralize the public at large.

The role of native-born European converted Muslims in the international jihadism should be further examined. This includes other type of questions, which are not necessary linked to the factors of radicalization discussed in this thesis. In addition, the motivation of lone wolf actors should be studied more. The role of international conflicts as a motivating factor of the perpetrators is definitely something that should be studied more.

Consequently, no aspect of any counterterrorism efforts, including the suggested counter-radicalization efforts required to combat discrimination in order to integrate Muslim immigrants into the society, should ever be disregarded. However, it is also important to note that Europe alone cannot continue to carry the burden of Muslim asylum seekers all by itself. Sound fiscal policies must be able to support integration programs and the financial accommodations that will be required for the incoming masses of Muslim asylum seekers. Europe will need to implement all aspects of covert and overt approaches in order to avoid mass casualties that can cripple the economy. While the number of Muslims asylum seekers involved in terrorist attacks is negligible at best, one terrorist can be one too many. Additional research should be done on whether based on various macroeconomic indicators like current and projected national revenues throughout the European Union, can the European Union sustain and afford the incoming influx of Muslim asylum seekers based on the statistical data that is available with regards to their migration into Europe while taking the macroeconomic indicators into account? Can the European Union realistically handle the financial burdens associated with provision of humanitarian aid, intervention programs, language and cultural training programs and various other on the job training and entrance level job programs for the incoming influxes of Muslim asylum seekers while also fulfilling its obligations domestically and abroad? A lot remains to be seen in the coming years and the future remains unknown, however, the unknown also offers great opportunities to tackle constantly evolving challenges.

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## **TIIVISTELMÄ**

### **UUSIA NÄKÖKULMIA TURVAPAIKANHAKIJOIDEN RADIKALISOITUMISEN VASTAISIIIN STRATEGIOIHIN**

Heidi Nihtilä

Viime vuosien kasvanut turvapaikanhakijamäärä Euroopassa yhdistettynä useisiin islamististen terroristijärjestöjen tekemiin terrori-iskuihin Euroopassa on herättänyt huolta ympäri Eurooppaa. Ovatko Eurooppaan saapuneet turvapaikanhakijat potentiaalinen turvallisuusuhka Euroopalle? Tämän tutkimuksen hypoteesina on, että turvapaikanhakijoiden integroiminen Eurooppalaiseen yhteiskuntaan vähentää terrorismin riskiä, ja radikalisoituminen liittyy enemmän taloudelliseen ja sosiaaliseen epätasa-arvoon kuin turvapaikanhakijoiden yhteiskunnalliseen tai kulttuuriseen taustaan.

Jotta turvapaikanhakijoiden radikalisoitumista voidaan tutkia, on tärkeää pystyä määrittelemään poliittinen väkivalta ja väkivaltainen ekstrimismi sekä terrorismi ja jihadismi, joista jälkimmäistä usein kutsutaan myös islamistiseksi terrorismiksi. Yhteistä näille kaikille käsitteille on väkivallan käyttö siviiliväestöä kohtaan. Käsitteet ovat kuitenkin kaikki poliittisesti ja moraalisesti värittyneitä, mikä tekee niiden määrittelemisestä haastavaa.

Kansainvälinen yhteisö ei ole löytänyt yhtä sitovaa määritelmää terrorismille. Euroopan unionissa terrorismi on käsitelty eri yhteyksissä, laajimman määritelmän tarjoaa vuoden 2002 puitepäättös 2002/475/YOS. Puitepäättöksen 1 artiklan mukaan terrorismia on kansallisessa rikoslaisissa rikoksiksi määritellyt teot, jotka ovat luonteeltaan tai asiayhteydeltään sellaisia, että ne voivat aiheuttaa vakavaa haittaa jollekin maalle tai kansainväliselle järjestölle. Lisäksi tekijällä tulee olla tietyt, artiklan 1 alakohdissa tyhjentävästi luetellut motiivit, kuten esimerkiksi väestön pelottelu, ja tämän teon seurauksena voi aiheutua kuolema, ruumiillisen koskemattomuuden loukkaaminen tai panttivangin ottaminen.

Euroopan viimeaikaiset suuret terrori-iskut ovat olleet pääasiassa uskonnollisesti ja poliittisesti motivoituneita. On kuitenkin muistettava, että Eurooppaan kohdistuu vain pieni uhka islamististen terroristijärjestöjen taholta. Suurin osa maailman islamistisista terrori-iskuista tapahtuu muslimimaissa, Irak, Afganistan, Syyria, Nigeria ja Pakistan ovat maita, jotka kärsivät terrorismista eniten. Osa näistä on myös maita, joista suurin osa maailman pakolaisista on kotoisin. Näin ollen maahanmuutolla ja terrorismilla on käänteinen yhteys, jota Euroopassa harvemmin huomioidaan: terrorismi aiheuttaa pakolaisuutta.

Maailman yli 65 miljoonasta pakolaisesta vain pieni osa on saapunut Eurooppaan turvapaikanhakijoina. Vuonna 2015 Euroopassa jätettiin hieman yli miljoona turvapaikkahakemusta, ylivoimaisesti suurin osa näistä jätettiin Saksassa. Kiinnostavaa on, että julkisessa keskustelussa turvapaikanhakijoiden nähdään aiheuttavan turvallisuusuhka Euroopassa, mutta esimerkiksi Ranska, joka on eniten islamistisesta terrorismista kärsinyt EU-maa, otti vastaan vain maltillisen määrän turvapaikanhakijoita, noin 76 000 turvapaikanhakijaa. Huomattavaa on, että Ranskassa jätettyjen turvapaikkahakemusten määrä ei prosentuaalisesti noussut yhtä paljon kuin muissa EU-maissa.

On kuitenkin huomattava, että Ranskan alttius terrori-iskuille on selitettävissä useilla muilla syillä kuin turvapaikanhakijoilla. Kukaan vuoden 2015 terrori-iskujen tekijöistä ei ollut turvapaikanhakija, kaikki olivat EU-kansalaisia ja suurin osa oli syntynyt Euroopassa. Mikä siis ajaa EU-kansalaisia radikaalin islamin pariin? Taloudellinen eriarvoisuus, syrjintä, huonommat työllistymismahdollisuudet sekä eräänlainen ulkopuolisuuden tunne ajavat pääasiassa nuoria maahanmuuttajataustaisia miehiä väkivaltaisten äärijärjestöjen pariin. Myös esimerkiksi Ranskan ajama islamilaisen kasvot peittävän burkha – vaateen kielto ja useat profeetta Muhammedia pilkanneet pilakuvat ovat aiheuttaneet vastareaktioita Ranskan muslimien keskuudessa. Ranska on myös yksi aktiivisimpia EU-maita Daeshin vastaisessa sodassa Syyriassa ja Irakissa. Tämä osaltaan selittää Daeshin vastaiskut Ranskassa.

YK ja EU ovat pyrkineet luomaan terrorismintorjuntaohjelmia, mutta etenkin YK:n ohjelmien ongelma Euroopan kannalta on, että ne keskittyvät pääasiassa ongelmiin, jotka ajavat ihmisiä äärijärjestöjen pariin kehittyvissä maissa. Euroopan unionin toimintasuunnitelmat sen sijaan keskittyvät estämään varsinaisia iskuja, eivät niinkään terrorismin ja radikalisoitumisen perimmäistä syytä. EU on keskittynyt esimerkiksi aselainsäädännön kiristämiseen ja terrorismin rahoittamisen valvontaan. Sen sijaan hyvin vähän huomiota on kiinnitetty esimerkiksi maahanmuuttajien integraatioon ja

työllisyysmahdollisuuksien kehittämiseen. Lisäksi EU on keskittynyt erilaisten terroristiksi teoiksi katsottavien tekojen kriminalisointiin. Kuitenkin useilla terroristeilla on jo rikollistaustaa, ja he ovat usein radikalisoituneet vankilassa, joten tekojen kriminalisointi ei välttämättä toimi pelotteena.

Euroopan valtioiden tulisikin uudessa tilanteessa, jossa useat maat ovat vastaanottaneet ennennäkemättömän määrän turvapaikanhakijoita, keskittyä luomaan toimintamalleja, jotka edistävät turvapaikanhakijoiden integraatiota ja kielen opetusta. Nämä lisäävät työllistymismahdollisuuksia ja näin ollen vähentävät riskiä jäädä yhteiskunnan ulkopuolelle. Lisääntynyt rasismi ja ksenofobia ovat omiaan lisäämään syrjintää, ja tätä kautta turvapaikanhakijoiden katkeroitumista uutta kotimaata kohtaan. Rasismin kitkeminen ja ennakkoluulojen vähentäminen vähentää riskiä radikalisoitua. Myös terrorismin torjuntatoimien tulee olla tasa-arvoisia, erityisesti tiettyyn uskontokuntaan tai etniseen taustaan kohdistuvat terrorismintorjuntatoimet nähdään usein leimaavina. Pahimmillaan tämä terroristin leima johtaa tilanteeseen, joka vaikeuttaa työllistymistä entisestään ja johtaa noidankehään, jossa syrjintä ja terrorismi ruokkivat toisiaan.

**Asiasanat:** terrorismi, jihadismi, poliittinen väkivalta, maahanmuutto, radikalisoituminen, syrjintä, integraatio, terrorismintorjunta