

**Patterns of Multi-Level Governance  
in Europe: The Challenge of  
the EU's Enlargement**

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**The thesis was accepted for the defence of the degree of Doctor of  
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Defence of the thesis: August 30, 2007

Declaration: Hereby I declare that this doctoral thesis, my original  
investigation and achievement, submitted for the doctoral degree at  
Tallinn University of Technology has not been submitted for any other  
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ISSN 1406-4790

ISBN 978-9985-59-722-4

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## LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS

This dissertation is based on the following original publications:

- I. Kungla, Tarvo.** 2005. Die Entwicklung der Regionalstrukturen in Estland: Zwischen Transformation und Europäisierung, in: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2005, edited by Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismusforschung. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 323-335.
- II. Kungla, T. and P. Kettunen.** 2005. Europeanization of Sub-national Governance in Unitary States: Estonia and Finland, in: Regional and Federal Studies 15 (4): 353-378.
- III. Kungla, Tarvo.** 2007. 'Raising the Game': Administrative Reform of the European Parliament General Secretariat, in: Management Reforms in International Organizations, edited by M.W. Bauer and C. Knill. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 71-83.

# INTRODUCTION

The European Union's (EU) Eastern enlargement has been a challenge to both the EU and the new member states. This is not only because the 10+2 enlargement<sup>1</sup> is the biggest in the history of the EU. The Eastern enlargement is unique also for two other reasons. Most importantly, 10 out of the 12 entrants are former communist countries that (re)established democratic institutions and free market economy only at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. In the beginning and during the accession negotiations, institution-building had not been completed yet in many areas. In effect, the candidate countries had the task to continue and complete the domestic reforms while at the same time taking into account the conditionality of the EU membership, especially aligning their legal and institutional arrangements with the *acquis communautaire* – the body of primary and secondary European Community<sup>2</sup> legislation – to become members of the EU. This has not been an easy task for the candidate countries as with the deepening of European integration, the *acquis* has become much 'thicker' and its implementation much more demanding. Neither is the EU's Eastern enlargement necessarily an easy thing to cope with for the EU institutions. A grown number of member states combined with the considerably increased heterogeneity of the EU in terms of different social and economic development but also historical experiences results in a need of adaptation for the EU institutions as well.

The aim of this dissertation is to explore some the key aspects of the impact of the EU's Eastern enlargement on governance in the European Union. The theoretical framework of the dissertation draws mainly on literature on governance, policy analysis and Europeanisation research. More in-depth empirical analysis has been undertaken for the European Parliament and local and regional government in Estonia.

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<sup>1</sup> On 1 May 2004, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia became members of the EU. The accession of Bulgaria and Romania on 1 January 2007 completed the fifth enlargement of the EU.

<sup>2</sup> The designation 'European Union' was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 to replace the term 'European Economic Community' (EEC). The Maastricht Treaty gave the EEC, together with the European Coal and Steel Community, and Euratom, a new name: the European Communities (EC), the first pillar of the European Union. Here and in the following text, the terms 'European Community' and 'European Union' will be used interchangeably.

The dissertation is based on 5 years of extensive research in Estonia and Germany. However, the dissertation was finalised in Brussels. The original empirical information of the dissertation was collected in expert interviews in Estonia and Brussels. Preliminary results of the dissertation were discussed at international workshops in Marburg, Belfast and Konstanz.

The original articles of the thesis focus on the impact of the Eastern enlargement on the European Union's multi-level governance both at the sub-national levels in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in the EU institutions. The first two core articles of the thesis discuss the impact of the EU on the regional and local government reform in Estonia (I) and put the Estonian sub-national governance in the context of developments in other unitary EU member states comparing Estonia to Finland (II). The third core article of the dissertation deals with enlargement challenges for the internal organisation of the European Parliament (III). Further publications by the author elaborate on the impact of the EU on the regionalisation reforms in CEE countries (Kungla 2002) and local government reform in CEE (Kungla 2005a; Kungla 2005b).

The introduction is divided into 5 parts. In setting a framework for the following sections, the first part of the paper elaborates the concept of multi-level governance. In the second section, the link between multi-level governance and Eastern enlargement is discussed. The third part discusses the influence of the Eastern enlargement on the internal organisation and working procedures of the EU institutions. The fourth section elaborates on the impact of the enlargement on sub-national levels in the CEE countries. Finally, challenges of the Eastern enlargement for the EU's multi-level governance are summarised.

### *1. The EU as a system of multi-level governance*

Since the beginnings of European integration, there has been a lot of disagreement about both the underlying dynamics of the integration process and the nature of the emerging political system. With the two most important opposing schools of thought neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, earlier discussion focused on the process of integration and the final aim of the integration project (Rosamond 2000; Schmitter 1996). However, in the aftermath of the speeding-up of the integration process with the Single European Act (1986) and Maastricht Treaty (1992), the focus of EU studies has shifted from aims and dynamics of the integration process to description and

analysis of the actual day-to-day workings of the EU's political system (Hix 1994, Jachtenfuchs 2001).

The 'governance' turn in EU studies has been accompanied by an opening up of the area of EU studies to a number of sub-disciplines of political science and public administration and to a development of new strands of research on the European Union. Since then, numerous studies have addressed issues that had previously not been investigated, such as the impact of the EU on the member states, and legitimacy in the EU. EU studies now are high up on the research agenda of comparative political science. Studies such as by Alberta Sbragia (1992), who found interesting parallels between the German type of executive federalism and the institutional architecture of the EU, and Fritz Scharpf (1985), who adapted his approach of 'joint-decision-making' (*Politikverflechtung*), which he originally developed in the context of the German federalist system, to understand certain aspects of the EU decision-making system, have provided interesting insights into the functioning of the EU.

However, the growing body of research does not mean that it has been easy to come to grips with analysing the political system of the EU. Considerable disagreement exists regarding the question of how to conceive the EU. Without doing much injustice to the more nuanced and detailed arguments that can be found in the literature, two broad lines of argument can be distinguished. The first tradition adopts a state-centred view and argues that, like other international organisations, the EU should be treated as a forum of cooperation for member states to enhance their problem-solving capacities. By using instruments such as unanimous decision-making and other safeguards, the member states remain in control of EU decision-making, in which 'supranational' institutions can be conceived as their agents. The second strand of research argues that whereas it might have been in the interest of the member states to establish supranational institutions to solve collective action problems, decision-making in the EU is not (any more) monopolised by the member states. This is even more the case since the changes introduced with the Single European Act (1986) and the Treaties of Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1999) and Nice (2001) (Hooghe and Marks 2001).

This general controversy about the nature of the political system is also reflected in a number of concepts used to describe the indeed quite unique and rapidly evolving political system of the EU. To take some examples, the EU has been described as a 'regulatory state' (Majone 1994), a 'post-Hobbesian state' (Streeck and Schmitter 1991) and an

'Empire' (Beck and Grande 2005). From among the different concepts used to capture the nature of the EU, the concept of 'multi-level governance' is most widely used. One of the earliest advocates of the concept, Gary Marks, describes multi-level governance as a system 'characterised by co-decision-making across several nested tiers of government, ill-defined and shifting spheres of competence (creating a consequential potential for conflicts about competences), and an ongoing search for principles of decisional distribution that might be applied to this emerging polity.' (1993: 407).

A considerable number of studies on multi-level governance has been published since Marks first developed the concept. Even though it has been refined, the concept still remains ill-defined (Bache and Flinders 2003; Jordan 2001). However, a number of central traits that characterise the EU's multi-level governance system can be identified bearing in mind that different scholars put more or less emphasis on each (cf. Grande 2000):

- *Firstly*, it is conceived as a structure which is in essence neither hierarchical nor anarchic but in which the political authority and power is shared. Central political authority is dispersed vertically from the national to the supranational and sub-national levels as well as horizontally to non-state actors.
- *Secondly*, the EU's system of governance is characterised by dialogue and negotiations rather than command and control (Grande 2000; Neyer 2003).
- *Thirdly*, it involves a high number of public and private actors involved at different stages of the decision-making process. The multi-level governance perspective emphasises multiple venues for interest group representation in the political process of the EU: 'With its dispersed competencies, contending but interlocked institutions, and shifting agendas, multi-level governance opens multiple points of access for interests.' (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 28).
- *Fourthly*, the EU's multi-level governance is a very dynamic system. Competencies of different actors are defined in a vague manner and are characterised by a considerable intensity of change caused by the changes in Treaties and secondary legislation as well as European Court of Justice case law. That, added to the complexity of the rules, makes the system very flexible and dynamic but also frequently causes conflicts of competence between different actors involved (Grande 2000).



At the level of concrete policies, the concept of multi-level governance has been mostly applied in the analysis of EU regional policy (e.g. Bache 1999; Benz and Eberlein 1999; Smith 1997; Hooghe 1996). Moreover, the concept was first developed in the context of EU regional policy. With the SEA and following changes, the sub-national levels acquired a significant role in the regional policy. In addition, the Commission was given a quite autonomous role in managing one part of the regional funds. These developments were accompanied by a significant mobilisation of local and regional governments at the European level (Keating and Hooghe 2001). This led several observers to talk about 'Europe of Regions' – a slogan that was replaced with 'Europe with Regions' (Hooghe and Marks 1996) after the less promising developments in the aftermath of Maastricht (Sutcliffe 2000). Early advocates of multi-level governance elaborated their arguments mostly on the basis of studies on the implementation of EU regional funds. The results of these studies do not allow equivocal conclusions as there is a considerable variation of the influence of sub-national actors both across and within member states (Marks 1996; Smyrl 1997). However, it can be concluded that the reform of EU regional policy has provided new windows of opportunity for sub-national actors to engage themselves in EU affairs.

With its focus on different institutional levels of government, it is not surprising that the concept of multi-level was first developed in the area of EU regional policy. In later analyses, the concept has also been used in other policy areas (see e.g. Eising 2004). Whereas in the earlier research, the 'level' in multi-level was conceived of as a level in the sense of a territorial-administrative level, more recent studies emphasise the need of the concept to encompass not only institutional levels but also levels in terms of policy arenas in different policies and around different issues. In this latter functionalist sense, multi-level governance does also take place at one institutional level and does also involve non-state actors (Marks and Hooghe 2003; Grande 2000, Peterson 1995).

## *2. Multi-level governance and the EU's Eastern enlargement*

The concept of multi-level governance was developed against the backdrop of the deepening of European integration. The Single European Act and the following Treaty changes resulted in an institutional framework that extends the EU's competencies to issues that are crucial for the everyday life of the people. Furthermore, the role of supranational institutions, notably of the European Parliament,

in the EU decision-making was strengthened. These reforms have also added a local and regional dimension to the European affairs. Alongside the supranational and state institutions, local governments and regions have now formal and informal channels to shape EU policies.

How does the Eastern enlargement of the EU influence this recently evolved governance system of the European Union? In answering this question, it is possible to distinguish two levels of analysis and consequently two different ways of elaborating on this issue. First, it is possible to discuss how and to what extent the EU's structures are capable of absorbing new members, i.e. for example which institutional changes were necessary to ensure a sufficient degree of decision-making capacity in a union that has 10+2 new members or how to avoid overstraining the budget of the EU considering that it is overwhelmingly poor countries which joined the EU. These questions are usually tackled at the level of the founding Treaties and involve a lot of bargaining between the member states. The Treaty of Nice (2001) was intended to prepare the EU's institutions for the enlargement.

The second way of elaborating on the consequences of Eastern enlargement for the EU's governance is to consider the impact of the enlargement on the day-to-day functioning of the multi-level governance in the EU. What does the enlargement imply for the functioning of the EU institutions? Does the entry of new member states trigger organisational change? The changes are not constrained only to the EU level. By definition, multi-level governance encompasses the whole polity of the European Union, including local and regional levels and interest groups. New patterns of governance can be expected to emerge in relation to the new member states. Thereby, central administrations as well as local and regional governments in these states engage in EU policy networks and establish their role in the EU decision-making system. On the other hand, also the EU institutions, notably the Commission, have to define and clarify their role vis-à-vis actors in the new member states.

In line with the core interest of the multi-level governance approach, the following chapters discuss the impact of the EU's Eastern enlargement on the day-to-day workings of the EU. The fact that the existing literature is characterised by a stronger focus on treaty-based reforms compared to reforms within the institutions (Dinan 2001) makes an even stronger case for investigating below treaty-level reforms. Thus, the first part of the following sections analyses the impact of the enlargement on the internal workings of the EU

institutions. It will focus on two supranational institutions at the core of the EU's decision-making: the European Parliament (EP) and the European Commission.<sup>3</sup>

The second part of the empirical section of the introduction elaborates on the impact of the enlargement on local governments and regions in the new member states. This topic also merits discussion because the CEE countries had to establish democratic local and regional structures basically from scratch after the collapse of communist regimes in these countries, and during the EU's Eastern enlargement, these structures were still evolving and not fully established yet. Thus, this enlargement seems to offer a unique opportunity to subject the hypotheses of the Europeanisation research to an empirical scrutiny in a rather different setting compared to EU-15.

### *3 Impact of the Eastern enlargement on the EU's institutions*

The EU's institutions are accustomed to changes in their environment. They have considerable experience from the past as regards both accommodating themselves with changes in institutional rules and absorbing new member states. Nevertheless, in two respects, the Eastern enlargement of the EU is quite a different challenge to the EU and its institutions than the previous rounds of enlargement. First, the institutions have never had the experience of absorbing so many new members at one point of time. Second, this exercise has been made even more difficult by the deepening of the European integration prior to the enlargement that has gone hand in hand with the expansion and differentiation of the administration of European institutions. Taken together, Eastern enlargement and the treaty reforms have changed the external environment of the EU's institutions considerably.

However, the link between enlargement and internal organisation of the institutions is not so obvious as the connection between internal changes in the institutions and the relevant Treaty changes concerning legislative procedures. Changes and adaptation as a result of enlargement are neither automatic nor even always to be expected. It can also be expected that depending on their composition and tasks, the enlargement had a differential impact on the EP and the Commission.

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<sup>3</sup> There is not sufficient empirical information available on the third most important EU institution – the Council. There has also been no formal reform of the Council general secretariat before or after the EU's eastern enlargement (Christiansen and Vanhoonacker 2006).

## European Parliament

The European Parliament seems to be the most interesting case to start with. Its role and competencies in the EU decision-making have changed the most compared to other EU institutions prior to the enlargement. Its powers have been significantly increased with the introduction of the 'co-operation' procedure in 1986 and even more importantly with the powers to veto and amend Council legislation under the 'co-decision' procedure that was introduced with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. First, the co-decision procedure applied to only selected areas, but it has been gradually extended to cover the bulk of the Community legislation and is foreseen as a default legislative procedure in the draft constitutional treaty of the EU. Also, its powers of control and supervision have been strengthened vis-à-vis the Commission. Whereas Margaret Thatcher might have been right in describing the EP as a 'Mickey-mouse parliament' in the eighties, the developments since the Single European Act have clearly changed this perception, and the EP can be considered a true 'co-legislator' alongside the Council in the political system of the European Union (cf. Corbett et al. 2003; Maurer 2003).

From the point of view of its composition, the EP has always been directly affected by enlargement. With the Eastern enlargement, the number of members of the EP went up from 626 before to 732 after the 2004 elections. After the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the number has temporarily increased to 785. This number will be downsized to 736 after the next EP elections in 2009.

The Treaty changes that had implications for the functioning of the EP have usually been accompanied by changes in the rules of procedure of the institution (Kreppel 2003). Such changes mostly concerned procedures and the organisation of the work of parliamentary committees, the President, political groups, Conference of Presidents and other political bodies. It can be observed that before the Eastern enlargement, such reforms were related solely to the 'political side' of the institution. Though in terms of numbers of staff, the General Secretariat has grown from 2,130 posts in 1980 to 4,259 posts in 2000, its internal organisation has followed an incremental path of changes and the recent Treaty changes have not been immediately accompanied by a major overhaul of the administration. It was only recently, in 2003, with the reform entitled 'Raising the Game', that a major overhaul of the EP administration has taken place. With an aim to improve legislative support for the Members of the EU, the reform consisted of large scale changes in the organisational structure of the

EP, including restructuring the existing directorates general as well as changes in the management of the parliamentary committees' budgets (III).

What is the link between the Eastern enlargement and the 'Raising the Game' exercise? There are several parallel developments that have led to the EP's administrative reform. Of the external factors, Treaty changes and the EU's Eastern enlargement have been very important. This reform is a result of discussions that go back several years where the issue of upgrading the legislative support services for the members in the light of the Treaty changes and the changed needs of the members were extensively discussed. On the other hand, background documents of 'Raising the Game' also mention Eastern enlargement although in a more vague manner. Actors who promoted the reform referred to the Eastern enlargement as an argument to support the 'Raising the Game'. Thus, it was used as a strategic resource to legitimise the reform. Secondly, Eastern enlargement facilitated the reform in making the transfer of the staff from Luxembourg to Brussels easier (III).<sup>4</sup> It can be concluded that the Eastern enlargement was definitely not a sufficient but perhaps a necessary condition for the reform.

#### European Commission

From the three core institutions of the EU, the administrative reform of the European Commission has received the most attention in the literature (Levy 2003; Bauer 2006; Stevens and Stevens 2006; Kassim 2004). This is not surprising considering that there was an enormous interest in measures taken in the institution to prevent future maladministration as a follow-up to the resignation of the Santer commission in 1999. The more widespread interest in the Commission reform might also be explained by the importance of the institution for the European policy-making and by the quite broad scope of the Commission reforms.

The key document on the basic framework of the reform – 'White Paper on reforming the Commission' (European Commission 2000, cf. Kinnock 2004) – outlined three areas for changes: priority setting and

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<sup>4</sup> According to an agreement between the Luxembourg authorities and the EP, the EP is obliged to maintain 2,060 posts in Luxembourg. The eastern enlargement brought an increase of staff and gave some leeway for reshuffling bringing the legislative support services from Luxembourg to Brussels and relocating additional non-legislative support service staff (e.g. translators) from Brussels to Luxembourg.

resource allocation (1), human resources (2) and financial management (3). As regards priority setting and resource allocation, Activity-Based Management was introduced. It aimed at strengthening strategic planning at the top management level and especially a better matching of priorities with resources and establishing a better connection between higher-level planning and lower-level working programmes on a regular basis. The management cycle was supposed to be accompanied by continuous monitoring of the implementation progress of working plans in order to take corrective actions if necessary (Bauer 2006).

Secondly, the Commission reform contained important changes in the personnel policy of the institutions. Most importantly, the new staff regulations<sup>5</sup> that entered in force in 2004 brought along new principles of promotion and career development as well as a new system of grading. The key element of the reform is that the link between the promotion and the merit of officials should become stronger (Levy 2003). Under the new rules, promotion should depend mainly on performance of the staff with less weight given to seniority. The grading scale was stretched, comprising more grades (16 instead of 8) and fewer steps than the earlier system. In addition, the former A, B, C categories were reduced to 'assistant' (B, C) and 'administrator' (A) and movement between the groups became easier.

Thirdly, the new Financial Regulation that was adopted in June 2002 had both the aims of shifting more responsibility for financial commitments to middle managers as well as to strengthen audit and control mechanisms in financial management. It eliminated the requirement for a prior approval of commitment from a separate financial control service and gave authorising officers direct responsibility for prior approval, at the same time strengthening the audit function. These changes were accompanied by setting up relevant institutional structures to ensure a better audit and control system (Stevens and Stevens 2006).

The overall thrust of the reform was to allocate more responsibility to middle-level managers. In the spirit of the reform, the heads of units were supposed to become real managers and the focus of their tasks should have shifted from a policy-formulation role more towards

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<sup>5</sup> Staff regulations are the basic document on the staff policy of the EU institutions. They are adopted using the consultation procedure. Whereas they set a general framework for personnel policy, each institutions adopts its implementing provisions that specify staff regulations.

personnel and financial management and planning. All in all, the reform aimed at a strong shift towards a managerialist culture in the institution (Bauer 2006).

How to explain the Commission reforms? Although the Santer commission resignation was important in essentially speeding up the process, it was certainly not the sole cause and factor that triggered the reform. There had been a growing awareness of a need for change in the Commission. Several proposals of the reform had been underway already for years before and actually considerable preparatory work had been done in the Santer commission (Bauer 2006; Stevens and Stevens 2006). The preparation and management of the reform in the Prodi commission was the responsibility of British vice-president Neil Kinnock who showed considerable commitment to and leadership in the reform (Kassim 2004). Thus, it was a particular constellation of relevant contextual events (resignation of the Santer commission) and organisational variables (e.g. reform awareness, leadership) that explain the timing and path of the Commission administrative reform (Levy 2003).

It cannot be overlooked that this major internal reform took place just on the eve of the EU's Eastern enlargement. Notwithstanding this, there seems to be no intrinsic link between the commission reform and Eastern enlargement (Peterson 2007). It can only be observed that the new staff regulations entered into force exactly on the day when the EU was expanded from 15 to 25 member states (1 May 2004). And it had a two-fold impact on the officials joining the institutions from 1 May onwards. As the reform expanded the range of administrative grades, the promotion of the newcomers (both from new and old member states) became slower compared to their predecessors. Also new entrants had to start at lower grades and lower salaries than would have been the case before (Peterson 2007).

Whereas the impact of the enlargement on the administrative reform in the Commission can be considered as low at best, enlargement certainly had a considerable impact on the workings of the institution. The increase of the College of Commissioners from 15 to 25, and after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to 27, has changed the working methods of the body. In order to avoid what he called 'fragmentation' and 'Balkanisation', president Barroso has used new powers granted to the president with the Nice Treaty to provide for more coherent policy guidance and coordination. It can also be observed that since people from the new member states have joined the Commission, there is a stronger preference for non-hierarchical policy instruments, such as

voluntary regulatory agreements, co-regulation, and the open method of coordination (Regent 2003) instead of relying on more hierarchical regulation (Peterson 2007).

#### *4. The EU's multi-level governance and sub-national governments in CEE*

Local and regional governments are effectively part of the EU's multi-level governance. Firstly, sub-national levels are directly involved in the policy process in the area of regional policy, albeit the possibilities to shape different stages of policy vary from country to country (Marks 1996). Secondly, since the establishment of the Committee of Regions with the Treaty of Maastricht, local and regional governments are formally part of the EU decision-making system. Thirdly, many EU policies have a direct impact on the tasks of sub-national governments (e.g. in the areas of public procurement and environment) (John 2000; Jeffery 1997; Jones and Keating 1995). With the accession of the CEE countries to the European Union, sub-national governments in these countries have, like their counterparts in older member states, become part of the EU's multi-level governance. The following paragraphs first set out the challenges of sub-national governance in the CEE countries and then analyse emerging patterns of multi-level governance in the new member states.

#### Background: transformation and decentralisation reforms

After the collapse of the communist system at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the CEE countries were confronted with a challenging task of establishing more or less simultaneously democratic political structures and market economy (Offe et al. 1998). Designing a democratic local and regional government was one of the first and most important reforms on the way from communism to democracy. First of all, viable democratically elected local and regional government structures were considered crucial for reinforcing the principles of democracy and rule of law. Secondly, local government reform was seen as a pre-condition for speeding-up the privatisation process. Therefore, almost in all CEE countries, local government institution-building took place before the crucial reforms at the central government level (Horváth 2000).

Local and regional government reforms followed a similar path in most of the CEE countries (Illner 2002; Coulson 1996). Whereas in the beginning of the transformation period, institution-building at the local



level was given priority, later on, reform of regional-level governance became more important. It was recognised in the CEE countries fairly early that there is a need for democratic local government, as the grass-roots level of democracy proper is the one closest to the citizens. The basic local government framework laws were in most cases adopted during the first years of transition. This was followed by the preparation of legislation on tasks and financing of local government. There was much less agreement about the necessity and design of regional-level (self-) government. In most of the CEE countries, regional-level governance first developed in an ad-hoc manner and a comprehensive reform of regional governance was postponed. One important reason why the regional-level reform was pending was that during the communist regime, regional institutions were very important outposts of the communist party. They were supposed to control the activities of local units. Therefore, decision-makers were reluctant to start institution-building at the regional level that was associated with the communist regime (Illner 2002; Coulson 1995; Baldersheim and Illner 1996).

By the mid-nineties, the lack of comprehensive strategies of dealing with regional-level reform led to several problems in most of the CEE countries. First of all, many countries were plagued by problems of fragmented state administrative organisation at the regional level (Verheijen 1997). Until then, the tasks of central government at the regional level had been fulfilled mainly by field offices or agencies of the respective ministries. This resulted in the lack of coordination of central government policies at the regional level. In particular, regional-policy considerations received too little attention, and there was unnecessary duplication of organisational structures at the regional level. At the backdrop of this, it was recognised that some kind of general-purpose units at the regional level – be it deconcentrated state administration or democratically elected regional government – would be necessary. On the other hand, in the beginning of the transformation period, relatively fragmented local government systems had been established with a large number of relatively small local government units. For an efficient provision of public services, it was necessary that these authorities cooperate or that some of their tasks are fulfilled by larger units at the regional level (Drechsler 1999). This increased problem pressure led to discussions on regional-level reform in several CEE countries at about the same time when the countries started accession negotiations with the EU.

### The EU's Eastern enlargement and sub-national governments in CEE

What did the EU require from the CEE countries in the area of local and regional administration? The EU does not prescribe territorial-administrative structures to its member states. However, it is argued that both the emphasis that the Commission put on ensuring that the member states have sufficient 'administrative capacity' to implement the EU's policies combined with the requirements of the *acquis communautaire* in the area of regional policy have at least in a number of cases had an impact on the development of territorial structures in the new member states (Hughes et al. 2005; Kungla 2002).

'Capacity' as part of the conditionality for EU membership, though first linked to economic performance, can be found already among the Copenhagen criteria. Afterwards, the concept was expanded to cover other domains such as legislation and regulation (Hughes et al. 2005). It was particularly in the case of CEE member states, which did not have long experience of modern public administration, that the European Commission put a strong emphasis on ensuring that there is sufficient 'administrative capacity' in terms of proper institutional framework, qualified personnel and sufficient monetary resources to implement the EU's legislation (Arnswald 2000; Ruubel 2002). Nevertheless, as important as this criterion was, it remained poorly defined and vague throughout the accession negotiations. This is also because at that time it was clear that the Commission had no legal mandate to involve itself in matters pertaining to internal administrative structures and procedures of member states – a domain which was reserved for the member states.

The regional policy part of the *acquis communautaire* (Chapter 21) had more clear-cut implications for sub-national governance CEE countries. The candidate countries had to design an institutional framework for implementing EU regional policy that would be in line with the principles of EU regional policy. As regards the relationship between sub-national governments and central government, the principle of partnership is of key importance. It prescribes 'the closest possible cooperation between the Commission and the 'appropriate authorities' at national, regional and local level in each member state, and at every stage in the policy process from preparation to implementation' (Allen 2000: 254). Whereas the institutional framework shall be compatible with the principles of the EU, the concrete design of the institutions is up to the member states to decide. The candidate countries also had to join the NUTS (Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques) statistical classification system, which divides territorial units into three

interrelated categories in order to create a single and coherent structure of territorial distribution for statistical purposes. There are three key levels in the NUTS system (NUTS 1, NUTS 2 and NUTS 3). However, it is up to the member states to set up relevant NUTS units in consultation with the Commission. Furthermore, the territorial administrative structures and NUTS structures do not have to overlap (Hughes et al. 2005).

Further parts of the introduction focus on two key aspects of the impact of the EU's Eastern enlargement on sub-national governance in the CEE countries. Firstly, the introduction will discuss the impact of the EU on regional level reform which took place in several states parallel to the accession negotiations. Although the reforms were driven mainly by domestic factors, the EU has shaped the processes through the conditionality of membership (Linden 2002). Secondly, it will analyse the institutional arrangements that the CEE countries adopted to provide for the implementation of EU regional policy.

#### The EU's Eastern enlargement and regional-level reform

The impact of the EU on the regional-level reform in CEE varies considerably from country to country. In Hungary, county regional development councils consisting of representatives of counties and the central government were established in 1996, which matched the NUTS level 2 regions, eligible for Objective 1 assistance in EU regional policy. The creation of these units has sparked discussion concerning the need for genuine regional self-government above the level of the traditional counties (Fowler 2001, Horváth 1999, Hughes et al. 2005). In Poland, there had been a long discussion on regional-level reform going back to the beginning of the 1990s. Finally, a law dividing Poland into 16 voivodships and 373 counties was adopted in 1998 and implemented in the following year. Among other things, it was emphasised that this reform was considered necessary for the efficient management of EU structural funds. It was also argued that the new larger units would be more appropriate from the perspective of trans-national cooperation and EU interregional partnership programmes (CoR 2000: 52-53; Garsztecki 2001: 307; Hughes et al. 2004).

In the case of the Czech Republic, the creation of regions as regional self-government units had been envisioned already in the 1993 constitution but these plans were not implemented until January 2001. Throughout the accession negotiations, the Commission had been overtly supportive of the creation of self-governing units at the regional

level. Marek and Baun argue that: 'It may well be the case that a narrow window of opportunity for regional reform existed after 1993 ... and this may have closed without the pressure of the EU accession ... At the very least, EU pressure and the prospect of accession probably accelerated the process of regionalization in the Czech Republic.' (2002: 903; cf. Yoder 2003; Brusis 2003). On the other hand, for example in Estonia, the EU accession has not led to any regionalisation processes (I, II).

Although it can be observed that in some CEE countries, the EU has shaped regionalisation reforms, its role remains vague and it is difficult to say to what extent the EU accounts for the reforms vis-à-vis the domestic factors. Regionalisation took place in circumstances where there had been a pre-existing reform discussion in the country in which arguments other than the EU have played the most important role. Thus for example in several countries, legacies of the past are important in explaining the path of regionalisation reforms (Brusis 2002; Wollmann 1995; cf. Kungla 2007). For example, the territorial model that Poland – a country that has gone the furthest in CEE on the path of regionalisation – has adopted is quite similar to the arrangement that had existed in Poland before the communist regime (Kukliński and Swianiewicz 1996). Apart from legacies, studies point to other domestic factors such as opportunity structures and domestic interest constellations that filter the impact of the European Union on the regionalisation process in CEE. Thus it is the differences as regards to these domestic factors that explain the differential impact of the European Union on the local and regional structures in the CEE countries (II; Hughes et al. 2004; Brusis 2002; Dobre 2005; Yoder 2003).

#### Multi-level governance in the EU regional policy in CEE

There are a number of studies that analyse the implementation of pre-accession aid and describe the institutional arrangements that the new member states have adopted for the implementation of the EU's regional policy. The following sections summarise the findings of the research on the role of CEE local and regional governments in the EU's regional policy.

Taking first the management of pre-accession aid, there is a mixed picture. Local and regional levels were involved into management of several programmes, but by far not always when their interests were concerned. In the Czech Republic, local and regional governments participated particularly in the Phare Cross-Border-Cooperation

programme and its one sub-programme. Also, the support in the framework of the SAPARD programme was managed taking into account the principle of partnership. However, the bulk of the monetary aid was managed in a centralised way (Marek and Baun 2002). The Czech example is representative for the management of pre-accession funds in other CEE countries in the sense that little if any real involvement of sub-national governments in them can be observed (Kozak 2006, Oppi and Moora 2004).

Institutional frameworks for ISPA and SAPARD, but to a lesser extent Phare, were modelled according to the management models used for different parts of structural funds and cohesion fund. Thus, it is not surprising that overall the situation has not changed considerably in the arrangements adopted for the management of structural funds after the accession. Taking again the example of the Czech Republic, there was an interesting confrontation between the Ministry of Regional Development and the representatives of regions in negotiating the institutional arrangement for the administering of structural funds under the National Development Programme 2004-06. At the end, the ministry was able to convince the government to adopt a more centralised solution with the support of the arguments of the European Commission (Marek and Baun 2002). In a similar vein, there is a centralised arrangement with the Ministry of Finance in charge of programming and management of structural funds in Estonia (II). In the Slovenian case, the framework for managing pre-accession funds has been described as: 'quite centralised at the national level, where central role of managing and implementing the structural policy lies with one central institution for co-ordination purposes (Managing Authority), and one single Paying Authority' (Lajh 2004: 27).

It can be argued that this is so because both the Czech Republic and especially Estonia and Slovenia are relatively small and there are no strong regional actors to devolve power to. This explanation does not hold in general as it was not only in smaller new member states that the programming and implementation of structural funds were established at the central government level. Hughes et al. (2005: 137-38) demonstrate that also in Poland, where self-governing regions (vojevodships) were first established with encouragement by the European Commission, the same institution took a considerably more centralist stance in the later stage of the negotiations when the institutional framework for the programming and implementation of structural funds was discussed. At odds with its recent regionalisation reforms, Poland adopted a relatively centralised structure with one integrated regional programme, instead of 16 regional programmes and

relatively centralised instruments for the management of the structural funds (Kozak 2006; Ferry 2003).

Multi-level governance in the new member states seems somewhat ambivalent. Overall, the EU has facilitated institution-building at the regional level in several new member states although the results of the reforms vary from establishing solely weak coordination structures for the purpose of EU structural funds to introducing self-government at the regional level. In some countries, regionalisation reform is still being discussed. On the other hand, adapting the institutional arrangements for structural funds has not enhanced the role of sub-national levels significantly.

### *5. Conclusion*

This introduction analysed challenges of Eastern enlargement to the EU's system of multi-level governance. It began by pointing out that the Eastern enlargement is a challenge not only to the new member states but also to the EU institutions. Since their beginnings, the EU institutions have been following a path of evolutionary development. It was with the deepening of the integration and on the eve of the Eastern enlargement that a need for a comprehensive reform was perceived in two of the three core institutions. The analysis demonstrated that the impact of the Eastern enlargement on the EU institutions goes beyond treaty-level changes, such as the enlarged College of Commissioners or the increased number of members of the EP. The enlargement has influenced internal reform of the EP, though it has not been the most important factor triggering these reforms. The Commission reform has been clearly driven more by other factors, but research shows that the impact of the enlargement can be felt on several other aspects of the functioning of the institution.

Most analyses of multi-level governance focus on the EU's regional policy. Studies on old EU member states argue that the EU empowers local governments and regions, albeit the results vary from one state to another and even within one state. Does the EU empower sub-national levels in the new member states? The results of the analysis are ambivalent. On the one hand, the EU has played an important role in shaping regional-level institution-building in a number of member states. Applying counterfactual argumentation, it can be concluded that in some of the cases, regionalisation would not have taken place as quickly if there had been no EU accession negotiations. On the other hand, in designing a framework for the implementation of EU

structural funds, the EU has not made a strong case for having decentralised structures. Instead, the Commission, representing the EU in the accession negotiations, has rather given preference for settling most of the management of the pre-accession aid and later on structural funds at the central government level because of concerns about lacking 'administrative capacity' at the sub-national levels. It can be observed that in general, sub-national actors have been in a relatively weak position during the accession negotiations.

The analysis has shown that the Eastern enlargement was a challenge for the EU institutions and sub-national governments in CEE. However, it is still too early to say whether the EU Eastern enlargement has led to a paradigm shift in the EU multi-level governance. There is some preliminary evidence that in the Commission, more preference is now given to non-hierarchical policy instruments, such as voluntary regulatory agreements, co-regulation, and the open method of coordination than before. Nevertheless, this evidence is not sufficient and further research is needed.

As regards the sub-national actors in the new member states, the EU accession has contributed to regional-level institution-building in a number of CEE countries. Yet in terms of legally-institutionally defined competencies, the powers of local and regional governments have not been significantly enhanced as a result of the EU accession. Moreover, there is compelling evidence that the European Commission has encouraged the accession countries to concentrate programming and implementation functions at the central government level. It has been observed that 'national governments remain firmly in control of domestic sub-national actors, and these national governments can be seen as gatekeepers in discussions with the Commission and in terms of preparation for Structural Funding.' (Bailey and DePropris 2004: 94).

It must also be noted that available studies focus almost exclusively on the institutional changes in the local and regional governance, and there is still little empirical information on the practice of multi-level governance in the new member states. Are there new policy networks emerging in the area of regional policy? What impact will these new policy networks have on central-local/regional relations in the new member states? To what extent will sub-national governments exploit other 'windows of opportunity' that the EU membership provides them? These issues need to be addressed in future research.

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## SUMMARY IN ENGLISH

### *Patterns of Multi-Level Governance in Europe: The Challenge of the EU's Eastern Enlargement*

Whereas earlier EU research focused on the aims and underlying principles of European integration, in the last two decades, more attention has been paid to analysing the political system of the EU. To a considerable extent, this increased interest in the EU structures and policies derives from the speeding-up of the integration process since the adoption of the Single European Act (1986). The introduction of the co-decision procedure and its gradual extension to different policy areas, the strengthening of the role of local governments and regions, and the extension of majority voting in the Council have been important in transforming the EU into a system of multi-level governance.

The EU's Eastern enlargement is one of the most recent important events that had an impact on the EU's multi-level governance. This is not only because the 10+2 enlargement is the biggest in the history of the EU. Eastern enlargement is unique also for two other reasons. Most importantly, 10 out of the 12 entrants are former communist countries that (re)established democratic institutions and free market economy only at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, and they had the task to continue and complete the domestic reforms while at the same time taking into account the conditionality of the EU membership, especially aligning their legal and institutional arrangements with the *acquis communautaire* to become members of the EU. Eastern enlargement also had an impact on the EU institutions. A grown number of member states, combined with the considerably increased heterogeneity of the EU in terms of different social and economic development but also historical experiences, results in the need for adaptation for the EU institutions.

The aim of this dissertation is to explore some of the key aspects of the impact of the EU's Eastern enlargement on governance in the European Union. The thesis focuses on the impact of the Eastern enlargement on the European Union's multi-level governance both at the sub-national levels in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in the EU institutions. The dissertation is based on 5 years of extensive research. The original empirical information of the dissertation has been collected in expert interviews in Estonia and Brussels. Preliminary results of the

dissertation have been discussed at international workshops in Marburg, Belfast and Konstanz.

The original articles of the thesis focus on the following topics: the impact of the EU on the regional and local government reform in Estonia (I), Developments in Estonian sub-national governance in the context of other EU unitary member states (comparison with Finland) (II), and enlargement challenges for the internal organisation of the European Parliament (III). Further publications by the author elaborate on the impact of the EU on the regionalisation reforms in CEE countries (Kungla 2002) and policy-transfer in the Hungarian local government reform (Kungla 2005a; Kungla 2005b).

The dissertation has demonstrated that the impact of the EU's Eastern enlargement on the EU institutions reached well beyond the Treaty level changes. There is evidence that the enlargement had an impact on the internal structure as well as working methods of two institutions at the core of EU decision-making. Eastern enlargement played an important role in the case of the reform of the General Secretariat of the European Parliament both in terms of legitimising the reform as well as facilitating its implementation (III). In the case of the administrative reform of the Commission, which took place more or less parallel to the accession negotiations, other factors have been much more important. Nevertheless, the enlargement had an impact on other aspects of the functioning of the institution. There is some preliminary evidence that in the Commission, more preference is now given to non-hierarchical policy instruments, such as voluntary regulatory agreements, co-regulation, and the open method of coordination, than before. In the Council, there has been no administrative reform, in contrast to the two other institutions.

The dissertation has further shown that the impact of the EU's Eastern enlargement on the local and regional governments in the CEE candidate countries has been ambivalent. On the one hand, the EU has played an important role in shaping regional-level institution-building in a number of member states. In some of the cases, regionalisation would not have taken place as quickly if there had not been EU accession negotiations (Kungla 2002). On the other hand, in designing a framework for the implementation of EU structural funds, the EU has not made a strong case for having decentralised structures. Instead, the Commission, representing the EU in the accession negotiations, has rather given preference to settling most of the management of the pre-accession aid and later on structural funds at the central government level because of concerns about lacking 'administrative capacity' at the



sub-national levels (I). In line with the results of the studies on old member states, the dissertation has also shown that the impact of the EU on sub-national governance depends on the institutions and actor constellations in the respective member states (II)

On the basis of the analysis in the dissertation, we can conclude that the Eastern enlargement of the EU had an impact on the workings and internal structure of the EU institutions as well as on the new member states' administrative structures. The dissertation made a contribution in showing that the impact of the Eastern enlargement goes beyond Treaty changes and touches upon everyday working procedures of the EU institutions and member states' administration.

## SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN

### *Mitmetasandilise valitsemise tavad Euroopas: Euroopa Liidu idasuunaline laienemine kui väljakutse*

Kui varasemad Euroopa Liidu (EL) uuringud keskendusid liidu eesmärkidele ja Euroopa integratsiooni aluspõhimõtetele, siis viimasel kahel aastakümnel on hakatud enam tähelepanu pöörama EL-i kui poliitilise süsteemi uurimisele. Suurenenud huvi EL-i struktuuride ja halduspoliitika vastu võib eriti täheldada seoses Euroopa integratsiooni süvenemisega alates Ühtse Euroopa Akti (1986) vastuvõtmisest. Kaasotsustamise menetluse sisseviimine ning selle kehtivusulatus järk-järguline laiendamine, kohalike omavalitsuste ja regioonide rolli tugevdamine EL-i otsustamisprotsessides ning enamushääletuse kasutamise laiendamine Euroopa Nõukogus on EL-i poliitilise süsteemi arengut oluliselt mõjutanud.

Euroopa Liidu idasuunaline laienemine on üks viimaseid olulisi protsesse, mis on mõjutanud EL-i valitsemise süsteemi. Seda mitte ainult seetõttu, et 10+2 laienemine on suurim liidu ajaloo, vaid ka kahel muul põhjusel. Esiteks on kümme kaheteistkümnest uuest liikmesriigist postkommunistlikud riigid, kes alles hiljuti taastasid demokraatlikud institutsioonid ning vaba turumajanduse. Nendel riikidel tuli liitumisläbirääkimiste käigus jätkata siseriiklike reformidega ning samal ajal sobitada need EL-i liikmekssaamise tingimustega, eriti *acquis communautaire*'i ülevõtmisega. EL-i idasuunaline laienemine oli samas väljakutseks mitte ainult kandidaatriikidele, vaid ka EL-i institutsioonidele. Liikmesriikide suurem arv ning suurenenud erinevused nende vahel (see puudutab nii sotsiaal-majanduslikku arengut kui ka erinevusi ajaloolistes kogemustes) nõuab ka EL-i institutsioonidelt kohandumist uue olukorraga.

Käsolev väitekirj käsitleb EL-i idasuunalise laienemise mõjusid EL-i haldussüsteemi mõnede aspektidele. Ühelt poolt arutleb töö idasuunalise laienemise mõjude üle EL-i institutsioonide toimimisele. Teisalt analüüsitakse laienemise mõju kohalikule ja regionaalsele tasandile uutes liikmesriikides. Väitekirja aluseks on viimase viie aasta põhjalikud uuringud. Töö empiiriline osa põhineb Eestis ja Euroopa Parlamendis läbi viidud ekspertintervjuudel. Autor on esinenud käsoleva väitekirja esialgsete tulemustega rahvusvahelistel konverentsidel Marburgis, Belfastis ja Konstanzis.

Väitekirja aluseks olevad artiklid analüüsivad lähemalt järgnevaid valdkondi: Euroopa Liidu mõjud Eesti kohaliku ja regionaalse tasandi reformile (I), Eesti regionaalhalduse arengud EL-i unitaarsete liikmesriikide kontekstis (võrdlus Soomega) (II) ning EL-i laienemisega seotud väljakutsed Euroopa Parlamendi haldusstruktuurile (III). Autori muud avaldatud tööd käsitlevad EL-i mõju regionaalhalduse reformile Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa riikides (Kungla 2002) ning analüüsivad poliitika ülevõtmist kohaliku omavalitsuse reformis Ungaris (Kungla 2005a; Kungla 2005b).

Väitekirja analüüs näitas, et EL-i idasuunalise laienemise mõju EL-i institutsioonidele ulatub sügavamale EL-i aluslepingutes ettenähtud muudatustest. Idasuunaline laienemine on mõjutanud nii institutsioonide haldusstruktuuri kui ka otsustusprotsesse. Laienemine oli oluliseks (kuigi samas mitte ainukeseks) teguriks Euroopa Parlamendi struktuurireformi algatamisel ja elluviimisel. Võib väita, et EL-i laienemine kindlasti kiirendas reformi kulgu ja soodustas selle praktilist läbiviimist (I). Euroopa Komisjoni haldusreformi seletavad teised tegurid. Samas on Euroopa Komisjoni puhul laienemise mõju märgata institutsiooni toimimise teistes aspektides. Näiteks võib komisjonis täheldada mitte-hierarhiliste poliitika vahendite (nagu näiteks vabatahtlikud kokkulepped ning *open method of coordination*) laialdasemat kasutamist. Erinevalt Euroopa Parlamendist ja Euroopa Komisjonist ei ole Euroopa Nõukogus nii laiaulatuslikku reformi seni läbi viidud.

Väitekirja analüüsi tulemusel saab väita, et idasuunalise laienemise mõju kohalikule ja regionaalsele tasandile Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopas on ambivalentne. Ühelt poolt soodustas ning julgustas EL paljudel juhtudel regionaliseerimisprotsesse uutes liikmesriikides (Kungla 2002). Teisalt rõhutas Euroopa Komisjon, esindades EL-i liitumisläbirääkimisel, ka vajadust tagada administratiivne suutlikkus EL-i fondide administreerimisel. See aga tähendas enamasti vastavate pädevuste tsentraliseerimist keskvalitsuse tasandile (II, III). Väitekirja näitas, et sarnaselt varasematele uurimustele vanades liikmesriikides, sõltub EL-i mõju kohalikule ja regionaalhaldusele vastava riigi institutsionaalsest raamistikust ning osalejate konstellatsioonist (II).

Väitekirja analüüsi tulemusena saame öelda, et EL-i idasuunaline laienemine avaldas mõju nii EL-i institutsioonide toimimisele kui ka liikmesriikide haldusele. Eelkõige näitas väitekirja, et idasuunalise laienemisega kaasnevad muudatused ulatuvad EL-i aluslepingute tasandilt tunduvalt sügavamale ning puudutavad nii EL-i institutsioonide kui ka uute liikmesriikide haldusstruktuure ja otsustamisprotsesse.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank several friends and colleagues for help and support. First of all, I am grateful to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Drechsler, who has not only provided me with invaluable help in writing the thesis but has also continuously supported my academic endeavours. I would never have been able to finish my PhD studies and this dissertation without his help. I will always remember classes of and discussions with Prof. Drechsler during my undergraduate and graduate studies which were crucial in inspiring me to undertake this effort. I would also like to thank my colleague and friend Prof. Dr. Tiina Randma-Liiv, who has greatly supported my academic career. Also numerous other colleagues from the Universities of Tartu, Jena and Konstanz have provided me with a very good working environment and additional insights for writing this dissertation. In particular, Prof. Dr. Christoph Knill has been of great help during my studies in Germany. One part of this thesis has benefited from a fruitful cooperation with Dr. Pekka Kettunen. The Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation and the Estonian Science Foundation have generously funded research behind this thesis. Finally I would like to thank my family and friends for their important and continuous support.

# PUBLICATIONS

## Articles

**Kungla, Tarvo.** 2007. 'Raising the Game': Administrative Reform of the European Parliament General Secretariat, in: Management Reforms in International Organizations, edited by M.W. Bauer and C. Knill. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 71-83.

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**Kungla, Tarvo.** 1999. Die estnischen Kommunen und ihre Finanzen. in: Die selbstverwaltete Gemeinde. Beiträge zu ihrer Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft in Estland, Deutschland und Europa [Anlässlich des 750jährigen Jubiläums der Verleihung Lübisches Rechts an Reval (Tallinn)], edited by Wolfgang Drechsler. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, pp. 111-122.

**Kungla, Tarvo.** 1999. Fiscal Decentralization in Estonia, Discussion Papers No. 13. Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative.

#### **Book reviews**

**Kungla, Tarvo.** 2004. How Governments Privatize? The Politics of Divestment in the United States and Germany. By Mark Cassell, in: Public Administration 82 (1): 211-233.

**Kungla, Tarvo.** 2004. On Different Tracks. Designing Railway Regulation in Britain and Germany. By Martin Lodge, in: West European Politics 27 (1): 179-180.

## **Appendix 1**

### **ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS**

#### **Article I**

**Kungla, Tarvo.** 2005. Die Entwicklung der Regionalstrukturen in Estland: Zwischen Transformation und Europäisierung, in: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2005, edited by Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismusforschung. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 323-335.

## **Appendix 1 continued**

### **Article II**

**Kungla, T. and P. Kettunen.** 2005. Europeanization of Sub-national Governance in Unitary States: Estonia and Finland, in: *Regional and Federal Studies*, Vol 15, No 44, pp. 353-378.



## **Appendix 1 continued**

### **Article III**

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## Appendix 2

### CURRICULUM VITAE

#### Tarvo Kungla

Date and Place of Birth: 8 June, 1977, Pärnu, Estonia  
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#### Education

September 2001 Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, *Master of Politics* in political science  
July 1999 University of Tartu, Tartu, *baccalaureus artium* in public administration and social policy

#### Languages

Estonian	mother tongue
English	advanced
German	advanced
French	intermediate
Russian	intermediate

## Appendix 2 continued

### Special Courses

20-21 February 2006	Change Management, Brussels
14-15 December 2005	Effective Communication: Public Speaking, Brussels
29-30 November 2005	Management and Teamwork, Brussels

### Professional Employment

05/2005 until now	policy specialist/head of subject team, DG Information, European Parliament
03/2002-05/2006	lecturer, Department of Public Administration, University of Tartu
09/2001-04/2004	lecturer/researcher (wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter), Chair of European Studies, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
02/1999-09/1999	specialist, since 25 August 1999 adviser, Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Estonia, Department of Public Law

### Scientific Work

#### Scientific projects

1 July 2004-31 December 2004, Ausschuss für Forschungsfragen, Universität Konstanz, topic: 'Politik-Transfer in post-kommunistischen Staaten' (Policy-Transfer in Post-Communist States)

#### Main areas of interest

Europeanisation; Policy-Transfer; Local and Regional Government

#### Topics of thesis

'Fiscal decentralization in Estonia' (*Baccalaureus Artium*)

'Modernisierung auf kommunaler Ebene: Deutschland und Grossbritannien im Vergleich: 1980er und 1990er Jahre' (*Master of Politics*)

## Appendix 3

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#### Haridus

september 2001 Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, *Master of Politics* poliitikateaduses  
juuli 1999 Tartu Ülikool, *baccalaureus artium* avalik haldus ja sotsiaalpoliitika

#### Keelteoskus

eesti keel	emakeel
inglise keel	kõrgtase
saksa keel	kõrgtase
prantsuse keel	kesktase
vene keel	kesktase

## Appendix 3 continued

### Täiendusõpe

20.–21. veebruar 2006	muutuste juhtimine, Brüssel
14.–15. detsember 2005	efektiivne suhtlus: avalik esinemine, Brüssel
29.–30. november 2005	juhtimine ja meeskonnatöö, Brüssel

### Teenistuskäik

mai 2005 – praegu	poliitika spetsialist/erialarühma koordinaator, Informatsiooni peadirektoraat, Euroopa Parlament
märts 2002 – mai 2006	lektor, avaliku halduse osakond, Tartu Ülikool
september 2001 – aprill 2004	lektor/teadur ( <i>wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter</i> ), Euroopa uuringute õppetool, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
veebruar 1999 – september 1999	spetsialist, alates 25. augustist 1999 nõunik, avaliku õiguse osakond, Eesti Vabariigi Justiitsministeerium

### Teadustegevus

#### Teadusprojektid

1. juuli 2004 – 31. detsember 2004, Ausschuss für Forschungsfragen, Universität Konstanz, teema: *‘Politik-Transfer in post-kommunistischen Staaten’* (Poliitika-ülevõtmine postkommunistlikes riikides)

#### Teadustöö põhisuunad

Euroopastumine; poliitika-ülevõtmine; kohalik ja regionaalne haldus

#### Kaitstud lõputööd

*‘Fiscal decentralization in Estonia’ (Baccalaureus Artium)*

*‘Modernisierung auf kommunaler Ebene: Deutschland und Grossbritannien im Vergleich: 1980er und 1990er Jahre’ (Master of Politics)*

**DISSERTATIONS DEFENDED AT  
TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY ON  
*HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES***

1. **Ilmar Tomusk.** Eesti keelepoliitika põhimõtted ja dünaamika eurointegratsiooni ning rahvusvaheliste inimõiguste kontekstis. 2002.
2. **Tiiu Kamdron.** Work motivation and job satisfaction of Estonian higher officials. 2003.
3. **Agu Uudelepp.** Propagandateooria ja -tehnikate areng 20. sajandil. 2005.
4. **Markus A. Launer.** Coordination of foreign subsidiaries in German multinational companies. 2005.
5. **Jürgen Bruns.** Interim–management–deployments in an innovation-context. 2005.
6. **Ülle Madise.** Elections, political parties, and legislative performance in Estonia: Institutional choices from the return to independence to the rise of e-democracy. 2007.