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NATO'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROCESS OF SOLVING THE EUROPEAN MIGRATION CRISIS: PARTNERING WITH THE EU?

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ABSTRACT

The ongoing migration crisis is a challenge for European countries menacing their security due to illegal border crossing, human trafficking and smuggling, and the spread of criminal activities. This research paper aims to analyse the position of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as one of those agencies, which try to solve the European migration crisis. In order to outline that, it is crucial to address the European Union (EU), as it is the main entity expected to be handling this crisis. However, the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has limited capacity to influence the migration challenge due to restricted experience when it comes to security, military, and defence.

This research paper uses a qualitative approach, discussing which way NATO intervenes in the migration crisis and how it may provide assistance to the EU. NATO as a political and military alliance has extensive experience in conducting crisis management operations. The Alliance obtains resources and capabilities that could protect external borders of the EU from flows of illegal migrants. The principles of the EU-NATO partnership explain the necessity to employ NATO's mechanisms with regard to illegal migration, pointing out the obstacles that lie in the disputes between Turkey and Cyprus. This master's thesis argues that NATO cannot independently offer a solution to the migration crisis by reason of its complex nature, and it can only provide assistance to the EU in managing this issue.

Key words: NATO, the European Union, NATO-EU cooperation, migration crisis.

INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, Europe faces the largest humanitarian crisis since the end of World War II (WWII), as there are huge migrant flows from Syria, the Middle East and Africa intending to reach a number of particular European countries. Arguably, this crisis has become a real threat to European security due to illegal border crossing, migrant smuggling and the spread of criminal networks. It appears that the European Union (EU) is the main entity made to bear responsibility for the refugee crisis, even though it was not the one who caused it. There is no common approach detected in the process of finding a solution to halt the crisis – the EU's Member States have distinctly different ways of treating the issue, which makes it impossible to reach a common decision, and it has become one of the most difficult issues to solve. The situation in Europe is challenging; thousands of migrants are crossing European borders illegally, benefiting criminal organisations and human traffickers. It is estimated that more than one million migrants crossed EU borders illegally in 2015, and there were over half a million border violations in 2016 (Frontex 2017, 8).

It is impossible for one organisation to resolve issues of that magnitude independently because of the factors that caused the refugee crisis. Initially, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, then the wars in Syria and Yemen, the existence of the failed state in Somalia, and the continuation of the Afghan crisis made terrorism and irregular migration to be directly interconnected in a sophisticated way. It could be suggested that the huge flow of migrants is a consequence of the Syrian problem and terrorism in the Middle East where general instability seems to be one of the main reasons for illegal border crossing and illegal human trafficking. These interconnections indicate that the migration crisis is a hybrid threat, requiring efforts of other international players, for instance the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The current situation in Europe shows that the EU attempted to conduct crisis management on its own launching Operation Sophia, however, NATO, as a military alliance that has great experience in managing crises, can offer its resources to influence such a challenging issue. It is necessary to

highlight that the EU needs NATO's assistance to fight the emerging issues because of the limited experience in the security, military and defence areas (Argano 2016). The EU's scope of activity is predominantly related to political economy, and it is still hard for the entity to establish an effective border security system to cope with illegal migrants. The outcome of the crisis not only lies in an inability to accept large numbers of refugees, but also in the risks associated with connecting the refugee problem with terrorism. In this case, external intervention seems reasonable, as the Member States of the EU have a lack of resources and there are problems with implementation of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the migration issue.

In this context, considering the organisation's 'inborn' focus on maintaining security in Europe, what is the role of NATO in today's world? After the end of the Cold War, it was necessary for NATO to reshape and reformulate its role in the international arena to adopt new security challenges, ensuring democratic peace by accepting new member states (Burton 2017, 1). With the emergence of new security threats it was crucial to unite capabilities of the member states contributing to stabilisation of international security environment and expanding borders of the organisation. NATO is a political and military alliance that has 29 independent member states, which include North American and European countries. NATO is aiming to become a global international actor, enhancing its partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region in terms of countering common security challenges (Chaban *et al.* 2017, 1). Such a factor indicates that NATO is broadening its influence around the world affecting more countries that are not members of the alliance. Keeping in mind the NATO's core tasks – collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security (Strategic Concepts 2014) – it is arguably essential for the organisation to carry out crisis management operations bringing together the forces of the allies as well as reliable partners.

NATO as a transatlantic alliance should be engaged in security issues that affect its member states in Europe and North America. Now, there is a high level of instability around the EU borders, in the Middle East and Africa, which have an enormous effect on NATO's European allies. It is also important that the EU and NATO possess shared values, such as democracy, freedom, and the rule of law, which should make them identify common threats more easily and move in one direction. As the EU and NATO have 22 member countries in common, they also possess shared problems that are expected to be resolved collectively, using both organisations' capabilities. When it comes to the

European migration crisis, refugees enter Europe predominantly via Greece, Italy, Bulgaria, and Turkey, and this situation shows that the European refugee crisis has a direct influence on NATO members, and involvement of this organisation in solving the problematic issue seems crucial. Recently, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recognised the importance of this issue. He highlights the necessity to maintain European security and to unify EU-NATO efforts to fight against global threats, including the refugee crisis (Stoltenberg 2016). The 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit also underlines NATO's intentions to continue tackling illegal migration in the Mediterranean Sea and to proceed cooperation with Operation Sophia, Frontex and Europol (Warsaw Summit Communiqué 2016).

Considering the above, the purpose of this paper is to analyse NATO's efforts in assisting the EU to deal with the migration crisis. This research paper claims that NATO's assistance to the EU in managing illegal migration is crucial and it is possible to *influence* the crisis only through effective and formal EU-NATO cooperation. This paper attempts to answer the following research questions:

1. What are the barriers preventing the EU within the framework of the CSDP to counter illegal migration unilaterally?

2. What factors, if any, obstruct NATO-EU cooperation in this issue, and why is such cooperation needed?

3. What effect does NATO's involvement have on the solution of the European migration crisis, and is its approach effective enough to fight the current issue?

Concerning the gaps in academic research, the effects of NATO's involvement in the refugee crisis has not yet been analysed well. The migration crisis is a new and transnational challenge for the EU. In the context of this paper's topic, the importance of NATO's assistance was raised in 2016, when NATO launched an operation in the Aegean Sea. It shows that NATO is willing to offer its resources and protect borders of the EU. One of the main principles of NATO is collective security, meaning that all members of the Alliance should be protected from external threats. It could be suggested that a NATO-EU joint action framework is the key to reducing illegal border crossing, which is considered a threat for European countries.

Methodology

This study focuses on two international organisations searching for an explanation and asking *why* and *how* independent entities address the existing issue. It concentrates on interpreting and analysing the roles and methods of two international organisations that are attempting to solve the current humanitarian crisis. In particular, the research paper focuses on NATO, as an independent entity, but it was also necessary to include the EU's position.

Within this context, this research uses a multiple case study approach to examine the behaviour of two international organisations towards the concrete problem in order to understand how the problem can be handled and what efforts the organisations should undertake. One of the strengths of the case study method is the ability to conduct an in-depth empirical investigation employing several types of data-gathering methods (Vennesson 2008, 229). Thereby, this makes the approach widely used by the researchers. This method permits narrowing the area of the research to two international organisations and conducting a profound analysis. According to Klotz (2008, 49), case studies are directed to "… trace a causal process that links the proposed independent variable to the dependent one, in order to offer an explanation for why the pattern emerges".

More specifically, the chosen approach, allows analysing the relationship between the EU and NATO from the perspective of the migration crisis. This method helps to identify NATO's position towards the migration crisis and its ability to provide assistance to the EU. The analysis on the EU is needed to prove that intervention from outside is required. This type of case study allows underlining differences and similarities between two organisations when it comes to the techniques dealing with the migration crisis. The advantage of a case study approach lies in the possibility for the investigator to set boundaries of the phenomenon independently (Vennesson 2008, 230). Accordingly, this thesis considers the problem of migration within two institutional frameworks, which makes this approach flexible and widespread. Concerning the selection of cases, it was decided to analyse the effects of Operation Sophia in order to identify EU's efforts in response to the current problem. The case of the EU's response cannot be called effective, as it has a limited influence on the humanitarian crisis. Therefore, the case of NATO was needed, as the EU is not able to achieve the desired outcomes, and

it was necessary to indicate what exactly another international entity could offer. Due to their nature, it is possible to compare EU's and NATO's efforts.

In addition, the process tracing method is employed in the research in order to complement a case study approach. Process tracing allows to identify causal effects and preconditions for actions, enabling to set a link between different factors (Vennesson 2008, 231-232). Checkel (2008, 116) highlights that "… process tracing means to trace the operation of the causal mechanism(s) at work in a given situation". In the context of this paper, the EU's and NATO's steps towards the migration crisis are analysed to achieve the desired outcome, which lies in the objective to resolve the existing issue. Thus, both institutional frameworks are intending to influence the process of migration. The migration problem is considered as an independent variable, while the EU's and NATO's actions are dependent variables. The advantage of process tracing lies in the ability to identify causal mechanisms and the capacity to explain causal paths that lead to concrete outcomes (Vennesson 2008, 233, 235). There is a causal mechanism leading from the EU's actions to the necessity of NATO's involvement. Accordingly, the nature of the CSDP and the limitation of Operation Sophia are linked to the deployment of NATO's operations and the need for further EU-NATO cooperation.

Therefore, this research is predominantly of qualitative methodological nature and based on primary and secondary textual data such as reports, analyses, NATO Defence College research papers, scientific materials (peer reviewed journal articles and books), and a number of media-originated sources. The analysis of textual information allows making certain findings concerning a concrete issue, in this case, illegal migration. The most important sources of information are reports, analyses, including NATO Defence College research papers. In addition, books and scientific academic articles will be used in the research to support the theoretical background of this paper by providing statements that make up the basis of the paper. The research uses an observation-based method that permits analysing effectively existing data collected from the different sources. Quantitative data will also be used in this research to compare the number of migrants crossing the EU borders. For example, it will be possible to compare a number of migrants crossing EU borders in 2017 with the previous years. Statistical data is needed in this research in order to make more comprehensive and accurate analysis.

The discussion will be held within the framework of the securitisation theory, explaining the reasons for engagement in the migration issue, and it could be argued as the foundation of the research. The motives for the EU-NATO cooperation will shape the grounds for engagement in the migration challenge, by pointing out the main factors enabling to conduct an effective collaboration in the security sector, specifically in crisis management. Accordingly, the concept of inter-organisational cooperation will be measured by the reasons enabling to make EU-NATO cooperation possible, which justify NATO's engagement in the migration crisis.

Structure of the paper

Initially, Chapter 1 of this research deals with a securitization theory to prove that migration is considered a security issue that requires cooperation amongst international organisations. It is necessary to start the research paper with a theory, as it should aid in understanding why illegal migration is considered a threat to European security. Chapter 2 focuses on the EU position in terms of crisis management, in particular, the effectiveness of the CSDP in managing the European migration crisis. This section will include the limitations of the CSDP explaining why the EU's efforts are not enough to cope with illegal migration. Chapter 3 considers the EU-NATO inter-organisational security cooperation to realise how these institutions can work together. That section will analyse the reasons why the EU and NATO should cooperate and the difficulties they face. Moreover, it is important to highlight informal and formal cooperation between these organisations. In Chapter 4, NATO's involvement in solving the EU migration crisis will be discussed, in particular, the current situation concerning Operation in the Aegean Sea and Operation Sea Guardian. It is also necessary to discuss NATO's position with regard to crisis management to explain the Alliance's engagement in this issue.

1. SECURITISATION THEORY AND MIGRATION

The following chapter will discuss a theoretical framework, which includes finding the relationship between security and migration. Securitisation theory claims that there are different non-political and non-military problems expected to be public security challenges (Stone 2009, 5). The migration-security nexus enables one to focus on social construction of threats showing that any issue can pose a danger to national security, and demonstrates that migration can be considered a security matter requiring cooperation between international actors, including international organisations such as the EU and NATO.

1.1. Securitisation theory

Firstly, it is necessary to point out the main features of securitisation theory, in order to link this approach with the issue of migration. The concept of securitisation was developed by the Copenhagen School, particularly by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. Wæver (2011, 93-94) argues that the notion of "security" has significantly transformed since WWII, reducing the powerful military identification and broadening the same approach to other sectors. Concentration only on military issues does not allow detecting the whole picture of existing threats, as many of them can be unnoticed. It can be regarded as the recognition of the concept of "security" in a broad sense. In addition, in the 1980s, the number of military-political security issues diminished, as the possibility of war declined in general (Buzan 1997, 6). Securitisation theory claims that there are economic, societal and environmental factors that could be recognised as security challenges (Stone 2009, 10). It indicates that not only military and political issues could pose a threat to public security. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998, 23-24) explain the phenomenon of securitisation:

> In theory any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning an issue is part of public policy,

requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure). In principle, the placement of issues on this spectrum is open.

Securitisation theory suggests that any non-political problem can become a security issue requiring the involvement of public actors and the necessity of appropriate decisions to deal with the threat. It could be said that the concept of securitisation examines issues and events that had not previously been considered security problems. In order to securitise an issue, the state and society should admit it as a threat, which means the issue needs to be argued and accepted in order to create a platform for further actions that lead to successful securitisation (Buzan *et al.* 1998, 25). This alternative concept argues that any sector might contain problems connected to vulnerabilities, threats, and defence, which potentially could undermine national sovereignty, forcing the state to employ extraordinary means (Wæver 2011, 94). Furthermore, the concept of securitisation aims to examine a problem as existential and relevant requiring immediate attention and action in the international arena (Buzan *et al.* 1998, 29). It shows there are some criterions to identify a security problem, meaning that an issue should be relevant in order to attract public attention, and the government must take appropriate and legitimate measures as much as possible to remove an issue from the security spectrum.

Moreover, it is necessary to discuss the concept of "societal security" to link this idea with the migration issues. According to the Copenhagen School, the concept of "societal security" is about threats related to identity, culture and ideology, but it is strongly associated with political and military security (Stone 2009, 5). Buzan (1997, 17) points out the existence of collective identities that are able to operate independently of a state, which makes it difficult to determine whether a threat is existential or unimportant. It can be noticed that collective identities could transform and develop reacting to internal and external changes, however, sometimes it is difficult to determine what exactly caused these evolvements whether threats or the evolution of identity (*Ibid.*). Under this concept, migration can be perceived a threat to national identity, because migrants generally have cultural differences with the population of the receiving state, and there is a possibility of connection with criminal activities. However, it cannot be claimed that all migration processes aimed to destabilise public security.

1.2. The securitisation of migration

At the present time, many countries face challenges about migration, which are enhanced by a fear of security threats such as illegal migration and terrorism. What are the causes for considering migration a security issue? As a consequence, migration can cause security threats in the receiving states that are not directly connected to military issues. There are several factors linking migration with the concept of security: a threat to a state's internal security, the influence on composition of population and culture of the receiving state, and the possible connection with criminal activities and terrorism.

1.2.1. Internal security

It is not a new approach to examine migration from the perspective of security. Since the second half of the twentieth century, migration has been considered one of the major global issues, as it restricts the capacity of states to regulate their borders, which is directly related to sovereignty (Heisler, Layton-Henry 1993, 149). For instance, in the 1980s there were debates regarding the defence of public order and the safety of domestic stability because of the impact of migration on states' internal affairs and the cultural composition of nations (Huysmans 2000, 751). It could be assumed that irregular migration undermines national sovereignty, as in the case of illegal migration people enter the territory of other states without permission, disrupting the territorial integrity of states and the national unity.

Huysmans (2000, 756) points out that migration has a destabilising effect on domestic integration and a harmful influence on public order. It is extremely challenging to settle a huge number of migrants in a new territory, as it requires particular resources and efforts from the governments, which are not always available. It includes the readiness of a state to accept a huge number of migrants, which is obstructed by the limited possibilities of migration policies, when a state simply cannot deal with such numbers of refugees. As a consequence, there could emerge contradictions either between states or inside one state concerning the migration issue. It is a conflicting issue, because there might be no common view on this problem even within one state or society.

Huysmans (2006, 48) also suggests that migration could undermine a state's position in the international arena, as a large number of migrants could disrupt the labour market, and increase the

unemployment rate, which might lead to the probability of popular unrests. It can be pointed out that economic problems in the receiving state could be the reason for protests, conflicts, and violence inside a state, and citizens of the receiving countries might suffer due to this situation. At the same time, the government's main objective is to protect its own citizens, meaning that their security is more valuable than other people's well-being. On the other hand, migration of highly qualified workers could boost the national economy creating new workplaces, but that is not applicable to illegal migration (Huysmans 2006, 48). It can be noticed that the economic situation and national security are directly connected from the point of view of illegal migration.

There is a possibility that the sending state could facilitate a promotion of the political pressure in the receiving country with the help of a large immigrant society (Karyotis 2007, 11). It demonstrates that migrants can be used as a tool to manipulate the government to act in accordance with someone's ends, which could cause unrest and conflicts inside the country. Moreover, a huge flow of migrants can be regarded as incapacity to represent the interests of its citizens and inability to manage population movements in the state's territory (*Ibid.*). It can be said that the rights of people in the receiving states may be undermined, leading to the decline of their welfare.

Concerning European countries, the issue of migration has become crucial since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, forcing border controls to be strengthened and disseminating Islamophobic attitudes not only in the United States, but also among European states (Pinyol-Jiménez 2012, 38). Migration has a direct effect on international border crossing, and in case of irregular migration, people enter a state's territory without permission, which undermines national integrity. It is necessary to highlight that border control and admission policies are the basic methods used to tackle irregular migration by guaranteeing national security (*Ibid.,* 41). The refugee problem in the EU is controversial, because there is no common agreement within the union whether to consider migration as a security issue or not. However, there is an increase in public debate regarding whether illegal migrants are a threat to societal security and national identity (Fakhoury 2016, 72). This problem should be recognised equally by both the governments and society, as this allows handling this problem using common methods to achieve a consensus on such a complicated issue.

1.2.2. Cultural identity

Furthermore, international migration has a significant influence on the composition of states' population and culture (Heisler, Layton-Henry 1993, 149). According to Huysmans (2000, 758), migration can be regarded as being the main force undermining public traditions and the nation's societal homogeneity. It is assumed that migrants should adapt to the population of the host country by accepting the language, customs, and norms of other society, but there are difficulties in implementation of this process (Heisler, Layton-Henry 1993, 160). For instance, a large flow of migrants could make changes in the receiving state's culture, because immigrants might hold completely different values, customs, identities and language. There is a chance that this situation may be enhanced by religious differences, and, in this case, the national identity may be threatened by migration. It is unquestionable that religion plays a crucial role in some societies, as people hold the principle of their religion indisputable. The difference of the Western ideology is that religion does not intervene in state's affairs and public issues. Thus, there could occur conflicts on the grounds of religion, because of the misunderstandings of people belonging to distinct societies.

It is necessary to point out that a fear of migrants might diminish social cohesion and bring problems in the integration process, which could lead to a crisis of multiculturalism (Pinyol-Jiménez 2012, 41). Furthermore, the EU acknowledges the principle of cultural homogeneity as a stabilising element, defining that the integration of migrants and refugees into Western societies is a challenging process. Besides, it has an impact on the realisation of multicultural policies, which are obstructed by the fact that the principle of solidarity, the provision of rights and duties are not directly related to cultural aspects (Huysmans 2006, 64). Integration is a hard process that requires the intention of both sides, but experience shows migrants are not ready to adopt Western values. Does this mean that a huge flow of refugees could bring new customs to European society? In this case, there is a risk of conflicts and identity' changes, as it is hard for completely different cultures to live together without contradictions. A huge number of migrants could bring new traditions and values to a society, but, in this case, the values of the receiving state may be disrupted and harmed. There is an intention in Europe to live in a culturally homogenous society, so immigrants can be seen as a barrier, and it cannot be claimed that refugees can successfully integrate into European society.

In some sense, there is an impact of nationalism, racism and xenophobia on the European integration process (Huysmans 2006, 74). Concerning the European migrant crisis, there is a danger of the politicisation of migrants due to their cultural identity, because of the nationalist movements and extreme right wing parties that that are trying to expand their influence using the cultural dimension (*Ibid.,* 77). It is important not to allow them to spread their nationalistic ideas in public, in order to avoid the recurrence of European events in the first half of the twentieth century. Migration is a complex process, as people are forced to integrate into a new society with distinct customs and values, which are extremely different.

1.2.3. Criminal activities and terrorism

Additionally, the possibility of connecting illegal migration with criminal activities will be argued, in particular, in the context of the EU. It is possible to associate the EU Common Market with internal security issues, as it not only improves free movement of goods, services and people, but also contributes to illegal activities committed by criminals, immigrants and international criminal organisations (Huysmans 2000, 760). Concerning the EU migration crisis, the situation was facilitated because of the Schengen area, which includes the free movement of people. This means criminals can move freely cross almost all EU countries once they enter the Schengen area. Therefore, it has been decided to reinforce security measures on EU's external borders by creating informal arrangements for sharing important information and establishing networks to promote communication between the EU Member States (Karyotis 2007, 4).

What is more, it is important to discuss the fact that migration might cause illegal activities such as proliferation of terrorism, illegal border crossing and transnational crime. The Arab Spring events and the ongoing war in Syria facilitated the recognition of the migration issue on a high level by the EU. The Union launched the relocation and resettlement plans among Member States of the EU, but these actions have led to tensions between national governments and supranational authorities, in particular, there are disagreements between some Member States (Fakhoury 2016, 71). There are fears concerning the possibility of connecting refugee arrivals to terrorist activities, which were enhanced by the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks (*Ibid.,* 72). This tendency started spreading after the 9/11 events, where 19 foreigners were involved in terrorist attacks, which lead to the present situation in which security is associated with the concept of migration (Karyotis 2007, 6). The securitization of migration

currently includes a plan of action established by European states trying to manage refugee flows from the South, which have a direct influence on Western society (Humphrey 2013, 190). It could be suggested that the main objective of EU Member States is to manage border control to stop illegal border crossing that is connected to irregular migration, human smuggling and other criminal activities.

Migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons can be seen as the most serious threats menacing European security, because of obstacles for refugees to reach European territory, and criminal organisation profit from this situation (Pinyol-Jiménez 2012, 55). In addition, criminals put migrants' lives at risk, encouraging them to cross the Mediterranean Sea using dangerous routes, which are less regulated by the governments. In those cases, many people die or disappear during their journey. These issues should be better regulated by the EU, and are directly linked to the border surveillance system.

Indeed, it is hard for some refugees to reach European countries due to strengthening border security, and smuggling is considered to be one of the options, causing people to illegally cross the EU border (Huysmans 2006, 58). These people are in a difficult situation, suggesting that illegal border crossing is the right decision for them. At the moment, border control is not an obstacle to enter the territory of another state, as criminals are able to transfer people illegally. The current situation shows that the border surveillance system is inadequate and requires enhancements to reduce illegal border crossing. It is necessary to highlight that blocking entrance, regulating the location of refugees and immigration detention camps does not really contribute to negotiations with migrants, but it is difficult or even an impossible task to communicate with a mass of people (*Ibid.,* 59).

To summarise briefly, securitisation theory points out that any problem can be seen through the prism of securitisation, and migration is not an exception. This chapter has proven that migration can be regarded as being a security problem, which is applicable in the context of the European migration crisis. The present chapter has also shown that it is necessary to prioritise this issue, as it could lead to uncontrollable consequences in the receiving states. The next chapter will argue the EU's attempt to influence illegal migration through the CSDP using military mechanisms.

2. THE EUROPEAN MIGRATION CRISIS AND THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

The following chapter will argue the position of the EU with regard to the refugee crisis pointing out the difficulties the organisation is facing in managing this issue. The main idea of this chapter is to describe EU's approach concerning illegal migration and to analyse EU's ability and resources to handle the problem. The involvement of the CSDP is crucial to examine in the research as well, as it is a logical measure of the EU to counter illegal border crossings from African countries and the Middle East, and the outcomes of CSDP's Operation Sophia should be taken into account. It is critical to observe and analyse in consideration of the securitisation theory what steps the EU has undertaken through the CSDP – this approach may assist to show that the issue of such magnitude is a menace to European security. The limitation of the CSDP will also be analysed to justify NATO's engagement in this problem. In this context, the limitation of the CSDP will also be analysed to justify NATO's engagement in the process of solving the problem.

2.1. The European Union and illegal migration

The importance of the migration issue has been changing over time in Europe. In 2003, the European Security Strategy and other documents on migration had not recognised this phenomenon as a security threat, as Europe faced other security challenges such as terrorism and organised crime, thus migration was only associated with the possibility of trafficking in migrants (Ceccorulli, Lucarelli 2017, 84-85). Then, the unstable situation in the Middle East and Africa led to the recognition of the migration problem, and required measures were implemented. The Arab Spring events in 2011 necessitated agreements on immigration control between members states of the EU and the EU and its neighbouring countries (*Ibid.*). In 2015, migration became one of the most challenging and hardest issues for European countries. The UN confirms that, today, there are around 65.5 million people in the world who have been forced to leave their home countries (UNHCR 2017, 2).

In fact, the EU does not offer a collective response to the migration crisis. This means that Member States of the EU look at this problem from different perspectives, without having a unified plan of action. The Dublin Regulation is not effective enough, as there is a huge number of refugees entering the EU, and evidence has shown that the system does not work. The Union simply cannot regulate and control such a large number of irregular migrants. Actually, some peripheral EU countries have already violated the Dublin Regulation, allowing migrants to move to other EU Member States, not stopping them (Ernst and Young Global Limited 2016, 5). Now, some countries such as Italy and Greece have much more pressure compared to other members of the EU. Hence, the burden of the peripheral states is much higher, and enhanced border control should be maintained to cope with illegal border crossings, as the present system forces them to accept the majority of migrants. The main objectives of the Dublin Regulation are to establish a mechanism that enables processing an individual asylum application to a particular EU Member State and to provide a legal framework to the protection of those in need, but it does not intend to share burdens between the Member States (Fratzke 2015, 1). The Schengen Area makes it impossible to hold migrants on the territory of one EU state, and illegal migrants are moving towards other European countries, such as Germany and Sweden. The EU also adopted the Return Directive in 2008 that outlines a mechanism of returning illegal migrants, but these methods are found to be unproductive, as return rates remain low (Ernst and Young Global Limited 2016, 5). It is necessary to note that this document entered into force before the huge number of illegal migrants started entering Europe, and it does not reflect the demands of the present situation to resist the migration issue.

When it comes to the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), it has been proven that some Member States of the EU cannot meet these requirements, and continue violating and ignoring the rules (*Ibid.*). This makes the crisis very difficult to handle, and the system was not designed to function in a time of crisis. As a response to the crisis, the European Commission adopted the European Agenda on Migration in 2015. The Agenda was developed to influence the crisis in a practical way, by the enhancement of funding to Frontex to save migrants lives at sea, coordination of resettlement plans to Europe, which was followed by launching a CSDP operation (European Agenda on Migration 2017). The CSDP's mission is an operational response to the refugee crisis, it was needed to offer a more comprehensive approach to the challenge, while the previous documents on migration do not have the capacity to react to the migration issue. Besides, another challenge for the EU is the inability to clearly

distinguish an economic migrant and a refugee. The current mechanisms do not allow accurate recognition of migrant's intentions, and it is usually a long procedure.

Further, it is important to look at statistics and numbers to have an overall picture of the problem. It is necessary to describe the main migrant routes to find out how migrant movements affect both members of the EU and NATO allies. There are several routes, which are popular among migrants: the Eastern Mediterranean route, the Central Mediterranean route, the Western Mediterranean route, and the Western Balkan route. People from the Middle East and African countries using these routes to reach the EU illegally with the help of criminals, and human smugglers are also benefiting.

Table 1. Detections of illegal border crossing

Routes	2015	2016	2017 (Jan-Sep)
Eastern Mediterranean route	885 386	182 277	27 419
Central Mediterranean route	153 946	181 459	104 760
Western Balkan route	764 038	130 261	9 054
Western Mediterranean route	7 004	10 231	14 769

Source: Compiled by the author (Frontex 2017, 19; Migratory routes map 2017)

This Table shows the number of people crossing EU borders illegally from 2015-2017, making it possible to determine whether there is either a positive or a negative trend comparing the years of arrival. The data for 2017 is not complete, covering illegal border crossings only until September. According to the data, the most popular route among refugees in 2017 is the Central Mediterranean route. However, the table shows that the number of illegal border crossings in 2017 has decreased significantly in the Eastern Mediterranean route compared to the previous years. There is also increased migrant flow in the Western Mediterranean route. These are only the official numbers provided by Frontex, and there is reason to believe that the unofficial numbers are much higher. Moreover, it is difficult or impossible to determine the exact number of people crossing the external border of the EU illegally.

According to these numbers, it was necessary to concentrate CSDP's mechanisms on the Central Mediterranean route, and on the Mediterranean Sea in general. The Eastern Mediterranean route has

an effect on Greece and Turkey, who are both NATO allies. Then, the EU-Turkey refugee deal was signed to reduce the number of illegal migrants reaching Greek soil. Lately, NATO has launched an operation in the Aegean Sea. According to the data, the number of migrants crossing the EU border and using the Eastern Mediterranean route has significantly decreased.

2.2 The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy and its limitations

2.2.1. CSDP's scope of activity

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was officially established at the Cologne European Council in 1999, to enhance the EU's ability to participate in international conflict prevention and crisis management using civilian and military capabilities, which was also considered as a unification of European countries (Lübkemeier 2001, 19). In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty made some improvements in the development of the ESDP, renaming this policy to the CSDP. The main changes are related to the establishment of the European External Action Service and formation of both a mutual assistance and a solidarity clause (Shaping of a Common Security… 2016). Article 42(1) of the Treaty on European Union refers to the possibility of using civilian and military assets for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security while respecting the principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter. The main purpose of the CSDP is to maintain peace on the territory of the EU through protection from external threats. The CSDP is a tool to manage external crises outside the EU that have an effect on European states and the European neighbourhood, strengthening international security and stability.

In order to respond to external crises, the CSDP functions under the Petersberg tasks, which are the foundation for the policy's operative development (Lübkemeier 2001, 19). They indicate the type of military action that the EU can launch in crisis management operations, including the objectives for deployment of military units (Shaping of a Common Security… 2016). In accordance with the Treaty on European Union Article 43(1), the EU can undertake its civilian and military capabilities for the following reasons: humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping, post-conflict stabilisation, military advice and assistance, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, and joint disarmament operations.

It is critical to determine how the migration issue fits in CSDP's area of responsibility in order to explain its engagement in this problem. It is necessary to point out that a threat caused by the refugee crisis is much greater than the ability of the CSDP to influence the issue. Migration is a hybrid threat, and there are many factors that should be taken into account when it comes to dealing with this problem. Without any hesitation, it is in CSDP's capacity to influence the refugee problem, as it matches CSDP's objectives, but the scope of the problem is extremely high. Thus, migration is perceived as a non-military issue, and CSDP's mechanisms are being employed to deal with a humanitarian issue. This challenge cannot be resolved using only civilian means, as they can only supplement the military ones. In the context of the migration challenge, it is crucial for the CSDP to ensure control and safety of EU's external borders to fight irregular migration, which require military assets. Moreover, there is a large number of migrants who lost their lives at sea while waiting to be rescued. It is a humanitarian crisis that is an aftermath of conflicts in Africa and the Middle East. CSDP's involvement could also be related to post-conflict stabilisation and conflict prevention and peace-keeping, but at the moment the EU has launched only one operation within the CSDP's framework in the Mediterranean Sea.

2.2.2. The limitations of the CSDP

In this section, it is crucial to refer to constraints of the CSDP, specifically, the factors obstructing the progress of the policy. As the development of the CSDP was based on attempting to unite European security, it is necessary to analyse why this has not yet been achieved. The EU does not have a common army, but it is moving towards independence in terms of international security provision. The president of the EU Commission Jean-Claude Juncker (2017) is in favour of creation of the EU army, claiming that "[b]y 2025 we need a fully-fledged European defence union. We need it. And NATO wants it". He believes that the EU should be independent from NATO elaborating strong military capabilities in order to be able to protect itself, but it is a complex process. Now, the EU evidently lacks military assets and there is absence of an effective military framework to deal with problems connected to security.

It could be argued that CSDP's operations are limited in scale and duration having restricted purposes, which were achieved, but the policy lacks the strategic guidance (Biscop, Coelmont 2010, 7). Hence, one of the major limitations of the CSDP is the absence of a concrete strategy towards security

provision to meet security challenges in a more comprehensive way, namely the policy is based on missions and operations that are applicable only to individual cases. More than 30 civilian and military operations have been conducted since CSDP's inception, and civilian missions are in majority (Haesebrouck 2015, 7). They all require specific approaches toward the solution of crises, and the list of missions is impressive covering Europe, the Middle East and African countries. More precisely, it is not specified when and where the EU has to intervene, so it is the leadership of the EU who make a decision when the policy is required, which is decided by unanimity in the European Council (Biscop, Coelmont 2010, 7). It could be highlighted that the CSDP reacts to problems selectively, without having an established mechanism of actions. This means that it is not prescribed exactly how the CSDP should respond to the migration crisis, and which Member States have to make the greatest impact. Thus, all crises are different in terms of causes and consequences, and it is quite difficult to set a unified plan of action.

It is important to notice that the Petersberg tasks can be interpreted in different ways, as their objectives are not characterized in a concrete manner, thereby distinct national interpretation about priorities of foreign and security policy could obstruct the development of the CSDP (Margaras 2010, 4). This means that some EU Member States might not agree to be involved in a mission, if they do not consider the reasons for launching an operation reasonable, and it is directly related to the voluntary principle, as states are not obliged to offer their military capabilities. For instance, there were no CSDP operations conducted in response to the Tuareg rebellion in Mali or the Libyan conflict to stop violent actions against civilians, even though these events had a direct influence on the security of the European neighbourhood (Haesebrouck 2015, 7). This shows the EU's CSDP functions selectively covering not all problems, however it seems logical for the EU to be involved in these issues.

It is necessary to notice that there is no economic support following a military operation, and this makes the lasting results extremely hard to achieve (Coelmont 2015, 110). The combination of different measures is crucial in conducting crisis management operations, and it is important to set a long-term strategy combining required approaches for the achievement of efficient results. It is not enough to conduct a short-term operation with limited objectives, because it does not produce a long-

term effect, as it takes time to stabilise a situation. The existence of a common strategy could raise the CSDP to a different level, enabling it to conduct the policy more effectively.

Thereby, CSDP's missions are limited in scope, and there is also a significant dependence on the EU leadership and priorities of major EU Member States, which is complicated by the fact that decision-making process requires unanimity (Freire 2008, 23). Thus, there might be a problem with conducting a common decision, as the interests of Member States can vary, and it is also highly dependent on the political will of EU's leadership. The principle of unanimity might lead to the situation where some problems are simply ignored, when they affect only a limited number of Member States. However, the decision-making process based on consensus leads to lower-level obligations by the CSDP, and this framework seems to be unattractive for the Member States to initiate and launch an operation (Haesebrouck 2015, 15). It can be said that Member States are not motivated to act under CSDP's framework, as there are no initiatives to allocate responsibilities equally depending on a Member State's capabilities, and it is likely that countries would not support that suggestion. National interests are always the priority for Member States of the EU, and no one is going to sacrifice them for the good of common security. At the moment, it is not possible to set EU's strategy in order to act identically on all issues, and Member States are not willing to transfer their autonomy to the EU contradicting their interests, values and culture. This is one of the reasons why it is extremely difficult to tackle the migration crisis. EU's Member States are different in terms of military capabilities and affected by a particular security problem in distinct ways. They have to find a balance between internal policies and common defence and security, and the risks are high in contributing to the CSDP, thus it is reasonable for them to offer resources without harming national interests.

In addition, disagreements between the EU Member States related to the use of force obstruct the development of the CSDP (Coelmont 2015, 111). There is no mechanism forcing Member States to give at the EU's disposal their military assets without consent. Hence, the principle of mutual assistance and the principle of solidarity are highly important in influencing international crises, including the migration problem (Anghel, Bacian 2016, 2-3). When it comes to migration, several states are affected the most by this challenge, and the principle of solidarity might be applicable in this question. The solidarity clause was introduced in the Lisbon Treaty to provide assistance to the Member State that were affected by the security challenge, and might be used for preventive activities

and assistance in the aftermaths, thus the clause can potentially be implemented in regards to the migration problem (Anghel, Bacian 2016, 2-3). This clause has not yet been used in terms of the refugee crisis.

Moreover, specific ideas and interests of some EU Member States might have an effect on launching a mission, especially if it could be related to holding the Presidency, political salience, or mass media coverage (Biscop, Coelmont 2010, 7). The migration crisis is profoundly discussed in the mass media, pointing out the situation in the Middle East, and the Mediterranean Sea, indicating that people are aware of this situation and public interest remains high. This makes the issue very popular among societies of EU countries and people expect action from the governments.

Furthermore, it is crucial to refer to EU's military capability, in particular, in which way it is limited. Haesebrouck (2015, 5) highlights that CSDP's operations are small in scale, not producing long-term results. CSDP's small-scale operations can also be explained by a divergent approach on the use of force that lies in the absence of a common strategic culture, but there is an increased tendency in choosing civilian missions over military ones (*Ibid.,* 11-12). Therefore, military missions are less approved by Member States, which is related to the availability of military assets, hampering the evolution common security and defence in Europe. Particularly, there is a risk of casualties in military operations, and financial costs are high, which makes Member States unwilling to contribute to military missions corresponding in scale to their capabilities, and there is a tendency of making minor contributions that are expressed in small-scale missions (*Ibid.,* 13).

There is also a difference between Member States of the EU in relation to availability of military resources. Small Member States have limited military resources, but bigger Member States such as France, Germany, and the UK have much more military capabilities allowing them to conduct long-term operations (Margaras 2010, 8). Due to the specific institutional structure of the CSDP, the achievements in military crisis management will always be determined by the individual efforts of EU's Member States (Rodt 2011, 105), connecting with their respective as well as disproportional military capabilities. In addition, the EU does not have a common army, meaning that the capability of the CSDP depends on contributions of Member States. Because of the different military capabilities, the share of several EU Member States is necessarily bigger, while others will contribute less to the

security provision. The situation was exacerbated by the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, as the UK has substantial military capabilities, and it will be unlikely for the union to fulfil its intentions of becoming an independent security actor in the future.

These arguments show evidence that the CSDP has a restrictive capacity to influence the European migration crisis, as its operations are limited in scope, not producing long-term results, while EU's military capabilities are also restricted. However, it is crucial to determine exactly how the EU is implementing the CSDP in the special case of the migration crisis.

2.3. Operation Sophia within the framework of the CSDP

Operation EUNAVFOR MED Sophia is a CSDP's response to the challenging migration issue in the Mediterranean Sea. This sub-chapter will include the outcomes of the operation to assess its performance discussing the implementation of the CSDP. The operation was launched on 22 June 2015, and its mandate has been extended until 31 December 2018 (EUNAVFOR MED … 2017). Firstly, it is crucial to determine the main objective of the maritime operation, which is directed at disruption of migrant smuggling networks by identifying, capturing, and disposing of vessels that are used for human smuggling and trafficking, but it also takes actions on saving migrant lives in the Mediterranean Sea (Tardy 2015, 1). It is a humanitarian obligation of the EU to rescue migrants at sea. The mandate of Operation Sophia has been extended in order to train and assist the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy, take part in realisation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the Libya's coast, and to promote cooperation with Frontex and Europol by sharing intelligence on human trafficking (EUNAVFOR MED… 2017). The operation was able to rescue more than 40,000 lives, neutralise 470 vessels used for migrant smuggling, and arrest 110 suspects in smuggling and trafficking (*Ibid.*).

Further, the limitations of Operation EUNAVFOR MED Sophia will be argued pointing out the restricted capacity to affect the migration challenge. The main idea of the operation is to tackle human trafficking at sea, but it does not prevent migrant flows, because criminals have adapted to the new situation using smaller boats and more dangerous routes that led to an increase in deaths (European Union Committee 2017, 15). The operation has narrow objectives, not indicating how migrants can

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be affected by the disruption of the criminal networks, specifically, how their possibilities can change in the long perspective (Tardy 2015, 4). Focusing only on smugglers' networks would not solve the crisis, as it is necessary to address the root causes of the crisis, which is not possible to achieve through a CSDP mission.

In order to operate in the Libya's territorial and internal waters, the EU has to receive a mandate from the UN Security Council (UNSC) or the permission of the Libyan authorities (Tardy 2015, 2). The Libyan state is politically unstable creating complications in cooperation, while it is necessary to operate onshore to achieve required results. The migrant smuggling networks are based on land, therefore Libya's engagement and acknowledgement in this question is highly important (European Union Committee 2017, 12). A maritime operation is not a practical choice in response to the migration issue, as the CSDP should operate on Libya's territory having the approval of the Libyan authorities. However, there is a small chance that migration will be a priority for Libya in the near future (European Union Committee 2017, 24).

It can be argued that EU's CSDP cannot secure the entity's borders using its capabilities, as Operation Sophia's main purpose is to tackle human smugglers. This operation is restricted in terms of the objectives without having long-term initiatives. Nevertheless, these actions indicate the acknowledgement of the problem by the organisation. The EU have to cooperate with Libyan authorities, which is complicated by the unstable situation in the country. It has always been the priority for the EU to act autonomously on European soil and in the neighbourhood, but NATO assets are indispensable, and the reality shows the EU needs NATO in this question.

3. EU-NATO INTER-ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION

The first chapter has identified that migration is a security issue that could pose a challenge to European security due to several reasons and should be accepted by international community. Further, it is necessary to discuss how the EU and NATO can cooperate to provide an effective support towards influencing the European refugee crisis. In order to determine NATO's role in solving the migration crisis, it is crucial to analyse the concept of inter-institutional security cooperation. In the first place, it is important to identify the possibility of the EU's partnership with NATO to determine whether that cooperation can be realised. Then, it is crucial to point out the main obstacles preventing the development of EU-NATO cooperation, and explain the EU-NATO relationship at both informal and formal levels, including the Berlin Plus arrangements.

3.1. EU-NATO security cooperation

There might be different causes forcing organisations to cooperate, including materialist motives and occasions based on shared values or interests (Haugevik 2007, 8). Concerning the EU-NATO relationship, it is possible to point out two main reasons for entering into a partnership, which are overlapping competencies and resource dependence. Since the end of the Cold War, the term "security" has been associated not only with territorial and military security issues, but also with new international conflicts that required multinational and multidimensional measures and more sophisticated approaches (*Ibid.*). The world is constantly changing, and new measures have to be applied to tackle the emerging issues, which require a completely new level of cooperation between international organisations in terms of crisis management. This means that cooperation at an inter-organisational level is needed, as complex issues cannot be addressed by one single entity alone.

3.1.1. Overlapping competencies

The EU and NATO are two completely different co-operational frameworks, which have overlapping functions and common threats. NATO is a political and military alliance, whose main activity is focused on providing security and defence. The Alliance also has capabilities to conduct crisis management operation that can be different in nature. At the same time, the EU's CSDP is only part of the entity's area of competence. It is rather difficult but still possible to establish a strong and productive cooperation between two completely different organisations. In accordance with the Treaty on European Union Article 42(2), the EU relies on NATO in terms of collective defence, seeing it as a main partner.

Concerning effective cooperation in crisis management, it is crucial to have a functional division of labour. The EU and NATO have more concrete tasks than the UN when it comes to security provision, although they were involved in the same conflicts facilitating long-term stabilisation in certain areas (Schleich 2014, 183). As organisations have common threats, there should be an overlap of issue areas. Without any doubt, NATO and the EU have common threats in terms of security, which are terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, human smuggling, etc. (Zyla 2011, 673). These problems have a transnational character, as they could spread beyond national boundaries and have a direct effect on other states. Cooperation is crucial in this context, because one organisation cannot deal with these kind of issues independently.

Moreover, the existence of common threats is also associated with the fact than the majority of Member States of the EU are also members of NATO. Now, the EU and NATO have 22 countries in common, and that makes an essential reason for cooperation. It is necessary to emphasise the importance of correct division of tasks and responsibilities, as it is a key element for effective crisis management. There are some assumptions that have to be followed in order to achieve that. When it comes to the EU-NATO relationship, it is critical to avoid decoupling, duplication and discrimination, which are the main principles in EU-NATO inter-organisational interactions (Reichard 2006, 147). These criteria should facilitate a comprehensive crisis management by allocating the appropriate tasks correctly. In other words, EU's decisions should not contradict decisions of the Alliance, the CSDP does not have to duplicate capabilities and resources that are in NATO's possession, and it is necessary

to avoid discrimination against non-EU NATO members in crisis management operations (Reichard 2006, 147, 158-159). Thus, division in opinions regarding security threats is not acceptable for the Alliance, as the EU and NATO have to move in one direction conducting crisis management missions.

3.1.2. Resource dependence

Further, it is important to argue that cooperation could occur on the grounds of resource dependence. It happens mainly when one organisation does not have enough capabilities to reach its goals and wants to gain benefit from having access to other institution's resources (Haugevik 2007, 11-12). When it comes to the EU-NATO relationship, the EU has needed NATO support in conducting some crisis management operations. For these objectives, it was necessary to formalise the EU-NATO partnership by signing the Berlin Plus agreements in 2003 that enables the EU to use NATO capabilities in CSDP's operations (Reichard 2006, 273). The EU gained benefit from NATO military resources in both Operation Concordia in Macedonia (2003) and Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004), which were conducted under the Berlin Plus arrangements (Haugevik 2007, 11-12). This formal agreement constitutes the foundation for the development of EU-NATO relations. The EU needed NATO military assets in carrying out these operations as the EU was unable to carry out crisis management independently. The entry into force of the Berlin Plus agreements could also mean that NATO has control over the development of the European military policy and is able to affect it in some way (*Ibid.,* 11). Thus, it enables the expansion of NATO's influence in Europe, as the EU has admitted that it has a lack of military resources. This is a materialistic motive, and both organisations have benefited from that sort of cooperation.

Improvements in EU-NATO cooperation are only possible when states' interests converge, as it allows moving in the same policy directions, otherwise there will be deadlock (Schleich 2014, 186). Member states have a great impact in the shaping of new policy fields, specifically foreign and security policy and the EU-NATO relationship in general (*Ibid*., 185). If states have common problems, they will start finding ways for collaboration. Concerning the migration crisis, Turkey as a member of NATO has the same goal as the EU to fight against irregular border crossing. As a result, the EU-Turkey agreement was signed in 2016 (Garelli, Tazzioli 2017, 7). It is necessary to highlight that shifting interests of member states cause changes in the EU-NATO relationship because powerful states, such as the United States, Great Britain, Germany and France have a significant influence on this process

by contributing to the budget a large amount, and it is not feasible to develop security and foreign policy without these states (Schleich 2014, 185-186). This means that some states have a dominant position and are willing to shape policies that are in their interests and which affect other countries. Sometimes even within one organisation there are differences in opinion which obstruct or slow down the decision making process. It is essential that states are willing to pursue their own interests and cooperate only in the case of gaining benefit. Member states also have their own political priorities and goals, and both organisations can be used as a tool for achieving particular objectives, which can vary depending on the organisation (Reichard 2006, 6). This assumes that a member state can change its position towards a particular issue.

After the 2013 EU's European Council meeting concerning the CSDP, it was decided to facilitate a greater EU-NATO cooperation (Howorth 2017, 1). At the same time, the EU Global Strategy of 2016 sets out the priory areas for the partnership with NATO, however, the list includes problems (such as cyber threats, maritime security, security sector reform, etc.) that are obvious and essential to joint efforts (*Ibid.*). Notwithstanding, this contradicts the initial idea of the EU becoming an autonomous entity from the point of view of security, and now the EU sees NATO as an indispensable associate, and recognises its dependence on NATO. As a result of the Warsaw Summit, NATO-EU Joint Declaration was signed in July 2016 that indicates the readiness to continue inter-institutional cooperation, highlighting that maritime security and illegal migration are also the priorities for further collaboration, underlying the need for more strategic partnership (Relation with the European Union 2017). Through these documents, both organisations show their readiness for further activities. Accordingly, the documents outline the priorities for future cooperation by describing the issues without offering concrete proposals for actions.

3.2. Difficulties in EU-NATO cooperation

However, there are difficulties restraining or obstructing the EU-NATO partnership. EU-NATO cooperation is restricted by differences in political perceptions of member states and distinctions in institutional cultures (Blockmans 2016, 7). Only states have the right to change their national policies, thus political factors determine the essence of inter-organisational cooperation. Distinct political perceptions obstruct inter-organisational cooperation, as it is impossible for member states to reach a

decision, which is beneficial to different institutions. This sub-chapter also allows explaining why the EU-NATO partnership is mostly occurring through informal networks.

3.2.1. The Cyprus issue

Smith (2011, 244) argues that disagreements between several states could cause problems with inter-institutional cooperation, specifying that the deadlock at the political stage refers to inability to solve common problems. These types of disagreements could hamper strategic inter-organisational cooperation. For instance, disputes between Turkey and Cyprus impede the EU-NATO partnership at the formal level.

The origin of disputes between Turkey and Cyprus lies in the division of the island of Cyprus, meaning that the island is separated into two parts causing a frozen conflict. In particular, Turkey does not officially recognise the government of Cyprus since 1963, only recognising the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Yost 2007, 93). Cyprus, in its turn, opposes Turkey's interactions with the EU's CSDP framework (Acikmese, Triantaphyllou 2012, 556). In other words, Cyprus has hindered Turkey's inclusion in the EU defence area, particularly, it has blocked Turkey's partnership with the European Defence Agency (EDA) (Oğuzlu 2010, 77). The situation is exacerbated by the fact that Turkey is not a member of the EU and Cyprus is not a member of NATO. All NATO allies should approve candidates for the Partnership for Peace (PfP) membership, but the Turkish government does not approve Cyprus as a part of this agreement (Yost 2007, 93, 95). Thereby, after the 2004 enlargement of the EU, the participation problem has emerged weakening cooperation between the EU and NATO, because it is not possible for NATO to formally discuss issues with the states who are not members of the PfP (Smith 2011, 247).

Since Cyprus joined the EU, it has become unfeasible to maintain full NATO-EU cooperation. This problem can be seen as deadlock in EU-NATO cooperation at the formal level. In fact, due to disputes between Turkey and Cyprus, Turkey uses its NATO membership preventing Cyprus from joining the PfP, and both sides use this situation to leverage each other (*Ibid.*). The issue must be settled in order to continue a comprehensive cooperation at the formal level. This can be seen as a serious obstruction in the relationship of these organisations, as many important issues are not discussed within a formal framework. This problem significantly weakens the political dialogue between the EU and NATO.

The issue also lies in the EU's operational inability to be flexible under the Berlin Plus framework; in particular, it is not possible to use NATO's military assets in CSDP's operations other than Concordia and Althea (Acikmese, Triantaphyllou 2012, 564). As it has become impossible to function under the formal framework, there were also difficulties in cooperation between the EU and NATO in Kosovo and Afghanistan (Oğuzlu 2010, 77). Concerning the topic of migration, it is not feasible to conduct CSDP's mission relying on NATO military capabilities due to the participation problem – the evident inability to effectively cooperate weakens the possibility of resolving complex problems that are common for both organisations, including hybrid threats. Formal meeting of NATO and EU can only be conducted on limited areas related to the Berlin Plus framework, excluding the participation of Cyprus (Acikmese, Triantaphyllou 2012, 564). Thus, NATO and the EU were forced into cooperation without a formal framework, which affected the results of missions of both organisations.

Furthermore, the participation problem has caused an issue related to the exchange of documents between the EU and NATO. This is reflected in the fact that Member States of the EU have access to NATO classified documents only if they have signed security agreements with NATO (Smith 2011, 248). It indicates that the system of document exchange is not efficient, as some Member States of the EU cannot receive important information from NATO. Yost (2007, 92) suggested that:

> EU member states hold that all EU members should attend NATO-EU meetings, while NATO member states maintain that the Alliance must uphold the NATO-EU agreement on security that stipulates that classified information can only be shared with EU members that have joined NATO's Partnership for Peace.

This also means that non-NATO EU Member States do not have an access to NATO assets, which makes the system inefficient. More precisely, classified information that is out of scope of the Berlin Plus agreement will not be transferred to the EU by NATO (Smith 2011, 248). Accordingly, the participation problem is directly connected to the issue of documents exchange, affecting the consideration of international challenges in the spectrum of security and defence. Cooperation that is based mainly on informal connections might be time-consuming with the issues on information sharing (Smith 2011, 253). This issue has forced both organisations to continue cooperation informally, which cannot achieve lasting results in comparison what formal partnership would

provide. It could be suggested that, if it ever becomes reality, the Turkey's prospective membership in the EU would overcome the stagnation in the EU-NATO relationship at the formal level (Acikmese, Triantaphyllou 2012, 568). However, this is a long and complex procedure, and not all within it depends on the EU – Turkey significantly adjusted its geostrategic priorities and attitude since the time when it had expressed its intentions to join the EU. It could be concluded that Turkey's actions towards Cyprus are a serious barrier to its accession to the EU.

The resolution of this frozen conflict could be named as an obligatory condition for the recovery of the EU-NATO relationship. However, it is not an easy a task to stabilise the relations of countries having long-standing disputes. Within the context of this paper, it can be argued that the restoration of formal NATO-EU cooperation can add plenty of value to the resolution of the migration crisis.

3.2.2. The use of force

The next obstacle for the partnership has an ideological character, as both organisations, in some sense, have distinct views on methods used for security provision and defence. Thereby, one of the difficulties linked to EU-NATO cooperation is related to the use of force, including types of missions, and resources employed in operations (Zyla 2011, 668). It is suggested that NATO and the EU have different understandings when it comes to the use of force in questions related to security.

Concerning the EU, it is determined to use soft power more often than NATO does, which might create some misunderstandings between the two entities on security provision. More precisely, political, diplomatic and economic methods of conflict prevention are the priorities for the EU, emphasising that military means can be used only in extreme cases (Demetriou 2016, 4). As has been argued in the previous chapter, the number of civilian missions under the CSDP is greater than military ones. EU's Member States are trying to avoid military obligations that require substantial use of military resources relying on soft power. On the other side, NATO is more prone to using military means. Sometimes the EU does not approve methods used by NATO in its missions, considering them insufficient due to the military factor. It could be claimed that the EU's approach is more peaceful and liberal, which minimizes use of force when it comes to crisis management. Hence, these distinctions between EU's intentions to use soft power and NATO's tendency towards hard power are not strengthening the EU-NATO partnership (*Ibid.*). In spite of this, the views of both organisations on the European migration

converge, as they have decided to launch military maritime operations. NATO's role here is also to assist the EU in conducting Operation Sophia. Notwithstanding, it is also highly important to employ civilian means in the migration crisis, for instance, humanitarian assistance. For instance the EU launched a civilian mission in Libya assisting border security (European Union Committee 2017, 20).

It could also be discussed that NATO's approach on crisis management is very concrete thanks to its military component, while the EU's wide range of policies, financial and diplomatic instruments enable it to wield a significant power in the international arena (Demetriou 2016, 4). Moreover, there are some disagreements between the EU and NATO on specific regions, including Libya, Mali, and Syria; for instance, the EU decided not to launch a CSDP mission in the Libyan crisis in 2011, expecting actions from NATO (Schleich 2014, 198). Therefore, the EU determined to stay outside of this crisis, allowing NATO to prevail in the region.

Now, EU-NATO security cooperation is mostly taking place through informal networks. In general, the relationship is based on meetings at different levels, informal ministerial dinners, staff-to-staff talks etc. (Relation with the European Union 2017). Informal meetings of NATO and EU foreign ministers were conducted in order to facilitate interaction by discussing issues that are on the agendas of both organisations (Yost 2007, 96-97). Moreover, due to the participation problem, exchange of classified information and cooperation at the formal level is restricted (Schleich 2014, 198). This problem makes it impossible to establish an effective partnership within a formal network, touching upon the inability to share crucial information, which could be an asset in countering migrant smuggling and illegal border crossings in the Mediterranean. Concerning illegal migration, it is crucial to have an effective system of shared databases, however, it is difficult to achieve when several states have disagreements regarding specific issues. Thus, the main obstacle in EU-NATO cooperation lies in the institutional structure, and inability to share important information. More precisely, Cyprus is a Mediterranean country, Turkey is located on the Eastern Mediterranean route, and this region is affected the most by migrant flows. However, there is cooperation between NATO and the EU at the operational level in the case of the migration issue, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

It is critical to add that the Turkish mafia is involved in migrant smuggling across the Mediterranean Sea. According to the Italian journalist and writer Roberto Saviano (2017), all migrant boats are

managed by the cartels, specifically the Turkish mafia is responsible for sending migrants from Syria to Europe, in addition Lebanon and Libyan criminal organisations are also involved. This is a highly profitable business, showing the current problem from another side.

The shift in the EU-NATO cooperation could be achieved through the resolution of Turkey-Cyprus issue, otherwise, there is no way to get around the problem of document sharing. This affects not only the migration crisis, but also other issues, as the Mediterranean is strategically important for both organisations. The next chapter will argue NATO's activities in the Mediterranean Sea and efforts assisting the EU with regard to the migration crisis.

4. NATO AND THE EUROPEAN MIGRATION CRISIS

This chapter will focus on NATO's response with regard to the European migration crisis, pointing out two NATO military missions in the Mediterranean. Firstly, it is necessary to analyse the concept of crisis management to determine to what extent NATO can be involved in the resolution of this humanitarian crisis. NATO's current position in Europe is crucial to the discussion as well, as it will help to identify whether or not the Alliance is dominant over the EU in terms of security on a global scale. The reasonableness and effectiveness of maritime operations within the context of the migration crisis will also be argued in order to determine whether it is an appropriate approach for NATO, or whether other measures should be employed. The scope of NATO's military missions indicates the extent to which the migration problem is securitised within the organisation.

4.1. NATO and crisis management

Since the creation of NATO, its role in the world has been transformed by adapting to new security challenges due to modifications in international society. After the end of the Cold War, NATO lost its purpose for existence, and since that time it has been necessary for the organisation to rethink its objectives (Burton 2017, 1). The collapse of the Soviet Union did not result in the decline of NATO, on the contrary, since then the Alliance has shown its relevance. In order to detect its new purpose for existence NATO aimed to cooperate with European countries, directing its power toward the security and defence of Europe (*Ibid.,* 2-3). NATO has found it reasonable to strengthen the relationship with the EU to develop together in the same direction by ensuring security in the European territory and contributing to protection from external threats. Now, NATO can be perceived as a modern security organisation that also has features of a traditional defence alliance (Holmberg 2011, 530-531). There are two main directions from which challenges menacing the security of NATO members come: the Russian threat from the East, exacerbated by the annexation of Crimea, and instability on the Alliance's Southern border that caused the migration crisis in Europe (Burton 2017, 9). Accordingly,

these are the main regions NATO has to address by employing comprehensive approaches, as the Southern and Eastern threats require different measures. More precisely, NATO acknowledges its limitations when it comes to threats coming from the South, seeing an opportunity for further security cooperation with other institutions, including the EU (Burton 2017, 9).

When it comes to the EU, it is dependent on NATO, making the Alliance the main entity responsible for security and defence in Europe (Howorth 2017, 1). NATO can still be seen as the main provider of security and defence in Europe, while the EU's CSDP has restricted capabilities, as the EU is primarily a political and economic entity. The Alliance's military component enables it to be considered one of the main actors responsible for combating security threats on a global scale, making the EU reliant on NATO in security terms. The tendency of the EU to depend on NATO demonstrates not only the Alliance's leadership in the 2011 Libyan crisis, but also the emergence of the Russian threat, including the situation in Ukraine (*Ibid*.). The EU's use of NATO's military assets in its operations also demonstrated the acceptance of the supremacy of the Alliance (Demetriou 2016, 8). However, now the EU is using the CSDP to pursue becoming a military player comparable to NATO, without disrupting its dominance (Howorth 2017, 2).

In order to remain powerful after the end of the Cold War, the Alliance had to acquire new functions in addition to collective defence (Tuohy 2016, 55). NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept highlights three fundamental security tasks of the Alliance: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security (Strategic concepts 2014). Further, it is crucial to address the concept of crisis management that would help to identify NATO's engagement in the Mediterranean. When it comes to crisis management, members of the Alliance should be working together concentrating on a transnational crisis before and during a conflict, and when managing the aftermath of a problem (Crisis Management 2015). It is necessary to keep in mind that international crises are specific in nature requiring individual approaches, which might include military, political, and civilian measures. The necessity of a comprehensive approach towards crisis management has shown NATO experience in Afghanistan and Southeastern Europe (Touhy 2016, 55). In addition, NATO acknowledges that the possibility of solving a crisis using only military capabilities is not high (Crisis Management 2015).

In the post-Cold War era, NATO conducted a number of non-Article 5 crisis response operations, which took place, for example, in Kosovo, Afghanistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Mediterranean, and Libya (Crisis Management 2015). Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was invoked only once after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, and resulted in launching Operation Endeavour in the Mediterranean that was directed towards fighting terrorist activities (Weintraub 2016, 2). It is important to add that non-Article 5 missions are voluntary, and member states are not obliged to participate in operations. Thus, the outcomes of a mission are highly dependent on states' intentions to use their capabilities and possibilities to affect a problem in general. NATO relies on its substantive military assets when conducting crisis response operations.

When speaking about a comprehensive approach towards crisis management, NATO faces some difficulties in achieving that due to not profiting from deployment of civilian measures (Wendling 2010, 39). This happens since the Alliance's military components are prevail while excluding civilian measures from its scope. Accordingly, this fact might complicate cooperation with other organisations due to their distinct practices, but it can be improved by enhanced coordination between military and civilian players (*Ibid.,* 38-39). Thus, the correct division of responsibilities and capabilities should facilitate the resolution of a conflict or a crisis. Due to the complex nature of the European migration crisis, NATO could elaborate military means, while the EU could use the civilian ones when dealing with illegal migration.

The migration crisis is an unusual challenge for NATO, as it is a humanitarian problem originating from several countries. NATO's missions in the Mediterranean designed to counter the European migration crisis are unique for the Alliance, as it the first time it has had to employ its military means to protect EU's external borders from a non-military threat (Weintraub 2016, 2). It is not in NATO's capacity to eliminate the migration challenge affecting its allies and EU Member States, but it has resources to minimize the effects of this challenge. NATO's crisis management shows that the Alliance as an independent entity has the capacity to be involved in the migration crisis, as it is prescribed as its core task. Further, two of NATO's maritime missions will be discussed to assess its response to the challenge.

4.2. NATO's maritime operations in the Mediterranean

As a response to the European migration crisis, NATO introduced two naval missions in the Mediterranean: Operation in the Aegean Sea and Operation Sea Guardian. These missions are different in their scope of activity and objectives, but have a common goal, which is to ensure security in the Mediterranean. It is necessary to argue the effectiveness of these missions taking into account CSDP's Operation Sophia, which is not regarded as successful in managing the migration challenge.

Figure 1. Naval missions to counter illegal migration

Source: (European Union Committee 2016, 117)

It is important to show the geographical location of maritime missions which take place in the Mediterranean. *Figure 1* demonstrates the location of NATO's mission in the Aegean Sea, EU's Operation Sophia, and Operation Triton that was launched by Frontex. NATO's second naval mission – Operation Sea Guardian, not shown on the map, also takes place in the Mediterranean Sea, in particular in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean (Dibenedetto 2016, 13).

In February 2016, NATO launched an operation in the Aegean Sea at the request of Greece, Germany and Turkey to reduce human smuggling and illegal migration (Assistance for the refugee… 2016). In

this context, Greece and Turkey are among those countries who are affected the most by increased flows of illegal migrants. When it comes to Germany, it is one of the desired destinations of migrants. Germany is in favour of cooperation with Turkey to decrease flows of migrants, and NATO institutionally provided this opportunity (Jacobs 2016, 2). The request for this operation also acknowledges that Germany and Greece, as members of the EU, consider the necessity of NATO's presence in the Aegean Sea, thus they recognise that the EU does not have autonomy in the security area. The main objective of this naval mission is to reduce illegal border crossing and fight human trafficking through surveillance, intelligence and reconnaissance, while providing support to Turkish and Greek authorities, and working together with EU's agency Frontex (Assistance for the refugee… 2016). This operation has a narrow mandate, so its main activity is directed to dismantling the Eastern Mediterranean route.

The advantage of this operation is that NATO is able to act in Turkish territorial waters (Garelli, Tazzioli 2017, 7). Turkey is a member of NATO, but the EU has no authority to act on the Turkish coasts. In accordance with the principles of international law, NATO ships are obliged to rescue people in distress at sea (Assistance for the refugee… 2016). This can be regarded as a humanitarian element of the mission. However, the Alliance's goal is not rescue people at sea, but to transfer information about refugee boats to Greek and Turkish Coast Guards and Frontex, intervening only in case of immediate danger (Jacobs 2016, 4). Without NATO's operation, it would be extremely difficult to establish an effective partnership between Turkish and Greek Coast Guards, which is an important precondition for deterring human smuggler networks. This shows that NATO also can be seen as an intermediary between Turkey, Greece and Frontex, improving the partnership (Weintraub 2016, 1). Moreover, NATO, as argued, should increase its surveillance efforts on the Turkish-Syrian border (*Ibid.*). It is also crucial for NATO to participate in border management of the EU, as it could improve the situation with illegal migration through exchange of information between the EU and NATO.

However, there are some constraints altering the effectiveness and the outcomes of the operation. There is evidence that NATO's mission could not stop migrant flows from Turkey to Greece due to disagreement between Greece and Turkey. In particular, there are disputes regarding the sea border between southern Turkish coast and the Greek Dodecanese islands, and smuggling routes will be transferred to the South (Chryssogelos 2016). Thus, there are some areas in the Aegean Sea that are

outside NATO's access area, which makes this mission restricted, and criminals are benefiting from this situation. Accordingly, it is likely that criminals are able to adapt to this situation, and this might even threaten the lives of migrants, as new routes could be more dangerous. This has proved once again that the disputes between states could hamper actions directed towards the solution of a problem.

It can be mentioned that the number of people crossing the Eastern Mediterranean route has decreased since the presence of NATO in the Aegean Sea (Dibenedetto 2016, 7). However, despite NATO's and CSDP's efforts, the number of deaths at sea is still high. For instance, 2408 people died in the Mediterranean Sea from January until August 2017, while in the same period of 2016 the total number was 3203 (Mediterranean migrant arrivals… 2017).

Recently, in November 2016, NATO decided to launch a maritime mission in the Mediterranean Sea called Operation Sea Guardian that was an outcome of the 2016 Warsaw Summit (Dibenedetto 2016, 1). The operation has three main goals: provide support to maritime situational awareness, fight terrorism at sea, and facilitate maritime security capacity-building (Operation Sea Guardian 2016). The objectives of the operation indicate that it has a broader scope of activity than NATO's mission in the Aegean Sea. Accordingly, it is not directly linked to the problem of illegal migration, as it is aimed at strengthening maritime security in general, including the protection of the EU's external borders.

One of the objectives of Operation Sea Guardian is to assist the EU's Operation Sophia through providing important information related to human trafficking, as the EU' mission has a lack of experience in intelligence (Dibenedetto 2016, 12). Thus, information sharing between missions could decrease the shortcomings of CSDP's mission and help to improve the situation, enhancing partnership at the operational level. The strengthening of the partnership is crucial, as has been shown in Chapter 3 that there are considerable problems in EU-NATO cooperation at the institutional level. Moreover, Operation Sea Guardian also aims to help CSDP's mission in training Libyan Guards, and intends to ensure stability in Libya (*Ibid.,* 11, 14).

In comparison to Operation Sophia, this current NATO mission addresses not only the migration challenge, but maritime security in general. Accordingly, NATO's mission does not have a narrow

mandate to counter illegal migration. However, this operation indicates the intention and readiness to jointly act together at the operational level against a security challenge, which was prescribed at the Warsaw Summit of 2016. Thus, it can be witnessed that the two NATO's naval mission have distinct approaches and purposes. Operation in the Aegean Sea has a concrete task related to dismantling migrants' routes. On the contrary, Operation Sea Guardian has a broad scope of activity to ensure stability in the Mediterranean and assist CSDP's Operation Sophia. It is necessary to mention that there is also criticism over NATO's measures. NATO's maritime operations can be seen as an approach based on deterrence, specifically these measures could lead to militarization of the problem because of the increased presence of NATO's military assets at sea (Dibenedetto 2016, 12).

The paper has shown that the problem of migration is securitised by NATO. The Alliance's actions in the Mediterranean indicates its readiness to assist the EU by providing its military assets. Most likely, this issue will continue to be securitised, as there is no signs that it will be solved in near future, which means that a stronger NATO presence could be required in this question. If the situation in the countries of migrants' origins is not improved, then the migration problem will not be de-securitised. Moreover, this issue could be exacerbated due to an increase of humanitarian problems, such as famine, in Nigeria, South Sudan and Somalia (Gowan 2017, 1-2). In 2017, the number of people crossing the Western Mediterranean route toward Spain has increased, which was shown in *Table 1*. This indicates that NATO's presence will be needed in the Western Mediterranean Sea, away from where current NATO missions are operating.

The EU's and NATO's military operations are dealing with the aftermaths of the problem. In order to improve the situation, it is critical to address the root causes of the issue, meaning to stabilise the situation in the counties of origin. However, this is impossible to achieve. The outcomes of NATO's two maritime operations are not possible to detect immediately – time will show the actual results. These missions are still active, but now, it can be concluded that NATO, in spite of its military advantage, has not done much to eliminate this challenge.

SUMMARY

The aim of this thesis was to address the European migration crisis from the perspective of two international frameworks – NATO and the EU, thus it was necessary to analyse the institutional response to the problem. The focus of the study was directed at NATO's attitude towards the migration problem, but it was also necessary to include the EU's position, the essence of the EU-NATO partnership, and only then to address NATO's efforts with regards to this problem. These steps were necessary in order to justify and explain the necessity of the Alliance's involvement in the challenging migration issue.

Firstly, it has been pointed out through the securitization theory that illegal migration could pose a threat to European security. The migration problem is regarded as a non-military and hybrid threat that is a consequence of instability in the Middle East and African countries. According to the securitisation theory, any issue can be regarded as a security problem. This research paper outlines several factors that enable the connection of migration with the concept of security: migration could threaten a state's internal security, have an effect on cultural identity, and be connected with terrorism and other criminal activities. It is highly important to prioritise this problem both at a state and international level, otherwise it could lead to uncontrollable aftermaths.

It is a widespread standpoint that the ongoing migration crisis is purely the EU's concern, as it affects mostly EU Member States. Therefore, it was crucial to analyse the abilities of the organisation to manage illegal migration, which was done through the EU's military component – the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In fact, the CSDP has limited ability to influence the migration issue, as there is no common strategy on security provision, and CSDP's missions are limited in scope. Moreover, a threat caused by illegal migration is much higher that the EU's capacity to solve the problem, and its military resources are also restricted. CSDP's Operation Sophia is not effective in combating illegal migration, as it could not prevent migrant flows, while operating only at sea, and focusing only on smuggler's networks.

This research paper has discussed the concept of EU-NATO inter-institutional cooperation to determine the synergy between NATO and the EU in managing the migration issue. The EU and NATO share the majority of their member states, and this makes an essential precondition for cooperation. The EU-NATO partnership in the security area has shown that there are problems preventing effective cooperation, which lie in the conflict between Turkey and Cyprus and different approaches to the use of force. The Turkey-Cyprus disputes prevent the exchange of important information at the formal level, which is also critical in managing the migration issue. Therefore, cooperation mainly takes place informally and at the operational level. However, there are intentions for cooperation from both sides in the security area, which are demonstrated by both the EU Global Strategy of 2016 and the NATO-EU Joint Declaration that was signed in July 2016.

In Chapter 4, NATO's position with regard to the migration crisis has been discussed. The previous chapters have proven that NATO, as a significant actor on a global scale, has the right and necessity to be involved in solving such a challenging problem – the European migration crisis. Crisis management is prescribed as one the fundamental tasks of the Alliance that is expressed in conduction of non-Article 5 crisis response operation. The Alliance has extensive experience in crisis management, but illegal migration is a unique challenge due to its nature, which NATO is trying to influence. The research has indicated that NATO decided to address the migration issue using military means, by launching two maritime operations in the Mediterranean: Operation in the Aegean Sea and Operation Sea Guardian. NATO's Operation in the Aegean Sea aimed to counter human smuggling has an advantage in the ability in Turkish territorial waters, but the disputes between Turkey and Greece weaken the effectiveness of this operation. The number of migrants crossing the Eastern Mediterranean route has decreased, but the number of deaths at sea is still high. Operation Sea Guardian has a broader scope of activity aiming to assist CSDP's Operation Sophia. This intention for the partnership with the EU that is expressed at the operational level is a good start for further developments in this direction.

The research has shown the focus of using military measures in naval operations. The scope of CSDP's mission is restricted due to the EU's military capabilities. NATO missions have also shown limited results, but NATO has substantial military assets. It can be concluded that neither NATO, nor the EU

can solve this hybrid threat independently. It is critical for NATO and the EU to act together on this problem, as only joint actions could improve the situation. But firstly, problems regarding EU-NATO cooperation should be resolved. It is highly important to highlight the necessity of overcoming the Turkey-Cyprus problem. This migration issue cannot be solved by only using military means, but for now, the EU and NATO have only launched military missions. There are intentions from the EU side to train the Libyan Coast Guard, but this cannot be achieved yet due to some complications. In general, it is not possible to immediately evaluate the outcomes of the EU's and NATO's activities. In order to solve an issue as challenging as the migration crisis, it is crucial to address the root causes of the problem. Now, both the EU and NATO are focusing on its outcomes, as this issue is the aftermath of problems in the Middle East and African countries.

This research paper has discussed military attitudes towards the migration crisis, however, further, it is possible to consider the EU's civilian approach towards this issue, as the EU is more prone to push for using its soft power. This might include CSDP's civilian missions and humanitarian assistance to countries of migrants' origin. Further research could discuss whether it is an effective way to support those countries and provide assistance to migrants. This will allow considering the influence on this problem from a different side, as the current research only concentrates on military aspects. The research has stated that the lack of military resources prevents the EU from dealing with the problem of migration effectively. The future of EU's military capabilities could be discussed as well, as this topic became relevant after the UK decided to leave the EU. This is important because the UK is one of those European countries possessing strong military capabilities. The effects and consequences of NATO presence in the Mediterranean could be a subject of further debates as well. For instance, it may be done in the context of whether it is possible for the migration crisis to become militarised due to the increased NATO's presence in the Mediterranean.

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