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**“NON-ALLIED FINLAND: PEACE AND STABILTY in
NORTHERN EUROPE”**

Bachelor’s thesis

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I hereby declare that I have compiled the paper independently and all works, important standpoints and data by other authors has been properly referenced and the same paper has not been previously presented for grading.

The document length is words from the introduction to the end of conclusion.

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ABSTRACT

Finland's non-allied security policy has proven to be successful in maintaining peace in the region. The research has been grounded on a factual historical documentation analysis and relies on a qualitative method, process tracing.

Collected research data begins from Finland's President Paasikivi's time, in power in the mid 1940's, progressing through the Cold War period and leading towards modern Finland at the present time. The research indicates that Finland owes its peace to its political and military neutrality and non-alliance. Today modern Finland is recognized internationally as a reliable global partner and more importantly, being a stakeholder in security and peacekeeping.

This approach has proven over modern times to maintaining peace and keeping Russian's security formation satisfied. At the same time, Finland has been able to maintain solid political and economic partnerships with the Western world.

This research identifies that becoming a full NATO member is not generally supported in Finland. So far Finland has not ever joined any military battle group associated with the EU or NATO, but maintains its position as a reliable and active partner associated with peacekeeping missions with EU and NATO organizations.

Keyword: Non-Alliance, Neutrality, Security Policy, Peacekeeping

INTRODUCTION

Finland's foreign policy has become an interesting point of study because it has consistently developed its foreign relationships and stable national economic growth. The ability to act with peaceful resolution has given Finnish society a noteworthy quality of life by maintaining peace in and outside its borders. Finland's position and pragmatic political approach has proven to The Russian State that their national security interest is of primary importance. When analyzing history, the nearby sphere of influence has always been crucial for major states in power politics. Generally, the major power tends to affect its sphere of influence from peaceful methods to an armed conflict. Russia seems to be willing to maintain former Soviet States under their sphere of influence. Finland understands its neighbor's perspective when it comes to security as a non-allied country.

The goals of Finland's foreign and security policy are to strengthen Finland's international position, to secure its independence and territorial integrity, and ultimately, to improve the security and wellbeing of Finns. In a world of global interdependencies, Finland aims at promoting international stability, peace, democracy, human rights, the rule of law and equality (Government Report 2016). In this respect, the following work will propose answers to issues pertaining to the very consistence of Finnish neutrality. The central research questions include: Is Finnish political and military neutrality guaranteeing peace and stability in Northern Europe? Is Finland still genuinely neutral within the contemporary political scene? How does this neutrality translate into its relationships with other neighboring States? The thesis is: Finland owes its peace to its political and military neutrality. Finally, will Finland be able to maintain this political stance in the future? These questions are relevant to the

current state of Finland's foreign policy and will provide information that can be used to determine the future success of the country.

This research paper is grounded on a factual historical documentation analysis. The research relies on a qualitative method—more specifically, process tracing. A qualitative approach will be taken because it enables the researcher to examine multiple sources that address foreign policy in Finland in order to determine similarities and differences. It is more flexible in this given scenario because the data can be compared and contrasted without being analyzed in a more systematic approach. Process tracing is a common method utilized by researchers in political science, aiming at developing theories from multiple sources that provide inputs and result in various outputs. This is very relevant when examining certain policies that have previously been implemented by the country because it will show exactly what they have done and what these actions have caused for the country, whether positive or negative. This will help the data to be more structured, but also allow for some flexibility when conducting the research because the knowledge that will be found is not pre-determined.

Source information has been gathered from official reports data and analysis made by the Finnish government, the NATO and individual researchers. The author reasons these decisions from the Cold War period to present time. First, specific terms, such as “neutrality” or “non-alignment”, will be explained, thanks to the contribution of international scholars. Second, a study from the Cold War period and the following complex “opening” on to a complex post-Cold War global situation will be explicated. The heated Cold War period situations such as the Note Crisis will be examined as a symptom of underlying political, economic and diplomatic crisis. Finally, the end of the Cold War era proceeds to the present time, transitioning from neutrality to a non-alignment. The following report is structured with an introduction, a literature review in which the relevant literature regarding Finnish foreign policy is examined and finally, a conclusion that will determine the findings of the relevant knowledge.

1. NEUTRALITY, NON-ALLIANCE AND ALLIANCE

The concept of neutrality was developed in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The term stems out the Latin *ne uter*, meaning “neither of two,” and basically meant non- participation in a war between other countries. Neutrality has both a legal and a political dimension. The legal basis of neutrality was drawn up at the beginning of the twentieth century in a code of regulations, enshrined in the Hague Conventions of 1907, which outlined the conduct of neutral states in time of war (Fisher 2016). Although this set of rules may seem outdated at the beginning of the 21st century, it still represents neutrality’s legal core.

By virtue of Hague Conventions of 1907, distinctions are further drawn between occasional (*ad hoc*, temporary) and permanent (perpetual, everlasting) neutrality. A country is occasionally neutral when it declares neutrality in a specific war, and only for the duration of that war. A country is permanently neutral when it commits itself to remain neutral in all future wars, as e.g. Switzerland did upon signing a multilateral agreement with the great powers at the Congress of Vienna 1815. (Fisher 2016)

In contrast, Sweden’s and Finland’s neutral status has no domestic nor international legal foundation. Instead, it is based on their foreign policy traditions and unilateral commitment to uphold a policy of neutrality. The Swedish and Finnish respective statuses is therefore termed “*de facto* permanent neutrality” (Fisher 2016). If a country is non-aligned, it does not support nor depend on any powerful country or group of countries.

The criteria for a nonaligned country were outlined at the preparatory meeting of the nonaligned movement’s first conference in 1961: A nonaligned country should adopt an independent foreign

policy based both on co-existence of States with different political and social systems and on nonalignment; or, should be showing a trend in favor of such a policy, and consistently support movements of national independence. Such a State must not be a member of a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of the Great Power conflict; if it has a bilateral military agreement with a Great Power or, if it is a member of a regional defense pact, such an agreement or pact should not be deliberately concluded in the context of the Great Power conflicts. Non-alignment is a political concept based on morality, with a clear intention to promote efforts toward peace, security, and stability in international relations (Fisher 2016).

In the context of the European Cold War, non-aligned and permanently neutral states conformed in their characteristics insofar as both opted for a non-bloc policy with regards to NATO and the European Community and the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. In contrast, the nonaligned and permanently neutral states differed most obviously in the legal status of their non-alignment/neutrality. While permanent neutrality was defined by a code of international law regulating relations between belligerent and non-belligerent states, non-alignment was based on no such legal criteria (Fisher 2016). Normative neutrality emphasizes that the alliances would threaten national security. This is a typical situation, where the political agenda of an alliance does not apply in the state's own agenda (Steele 2008). In the case of Finnish normative neutrality, joining a military alliance would considerably change the perspective in Northern-Europe. If Finland would join the NATO, this would narrow the political leverage and raise the stakes of being drawn into a dispute between major powers. This kind of action defines the means the states see and recognizes its biggest risks and threats, as well as what kind of primary solutions the state is trying to find.

In this type of alliance, countries narrow the spectrum of solutions for themselves. A non-allied Finland is unlikely to be drawn into a conflict outside of its nearby territory. In case of allied Finland, this country would be involved in international conflicts and at the same time, become liable for the negative, costly consequences of war. Instrumentalism emphasizes the fact that neutrality is the most cost-efficient stance regarding conflicts. When the state is not involved in conflicts and disputes, it withdraws itself from unpopular actions and minimizes the economic loss outside its borders. Instrumentalist states typically face pressure and influence from one or more opposing rivalries, which

attempts to draw the neutral state out of its position with economic, political or military alliances (Steele 2008).

2. THE COLD WAR PERIOD

Finland has experienced challenging diplomatic relationships with the Soviet Union. From 1917 until 1944, the Finno-Soviet relationships were hostile (hence the Winter War 1939- 1940 and the Continuation war 1941-1944). The Winter War of 1939-1940 changed the political situation. Both sides of the Winter War understood that the Moscow Peace Treaty, signed in March 1940, did not create peace in the true sense of the term. The USSR continued to pressure Finland. To back up its independence and its social system, Finland had to develop unprecedented means of resistance. The role of the President became decisive. (Jakobson 2006, 49) Both the Winter War 1939-1940 and the Continuity War 1941-1944 showed to the Soviet Union that the Finnish state could have a relatively strong army. During the Continuity war (1941-1944), Finland received economic and military aid from Nazi Germany (Jakobson 2006, 33) Because of this aid and Finnish fierce fighting, the Soviet Union could not occupy Finnish territories (Kuisma 2010).

The establishment of the multilateral Europe and the influences that pierced the Iron Curtain were part of the end of bipolar Europe and the end of the Cold War period. However, the change did not happen overnight in Berlin, nor did the exclusive explanation of the economic struggle of the Soviet Union. The smaller states had a bigger influence on the superpowers and their development than initially expected. The process was more complex and was indeed affected by superpowers, smaller states, companies, organizations and European citizens. (Sarasmö & Miklossy 2009). For example, from the 1950's until 1990's, Estonia was able to follow Finland's development and that gave Estonians an alternative way to see their future.

2.1. Basis for Finnish Neutrality Position in the Cold War

To maintain independence, Finland kept common interests with the Soviets. Since 1944, it has been developing its own Reassurance Policy. The policy's first actions were to set Finland's position voluntarily in a way that guaranteed Soviet security in its territory. This meant that the Finnish army would keep all foreign troops outside Finnish territory as a protection for Soviet territory. Later on, the Reassurance policy was translated into the term of "Finlandization". Over decades, "Finlandization" became a worldwide recognized political phenomenon. This policy was not only focusing on territorial protection; it strived to dissolve the ideological differences and ended the legacy of mistrust, based on historical experiences between Finland and the Soviet Union.

The Paris Peace Treaty, signed in 1947, formally fortified Finland's position, but did not restore its self-confidence. Independence was preserved, but security was questionable. Finland seemed to be alone with Soviet superiority (Suomi 2016). Two years later, Finland and the Soviet Union signed the Finno-Soviet Treaty. This Treaty and its codes became the baseline for Finnish political policy making for the subsequent 40 years. Throughout the Treaty, President Paasikivi essentially removed the main and overriding Soviet justification for mounting a costly military campaign against Finland. Consequently, total Soviet control of Finland was no longer a strategic necessity (Tarkka 2012). (Ries 1988) describes that this change was a practical necessity. In 1944, Finland had already defeated two major Soviet invasion attempts, thanks to the German war aid. Historians have noted that one Finnish soldier was equivalent to ten Soviet soldiers (Ries 1988).

This agreement stabilized the hostile situation. It guaranteed that the Soviet Union would not invade Finland. In turn, Finland promised the Soviet Union that its territory would not be used by westerners against them (Tarkka 2012). The Soviet Union stated to the Finno-Soviet Treaty's, 4. Article, a qualification stipulation, that forbid the other to join an alliance against each other's. This limited Finland's theoretical maneuvering, but at the same time removed the main overriding Soviet justification for mounting a military campaign against Finland. Security policy researcher Tomas Ries

has estimated that during the World War II, Finland's territory was a "got to have" zone for the Soviet Union. Finland's objective was to take care of the situation that it would not go back to "got to have", without damaging the basics of the Finnish institutions. Reassuring the Soviet Union, that Finland's territory is it is military secure, also for Soviet's, was fundamental strategic objective (Ries 1988) This, in essence, was called as the "Paasikivi Doctrine" and it formed the basis of Finnish Reassurance policy.

The Paasikivi's Doctrine was implemented by President Paasikivi during challenging times in Finland, forcing him to find a solution to end the state of emergency that followed from the truce with the Soviet Union in 1944. This meant that Finland had to make a peace agreement with the Allied forces. In 1947, at the Paris Peace Conference, Finland signed the peace agreement with the Allies. The agreement tied Finnish foreign and domestic policy together, as Finland banned anti-allied propaganda and provided latitude to the communist party that had worked "underground" before World War II. Finland showed a commitment towards the agreement consistently for almost 50 years. Finland's reputation and international position was created by showing great respect towards the agreement written by the winner of the war (Paasikivi Society).

A Core concept of the doctrine was to create a functioning neighbor relationship with the Soviet Union. Paasikivi felt that it was possible only by building a long-term, trustworthy relationship. He reasoned that Finland's own security policy would not intervene with the Soviet security. To make this point even clearer to the Soviets, Paasikivi promised that no third party would be able to use Finnish territory against the Soviet Union. This ethical, yet at the same time practical, principle united President Paasikivi and his successor, President Urho Kekkonen. As the Paasikivi doctrine had proven to restore the relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, President Kekkonen decided to take the relationship to the next level. He felt that Finland could provide the Soviet Union with more than just security guarantees. His vision was that Finland could work as a political and economic "bridge" between the East and the West by upkeeping working relationship between the blocs (Paasikivi Society). The Reassurance policy was crucial from the Finnish perspective. It had to be done to maintain and develop the relationship with the Soviet Union.

2.2. Neutral Finland: Recognition in the International Community

In 1946, Finland started to build up its position in the market economy by applying for a membership to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and was soon accepted. The Soviet Union did not react to Finland's actions. During that time, these organizations were still seen as neutral United Nations co-operations, rather than political players in the Cold War. In 1950, Finland then joined the GATT (General agreement on Tariffs and Trade) -organization (Tarkka 2012). The rapid aspiration towards the World Bank and IMF connected Finland commercially to the Western world. This was successful start to grow Finnish economy and creating interactive politics with western states.

When the Korean War started in 1950, the United States had a concern that the Soviet Union might include Finland in the conflict, through the Finno-Soviet treaty in 1949. The United States estimated that the Finnish survivability would be best, if the U.S. kept Finland out of the Cold War conflict. The United States National Security Council stated that Finland was fully under the influence of the Soviet Union (Tarkka 2012). If the Soviet Union would try to occupy Finland, the United States would not intervene. In 1950, columnist Walter Lippman interviewed Prime Minister Kekkonen. One of the questions concerned the possibility of U.S. help in a conflicting situation with Soviet Union. Kekkonen's answer was clear: to leave Finland alone as "your help might come in an unworthy time" (Tarkka 2012). Finland's identity as independent western democracy was therefore questionable.

Finnish participation within international organizations took place with a low profile, as required by President Paasikivi's heritage. It still fulfilled and opened Kekkonen's long-term neutrality policy. The Hungarian uprising in 1956 was Finland's first "baptism of fire" of its neutrality policy. The UN did not pose sanctions towards The Soviet Union; it formalized a petition for Hungarian freedom and self-determination. Finnish delegates wanted to support the petition, as it fit with the Finno-Soviet treaty, but President Kekkonen demanded the delegates to absentee the vote if it criticized the Soviet Union. In Finland, this position was perceived as a display of political cowardice (Tarkka 2012).

This was Finland's first concrete display in the United Nations and had a negative impact in Western attitude regarding Finnish neutrality. The events in 1956 in Hungary were observed with major concerns in Finland. Hungarians were perceived as kindred people and many Finns had existing relationships from pre-war times. Both countries shared similar attitudes towards the Soviet Union, both were in close inside the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union and both shared an agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. The press in Finland took the stance of the Hungarians and being against the Soviet actions. The foreign policy problem in Finland occurred when Finland was asked for a statement in the United Nations. When President Kekkonen realized that the options were either to support the West's resolution or the Soviet resolution, President Kekkonen, with support of former President Paasikivi, decided to support the Soviet resolution (Kallenautio 2005; Soikkanen 2003; Suomi 1992).

The Finnish ministry of Foreign Affairs and the UN representatives suggested that Finland would absentee the vote which gained its approval from President Kekkonen. This is how Finland created its precedent elective behavior, which corresponds to President Paasikivi's doctrine to take no part in super power disputes. In the general assembly floor, Finland hoped that the Soviet Union and Hungary could peacefully agree on withdrawing the Soviet troops and securing the human rights of the Hungarians (Suomi 1992).

2.3. The Multifaceted Note Crisis

In 1961, the West had just given an official recognition to Finnish neutrality. The Soviet Union gave a note to an invitation to a militaristic Finno-Soviet negotiation. The argument behind the negotiation was that of the Soviet Union's projection about an offensive West Germany together with the rising threat of war. The Note crisis was a tense security issue in Northern Europe (Tarkka 2012). The Soviet Union wanted to send troops to Finnish territories, as they felt that the Baltic Sea was unprotected. The first impressions in Finland were that the Soviet Union would not be interested in negotiations. The invitation was perceived as an open pressure that would threaten Finnish independence. The consultations could have drawn Finland to the Warsaw Pact and would have thus damaged Finnish

neutrality (Tarkka 2012). Finland had to take part in the negotiations. In 1954, Prime Minister Kekkonen's solution was similar than the diplomatic diverge, when the Soviet's invited Finland to security negotiations. He did not answer to the note with a note, he used the scheme 'yes but...' (Tarkka 2012). Finland avoided discussions about threats, and did not admit that any threat existed. This denial also included an idea that the NATO was not an aggressor. By doing so, Finland took an international position, where it illustrated the ability to neutralize the different scenarios even under the pressure of a superpower.

In 1961, President Kekkonen left to Moscow to negotiate with Soviet Chairman Khrushchev. President Kekkonen's plan was to indicate to Khrushchev that the consultation The Soviet Union suggested was not supporting its own self-interest. President Kekkonen told his counterpart that Soviet actions in Finland would agitate war psychosis in Scandinavia. Khrushchev trusted his ability to continue the neutrality policy in Finland and agreed to downplay the issue in this Note. It was stated to the official dictum, that Finland would monitor the situation in Northern-Europe. If necessary, Finland would include the Soviets (Tarkka 2012).

To lessen the heated situation, Finland needed a positive rendition to the Note. It was agreed that the initiative for action, was now in the Finnish hands. Obligation for the consultation would arise only if the threat was noticed jointly. The Soviet estimate of war did not lead to military consultation because Finland did not see the threat. The neutrality was kept not by being defiant to the Soviet Union but rather with mutual understanding (Tarkka 2012).

As the diplomatic negotiations continued, the European situation settled down and President Kekkonen could promise the Soviet Union that Finns would track all movement in their territory, report it to the Soviet Union and ask for support, if needed (Tarkka 2012).

2.4. Finland's Special Position due to Neutrality

In 1957, in the Treaty of Rome, the core of contemporary European Union, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany, established the European Economic Community (The EEC). The EEC had much success in uniting European countries by economic means i.e. by creating a common market and custom unions. It created common institutions along with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) under the Merger Treaty in 1965.

Western-European states that were left outside created a free trade union European Free Trade Association EFTA. Their prohibitive duty started to crumble competitiveness to the ones who were left outside of EFTA. Because of the Soviets, Finland was delayed in joining, while Sweden took over the English paper market (Tarkka, 2012). In 1957, Finnish Forest Industry's Federation annual report stated that the national economy that was heavily connected to forest industry would severely decrease if Finland would not join the EFTA the Forest industry was the main industry in the Finnish economy until the rise of Nokia mobile phones (Siltala 2018).

The EFTA recognized the special situation in Finland and agreed to negotiate exception to the rules. The Soviet Union could have sent Finland a note that pointed out the agreement in the Finno – Soviet treaty. That would prevent the other joining an alliance against the other. (Tarkka 2012) Joining the EFTA was not effortless as various political aspects were not fully understood by the Finnish business circles. President Kekkonen and Prime Minister Karjalainen understood that the Soviets' opinion in this matter was a very important one. On the other hand, the business circles wanted to join the EFTA as soon as possible without asking a permission from the Soviet Union. However, President Kekkonen's opinion was the major factor and Finland proceeded with this matter accordingly (Siltala 2018).

President Kekkonen did not fully obey the promise given to the Soviets; he withdrew the full membership and being part of the free trade zone was accomplished. The employer union's CEO Hetemäki, who was a supporter of integration, met Ambassador Zaharov to discuss trade matters and

Finn-Soviet relations. Hetemäki reasoned that Finland wanted to keep the friendly relationships with its neighbor and, why the Soviet Union would want to prevent Finland's economic growth. Zaharov avoided the accusation and assured, that the Soviet Union would not harm the Finnish economy. By so doing the FINEFTA agreement was conducted in 1960.

Establishing FINEFTA was a major victory in the diplomatic negotiations for Finland. If Finland had been left outside the free trade zone, Finland's economy which already was biased unilaterally towards the Soviet Union, could have had major limitations. The European integration stemmed from the economic sector, by creating economic win – win situations between states. This kind of reasoning brought peace in Europe. If Finland was left outside of this kind of integration, the socio-economic situation in Europe could be very different.

The methods Finland used in the negotiation with the Soviet Union about Finland integrating towards the European economy were promising. First, the so-called hefty argument of friendly relations was used even though Finland was integrating towards a different direction than the Soviet bloc's target was. Second, Finland had gained a special position within the Soviet Union. In other Eastern bloc countries, this kind of progress, would have interpreted as Western offence. The Reassurance policy had to play a part in how the Soviets saw this integration. The long-term self-censorship and positiveness towards the Soviet Union, could pacify the Soviet leadership in regards of Finland's hostility. Although Finland joined an economic organization towards the west European countries, its relationship towards the Soviet Union would maintain the formation of primary security issues.

An important factor in the Finnish-Soviet relations was the unique bilateral trade. The bilateral trade was very beneficial for Finland compared to other Eastern bloc countries. Evidence shows that the Soviet Union paid quite lavishly to Finnish exporting companies for their products. By up keeping this beneficial trade, in the Finnish point of view, the Soviets provided economic growth in the Finnish economy that would help stabilize internal Finland and build up a trade demand between the countries. (Holopainen 2014)

2.5. The Beneficial Bilateral trade due to Finland's Neutrality

Finland and the Soviet Union used so-called "clearing trade" from 1950 to 1991. Clearing trade can be referred to as a method by which financial claims are settled against each other to reduce them to a single claim and minimize the number of payment transfers. During this period, the agreements were extended to cover technical, scientific, cultural and other forms of cooperation. Typically, the higher level of the agreement, the longer the period it covered and the higher level of political decision makers and institutions that procured the agreement. The Finno-Soviet treaty in 1948, precisely its fifth article, constituted the political basis for commercial five-year agreements. From the early 1950s, when Soviet leadership started to believe and trust the Finnish overlapping security issues written in the treaty. Based on this treaty the commercial trade increased. The first five-year trade agreement began in June 1950. In 1951, 86% of Finnish boats, 70% of metal works, 41% of copper works, 37% of steel and coal were exported to the Soviet Union. In contrast, the Soviets sent 80-90% provisions, Finland received about 70% of the nation's consumption of wheat from the Soviets, 65% of sugar, 20% oil products and 70% of its automobiles.

From the first 5-year trade agreement the Finnish-Soviet trade compiled to a 15-20% of Finland's gross market trade. As Finland reached Western trade organizations, the Finnish- Soviet trade dipped to 16-18% in the 1960s. The peak of the trade was during the 1980s where the Finnish-Soviet trade took over 25% of Finnish import-exports. The main products Finland sold to the Soviets were consumer products such as clothing and Finland received mostly raw materials such as oil (Laurila, 1995).

An interesting observation of the Finnish-Soviet trade could be the quality of the products. It is said that the products which Finland and the Soviets traded with each other would not be very competitive in the free markets. For instance, Finnish company Finnwear, formerly known as Suomen Trikot, was a textile clothing manufacturer which had major exports to the Soviet Union. The quality of their final products was widely known to be far more inferior than most western European textile products of a similar quality. It could be noted that those Finnwear product offers would struggle in the free

markets; however, these articles were deemed as being satisfactory and passed quality control standards for the Soviet needs. Companies such as Suomen Trikoot grew massively and produced more than half of the Finnish tricot textile products. Many successful Finnish businesses along the eastern border with The Soviet Union greatly benefitted from the long-term trade agreements with the Soviet Union. The massive trade deals of this time period provided a stable economic business model for family business owners, with having the knowledge of their order books being filled repeatably and regularly, product demand provided made these local businesses successful and the real possibility to enhance their businesses.

For the Soviet Union, commercial product trade with Finland was also political. By maintaining Finnish commercial trade and implementing significant purchase orders for Finnish made products, it tied many Finnish businesses to the Soviet Union rather than to the west. Having a long-term economic relationship certainly eased political pressure between the two countries (Laurila 1995). Neutrality and the sovereign defense of the Finnish territory without external forces created a new basis for the relationship between the two countries. Although neutrality left the West-oriented Finland alone inside the Eastern Block, it created a better understanding between Finland and the Soviet Union. This confidence can be seen in a major security crisis as the Note Crisis of 1961 where Finland was able to calm the Soviet threat and as a result reinforced its own defense.

3. TRANSITION FROM THE COLD WAR TO PRESENT TIME

After a major war, the winners of the war tend to restructure the world order in favor of their national interest. After the Napoleonic wars, it was the Holy Alliance. After World War I, it was the League of Nations, and after the World War II, it was the five permanent leaders of the UN security council. The Cold War was also a world-wide battle for power. Even though it was not fought with guns, rather with ideological and economical methods, the end of the Cold War had similar effects. After World War II, the matter was on the change in balance of military power, after the Cold War the economy and technological development was the major matter. The winners were the economic powers, i.e. The United States, Japan, Germany, France, England, Canada and Italy that had major control of the global economy. These seven nations have worked as an unofficial director of global world politics, they gave advice and recommendations to all major international organizations such as the UN, NATO, OECD, GATT and the IMF. What makes it interesting is that these countries do not have a signed treaty of any kind of an agreement as from the previous World Wars, simply their compiled economic might and influence forced other to listen them. (Jakobson 1992)

In 1990, The Paris Charter, European leadership had the intention to minimize humanitarian issues due to the bloc policy and the fall of the Soviet Union. The primary focus was on the individual, citizenship rights, and freedom. Respecting human rights was no longer a humanitarian issue; it was one of the cornerstones for European peace and stability. These kinds of issues were not anymore seen as an internal issue that others could not intervene. All countries and their governments were responsible for how they treated their citizens. Intervening in human right issues was considered the responsibility for the countries in the Organization for Security and Co- Operation in Europe (the

OSCE). It has been agreed in the Paris Charter that democracy was the only acceptable form of governance in Europe. Individual rights and political diversity were crucial requirements for a market economy. It was also stated that it would be a benefit for all Europeans to help and support the former socialistic states towards the market economy (Jakobson 1992).

The Paris Charter helped shaped a new Europe with common values. Many political and military leaders had tried to achieve this goal without success. The Charter was not a description of the everyday reality; it was a vision for a better future. Europe had been freed from the ideological and military barriers. This arrangement was replaced by a more modern policy, a politically and economically stable Western Europe. Meanwhile, the East struggled with political conflicts, economic chaos, minority issues and environmental issues. The European security situation had changed, the threat of a full-scale super power military conflict was dismissed and a new threat was identified, the flow of migrants, local level conflicts, nuclear disasters, and environmental disasters. The traditional security methods were considered enough. New methods were needed to affect the economy and sharing of information between countries. The western countries believed that democracy and an open market economy would together bring well-being and elevate the Eastern European countries to better life (Jakobson 1992).

In 1992, the removal of the Finno-Soviet Treaty reversed the Finnish-Russian relations. It normalized the position of Finland and established a new foundation for the two states and for Finland's international status (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 1993). The reformation of the Eastern relationship did not remove permanent preparatory concerning Russia as a neighboring country. Finland's policy regarding security, especially defense closure, is connected to a broader geopolitical entirety that affects Russian security. The membership into the European Union (the EU) drew Finland out of the neutrality policy to a non-allied policy. This had an impact in foreign relations throughout the European Union policy.

4. FINLAND AND ITS FOREIGN & SECURITY POLICY

President Paasikivi called foreign policy a life and death question for a small state. Some scholars define the small state using quantifiable criteria such as population, gross domestic product (GDP), military size or geographic size, while other researchers rely on criteria which link small states to their relative position of weakness in the state system on the other (Maass 2009). Some individuals feel that, European Union membership has eased problems that a small country like Finland faced. Even today Finland is called an independent non-allied state (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 1993; Pesu 2017).

The official defense strategy of Finland, according to Ministry of Defense's strategic security plan, lies on certain values: Credibility, accountability and willingness to develop. The strategic vision is to maintain creditable defense forces, that can secure independence, territorial integrity and governmental latitude. The most important objective is to maintain credible defense forces in the changing environment. Key factors are all-round affection, goal directed networking and proactive understanding of the operational environment.

A crucial issue in the strategic vision is networking. By networking, Finland is trying to achieve wider and more persistent defense and security politics, where Finnish defense forces are offered to benefit others while Finland can expect mutual contribution from friendly countries. The official report highlights that networking will not guarantee support in a crisis situation, guarantee needs an agreement that includes terms of agreement, management of leadership and other preparation for common defense formation. Networking strengthens the international position of Finland, meaning

that Finland would anticipate possibilities to receive international support in a specific situation. Networking, also gives the possibility to move from non-aligned to an allied or common defense, if the leadership decides to do so.

Trends in the present operational environment are unbalanced population growth, integrated globalism, technological development, climate change and scarcity of natural resources. The Finnish defense forces are being developed to an operational environment where significance of the interaction between actors rises and where resources towards military are restricted. One of the main objectives for the military is to prevent any kind of military actions before larger actions are needed to be taken. The military's focus is also on international large-scale security threats that cannot be tackled without the support of the international community. In the near future, a challenge for the Finnish defense forces is the rising cost of equipment, infrastructure and materials.

Finland sees that the European Union's Lisbon treaty that includes The EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is one of the best networking platforms for the near future. The CSDP has many parallel strategic targets with Finland's own security policy such as making military expenditure more effective, strengthening the defense sector's industrial and technological base or introducing and managing programs in order to achieve set objectives. Focusing on the CSDP rather than NATO keeps the control and power in European hands rather than other side of the Atlantic in United States (Eur-Lex).

The defense ministry defines four different near future scenarios that affect Finland's defense policy and its possible actions. A multipolar world: The international spectrum is unstable as new powers tend to strengthen their position. The role of strong nations increases, competition can lead to confrontation and even to a military conflict in specific important strategic regions. Major powers are more willing to use power for national interest. In this kind of situation, the significance of international organizations will decrease but the EU and NATO will maintain their ability to perform. The Ministry of Defense's role increases to maintain security inside the society and being an active part in the international society especially in the co-operation with the EU, NATO and the Nordic regional neighbors. The defense policy will be planned to develop co-operation with the EU and NATO.

Networked world: The international spectrum is heavily networked. Non-governmental actors' influence has increased. Countries that have strong and efficient government are more successful in adapting to a rapidly changing global environment. Globalization and technological development will maintain peace prosperity and economic gain. The integration of world's economy deepens. In the networked world the traditional defense is integrated to a larger complexity of security. The traditional military defense loses its focal point and its transitioned to crisis management and anchoring the society. (Puolustusministeriön Strateginen Suunnitelma 2030)

Divided world: The international spectrum is divided to a community of developed countries, neutral countries and non-developed countries. The neutrals will be divided to two categories, the ones who are trying to gain a position in the community of developed countries and the ones who alienate from this path. States sharing similar ideology in culture and society tend to protect each other, keeping in mind that their national interest reaches only states that have strategic or economic reasons. A majority of the world's population lives in the non-developed world. In Finland, defense will be seen as a crucial part of a working state. Defense will be developed to new focal points with decreasing budgets. Defense policy focuses on internal security and the development focuses on integration between traditional defense and other official authority.

Fragmented world: The international spectrum is unstable and has no center point. Global governance decreases and economic integration becomes more difficult. International law and their organizations lose their significance as states work towards their national interest. The world moves towards rising use of power and disruption. In this scenario the role of defense in the society rises. The ability to defend is questionable as resources might become a scarcity and the simultaneous security threats are on the rise. The ability to defend is crucial, the military has to be able to upkeep its objectives, the citizens must show desire to defend their land and show great amount of crisis management.

At the present time, a core concept in the Finnish security policy is co-operation. Finland has undergone changes in their legal and facilitator agreements that have opened doors for deeper development in defense co-operation. This is a step towards the West and the European Union, away from the Cold War period "gray zone" (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 1993 & Pesu 2017). The co-operation is with viable partners including the EU, the NATO, and the Nordic Partners. In spite of Finnish

policy-decisions, Finland has been very careful; that they stay in the non-allied state agenda. By being very active in co-operating with others, Finland seeks to fortify its position in the international community (Pesu 2017).

During the last decade, The NATO option has increasingly become a serious topic within political discussions in Finland concerning deeper partnerships and even full membership. Currently, Finland has kept its long standing non-allied policy and for the foreseeable future, the continuation of neutrality policy, does not appear to have any immediate barriers (Pesonen, 2015).

4.1. The European Union's Common Foreign Policy

As a European Union member, Finland takes part in the Union's common Foreign and Security policies. It frees Finland from the Cold War period of "isolation", as it can share similar values and ideology with other members. This ties Finland closer to central European perspectives as most of the European political power is controlled by the focal central European powers such as Germany and France. In Finland, the EU membership has a fundamental importance for its security policy. Finland does not depend on the European Union for its national security. The EU's security doctrine defines different threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states and organized crime but no massive attack on a member state is considered likely (Jakobson 2006).

The EU's Foreign Common Policy's primary goals are: securing common values, maintaining peace, strengthening democracy, human rights and providing security inside and outside the Union. Finland is an active member in executing and developing the EU's common foreign and security policy. Globalization has brought up new challenges and conflicts around the world, which has had an effect on the EU and its citizens. The EU is the largest economic organization and maintains diplomatic relationships with almost every state on the globe (EU's Foreign Policy and Finland).

The implementation is done by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and in the European External Action Service. The European Council has traditionally set the

basic guidelines for the EU's common foreign policy. Member state's foreign ministers assemble once a month, while defense ministers assemble four times in a year to discuss defense related issues (EU's Foreign Policy and Finland).

EU's foreign and security policy objective is to have a homogeneous voice to have direct impact on foreign policy. Different attributes regarding geopolitics, economy, religion and even ideology are factors slowing the integration process. These differences can damage the potential power the EU's common foreign policy could have (EU's Foreign Policy and Finland). The geopolitical, cultural and historical background defines different approaches. Finland is an active member in the European operations but uses actively only 10% of its defense forces in the European operations and keep 90 % of its defense forces on its own territorial defense. Finland has an up to 300 000 mobilized troops for the territorial defense (Jakobson 2006).

Jakobson (2006) found that the above-mentioned ideas and ideals can be conflicting as it could be seen in the Refugee Crisis in 2015. The EU could not maintain a common refugee policy, nor keep control of its borders. Furthermore, different countries acted as their guidance of their own policies, leading to a situation, where member states were finding solutions by their own standards. This showed weakness and negative versatility within the EU's common foreign policy.

At the present time in Finland, the European Union is the Country's most important platform to conduct its political agendas and views. Finland is one of the more active countries in pursuit of a better European common security policy. In order to make the European Union's Foreign policy more effective, it needs unanimity between the EU countries. That is highly unlikely, as security issues are very complex and countries self-interest overrides the common policy (EU's Foreign Policy and Finland).

4.2. Finland's Co-Operation with the NATO

Finnish co-operation with NATO is based on the Finnish policy of non-alignment. The Co-operation was reinforced when Finland joined NATO's "Partnership for Peace" in 1994. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a program of practical bilateral cooperation between individual Euro-Atlantic partner countries and NATO. It allows partners to build up and develop an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation" (NATO & Finland). NATO's origins came from the aftermath of the World War II. NATO was founded to serve three major goals: deterring the Soviet expansion, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe and enhance a strong North American presence and encourage European political integration.

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949. Its original members were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In the Treaty's renowned Article 5, the new Allies agreed "an armed attack against one or more of members... shall be considered an attack against all members" and that following such an attack, each Ally would take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force" in response. Significantly, 2 and 3 Articles of the Treaty had important purposes not immediately germane to the threat of attack. The Article 3 laid the foundation for cooperation in military preparedness between the Allies, and the Article 2 allowed members some leeway to engage in non-military cooperation (NATO history).

The main purpose of NATO was to stop the communist or socialist global revolution. The fear of rising socialism in the globe was enough to build up an alliance against its enemies. In our present time we can see that the external battle of capitalism vs socialism has ended. States are free to choose however they want to control their internal politics. In present time communist states are not enemies of all NATO members and NATO itself. Also, and arguably just as important is the real fact that Europe has integrated and evolved since 1949. It defies logic that Europe and its European Union would need American presence to integrate even further. The problem in continuous European integration is that there are notable differences between member states. Bringing an American presence and perspective can lead to confusion and tangles up the already complex entity. As above mentioned, the European integration has largely provided peace and stability in Europe. A full-scale

military war, country against country seems unlikely even without an Article 5 type of deterrence. However, internal political conflicts within EU membership states seem to be more likely at the present time, for example, The United Kingdom and Brexit negotiations and Catalonia's desire for Independence in Spain.

The primary objective for Partnership for Peace is to increase stability, replace threats by peace and develop military co-operation. The program includes elements of all NATO's significant branches: Development of defense, military co-operation, defense policy, political co-operation, the readiness of civil sector and developing a working infrastructure. The partnership provides Finland a platform and a window for international networking and gaining information from other partners, actions and different methods of action (NATO & Finland).

The most important factor for Finnish continuity policy is that the program does not obligate Finland to join any kind of action. Members have the right to choose whether they are active or take on a non-active role in missions of the program. It means that Finland's defense stays independent as long as Finland chooses to remain so. The partnership also strengthens Finland's independent defense by learning and testing of new weapon technologies and the promotion of weapon equipment deals. In 1997, Finland became a member in NATO's Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, with fifty-member countries (EAPC), is a multilateral forum for dialogue and consultation on political and security-related issues among Allies and partner countries. It provides the overall political framework for NATO's cooperation with partner countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, and for bilateral relationships developed between NATO and individual partner countries under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program (Euro-Atlantic Council).

The author finds that being a partner of NATO has been quite a rational development. Since joining the EU in 1995 Finland was drawn outside from neutrality to non-alignment. In this case Finland had already lost the fully neutral position and being part of the NATO's Partnership for Peace program and later in 2014 signing the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) does not change Finland's political position from a non-aligned country to an allied member state. As long as Finland can determine its own involvement and responsibilities within NATO and not be overtly pressured by larger member countries members, the partnership should work for the benefit of Finland and

subsequently for the organization as a whole. In contrast, if Finland's desires within NATO and its partnership programs are not taken seriously or fully understood Finland might be pushed to a major power dispute by default. Withdrawing from these types of disputes have been one of the core aspects of the Finland's foreign policy since end of the World War II. As it stands currently, NATO membership and partnership programs are in the hands of Finland. NATO's Partnership for Peace program does not include Article 5 and does not demand a country (Finland) to take actions in NATO-led missions.

Finland has also been an active partner in NATO led missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan, e.g. Finland participated in Resolute Support Operation since 2015 in Afghanistan. Finland is also active in training peacekeeping missions. They also participate actively in NATO Partnership for Peace exercises. Finland is also involved in a multinational cyber security development project with NATO. It focuses on sharing technologies and promotes awareness of potential threats and attacks (NATO-Finland).

The most recent and an important agreement was the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Finland and NATO in 2014. The memorandum illustrates concrete practices how the support and assistance will be given in training, a military crisis, or even environmental situations. The MoU illustrates how: logistical issues are being handled during training missions, responsibility of feeding and general wellbeing of troops, and where petroleum fuel are being bought and transferred. When there is clear a detailed guidance for military practices, support groups too can improve and coordinate efforts in order for smoother more efficient operations. The rules of conduct give a good framework for co-operation in real situations and could, as needed in Finland's case further develop partnerships in other areas and potentially, in a broader scope (NATO & Finland).

It is worth noting that, the memorandum does not obligate either party to provide or receive help in support operations, or even more importantly, armed troop involvement. Finland can decide that for itself, in regards to being a participant in a mission or in a supportive role and a co-operation project. Finland is not obligated to allow NATO troops into their territory. (NATO & Finland) The author thinks that, Finland still has control of its own security policy and is not obligated to be dragged into issues or conflicts it does not want to be part of. The fact that NATO troops are not obligated to help

Finland highlights the fact that Finland's defense is still independent and under local command and control. As NATO is not obligated to help Finland, the country must keep its own military up to date and on watchful guard. This position is not something new or unexpected, in fact, it has been the norm for over 60 years. Finland cannot rely on foreign forces; thus, this is continuity of Finland security policy.

All actions that benefit Finland's independent defense and readiness in crisis strengthens Finland's independence and a non-alliance. The co-operation with NATO benefits Finnish security through shared information, peacekeeping missions, and new threats in bio or cyber areas of concern. Finland understanding and willingness to remain with its independent military strategy, has translated in Finland taking on new shared tasks within NATO which has further promoted Finland's identity and position at home and abroad.

At the moment, numerous supporters inside the pro -NATO membership has been rationalized by the phrase used loosely that, "a suddenly changed Russia". Security policy should be always based on a long-term perspective, not to be based on sudden reactions. Finnish neutrality policy, and non-alliance continuum, has fulfilled this requirement. It could be argued that, the NATO membership would mean a recourse to the Cold War world, where "guns bring peace" (Pesonen 2013).

In 2014, during the Kultaranta discussions, NATO and Russia were part of the discussions. According to the Chairman of the Business Team for Russia, Mr Esko Aho, Finland's role is different than with the Soviet Union. He thinks that Finland must find a way to deal with Russia regardless of the Russian power. Emeritus Professor Osmo Apunen, finds that the last decades have been exceptional since Russia has been relatively weak. He continues: "We are in a new situation where Russia has been treated like an impoverished gulag, now we have to fit into a situation where a European Superpower seeks a new position for itself, which has caused unrest. Finland's President Sauli Niinistö, noted that the zeitgeist has changed due to the Ukrainian crisis. He still highlighted that economic issues are the major security threat. The economy can shake to the whole society and its stability. According to Ambassador Heikki Talvitie the Russian takeover of Crimea is a Russia against the West territorial dispute. Also, Professor Hiski Haukkala agrees that Russian actions in Ukraine is to ensure to

continuity of Russian national interest and the control of its sphere of influence (Tasavallan Presidentti 2014).

4.2.1. Finland's possible Full Membership in the NATO

According to Pesonen (2013), the full membership of NATO would have a direct impact in the Finnish and Baltic rim security. In the case of Finland, it would be part of the Article 5, security guarantee, it would strengthen the deterrence towards an offence. From NATO's point of view, Finnish and Swedish membership would ease the security dilemma that NATO faces in the Nordic, especially in the Baltic sea (Mölder 2011). The NATO forces would be present in the Finnish territory and control the Baltic sea. Since Finland has been able to defend its own territory, foreign troops, even NATO, would be seen as a threat rather than savior as it would work directly against the Russian national security interest. This would draw the Finnish-Russian relationship into a severe crisis for an undefined period of time. Even, if this would not escalate into a hot conflict, because of the deterrence from NATO's Article 5. The crisis would have effect in all cooperation sectors with Russia. Russia's political answer would be harsh and personal, as it was when Turkey shot down Russian fighter plane during the Syrian conflict in November 2015.

The will to defend the country is unchanged; independence is the most important reason for defending Finland by military means. Seven out of ten or 72 per cent think that Finns should defend themselves by military means in all situations even if the outcome seemed uncertain. Finland's independence was given as the most important factor for willingness to defend the country. (ABDI 2017)

The citizens of Finland still see that it is more preferable being non-allied rather than allied. As the study highlights the citizens agree in the ways how Finland acts towards Russia. (ABDI 2017) Long term commitment towards the East by being non-allied especially to NATO, keeps both sides i.e. Russia and Finland satisfied. The study also shows that Russia has not caused uncertainty with its relationship towards Finland. It has done that to many other neighboring countries. Finnish citizens feel secure next to Russia without external help.

5. FINLAND'S NON-ALLIANCE MOVEMENT AND CO-OPERATION WITH RUSSIA

The non-alliance movement has created a unique co-operation relationship, between the two different states. The continuity of Finland's non-alliance, has created a trustworthy relationship as the author noted above. Maintaining an engaging political dialogue has been crucial in contradicting issues. This kind of political dialogue started during the Cold War period, especially during Presidents Paasikivi's- Kekkonen's era. Up keeping an active, personal dialogue between leaders of each nation has been of the cornerstones in the pragmatic approach. Former President Tarja Halonen has stated this about the relationship: "We know how to draw a line between peace and war, we know that peace is very important and that it is necessary to adhere to it when contradictions emerge, ... I think that this very mundane manner of cooperation is the thing that others could learn as well" (Tass 2017).

According to Hiski Haukkala, a researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Finland differs from others precisely in its historically rooted tendency to pragmatism. "Unlike many Central and Eastern European countries traumatized by communist-era experiences, Finland's relationship with Russia has always been based on realistic and down-to-earth interaction. This has been instrumental in building trust towards Finnish policies among Russian elites" (Uitti 2007).

Finnish foreign policy states openly the importance of the Finland-Russia relationship. One of the most important tasks for a foreign minister is to upkeep the active political dialogue with Russian leaders. For example, in 2016, after the Finnish Foreign Ministry's report on "Assessment of the

effects of Finland's possible NATO membership” Foreign ministers Mr. Lavrov and Foreign minister Mr. Soini had discussions. Lavrov expressed his concern, that Finland would overturn its 60-year-old foreign policy. Soini was able to assure Lavrov that Finland has not made any decision and that the issue will be debated in the parliament. As the NATO issue was out of the way for now, the ministers shifted the discussion to co-operation in various issues such as: building joint venture nuclear power plants together to managing the refugee flow better at their shared border (Standish 2016).

This is a typical example of political discussion. Political differences are “brought to the table”, but when a conflicting topic is mentioned, it is not stated as a demand, it is a polite note on difference in opinion. Over the decades, the successful interaction between Finland and Russia has developed an atmosphere, where conflicting issue do not overrun the joint interest in interaction as neighboring countries. Maintaining workable relationships require positive actions from both sides. Russia recognizes that Finland would be a valuable member for NATO, which in turn would be major threat for Russian security.

Given the history of commercial links, the Finns claim to possess special knowledge of the Russian market and administration that others lack (Uitti 2007). The geographical position of Finland provides a possibility of having a large trade between the EU and Russia. Currently, numerous Finnish companies are suffering from the economic sanctions the EU has placed on Russia as well as Russia’s contra sanctions. Usually, economic sanctions are most effective on an open and democratic society. The citizens start to question the leaderships actions that have led to economic sanctions. This does not seem to be the case with Russia. Russia is a large and authoritarian style country. Due to its history, Russian understanding of democracy differs from the European one; one cannot alter history and culture.

The Arctic Council is an important forum for Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Russia, the UK and the United States. Finland holds the chairmanship of the council 2017-2019. At the present time, the energy resources in the Barents Sea is a hot topic. If the competition of these energy resources results in major power conflict the environmental consequences would be global. Non-allied countries tend to mitigate power battles between the major powers. As Finland’s Minister of Foreign affairs Timo Soini states: "The Arctic has a great potential. Better access to natural

resources and the opening of new sea routes in the Arctic will bring benefits, but also challenges. The new opportunities oblige us all to work for sustainable development in the Arctic region. This will emphasize the leading role of the Arctic Council in producing outstanding scientific assessments and addressing the impacts of globalization and climate change. (Arctic Council 2018) The above-mentioned statement concerns the whole Arctic Council it's not solely Finland's position Soini's thoughts emphasize that this kind of cooperation is beneficial to all parties including Russia. The author finds that Russian membership in the Arctic Council gives space positive for dialogue between Russia and other countries. Here, Finland as a non-allied country can be helpful. This Council offers also a forum for the Russian and Americans high-level officials to meet. Dialogue is always better choice than deterrence.

The Former German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, gave his opinion on the European Russia relationship to a German newspaper Aachener Nachrichten. His views did not match with the present German policies. Schröder highlights that Europe will not have long term peace without the Russians. He also mentions strategic resources such as energy that is imported to many European countries. He proposed a new Co-operation & Convergence agreement with Russia. He defines a geographical issue in the relationship between the United States, Europe and Russia. He says that there is no Atlantic Ocean between Russia and Europe and continues to claim that the United States wants to keep Russia a negligible country. French President Charles de Gaulle also had visions of integrating Russian and European relations to balance American presence in Europe (Rusi 2018).

Rusi (2018) believed that Schröder's views might be a bit Utopian in relation that Russia and the EU relationship could become something similar that European states share in Economy, Foreign & Security policy. Russian policies differ to a large extent from the EU's point of views. But so was the vision of the present European Union. The containment of Russia will not help in the relationship, it seems that Europeans are using the us vs them approach, which the Kremlin bounces back and the cycle of misunderstanding, blaming and shifting the responsibility magnifies.

It has been proven that strong trade relationships between countries can act as a stabilizer in political conflict. The core of the present European Union was historically based on this idea. As the author showed above Germany and France were tied together with mutually beneficially trade relations.

CONCLUSION

Today, Finland's foreign and security policies tend to follow the Paasikivi Doctrine. By maintaining an independent modern defense force, Finland continues to provide the overriding security interest within Finnish territory. This solution has proved to maintain peace and keep Russian's security formation satisfied. Finland identifies itself as a Western open democracy and an active player in international politics, especially within the European Union and the United Nations. The Finno-Soviet Treaty obligated Finland to keep its territory safe for the Soviets by keeping all foreign troops outside its territory. Although the Treaty expired in 1992, the two countries still honor the major points of the treaty, especially for military and security issues. By upholding the principles of the Treaty, it maintains the security formation in Northern Europe, which has kept the region stable.

Finland's defense forces have an arsenal, guaranteeing that Finland cannot be taken by surprise and that the national leadership will have the most accurate information on military situations and its likely developments. The defense departments are fully capable of fulfilling the requirements of crisis and war time conditions (Ries, 1988). This would enable Finland to secure its territorial integrity in peacetime and to adjust in crisis and during threat of war. The long tradition of mandatory military service for its citizens and historical experiences from World War II has fortified Finland's national identity associated with self-defense and strong national character. The objectives of the Finnish army are defense orientated; the objectives are centered in Finland and the defense of the country. In modern times, Finland has not shown any aggression against any other nation. Its objectives have always been related towards its territory and peaceful means. These actions have resulted in a military culture that

upholds passive peacekeeping methods, which further strengthens Finland's identity home and abroad.

It is arguable that the Tomas Ries's equilibrium point of reassurance which represents the deterrence between Finland and Russia still exists. The "point" has shifted from Russian domination, leaning closer towards a middle ground position, which suggests the element of neutrality. The major shift happened during the Paasikivi-Kekkonen era due to the express of loyalty in security issues that later developed into the economic sector. As the point shifted towards a so-called middle ground, Finland has shown deterrence to Russia by being active in the European Union's security policy, participating in the NATO's programs and gaining a more stable and respected position in the international community. Finland still respects the Russian security issues regarding Finnish territory. By doing so, Finland has kept the primary security reason for Russian expansion. NATO membership and NATO troops in Finnish territory would stretch the equilibrium point too much towards deterrence and could spark a hot conflict.

The fact that NATO was established after World War II suggests that some of its original goals and methods are outdated. The global situation is now very different and no longer involves the East against the West or Capitalism versus Communism. The international field is much more complex; the rising of so-called third world reduces the Euro-centric approach. This complex field makes alliances harder to operate and maintain a "single" voice as unitive aspect is not clear as it was in Capitalism against Communism.

Overall, it is evident that Finland consistently aims to better itself by developing relationships with powerful countries and practicing a form of neutrality. This has led to bustling success in the country, whether politically, economically or with other issues involving the European Union. Moreover, the country has remained a strong power in Europe for many reasons. Finland has demonstrated the ability to be flexible in regards to the EU and its foreign, security and defense policies (Palosaari, 2003), which is why the country is now regarded with respect and used as a reference point when aiming to discover the best ways to build a country and ensure that its people are safe and that other countries will look to it as a powerful force that could be used for various political and economic relations.

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