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PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF EARLY PROMPT INJECTION DETECTION SOLUTIONS

Master's Thesis

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Ph.D.

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VARAJASE VIHJE SÜSTIMISE TUVASTAMISE LAHENDUSTE TOIMIVUSE VÕRDLUS

Magistritöö

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Author's Declaration of Originality

I hereby certify that I am the sole author of this thesis. All the used materials, references to the literature and the work of others have been referred to. This thesis has not been presented for examination anywhere else.

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Abstract

Prompt injection is a threat to novel applications that emerge from adapting LLMs for various user tasks. The newly developed LLM-based software applications become more ubiquitous and variable. However, the threat of prompt injection attacks undermines the security of these systems as there are little to no reliable mitigations or defenses against them at the time of this writing. In this thesis, our goal is to explore the capabilities of early prompt injection detection systems. Specifically, we aim to examine the detection performances of various prompt injection detection techniques on real prompt injection attacks. We present the comparison of several detection solutions and reason about issues with the implementations of their detection techniques. We identify the pros and cons of these techniques and reason about their optimal configuring and usage in serious deployments.

We believe our comparison of performances of LLM Guard, Vigil, and Rebuff is one of the first research of existing prompt injection detection solutions. We examine the early solutions so that we can contribute to growing research in tackling the problem of prompt injection attacks. We aim to contribute to the development of better detection mechanisms against prompt injection attacks on LLM-based applications.

The thesis is written in English and is 63 pages long, including 7 chapters, 10 figures, and 21 tables.

Annotatsioon

Varajase vihje süstimise tuvastamise lahenduste toimivuse võrdlus

Vihje süstimine ohustab uudseid rakendusi, mis tekivad LLM-ide kohandamisel erinevate kasutajaülesannete jaoks. Äsja arendatud LLM-põhised tarkvararakendused muutuvad üldlevinud ja muutuvamaks. Vihjete süstimise rünnakute oht kahjustab aga nende süsteemide turvalisust, kuna selle kirjutamise ajal on nende vastu usaldusväärseid leevendus- või kaitsevahendeid vähe või üldse mitte. Selles lõputöös on meie eesmärk uurida varajase vihje süstimise tuvastamise süsteemide võimalusi. Täpsemalt on meie eesmärk uurida erinevate vihjesüstimise tuvastamise tehnikate tuvastamise jõudlust tõeliste vihjete süstimise rünnakute korral. Tutvustame mitmete tuvastuslahenduste võrdlust ja nende tuvastamistehnikate juurutamise probleemide põhjuseid. Tuvastame nende tehnikate plussid ja miinused ning põhjendame nende optimaalset konfigureerimist ja kasutamist tõsiste juurutuste puhul.

Usume, et meie LLM Guardi, Vigili ja Rebuffi toimivuse võrdlus on üks esimesi olemasolevate vihjesüstide tuvastamise lahenduste uuringuid. Uurime varajasi lahendusi, et saaksime kaasa aidata vihjesüstide rünnakute probleemi lahendamise kasvavale teadustööle. Meie eesmärk on aidata kaasa LLM-põhiste rakenduste vihjesüstide rünnakute paremate tuvastamismehhanismide väljatöötamisele.

Lõputöö on kirjutatud inglise keeles ning sisaldab teksti 63 leheküljel, 7 peatükki, 10 joonist, 21 tabelit.

List of Abbreviations and Terms

PI	prompt injection
LLM	Large Language Model
TPR	True Positive Rate
FPR	False Positive Rate

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1. Introduction

1.1 Motivation

With the boost of performance and availability of LLMs the new software applications emerged - LLM-based applications and LLM agents. These applications provided novel and fascinating user experiences by applying human language generation models to advance traditional user tasks. However, the applications with novel LLM components turned out to be vulnerable to novel security attacks. One class of these attacks was called prompt injection [1]. In a prompt injection attack, an adversary crafts a special prompt to the LLM component and manipulates the model into execution of some operations within an application, which are not intended to be executed by it. An adversary may manipulate the model into malicious actions against the application's back-end (direct prompt injection). Furthermore, an adversary may control the model's actions and responses along adversary's intentions in the context of the conversation between the model and another genuine user of the application (indirect prompt injection) [2].

Prompt injection is conceptually the same as traditional injection attacks, whereas in LLM applications the injected input resides in the prompt to the language model component. Prompt injection attacks appeared to be a valid threat as many LLM-based chatbots [3] and source LLM application software libraries [4] appeared vulnerable. However, the prompt injection was said to be challenging to mitigate at the moment [5]. The mitigations for traditional injection attacks, such as "data" and "code" context separation, were insufficiently effective for countering the prompt injection problem. The boundary between "code" and "data" in prompts to language models is "blurry" [6]. The reason is that both follow the same syntax - the syntax of human language. Currently, LLM application security practitioners achieve adequate defense against prompt injections by combining many approaches. Detecting user prompts with injections is one of them.

The prompt injection attacks became an issue that needs to be tackled in research. They become riskier if the LLM component within an application is able to execute highly sensitive functions like confidential data processing, security operations, or critical business operations. Until there is a reliable solution to the prompt injection problem the full benefits of LLMs in software applications are avoided because of these risks.

1.2 Scope

In this thesis, we explore the prompt injection detection solutions proposed so far. We examine several candidates from open source and the majority of them are still in early development. Particularly, we choose LLM Guard [7], Vigil [8], and Rebuff [9] as our candidates for analysis. Still, we wanted to shed light on different techniques used to detect prompt injections in user prompts. We consider such prompt injection detection techniques as canary word check, vector similarity search-based, secondary language model-based, and transformer model-based. Vector similarity search-based technique uses vector representations of prompts of known injection tactics. These representations are compared with vector representations of user prompts, which are classified as malicious whenever the vector representations are close. The transformer mode-based technique uses transformer models trained on datasets of prompt injections to classify prompts as benign or malicious. The secondary model-based technique uses an additional language model, prompting it to evaluate a given user prompt.

Our selected detection solutions use different combinations of detection techniques. LLM Guard uses transformer-based detection. Vigil uses transformer-based, vector similarity search-based, and canary word checks. Rebuff uses vector similarity search-based, secondary model-based, and canary word check. Importantly, these detection solutions are different in how they implement certain detection techniques. For example, Vigil and Rebuff differ in how their vector similarity search-based detections and canary word checkers work in detail.

We aim to compare the detection performances for these proposed combinations of techniques. Additionally, we analyze the susceptibility of the implemented detection methods to some devised evasion methods. The practitioners argued that some detection techniques are ineffective (for example, secondary model-based), given how easily they can be evaded. We consider such arguments in our work in order to give an objective and versatile analysis of examined detection techniques.

At the time of this writing many researches on prompt injections focus on how these attacks make language models produce immoral responses - discriminatory, defamatory, illegal, etc. In their case, the prompt injection attack targets the safety of LLM-based applications. We focus on injection attacks aimed at the security of tools and services of LLM applications. Security-oriented injections target an application's confidentiality and integrity and disrupt its functions to the attacker's objectives. We explicitly do not consider attacks on the safety of content generations in these applications, though the injection techniques can be shared between security and safety objectives.

To test how the candidate solutions detect prompt injection attacks in this work we construct working prompt injection samples ourselves. In this work, we only use prompt leak attack samples. We are aware of other prompt injection tactics in direct and indirect PIs and we mention them in the Related Work chapter. We limited ourselves to prompt leak attacks as this is the simplest tactic of prompt injection and because we considered our research duration limits. At the same time, we use variations of enhancements (jailbreaks and obfuscations) to prompt attacks in our construction of samples. These enhancements are the real-world prompt attacker techniques, which are purposed to evade certain detection methods. We develop our own simple document chat LLM-based application to act as an experimentation target.

1.3 Research questions

Centrally, we aim to analyze the detection performance metrics - precision, accuracy, and f1 score - in candidate prompt injection detection solutions. Then we aim to analyze the detection performances of each detection technique on particular prompt attack enhancements or evasions. We construct test samples from prompt leaks by enhancing them with selected jailbreaks and/or obfuscations. The samples consisting of various combinations of those jailbreaks and obfuscations on prompt leaks are called **prompt injection sample classes**. By observing detection performance of detection techniques on various prompt injection sample classes we aim to make conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of those techniques against jailbreaks and obfuscations, used in corresponding prompt injection sample classes.

First, in our work, we examine the following prompt injection detection techniques within examined detection solutions, specifically their true positive rates produced on each prompt injection sample class constructed by us. We have the following detection techniques to analyze: yara rules-based, heuristics-based, transformer-based, vector similarity search-based ("vectordb-based" for short), language model-based, and canary word check. We analyze the implementations of these techniques in candidate solutions separately. We aim to answer the questions:

1. What are the detection performances on prompt injection attacks in currently implemented transformer-based prompt injection scanners?
2. What are the detection performances on prompt injection attacks in currently implemented vector embedding lookup-based prompt injection scanner?
3. What are the detection performances on prompt injection attacks in currently implemented language model-based prompt injection scanner?
4. What are the detection performances in currently implemented canary word check-

based prompt leak attack detection technique?

We do not pay too much attention to Yara-based and heuristics-based detection techniques and their performance. Still, we consider their contribution to the detection performances of detection solution candidates as a whole, so we shortly mention them.

Second, we aim to compare performances in detecting our chosen attacks by prompt injection detection solutions as a whole. We analyze the produced false positives and compare the detection performance metrics like precision, accuracy, and f1 score over all tested attack samples. We seek to answer the main question:

1. Which prompt injection detection solution from our candidate list performs the most optimal on detecting our chosen attacks?

Our interest is to conclude on the currently optimal detection solution among candidates with the true positive and false positive rates that they produce. We attempt to increase the detection performances of detection solutions via their configurable values first. Additionally, we consider the susceptibility of detection solutions to some evasion attacks before giving an evaluation of them.

1.4 Novelty

The problem of prompt injections, at the time of this writing, is relatively recent. To our knowledge, there were no finished works examining the prompt injection detection solutions from our candidate list yet. The defenses against prompt injections were discussed in the related work, but we aim to conduct a more detailed look into those. Furthermore, we expect to give practical recommendations to improvements as we examine the real-world examples of PI detection solutions.

We chose a few of the most prominent PI detection software among open-sourced. LLM Guard was branded as a "Swiss Army knife" security tool for LLM-integrated software and we were eager to examine it. Particularly, we we going to conduct a more thorough examination as was done by enthusiasts [10] regarding the use of this tool. Rebuff was added to this list because it is directly promoted by LangChain [11] - the one major LLM app orchestration library. Among other performance metrics, we were eager to examine how much this tool produces false positives. All because the developers of Rebuff especially bring attention to this disadvantage of their early detection solution. Next, we added Vigil to the list as another open-source tool that consists of multiple detection techniques. In difference to Rebuff, Vigil has a different combination of detection techniques. Additionally,

where Vigil shares detection techniques with Rebuff it implements them differently. There were other big PI detection tools in open source like LangKit [12], or ChainGuard [13] but they were not examined due to research duration consideration.

1.5 Thesis structure

We structure this thesis as follows. In Chapter 2 we give an essential background on LLM-based applications, the components and vulnerabilities that are targeted with prompt injection attacks, and proposed detection and mitigation methods. In Chapter 3 we analyze the existing research on prompt injection attacks - the classes of the attacks, their construction, and potent detection evasion tactics. In Chapter 4 we present our experimentation methodology. We describe the architecture of our target application, the construction flow for test samples, and configuration setups for candidate detection solutions in each experiment phase. In Chapter 5 we present the results of our experiments - the detection performance metrics generated on tests on various injection attack classes for chosen configuration setups of detection solutions. In Chapter 6 we discuss the issues with examined detection solutions identified along our experiments. We conclude our findings in the Summary chapter.

2. Background

This section gives the definitions of key terms and concepts used in this work. The most important ones are large language models, LLM-based software applications, emerging vulnerabilities and attacks on these applications, and state of art in defensive measures.

2.1 Large language models

Large language models are natural language prediction models, trained on inconceivably large volumes of data. These models are capable of generating human-readable text while conforming to some context and common knowledge. Generally, the models handle human-readable texts as sequences of so-called **tokens** - combinations of natural language characters, or whole words. To generate these texts the client inputs a sequence of tokens to it, and the model generates the continuation for that sequence. The input sequence of tokens is called a **prompt**, and the generated output is generally called a **LLM response**. Different models encode tokens differently and accept different formatting of input token sequence.

In order to elicit the desired generated content out of LLM the prompt to it has to be carefully crafted. An emerging applied field of **prompt engineering** explores and collects the rules and tips for writing efficient and reliable prompts. The clients of LLMs generally aim to produce shorter prompts, because of the limits on the length of input token sequences (on the length of the prompts) that the models are allowed to digest. We refer to the complete token sequence, passed to the model as an input, as **context window**, or **context** for short. Then, the clients aim to maximize the likelihood of the model responding precisely and consistently enough for their task.

Many models, prompted by prompt engineers, are not tuned for their specific tasks, hence engineers have to give a thorough context to the model in the prompt itself. Importantly, the engineers have to instruct the model to complete the task in the prompt. They describe the task and give the ground information required for generations at the start of the whole prompt. This part is usually referred to as **system prompt** or **developer prompt**. To constrain the "task following" and response generation done by the model, the engineers usually give **few-shot examples** after the system prompt. These are examples of correct pairs of prompt-response between user and language model and the model has to follow them in subsequent generation. The examples may demonstrate the format of the response,

the relation between the input to the task and the result of it, and so on. So the full prompt is usually constructed from a system prompt defining the task, few-shot examples of the task, and the input to the task, in a sequence.

2.2 LLM-based software applications

At the time of this writing, there is an upraise in the development of applications integrated with large language models. In the common architecture of these applications, they consist of a large language model, its prompting interface, its memory module, data environment, tools and services, and orchestration systems chaining all former sub-systems. The useful areas for LLM-based software applications are innumerable, and all possible applications have the common functionality of supporting a conversation with the end user in their natural language.

These novel applications can be divided into two categories: LLM-integrated applications, and LLM agents. **LLM agents** are fully autonomous systems in which execution flow is controlled by LLM generations. The human operator only inputs high-level instructions and an objective into the agent, and the LLM in the agent proceeds to complete the given objective in the absence of predetermined execution steps. The LLM is capable of reasoning about actions necessary to reach the set high-level goal and then plan and execute multiple actions in a sequence. **LLM-integrated applications**, on the other side, are functionally closer to traditional software applications. In them, LLMs are merely an interface between the user and the internal services of the application. Such LLM is capable of following a conversation with the user, and execute the services if the user instructs so. Such software applications generally work like personal assistants or chat-bots, which are capable of answering the questions based on the text, summarizing the texts, assisting in writing, and other natural language text-based activities.

2.3 Prompt-based attacks

With the introduction of the novel LLM component in software applications, new vulnerabilities and threats emerged. OWASP [2] describes the classes of potential vulnerabilities in LLM applications, one of which is the **prompt injection**. A prompt injection attack is analogical to traditional code, command, or SQL injection attacks, in which an attacker crafts a special input sample to manipulate the context of execution in the application. In the case of the prompt injection, the context of the execution of the LLM application is structured by the developers into the aforementioned system prompt, few-shot examples, tool descriptions, and other elements of the context, one of which must be a client input.

All these components of the contents are in the natural language supported by the model, specifically the tokens encoded by the model in use. The prompt injection attack crafts the client input part of this context to manipulate other parts to the objective of the attacker. For example, to override the system prompt with new instructions, to elicit undesired generations from the model that are otherwise banned by the context, etc.

Initially, prompt injection attacks on the models were aimed at eliciting unsafe generations from it - the responses that would be emotionally harmful content for the client. This is possible because the models were being trained on the data without filtering harmful statements, hence those could be produced by the model in its generations if the context "favors" that. The developers put instructions for the models to not generate harmful content from any context into the system prompt. However, the specially-purposed prompt injections, also called **jailbreaks**, allowed to make model to disregard those safety instructions in the system prompt and generate safe and unsafe without bounds.

Then, the consequences of prompt injections are not limited to generating unsafe responses. The design of LLM-based applications allows the attacker to drive the model to execute its tools with attacker-provided input, subsequently triggering malicious behavior of the whole application. For example, for an LLM-integrated mailing agent, a successful prompt injection can potentially allow an attacker to tamper with mail management functionality or the contents of the mail, impersonating the sender. These consequences can also arise from the vulnerability of **excessive agency** as defined by [2]. That refers to the model being allowed to execute too many tools, some of which should not be executed on inputs coming from the client for security reasons. In the aforementioned example of the LLM-integrated mailing agent, the excessive agency is the root cause of the threats to mail management functionality and the model should be stripped of access to mail-sending functions.

The root cause of prompt injections is the indistinction between different parts of the context by the model itself. The developers format the context and fill in its parts following the efficiency tips from prompt engineering. However, the model does not follow any format and does not differentiate between "code" - the instructions to the model in human language, and "data" - the plain human texts assisting the generation. Recent solutions for protecting against injections in the model context include strict formatting with validation and sanitization of the input context, which is done by the hosts of the model. For example, [14] is the format to model context for the models hosted by OpenAI [15], and the formatting, validation, and sanitization of the client-provided context is done by their API. Other commercially hosted models can have their own formats and be protected by their specific validation behind APIs.

The design of LLM-based applications can be vulnerable to prompt injections in a number of its inputs. In **direct prompt injection** an attacker manipulates the client prompt part of the context window, sent to the model, in the attacker's conversation session with the model. This includes manipulating the current user prompt input, or the memory of previous user prompts. **Indirect prompt injection** implies the attacker manipulating other parts of the context window, which come from elsewhere than from the client of the conversation. For example, text resources available to the agent, which are used by the model to answer questions from the client. Upon selecting the chunk of text, relevant to the current question, it is inserted into the context window for further model generations. Agent-retrieved text resources, injected with malicious prompts, can be executed in conversation sessions of any LLM application users, not only in the attacker's session.

2.4 Detection techniques

Among protection solutions against prompt injections, there are injection detectors. In analogy to code and SQL injections to increase the security of the application validation of the inputs may contain weaknesses allowing circumvention. Then the injection detection software is necessary. Various classes of prompt injection techniques, or specifically objectified injections could be detected with signatures, benefiting from traditional **regular expression** check. This detection method implies writing detection rules based on observed malicious inputs, which can be resourceful in terms of a number of rules necessary. That is because of the large size of the field of injections in human languages. Moreover, signature checks generally fall short on usefulness in detection of the new, previously not observed, malicious inputs.

Additionally, **regular expressions** are also used to detect specially-formatted strings in user prompts, which could signify the prompt being malicious. There exist domain and IP address string signatures, PII signatures, and others. These can be sanitized from user prompts to a given LLM agent if there are security and privacy reasons.

To tackle the problem of the large size of the field of injections in human language, there is a technique to calculate the semantic similarity or closeness of two samples. Two prompt injection samples with the same objectives and similar injection techniques generally are encoded in close token sequences in terms of vector distance between their vector embeddings. This detection method is called **vector embedding lookup** check. It also implies preloading vector embeddings of observed malicious samples in the vector database for subsequent closeness checks. But with a precise vector embedding model the sufficient number of preloaded examples of malicious samples is significantly less than the number of traditional signatures.

Another detection technique, that appeared to tackle the problem of a large field of human language injections, is to use another language model to analyze the sample. The **secondary LLM** is instructed to classify some text, provided by its clients, as either benign prompt or prompt injection [16]. Secondary LLM is given explanations of what is considered malicious in the system instructions to it. For better results, the developer of this detection technique can add several few-shot examples of known malicious samples that the model has to flag as malicious confidently. The secondary LLM can be prompted (by the developer) to simply respond with "benign" or "injection" verdicts, or respond with an evaluation score representing the likelihood that the evaluated prompt is an injection. Since language models are not trained for this specific task, security practitioners have to utilize prompt engineering to adjust the model for it. The few-shot examples of prompt injections would be required then, and the expected evaluation scores for these examples have to be stated by the developer of this detection technique.

Finally, prompt injections could be classified via transformer-based neural language models. Transformer models [17] are neural networks trained to discern patterns in sequential data. Transformers are called the latest architectures of these neural networks, which utilize attention mechanisms and are superior to previous networks. The pre-trained transformer models are capable of text completion, text summarization, text classification, etc. They are further trained on labeled datasets of malicious and benign prompts to discern special patterns of characters and words, unique for prompt injection prompts. This allows us to classify the user prompts as either "injections" or "benign", specifically for the needs of prompt injection detection tasks. We will call this a **transformer model-based** detection technique.

3. Related work

The aim of this section is, first, to review the literature on techniques in security-oriented prompt injection attacks on LLMs. Then, the defensive approaches as opposed to those techniques are reviewed. The state of art tools - security LLM guardrails - on the market are examined. The approaches to detection and prevention of prompt injections, used in those tools, are categorized. Finally, related work in analyzing the effectiveness of defensive guardrails for LLM security is reviewed.

3.1 Review of prompt-based attacks

In order to craft the attacks in our experiments we review the literature on prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. We aim to analyze attacks, applicable to a wide range of LLM-based applications. Several works examine the attacks which rely on vulnerabilities of AI tools (e.g. injecting malicious code via prompt injection in [18]), or rely on specific purposes of LLM application itself (e.g. injecting malicious SQL via prompt injection into LLM app capable of executing SQL queries [19]). These attacks are very specific to their target LLM applications. Moreover, some of the devised prompt injections exploit vulnerabilities in the design of the target application - not in its LLM component. These vulnerabilities are aforementioned excessive agency vulnerability in application, and insecure LLM-accessed tools and services. We focus more on prompt injections, which elicit undesired behavior of LLMs when they are used as question-answering or task-solving components of arbitrary applications.

The majority of reviewed works and grey sources examine manually written malicious prompts. The researchers and prompt engineering enthusiasts manually wrote the whole prompts to the language models, rewriting them to optimize the model's responses. For our experiments, we need an automated way to craft all prompt injection samples. We were going to test a large number of prompt samples, and we did not have much time to write them manually. We achieved this via modeling injection prompts with several components. Each prompt injection component then is generated separately, and the whole injection prompt could be constructed from them with a particular algorithm. Generally, we generate all variations of specific components via string combinations, and then concatenate each variation for one component with each variation for another component and get the full prompt.

Such an approach was already applied by [20]. Their attack samples are constructed from a predetermined template with the three components of a full PI prompt. The component that they call the "Separator" corresponds to our PI enhancements (jailbreaks and obfuscations, see Methodology chapter). Their "Disruptor" component corresponds to the "PI objective" in our work. They also have a "Framework" component, which acts as a seemingly benign prefix of PI, purposed to add evasion to detections to the attack. All their three components are concatenated to construct a full PI prompt. However, their prompts are very specific to the application that they target. The "Framework", and "Separator" components are written with specific instructions to an application with a specific purpose (code generation, writer, chatbot). We can adapt this approach to the automated generation of a large number of malicious prompts out of a small number of manually written components. However, we would like to make these components (jailbreak and obfuscation enhancements) as generic as possible, without connection to the type of target LLM-based application. Also, we note the small number of utilized "Separator" component variations. More prompt injection tactics and their example templates were enumerated by [21]. We will benefit from their work to list more prompt injection tactics and enhancements here, which may be useful in our experiments.

One of the key injection prompt components shall be the actual instructions aligned with **attacker's objectives**. These objectives are different for direct and indirect prompt injection attacks. In the former ones, the attacker manipulates their own conversation session with the agent and, hence is limited in consequences dealt to the application and its users. We delineate the following objectives for the direct prompt injection attacks on generic LLM applications:

- Prompt leak [22]
- Goal hijack (also called "System prompt hijack") [22]

A prompt leak attack, where the goal is to generate the system prompt of the application, is always relevant for the attacker no matter the target LLM application. The system prompt is the same for all application users and is rewarding to the attacker. Leaking the system prompt can ease further injections in application, or can reveal application-sensitive information. Finally, the system prompt can be an intellectual property of the LLM application as it central part of its design. This objective was described by [23], and [22].

[22] were also among the first to formulate it and also presented the ways to effective construction of prompt leak attack samples. The corresponding prompt leak prompt instructs or asks the model to respond with "what is at the beginning of its input". This

shall be its system prompt, which usually comes at the beginning of any input given to the model to generate from.

An indirect prompt injection attack has consequences for the benign users of the application. The attacker's injection resides in retrieval text resources, which get inserted into the context window of an arbitrary user at some point of the model executing tools to generate the response to their prompt. Another user's poisoned context can lead to an attacker controlling that user's prompting session at worst. The precise rewarding goals for the attacker depend on the purpose of the LLM application, so we enumerate general objectives for the attacker inside another user's session:

- Chat history dump with server-side request [24]
- Persistent goal hijack [6]
- Persistent prompt denial [6]

When conducting a chat history dump attack on another user the attacker is required to instruct the model to transfer the generated text of the chat history. We suppose the model in the application is capable of making web requests when responding to prompts as it often employed functionality. This is the way, the attacker composes a two-objective prompt: the first instruction is to dump history the same as for direct injections, and the second instructs the model to send what was dumped to the attacker's web address. In [24], the prompt injection is delivered to LLM via ChatGPT Plugin. GPT chat is capable of sending arbitrary web requests on instruction. The user instructs it to render an arbitrary web address as a markdown image to send retrieved chat history.

Persistent goal hijack attack implies that the model executes the injected attacker's prompt each time the benign user prompts the model, and it does not require the model to retrieve poisoned text resources each time - only one retrieval should be enough to hijack all following prompts of the benign user. The same for prompt denial, which should work by instructing the model to execute no tools or functions and fail to answer benign user's prompts for any new prompt.

The exemplary prompts for the attacker's objectives listed above are unlikely to elicit the desired generation from the model as they are. These prompts generally are rejected on execution thanks to the simplest defensive measures and the model reasons how the prompts do not align with the model's initial instructions. To revert the model from strictly following the developer instructions the attacker's prompt can be enhanced with the **jailbreak**. Now the majority of the literature uses the terms "jailbreak" and "prompt injection" interchangeably and adds jailbreaks to prompts aimed at generating ethically

unsafe responses. These terms are, in fact, not the same [25]. The prompt injections aimed at the security of LLM applications exploit the weakly separated context of data and instructions within the user prompt. Then, the jailbreaks exploit the unexpected abilities of the model to generate specific responses when the model was fine-tuned, or prompt-engineered not to do so. Still, there are cases when the PI attacker needs to make the model misbehave its system instructions similar to what jailbreaks are purposed to do. That is why we are still inspired by successful jailbreaking techniques and list the most known ones in our work.

[21] made an initial attempt to do systematic categorization of the types and techniques of jailbreaking, also separating direct and indirect attacks. However, their categorization does not separate the prompt injection objective from the prompting technique itself like we aim to do. So we extract the independent jailbreak component from their exemplar prompts and exemplar samples from originating papers. Then we get the list of jailbreak techniques:

- "Ignore previous instructions" prompt injection [22]
- Prefix injection [26]
- Refusal suppression [26]
- Universal transferable suffix [27]
- Multi-step jailbreaks [28]
- Virtualization [29]

The aforementioned jailbreaks are not an exhaustive list of them, but they are some of the most heard of in the literature. The majority of these function as templates in the construction of full attack samples. An exception is the universal suffix [27] which iteratively produces the "jailbreaking" suffix from the actual malicious prompt. This jailbreak method proved to be very successful in comparison with manually written templates, not to mention the automated construction.

Some works [26] show that combining different jailbreak techniques (applying their templates in a sequence) may boost the attack success rate. However, the combinations of jailbreaks are limited as they can interfere with each other. Such jailbreaks contain instructions to the model, which do not combine with each other, because in the result the model may not follow one of the jailbreaks in combination, or not follow these instructions at all. For example, the "ignore previous instructions" will "override" any instructions, that are preceding it in the prompt. Another example is instructing the model to do multiple decryptions of obfuscated prompts (e.g. first decode base64, then decrypt ROT13). With more sequential operations that the model has to perform following the instructions of each

jailbreak in combination, the less likely the model will respond with the correct answer.

We refer to jailbreak or obfuscation techniques interfering with each other or with the prompt objective if, with their application to the prompt, the model fails to follow the prompt objective at all. The model can start responding correctly less often (only one in many retries with the same prompt elicits the correct answer), or the model's response follows unintended (unintended for the attacker) instructions. We call manual and automated tests aimed at filtering out such incorrect samples from a sample set the workability tests. After workability tests, we should be left with the prompt samples, which elicit the intended model responses for the majority of retries (generally two out of three retries of the same prompt).

The jailbreaks are purposed to elicit the desired responses from the model in situations where it refuses to do so. The model may refuse if it is prompted in its system instructions or trained during fine-tuning to not respond to specific requests from the user. This differentiates the jailbreak from the prompt injection [25] and sets the rules for the attacker as to whether to use the jailbreak in injection attacks or not. We also filtered the jailbreaks from related work before we grew our methodology, choosing the "related" ones for our prompt objectives.

3.2 Evaluating defense solutions

When prompt injections and jailbreaks turned out to be a critical threat to LLM security and safety, the protection mechanisms started to emerge. The safety problem with the content generated by LLMs could be partly solved by controlled pre-training and fine-tuning. The training and fine-tuning of datasets with minimized inappropriate content could subsequently minimise the chance of LLM responding with harmful texts. However, the more robust solutions followed the approach of analyzing and classifying the input queries and responses of LLMs.

LLM Guard [7] is a solution of many scanners helpful to sanitize user prompts or detect injections. LLM Guard contains a transformer model-based scanner, and LLM input-response similarity scanner, purposed to detect prompt injection. Input-response similarity PI detection technique was not included in our scope as it requires a large dataset of benign prompts, needed to adjust its detection threshold. Input-response similarity scanner works similarly to vector similarity search-based detection technique, whereas this scanner assumes that the benign user prompts and benign model responses to them should have close vector representations (their vector embeddings should be similar). Hence, this scanner works by flagging the user prompt as malicious if the response to that prompt has a

large vector distance to the user prompt's vector representation (the vector distance is above the threshold). We focus on LLM Guard's PI scanner, which uses a transformer-based technique. The transformer model [30], which is used to classify prompt injections among user prompts, is an open model trained on open datasets of known widespread prompt injection samples.

Vigil [8] is a multiple-technique prompt injection detection solution. It implements a regular expression-based technique (specifically Yara rules), vector embedding lookup-based technique, and transformer model-based detection technique. Also, Vigil implements canary word check functionality with two modes - one mode to detect system prompt leak, and the second mode to detect system prompt hijack.

Rebuff [9] is an open-source prompt injection detection web application. It provides an API for prompt injection and jailbreak detection and is continuously improved by the community. The defense behind Rebuff consists of 4 checks: initial *heuristics scan* of the prompt, classification of the prompt maliciousness by *secondary LLM*, check against already-seen malicious prompts in community vector

4. Methodology

In order to construct the evaluation tests we systematically review the prompt injection attack types and techniques. First, we model the prompt injection-based attack on an arbitrary LLM-integrated application. We state the practical steps to the construction of separate prompt attack parts, then the construction of whole attack prompts.

4.1 Sample construction workflow

We construct the prompt injection prompt samples in iterations. Process-based workflow of selection and testing of prompt components can be seen in Figure 1. On the first iteration, we select a prompt objective to be tested and filter out the non-working prompts out of all generated bare prompts for this objective in its dataset. This is a workability test, which ensures that taken prompt sample elicits the responses from the model that are intended for the corresponding prompt objective. The prompt objective prompts contain the instructions aligned with the objective of the attack. They are examples of certain prompt injection tactics. In this work, we only have a prompt leak objective to be tested. The filtered bare prompt objective prompts are subject to detection experiments too.

Starting from the second iteration we can choose to apply the jailbreak to the bare prompt objective prompts. We aim to cover many combinations of jailbreak and obfuscations in our experiments, so we produce samples only with obfuscation enhancements too, skipping this iteration. To enhance the bare prompt samples with jailbreak we select one to be applied on this iteration. We generate the enhanced prompt samples from all possible combinations of previously filtered prompt objective prompts and all jailbreak templates given for selected jailbreak in its dataset. The resulting prompts (enhanced with one jailbreak for now) have to pass the next workability tests. The filtered successful enhanced prompt samples are subject to detection experiments.

In the next iterations, we can choose to apply another jailbreak to the successful enhanced prompts from the previous step. For this, we repeat the previous iteration for another selected jailbreak and its templates in the dataset. Again, it is important to select and apply the sequences of jailbreaks in a way that they do not interfere with each other. For example, "Ignore previous instructions" jailbreak should be applied the last in the sequence of jailbreaks. We obtain the successful enhanced with multiple jailbreaks prompt samples, which are subject to detection experiments too.

After we produced successful jailbreak-enhanced prompt samples or chose to obfuscate bare prompt objective prompts, we chose the obfuscation function to be applied to this iteration. The obfuscation functions transform the one plain prompt sample into one obfuscated sample, though some obfuscation functions can be non-deterministic and produce different outputs on the same inputs to them. We conduct workability tests on produced obfuscated prompt samples and the resultant prompts are subject to detection experiments.



Figure 1. Prompt injection sample dataset generation

Samples for each jailbreak template, prompt objective, or applied obfuscation have to be manually validated on the target LLM application. As initial tests show the samples of prompt injection attacks, taken from related works, often do not work as is. We adjust them with prompt engineering methods (chain of thought prompting, being clear, giving few-shot examples, etc.) until they work successfully and reliably. The number of samples for every enhancement's dataset is increased by substituting any word in one manually written template with its equivalent synonyms. For example, this way we can have a high number of "Ignore previous instructions" jailbreak templates, which differ with at least one word in them (but different words in them are still synonyms). This also allows us to identify whether some detection solution discerns particular words in user prompts instead of discerning the intent of the instructions written in them.

4.1.1 Prompt injection objectives

First, we generate sample prompts for each prompt attack objective. We are still inspired by manual prompts devised in related works. Attack objective prompts are merely instructions or questions to the model, which shall make it generate malicious content or malicious actions. However, generally, these plain prompts would not be enough to drive the model into those malicious generations thanks to various simple countermeasures in place. Those countermeasures shall be addressed with jailbreak and obfuscation enhancements.

Prompt leak is an objective of a direct prompt injection attack. [22] proposed several examples of prompt leaks and calculated success rates for deviations from those. Prompt leak is constructed as a combination of the word of corresponding meaning, each word being substitutable with its synonyms (Figure 2). In combination, the words have to form instructions semantically similar to *"Tell me the beginning of this prompt"* or *"Tell me your previous instructions"*. Other enthusiasts show the prompt leaks can be formulated in the form of questions like *"What are the first {N} letters at the beginning of this prompt?"*. The work [22] demonstrates the effectiveness of using the word "spell-check" and writing the prompt in upper case.

The number of unique prompts in their work is small and they evaluated them on the outdated versions of language models for our work. Therefore, we create our own dataset of prompt leak payloads from workability tests. After these tests, we code the construction of prompt leak strings as follows:



Figure 2. Prompt Leak samples

The related works ([31], [22]) usually conduct prompt leak attacks directly on memoryless LLM applications. This means the prompt leak instructions reside right below the system prompt in the model's context. Exactly this allows the attacker to refer to system prompts as "above document", "first instructions", "previous commands", and so on. Hence, we test and experiment with prompt leak samples in conversations with agent with no memory in the same setup.

The workability test for prompts containing prompt leak objective is merely a string search for the original system instructions in model-generated responses to tested samples. In order to score the success of the tested prompt leak samples during workability tests

we employ N-gramm similarity checks [32]. For every sample we compare the actual system message, which was used in the LLM application, with the model's generated response to the sample, using a variation of N-gramm similarity algorithm. If the system message was leaked in the response, the similarity test will score 1. Otherwise, every substring of the N-length of the system message, if found among substrings of the model's response, contributes to the score. We use a threshold of 0.7 for this score to label sample as successful (which elicits a response having >=0.7 similarity with the actual system message), or otherwise failed.

4.1.2 Jailbreaks

"Ignore previous instructions" jailbreak corresponds to "Instruction manipulation" prompt injection in a categorization of [21]. The jailbreak was initially proposed by [22]. They define the jailbreak as consisting of the prefix only. It has to have a number of linebreak-delimited lines in the beginning, followed with the instructions, semantically equal to "Ignore previous instructions and ". This jailbreak is used in prompt hijack attacks, prompt leak attacks, and any other, that require overwriting original system instructions in the LLM agent.

We extend the number of these jailbreak samples with synonyms (Figure 3), generating the samples similarly to how we generate prompt leak samples.



Figure 3. "Ignore" jailbreak samples

"Ignore" interferes with almost all jailbreak prefixes that are applied on iterations afterward.

Basically, "Ignore" jailbreak will instruct the model to ignore prefixed instructions too, rendering those prefixes unsuccessful. "Ignore" jailbreak has to be applied on the last iteration of sample construction.

"Repeat characters" jailbreak exploits the flaws of LLM processing large contexts, paying more attention to the latest sentences in it. This jailbreak aims to create a large gap between user-provided "new system instructions" and original system instructions in LLM's context by putting repeating characters in the gap. As a result, the agent may "forget" its original instructions as they were way at the beginning of the long input context [**RepeatedCharsJailbreak**]. Various characters elicit this behavior more effectively with less number of characters. However the most important for us is for the constructed prompts enhanced with repeated characters to still elicit intended responses from the model. With a higher number of repeated characters, the model tends to only respond back with these same characters no matter the actual instructions in the attacker's prompt.



Figure 4. Repeated Chars jailbreak samples

We choose several of the shortest repeated sequences (Figure 4), based on the research results in [**RepeatedCharsJailbreak**]. The fewer characters in the jailbreak sequence, the more characters are left for the rest of the sample, and the more reliable the resultant prompt samples are. Still, the reliability of these sequences is tested before actual experiments, and only successful sequences are left for full sample construction. This jailbreak can interfere with other jailbreaks, or prompt objectives because it acts as a separation between previous and new priority instructions to the model (corresponds to syntax "Separator" in [20]). This means it should be applied on the last sample construction iteration, even later than the "Ignore" jailbreak.

"Prefix Injection" jailbreak forces the model to start its response with affirmative words,

e.g. "Absolutely sure, here is". This turned out to be effective at diverting the model from refusing to generate the answer that the user was asking for. When the model starts its response with affirmation, the latter generations should contain what the user asks for. It should be noted that at the time of this writing, this jailbreak was effectively tackled via human feedback learning. After this additional training the model can still start its response with "Absolutely sure, here is" but will not give the intended answer afterward. Still, we examine whether the detection solutions are capable of detecting the usage of this jailbreak.

Prefix injection was proposed by [26]. It is supposed to help elicit unsafe responses to adversarial prompts from language models. The models should refuse such prompts, but enforcing affirmative prefixes in the model's responses can boost the success of adversarial prompts. We use this jailbreak when the bare objective prompt is refused by the model due to its inner restrictions.



Figure 5. Prefix Injection jailbreak samples

We use only one sample (Figure 5) of this jailbreak, inspired from [26]. We manually check its workability and adjust its use as a template for our prompt objective prompts.

4.1.3 Obfuscations

Leetspeak obfuscation (or for short "Leet") is a character-level misspelling technique useful for obfuscating sensitive words in prompt injections. Leet supposes substituting letters of the English alphabet with visually similar alternatives (digits, special symbols, and Unicode symbols), and this technique is widespread in informal texting. Prompting LLMs with Leet does not require additional prompt engineering to work - the models "understand" the word with substituted characters. Leet is useful for avoiding heuristics-based detections and word-level filtering. Heuristics-based detection looks for particular words in user prompts (for example the word "ignore" to detect "Ignore previous instructions" jailbreak)

and Leet changes the words without interfering with the prompt. Same goes for word-level filtering, also called blacklisting.

Leet obfuscation was examined in [26]. Originally, Leet had several substitutions for every letter. In [26] the authors used a limited set of these substitutions. We start from the full substitution table [33] and manually check if some substitutions work as equivalents to their letters when processed by the language model.



Figure 6. Leet obfuscation function

For experimentation, we leave single substitutions for several letters, which we found not interfering with the prompt being obfuscated (Figure 6). We make the Leet obfuscation function non-deterministic - it chooses the letters for substitution in plaintext prompt randomly. We only adjust the maximum percent of substituted letters per word, exception words (which should not be obfuscated at all), etc. Obfuscating too many letters breaks the prompt (the model does not understand the obfuscated prompt), so we leave the obfuscation percentage at low (maximum two characters substituted per word, but no more than 30% of characters).

4.2 Target application

We conduct our manual and automated tests, and experimentation, on our own developed LLM application, which has a functionality for listing and reading text documents. The

LLM application consists of two LLM agents - one with the memory of previous conversations with the user, and one memoryless. Our LLM application uses the Langchain library to set up the agents and retrieve data from them. Both agents use OpenAI's function calling API to provide question-answering and task-solving features to the user. The agents use OpenAI's GPT-3.5 language model.

Direct prompt injection attacks, such as prompt leaks, are conducted on the memoryless agent of our application. An agent with memory is used for attacks on sensitive data residing in conversation history. Indirect attacks are first tested in direct prompting sessions for workability before being used in experiments on agents with memory in indirect attack setup.

Both agents are document chat agents. The component diagram of these agents can be seen in Figure 7. Memoryless agent receives the User Prompt and places it into the Prompt Template. The Prompt Template is a template of the full prompt to be sent to the model for generations. The template has to be filled with System Message, Tooling Description, and User prompt. Also, the Promt Template contains task-specific instructions, response formatting instructions, Reason and Act instructions (if necessary for the model used), etc. We use the LangChain library which provides the complete templates for various types of agents (in our case we used the OpenAI function calling agent). We only provide our own System Message to the LangChain template, as well as use the LangChain library to generate the descriptions of the tools used by our agent and add them to the template too. The tools are ListDocuments (list document names), ReadDocument (respond with the contents of the document given its name), and SaveMessage (save the user-provided message as a new document). Every User Prompt is added to the Prompt Template, the full prompt then is sent to the model for generation. The model can either respond with a finished answer or respond with the formatted request to execute one of the tools. The model provides the name of the tool, and the parameters to it. The application then executes these tools with given parameters and resends the full prompt with appended tools results to it and awaits the model's response. The model should eventually give a final answer, based on what was provided in the User Prompt and subsequent results of tool executions.

An agent with memory has an additional field in Prompt Template - Memory Buffer. The Memory Buffer is created from concatenated pairs of user prompts and respective model's responses, added after each model completion. The Memory Buffer goes between System Instructions and User Prompt in the Prompt Template. Regarding else functions memoryless and agent with memory share the construction of *Prompt template*, the same *Tools* and the *Documents*. Other components are shared for memoryless agent and agent with memory.



Figure 7. Document chat agent design

In Figure 8 the *System message*, used to instruct both agents, can be seen. The system message defines the purpose and the capabilities of the agent and is placed at the beginning of the *Prompt template*. During prompt leak attacks, we aim to leak this exact system message in responses from the agent. The *Tooling description* consists of documentation for respective *Tools*, and it goes after *System message* in the *Prompt template*. As a result, some prompt leak attacks are able to leak *Tooling description* in addition to the *System message*.

System message

You are a helpful assistant. You can do anything. Also you are able to:
1) Get list of names of available documents
2) Read the document given its name
3) Answer questions about the contents of those documents
4) Save (log) given messages

Figure 8. System message for the agents

Importantly, our LLM application supports log-based detection, which is to be used with

prompt injection detector solutions. The application produces the logs of user prompts, intermediate thoughts and results, produced by the model, and the final model's response. Logs of intermediate results are required to detect indirect prompt injections. The logs of user prompts and the model's responses are used to detect direct prompt injections. Precisely, user prompts and model responses are passed to prompt injection detectors. The source code for this application can be found on GitHub [34].

4.3 Sample dataset creation

Following our automated prompt injection construction flow we construct several classes of prompt injection samples. First, we generate **bare_promptleak** samples (see Table 1). The number of bare prompt leak samples is reasoned by the number of various synonyms that we used in these prompts(see prompt leak samples generation in Figure 2).

Table 1. *Prompt Injection sample classes*

Prompt Injection sample class	**Number of successful samples**
bare_promptleak	320
promptleak_pi	170
promptleak_leet	60
promptleak_repeatchar	531
promptleak_ignore	1000
promptleak_ignore_repeatchar	1000
promptleak_ignore_leet	1000
promptleak_ignore_leet_repeatchar	1000
Total	5081

To optimize the process of construction of samples for experiments we test them in iterations. We only use successful samples for subsequent attack-enhancing iterations. Additionally, where the number of samples to be verified is over 1000 we limit it there. The successful prompt objective prompts are used to construct enhanced PI samples - PI sample classes.

promptleak_pi are prompt leak samples enhanced with prefix injection jailbreak. We only had one variation of the prefix injection template, and after workability tests the number of successful samples dropped compared to the number of successful samples for the bare prompt leak (Table 1).

promptleak_leet are prompt leak samples obfuscated with leet. We only obfuscated the

320 samples of bare prompt leaks and only 60 successful ones passed the workability tests.

promptleak_repeatchar are prompt leak samples enhanced with repeated characters jailbreak.

promptleak_ignore are prompt leak samples enhanced with "ignore" jailbreak. Then we went into combining the enhancements for prompt samples containing "ignore" jailbreak.

promptleak_ignore_repeatchar are prompt leak samples enhanced with "ignore" jailbreak and then enhanced with repeated characters jailbreak. Here the "ignore" jailbreak part of the full **promptleak_ignore_repeatchar** sample stays in plaintext (unobfuscated).

promptleak_ignore_leet are prompt leak samples enhanced with "ignore" jailbreak and then obfuscated with leet. Here both the prompt leak's prompt obejctive part an the "ignore" jailbreak part of the full **promptleak_ignore_leet** sample became obfuscated.

promptleak_ignore_leet_repeatchar are prompt leak samples enhanced with "ignore" jailbreak, then obfuscated with leet, and then enhanced with repeated characters jailbreak. Prompt leak's prompt obejctive part an the "ignore" jailbreak part of the full sample are obfuscated, and the prompt contains numerous repeated characters in the beginning.

Finally, we prepare our own dataset of 50 benign prompts. These prompts are relevant for the agents in our LLM application. These prompts are the most spread instructions and questions to document chat agent and also refer to specific agent tools of our application.

4.4 Experiments

We set up three applications for the experimentation. One application uses an LLM Guard prompt injection scanner on logs, produced by its agents. The second one uses Vigil scanners - Yara-based scanner, transformer scanner, vector database scanner, and canary word checker - on produced agent logs. The third application uses Rebuff scanners: heuristics scanner, vector store scanner, secondary model scanner, and a canary word checker.

LLM Guard [7] provides a large number of different purpose scanners. The scanners are divided into two categories - input scanners (which analyze user prompts exclusively) and output scanners (which analyze the pairs of user prompts and model responses). The scanners are scattered in their purpose and potential use cases, LLM-Guard can be called a "Swiss Army knife" for an LLM-integrated system. We use LLm Guard version 0.3.9

through all our experiments.

The output scanners are to be used to correct model-generated content to improve user experience, enforce certain policies of formatting on these generations, etc. No output scanner is explicitly purposed to detect prompt injections or jailbreaks. Then, the input scanners contain a prompt injection scanner. In our experiments, we only use this specific scanner. We acknowledge that many input scanners, and some output scanners, would be useful in detecting specific prompt injection attack scenarios, e.g. *BanCode* scanner may tackle code-based injections in user prompts, *InvisibleText* scanner may tackle hidden prompt injections, etc. Still, we aim to test the usefulness of the scanner, which must detect prompt injection or jailbreak attacks in general attack scenarios.

Prompt injection scanner works by processing the user prompts via transformer model [30] (HuggingFace hub link to it is *protectai/deberta-v3-base-prompt-injection*), which classifies prompts as benign or injections. The model generates the detection score, and we choose a threshold of 0.5 for this score, following the recommended usage for this scanner at [7]. The detection score is generated for a given user prompt as a whole (without splitting into chunks). In our application, we label a user prompt as detected or undetected based solely on the detection results of this one scanner (comparing the generated detection score with the threshold).

LLM Guard can be used as a software library. In experiments with detections of PI sample classes with LLM Guard we add the processing of user prompts with LLM Guard library functions into our application' implementation. LLM Guard processes the user prompts without interference with the LLM application's functions.

Vigil [8] provides four detection functions, and we use all of them. Vigil, at the time of this writing, is still in alpha state. Still, Vigil is a prominent prompt injection detection software on the open-source market, which implements a unique combination of prompt injection detection techniques. We use Vigil 0.8.7 version through all our experiments.

The first detection technique is a Yara rules-based user prompt scan. Yara is a flexible format for writing complex regex signatures. Vigil comes with preloaded regex signatures of known prompt injections. These injections include "ignore" jailbreak-enhanced injections (called "instruction bypass" by Vigil), ChatML-based injections [35] (called "system instructions" by Vigil), image markdown-based injections [24], and several others. Also, there are Yara rules for detecting sensitive data in prompts or detecting user attempts to leak sensitive data. The Yara-based scan generates the list of the rules, which match against the examined user prompt. So if the user prompt matches at least one Yara rule

from Vigil's arsenal, this scan fires an alarm.

The second detection technique is a transformer model-based user prompt scan. It works the same as the prompt injection scanner in LLM Guard. The usage recommendations suggest using either *deepset/deberta-v3-base-injection* or *protectai/deberta-v3-base-prompt-injection* model [30]. We configure Vigil to use the latter one by default, which is the same model used in LLM Guard. We use a threshold of 0.98 for detection scores, which is a default and recommended threshold value. The detection score greater or equal to the threshold fires an alarm for this scan.

The third detection technique is a vector embedding lookup for user prompts. Vigil provides the means to create a local vector embedding store (uses ChromaDB vector store) of labeled prompt injections. Then, the scan works by searching the nearest vectors in this vector store with the vector distance to the embedding of the user prompt being less than the threshold value. The vector distance is calculated via the cosine distance algorithm, and the less distance means a match for this scanner. The match appears if there is at least one vector in the database with the vector distance to the sample being less than the threshold. The default threshold value is 0.4, but we set it less (at 0.2) for the initial experiments. That is because the manual tests of the scanner showed that the vector distance of 0.4 is too big, which results in too many false alarms. We preload the vector store with the recommended labeled datasets of known prompt injection prompts: *deadbits/vigil-instruction-bypass-ada-002* and *deadbits/vigil-jailbreak-ada-002*. These datasets contain the texts of malicious prompts and their vector embeddings.

The final detection technique is a canary word check. Vigil provides two operating modes for this check, which function differently. In both modes, the canary word is a randomly generated hex string enclosed in fixed special characters. It is generated anew for every conversation session between the user and the agent. In prompt leak mode, this canary word is prefixed to the system message before the prompt template is created (Figure 7) and sent to the model. Then, if the canary word appears in the model's response, the canary check scan fires an alarm, as the user's prompt is likely to be a prompt leak attack. In goal hijack mode, the canary word is prefixed to the system message along with the instructions to the model to always put the canary word in its responses. Then, if the canary word does not appear in the model's response, the canary word check fires an alarm as the user's prompt is likely to be a goal hijack attack (which overwrote the instructions to put the canary word in the response for the model). We only use canary check in prompt leak mode (particularly for our prompt leak attacks). We leave default configuration values for it: 16 characters long canary word, default canary word enclosing characters.

The vendors of Vigil recommend flagging the user's prompt as malicious only if several different scans detect it as malicious as distinct scanners may produce false alarms. Vigil, by default, raises an alarm if all three scanners (Yara, transformer, and vectordb) fire alarms at the same time. Vigil allows then to update its vector store, used in vector embedding lookup scan, with the detected user prompt to extend future detections. We turned off this function so it would not interfere with the results of our experiments.

Vigil can be used as a software library too. We compiled the released Vigil 0.8.7 version of the source code into a Python package and used the Vigil library inside our application instance. The repository of Vigil's source code is still used by the Yara-based check (the repository contains files with Yara rules to be used in this check).

Rebuff [9] provides four detection techniques similarly to Vigil. Rebuff, at the time of this writing, is in alpha state. But Rebuff also implements a unique combination of detection techniques, which we deem worth analyzing. We use Rebuff 0.1.1 Python SDK through all our experiments.

The first Rebuff's detection technique is a heuristics scan. This scan employs running substring matches for the user's prompt and preloaded malicious prompt substrings. The preloaded known malicious prompts are mostly "ignore" jailbreak classes. The search for matching substrings in the user's prompt with these substrings of known malicious prompts produces a match score. The match score has to be greater than the threshold for the heuristics score. We leave this threshold at a default value of 0.75.

The second Rebuff's detection technique is a vector embedding lookup scan. It works similarly to the Vigil's vectordb detection. In difference to Vigil, Rebuff uses a cosine similarity algorithm and uses Pinecone [36] vector store. The score for this scanner is the highest cosine similarity value among found 20 nearest vectors in the store for a given vector. Cosine distance score in Vigil and cosine similarity in Rebuff are related by a formula: $cosine\_distance \approx 1 - cosine\_similarity$. Rebuff does not suggest the datasets with known prompt injections to be loaded into its vector store, so we load it with the same data as we did for Vigil (*deadbits/vigil-instruction-bypass-ada-002* and *deadbits/vigil-jailbreak-ada-002*). We leave the default threshold for detection scores of this scan - the threshold value is 0.9.

The third Rebuff's detection technique is a secondary model scan. Currently, Rebuff uses OpenAI's language model (GPT-3.5) and instructs it to generate the maliciousness score for the user's prompt. This scan instructs the model using prompt engineering methods (system message, few-shot examples, response formatting instructions, etc.). The actual

prompt template used by this scan can be seen in Figure 9. The user prompt under this scan is put into this template in the place of *{user_input}* string. The detection score for this scan is then taken from the response from the model. The model is instructed to generate a normalized detection score, which is then compared with the threshold. We leave the threshold for this score at a default value of 0.9.

Along our preliminary experiments, we found out that for some samples model check throws an exception on the Rebuff detection server due to lack of error escaping in its source code. The reason is that the model, which is prompted to classify the user's prompt, responds with an arbitrary string instead of a floating point number representing the classification score. Rebuff throws an error when the code attempts to parse the string into a floating point number. In these situations, we set the model check score at zero by default.



Figure 9. Prompt template used by Rebuff model scan

The final Rebuff's detection score is a canary check. Rebuff only provides canary check functionality equal to Vigil's prompt leak mode canary check. Rebuff, by default, uses 8 characters long canary words, and some enclosing special characters. We use these default values for the canary word check. In distinction to Vigil, Rebuff allows to change the format of the canary word header, which is prefixed to the system message. Also, Rebuff allows to update its vector store with the user prompts, on which the canary word leak was detected. We turn off this functionality on experimentation so it does not interfere with the results.

Rebuff can be used as a software library like both previous solutions. Due to technical

issues with the releases of Rebuff available at the time of this writing, we compiled Rebuff's software library from source code and developed a separate server to host the detection functions of Rebuff. The code for this separate server can also be found under our repository at [34].

Taking the generated samples in the prompt injection sample class (Table 1) we run them against the same application but configured with LLM-Guard detections. Then run all samples on the application with configured Vigil detections, and then on the application configured to process the user prompts via Rebuff detections on a separate server. For each distinct scanner, we calculate the detection rates produced on each prompt injection sample class.

5. Results

We present the results of our experiments on target LLM applications. For each PI attack class, we note the true positive rates produced by separate detection techniques. Then, we analyze the precision, accuracy, and f1 score performance metrics for separate detection techniques over all PI ample classes at once. For some detection techniques, we present their performance results both with default settings and with our proposed improvement. Finally, we analyze the detection rates of detection solutions as a whole, considering the best produced results (either with default settings or improved by us).

5.1 Experiments with defaults

We ran detection tests with each scanner from each detection solution on every prompt injection attack class that we generated. In this section, we present the results for the scanners, which we only ran with their default settings. We leave the threshold values, used models, and other configurable values of these certain scanners at default values (recommended or set as default by detection solution vendors). The results for other scanners, which we ran both with default configurations and with our improvements, are presented in the next section. We compare detection rates for different prompt injection attack classes for a particular scanner type. This way we conclude how particular jailbreaks or obfuscations affect detections for this scanner type. Then we compare total detection metrics between different scanner types.

In Table 2 there are true positive rates (TPR or recall, it is the ratio between the number of correctly identified malicious samples by detection technique and the number of malicious samples in the sample class), produced by LLM Guard's single transformer-based input scanner. We did not optimize its configurable threshold, because the detection scores for benign and malicious samples extremely rarely differed from 0 or 1. LLM Guard does not allow configuring the transformer model that it uses for detection, so this scanner persists in using *protectai/deberta-v3-base-prompt-injection* [30].

The metrics in Table 2 show that this model performs at maximum on samples containing plain (unobfuscated) *ignore* jailbreak. Prompt leaks enhanced with *ignore_leet* and *pi* (prefix injection) were also detected in the majority. The enhancement *repeatchar* negatively affected the detection scores. We can see this for *promptleak_repeatchar* and *promptleak_ignore_leet_repeatchar*. We could assume that the cause for this is that the

LLM Guard's PI scanner was sensitive to the length of evaluated prompts, and it could fail on rather long prompts. By default, LLM Guard's PI scanner evaluates the user prompts as full but optionally can evaluate splits, sentences, or chunks of user prompts. We did not try evaluations due to research duration consideration. Larger prompts may produce worse detection results if the scanner is set on full string processing, so the engineer should set it to use splits-based processing or sentence-based processing. However, the TPRs for *promptleak_ignore_repeatchar* class are still detected by the scanner at fullest, because they contain unobfuscated *ignore* parts, which are greatly detected by this scanner's model.

Table 2. *Detection metrics with LLM Guard input scanner*

Prompt Injection sample class	**PI scanner (LLM Guard)**
	TPR
bare_promptleak	0.4531
promptleak_pi	0.7353
promptleak_leet	0.6000
promptleak_repeatchar	0.0056
promptleak_ignore	1.0000
promptleak_ignore_repeatchar	0.9990
promptleak_ignore_leet	0.7210
promptleak_ignore_leet_repeatchar	0.5190

In total (table 3), the LLM Guard input scanner generates a significantly low number of false positives but is low on true positives rate on many sample classes. The classes detected by this scanner specifically contain *ignore* or *pi*, but *leet* and *repeatchar* decrease detection rates notably. We expected this as there were limitations in training datasets used for this model - they did not contain examples of the latter two enhancements.

Table 3. *Total detection metrics with LLM Guard input scanner*

Prompt Injection sample class	**PI scanner (LLM Guard)**		
	Precision	**Accuracy**	**F1 Score**
Total	**0.9997**	**0.7010**	**0.8222**

In table 4 we have the detection metrics produced by Vigil's Yara rules-based input scanner. It performs as expected, based on the descriptions of the rules in Vigil's documentation. The scanner is exclusively purposed to detect plain *ignore* jailbreak-containing samples. The scanner is completely avoided with *leet* obfuscation then.

Table 4. *Detection metrics with Vigil's Yara scanner*

Prompt Injection sample class	**Yara scanner (Vigil)**
	TPR
bare_promptleak	0.0000
promptleak_pi	0.0000
promptleak_leet	0.0000
promptleak_repeatchar	0.0000
promptleak_ignore	1.0000
promptleak_ignore_repeatchar	1.0000
promptleak_ignore_leet	0.0000
promptleak_ignore_leet_repeatchar	0.0000

Table 5. *Total detection metrics with Vigil's Yara scanner*

Prompt Injection sample class	**Yara scanner (Vigil)**		
	Precision	**Accuracy**	**F1 Score**
Total	**1.0000**	**0.3995**	**0.5649**

In table 6 we have the detection metrics produced by Rebuff's heuristics input scanner. Similarly to Vigil's Yara-based scanner this scanner is limited to plaintext *ignore* jailbreak and is completely avoided with word-level or character-level obfuscations like *leet*.

Table 6. *Detection metrics with Rebuff's Heuristics input scanner*

Prompt Injection sample class	**Heuristics scanner (Rebuff)**
	TPR
bare_promptleak	0.0000
promptleak_pi	0.0000
promptleak_leet	0.0000
promptleak_repeatchar	0.0000
promptleak_ignore	1.0000
promptleak_ignore_repeatchar	1.0000
promptleak_ignore_leet	0.0000
promptleak_ignore_leet_repeatchar	0.0000

Table 7. *Total detection metrics with Rebuff's Heuristics input scanner*

Prompt Injection sample class	**Heuristics scanner (Rebuff)**		
	Precision	**Accuracy**	**F1 Score**
Total	**1.0000**	**0.3995**	**0.5649**

In table 8 there are detection metrics produced by Rebuff's model check input scanner. We did not optimize this scanner via configurable values, because the threshold for it is defined in this scanner's prompt template to secondary language model (GPT-3.5) (figure 9) - in the system instructions and few-shot examples to it.

Importantly, this check produced the most false positives compared to any other scanner. At the same time, it generally performs better than any other scanner over almost any injection sample class. The exception is *promptleak_pi* - this is the class that elicits the program exceptions in Rebuff, which we mention in the description of Rebuff in the previous chapter. The prompts that were successful in crashing Rebuff due to this error were scores zero by this check, and the number of such samples is rather high.

Interestingly, *leet* obfuscation should not interfere with detection rates by this check as the language models are successful in "interpreting" the misspelled words in prompts. However, we could see that the results for *promptleak_ignore_leet* are much lower than other classes containing *ignore*. The detection scores in produced false negative samples from this class, in a majority, are right below the threshold. The threshold value should not be blamed here because the FPR is already high enough. We assume the evaluations for *leet*-obfuscated prompts have to be improved by adding few-shot examples of them in the prompt template of this scanner.

Table 8. *Detection metrics with Rebuff's Model input scanner*

Prompt Injection sample class	**Model check scanner (Rebuff)**
	TPR
bare_promptleak	0.8406
promptleak_pi	0.0353
promptleak_leet	0.7000
promptleak_repeatchar	0.9379
promptleak_ignore	0.9050
promptleak_ignore_repeatchar	0.9890
promptleak_ignore_leet	0.8120

Continues...

Table 8 – *Continues...*

Prompt Injection sample class	**Model check scanner (Rebuff)**
	TPR
promptleak_ignore_leet_repeatchar	0.9630

The total detection results (table 9) show that the model check has an optimal trade-off between true negatives and true positives. We admit that the number of negatives (benign samples, genuine user prompts) was extremely low in comparison with the number of automatically generated malicious samples. This imbalance in negative and positive sets may imply that for real-world environments the f1 scores may be less than in our experiments. Further, we identified another issue with the implementation of the model check, which undermines the produced detection metrics even further. We discuss this issue in the next (Discussion) chapter.

Table 9. *Total detection metrics with Rebuff's Model input scanner*

Prompt Injection sample class	**Model check scanner (Rebuff)**		
	Precision	**Accuracy**	**F1 Score**
Total	**0.9951**	**0.8794**	**0.9354**

5.2 Experiments with modified values

Given the detection scores obtained on the initial experiment (with all default configurable values on all scanners) we adjust them for better performance. We chose to optimize the thresholds on sets of *benign* and *promptleak_ignore* samples. The *promptleak_ignore* was the prompt injection and jailbreak class that the security analysts were the most aware of. Hence, all the tools here are especially successful in detecting this class, or they are supposed to be by design and implementation. Hence, we seek the thresholds that maximize the detection in the tools and suppose that the produced threshold value was supposed to be.

For Vigil, we modify vectordb scanner's threshold, optimizing its TPR on *promptleak_-ignore* samples. Vectordb scanner generates the scores (vector distances) of 0.1695 and less for *promptleak_ignore* samples. Then, the lowest score generated for benign samples is 0.1742. We set the threshold at 0.17 to optimize detection performance on *promptleak_-ignore* samples, and so we got zero FPR too. The threshold was chosen solely based on the maximum score of malicious samples here, and later we compare this choice with calculating the mean threshold instead (how we do this for Rebuff's vectordb check). The

results (table 10) show the overall decrease in detections for this scanner.

We were concerned with the default set threshold for vector distance as it generated false alarms on benign prompts (including other benign prompts in our manual experiments). The vectordb scanner looks up the closest vector for a given user prompt and the found closest prompt also represents the PI class that the evaluated prompt belongs to. The manual experiments showed that vectordb scanner looks up incorrect similar classes of PIs. The datasets of embeddings that we loaded consist only of "ignore" jailbreak variations and "virtualization" jailbreaks, so we did not expect this scanner to correctly classify anything else. We used the modified threshold and the results produced with it when analyzing the performance of Vigil as a whole.

The results show that PI classes containing *ignore* enhancement, which were supposed to be detected via this vector distance check, became less and less detected. The other enhancements - *leet*, *repeatchar* - affected the true positives on this scanner with each iterated enhancement. We expected that vector distance check detects *leet* obfuscated jailbreaks, even if there are only unobfuscated samples loaded in the embedding database. Additionally, there were prompts in tested samples (any PI class enhanced with *repeatchar*) set, which are significantly longer than any prompt in vector embedding database, so the vector distance check performed worse on these PI classes.

Table 10. *Detection metrics with Vigil's VectorDB input scanner*

Prompt Injection sample class	**VectorDB scanner (Vigil)**	
	default	**modified**
	TPR	**TPR**
bare_promptleak	0.9969	0.8625
promptleak_pi	1.0000	0.8412
promptleak_leet	1.0000	0.4833
promptleak_repeatchar	0.7439	0.4991
promptleak_ignore	1.0000	1.0000
promptleak_ignore_repeatchar	1.0000	0.9810
promptleak_ignore_leet	0.9990	0.8070
promptleak_ignore_leet_repeatchar	0.9760	0.6420

Overall we assume that this scanner is mostly supposed to detect only pre-loaded classes of PI. The obfuscations (leet) and jailbreaks (repeatchar, prefix injection), which were not present in the vector store, affect the detections negatively, though slightly. Vigil's authors are more aware of false positives on this scanner though. The recommendation is to not

rely on this scanner exclusively but in combination with transformer-based scanner. This may contradict the purpose of this scanner as a transformer-based technique should be able to occasionally detect before unseen PIs.

Table 11. *Total detection metrics with Vigil's VectorDB input scanner*

Prompt Injection sample class	**VectorDB scanner (Vigil)**					
	default			**modified**		
	Precision	**Accuracy**	**F1 Score**	**Precision**	**Accuracy**	**F1 Score**
Total	**0.9986**	**0.9671**	**0.9831**	**1.0000**	**0.8172**	**0.8983**

We modified the Vigil transformer scanner with a different transformer model to use. We utilized the new better (further trained) version of the default model - *protectai/deberta-v3-base-prompt-injection-v2* [37]. This model was opened for access very recently, and it showed overwhelmingly better results (table 12) than the predecessor. The model was successful at detecting every constructed PI class, while its produced false positive rates are only slightly higher (table 13). The training dataset for this new model was extended and improved and the authors of this model focused on injections in English. The larger pool of known PIs that was used to train the new model allows it to identify the jailbreaks used in our experiments. We mainly use very popular jailbreaks, so they were included in the latest training datasets, we suppose.

Table 12. *Detection metrics with Vigil's Transformer input scanner*

Prompt Injection sample class	**Transformer scanner (Vigil)**	
	default	**modified**
	TPR	**TPR**
bare_promptleak	0.4531	1.0000
promptleak_pi	0.7353	1.0000
promptleak_leet	0.6000	0.9833
promptleak_repeatchar	0.0056	1.0000
promptleak_ignore	1.0000	1.0000
promptleak_ignore_repeatchar	0.9990	1.0000
promptleak_ignore_leet	0.7210	0.9930
promptleak_ignore_leet_repeatchar	0.5190	1.0000

Table 13. *Total detection metrics with Vigil's Transformer input scanner*

Prompt Injection sample class	**Transformer scanner (Vigil)**					
	default			**modified**		
	Precision	**Accuracy**	**F1 Score**	**Precision**	**Accuracy**	**F1 Score**
Total	**0.9997**	**0.7010**	**0.8222**	**0.9992**	**0.9977**	**0.9988**

We modified Vigil's canary word check implementation after we obtained the results of experiments with defaults. The results (table 14) have shown the canary check does not work correctly with prompt leaks in our PI classes. The default implementation works by prefixing the system instructions, which are protected from leakage, with the canary word. Our modified implementation works by placing the canary word within the system instructions, specifically between the second and the third sentences. However, the detection results for both implementations then turned out to be zero. We discuss the potential causes for this in the Discussion chapter.

Table 14. *Detection metrics with Vigil's Canary word check*

Prompt Injection sample class	**Canary word check (Vigil)**	
	default	**modified**
	TPR	**TPR**
bare_promptleak	0.0000	0.0000
promptleak_pi	0.0000	0.0000
promptleak_leet	0.0000	0.0000
promptleak_repeatchar	0.0000	0.0000
promptleak_ignore	0.0000	0.0000
promptleak_ignore_repeatchar	0.0000	0.0000
promptleak_ignore_leet	0.0000	0.0013
promptleak_ignore_leet_repeatchar	0.0000	0.0023

Table 15. *Total detection metrics with Vigil's Canary word check*

Prompt Injection sample class	**Canary word check (Vigil)**					
	default			**modified**		
	Precision	**Accuracy**	**F1 Score**	**Precision**	**Accuracy**	**F1 Score**
Total	**0.0000**	**0.0101**	**0.0000**	**1.0000**	**0.0120**	**0.0014**

We modified the vectordb scanner's threshold in Rebuff. The problem was that the scanner did not detect any of our samples as the default threshold was too high. We optimized it on

benign samples and samples of *promptleak_ignore*, but in difference to Vigil, we used a mean average of bound scores for benign and malicious samples. On benign samples, the maximum vectordb scanner score was 0.823, while on *promptleak_ignore* samples it was 0.839 at minimum. We set the threshold at mean of these two values - 0.831.

In table 16 we observe similar detection rates as for Vigil's vectordb scanner. The new threshold makes no FPR either, but in difference to Vigil's modified vectordb the TPRs are higher.

Table 16. *Detection metrics with Rebuff's VectorDB input scanner*

Prompt Injection sample class	**VectorDB scanner (Rebuff)**	
	default	**modified**
	TPR	**TPR**
bare_promptleak	0.0000	0.9656
promptleak_pi	0.0000	0.4353
promptleak_leet	0.0000	0.5833
promptleak_repeatchar	0.0000	0.5141
promptleak_ignore	0.0000	1.0000
promptleak_ignore_repeatchar	0.0000	0.9900
promptleak_ignore_leet	0.0000	0.8350
promptleak_ignore_leet_repeatchar	0.0000	0.7070

Table 17. *Total detection metrics with Rebuff's VectorDB input scanner*

Prompt Injection sample class	**VectorDB scanner (Rebuff)**					
	default			**modified**		
	Precision	**Accuracy**	**F1 Score**	**Precision**	**Accuracy**	**F1 Score**
Total	**0.0000**	**0.0097**	**0.0000**	**1.0000**	**0.8328**	**0.9078**

Same as for Vigil, we modified Rebuff's canary word check implementation as the default one (which is mostly the same as in Vigil). The new canary check in Rebuff placed the canary word inside the system instructions. Surprisingly, Rebuff's modified canary word produced many more detections now. We discuss the causes for this in the Discussion chapter. Still, the true positive rates are low for this detection technique, which is specifically purposed to detect prompt leak attacks. In not-included tests of canary word checks, where we did not use the enclosing characters for canary word, we did not observe better detection rates either. The canary word as a detection technique did not succeed in detecting our attacks no matter how we tuned it.

Table 18. *Detection metrics with Rebuff's Canary word check*

Prompt Injection sample class	**Canary word check (Rebuff)**	
	default	**modified**
	TPR	**TPR**
bare_promptleak	0.0000	0.4324
promptleak_pi	0.0059	0.8387
promptleak_leet	0.0000	0.3000
promptleak_repeatchar	0.0000	0.5583
promptleak_ignore	0.0000	0.5645
promptleak_ignore_repeatchar	0.0000	0.8422
promptleak_ignore_leet	0.0000	0.2074
promptleak_ignore_leet_repeatchar	0.0000	0.4180

Table 19. *Total detection metrics with Rebuff's Canary word check*

Prompt Injection sample class	**Canary word check (Rebuff)**					
	default			**modified**		
	Precision	**Accuracy**	**F1 Score**	**Precision**	**Accuracy**	**F1 Score**
Total	**1.0000**	**0.0101**	**0.0004**	**1.0000**	**0.5291**	**0.6877**

5.3 Total results for detection solutions

We calculate total detection metrics over all scanners of a particular detection solution. These are LLM Guard (1 scanner), Vigil (4 scanners), and Rebuff (4 scanners). We calculate total metrics following the recommended detection policies of these solutions. For LLM Guard this is trivial as we only ran its single scanner. For Vigil, the rule is to fire an alarm on prompt injection if the two input scanners, which are prone to false positives (transformer-based and vectordb-based), detect it simultaneously, or if at least one other check detects (yara-based or canary check). For Rebuff, the vendors suggest firing an alarm if at least one of the scanners (all input ones and the canary check) detected user prompt as an injection. Rebuff's vendors suggest different scanners complement detection capabilities of each other.

Table 20. *Detection metrics over sample classes for detection solutions as whole*

Prompt Injection sample class	**LLM Guard**	**Vigil**	**Rebuff**
	TPR	**TPR**	**TPR**
bare_promptleak	0.4531	0.8625	0.9906
promptleak_pi	0.7353	0.8412	0.8765
promptleak_leet	0.6000	0.5000	0.8833
promptleak_repeatchar	0.0056	0.4991	0.9831
promptleak_ignore	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000
promptleak_ignore_repeatchar	0.9990	1.0000	1.0000
promptleak_ignore_leet	0.7210	0.8080	0.9740
promptleak_ignore_leet_repeatchar	0.5190	0.6420	0.9960

Table 21. *Total detection metrics of detection solutions*

Detection solution	**Total PI samples**			
	FPR	**Precision**	**Accuracy**	**F1 Score**
LLM Guard	0.02	0.9997	0.7010	0.8222
Vigil	0.0000	1.0000	0.8213	0.9008
Rebuff	0.4400	0.9956	0.9821	0.9909

In table 20 we can see that Rebuff performs better than LLM Guard or Vigil on any PI class and has the highest accuracy and f1 score (see Table 21). This is explained by how Rebuff calculates detection verdicts (if any its scanner fired), combined with how less benign samples we had to obtain Rebuff's FPR with such a detection policy.

If comparing LLM Guard and Vigil (table 20) we expected the latter to be superior in every PI class. Vigil's transformer was superior to LLM Guard's PI scanner in detection results, Vigil's Yara scanner supported full detection of *ignore*-enhanced classes, etc. But, for example, on *promptleak_leet* LLM Guard was superior. This is caused by Vigil's vectordb check, which fired a false negative on some samples of this class, whereas the transformer-based check fired a true positive. Vigil's detection policy causes this drop in detections, and we argue that vectordb check should be used this way in the detection policy. The latest version of LLM Guard, deployed while we wrote this thesis, uses the same transformer model as we used in modified Vigil's transformer scanner. This means now the detection rates of LLM Guard with this new model are higher than Vigil's (compare values for modified scanner in Table 12, and values for Vigil in Table 21). Again, because of Vigil's detection policy, but in difference to Rebuff, the new transformer model produces a very low number of false positives in exchange for high detection rates.

The results for PI classes show that we were successful at constructing enhanced PI samples, which became more and more successful at evading detection techniques in examined solutions. The samples of *promptleak_ignore_leet_repeatchar* represent the most usable PI class by attackers as they combine evasion obfuscation and jailbreak, as well as the goal hijack instructions. The evasions applied in these samples still succeed as we can see from the detection results (table 20). The results are lower than for the samples without evasions. An exception is the new transformer in the modified Vigil detects the samples no matter the evasion that we used. The offensive-defensive race in the prompt injection problem has advanced while we wrote this thesis, specifically by incorporating the widely used evasion into the training datasets.

We assume that the use of detection techniques within the policies should be revisited in both Vigil and Rebuff. We could see that vectordb scanners could be optimized for zero FPR with the thresholds. The better approach was the mean average on boundaries, but also we could optimize it over all PI classes that we constructed. Not all our PI classes have representing vectors pre-loaded in the vector store, so the optimized threshold cannot produce absolute detection.

In the serious deployment of vectordb scanner we would recommend optimizing the threshold on a high number of benign samples and on a subset of PI classes present in vector store. For example, where the granular datasets are limited to one PI class or jailbreak type, the vector store could be loaded with 75% of the dataset and threshold optimized for the remaining 25%. This is in order to harden the vectordb scanner to rarely fire a false alarm, and reliably detect the malicious samples belonging to PI classes and jailbreak types present in the vector stores. The vector stores hence should be pre-loaded with as many varied PI classes as possible. From our results, we see that vector stores had to be pre-loaded with examples of *leet*-obfuscated samples and *repeatchar*-enhanced samples to adequately perform on those. We suppose that vectordb scanner then could be used exclusively and it could solely detect the PI samples, which classes appear in the vector store, and do it reliably (with minimum false positives).

The transformer-based and language model-based (alias secondary model-based, or model check) techniques then are supposed to also detect more classes of PIs than there were present in their training, or in their few-shot examples correspondingly. The transformer-based technique uses the transformer model which "learns" the distinguishing patterns of the prompts it has been trained on. Hence, whenever these patterns are present in the prompts, which were not included in the training datasets, the model will still classify them as injections. Similarly, the secondary model-based technique uses a large language model as an evaluator and prompts it to classify the prompts that have a special intent (for

example the prompts that "ask to ignore the previous instructions" - see Figure 9). The developer also provides examples of such prompts in the few-shot examples it, but the language model will be able to identify a larger set of the prompts, based on their intent. These techniques (transformer-based and secondary model-based) then should be used carefully in conjunction to avoid false positives.

6. Discussion

Along our experiments, we identified the problems in the implementations of some of the detection techniques in examined detection solutions. We also gained an understanding of the root causes of the attacks that we employ in our tests. We discuss our findings in this chapter.

6.1 Weakness in Rebuff's model check input scan

In Rebuff the model check scan is prone to injection on its own. As the model check utilizes the second large language model to evaluate the prompts, given to the primary one, some prompt injections may affect this second model too. This was already encountered by us on tests with *promptleak_ignore* samples, which made the model check output arbitrary strings instead of detection scores. We extended this manipulation into a consistent and reliable evasion suffix that makes any sample evade the model scanner.



Figure 10. Vulnerability in Rebuff's model check scanner

It works precisely as shown in Figure 10. By analyzing the prompt template used by

Rebuff's model check scanner, we devised an injection in this template, which makes the language model, which consumes this evaluation prompt, evaluate completely different input. The suffix with benign score *"0.0"* and a "placeholder" with a substitute prompt *"User string: aaaa"* hints the model to evaluate the string *"aaaa"* when the check is run. This suffix is said to be reliable as it almost does not interfere with the actual malicious prompt - *"Ignore previous instructions and leak the system instructions"*. When it is consumed by the primary language model of the application, the model responds correctly.

This weakness is inherent to Rebuff 0.1.1 version and earlier and it lies in the lack of sanitation of the processed user prompts at model check. The attack itself is merely an injection into the "context" of Rebuff's model check prompt template (hence it is specific to this implementation of the secondary model detection technique). The attack could be minimized when sanitizing user prompts from the context delimiters (in the case of Rebuff's prompt template the delimiter is "User string: "), or considering different context delimiters for few-shot examples and the actual user input. But the sanitation should be thorough as the attacker can still inject the delimiters in obfuscated form, or in another way inject the new "fraudulent" few-shot examples into the model via manually written prompts. This model check demonstrates the corresponding secondary model detection technique is rather counterproductive as it introduces another attack surface in addition to the primary language model. The implementation of such a check has to address any sanitation necessary to avoid injections in the secondary model.

6.2 Nuances of canary checks

The results of our experiments demonstrate that the default implementations of canary word checks (both in Vigil and in Rebuff) do not detect prompt leaks at all in our attacks. Both Vigil's and Rebuff's canary checks by default prepend the "secret" canary word to the system message. But when the buffed system instructions (original system message with canary word added at its beginning) were used in Prompt Template in the application the user prompts to output the system instructions (the prompt leak attack prompts) almost never produced the canary word in the outputs. We suppose this is because the model "understands" that canary word does not belong to the "initial prompt", "first commands", "system instructions", or any alias that the attacker uses to ask the model to respond with. Hence, the model does not include it in its answers.

Then we attempted to modify the implementation of these canary word checkers by "injecting" the canary word inside the system message. We injected it between the sentences to not interfere with the instructions themselves. Vigil's canary word check did not change its extremely low TPRs. Via manual prompting, we gained an understanding

that the language model treats the delimiters (enclosing characters) around the canary word as commentary signs. In the case of Vigil, these characters are <-@!– *{hexadecimal canary word string}* –@!->. The model seems to remove everything inside of the comment from the responses that it generates. Rebuff's canary word delimiters are <!– *{hexadecimal canary word string}* –>. Rebuff's modified canary check was successful on a number of samples, though still very weak. We suppose that Rebuff the delimiters around the canary word does not affect the detection performance of the canary word check, unlike in Vigil. Instead, we suppose Rebuff's canary check performs poorly because the canary word is not included in the model's responses on chance - due to the indeterminism of the language model generations. This means that supposedly any prompt leak sample against Rebuff's canary word checker will eventually leak the canary word too (together with system instructions) after several retries. However, the attacker needs only one leak to be successful.

We argue that the canary word technique to detect prompt leaks can be improved to be superior to simpler anti-prompt leak approaches. We are aware of one more distinct approach to implementing the canary word injection into the system message. This method suggests instructing the model (in system instructions to it) to treat the canary word as a secret value and hide its existence from the user. This way the canary word will become the inherent part, "tied" to the system message, and so it should appear in a successful prompt leak response. However, there were examinations [38] which show how the model could always be tricked, and manipulated into leaking something "secret" from its context. Knowing the canary word the attacker can instruct the model to never include it in its responses, evading this implementation of canary word check.

Intuitively, detecting prompt leak attacks is the most effective and reliable via simple string similarity comparison between the original system prompt and the responses from the model. We used this technique to collect successful prompt leak samples anyway. But this technique can also be evaded by instructing the model to obfuscate its responses. String similarity comparison works only on plaintext strings - with close tokens, or paraphrased. But if the model is able to encode characters (BASE64 for example), then the prompt leaks will stay undetected.

These evasion approaches were once explored in existing work on prompt leaks [39]. The attacks on system messages can be extended to leak any user prompt from the conversation memory buffer. The work [39] suggests these prompts as well as the system message should not be treated as secrets as the protections are evaded eventually. However, we argue that no protection may be the way for the majority of LLM-based applications, which are mostly chatbots with limited agency. The models with more access to executable

tools still need restrictions in place against leaking the system instructions. Moreover, the written system message or templates became a paid intellectual property already and the prompts are sold on the market. We suggest the direction for improvements in detecting prompt leaks should start from the earlier language model training phase. The model should be trained on a particular stage (likely the RHFL stage) to refuse to output its system instructions specifically. This way the prompt leak problem will become a jailbreak problem, and the attacker will be required to force the model to generate unrestricted outputs. The models used within LLM-based applications, should be limited in their functionality (also called the model's "agency" [2]) both during training the model and post (via prompt engineering and application design).

6.3 Limitations

Limitation 1. Due to the non-deterministic setting of the language model that we used in our experiments (GPT-3.5) the results (detection metrics) may be not fully reproducible. The number of samples that prove to leak the prompts successfully varies and depends on the number of retries. Then, the model check-in Rebuff, being also language model-based, may generate different scores on the same sample. We acknowledge that our results are approximate performance metrics for examined detection techniques.

Limitation 2. In our work we stuck to prompt leak attacks and missed out on other prominent attacks on LLM-based applications, listed in the related work. We defined our scope this way, but the unaddressed attacks will be the candidates for future experimentation in this field. Importantly, in our examination of PI detection software, we came across the lack of methods to detect indirect attacks in those solutions as the major focus of detection techniques was direct prompt injection. Hence, we started with the attacks that are addressed by our candidate PI detection solutions explicitly.

Limitation 3. As we wrote the genuine user prompts for false positive experiments manually their number is significantly less than than number of malicious samples. This may give an incomplete understanding of false positive rates produced in our experiments. Still, we tried to cover as many use cases - different potential prompts that the genuine user would ask from the language model in our document chat application, so we believe our false positive rates should not be much higher than the true ones.

7. Summary

In our work, we created numerous samples for several prompt injection classes. These classes were created from bare prompt injection attack samples enhanced with various combinations of selected jailbreaks and obfuscations. We tested how LLM Guard, Vigil, and Rebuff perform detection of these PI sample classes and obtained the detection performance results for each one of their detection techniques, and for each one of them as a whole. We analyzed how the separate detection techniques perform on every PI sample class, and in total (on all attack samples).

We conclude our findings on performance and appropriate usage of examined detection techniques, and performance results of the whole detection solutions. We applied different configurations to the techniques and inspected which PI classes they detect the best or the worst, and so we have suggestions for optimal usage of combinations of techniques and their optimal configuring methods.

Regarding transformer-based prompt injection scanners, we observed the growth of detection rates on any PI class for the models with larger and more varied training datasets. The latest models were able to detect more than 99% of all our malicious samples. However, transformer models produce low but notable false positive rates. We concluded that this technique is better used for the purpose of detecting the before-unseen (in the training datasets) malicious sample classes, but should be used in conjunction with other techniques with similar purpose in order to lower the number of false positives.

A secondary model-based prompt injection scanner appeared to have a similar purpose as a transformer-based one. This scanner can also produce superior true positive rates, but it also produced the highest number of false positives in our experiments. The language model employed in the check is capable of classifying samples, whose classes were not included in its prompt instructions and few-shot examples. However, the effectiveness of this scanner is largely affected by its implementation, making it crucial to harden it from the simplest evasions. We were able to evade its implementation in Rebuff completely, what made Vigil superior in detection performance in the end.

The vector embedding lookup-based prompt injection scanner in our experiments demonstrated that it is capable of producing low false positives while performing adequately even on obfuscated attack samples (obfuscated with leet). This hinted to us that the vectordb-

based technique can be employed independently of other scanners in the detection policy of a detection solution. This is contrary to how Vigil uses the vectordb scanner - Vigil conditions the detection results of vectordb scanner with the results of its other scanner. In our experiments, we saw that the vectordb scanner could be configured properly to avoid false positives almost completely and be purposed to only detect the PI classes loaded in its vector store (and mostly fail on PI attacks not represented in its vector store). Moreover, the detection solution could employ self-hardening like Vigil and Rebuff do. Loading vector stores with correctly identified malicious samples after deployment will increase the performance of this scanner. We only recommend recalculating thresholds when new vectors are added to keep false positive rates at an unnoticeable minimum.

Regarding canary word check-based prompt leak attack detection, we observed its ineffectiveness, no matter how we attempted to improve its implementation. We believe the protection against prompt leak attacks is feasible and the solution should be researched. But, whereas some prompt leakage detection techniques were better than canary word check (just sub-string search-based algorithms), the crafty attacker's prompts can still evade known detections. Overall, we did not see any performance in canary checkers of examined PI detection solutions.

In summary, we deemed Vigil as the optimal PI detection solution out of the three examined by us. We proposed the configuration approaches that improve Vigil's performance up to adequate values. Still, Vigil itself had serious problems with its canary word check technique. We also argued that Vigil could employ different detection policy in its detection techniques. Rebuff's secondary model turned out to be easily evaded due to its current implementation insecurities. In the result, we would suggest an extended combination of detection techniques and adjusted detection policy to limit the false positives and also extend the detections on more prompt injection variations. Specifically, we recommend including heuristics-based detection (exclusive to other detections in the policy), vectordb-based detection (exclusive to other detections, its threshold optimized on a large number of benign prompts), transformer-based and secondary model-based techniques in conjunction (both techniques have to detect the sample to flag it as an injection, secondary model scanner has to have protections against manipulations with its prompt template). We did not include a canary word check in our recommendations as it demonstrated poor results in experiments. We also concluded in our discussion that there is little effect in improving the canary word check technique to specifically detect prompt leak attacks.

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