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THE INFLUENCE OF IMMIGRATION ON EUROPEAN SOCIETIES: THE CASE OF MUSLIM INTEGRATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Master`s Thesis

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I declare I have written the master`s thesis independently.
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ABSTRACT

Many European countries have sizeable non-European origin immigrant populations and over the last three years, there has been an increase in negative attitudes towards immigration. Terrorist attacks in France and Germany as well as the arrival of hundreds of thousands of mostly Muslim refugees in Europe have drawn renewed attention to the continent`s Muslim population. Among the European Union member nations, Germany, France and the United Kingdom have the greatest number of Muslims.

This master`s thesis analyses the challenges of migration in the European Union and fear of Islamic fundamentalism. Nowadays the borders of Western states are harder to cross. Anti-Muslim and anti-Islam expressions, attitudes and hostilities are becoming generally more accepted in Europe. Muslims face discrimination in all aspects of life. Including in relation to health, education and policing services, as well in how migrants have been attacked by random members of the majority society. They found themselves to be socio-economically disadvantaged in western liberal democracies. Exclusion is one barrier to overcome, but the illegal migration and deportation stories closely reflect the end of the liberal vision of immigration.

Keywords: Receiving societies, integration, British Muslims, social exclusion, migration challenges.

INTRODUCTION

The movement of people is one of the greatest challenges to stability in European societies in the 21st century. Cohesion is being tested by the movement of refugees and asylum seekers across European borders. In 2011 and 2012 tens of thousands of people have fled the instability of North Africa to seek shelter, mostly in southern European countries. In 2011 the European Union experienced a 59 per cent increase in applicants for entry (Palmer 2012, 17).

One of the main objective is to gain a better understanding of the impact migrants exert on western society. The world in which the European Union operates today has changed so much since the 1950s that it seems highly unlikely that the old operational principles and working hypotheses may still be valid. The thesis examines how states are captured by pro-immigrant interests and therefore sets the following research questions:

1) What are the differences between integration policies of the European Union and its individual member states?
2) How assimilation takes place in the United Kingdom as a view of Muslims varies widely across country?
3) Which are the present challenges of migration in Europe?

Additionally, the thesis approaches current immigration issues in European societies by examining the Muslim presence in the United Kingdom within a historical perspective. Immigration remains one of the most powerful processes that can change the demographic composition of a society and more research needs to be done on the increasingly transnational nature of migration.

Methodology

The empirical analysis is based on a wide review of different set of sources, such as national newspapers like the Guardian, policy drafts, press articles, research papers and the secondary literature. Quantitative sources include data on migration flows, surveys measuring immigrant behavior and native attitudes.

The main data sources are Pew Research Centre surveys on Muslim population in Europe. Including EUR-Lex to access the European Union Law database, Eurostat for population statistics and OECD International Migration Database.

Structure of the thesis

This thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter examine discourses, policies and programs of integration in the receiving societies, studying how these are experienced by migrant families as they seek to realize the hopes and ambitions for a better life that led them to leave their country of origin. This chapter reviews impact of immigration on receiving society and compares the findings in light of the existing literature on global convergence of immigration policy development as many countries of destination increasingly perceive immigration as a threat. Also the number of migrants a country receives is influenced by the countries migration policy.

The second chapter introduces the practices of integration and migration movements in Europe. In 1980s and early 1990s, civil wars and revolutions in the various parts of the Islamic world became another source of Muslim migration to Europe (Masood 2006). European Union free movement has been regulated successfully, allowing European Union citizens to travel freely and work in other European Union countries, but the approach towards non-EU nationals has been selective. Until today, no coherent and comprehensive migration policy for people outside the European Union is in place. It is impossible to analyse migration and integration rules and policies in Europe without looking at both the level of the European Union and the individual member states. Also in this part, I explore the politics of European identity by adopting a multidisciplinary perspective. Christianity is at the centre of what constitutes European values today. Interest in Islam has been compounded by the experience of violence and the misrecognition of the religion, culture, politics and its people.

Chapter three, considers the years during which Muslims from many different parts of the world arrived in the United Kingdom. It was after the end of the Second World War that the United Kingdom began to see significant waves of immigration from a range of once-colonized lands. Muslims came to fill unwanted work in the declining manufacturing, engineering, heavy industrial and motor-vehicle sectors.

In some parts of the country migrants are successful and prosperous. In others they are poor and deprived. It is these Muslims that effectively symbolize notions of British Islam and today there are about 2.2 million Muslims in the United Kingdom, who are predominantly Sunnis (Abbas 2011, 20). Third part`s chapters give a short overview of the British Muslims assimilation, including various types of identity. Migration, settlement, engagement with the wider society and the role of women – all are the key elements of British Muslim identity as it had emerged and evolved by the start of the twenty-first century (Caldwell 2009, 95). It then moves to a detailed step-by-step guide describing the changing position of Muslim women in the society. This part also covers younger Muslims political involvement, first locally and then on the national stage.

The United Kingdom has a longer tradition of immigration and has one of the largest number of international migrants in Europe. This case study will be relevant to provide an insight, why integration is seen as a threat to lose migrant`s identity and increase in the Muslim population would weaken national identity, but also explores the reasons, why migrants in receiving countries have integrated with their own communities instead of integrating with wider society and whereas Muslims in the United Kingdom see their religious and cultural traditions contributing to major society.

Fourth chapter deals with negative interactions, islamophobia and problems of discrimination. On 7 July 2005, London experienced the first ever suicide-bombing, which is often referred to as 7/7. Four second-generation young Caribbean, Kashmiri and Pakistani Muslim men attacked public targets in London during the morning rush hour. Fifty-two people were killed and over 700 were injured. This day changed dramatically the British Islam course. Since the 7/7 London bombings and 21/7 failed terror attacks, Muslims are often portrayed in negative ways in media, political and cultural discourses (Johnson 2011). In this part you can find an in-depth description of multiculturalism and the ways in which it can move forward effectively. In addition, there is a comprehensive chapter on the social exclusion.

Consequently, based on detailed competency framework that has been established for each issue, you will find a full set of ways to help you understand a civilizational clash, which is over the unequal distribution of world power, wealth and influence. The cultural complexity brings about the potential for a co-existing multiplicity of worldviews and the competence to behave appropriately in a number of different arenas.

1. DIFFERENT POLICY APPROACHES AND IMMIGRATION CONFLICT

European society is seen as the product of historically rooted cultures and America has been built on immigration, the melting pot of newcomers. In Europe, conventional postcolonial and guest-worker immigration was supposed to have ended in the 1970s, leaving only limited channels of family reunification and asylum as entry points for migration (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009, 170). But today it battles with the worst migration crisis since World War II and recent years have seen the return of nationalist integration policies across all of the European Union.

This chapter will provide the theoretical framework for the thesis through examining the discourse on international immigration. Primary source of references is Robert Palmer`s (2012) research, where he stated different approaches to integration policy and Rafaela M. Dancygier`s (2010) theory of immigrant conflict. Including Checkel and Katzenstein (2009) study, which shows that issues of multiculturalism or inter-ethnic conflict that were most familiar to former colonial powers like the United Kingdom and France are now raised in every country in Western Europe, and increasingly in East and Central Europe too. As a majority of these new immigrants come from predominantly Muslim countries, the Islamic dimension of this immigration has become the defining issues of twenty-first-century Europe.

In his conference speech "Integration Policies for Europe in the 21st century", Robert Palmer summarizes the main policy approaches as follows (2012, 19):

1) Non-policy – where migrants have been regarded as irrelevant or a transient phenomenon with no lasting impact, or they have been considered unwelcome, and therefore there has been no need to formulate a specific policy;
2) Guest Worker Policy – where migrants are regarded as a temporary labour force whose members will eventually return to their countries of origin, and so policy is seen as short-term and designed to minimize the impact of migrants on the rest of the population;
3) Assimilations' Policy – where migrants are accepted as permanent, but where it is assumed that they will be absorbed as quickly as possible into the general population.

Differences from generally accepted cultural norms are not encouraged, and may even be discouraged or suppressed if they are considered a threat to the integrity of the state;

4) Multicultural Policy – where migrants are accepted as permanent and their differences from the cultural norms of the host community are encouraged and protected in law, with an acceptance of the fact that in some circumstances this may lead to certain separate or segregated development;
5) Intercultural Policy – where migrants can be accepted as permanent, and while their rights to have differences are recognized in law and institutions, there is an emphasis and encouragement of policies, institutions and activities which create common ground, mutual understanding, empathy and shared aspirations, and which communicate strongly the importance and value of diversity of society.

The policy approaches identified above place different emphases on the relative importance of economic, social and cultural rights. Consideration should be given to specific issues that arise in communities where there are growing Muslim populations due to immigration. Islam should be given a place, parallel to that given to Christian churches and Jewish communities. Exchange of experience and good practice models between national, regional and local bodies in relation to cultural integration should be actively encouraged. There are many examples of new integration approaches at both national and local levels in Europe.

Immigration has an enduring impact on the political systems and social fabrics of receiving societies. The incidence of immigrant conflicts has varied widely across settings and over time. Dancygier (2010, 5) divides group immigration conflict into two phenomena: immigrant-native conflict and immigrant-state conflict. Immigrant-native conflict involves the sustained confrontation between members of the immigrant and the native populations in a given locality. Immigrant-state conflict involves the sustained confrontation between members of the immigrant population and state actors in a given locality. Concerning immigrant-native conflict in the United Kingdom, the arrival of postcolonial migrants prompted the rise of the xenophobic National Front in London`s East End. Concerning immigrant-state conflict, large-scale confrontations between immigrants and the police shook British inner cities in the 1970s and 1980s.

Not all immigrant groups participated equally in these clashes. Migrants of West Indian descent have tended to be involved in confrontations with the state, while their South Asian counterparts have been more likely to be targeted by native white Britons.

Table 1. A theory of immigrant conflict

		Immigrant Political Power	
		Low	High
Economic Scarcity	Low	No Conflict	Immigrant Mobilization; No Conflict
	High	Immigrant - State Conflict	Immigrant - Native Conflict

Source: Dancygier 2010

Dancygier (2010, 41) has defined economic scarcity to describe a situation in which there is a shortage of goods desired by both immigrants and natives. The top row of table 1 indicates that neither type of immigrant conflict is likely to emerge when economic resources are generally available. This theory of immigrant conflict explains the varied incidence of immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflict across immigrant groups, localities and countries.

1.1. Legal architecture

The nation-building enterprise is structured by law: its constitutions and declarations, its rights and treaties. The law creates the conditions for building a settler society (like the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) and provide much of the tool set for that construction. Everywhere that a settler society has been firmly established, the previous indigenous population has been legally displaced and confined, leaving vast tracts of land legally empty. The legal architecture of settler societies provided three key nation-building tools; immigration regulation, citizenship as membership, and constitutional frameworks.

Regulation of immigration has at all times been closely tied to national values. Values have evolved over time. The development of race-based restrictions on immigration was fundamental to the completion of worldwide migration regulation in the first decades of the twentieth century. These restrictions in favor of Europeans were a final piece in the progressive global closure of borders. For example in New Zealand, migration regulation of the nineteenth century recognized only two categories: "Britons" and "non-Britons." British citizens did not need entry permits for New Zealand until 1974 (Dauvergne 2016, 20).

In contrast, international law offers little in the realm of immigration regulation. Despite its inherent border-crossing character, immigration is almost absent from international law. Aside from a duty to admit their own citizens, states are free to admit or exclude whomever they choose. The only exception is the contemporary protection regime and its principle of *non-refoulement*. Its idea is that some groups of people cannot be returned to places where they face a risk of certain types of serious harm. The *non-refoulement* principle has been recognized in the Convention Against Torture and in the European Convention on Human Rights. In many Western migrant-receiving states, refugees are able to transform their international right to protection into a right of permanent residency. The stability that this creates allows refugees to settle and rebuild their lives.

Human rights are the most powerful legal tools that migrant advocates can deploy. Dauvergne (2016, 22) has argued that neither economics nor human rights analyses have much predictive effect in matters of migration. Policy development is always about shaping what will happen in the future. The enhanced place of migration law has direct consequences for the new politics of immigration. The politics becomes legalized as actors on all sides of migration debates turn increasingly to law as a tool. The volume of cases reaching courts is higher and the political stakes of their rulings are intensified.

1.2. European Union policies

The European Union was built on the four freedoms: free movement of goods, services, capital and persons. A fundamental difference between the European Union and its member states is namely the absence of the traditional government-opposition dialectic at European level.

Having been denied an appropriate political arena in which to hold European governance accountable, voters are almost forced to gradually transform popular referendums into contests for or against the European Union. Given the present state of public opinion, such referendums represent a potential hazard for the integration process. The difference is that the average parliamentarian is likely to vote according to party discipline, while the average voter uses the referendum as a rare occasion to express his or her assessment of the European project. Voter`s turnouts at referendums are typically higher than at elections for the European Parliament (Majone 2009, 182).

Different countries have different reasons for supporting the official position. Small countries see in common institutions and common deliberations the best protection against the risk of domination by the larger member states. The view of straight-line evolution towards European integration emerged at a time when the European Community comprised a small group of fairly homogeneous West European states. Today members are at different stages of socioeconomic development, with different geopolitical concerns, and correspondingly diverse policy priorities. Idea of differentiated integration has been proposed, but it has not been taken too seriously so far. This model of differentiated integration aims to give substantive meaning to the twin notions of unity in diversity and competition with cooperation.

Only a strong social dimension can legitimate the process of European integration and at the same time rescue the national welfare state threatened by globalization. The main obstacle to a European welfare state is public opinion. It is not only the national governments that refuse to surrender control over social policy. One of the major strengths of the welfare state is the broad electoral base for core social programmes. The same voters who strongly support the national welfare state also resist any significant transfer of social-policy competences to the European level. The extent to which non work-motivated immigration flows end up playing an active role in European labour markets is critically affected by the capacity of active labour market policies to reach and include minorities of migrant origin. This is becoming a crucial policy challenge in the context of the crisis.

Yves Pascouau (2014) from European Policy Centre raised following question in his research “EU Integration Policy: An Overview of an Intricate Picture” - How could the European Union act in the field of integration without having received any clear-cut competence? He pointed out, that the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009, brought some clarification in this policy field.

Article 79.4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states: "The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may establish measures to provide incentives and support for the action of member states with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the member states". It indicates that the European Union can intervene in the field of integration but only in order to support national policies (Pascouau 2014, 197).

Integration policy is taking place at European Union level as the adopted rules have been to force member states to harmonise national policies in fields which fall within integration policies. The entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty gave the European Union the ability to adopt European Union rules, directives and regulations, in the fields of visa, asylum and immigration.

Following two different instruments have been adopted with the aim to foster integration of third country nationals:

1) Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification (EUR-Lex 2003a) - point 4 of the directive`s preamble states: "Family reunification is a necessary way of making family life possible. It helps to create sociocultural stability facilitating the integration of third country nationals in the member state, which also serves to promote economic and social cohesion, a fundamental community objective stated in the treaty". According to this point, family reunification serves integration in many different ways. The promotion of economic and social cohesion is also highlighted as an added value;
2) Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents (EUR-Lex 2003b) - the long-term residents were quoted as a category of persons who should be granted "rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens" and possible to obtain this permit after five years of legal residence. Holders of the European Union long term residence permit are granted a reinforced status and enhanced freedom of movement. As a principle, any long term resident wishing to reside in another member state has to apply for a residence permit in the second state. Within this procedure, authorities of the second states may ask the applicant to fulfil some conditions among which the fulfilment of "integration measures" could be requested.

These two directives show that the European Union has been able to adopt rules directly linked with integration, despite the limitation introduced in the Lisbon treaty. Other social rights are recognised in different directives, like access to education and vocational training, social assistance, medical screening, recognition of diplomas and qualifications, access to goods and services, tax benefit.

These rights depend on the specific situation of the persons concerned as they may be applicable to asylum seekers, family members, refugees or workers. All of these rights serve the purpose of including migrants into society. European Union law may be considered an important framework granting third-country nationals with basic rights which they would not benefit under national law.

The Directorate General Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME), is the main coordinator of the European Union initiatives and instruments to promote integration, but the other European Union institutions are also working on this issue.

Like the Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted the Common Basic Principles of Integration document in November 2004, which stated following eleven principles (European Commission 2004):

1) Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of member states;
2) Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union;
3) Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions visible;
4) Basic knowledge of the host society`s language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration, enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration;
5) Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society;
6) Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for better integration;
7) Frequent interaction between immigrants and member state citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, intercultural dialogue, education about

immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and member state citizens;

8) The practices of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law;
9) The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration;
10) Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public policy formation and implementation;
11) Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective.

This overview of integration policy illustrates how the European Union and its member states have overcome legal limitations deriving from a lack of competences, which were confirmed by the Lisbon Treaty. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is the only European Union policy area where decisions are still taken by member state consensus. This policy area is closely linked to national sovereignty where member states want to retain their powers.

The next chapter will take a look at the reasons for different approaches towards immigration between state-wide parties and identifies explanatory factors for their positions on immigration. Never before have immigration issues been at the center of the political stage in so many places at the same time.

Chapter`s main interest lies in explaining why some cities witness sustained confrontations between immigrants and longer-settled native residents or continued, while relations between immigrants, natives, and state actors remain peaceful elsewhere.

1.3. Global convergence and positioning of parties on immigration

Over the past decade, a global convergence in migration policies has emerged and it is now evident that the idea of a settler society is a thing of the past. Prosperous states that people from around the world queue to enter are in a very strong position to set the terms of global migration. Despite the amount of national autonomy, immigration policies are converging. Moving beyond both colonization and decolonization is part of what shapes the contours of the new politics of immigration.

At a time when more people around the world want to move than ever before, policy development is focused on keeping people in place, controlling borders and intensifying competition for the brightest migrants. Highly skilled workers fit the nation-building paradigm, whereas low-skilled workers represent risk. Current policies often prefer immigrants who arrive with no social, political or economic need to integrate. According to Dauvergne (2016, 19), no new policies are being developed, but rather that as prosperous Western states seek to alter their immigration regimes and enhance their control. This is despite the fact that many actors – states and migrants – want something different from migration regulation at this point in time. States are using ideas that have been tried before. Like heightening privileges for the most attractive migrants and building bigger fences.

Scholars have also argued that identity-based fears can outweigh economic anxieties and point to the cultural threats that cause individuals to reject the inflow of ethnically distinct newcomers (Sides and Citrin 2007, 480).

Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero (2014, 52) have provided an explanatory framework for understanding the positioning of parties on immigration and these factors are:

1) demographic issues,
2) economic issues,
3) linguistic and cultural issues,
4) party ideology,
5) electoral system,
6) party polarization,
7) relative degree of government control over immigration policy.

The first factor relates to the overall demographic situation, which includes levels of immigration and stability of regional population. If a state has received high overall levels of immigrants, then it is more likely that state-wide parties adopt more restrictive stances on immigration. Parties will adopt positive approaches towards immigration if the state has received a low numbers of immigrants and there is a long-term demographic decline forecast for region. Also immigration is viewed positively by parties if the national economy is in decline, there is a labour shortage and when the newcomers are willing to learn the national language. The third factor, language and culture can present barriers to migrant integration. Some scholars have argued that the left-wing parties favour more pro-immigrant multicultural stances while right-wing parties are more traditionalist and anti-immigrant (Lahav 2004, 256).

Electoral systems based on proportional representation encourage a wider variety of policy positions, including more extreme positions, with the resultant creation of coalition governments. Proportional systems may increase polarization between parties, thereby encouraging parties to adopt more anti-immigrant positions. In particular, if there is an electorally successful anti-immigrant party competing in the party system.

The following chapters examine the integration of migrants into their host societies in Europe as this is the key to maximise the benefits of immigration.

2. PRACTICES OF INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN SOCIETIES

The welfare system has provided an important framework for the incorporation of immigrants and refugees into Europe. Many newcomers learn about European society primarily through health clinics, social service centres, integration programmes and in the case of refugees, asylum centres. Their personal encounters with local population involve mainly staff on these various welfare programmes. Immigrants and refugees have been expected to actively take part, as workers and taxpayers, in the reciprocal social and economic relations between the state and the local population fundamental to the European model.

This chapter combines analysis of the integration methods employed in European societies. One crucial question is how to design proper regulatory and policy frameworks for various levels of integration. The European Community has developed in essentially three ways (Pelkmans 1997, 21):

1) deepening (of its economic liberalisation, common regulation and policies and of the commitments and prohibitions of the member states),
2) widening (of the scope of its economic and other powers),
3) enlargement (of membership).

Realising the fragility of early stages of integration, one should not expect faithful implementation, deepening, widening and enlargement all to go well at every moment in time. This idea of successive crises and booms in European integration is also fed by an exclusive focus on the Council and the Commission, hence on legislation, rather than on the Court and judicial review. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union introduced monetary union as a radical form of deepening. Its widening is extremely complex, however, mainly for political and institutional reasons. The Union`s common provisions comprise crucial principles, including subsidiarity and the maintenance of the *acquis communautaire*. Cohesion is the Union concern to narrow interregional disparities of wealth and economic performance via negative and positive integration.

The Rome Treaty is based on the notion of real economic convergence via market integration. The Structural Funds respond to the latter fear and help regions to exploit market integration better. The internal market exerts positive effects on cohesion in four ways: via specialization, based on comparative advantage, foreign direct investment, competitive exposure and by reducing a number of national distortions.

2.1. Immigration in Europe

Throughout the centuries, Europe has been marked by intense migration flows. Figures from Eurostat indicate that in 2010, there were 47.3 million foreign-born residents, representing about 9.4 per cent of the European population (Eurostat 2011). However, unlike the self-proclaimed countries of immigrant of the New World, such as the United States, Canada and Australia, countries in Europe have found it difficult to come to terms with the fact of immigration. Many sections of European societies have been reluctant to welcome and incorporate immigrants, especially coming from non-OECD countries that are perceived as having significantly different cultural and ethnic backgrounds. This hostility is counter-intuitive given the extent to which European countries have benefited from immigration in the past decades. The large-scale mainly low-skilled immigration of the 1950`s and 1960`s was a crucial component of post-war economic reconstruction in Western Europe.

According to Palmer (2012, 18), the pattern of European migration has changed. In terms of countries of origin, the composition of European migration flows have altered. In the 1960`s and 1970`s, most of the foreign population in Western Europe consisted of migrants from Southern Europe – Italians, Greeks, and Spanish. Then after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, migration in the 1990`s was largely east to west. New Europe has distanced itself from its colonial past. As the European powers withdrew from their roles as colonial rulers, one trace of that role that often remained was a right of nationals of the former colony to enter and remain in the European nation from which they had recently gained independence. This pattern of post-colonial linkage has been central to immigration patterns in Europe in the second half of the twentieth century, the era of decolonization. It has brought South Asians to the United Kingdom, Algerians to France. These pathways have been closed and are now almost completely eliminated.

Immigration has been changing the faces of neighborhoods, cities, and countries across Europe, North America, and beyond. The large-scale inflow and permanent settlement of migrants is no longer confined to traditional immigration countries. In 2013, the share of foreign-born residents reached 16.7 per cent in Austria and 12.8 per cent in Germany, compared with 13.1 per cent in the United States. In many other European countries approximately one in ten residents is born abroad (see Figure 1).



Figure 1. Foreign-born population, total % of population 2013
Source: OECD International Migration Database (2013)

Migration is influenced by a combination of economic, political and social factors: either in a migrant`s country of origin or in the country of destination. A total of 3.8 million people immigrated to one of the EU-28 member states during 2014, while at least 2.8 million emigrants were reported to have left the European Union member state. These Eurostat (2016) total figures do not represent the migration flows to/from the European Union as a whole, since they also include flows between different member states.

2.1.1. Permanent immigration in the European Union countries

Ferruccio Pastore and Ester Salis (2014, 102) pointed out in their study "Managing labour migration in times of crisis – recent trends and open issues in selected EU countries", that the European Union is neither a unified nor a homogeneous arena for public debates on labour migration. The connection with the broader economic outlook of each country is strong, but the nature of the domestic entrepreneurial structure also plays an important role: where the economy fares better, and where large companies and multinationals are more important, the demand for labour immigration tends to be more explicit and the debate more focused on the positive nexus between labour mobility and competitiveness. This happens in Germany and Sweden, but used to be the case also in Spain and the United Kingdom prior to the worsening of the crisis.

Largest immigrant destinations in Europe are France, Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom and Sweden. The overall size of inflows varies deeply over time and across countries.

Table 2. Inflows of permanent immigrants in selected European Union countries, 2007-2013

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Germany	232 900	228 300	201 500	222 500	290 800	400 200	468 800
United Kingdom	343 300	317 300	359 200	394 800	322 600	286 100	291 000
France	206 500	214 400	212 100	224 300	231 500	251 200	259 800
Italy	571 900	490 400	390 300	355 700	317 300	258 400	245 800
Spain	691 900	409 600	334 100	300 000	291 000	209 800	195 300
Sweden	74 400	71 000	71 500	65 600	71 800	81 700	86 700
EU included above	2 610 500	2 224 700	1 970 800	1 924 800	1 906 300	1 875 500	1 949 500
Of which: free movements	1 215 700	900 000	734 900	739 300	831 700	926 200	968 400

Source: OECD International Migration Database (2015)

As shown in Table 2, Germany was the main European Union destination country, with 468 800 arrivals of permanent migrants, a figure twice higher than at the end of 2000s. In Spain and Italy, new migrants are approximately twice fewer than in 2008, because these countries

had been particularly hard hit by the 2008 Great Recession. The levels of permanent immigration have remained constantly modest in France, United Kingdom and Sweden.

Permanent immigrants are persons who have been granted the right of permanent residence upon entry, persons admitted with a permit of limited duration that is more or less indefinitely renewable plus some entering persons with the right of free movement (such as European Union citizens within the European Union). Based on this definition, tourists, business visitors, seasonal workers, international students, exchange academics and researchers, trainees, service providers are excluded from the statistics on permanent immigration (Dancygier 2010, 160).

2.1.2. Migration movements in Germany and France

The population growth of some countries demands more achievable and sufficient capabilities for all, while other countries are concerned by their demographic losses and have to tackle the challenge of recruiting adequate human capital supply for the labour market and social welfare depositor for the aging society.

For many centuries, Germany was a destination country for people fleeing their home countries. In the 17th century, Huguenots fled France and moved to Prussia, which offered them asylum. In the second half of the 17th century, one third of the population in Berlin belonged to the Huguenots. In the 19th century, Jews from Eastern Europe escaped to Germany and established a new powerful ethnic minority, also centered in Berlin. However, at the same time (16th - 20th century), millions of mostly young Germans emigrated to America or Australia to escape the consequences of long war.

Under the rule of Adolf Hitler from 1933-1945, millions of people emigrated due to politics, religious, ethnic and cultural reasons. As a result of the demographic changes through the war and the emigration as well as deportation, the growing German economy lacked substantial labour forces for industrial production, mostly in the car sector. Germany signed special recruitment agreements for foreign workers with Italy (1955), Greece (1960), Spain (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), South Korea (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and the former Yugoslavia (1968). In total, Germany recruited 280,000 employees (Steller 2014, 224).

Apart from the immigration of foreign workers there has been another continuous migration inflow to German since the early 1950s: the one of the (post-war) ethnic German repatriates and their family dependents (Kohlmeier and Schimany 2005). They are persons of German ethnicity who were allowed to emigrate after the expulsion measures from the former Eastern bloc countries. More than 4 million (post-war) ethnic German repatriates have come to the Federal Republic of Germany since 1950 and this constitutes the third largest immigration inflow.

Asylum seekers come on the basis of Article 16a Basic Law, which grants protection to persons who are politically persecuted in the country of origin. The reason for including this article into the German Constitution was the experience of politically persecuted people during the National Socialism. According to Kohlmeier and Schimany (2005), the number of asylum applications started rising continuously from year 1988 (103 000 applications). In the 1990s, Germany granted protection to some 345 000 civil war refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and in 1991, to about 195 000 refugees from the Kosovo. Another immigration groups in Germany are foreign students and the European Union internal migrants. In the winter semester of 2003/2004 about 180 000 educational foreigners were registered in higher education, among them around 42 000 students who started their academic studies.

In Germany, the largest single group of guest workers hailed from Turkey, with smaller contingents originating from Southern Europe, while immigration beginning the late 1980s was dominated by ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union as well as by refugees from Eastern Europe and the former Yugoslavia. A Pew Research Center`s (2016) survey shows that Germany has the largest Muslim population among European Union member countries. In 2010, there were 4.8 million Muslims in Germany, which is 5.8 per cent of the country`s population. The foreign-born Muslim population is primarily made up of Turkish immigrants, but also includes many born in Kosovo, Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Morocco. Turkish immigration to Germany began in the 1960s in response to a labour shortage. While these labourers were expected to leave Germany after their work has completed, half of them ended up staying in the country. Today Muslims of four generations live in Germany.

The 3 million foreign-born Muslims in France are largely from France`s former colonies of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. The majority of Muslims in France belong to the Sunni denomination.

In many European countries concerns about growing Muslim communities have led to calls for restrictions on immigration. A Pew Research Center`s (Spring 2016) survey gives five facts about the Muslim population in Europe:

1) As of 2010, there were 4.8 million Muslims in Germany, 4.7 million in France and 3 million in United Kingdom. In Europe overall, Russia`s population of 14 million Muslims is the largest on the continent;
2) The Muslim share of Europe`s total population has been increasing steadily;
3) Muslims are younger than other Europeans;
4) Views of Muslims vary widely across European countries;
5) As of 2010, the European Union was home to about 13 million Muslim immigrants.

In France, as in most of Europe, Muslims are very divided by religious schools and attend different mosques. The most important is the Great Mosque of Paris, founded in the 1920s (Goody 2004, 136). The French government has made efforts to organize a central Muslim council that would provide a unified point of communication between all different elements and the state, in the same way as was earlier done for Catholics, Jews and Protestants.

The problem posed by contemporary Islamic immigration to Western Europe is seen most explicitly in France, and in particular in "the crisis of the headscarves". Main question is should the state insist on assimilation and forbid the wearing of discriminating clothing. The wearing of the Islamic headscarf has been seen as a threat to the unity of the republic.

2.1.3. European identity

Enlargement of the European Union has increased greatly Europe`s social heterogeneity. Populist European politics draw boundaries between "Europe" and the "other", a fact illustrated by the highly charged debate over Turkish accession to the European Union and, more generally, the difficult relations between Europe and Islam. According to Checkel and Katzenstein (2009, 13), European identities are evolving at a complex intersection of elite and mass politics. The complexity makes the analysis of European identity contingent upon many factors that resist easy categorization by any one academic discipline. Populist conceptions of European identities have cultural and ethnic rather than political content. Europeans are experimenting now with multiracial, multicultural and other novel forms of identity.

The political and social integration of ethnic and cultural minorities is a task that populist conceptions of European identities regard as a threat. In its original eighteenth-century meaning, cosmopolitanism referred to tolerance toward strangers. Today, it is grounded in the principle of humanity. European cosmopolitanism often refers to a growing acceptance of cross-border exchanges, not only of goods and services but also of Europeans.

Today, neither identity project can avoid the inescapable social fact of a growing number of migrants who are attracted by the vision of a social, prosperous, and peaceful Europe. These contrasting identities draw on different layers of political practices.

The historical foundations of the European Union are Christian-Democratic. The founders of the European Union – notably Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, and Alcipe de Gaspari – were social Catholics and drew on Catholic doctrine. They designed a framework in which a commitment to pluralist identities was fundamental. Religion is relevant not only for how Europe relates to its new members, but to the outside world as well. There are the complicated and delicate relations between the Catholic Church and Islam in contemporary Europe. The aim is to achieve a "common good" in which shifting and unequal societal interests are linked through ties of cooperation and mutual aid to achieve social justice. The powerful sociological consequence of the political practice of "subsidiarity" is the promotion of a diversely constituted European social order. It provides an administrative model for aiding diverse collective groups – with distinctive liberal and illiberal identities – and drawing them into a common political process.

Political elites like to invoke citizens when justifying their positions on European integration, and they tend to blame them when explaining crisis in the integration process. Citizens are rarely invited to participate in the integration process. The European Union transforms itself from a market into a multilevel system of governance. Problems currently faced by the European Union, such as the accession of Muslim countries and the rise of far-right mobilization and violence, can only be addressed effectively under a broad consensus among its members (Caldwell 2009, 111). Across Europe, however, the citizens are split regarding its cultural identity and social model. The main source of such an identity is the opportunity to positively interact on a regular basis with people from other European countries with whom one has a basis for solidarity. Since this opportunity is restricted to a certain part of the population, it follows that not everyone in Europe is likely to adopt a European identity. This unevenness of interaction with others in Europe has produced a counter effect.

Theoretical considerations of European identity – sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists have been interested in the formation of collective identities. Nicoll and Salmon (1994, 25) say that the collective identities refer to the idea that a group of people accepts a fundamental and consequential sameness that causes them to feel solidarity amongst themselves. People grow up in families and communities, and they come to identify with the groups in which they are socially located. Gender, ethnicity, religion, nationality, social class, and age have all been the basis of people`s main identities and their central relationships to various communities.

National identity is one form of collective identity. In different times and places, the basis of an appeal to a common culture can include language, religion, race, ethnicity, or a common formative experience. As European economic, social, and political fields have developed, they imply the routine interaction of people from different societies.

It is the people involved in these routine interactions who are most likely to come to see themselves as Europeans and involved in a European national project. They will come to see that their counterparts in other countries are more like them than unlike them. These people are the owners of businesses, managers, professionals, and other white-collar workers who are involved in various aspects of business and government. These people travel for business and live in other countries for short periods. They speak second languages for work.

Young people who travel across borders for schooling, tourism, and jobs are also likely to be more European. Less educated and less financially well-off people will lack the inclination to be attracted to the cultural diversity of Europe. A cross-class alliance based on forms of shared culture and patterns of interaction has not emerged in Europe. Instead, the social class lines have been followed.

People who tend to think of themselves as European represent the more privileged members of society, while people who tend to think of themselves as mainly national in identity tend to less privileged. As Majone (2009, 201) explains, people who have something to gain from the European Union – professionals, managers, educated people – are also more likely to be in favor of its activities.

2.2. Immigration in a multi-level states

Since the implementation of the first *Immigration Act* in 1962, the British government has consistently managed to keep immigration at a significantly lower level than its continental neighbours such as France, Germany, or the Netherlands (Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero 2014, 111). After seventeen years of Conservative rule, New Labour took office in 1997 with an open-boarders agenda for those bringing desirable skills. Lisenkova et. al. (2008, 20) has argued that it lacked a clear strategy to achieve this aim in practice. From 1997, the net migration balance grew sharply, stabilized in 2000, and rose again in 2004 with the European Union`s enlargement. There were a subsequent flows of East European migrants into the fast expanding British labour market. With a net migration rate above the 250,000 threshold in 2004, it seemed the executive was no longer able to control borders effectively.

In 2008, a points-based immigration system was introduced with the aim of reinforcing control for "unwanted" migrants, while broadening the channels of entry for skilled ones. In sharp contrast with the United Kingdom where immigration control has regularly appeared on the political agenda since the 1962 *Commonwealth Immigrants Act*, the first piece of legislation in Spain was issued as late as 1985. To that date, there were less than 250,000 foreign nationals living in Spain.

But by the end of the decade, the Spanish economy initiated a period of unprecedented growth, boosted by the labour-intensive construction and tourism sectors. In 1999, the Institute of National Statistics (INE) recorded 127,000 entries and in 2010, the number was up to 5,708,940. This converted Spain into one of the main recipients of international migration in the course of a single decade.

The United Kingdom is a unitary state, though the central Westminster government delegates specific competencies to regional and local governments. Promoting community cohesion would be the solution to the problem of growing segregation. London is the city with the largest immigrant population in the United Kingdom. About one-third of the London population was born outside the United Kingdom. This includes a large proportion of refugees, family migrants as well as labour migrants, especially from Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, whose immigration to London peaked in the 1990s and early 2000s (Gidley and Jayaweera 2010).

There is no single policy framework for the whole of London. Faced with the city`s diversity, London`s governments have tried to put the opportunities offered by race-relations policies as well as community cohesion policies and the refugee-integration framework to its maximum use.

The Netherlands was the first European country to develop centrally coordinated migrant integration policies at the end of the 1970s. The Netherlands has attracted various types of migrants, including colonial migrants as well as labour and asylum migrants. In contrast to the United Kingdom, the Netherlands is a decentralized unitary state where the central government plays a leading and coordinating role in many policy areas, including migration and integration. The Ethnic Minorities Policy that the Dutch central government formulated in the late 1980s reflected some traits of the multicultural model. According to Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero (2014, 117), Amsterdam and Rotterdam are the two largest cities as well as the two most diverse cities in the Netherlands, with large populations of Moroccan, Surinamese, and Turkish migrants. Next chapter explores understandings and practices of integration in the Scandinavian welfare societies of Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

2.3. Ways of integration in Denmark, Norway and Sweden

These countries have had parallel histories as welfare societies receiving increasing numbers of migrants and refugees after World War II, and yet they have reacted in dissimilar ways to the presence of foreigners, with Denmark developing tough immigration policies and nationalist integration requirements, Sweden asserting itself as a relatively open country with an official multicultural policy, and Norway taking a middle position (Olwig et. al. 2012, 103).

Denmark, Norway and Sweden have experienced relatively limited immigration before the World War II. In the early 2000s, the foreign-born comprised approximately 6.5 per cent of the population in Denmark and Norway, and 12 per cent of the population in Sweden. Despite these rather small numbers, the integration of immigrants and refugees has become a growing concern in public debate, legislation and policymaking. Benign view of the immigrants as a useful labour force was challenged after the 1973 oil crisis which resulted in an economic recession and large-scale unemployment. This led the three countries to put a stop to further immigration.

Denmark, a small country that has developed as a modern state largely through cooperative movements based in traditionally rural, agricultural society, seems to have become an increasingly closed, nationalistic society with restrictive immigration policies.

Sweden, on the other hand, a country with a more centralist nation-state and a long history of heavy industry drawing on skilled foreign labour, has asserted itself as a progressive country with an official multicultural policy, celebrating cultural diversity and a more liberal policy of family reunification and refugee admittance.

Norway, traditionally based on a maritime as well as a rural economy, has opted for a middle course, but with a tendency to move toward the more restrictive policies of Denmark. In 1975 the Norwegian government closed its borders to further immigration. Since then immigrants have only been accepted as students, as refugees, and as close relatives of Norwegian residents admitted through the policy of family unification. From the mid-1980s, newest immigrants have arrived as refugees. In January 2003, 93,600 immigrants were refugees, 75 per cent having arrived as such and 25 per cent as family members who had been reunited with them (Olwig et. al. 2012, 136). Most Norwegians consider their country to be a tolerant nation with history of humanitarian traditions. Despite belief in tolerance, inclusion and multiculturalism, many Norwegians regard foreigners as unfamiliar and strange.

Olwig et. al. (2012) analyses the impact of differences on immigrants and their descendants over three crossing themes:

1) Integration as political practice - When the immigrant workers decided to stay on in Scandinavia it became apparent that they were no longer temporary workers but more permanent immigrants. The three countries reacted very differently to this change. Sweden instituted an immigration policy in 1975 based on a multicultural ideology of equality, freedom of choice and partnership. It emphasized the right to maintain cultural differences while enjoying the benefits of the welfare society. But there is a growing tendency to view refugees as a social and economic burden on the welfare system. Norway adopted a more hesitant multicultural policy towards immigrants, but the media debate has tended to stress the problems connected with immigrant populations. Denmark, by contrast, rejected multiculturalism and there has been increasing tendency in the media to portray immigrants as a threat against national community. Denmark has attained an international image as a xenophobic and discriminatory society (Olwig et. al. 2012, 5). On the other side, Denmark has a

long tradition of encouraging the population`s active involvement in a range of voluntary associations and educational pursuits. This financial support has enabled a large number of ethnic organizations and Muslim schools to emerge in Denmark during recent decades.

2) Integration as a welfare state project - As refugees became an increasingly prominent part of the immigrant population, a number of welfare programmes were put in place, helping refugees to incorporate into the receiving society. This assistance is problematic, because it entails intervention in the private lives of immigrants by professionals within the Scandinavian welfare system seeking to shape these population groups according to Scandinavian norms. They have tended to treat newcomers in terms of what they are lacking, rather than what they can offer to the receiving society. Furthermore, since there is no set definition of what is needed to be culturally competent, social workers and other key staff in the welfare institutions have had a great say in determining what sort of cultural competence is deemed necessary for the refugees to be part of the receiving society. The refugees can easily become stuck in the integration sector of the welfare society. Olwig et. al. (2012, 63) see a major problem with the dispersal policy is that many of the small communities where refugees are located are not used to having strangers from distant places of origin in their midst.
3) Integration as immigrant`s quest for belonging - People are thought to migrate because they believe that a change of place will lead to an improvement in their condition of life. The social rejection that immigrants encounter in different ways in contemporary Scandinavia is experienced as a great problem preventing them from improving their condition and developing a sense of belonging in the country where they are living. Refugees` family relations play a central role in the process of social incorporation in a receiving society. They can provide the refugees with somewhat of a protective shield against the intruding welfare authorities while the newly arrived learn local ways.

The following chapter provides more detailed insight, how Muslims are integrated into British society. Additionally, examining the reasons, why this religious minority often struggles to feel at home in Europe.

3. MUSLIM SETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Inward and outward migration has been a major aspect of United Kingdom`s social development for centuries. From the nineteenth century this Empire established wide-ranging connections with different regions of the Muslim world. The most striking aspect of the Muslims living in the United Kingdom today is their diversity (Milton-Edwards 2004, 99). This is directly related to the importance of Muslim migration to the United Kingdom from many parts of the world since the early nineteenth century. It was mostly material circumstance that determined when and why they arrived in the United Kingdom.

According to Ansari (2004, 25), the mid-nineteenth century is when the first relatively permanent Muslim populations were established in Manchester, Cardiff, Liverpool, South Shields and the East End of London. These consisted primarily of sailors but were joined by merchants, servants and students. The vast majority were in some way connected with the Empire and so came from the colonies or protected territories, such as the Aden hinterland, British Somaliland, Malaya and the Yemen.

By 1818 United Kingdom was recognized as the paramount power in India. United Kingdom spread its domination in the Persian Gulf and after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, it acquired huge Muslim territories in the Middle East and Africa. In 1882 it occupied Egypt and then instituted an Anglo-Egyptian "Condominium" over Sudan in 1898. For much of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire, the only significant center of Muslim power, lost ground to Europe, and its defeat at the end of the First World War meant relinquishing control over the Balkan Muslims and the sharing-out of its Arab territories between the United Kingdom and France (Raza 1993, 39). Muslims generally no longer controlled their own material resources. With the creation of colonial relationships ensuring economic dependence, a gap developed between the level of prosperity enjoyed in the United Kingdom and the impoverishment of the Muslim world. Muslims had to come to terms with the power of the European imperial state, through which material and human resources were harnessed to the needs of the European empires (Allen 2007, 130). British laws and policies began to transform many societies that came under British control.

A particularly significant group of migrants to arrive in the United Kingdom during the nineteenth century were maritime workers. United Kingdom increasingly recruited Indian sailors as cheap labour. As a receiving country the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century was already a relatively rich industrial society attracting migrants from other parts of Europe. This was an era when movement across countries was relatively free and migrants entered at will. For Indian migrants a big attraction of working in the United Kingdom was that wages there were much higher than for comparable job in India. However, despite the better wages there is evidence that many of these Indian Muslim sailors were brutally treated on ships, which compelled many to try to escape such harrowing ordeals. It was little wonder that an increasing number jumped ship, and took their chances in London`s East End.

Migrants moved in order to work and indeed their movement itself showed where the demand for their labour was strongest. Ansari (2004, 129) study showed that they headed for some of the main industrial conurbations – Greater London, the South-East, the West Midlands, Yorkshire and Lancashire in England, central Clydeside in Scotland, the ports of South Wales, and Belfast in Northern Ireland.

A significant proportion of seamen originating in different parts of the British empire with predominantly Muslim populations – Yemen, Somaliland, Malaya and India – put down roots there in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. As the British empire expanded in the nineteenth century, so too did the volume of passenger and cargo sea traffic with the colonies and the rest of the world. Migrants poured in from India, Somalia and the surrounding areas. Once migration has started, other factors strengthened the ties of prospective workers from these regions of the Muslim world with seafaring as an occupation. Peasants from north-east and north-west India followed one another on to ships, to foreign lands and eventually to the United Kingdom in search in riches. By the early twentieth century Muslim formed a substantial section of the migrant population in the United Kingdom. This was largely the result of the evolving economic and political relationship between the United Kingdom and its colonies.

During the First World War migration accelerated and after the Second World War the mass migration developed in the period of post-war reconstruction. However, refugees also arrived on a result of political repression. There were better opportunities for work on land in wartime industries. As shown in Table 3, since the Second World War Muslims have migrated to the United Kingdom in much large numbers than before 1945, with the majority still coming from South Asia, parts of the Middle East, Africa and Cyprus.

The various pieces of immigration legislation affected them, which were passed by post-war British government (Ansari 2004, 145).

Table 3. Muslim population in the United Kingdom

Estimated 1990 Muslim Population	1 172 000
Percentage of 1990 Population that is Muslim	2
Estimated 2010 Muslim Population	2 869 000
Percentage of 2010 Population that is Muslim	4,6
Projected 2030 Muslim Population	5 567 000
Projected Percentage of 2030 Population that is Muslim	8,2

Source: Pew Research Center (2011)

Improved transport and communications, together with internationalisation of production, trade and finance, led to greater mobility of highly skilled and qualified technicians, professionals and executives. Hunter (1998, 111) suggested that one consequence of dramatic rise in the oil price in 1973 was that it facilitated the arrival in the United Kingdom of an élite group of Arabs, many of whom were flush with enormous capital seeking a home for investment. Syrians, Lebanese, Egyptians, Palestinians and Jordanians decided to establish their businesses in the United Kingdom where they felt that their investments would be more secure and less vulnerable to unpredictable political developments in their home countries. Saudi and Gulf Arabs established a more permanent base in the United Kingdom and cautiously invested capital. They acquired businesses, banks, hospitals and invested handsomely in property.

Social networks also helped migrants find work in the wider society and cushioned the loss of earnings by sharing the burden of expenditure. For many, jobs had been arranged by contacts already in the United Kingdom. Muslim migrants, like many non-Muslim migrants, were willing to take undesirable, low-skill and low-waged jobs with poor conditions primarily because they could earn more in the United Kingdom than back home.

Turkish Cypriot migration also made use of kinship networks, which influence the migrant`s decision to select specific destinations (Geaves 1996). Males arriving first and then after few months their families joined participating in a process of family reunification. Altogether, Muslims have arrived in the United Kingdom for over a thousand years.

3.1. The ethnic characteristics of British Muslims

Alexander (2000, 153) argued that too often Islam is seen as a Middle Eastern religion and it is forgotten that the largest Muslim populations and nations are found in Asia. The majority of British Muslims originate from South Asia. Muslims belong to a variety of linguistic, regional and sectarian groups. They have been very successful in reproducing much of their traditional social and cultural world. Many Muslim elders remain confused as to how to respond to an emerging Muslim youth culture, a hybrid of British and South Asian forms, expressed in music, magazines and local media. Much of this is in English, since youngsters are genuinely bilingual. Allen (2007, 138) emphasised that Muslims want public recognition for their unique religious and cultural identities. Muslims communities across the United Kingdom find themselves increasingly isolated and friendless.

One of the most worrying aspects is the habit of describing British Muslims as "fundamentalist". There is a movement within the Islamic world which sets its face against the West and seeks to capture political power. This movement is described by participants and scholars alike as "Islamist". For them, Islam is a self-sufficient ideology. Islamism exists to mobilize, educate and lead the masses. It remains to be seen whether it can translate its utopian rhetoric into coherent and compelling social, economic and political policy. The movement exists in the United Kingdom, but is struggling to establish its relevance in a situation where Muslims are a minority. At different times Muslims have been able to negotiate resources on the basis of a shared "black" identity, a national identity – Pakistani/Bangladeshi – or multiculturalism (Michaels 2006, 71).

A critical issue facing Muslims in the United Kingdom is their ability to develop national organizations which reflect the diversity of sectarian, regional and linguistic backgrounds of the Muslim communities.

Lewis (1994, 6) has concluded that the heightened awareness of a British Muslim presence has two positive features:

1) The range of academic disciplines seeking to understand Muslim communities has increased;
2) Almost a quarter of the contributions listed come from British Muslim scholars themselves.

The huge investment in mosques is one indication of both a Muslim commitment to stay in the United Kingdom and a determination to pass on to their children their religious and cultural values. Most of the Muslim communities are networked across the country with relatives living in other cities and whom they regularly visit on religious and social occasions. Religious leaders are also part of regional, national and international associations.

As a result of this diversity, British Muslims are neither ethnically nor ideologically homogeneous. Yet generalisations about Muslim communities have tended to rely heavily on the experience of South Asian Muslims, who have come predominantly from Pakistan and Bangladesh, bringing with them particular socio-economic characteristics, rural origins and religious beliefs and practices heavily infused with mystical and magical features. Their often socially conservative ways differ greatly from other British Muslims. Alexander (2000, 174) argued that a Sylheti from Bangladesh is likely to have little in common with a Mirpuri from Pakistani, let alone a Somali or a Bosnian Muslim. In this heavy ethnic mix, religious affiliations intersect in many ways with age-group, gender and socio-economic status, as well as with the specific circumstances of immigrant settlement experience in the United Kingdom.

In London alone there are Muslims from over fifty ethnic backgrounds (Vertovec and Rogers 1998, 34). Still, there have been occasions in the United Kingdom, when Islam has become the main identity for many British Muslims, particularly when they have been criticised or attacked by others on the basis of their religion. The experiences of migration and exile have also played their part in constructing new identities. Michaels (2006, 85) sees the identity as one of the key issues for Muslims in the United Kingdom. The current view is constantly shaped by the changing context.

The broadly secular and plural character of British society is seen as generating an array of competing identities. With time British Muslims of migrant heritage have gained in confidence, and challenged with some success the attitudes, policies and concerns of the majority social order as part of the process of re-evaluating their treatment by wider British society. This increase in confidence has also encouraged certain Muslims to move from a defensive position to a proselytising one in the hope of winning new converts to Islam.

Most Muslim communities in the United Kingdom have been primarily concerned to survive, and beyond that to preserve the essential elements of their faith by transmitting them to future generations. Muslim identity in the United Kingdom is being constructed very much against a background of negative perceptions about who and what Muslims are.

It is evolving as an identity of unbelonging in contest with hegemonic British identity, which continues to be perceived as Christian, white and rooted in past centuries.

One of the earliest signs of the emergence of British Muslim consciousness was the struggle over Muslim schools. Muslims who campaigned for separate schools with a Muslim ethos saw this as symbolic of the challenge to the hegemonic culture. The more the campaign was resisted, the more British Muslims saw it as a denial of their equal citizenship and of their very identity since in their view Muslim schools were precisely where a distinct sense of Muslim identity could be constructed. Hunter (2002, 46) emphasised that diversity was tolerable so long as it did not conflict with British identity. Muslims want to be a part of British society, but there is an issue with the common xenophobia pervasive in society that casts Muslims as outsiders.

A consistent spattering of polls shows that many non-Muslim Britons still view Muslims as a potential enemy within (The Guardian 2012):

- 47% of Britons see Muslims as a threat;
- Only 28% of Britons believe Muslims want to integrate into British society;
- 52% of Britons believe that Muslims create problems;
- 45% of Britons admit that they think there are too many Muslims in the United Kingdom;
- 55% of Britons would be concerned if a mosque was built in their area;
- 58% of Britons associate Islam with extremism.

The role of Muslim institutions, particularly the mosque, in reinforcing Muslim identities has been significant. These institutions established a cultural infrastructure.

Next chapter examines the British government measures, when there is increase in the migration flow and pressure from the elite.

3.2. British government intervention

Migratory movements arose from the existence of prior links between sending and receiving societies based on colonisation, political influence, trade, investment and cultural ties. Government policies, both in the United Kingdom and in the migrant`s countries of origin, reflecting public opinion on migration issues, played an important part.

The flow of migration in 1950s and racial tension had started to cause the British government considerable anxiety. Consequently, Indian and Pakistani governments, responding to pressure from the British authorities over the increasing rate of migration, applied restrictions on emigration by introducing controls on the issuing of passports, medical checks, language tests and financial guarantees.

These measures led to massive forging of passports and other irregularities, and failed to stem the flow significantly. Indeed, once the Indian and Pakistani governments found themselves unable to deal effectively with their own worsening economic conditions and high levels of unemployment and tensions, they relaxed restrictions on travel abroad to alleviate their own mounting problems (Jacobson 1997, 222).

Under these circumstances the announcement in 1961 of the forthcoming Commonwealth Immigrants Act triggered an enormous rush to "beat the ban". The rate of immigration from India, Pakistan and Cyprus rose sharply and at first had the opposite effect to that intended by the legislation. By removing the right to come and go freely, the 1962 Act transformed what had in the past been temporary movements from the New Commonwealth into the permanent settlement of migrants and their families. Jacobson`s (1997, 231) study showed that, it disrupted the link between the supply of and demand for migrant labour. Single men periodically were replaced by relatives and this flow shifted the balance from the economically active to the economically inactive. Connections with home villages weakened as immediate settlement became the norm.

From the 1970s a different kind of migration phenomenon gathered momentum. Large numbers of people from the so-called Third World began to arrive as a result of involuntary or coerced migration. At first these inflows received little attention, partly because the numbers were small and partly because providing a haven for refugees had been viewed in the United Kingdom as a proud tradition stretching back centuries. But the number of refugees grew rapidly from the mid-1970s responding to crises produced by ethno-religious and communal conflict, famines and natural disasters, and oppression by various political regimes. For instance, Muslim refugees from Somalia in the 1980s and 1990s can be seen as attempting to escape clan warfare as well as the massive economic dislocation that resulted (Raza 1993, 41). Since the possession of financial resources was a prerequisite of migration – to pay for the passage and other needs – most refugees of this kind belonged to the middle-class, and were from relatively prosperous, professional or merchant, and well-educated urban backgrounds.

3.3. Degrees of British Muslim assimilation

Nearly half of British Muslims live in and around London, where all ethnic and cultural differences are present. The high number of mosques is ways of Islam. At present, it is considered that there are about 2000 mosques and Islamic centres in the United Kingdom (Abbas 2011, 35). In certain localities, there are specialist goods and services outlets, which are all owned and managed by Muslims. This is helping to form and establish distinct ethnic enclave economies.

There are also within-group variations to consider. For example, Masood (2006) has pointed out that there is a difference between Sunni Barelwi Pakistanis and East African Ismailis. Generally Muslim Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have lower economic activity than Muslims from India, who have employment rates close to that of the national average. Muslim communities are different in regard to their level of integration and their ideological orientations, but they have much in common in terms of their experiences of alienation. Many of the more recent and therefore less well established ethnic communities among Muslims in the United Kingdom are refugees from conflicts. The discussion of violent struggle is discussion about their everyday experiences before coming to the United Kingdom and remains the everyday experience of their relatives left behind. Muslim`s poorer working class communities see their own often mosque-based communities as primary foci of belonging. The second and third generations of British Muslims identify themselves first as Muslims and then according to their ethnic group. They seem less concerned with attendance at mosque than with the public assertion of Muslim political values. They are more concerned about ensuring that schools allow time for prayer, respect Muslim dress, provide *halal* meat in school meals and do not require girls to take part in swimming lessons (Ansari 2004, 149).

Some Muslims are more inclined toward integration, where as others exhibit ideological and communal tendencies. There is an extremist fringe within the community. From the Muslim`s perspective, the main fear is the potential loss of their religion, culture, distinct identity and to be totally assimilated. Muslims face a number of following challenges on integration and assimilation (Hunter 2002, 55):

- Poverty and segregation – High crime rates and dependency on the social welfare system also contribute to British feelings that there is a Muslim problem;

- Unemployment rates – for Pakistani and Bangladeshi woman are high. Muslim women found that unemployment was less because of religion and culture than because of poor job and language skills, and a lack of childcare and confidence;
- Treatment of women in Islam – are considered evidence of intolerance by Muslims toward freedom of expression. Muslim women are seen as different and who do not wish to engage in society;
- Balance between Muslim and Western – Muslims in Europe are working hard to try to find ways to educate their own communities and talk about the balance between being Muslim and Western, not Muslim or Western. They believe in democratic institutions;
- Discrimination and Bias – Muslims face discrimination in all aspects of life;
- Terrorism and Security – Main question is how extremist the Muslim communities across Europe are. Since events of 7/7, the United Kingdom government has developed a range of policies and practises to disentangle the processes of violent extremism, and to help realise appropriate and necessary solutions.

Johnson (2011) has concluded that many British Muslims contend that they are being victimised by the police service, which abuses the powers vested in it. The state now has more powers than ever to hold people without charge, and large numbers of ultimately exonerated Muslims are being arrested, questioned and released. These arrests under the anti-terrorist laws have attracted widespread media coverage. Policies seek to modify, improve or develop the behaviours of Muslims and the ways of Islam, but not always the attitudes of majority society. Muslims in the United Kingdom are often weak and lack organisation and leadership, because there is a lack of confidence or capacity. Mosques and imams are limited in their capacities. There is a lack of knowledge of Islam, not just within majority society but also within Muslim communities.

According to Milton-Edwards (2004, 110), there are many shared bonds between Muslims and non-Muslims in the United Kingdom – for example, in relation to attitudes towards welfare, charity, neighbourliness, reciprocity, kindness to children and elders, voting, property rights, inheritance rights and divorce rights. What differentiate Muslims are language, culture and history. The majority of Muslims believe that it is possible to live peacefully in the United Kingdom and remain perfectly Muslim.

The pace of absorption, incorporation and adjustment that minority groups experience has varied. Younger British Muslims have become more assimilated in more ways than their parents (Vertovec and Rogers 1998, 40). They have developed more informal contacts with the wider society and have less fear of the dangers of contact with Western culture. Assimilation describes a process, where the group becomes indistinguishably integrated into the dominant host society, and they are accepted as equals. The immigrant feels at ease with the culture of the adopted land, and has internalised its values. The group has adapted to and identifies itself with the host society and been accepted by it so completely that it has merged into the whole and lost its separate identity.

However, in a plural society such as the United Kingdom, not only are the values of the dominant group being affected by minority cultures, but dominant and subordinate groups have also striven to achieve coexistence, while continuing to adhere to their own values and traditions. Many older British Muslims assimilated to some extent in language and dress, and adapted largely to economic life, but where reluctant to accommodate to the dominant patterns of family life, leisure and recreation. Masood`s (2006) study showed that the first generation of British Muslims remained relatively unassimilated, the second generation, more exposed to British culture at an earlier stage of development, have assimilated more and more. Clothes are a visible aspect of culture and provide clues to the level of integration of a particular group. Traditional dress is more prevalent in the north of England than in the south-east.

Another indication of how far Muslims have moved towards absorbing the values and norms of the dominant group is the shift in their attitudes to the tradition of arranged marriage. Parents appear less insistent and allow their children to make up their own minds and arrive at a compromise.

3.3.1. Young British Muslims

Many young Muslims think of themselves as on the whole culturally and socially British. By identifying with global Islam they are able to see themselves as part of a potentially powerful community. At the same time, it gives young British Muslims a sense of belonging akin to being part of an ethnic group. This kind of self-consciousness helps them to cope with the ambiguities and contradictions they experience in British society. The lives of these young people are being shaped by local geography, state institutions, class dynamics and racism.

The result is that there now seems to be a greater propensity to associate with the culture of the indigenous white majority and adopt many of its traits. They feel that while the religious element in their identities remains relatively stable, the ethnic boundaries are malleable and have the potential for change. This trend was particularly apparent in the findings of Jacobson`s (1997, 243) study of British Pakistanis in 1997, in which many respondents, while regarding Pakistan as an exciting and interesting place to go on holiday and something with which they have close ties, at the same time, they felt strongly that the United Kingdom was the country in which they were most comfortable and at home. They tended to converse in Urdu or Punjabi with their parents, but almost invariably in English with members of their own peer generation.

Younger Muslims seem less willing to accept their parent`s rejection of British cultural styles. Particularly since their education encourages them to demand rational explanations for everything. Many question the meaning and relevance of elaborate rituals, the segregation of sexes and the minutiae of dietary restrictions. Indeed, the movement away from the traditions, customs and practices of their homelands began decades ago. The clash between the values of the older and younger generations is creating some tension, with traditional male hegemony within the family and the community challenged more often. Young Muslims do feel that the views of their parents and grandparents are increasingly out of touch with British society.

Their expectations are similar to those of their white counterparts. They start to question not only traditional customs but also religious ideas which seem largely alien to life in a Western materialistic society. The cultural and leisure arenas are where British Muslims have been confronted most acutely with moral choices. The Islamist strand asserts that both the playing of musical instruments and listening to music is forbidden, implicitly in the Quran and in the Hadith (Lewis 1994, 15).

Nevertheless, many Muslims have interpreted Islamic treatises on art differently and have developed a much more intimate association with Western art. Muslim engagement with British culture is growing steadily, whether in theatre, cinema, television or the novel. It is particularly the cohort of young British Muslims who are presumed to have a problem with identity, but the problem is far more often in the mind of the non-Muslim or the of the Muslim elder, than among the young people themselves.

Allen (2007, 125) stated that a prolonged period in a multicultural society means a longer process of socialisation and acculturation of the immigrant`s children in terms of educational processes, peer group relations and media influences.

Some of the young people are still conforming to cultural and religious values and some of them are developing new attitude which are in conflict with parental culture. The tension between change and continuity will remain as long as the young generation is exposed to conflicting value systems and multiple group belonging. Young people would like to be less influenced by external agents when they are making their own decisions. Language, culture, sexuality, control and freedom on the one hand and the multiple identity allegiance on the other, seem to be the sources of tension and conflict. Young Muslims are developing a new identity in constant negotiation with parental values. They have a desire to preserve parental values at home and to adopt some elements of the host culture outside.

3.3.2. The changing position of Muslim women

The dominant Western picture of Muslim women is as passive, subject to patriarchal traditions and ruthlessly oppressed victims of religion. Invisible in the public domain and trapped within the family framework, their lives are seen as unfree and exposed to domestic exploitation. Allen (2007, 140) has argued that this picture is misleading, and far removed from the lived experience of most Muslim women in the United Kingdom. For them Muslim communities are a source of emotional strength and a haven of spiritual and moral safety from the perceived assault of British society and its unwelcome values.

For many Muslim women coming to the United Kingdom was the first encounter with urban life in another culture. Lack of social and linguistic skills restricted interaction with the wider society and so increased their isolation. Isolation caused cultural shock, withdrawal and sometimes depression. However, on the positive side, these women have become resourceful and pragmatic and found new ways of coping with the challenges of their harsh situations. The more rural households were stricter than the urban ones (Alexander 2000, 180).

Some young women have become aware of the double standards they see in the freedoms and opportunities accessible to men and not to women. According to Johnson (2011), these women say that Islam is used to legitimate male control by asserting the importance of appropriate gender roles, codes of dress and family honour in religious terms. It is also used to justify the harassment of the women and violence more generally. While headscarves signal their Muslim faith, short-sleeved blouses and leg-revealing slits in their dresses show their allegiance to fashion.

The changes in the lives of Muslim women in the United Kingdom were related to changes in the family in British society as a whole. For instance, as Cypriots adjusted to life in the United Kingdom the extended family lost its force, in common with the overall population. The trends among Muslim women, especially those with higher educational qualifications who had entered employment and were engaged in professional careers, were towards later marriage. Cultural and religious traditions appear to have been modified by educational and socio-economic opportunities and individual circumstances. The second generation of Muslim women has undergone a number of changes in their attitudes and behaviour towards the family. They seemed to be marrying later, but still earlier than their white counterparts. The general trend is towards fewer children as women increasingly are going to work. The overall patterns suggest that Muslim women together with their families are moving gradually towards the norms of the white population although cultural traditions and religion have applied a brake on the rate of change.

The end of male immigration by the early 1970s and the continuing demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labour resulted in many Muslim women being recruited into factory production. As young Muslim women`s qualifications and language skills have improved, so has their relative participation in the labour market. Allen (2007, 142) has argued that paid work has had a positive impact on the role and status of many Muslim women within their families. The new patterns of employment have produced new definitions of what is acceptable and respectable. At home relations between husbands and wives have become more egalitarian – sharing of domestic tasks, participation in decision-making, companionship, leisure, control of expenditure. The proportion working outside the home has increased and the vast majority of females experience the British school system.

They may still face discrimination on religious as well as racial grounds, but they have become increasingly confident and able to challenge and combat it. In the public domain Muslim women are increasingly involved in local politics and voluntary work and holding public office. However, boys and girls continue to be treated differently. Considerable social control is still exercised over Muslim women and their movements are monitored closely by their own families themselves and by their communities. The cultural ties and family bonds have proved remarkably firm, and maintained a degree of control, despite the relative wealth and economic independence of the younger generation.

3.4. Muslim political engagement in the United Kingdom

As sizeable Muslim communities in the United Kingdom become more politically active, there is a pressing need to respond to issues. Whenever Muslim engagement with British society and its institutions is discussed, the place of Islamic religious law has been to the force. The issue of *halal* food has been a consistent source of controversy. The education system has had to take account of Muslim concerns over dress, religious and sex education.

Local authorities have had to deal with requests for planning permission for mosques and forms of burial agreeable to Muslims. Employers have had to meet Muslim demands on dress codes, for prayers at set times and for time off to celebrate religious festivals. Muslims also wish to have the family laws based on Islamic traditions incorporated in the British legal systems. For many Muslims in the United Kingdom adherence to Islamic law is part of living in accordance with God`s will. Two kinds of human behaviour are regarded by Muslims as subject to the Sharia: individual duties towards God and individual duties towards society. *Darura* (the principle of necessity) allows Muslims to engage with wider society: it authorises and justifies an accommodation enabling the faithful settled in a non-Muslim society to break the letter of certain rules and to partake of some things that are in principle forbidden while still continuing to be recognised as Muslims (Geaves 1996).

A parallel set of institutions has gradually been created to provide religious legitimacy for individual actions. The UK Islamic Shariah Council, consisting of religious scholars, gives guidance and advice on the basis of their understanding of Islamic law. Many mosques have also obtained the services of *muftis*, specialist on Islamic law, to issue *fatwas* (expert advice of a jurist on a specific legal problem) on personal and social minutiae (Hunter 2002, 72). The 1980s saw Muslims in the United Kingdom struggling for official acknowledgement of religious rights against a background of increasing anti-Muslim sentiment in the wider British society. The high point of this struggle was reached with the Rushdie affair. Outraged by what to them was the blasphemous content of Salman Rushdie`s novel *The Satanic Verses*, groups of British Muslims engaged in protests and petitioned the government to ban it. Their sometimes violent campaign suggested that they had not quite understood British cultural sensibilities and that they lacked respect for the rule of law. This general perception tended to isolate them from the rest of the population.

The book-burning episode in January 1989 and the media-manufactured support for Khomeini`s *fatwa* sentencing Rushdie to death alienated popular opinion already shaped by negative stereotypes and images of Muslims as intolerant and incapable of resolving disputes through peaceful and rational debate. The majority saw it as an attack on the principles of free speech, thought and expression. Muslims did not seem to be engaging constructively with British political, social and cultural institutions (Geaves 1996).

Growing number of Muslims have come to regard formal political mechanisms as an effective way of getting their problems addressed. As Muslims became more settled and confident their political involvement increased. At first locally and then on the national stage. Drawing strength from community support, organisations used their strength in local politics to achieve agreement on specific issues through a typically British process of negotiation and compromise rather than confrontation. In the 1980s, Muslim organisations mushroomed and come together from time to time to lobby local authorities to change policy and act on particular areas of concern.

By the mid-1980s a more active involvement in local politics began to develop. Younger Muslims involvement in local politics grew substantially, and alliances with mainstream parties were developed on the basis of ideological understandings. However, Muslim politicians largely remained side-lined in terms of power. Muslims are allowed to join the Labour Party but are not allowed to influence policies. They have faced resistance in the selection process because of the negative stereotypes of Muslims, including lack of professionalism and ideological commitment to democratic practices. Muslim networking has been seen as undemocratic.

As Muslims ability to communicate effectively has improved, they have become more confident about engaging with the British political systems and learned to bend it to serve their interests. The diversity of their political responses reflects the differentiated character of Muslim communities in the United Kingdom as well as the range of interpretations of Islam. However, Hunter`s (2002, 81) study showed that the economic deprivation and social exclusion have caused some British Muslims to see mainstream politics as an ideological betrayal and as part of the process of cultural homogenisation. They pursue the politics of the street, confronting the power of the state through direct and disruptive collective action. Political refugees arriving as families are likely to place more demands on social and educational services than young, single guest workers.

When immigrants and their descendants are entitled to participate in local elections may help their quest for local political power. Institutional and behavioral variables are therefore at work in molding patterns of immigrant political power. South Asian migrants in the United Kingdom have often been able to draw on networks of kin and clan to facilitate impressive get-out-the-vote efforts, which has made this group politically powerful in many British local authorities.

3.5. Brexit – the rise of nationalism

There is growing distrust on the European Union and on the 23rd of June 2016 membership referendum 51,9% of British voters voted to leave the EU. This referendum is also known as Brexit. One of the main arguments was that the United Kingdom is not able to control the migration flow, when remaining in the union and the country will lose its national identity. The leaving vote as a statement was less about British economic and political future, but more about the diversity, which is in the country. British Muslims saw that the European Union membership offers security in human rights and they are afraid that there will be an increase on xenophobic sentiments against minorities in the United Kingdom. The British government has announced that it will start the formal process of leaving the European Union by March 2017.

George Friedman (2016) pointed out following three reasons, why the British voted to leave the European Union:

1) Economic problems – European Union failed to address these problems and Europe has as a whole has stagnated economically;
2) Sovereignty – the rise of nationalism across the world and the immigration crisis, which affects internal life of the country;
3) Political elitism – Brexit was a vote against the British elite, who lost their right to control the system.

This referendum was followed by racist abuse against foreigners in the United Kingdom and nationalist anti-European parties have enhanced their own demands to exit in other European countries. The next chapter will take a look at other responses to multiculturalism.

4. PROBLEMS OF CULTURAL COMPLEXITY

More Europeans have begun to question multiculturalism, which has serious limits at national and local levels. But contemporary Europe prides itself on its liberal ideologies, encouraging multicultural integration, freedom of speech and equality of opportunity. For example, Britishness is often described in terms of citizenship, a birth right, but not really a deeply-held emotional and cultural bond shared with the white, secular or Christian majority.

According to Michaels (2006, 102), there are at least four ways in which multiculturalism can move forward effectively:

1) The elimination of structural and cultural inequalities,
2) There is great importance in shifting away from a focus on individual and group identities to issues of power and knowledge,
3) Multiculturalism can refer to shared citizenship based on an allegiance to common values which are universal in nature and where ethnic belonging does not impact on perceived allegiance or loyalty,
4) There is a need to eliminate discrimination both racial and religious.

Responses to multiculturalism have varied widely. There was a belief that theoretical correctness would provide the solution to the problem of dealing with the intractable difficulties which arise between individuals and groups in every society. To some Muslims it has meant the adoption of a liberal approach which has not adequately addressed their religious requirements. The opportunity to practice the faith in accordance with Islamic principles is an important aspect of everyday life. For Muslims, a major aspect of their faith is the duty to pray five times a day.

Flexibility in the timetable to allow midday prayer and attendance at Friday prayers are advocated. Similarly, the provision of a prayer room and ablution facilities are required to assist this activity. First-generation Muslims will have specific needs, concerns and anxieties, but as time, knowledge and experience passes between generations the situation changes and therefore needs change (Caldwell 2009, 164).

The most important factors to appreciate are that Muslims are not one undifferentiated mass. The notion of linking social justice and community harmony to citizenships and multiculturalism ought to be the end goals for all. Taking time off for Muslim religious festivals seemed at times to be resented by employers, and although *halal* food has become more widely available, the response from institutions to this Muslim need is still inconsistent.

Generally, Muslims face the same disadvantages as do other immigrants in the German labour market, namely because of their insecure residence status and high unemployment rates. Asylum seekers often face a long waiting periods before the work permission is granted. Muslim women sometimes encounter additional barriers to employment, as evidenced by the ban of the headscarf. Discrimination is often more significant in semi-skilled jobs, where Muslims regularly face their employers` intolerance towards their religious duties since no legal regulation exist with regard to these matters.

4.1. Experience of Xenophobia

Similar skin colors have not necessarily ensured cross-ethnic solidarity. In the United Kingdom, natives also considered white migrant populations of earlier decades to be ethnic outsiders. When Irish migration was at record highs in the mid-nineteenth century, the Irish were regarded as both racially and, more obviously, religiously distinct. The Irish, who tended to live in squalid conditions and occupied the lowest rung on the socioeconomic ladder, also became the target of sustained anti-immigrant activity.

Violence is one important component of immigrant conflict. The interdisciplinary literature on hate crime identifies both expressive and rational motivations in the commission of such violence. For example, how hate crime in 1950s urban America was employed systematically to drive out black neighbors. Even if some individual whites may have acted on irrational impulses, their actions were part of a larger grassroots campaign that pursued specific, well-articulated goals. Antistate violence in France shows that immigrants may engage in confrontations with state actors or participate in antistate riots to signal their dissatisfaction with state practices. As Dancygier (2010) explains, violent acts do not occur in a vacuum but are embedded in specific political contexts, economic conditions, and social environments. Racist violence is one of the most vicious and harmful phenomena commonly experienced in ethnically diverse societies today.

Its forms are varied, encompassing verbal slurs, graffiti, vandalism, harassment, arson, physical assault, and murder. Divergent conceptions of racially motivated crime are also associated with varying notions of the underlying causes of such violence. In Germany, efforts to combat racist violence usually address the structural conditions that are thought conducive to the dissemination of Nazi ideology, focusing less on the impact of victimization at the level of the minority group. Conversely, British authorities have tended to view racist crime as an indicator of the quality of intergroup relations. Communities that harbor resentments against their ethnic minority neighbors may thus foster racist attacks as well as support for xenophobic political parties.

Similar to its Midlands neighbor, Leicester is a city that is both urban and provincial. Its population is socioeconomically mixed and ethnically diverse. This city boundaries encompass an inner-city core, middle-class suburbs, and an outer ring of working-class council estates. Leicester has experienced New Commonwealth immigration since the 1950s, when labour shortages attracted small numbers of West Indian migrants who were soon followed by settlers from the Indian subcontinent. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the city received a further wave of migrants of Indian descent, who arrived in Leicester via Africa. This group of migrants, most of them Gujarati Hindus, has most decisively shaped Leicester`s multicultural character.

In 1981, over 13 per cent of the city`s residents had been born in India or East Africa, and by 2001, over 25 per cent of the city`s population identified themselves as being ethnically Indian. In the mid-1970s, Leicester was thus faced with absorbing large shares of immigrants while experiencing its first economic contraction in decades (Dancygier 2010, 178). The fact that the arrivals constituted refugee families, including children and an elderly population, meant that pressures on education and social services would be more immediately felt when compared to the migration of single workers.

Eastmond (2012, 10) study shows that young migrant women are often stereotyped as passive victims of patriarchal cultures. Especially women from the Middle East or other Muslim societies. Some of the women contain their anger and frustration by simply ignoring racist attitudes and statements. Men tend to stress more than women, that they never feel accepted as full members of society because of their looks. This may be because men are more frequent targets of racism than women. They are being seen as a threat.

At municipal level, the social services are mostly those responsible for refugee reception and integration, facilitating a programme of introduction which is financed by the government.

The programme includes language and society courses, and other complementary education or re-training seen as needed in order to prepare an adult person for entering the labour market. The first years of introduction normally also involve close contact with a range of other local agencies, such as the employment office, adult education and health services. A person who is not self-supportive at the end of the introduction will remain the responsibility of social services. How policy is translated into local-level practice seems to be a crucial question for understanding whether ambitious integration programmes achieve their goals.

As Eastmond (2012, 12) explains, there has long been a tendency to see the problems of integration in terms of the characteristics of new groups, rather than considering the structures of the receiving society. Immigrant clients tended to be regarded as a general category with special problems such as language and culture, lack of adequate skills, or trauma and poor mental health. All immigrants must undergo a process of normalization to enter European society, guided in a rather top-down approach by the various programmes offered. Social equality comes with a demand for conformity.

4.2. Islamophobia in a Western culture

The terrorist attacks have permanently altered Europe`s view of Islam and this fear of Muslims is described as islamophobia. That racial discrimination against Muslims is defended rather than challenged. According to Allen (2007, 127), a deep dislike of Islam is not a new phenomenon in British society, but new is the way it is articulated by those sections of society who claim the mantle of secularism, tolerance and liberalism. Islam in the wider context is positioned as being in opposition to democratic values. Raza (1993, 20) has argued that prejudice against Islam has always been widespread among the people of Christian civilization. The fear is mixed with racist hostility to immigration. British Muslims often express a stronger sense of belonging than other citizens. Muslims are clustered in localities where the services of education and health are in limited supply, but where the need is significant and continues to grow.

The relationship between Islam and the West has taken up a central space in popular and political discourses for now more than a decade. Dauvergne (2016, 64) has argued that very few of us have any idea at all how to differentiate Islam from Islamic fundamentalism.

One of the problems is that there is much about Islamic culture that is so different it does not make sense to us. Learning about it does not address the problem and it remains "other". Europeans are often the most vociferous in their critique of certain Islamic practices, such as veiling, circumcision, and the ritual slaughtering of animals. They believe such practices should be prevented, because they represent a culture that promotes extreme submission to religion. Muslim activists argue that Muslims come to Europe with already defined identities, priorities, and lifestyles that need to be recognized as different and respected. As the welfare state is shrinking throughout Europe, the politics of recognition are replacing the politics of redistribution. Özyürek (2009, 123) has concluded that diverse policies applied by different countries in the European Union lead to disparate results for the Muslim communities in Europe.

The term, islamophobia, is at least a hundred years old. It is the motivation underpinning several types of misrepresentation of Islam and its prophet. Most common accusations against Islam are holy war, polygamy, slavery and fanaticism. Seven features of islamophobia were identified in the Runnymede Trust report of 1997 (Abbas 2011, 85):

1) Muslim cultures are seen as monolithic;
2) Islamic cultures are substantially different from other cultures;
3) Islam is perceived as implacably threatening;
4) Adherents of Islam use their faith to gain political or military advantage;
5) Muslim criticism of Western cultures and societies is rejected out of hand;
6) The fear of Islam is mixed with racist hostility to immigration;
7) Islamophobia is assumed to be natural and unproblematic.

Today, European societies are going through deep social and economic crises. López (2011) emphasised that religious minority such as Muslims can be object of a rejection similar to that suffered by the Jews. During periods of economic decline, Muslims become targets of animosity, because they are viewed as burdens on the society.

The question of unemployment is haunting many people and social exclusion is increasing. Strong islamophobic tendencies exist among intellectuals, religious circles and the press. Even those, who accept Western society`s multicultural character, do not necessarily believe in the equal treatment of all groups. Islam is considered as an enemy that must be fought. Therefore, the need to promote better mutual knowledge between different groups is essential.

4.3. The effect of immigration on European Union institution

The European Union finds itself implicated in practices of security, which cast the European Union as a violated property. Clashes between immigrants and natives, as well as between immigrants and the state, continue to claim lives, cause property damage, and impede the integration of immigrants more generally, we still know very little about what causes these confrontations to emerge. Migration in Europe has impact on European identity and there are emerging patterns that are shaping Europe as a distinctive new regional space of migration and mobility.

As Walters and Haahr (2005, 65) explains, in many Western nation-states one of the ways in which the meaning of democracy was settled was through a set of oppositions to a totalitarian other. But in the EU, there is no consensus on a single democratic identity. Europe does not acquire the identity of a homeland, at least not in the sense implied by the American idea of "homeland security". For homeland summons up all sorts of patriotic forces, effects that may be present at the national level in Europe but not above it. Schengenland casts the European Union in the form of a safe inside which is troubled by a world of chaos beyond it. It constitutes a new kind of security nexus. Most of the European Union countries believe that incoming refugees increase the likelihood of terrorism in their country (Spindler 2016). The immigration politics and asylum politics are not the same, but the asylum crisis has drawn them closer together.

Solutions are to be developed in a European framework, drawing upon experiences and knowledges of other European Union member states and their representatives, or of European institutions such as the Commission. The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) employs such techniques as systematic comparison and mutual learning. It is sometimes described in terms of soft governance and heterarchy.

One of the most striking aspects of European integration has been the development of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Addressing questions of cooperation and interdependence between the European Union states in such areas as immigration, asylum, border control, police and judicial matters, JHA has quickly emerged as a dynamic and important arena of integration politics. Under the rubric of JHA the European Union finds itself taking a central position within the field of internal security.

The governmentalization of Europe is not a linear process, and it is better understood as the tangled outcome of multiple trajectories, each with their own complex temporality. The following chapter analyses the risk of social exclusion among the European Union population.

4.3.1. Social exclusion

In the future, the Muslim presence in Europe is likely to grow and eventually, Islam is bound to find its place in the socio-cultural and political landscape of Europe. The Islamic factor will affect Europe`s internal evolution and its external relations. In the United Kingdom both sides have been engaged in dialogue with the purpose of providing guidelines for British Muslims on how to practice their faith while being good citizens. Hunter (2002, 89) says that many of Muslims cannot understand that many of the British values are indeed also part of Islamic values. For example, principles of justice and equality.

As explained by Mayes et. al. (2001, 310) social exclusion is a multidimensional concept. It involves aspects of poverty, unemployment, disability, poor health, lack of rights, etc. To some extent social exclusion is a matter of exposure to risk. There has been a tendency for labour markets to become divided into insiders and outsiders. The insiders have secure jobs and good benefits, while the outsiders remain in a fringe of temporary employment. This second group will be socially excluded. Also some groups in society are excluded because of their ethnic origin. The exclusion can come from simple prejudice. Here the problem is more difficult as although one can legislate against the exercise of the prejudice it is not possible to ban the prejudice itself. Indeed, inclusion in society may be the best route to eradicating prejudice based on ignorance and fear.

In the European Union the social exclusion has been primarily viewed as a problem for the member states and what countries do in tackling social exclusion depends heavily on how they define the problem. Since the definitions differ it is not surprising that policies do. However, the differences in policies also reflects important philosophical and structural differences in approach. For example, exclusion in the United Kingdom has been viewed mainly in terms of poverty and deprivation and not as a largely labour market phenomenon. One important dimension of their government`s strategy is to tackle poverty and exclusion linked to geographical factors by empowering local actors and developing partnerships. The strategy is also address child poverty to break the vicious circle of poverty passed from one generation to the other.

The French approach is attempting to be comprehensive in two respects. It is first of all tackling all the various facets of exclusion: poor housing, poor access to healthcare, unemployment, exclusion of ethnic minorities etc. Secondly it is trying to involve all levels of government in the process (Clout et. al. 2014, 31). Since they result from a combination of factors, the phenomena of poverty and social exclusion can only be eradicated by a policy that is itself multidimensional, and which brings pressure to bear on all of the mechanisms used in the struggle against exclusion.

Greece is relatively new to the concept of social exclusion and as a result the concept is rather vague. One of the main reasons that exclusion has not been high on the agenda earlier is that Greece has been a cohesive society with strong family ties (Mayes et. al. 2001, 319). The strength of family ties contributed to a less individualistic and more cohesive society. Immigration has altered all of this and created a new separate group with limited rights. Their social protection system is focused almost entirely on pensions. The social tensions arising from the massive population movements have made progress towards integration slower. Prejudice is partly as a reaction to rising criminality, commonly perceived to be clearly associated with immigration. Social protection for many immigrants is limited to the informal networks of their own communities or to services provided by humanitarian organisations.

Social exclusion affects outsiders and this explains why the matter has been given such a low policy priority. However, under the combined pressures of a rapidly shifting social landscape this is set to change. The rising profile of voluntary organisations is one of the most encouraging developments of recent years. What is still missing is a programme of reform: a set of realistic and ambitious ideas, capable of transforming these disparate forces.

Berghman (2007, 106) has listed three meanings of social cohesion:

1) Economic aspect – social cohesion refers to income inequality;
2) The institutional – organizational aspects of society. Conflict regulation between different segments in society;
3) Social capital – the organizations that are situated between the individual and macro-institutions.

Social policy is opposed to the economy, the military, law and order, infrastructure and other traditional functions of the state. The proportion of people who are to a large extent dependent upon social provisions has been growing constantly.

A challenge for social policy is to balance the ethnic relations, and to advance mutual understanding and cooperation. Financial incentives and top-down impact have attracted the attention of municipalities across Europe, but local governments are hardly coherently Europeanised. Cohesion policy demonstrates a development towards a system of joint management across multiple levels under which competencies, resources and accountabilities are merging.

As Caldwell (2009, 207) explains, that cultural complexity brings about the potential, in every person, for a co-existing multiplicity of worldviews and ways of being. Just as individuals can be bilingual, they can also be multicultural, with the competence to behave appropriately in a number of different arenas.

The next chapter gives insights about the challenges of large-scale immigration in advanced industrialized democracies.

4.4. Challenges of migration

While many countries of destination increasingly perceive immigration as a threat to social cohesion and try to limit migration inflows, a growing number of countries of origin include emigration in their development strategies. Multiculturalism is a commitment to a set of ideas about how different groups should live together in a state. In particular, it is a set of ideas about groups that end up living together because of immigration. Multiculturalism could not have emerged without the ideas of liberalism, including some valuing of human rights.

The demise of multiculturalism grows out from the concomitant notion that cultural unintelligibility is a threat to liberal practices. Dauvergne (2016, 52) argues that the illegal migration, criminalization and deportation stories closely reflect the end of settler society values.

There are three challenges of migration policies today (OECD 2011):

1) the regulation of international migration flows,
2) the integration of immigrants in developing countries,
3) the impact of labour mobility on development.

The lack of co-operation between countries raises the challenge of regulating migration flows, especially in the current context of global interdependence. Political and economic tensions in one part of the planet generate migration pressure in another.

No matter the level of development, new migration flows have produced social tension in countries of transit and destination. OECD (2011) study shows that the objectives of migrations policies should be oriented towards:

- A more flexible regulation of international migration flows;
- A better integration of immigrants in the South;
- A greater impact of labour mobility on development.

The governance of international migration should rely on effective partnerships and include four dimensions: international co-operation, decentralization, inclusiveness and policy coherence.

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this thesis was to understand new forms of insecurity and their relationship to European integration, also to promote understanding of transformations in the relationship between power, security and territory. The logics of security mobilized by the European Union are changing. In the past the European integration was to avert the possibility of armed conflict between European states and to ensure Western Europe`s geopolitical security. Now the European Union is being asked to address new forms of internal security threats which include terrorism, drugs-smuggling, mass asylum-seeking, people trafficking and transnational organized crime.

A full understanding of Europe`s ambivalence, refracted through its multiple, nested identities, lies at the intersection of competing European political projects and social processes. Identities to be revealed by social practices as well as by political attitudes, are shaped by social and geographical structures and national contexts.

Thesis answered the following research questions:

1) What are the differences between integration policies of the European Union and its individual member states?
2) How assimilation takes place in the United Kingdom as a view of Muslims varies widely across country?
3) Which are the present challenges of migration in Europe?

Nowadays the large-scale movement changes the composition of the societies in the sending and receiving countries and results in some of today`s key challenges. Many European countries are characterized by ageing and shrinking populations. In order to ensure their economic growths and maintain their welfare systems, they have implemented a series of measures to reduce the demographic effects like opening channels to legal migration.

Receiving societies try to attract mainly highly skilled professionals, who are encouraged to stay longer periods. This is achieved by providing them with rights and benefits, facilitating their stay, and making them the target of integration policies. Young people who travel across borders for schooling, tourism, and jobs are also likely to be more European.

Less educated and less financially well-off people will lack the inclination to be attracted to the cultural diversity of Europe. People, who have something to gain from the European Union are also more likely to be in favor of its activities.

What are the differences between integration policies of the European Union and its individual member states?

Migration is influenced by a combination of economic, political and social factors. The overall size of inflows varies deeply over time and across countries. An analysis of the age structure of the population shows that the foreign population is younger than the national population.

European economic and political integration has proceeded in a technocratic fashion. At first, this was an understandable strategy, given the need to solve the German problem and to cope with the geopolitics of the Cold War. The single market, the euro, the Schengen passport-free zone was designed and completed by elites. From a sociological perspective, migrant integration appears to be primarily a local process. The local level is where migrants go to school, find jobs, participate in social life and raise their kids.

Studying British migrants offers practical advantages, in that qualitative and quantitative data tend to be more readily available when compared with that of other countries. In terms of the cross-national comparisons, Germany and the United Kingdom make for a good pairing. The two countries share a host of similarities: both opened their borders to large-scale immigration in the postwar period, resulting in the settlement of immigrant communities that are ethnically, culturally, and religiously distinct from the indigenous population. The main relevant features that distinguish the two countries are the economic foundations of their immigration regimes and the stringency of their citizenship laws.

Since the implementation of the first *Immigration Act* in 1962, the British government has consistently managed to keep immigration at a significantly lower level than its continental neighbours such as France, Germany or the Netherlands. In contrast with the United Kingdom where immigration control has regularly appeared on the political agenda since the 1962, the first piece of legislation in Spain was issued as late as 1985. The Netherlands developed centrally coordinated migrant integration policies at the end of the 1970s and has attracted various types of migrants, including colonial migrants as well as labour and asylum migrants.

Denmark seems to have become an increasingly closed, nationalistic society with restrictive immigration policies. Sweden, on the other hand, a country with a more centralist nation-state and a long history of heavy industry drawing on skilled foreign labour, has asserted itself as a progressive country with an official multicultural policy, celebrating cultural diversity and a more liberal policy of family reunification and refugee admittance. Norway, traditionally based on a maritime as well as a rural economy, has opted for a middle course, but with a tendency to move toward the more restrictive policies of Denmark.

A fundamental difference between the European Union and its member states is namely the absence of the traditional government-opposition dialectic at European level. Having been denied an appropriate political arena in which to hold European governance accountable, voters are almost forced to gradually transform popular referendums into contests for or against the European Union. Given the present state of public opinion, such referendums represent a potential hazard for the integration process. Small countries see in common institutions and common deliberations the best protection against the risk of domination by the larger member states. Today members are at different stages of socioeconomic development, with different geopolitical concerns, and correspondingly diverse policy priorities. Idea of differentiated integration has been proposed.

European Union has been able to adopt rules directly linked with integration, like access to education and vocational training, social assistance, medical screening, recognition of diplomas and qualifications, access to goods and services, tax benefit. All of these rights serve the purpose of including migrants into society. The European Union law may be considered an important framework granting third-country nationals with basic rights which they would not benefit under national law. Many newcomers learn about European society primarily through health clinics, social service centres, integration programmes and in the case of refugees, asylum centres. Their personal encounters with local population involve mainly staff on these various welfare programmes.

This assistance is problematic, largely because it entails active intervention in the private lives of refugees and immigrants by professionals within the European welfare system seeking to shape these population groups according to European norms. Another problem arising from the welfare societies` integration programmes is that the refugees can easily become stuck in the integration sector of the welfare society.

How assimilation takes place in the United Kingdom as a view of Muslims varies widely across country?

At the end of the nineteenth century, almost all of the Muslim lands were under colonial rule. The role of colonialism is important in the formation of anti-Western discourses and practices on the part of Muslims. Post-war Muslim groups arrived in the United Kingdom as immigrants and settled as communities at a time of rapid globalisation. The United Kingdom has one of the largest Muslim communities in Europe, which form an economically underprivileged class. The British Muslim communities have remained concentrated in the inner-city areas of older towns and cities in the United Kingdom. Nearly half of them live in and around London. It is an indicator of their inability to move out of areas facing high levels of social tension and economic deprivation, as well as direct discrimination, racial hostility and cultural exclusion.

In modern urban centres there is an increasingly cosmopolitan environment evident, through the diversities of people, politics and places. It is the increase in these differences between individuals in society that leads to an increasing need for recognition and status. This population is largely young and religious one that holds strong family values. On average it is relatively poor, badly housed, poorly educated and has a distinctively limited female participation rate in the labour market. The Muslim community in the United Kingdom is not a homogenous one. It is multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-lingual and comprises the largest religious minority in the United Kingdom today. It is this religious dimension which provides a uniting factor.

Since Muslim immigrants first began arriving in the United Kingdom from the Indian sub-continent and parts of Africa in the 1950s, they have negotiated long and hard with local authorities. This generates debate over issues such as cultural diversity, social cohesion, and the extent of minority rights in a democracy. In the light of the events of 9/11, the subsequent "War on Terror" and the events of 7/7, it is a time when the religion of Islam and Muslims as a body of people are persistently given negative attention. The positions of Islam and Muslims are being continuously re-examined in the light of further events and new challenges. Islam is slowly, but continuously becoming part of British social, cultural and political landscape. Some Muslims are more inclined toward integration than others.

Their communities are different in regard to their level of integration and their ideological orientation, but they have much in common in terms of their experiences of alienation. While efforts have been made in developing institutions and methods to deal with an increasingly multi-ethnic and multicultural society, much still needs to be done by both sides. The need to promote better mutual knowledge between Muslims and British is essential. The huge investment in mosques is one indication of both a Muslim commitment to stay in the United Kingdom and a determination to pass on to their children their religious and cultural values. Most of the Muslim communities are networked across the country with relatives living in other cities and whom they regularly visit on religious and social occasions. Religious leaders are also part of regional, national and international associations. The case study shows that Muslims have created their own segregated communities, which makes it harder to integrate into British society.

Reducing social and economic inequalities will help to alleviate the potential for extremism. The demand by Muslims to be defined and recognized as separate group is shaped and motivated by the present social, political and legal context of the enlarged Europe.

As Muslims ability to communicate effectively has improved, they have become more confident about engaging with the British political systems and learned to bend it to serve their interests. There are many shared bonds between Muslims and non-Muslims in the United Kingdom – for example, in relation to attitudes towards welfare, charity, neighbourliness, reciprocity, kindness to children and elders, voting, property rights, inheritance rights and divorce rights. What differentiate Muslims are language, culture and history. The majority of Muslims believe that it is possible to live peacefully in the United Kingdom and remain perfectly Muslim.

Which are the present challenges of migration in Europe?

The level of hostility towards migrants is higher than ever before. The three factors that have brought the settler society era to a close are: the asylum crisis, the fear of fundamental Islam and the demise of multiculturalism. Major problem with the dispersal policy is that many of the small communities where refugees are located are not used to having strangers from distant places of origin in their midst.

Immigrants and refugees are struggling with a generally negative image in European society. This has made it more difficult for them to gain social acceptance and obtain employment, especially in periods when jobs are scarce. The tension between local and global forces sets off two processes, one tending towards the homogenisation of global culture and the other towards differentiation of cultures. A radical Muslim perspective, taking advantage of global communication, present itself in sharp contrast to the images presented by the Western-controlled media and gathers support among the most disillusioned and alienated. In light of fears for the security of their safety, anti-immigrant sentiment rose among the locally born in almost every European Union country. Even the right to the free movement of people within the Schengen area in Europe has been questioned.

Policies are also becoming more protective of the local population. Fences are being built in different parts of the world to keep intruders from entering the country. These tensions are showing shortages of international co-operation on migration issues. Countries of destination face more migration-related problems and the rejection of immigrants by locals is higher. The latest waves of migration have led to political crises in many countries in both the developed and developing world.

Main political orientation should rely on three key drivers:

1) More investment in people;
2) Activating social policies;
3) Strengthening action against old and new forms of social exclusion.

States have sovereign rights to control which non-citizens enter and remain in their territory. The shift away from unbounded liberal commitments is important for all Western democracies. The loss of these liberal commitments brings with it the end of the liberal vision of immigration. The ways in which immigration regimes affect the supply of and demand for local economic resources, influence levels of economic scarcity in immigrant destinations. Together, immigrant political power and economic scarcity explain the incidence of local immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflict.

The social rejection that immigrants encounter in different ways in contemporary Europe is experienced as a great problem preventing them from improving their condition and developing a sense of belonging in the country where they are living. Refugees` family relations play a central role in the process of social incorporation in a receiving society because they can act as brokers, explicating the foreign ways in an environment unfamiliar to newcomers.

The innovation of a united Europe is expressed mostly in the freedom of movement that the open borders represent. But the asylum crisis and the fear of Islamic fundamentalism challenges this freedom. Without it, the European Union becomes much more a free trade zone where goods and capital flow, but labour does not. Only by acting as a united whole can Europe continue as a major international actor.

Possible areas of further research

One of the possible study areas is to learn, what is the end point of assimilation. Even after generations in North America, many people of European ancestry appear to retain a symbolic level of ethnicity. Since ethnic identity is dynamic, it thus remains unclear how today`s second generation in the United States will ultimately view itself. But opportunities for greater economic mobility will be critical to the outcome. At the same time liberal states are caught in a dilemma. International economics push liberal states toward greater openness for efficiency reasons. Whereas domestic political and legal forces push the same states toward greater closure, to preserve the sovereignty. Another further research questions would be, how states are able to escape from this dilemma.

Political commitment is decisive for the future of the integration process. The need for modernisation of social protection systems so that they can provide adequate income support and access to healthcare while remaining financially sustainable. There is a very real risk that the social dimensions will become swamped by economic considerations. The fight against social exclusion has received disproportionate attention. Income instability may lead to feelings of insecurity and to postponing important life course decisions such as the formation of an independent household, having children and so on. The societies have focused on the outcome of failures, while the roots of the problems have remained unaddressed. It is clear from a review of the literature that no simple European Union-wide solution to social exclusion exists, because the understanding of it varies from country to country. Exchange of experience can be a valuable tool in developing new policy responses.

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