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**BRITISH POLITICAL LEADERS AND THEIR VISION ABOUT
THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. CHURCHILL AND
THATCHER: MODELS FOR THE FUTURE?**

Bachelor's Thesis

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I declare I have written the bachelor's thesis independently.

All works and major viewpoints of the other authors, data from other sources of literature and elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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ABSTRACT

Sir Winston Churchill is one of the most influential persons of the XX Century. His achievements as a writer, historian, adventurer, soldier, artist and politician provides him outstanding aura of prestige. Churchill was an active leader during the tragic events of the WWII, a fundamental actor for the victory of the Allies and the further organization of the post war era. This research analyses the view of Churchill about the European integration through his main political speeches, mainly in Zurich and in la Hague, his ideas about the League of Nations and the further United Nations, his understanding of the British Empire, and the special relations between UK and USA. His participation of the process uniting Europe in its early stages provides us with essential information about the original plans for the creation of a united Europe.

Baroness Margaret Thatcher has been one of the most influential politicians in the European building process. Her opinions are still today supported by many people in the current crisis of the European common currency, and her participation in issues such as the Single European Act or the solution of the British question influence still the lives of European citizens.

Thatcher is still a symbol for euro sceptics, a defender of national sovereignty and the independence of the member States of the European Union from the European institutions. Her basic idea was related to popular loyalty and the transfer of sovereignty from the national to the European level, a utopia according to Thatcher that could endanger European societies, liberties, and way of life.

The research question of this bachelor thesis is finding how much these two outstanding British politicians have influenced the implication of the United Kingdom in the European integration process, if their influence last until the current times and if it still has distinct prospects to influence the development of the EU-British relations in years to come.

Keywords: Churchill, Thatcher, Intergovernmentalism, British Euroscepticism, fathers of Europe, European integration, EFTA, the Council of Europe, The Single European Act, The British Rebate.

1. INTRODUCTION TO CHURCHILL

The analysis of the role of Sir Winston Churchill in the European integration is complicated and his real involvement in the integration process has not been properly analysed. External issues, specially his role as British premier and his active and crucial participation in the most important events of world politics in the XX century, have overshadowed Churchill's contribution to the European Integration. It complicates the analysis of the real relevance of Churchill's involvement in the process creating the current European Union (EU). His relation with the European integration was concentrated between the years after the IIWW and his second term as British Premier in 1951, but his contacts with Jean Monnet date back the IWW. Churchill was a historian, a writer, a soldier, a painter, adventurer and politician. This outstanding multifaceted activity hides the modest, but important, contributions of Churchill in the European building process that awarded him the title of Founding father of the European Union, among other important persons involved in the process as Konrad Adenauer (Germany), Joseph Bech (Luxembourg), Johan Willem Beyen (Netherlands), Alcide De Gasperi (Italy), Walter Hallstein (Germany), Sicco Mansholt (Netherlands), Jean Monnet (France), Robert Schuman (France), Paul-Henri Spaak (Belgium), Altiero Spinelli (Italy). It has added more confusion to the real role of Churchill in relation with the integration of Europe, as he stands officially in equal terms with the architects of the first European Community.

The goal of this research is determining clearly the involvement of Churchill in the European integration affairs, his ideas about the European States of Europe. His ideas or perceptions about the European building process are important to understand the origins of the EU and the further developments expected by Churchill in a long term integration process. The historical relations between United Kingdom and the EU with constant tensions and different visions about how the organization should work, are another important factor in the research. The iconic force of Churchill in the British popular imagery can influence the constant British debate about the country's involvement in the EU. The ideas and contributions of Churchill to the European integration, the most popular icon of United Kingdom in the XX century and only British personality involved in the European integration building process, are crucial to understand the historical and current relations between the UK and the EU.

The main problem for researching the contributions of Winston Churchill to the current EU is the lack of specialised literature focused on the topic. Nevertheless much has been written about Churchill, from different perspectives, including an outstanding number of general biographies, sectorial works focus on his different activities, his own writings, his own autobiography and the record of his numerous speeches. Nevertheless there is not relevant literature focus on his involvement on the European integration affairs rather than ethereal references to his famous speech in Zurich (1946) calling for the United States of Europe, that mostly is limited evoking the title of the speech rather than its content.

Churchill's work as historian includes several important books, as *his A History of the English-speaking peoples* (Churchill 1958), *The Second World War* (Churchill 1953) or *The World Crisis* (Churchill, 1931). His narrative history earned him the Nobel Prize in Literature but is strongly link with the British affairs, hence the interest of Churchill obviously was not, at least from the historical approach, focus on the European affairs as a whole, rather than with the British involvement in the world affairs as a world power and active player in the international relations. The work as historian of Churchill has been carefully analysed by Maurice Ashley, (1968) literary assistant to Winston Churchill and historian himself.

The writing career of Churchill contains dozens of books on different topics, mostly link with his living experiences, novels and even fictional works. His literature career has been analysed by several authors, as Carter (1965), Alldritt (1992) or Rasor (2000). On his more artistic sphere, his painting activity is less relevant for this research, but still important to understand Churchill, as clearly he himself pointed out in his work *Painting as a Pastime* (1948). Combs (2004) has made a detailed research about Churchill's painting and its influence in his life. His military activity has attracted more attention, mainly in his early days as a young officer serving in the British Empire and his military activity in the Western front during the IWW. Authors as D'Este (2010), Russell (2006) or Thompson (1973) have deeply research the topic, highlighting his personal bravery, his tactical developments and his command skills. His life as adventurer has attract lots of devotion, thanks to his own writings about the different campaigns he took part of, and the myth of a young hero built around the figure of Churchill, as it was brilliantly pointed out by Cannadine (2005).

The extended political career of Churchill have been widely discuss from different perspectives, as emphasizing his political beliefs Gilbert (1983), Addison (1980) and Charmley

(2014). These three authors, among others, explain properly the main political ideas of Churchill, but their outstanding works do not include enough information about the political beliefs of Churchill referring to the European Integration rather than mere indirect references. The biographies of Churchill are also countless, including several brilliant works, especially the works published by Gilbert (1992) and Roy Jenkins (2012). Nevertheless, these well documented books analysed deeply the life, actions and ideas of Churchill, but their references to the role of Churchill as a father of Europe are not properly addressed.

Hence the best approach to understand the real thoughts and contributions of Winston Churchill to the European integration are his own speeches, his wide correspondence with the main political leaders of the XX century, his prolific correspondence with his wife, and his participation in different historical events shaping the current European Union. Thanks to the literature skills of Churchill, he mastered the elaboration of speeches, and used their publication as a way to spread his ideas. The great edition of Robert Rhodes (1974) includes the most relevant speeches of Churchill's long political career; like his famous *we shall never surrender* included in his speech *We Shall Fight on the Beaches* (June 4, 1940.) addressed to the House of Commons, or the reference to the Iron Curtain included in his speech *The Sinews of Peace* (March 5, 1946.) in Missouri, USA. The main speeches related to the European integration, and basic pillars of this research are *the United States of Europe* (September 19, 1946) in the University of Zurich, his speech to the Council of Europe (August 17, 1949. Strasbourg) and his participation in the debate about the Schuman plan in the House of Commons (27 June 1950). As a complementary source, his wide correspondence with political leaders and close associates include some valuable information about the ideas of Churchill related to the European integration. Finally, his participation in the Hague Congress (1948) provides us with important information about the real involvement of Winston Churchill in the European movement and his position about the possible shape of the future organization.

The combination of the primary sources with a critic analysis to the extensive literature provides this research with information to clarify Churchill's ideas about the political and economic integration of Europe and establish his real role in the process uniting Europe.

2. CHURCHILL. PERSONAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT.

Winston Spencer Churchill was born in an English aristocratic family with a socialite American mother in 1874. He chose the military career and served in different locations of the British Empire, as India, South Africa and Sudan as an officer. He showed courage in his war actions and combined his military activity with a work as war correspondent. His literature work was outstanding, being awarded with the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1953, thanks to different biographic and historical books, his series of articles and his speeches. Being the last highly influential in the world politics, as his speech encouraging the British to resist the German threat and his famous we shall never surrender (We Shall Fight on the Beaches, June 4, 1940), when the German troops seemed unstoppable.

Before the IWW he was already and active politician, using his growing popularity as a war hero and as a writer to join the House of Commons of United Kingdom. He served as President of the Board of Trade, Home Secretary, and First Lord of the Admiralty as part of Asquith's Liberal government. The disaster of Gallipoli led to his resignation and he resumed his military activity in the Western front as commander of the 6th Battalion of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, where once again he showed his personal bravery in several war actions. He returned to government as Minister of Munitions, Secretary of State for War, and Secretary of State for Air. In 1921–1922 Churchill served as Secretary of State for the Colonies, then Chancellor of the Exchequer in Baldwin's Conservative government of 1924–1929. During this period in governmental positions he took controversial decisions as supporting the gold standard, or rejecting the home rule of India and opposing the abdication of Edward VIII.

During the 1930s, Churchill became a strong critic to the Western inactivity towards Nazi Germany and campaigned for rearmament. He was again appointed First Lord of the Admiralty and following the resignation of Neville Chamberlain on 1940, became Prime Minister, leading the British Empire and the allies in the war effort against the Nazis.

The elections of 1945 send him to the opposition, being an active period in European affairs, with several conferences and his active participation in the Hague Congress in 1948. The post war period was crucial for the creation of the current European Union and other European initiatives as the Council of Europe. The participation of Churchill was very important due his immense personal

prestige and his support to the integration process in Europe under special conditions, not necessarily matching with the current trends of integration. Nevertheless his return to Downing Street as Prime minister from 1951 till 1955, reduced his participation in the process and increased the British-American axis, separating UK from the first European Communities (David, Cannadine, 2005, 20-160)

Winston Churchill died in 1965, being his last remarkable speech link with his nomination as honorary citizen of the United States by President John F. Kennedy. The last years of Churchill were negatively influenced by sickness and physical problems, reducing his personal participation in the European affairs, as for example in the case of the personal veto of the French president, de Gaulle, to the British petition of membership to the European Communities, where Churchill did not intervene regardless his solid personal connections with the French general.

3. POLITICAL IDEAS AND MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS

The long political career of Churchill was defined by three different factors; pragmatism, tenacity and innovation. His political life was divided between two of the main parties of UK, the conservatives and the liberals, but his ideas remained substantially similar in his double way journey across the benches of the House of Commons. The analysis of Churchill's political work helps us to understand his vision about UK, as an active British statesman, and the international affairs, as a world leader. Nevertheless this analysis should be cautious, as it is an indirect source open to interpretations and because Churchill was a politician, open to change his positions according to the social necessities. All the actions of Churchill must be understood under the prism of the historical situation, as the zenith of the British Empire, the IWW, the Interwar period, the IIWW and the Cold War.

Winston Churchill was a fervent supporter of free trade, when at the time the British politics were dominated by the debate of the economic model of the state; open to the world economy fostering trade, or more restrictive access to the British market protecting the British industry from more competitive foreign companies. The result of the internal debate was favourable to Churchill's option, influencing the British economic development during all the XX century and its relations with the European Communities.

The creation of the ECSC, the embryo of the current European Union, was an interesting project to the British authorities as the mining sector was important for the British economy. It was seen as a free trade area in the markets of coal and steel (Lucas, Bruyning 1990, 55-66), but the inclusion of integrational elements meant the British withdraw from the negotiations. Afterwards the British government created an alternative model of cooperation based exclusively on industrial free trade, the European Free Trade Association, signed in Stockholm in 1960 by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, including later other European states. The association sponsored by the British government lost its importance with the enlargement of the European Communities to UK, Ireland and Denmark. Nevertheless, the British once inside of the EEC have been constantly pushing in the direction of a free trade economy in Europe rather than political integration. The contributions of Margaret Thatcher to the Single European Act (1986) were crucial to create the Single European Market, and even in the current

times, the British government lead by Cameron is constantly proposing increasing the freedom of the market to foster trade, but reducing the political integration, a constant in most of his predecessors. The influence of Churchill in the traditional British approach to the European Integration, as a free trade area rather than a political project, is obvious as he was crucial in the internal debate of UK leading to the implementation of a free trade policy. Nevertheless, the idea of Churchill was link with the conception of the British Empire as a world free trade area, but if we extrapolate this idea to the European stage, the current British position is a result of the ideas developed and supported fervently by him.

Churchill regardless his aristocracy origins included in his political actions numerous actions favouring the less fortunate British citizens, as an example of pragmatism accepting the new necessities of the British society against the privileges of his own social class, the imperial aristocracy. He introduced the Trade Boards Bill setting up the first minimum wages in Britain, he helped drafting the first unemployment pension legislation of the country, the National Insurance Act of 1911 (Anthony Montague, Browne 1995, 51) and he also assisted and supported the people's Budget, creating new taxes on the wealthy to finance social welfare programmes. His ideas were somehow included in the essence of the European Union as the solidarity between member states is one of the main pillars in the organization, and did not differ from the ideas of the Christian democrats designing the European integration process. It also shows the great social adaptability of Churchill to new ideologies and the idea of a constant social evolution. It suggest adaptation to the European society demands and hence a flexible approach to the European building process according to the necessities of the society, in constant evolution.

His capacity to compromise and accept creative and innovative political solutions was shown in the aftermath of the Second Boer War, also known as the Second Anglo-Boer War and the South African War (11 October 1899 – 31 May 1902), were he participated officially as a war correspondent combining it with active involvement in the fighting. After the military British victory, Churchill supported the Transvaal Constitution delegating a greater proportion of power to the Boers themselves. Regardless the British success in the war, he pointed out that any government imposed by London without including the Boers would lead to a repetition of the conflict. Integration between victors and losers was the best solution for a peaceful and prosperous coexistence in South Africa in the framework of the British Empire. It was the same essential idea

that years later would lead to the creation of the European Communities, including Germany in the European integration as an equal partner. Churchill showed a similar approach in the European scenario; at the Second Quebec Conference in 1944 he drafted and, together with Roosevelt, signed a less-harsh version of the original Morgenthau Plan, in which was pledged to convert Germany after its unconditional surrender into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character. He remarkably changed his original position towards Germany promoting a strong and free Western Germany in the context of the Cold War (Martin, Gilbert 1992, 96-98).

The tenacity of Churchill could be defined as providential. His ardent opposition to the Communist regime in Russia, after the IWW, and his call for a military intervention to prevent future threats were dismissed by a British government and a British society exhausted by the war efforts. His resistance against the Nazis, against any logic as UK was standing alone against Germany after the Germans pact with the USSR, the French surrender and the USA neutrality, prevented the Hitler's triumph and paved the way to victory. During the war he again showed pragmatism, as he collaborated actively with an unexpected ally, the USSR, regardless his opposition to the communist ideas. Right after the war he became a public advocate of freedom and democracy against the totalitarian system imposed by the communist regimes all over central and east Europe supported by the Red Army, and his speech *The Sinews of Peace* (March 5, 1946.) encouraged the Europeans to stand firmly in the context of the Cold War against the aggressive behaviour of the Soviet Union and its world revolution. Churchill's opposition to the Communist expansion also helped the European Integration, as a united Western Europe was crucial to stand against the Soviet threat. The desirable collaboration between West Germany and France cannot be understood without the external influence of the Cold War.

The capacity of Winston Churchill to adapt and implement innovations in different fields was one of his outstanding skills. He launched a Programme to replace coal power with oil power, among other innovations in the British navy as First Lord of the Admiralty, a controversial initiative as UK was an important producer of coal, and back then its oil reserves were minimal. Nevertheless, his risky reform paid off during the IIWW as the Royal Navy stood firmly in different war scenarios against the German Kriegsmarine. He also was a keen supporter of other military innovations, as the development of a tank force and the investment in aircrafts. His measures provided the RAF with enough strength during the Battle of Britain (1940) to contain the Luftwaffe

and prevent any amphibious invasion. These fact proved that Churchill was not afraid of innovations, on the other hand, he supported them in any field, as military or politics. Hence the innovative approach of the European Communities, an integration process between enemies, would have not hesitated him (Roy, Jenkins 2012, 272)

An important feature of Churchill's life, in the political and personal sphere, was his relation with the United States of America. His mother, Jennie Jerome, was born in New York in 1854, in a rich family with a financier and speculator father, and a rich heiress mother, influencing Churchill's approach to USA. In political terms, his relation with Roosevelt and the collaboration between UK and USA during the WWII was crucial to defeat the Germans. The important influence in Churchill's life of USA has been analysed by his own homonymous grandson, Winston S. Churchill, *The Great Republic: A History of America* (2001) and the outstanding book of Martin Gilbert *Churchill and America* (2005). Also Churchill's own writings refer to the matter, as his book *A history of the English-speaking peoples* (2013) includes constant references to the special relations between United Kingdom and USA, as part of the same political and cultural space with common traditions and goals.

Winston Churchill visited for the first time USA in November 1895, on his way to his first military adventure, in Cuba. In 1900 Churchill returned for a comprehensive lecture tour across the eastern United States and Canada. During 1929 he repeated successfully a lecture tour all over USA, even visiting the West Cost, and again in December 1931 was in New York. As British Prime minister he visited USA five times during the IIWW. On 1946, already out of office, he took a vacation in USA, and by 1953, again as British Prime Minister he visited again the USA with the Cold War as a main objective of discussion. In May 1959, at the age of eighty-four, Churchill returned to the United States as a personal guest of the President Eisenhower, and in 1961 he made his last visit to the States (Martin, Gilbert 2005, 22-36).

Already during the WWI the Americans honoured him with the Distinguished Service Medal in 1919 and after the IIW he was awarded with honorary American citizenship, a rare privilege. The special relation of Churchill, a major politician in the British Empire, the world power then, with three USA presidents, during the emergence of the United States as a major power was essential for the international affairs. The transition from the British leadership to the current USA position of world power cannot be understood without the friendly attitude of Churchill

towards America. Even though Jean Monnet, another so called father of Europe and main architect of the European Coal and Steel Community, also had strong relations with USA, his approach was different, as he saw the Americans as the needed sponsors for building the European States of Europe. Churchill saw the Americans as an equal partner to the British Empire, and an ally to keep the British status as a world power, including a combined sponsorship on the European Integration. The special relation between USA and UK fostered and promoted by Churchill, did not really fit with the European integration process, as the relations with USA, according to Churchill, were the priority of the British government in foreign affairs. The transatlantic cooperation was more important than the European domestic issues, as the vision of Churchill was influenced by a global perspective provided by the conception of the British Empire as a world leader. The fluid relation with the USA was shadowed by different disagreements, as the problems with USA about the Treaty of Versailles after WWI or the Churchill's critics about US Sec of State John Foster Dulles' domino theory or some disagreements with Eisenhower about the European integration. Nevertheless he had a strong relationship with U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt—between 1939 and 1945 they exchanged an estimated 1,700 letters and telegrams and met 11 times; Churchill estimated that they had 120 days of close personal contact.

The special relation between UK and USA was, among other reasons, used by the French president de Gaulle to reject twice the British application to full membership to the European Communities. The intentions of de Gaulle of building a third way in the Cold War independent from USA and USSR, and promoting the French role as a world leader, colluded with the Anglo-American relations. The French statesman even thought of UK as a Trojan Horse of USA in the European Communities. Churchill's position towards USA was also adopted by other British prime ministers as Margaret Thatcher or Tony Blair. It has been a constant since then in British politics and it has highly influenced the British actions inside the EU (David, Ramiro 2008).

4. CHURCHILL IDEAS AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.

There are different direct sources in order to analyse Churchill's position towards the European integration process. His political activity provides important information for the research on Churchill's approach to the European integration, as the Declaration of Union between France and UK, adopted by the British government and announced by Churchill in June 1940, (Avi, Shlaim 1974, 27-63) his support to the European Defence Community (Brian, Duchin 1992, 201-221.), Churchill's membership in the European Movement, and his relations with the European Communities in his second term as Prime Minister from 1951 to 1955 (John, Young 1985, 923-937.)

His public speeches are traditionally the main source used to explain the relation of Churchill with the European Integration; basically just one speech has been quoted constantly to explain Churchill's position, the famous 1946 Zurich speech (Winston, Churchill 2013). It, obviously has created a distortion around the real position of Churchill towards the European Integration as most of the authors mostly refer exclusively to this speech in order to explain Churchill's ideas related to Europe, as the former president of the European Commission, Barroso did in 2013. (Massimo, Gibilaro 2013, 88) Nevertheless there are many other direct sources to investigate Churchill's position about European affairs, as important speeches in the Congress of Europe, the opening meeting of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, his interventions as Chairman of the European Movement, international conferences, especially in USA, the mail correspondence with his close collaborators, and his interventions in the House of Commons, especially regarding the debate about the Schuman Plan. (Winston, Churchill 1947)

4.1 Winston Churchill. Euro-sceptic or European integration supporter

Churchill has been used as an icon against the European Integration in British politics, UKIP leader Nigel Farage has stressed Churchill's opposition to the European Communities and his commitment to the independence of UK against any supranational intervention (Richard,

Hayton 2010, 26-35) and even important scholars have written about the rejection of Churchill to join the European integration process (John, Young 1985, 923). On the other hand, Churchill is included by the European Union as one of its founding fathers (Desmond, Dinan 2014, 132) and an example of British support to the European Union when the relations between UK and the EU are conflictive, as previous president of the European Commission, Mr. Barroso, pointed out in a Special Churchill Lecture in the university of Zürich (8 November 2013)

The apparent contradiction can be clarified through the own words of Churchill and his own European political positions. Churchill wrote to his foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, on 21 October 1942: *'Hard as it is to say now... I look forward to a United States of Europe, in which the barriers between the nations will be greatly minimized and unrestricted travel will be possible.'* (Anthony, Eden 1965, 74). Clearly he liked the idea of some kind European Integration as a novelty to prevent conflicts, because these words must be understood in the context of the IIWW. Churchill made public his support to the European integration in his Zurich speech of 1946 as he said: *'We must build a kind of United States of Europe'*. His words are clear as he used WE instead of THEY, showing his support and possible participation in the new process uniting Europe. (Winston, Churchill 1946) At London's Albert Hall, in May 1947, just a few months after his Zurich speech, Churchill spoke as Chairman and Founder of the United Europe Movement to *'present the idea of a United Europe in which our country will play a decisive part.'* His support to the novelty of uniting Europe was clear, including UK in the process. Nevertheless the role of UK in the integration was not explained in detail in this occasion beside the reference about sponsoring it. He argued in the same speech that Britain and France should be the, *'founder-partners in this movement'* and concluded, *'Britain will have to play her full part as a member of the European family'*. In May 1948 Churchill said in the opening speech to the Congress of Europe in The Hague:

We cannot aim at anything less than the Union of Europe as a whole, and we look forward with confidence to the day when that Union will be achieved.'
Again making clear his support and involvement in the European integration in front of an audience debating about the model of the future integration.

Nevertheless Churchill did not present clearly his position about the level of British involvement and the way the integration should follow. At a speech, again given for the European Movement at Kingsway Hall, November 1949, Churchill argued:

The British Government have rightly stated that they cannot commit this country to entering any European Union without the agreement of the other members of the British Commonwealth. We all agree with that statement. But no time must be lost in discussing the question with the Dominions and seeking to convince them that their interests as well as ours lie in a United Europe. It express again the support of Churchill to the European integration, and adds a new element, the inclusion of the former British Empire countries included in the Commonwealth in the process.

These declarations, during a long and stable period of time, reject any Eurosceptic sentiment in Churchill and understandably are not referred by those using the iconic force of Churchill against the European Union.

It is evident that Winston S. Churchill supported the process of the European integration as he expressed several times during his political life. Hence, the real debate should then be about what kind of Europe he supported, as there were, and still are, different visions about the process uniting Europe and not just a unitary position.

4.2 Europe as United Nations

Winston Churchill supported the creation of the League of Nations, even though he complaint bitterly about the incapacity of the organization to prevent the IWW because of its incapacity to treat fairly the defeated Germany. (Winston, Churchill 1948, 2) After the IWW he promoted the United Nations, a new world organization heir of the League of Nations (E. J., Hughes 1974, 177-194) Obviously the international cooperation was a priority for Churchill in order to keep peace and stability, basic for the international economic development. Both

organizations were based on cooperation, rather than integration; it provides an example of Churchill's ideas about international integration. Nevertheless, the UN differed from the League of Nations in several crucial points, as more executive powers to the Security Council and the creation of armed forces provided by the member states to serve as peace-keepers or to repel an aggressor. The Security Council had five permanent members, United States, the Soviet Union, China, France and Britain, plus other countries serving two years terms on it. The veto power of the permanent members over the decisions made by the Security Council express the idea of cooperation rather than integration, as a single member can blockade any decision against its national interest; a facto way to keep intact the national sovereignty. It resembles the actions of de Gaulle inside the European Communities and the agreement of Fontainebleau after the empty chair crisis where it was accepted a voting system based on qualified majority accepting the veto of any member state if its national interest was at stake. (David, Ramiro 2008, 139-152) As Churchill was one of the main architects of UN and promoted it on USA and even with Stalin, we can assure that his commitment with international cooperation, and even with some sort of integration, was clear, but establishing some safeguards to the national sovereignty avoiding full integration.

Churchill made several statements linking the European integration and the new world organization, in his view complementing each other. Churchill's speech in La Hague 1948 outlined: *'we must endeavour by patience and faithful service to prepare for the day when there will be an effective world government resting on the main groupings of mankind.'* (Winston, Churchill 1949). The reference of main groupings of mankind makes reference to Europe, Asia or America as an integral part of the organization. If UN would be organized by regional unions rather than countries, obviously these regions should be organized in a similar way than the United Nations. Hence, it is likely that Churchill thought of the future European Union as an organization organized as a forum where to solve the problems between the member states by peaceful meanings with a regional security council including the most powerful member states with veto rights. This idea is reinforced by Churchill's speech at the University of Harvard on September 1943: *'Let us have a world council and under it regional or continental councils'* (Winston, Churchill 1944, 1). According to these ideas, Europe should work as a regional council integrated in a world council, as a part of the United Nations. Hence the European organization should not lay on political integration rather than an organization based on collaboration between its members. Churchill argued about the needed

leadership of UK and France in the new organization, the only two European members of the Security Council of the UN with veto right. At London's Albert Hall, in May 1947, speaking in a meeting of the United Europe Movement to '*present the idea of a United Europe in which our country will play a decisive part...*' Churchill supported that Britain and France should be the, '*founder-partners in this movement*'. It could suggest that the Security Council of the UN, formed by USA, UK, France, USSR and China was representing the major civilizations of the world and the leaders of their respective regional areas.

In October 1948 during a Conservative Mass Meeting at Llandudno, Churchill made clear that Britain held a unique position at the heart of 'three majestic circles': the 'Empire and Commonwealth', 'the English speaking world' and a 'United Europe'. It would have made UK member of different regional organizations part of the United Nations. Obviously, in a model following the pattern of integration, it would have been impossible to be part of different regional areas at the same time. For example, the European Coal and Steel Community created a common market with common external borders, these would have prevented the simultaneous membership of different regional organizations simultaneously. Hence, the idea of Churchill about the European integration differed strongly from the path chosen by Europe leading to the current European Union. In the same speech, he continued with:

We are the only country which has a great part in every one of them. We stand, in fact, at the very point of junction, and here in this Island at the centre of the seaways and perhaps of the airways also, we have the opportunity of joining them all together

Besides a British centred point of view in international relations, normal in a politician born in the British Empire, Churchill made clear his position towards the model of integration, as just with an organization as United Nations, could UK be part of different regional levels.

Reinforcing the idea of the European integration as a regional part of the world organization, Churchill made a speech in Fulton in 1946 declaring himself against Europe becoming a Third Force between America and USSR and creating a neutral geographical bloc in the context of the international relations (Winston, Churchill 1946). As USA and UK were defending universal rights, principals common to all humankind being aside them during the Cold

War, was standing for freedom and humanity, somehow representing the world. The idea of the European Communities as a third independent way in the Cold War was applied by de Gaulle in his attempt of recovering French international prestige and influence in the world affairs. Nevertheless his position did not survive his office term, as Pompidou already changed the French Foreign Policy. (David, Ramiro 2008, 152)

4.3 Cooperation versus integration

According to the public positions of Churchill we can only guess what kind of organization he wanted in the European level. He was very ambiguous about it, but we should not forget that at that time a new process of integration started, something never done before in human history, without a clear map road to support or reject. Nevertheless there are some red lines in Churchill's ideas about the European integration that should be respected to the full membership of UK in the organization, and the British were seen by him as a crucial part of the European future as he wrote in a private letter in 1963, just two years before his death: "*The future of Europe if Britain were to be excluded is black indeed*" (David, Dutton 1997, 210).

The best source to obtain Churchill's views about the European organization are his interventions in the debate of the House of Commons to discuss a united Europe in June 1950, (Christopher, Lord, 1992, 419-436) because it was a debate about Europe, a discussion related with the model of Europe suitable for UK. Churchill said that he could not 'at present' foresee Britain being 'a member of a Federal Union of Europe'. However, Churchill went on to explain that this was primarily because of Britain's position, 'at the centre of the British Empire and Commonwealth', and, 'our fraternal association with the United States of America.' Hence Churchill's ideas about the European integration were not link with federalism, but he was a supporter of UK participating in the project for the good of Europe and UK. The idea of Great Britain participating in different regional organizations, as Europe, transatlantic relations or the Commonwealth, would have been possible in a scenario based on cooperation where the relations with the members of the organization will not be exclusively, as a common market with common external tariffs rather than a free trade area without integration.

Nevertheless Churchill's pragmatism was present in this debate, complaining about the obstructive attitude of the British Socialist Government to the European Integration and the Schuman plan, converting UK an enemy of Europe. According to Churchill, if the British government persisted in its position, the influence of UK in Europe would decline. Therefore, even if he did not want UK as a part of a federal Europe, he was open to negotiations to try to find the best solution for the British and European interest. The strategy of the British labour government was to delay as much as possible the European integration in a way to divert the path from integration to cooperation, earning for UK the European suspicious about the real involvement of the country in the European building process, that last until nowadays. (David, Ramiro 2013)

Churchill was not against sharing sovereignty as a principle, as he reassured himself in the House of Common in 1948, when he argued:

To win the war we agreed to put our armies under S.H.A.E.F., a great Anglo-American organisation that was for the tactical and limited purposes prescribed. No one would ever have suggested that General Eisenhower should have had the power to say what units of the British Army should be suppressed or disbanded, or how they should be raised or remodelled, or anything like it. All these remained questions within the control of the autonomous sovereign States which were willing to agree to a larger unity for certain well defined functional—I use the "functional" because it is coming into use—functional purposes. Surely, this is one of the points we could have urged, and even have made conditional upon our agreement to any final scheme.

It is again a clear approach to the cooperation theory as the best option to coordinate the common efforts, where autonomous partners are under a common authority taking the decisions by consensus. Churchill's references to functions are link with the back then popular theory of integration developed by David Mitrany, functionalism, a liberal tradition based on a positive approach which accepts as a fact that humans are rational and wish peaceful progress, that conflict and disharmony are not endemic to the human condition. Essentially, it claims that the main target of any kind of integration is ending the conflicts of the world through international organizations. The shape of the organization, its name, or other symbols, are not important; what matters is the

achievement of the goals. Functionalism stresses the functions of the organization over any other consideration. The priority of the organization should be the human needs or the public welfare of its members, the people, forgetting any kind of ideology because of its tight framework, the results and not the method. It is a technocratic vision: people who know best about any job are the ones who should do it in order to succeed. Technicians have to rule over the areas where their expertise provides them with the wisdom to offer the best solutions to the problems of the people or the members. On the other hand, functionalism does not trust politicians because their goal is keeping their power rather than the common good. Mitrany argued that transnational organizations were more effective than national entities, as they were more efficient and hence could solve the problems of the people. This efficiency would transfer the loyalty of the people from the national level to the international one, ending wars and conflicts. The concept of flexibility is very important in this theory, because human needs, and not the creation of a supranational state, are the priority. Thus functionalism can adopt different forms, different names, and different means in order to achieve its target. Mitrany thought that the European Communities were just reproducing the functions of the states in a supranational level, keeping intact the decision making of the states, leading to the domination of the main states over the other members of the organization. (David, Ramiro 2013, 92-96)

Functionalism is too technocratic; it is mainly based in professionals doing the job, with a minimum involvement of other important actors, such as politicians, diplomats, and mainly citizens. The idea of building a community without counting on the people is very close to a dictatorship of the social elite. But even if its intentions are good, it is impracticable in the present time where democracy has become the main method of organizing European societies. It also has too much faith on humans and in their capacity to act rationally in all the situations (David, Mitrany 1965, 119-149). Churchill's position towards functionalism was friendly but without full support. This approach to the integration reflected somehow his pragmatic vision of politics in the international level, and the several occasions when Churchill referred to the United States of Europe fit with the functionalist idea that the denomination of the organization does not matter rather than the functions. Obviously Churchill was not a supporter of the idea of a European Federation, link with the reproduction of the USA in the European level, hence his call to the United States of Europe as early as 1930 in an article in the Saturday Evening Post (Lucas, Bruyning 1990,

55-66) must be understood under the prim of functionalism. But at the same time the combination of rejection of politicians involved in the project and the lack of democracy of the future institutions, made it unacceptable for Churchill's world vision.

During the debate about the British involvement in the Schuman plan in the British Parliament, Churchill openly supported the idea of cooperation in Europe, as in his intervention proves:

I would add, to make my answer quite clear to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, that if he asked me, "Would you agree to a supranational authority which has the power to tell Great Britain not to cut any more coal or make any more steel, but to grow tomatoes instead?" I should say, without hesitation, the answer is "No." But why not be there to give the answer?

It clearly shows the opposition of Churchill to full integration in the European level, but not full rejection to the process, as he himself points out, UK should be in the negotiations to defend its position towards the model of future Europe. This reference against a strong influence of the Communal authorities over the domestic policies of its members can also be link with the idea of subsidiarity, where the most efficient level of decision making will manage the issues in a common association. Hence, the highest level will just deal with aspects influencing the whole community, leaving to the members the management of domestic issues or the application of the common rules according to the national traditions, as currently the European Union directives do. The idea of subsidiarity is included in the European Union as a main pillar of the integration, respecting the national, regional and local authorities. Perhaps, the main difference between Churchill's ideas about subsidiarity and sharing sovereignty and the EU, is the voting system in the highest level of decision making, unanimity versus majority, or at least some veto capacity for the member states when outvoted and their national interest is at stake. As he clearly made public in the same speech about the Schuman plan:

Nothing is said about the method of voting. We know nothing about the method by which voting power will be allotted to the different members of any supra-national authority, which may be set up. Nevertheless, it is quite certain we should not agree to become members of it—and that we should have every right to disagree—if our great preponderance in coal and steel production did not receive full recognition. Then there is the question of the right to terminate such an agreement. That is surely a matter we could have looked at after discussion.

Obviously, Winston Churchill was asking for greater power to the UK in the European organization, as it has in other international organizations, as United Nations. (Winston, Churchill 1974, 324) His position of member states having the possibility to withdraw the European organization if it was their national interest is another pillar to the cooperative essence of the new community, following Churchill's ideas.

His opposition to the federal proposal for building Europe was expressed in the House of Commons in his intervention in the debate about the Schuman plan:

Such a tremendous step as the federal union of Europe as something like a United States of Europe is not a matter which rests with us to decide. It is primarily one for the peoples of Europe. In our European Movement we have worked with federalists, and we have always made it clear that, though they are moving along the same road, we are not committed to their conclusions. Personally, I have always deprecated in public our becoming involved at this stage in all the tangles and intricacies of rigid constitution-making, which appeals so strongly to a certain type of mind. I was sorry that the hon. Member for Coventry, East, should have marred an able speech, as he so often does, by a gross misstatement when he says that European Union is run and financed by federalists.

The majority of the European citizens, was, and still is, against the idea of a European Federation. Even Altiero Spinelli, a prominent federalist, had a big bang approach to the issue in

order to break the popular resistance to the creation of a European Federation; basically the federation should have been done at once, from the top, without the consent of the European people, who afterwards would have recognize the benign effects of it and support it. (Altiero, Spinelli 1983, Vol. 6). Churchill's delegation of the decision about a European Federation to the European people matched his idea about Europe, without any political cost or political erosion. His opening speech at the Congress of Europe in May 1948, includes this idea presenting the European building process: *'should be a movement of the people, not parties'*. (Winston, Churchill 1949, 3)

The European Movement included the supporters of the European federalism even if Churchill's opinion was against the inclusion of some kind of constitution or legal document binding the members, main pillar of a Federal State. Nevertheless, if continental Europe was going to move in the federal integration model direction, Churchill did not want UK to be a member, but neither an obstacle, collaborating with the hypothetical European Federation following his idea of the three magic circles, Europe, the Commonwealth and USA, where UK could be associated with all of them:

I cannot conceive that Britain would be an ordinary member of a Federal Union limited to Europe in any period which can at present be foreseen. We should in my opinion favour and help forward all developments on the Continent which arise naturally from a removal of barriers, from the process of reconciliation, and blessed oblivion of the terrible past, and also from our common dangers in the future and present. Although a hard-and-fast concrete federal constitution for Europe is not within the scope of practical affairs, we should help, sponsor and aid in every possible way the movement towards European unity. We should seek steadfastly for means to become intimately associated with it.

Sponsoring the process would have given the British government the possibility of influencing the development of the integration according to its interest and keep good diplomatic relations with the states involved in the process, a basic movement in a gradually more global world where the independent European states were losing its predominance in the international relations.

Hence, the most likely theoretical approach to Churchill's vision about Europe is Intergovernmentalism. This theory is based on agreements between States supporting coordination as the way to solve conflicts between the members of the organization because the states are accepted as the last recipients of sovereignty. Churchill was not against the transfer of loyalty as a principle, as he himself proclaimed in his last speech about Europe at London's Central Hall, Westminster in July 1957; some four months after six founding nations established the European Economic Community by signing the Treaty of Rome:

The Conservative and Liberal Parties declare that national sovereignty is not inviolable, and that it may be resolutely diminished for the sake of all the men in all the lands finding their way home together.

But he wanted to include veto powers for the member states, following the model of United Nations, if the decisions of the European organization were going to harm the UK. This power in reality means a strong brake for the autonomous decision making of the organization.

Moravcsik, supporter of Intergovernmentalism, highlights that cooperation between states is possible only when they share some common interest or common values. The basis of the European integration should be agreements between states and good faith in their relations. The common institutions should be just common forums at which to negotiate and solve different problems. (Andrew, Moravcsik 1993, 473-524). It fits perfectly the idea of Churchill of building Europe based on common principles, as freedom or human rights in opposition to the Communist area dominated by USSR.

Nevertheless, Churchill did not radically rejected the British involvement in the European integration process based on integration, as he declare at the European Assembly in July 1949, where he addressed the intergovernmental-federal debate by suggesting that all possibilities be explored. On the other hand, in a 29 November 1951 Cabinet memorandum, Churchill affirmed that Britain should not become an "*integral part of European integration*" as it would "*forfeit our insular or commonwealth-wide character.*" (Wendell R, Mauter 1998, 119-149) Obviously he was

open to the debate and some kind of compromise to reach a satisfactory solution for all the parts involved in the process, as he expressed in the House of Commons in:

The French Foreign Minister, M. Schuman, declared in the French Parliament this week that, ‘Without Britain there can be no Europe.’ This is entirely true. But our friends on the Continent need have no misgivings. Britain is an integral part of Europe, and we mean to play our part in the revival of her prosperity and greatness.

(Winston, Churchill 1974)

In Churchill’s head, there was no doubt of the European necessity of UK to succeed and the British necessity of involvement in a process of peace and prosperity. Hence, negotiation was the solution. When the British government rejected the invitation to participate in the ECSC Churchill bitterly attacked the British government for isolating the country and not even present their ideas about Europe. The British absence from the Messina conference held from 1 to 3 June 1955 leading to the creation of the EEC, current European Union, occurred under the premiership of Anthony Eden, Churchill’s successor in Downing Street since 6 April 1955 because the health conditions of Churchill were deteriorating incapacitating him for a daily intense political activity.

The last years of a Churchill affected by sickness entailed some references to the European integration, in August 1961, Churchill wrote to his constituency Chairman: *‘I think that the Government are right to apply to join the European Economic Community...’* and in 1963, he wrote in a private letter: *‘The future of Europe if Britain were to be excluded is black indeed.’* (Anthony Montague, Browne 1995, 321) Because he warned: *‘If, on the other hand, the European trade community were to be permanently restricted to the six nations, the results might be worse than if nothing were done at all – worse for them as well as for us. It would tend not to unite Europe but to divide it – and not only in the economic field.’* (Winston, Churchill 1974)

It reassures Churchill’s support to the European integration and the British involvement in the process, just leaving open the questions about what kind of Europe was desired by him and the

British capacity to effectively negotiate with its European partners and the flexibility of the European Communities to accept the British singularity.

5. CHURCHILL'S MODEL OF EUROPE

Two European organizations reflect the vision of Churchill about a united Europe because of his direct involvement in its creation, as the Council of Europe, and because it follows his statements in British politics and it was implemented by his closer collaborator Harold Macmillan, the European Free Trade Organization. The combination of both organizations provides us with a global vision of Churchill's proposals for uniting Europe as an integral part of a world organization. NATO is the third pillar of his idea about Europe, including defence.

The Council of Europe is the result of the Congress of Europe, where Churchill made the opening speech in The Hague in 1948. He proposed a European 'Charter' and 'Court' of Human Rights, assuring in his opening speech: '*We aim at the eventual participation of all the peoples throughout the continent whose society and way of life are in accord with the Charter of Human Rights.*' (Winston, Churchill 1949, 12) The meeting was a milestone in the European integration, where people all over Europe met to discuss the possibilities of a European organization. The meeting was presided over by Winston Churchill and brought representatives from different countries and different ideas about how to build a joint Europe. The participants were politicians, intellectuals, and major representatives of the European culture who took three main positions towards European integration: the unionist, the federalist, and the supporters of Pan-Europe.

The unionists were under the moral leadership of Winston Churchill and entailed mainly Anglo-Saxon and Nordic people who were keener supporters of European cooperation among states. According to their ideas, any European organization could just work based just on agreements between governments. The decision making could still be in the hands of the member states, adding economic cooperation based on free trade agreements, not on a common market. The federalists supported a European federation similar to the United States of America. They wanted to build a European State integrating economy and politics. Their main leader in the Congress was Altiero Spinelli, an important figure in the further European Communities where he was Commissioner of the European Commission and afterwards an important leader of the European Parliament. The third group, the supporters of pan-Europe, had a middle approach, between federalist and unionist, suggesting a Confederation of European states, deeper than the cooperation of the unionists, but far from the federal idea of one European state.

The Council of Europe is an organization outside of the European Union and based on common general principles, as defence of human rights, democracy and cultural understanding. It was created in 1949 by the Treaty of London, reassuring the prominent role of UK in its foundation, including ten members, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom; five out of the six original members of the European Communities took part in this European initiative. Currently it has 47 member states. The institutional framework of the Council of Europe was organized based on three main institutions, a Committee of Ministers, a Parliamentary Assembly and a Secretary General, very similar to the institutions of the European Coal and Steel Community. (Frederick L, Schuman 1951, 724-740) but the main difference resides on the power of the common decisions, not binding in the case of the Council of Europe in opposition to the supremacy of the communitarian law over the national legal systems in the European Union; a model based on cooperation versus a system based on integration.

The EFTA was somehow a British answer to the creation of the European Common Market by the treaty of Rome in 1957, establishing the European Economic Community in 1958 by the member states of the European Coal and Steel Community. The main force leading to the Treaty of Stockholm in 1960 was UK and its Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, who was a political protégé of Churchill. He served as Foreign Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer under Churchill's successor and close political ally, Sir Anthony Eden. When Eden resigned because of the Suez Crisis in 1957, Macmillan succeeded him as Prime Minister and led the conversations for the new European organization, the EFTA, following the pattern already established by his mentor. (Harold, Evans 1981, 53)

Winston Churchill had become a defender of free trade in his early political career when the British economic model was under discussion, and also supported it as a valid model for Europe as a way to foster trade and economic development to achieve social stability and peace. The EFTA followed the ideas of Churchill with a free trade area without common external customs, as the EEC, allowing the Imperial Preference system of the Commonwealth to continue. The EFTA worked good economically fostering trade between the members from 3.22 to 7.5 billion euro between 1959 and 1967, similar to the growth rate in the EEC (Norman D, Aitken 1983, 881-892). The EFTA mostly included just industrial production and excluded agricultural products and

maritime trade, and again, it was based on cooperation against the EEC model of integration, which eventually followed a model closer to cooperation through a the decision making based on unanimity, but was open to future integrationist reforms, as the Single European Act in 1986, that really created the European market. The EFTA excluded similar future actions and lost its importance with the British, Danish and Irish membership to the EEC in 1972; eventually the remaining members were absorbed by the European Union with the creation of the European Economic Area (Thomas, Pedersen 1994, 311).

The third organization representing Churchill's approach to Europe is NATO. His involvement in European military association dates back to 1950, when Churchill called for the creation of a European Army '*...under a unified command, and in which we should all bear a worthy and honourable part.*' (Winston, Churchill 1974), just one year after the creation of NATO. He presented a motion to the European Assembly creating a European Army, which was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the European Council. The proposal expressed the defensive essence of the new military association, the creation of a common leadership through a European minister of defence under the supervision of the member states, democracy and freedom as principal common values, active collaboration with USA and Canada (NATO) and integration as a regional force in the United Nations (Clarence C, Walton 1953, 42-69).

Nevertheless the French proposed another path for the military collaboration between Western European States based on integration rather than the collaborationist proposal of Churchill. The European Defence Community included the original members of the ECSC, and hence excluded the UK. A treaty was signed on 1952 but it never came into force as the French National Assembly rejected the idea due fears about national sovereignty and the strong opposition of de Gaul and the French Communist. Churchill's proposal included national divisions, as the EDC, under the command of a civilian in the European level following the SHAEF model, rather than common institutions as in the alternative proposal, and the member states governments controlling all the process against the French proposal including several supranational elements. (Josef L, Kunz 1953, 275-281) After the French National Assembly rejection, NATO, an organization supported by Churchill and following his ideas about regional cooperation based on major principles, became the centre of the European defence system, including currently all the

member states of the European Union with the exception of Austria, Ireland, Finland and Sweden. Hence, Churchill's ideas succeeded this time in the European level over other proposals.

A combination of the Council of Europe, based on political and cultural values, as major principles as democracy or human rights, the EFTA, based economic relations, and NATO, based on military relations, was Churchill's idea about the European Integration. The British government took a leading position in the three organizations, but France, Germany, the Benelux and Italy follow a different approach with the ECSC and the EEC. Nevertheless Churchill argued against the development of the European integration without the involvement of UK, consequence of British lack of interest for integration models and the lack of flexibility of the European Communities to negotiate the British proposals and reach a compromise. Churchill in his speech to the House of Commons during the debate about the Schuman plan affirmed: 'the absence of Britain deranges the balance of Europe. I am all for a reconciliation between France and Germany, and for receiving Germany back into the European family, but this implies, as I have always insisted, that Britain and France should in the main act together so as to be able to deal on even terms with Germany, which is so much stronger than France alone. Without Britain, the coal and steel pool in Western Europe must naturally tend to be dominated by Germany, who will be the most powerful member. (Winston, Churchill 1974). This idea was already mentioned in 1946 when Churchill visited Holland: *'the cornerstone of the new organization would be Anglo-French friendship'* (Martin, Gilbert 2000, 421). So, the participation of UK in the European integration was needed in order to keep the organization balanced. This debate is currently important again, as Germany is taking the undisputable leadership of the European Union with a depress France and a reluctant Cameron after an initial political French domination led by de Gaulle in the European Communities, followed by an equal tandem between Mitterrand and Kohl. Obviously Churchill's vision is link with his state centre organization approach, because another way to decrease German's influence in the EU would be increasing the level of integration and hence decreasing the power of the member states of the organization. In a Cabinet memorandum 29 November 1951, already back as British Prime Minister, Churchill said that UK should not become *'an integral part of European integration'* (John W, Young 1985, 923-937) leaving open the participation of UK in the process from another perspective different than full membership.

In the debate about Schuman plan, Churchill asked rhetorically about: 'what association should Britain have with the Federal Union of Europe if such a thing should come to pass in the course of time?' The word association provides us with an important hint of Churchill's ideas about the relation of UK with the European integration. Once the British proposals towards a united Europe were not adopted by the main continental powers, France and Germany, Churchill wanted to associate UK to the integration process without full membership: *'there is the question of whether there could be two grades of members of such a body—full members and associate'*. An idea expressed in the early stages of the debate about the future European organization: *'If at first all the States of Europe are not willing or able to join the Union, we must nevertheless proceed to assemble and combine those who will and those who can.'* (Winston, Churchill 1946) Opening the possibility of a multi-speed Europe, which as the matter of fact is currently working in the European Union, with UK keeping his national currency outside if the Eurozone, control over its borders outside the Schengen area, and not adopting the Social Policy of the European Union. (David, Ramiro 2009, 124 - 150) The incapacity of both areas to compromise influenced Churchill's diplomatic inactivity regarding European integration affairs, after his return to Downing Street in 1951.

6. CONCLUSIONS ON CHURCHILL

Winston Spencer Churchill was an outstanding man who owned an enormous personal prestige due his political leadership of the United Kingdom and somehow the free world against totalitarianism. His iconic aura was supplemented with writing skills, a past as young adventurer, a warrior, a gentleman, and a painter. This combination has given Churchill a prestige compare to those figures ruling the human history. Hence, the importance of his real ideas about the European integration come from his own stature as a statesman. The Eurosceptic need Churchill to gain the popular support against the European integration; the European Union needs his support to bring closer to Europe the always recalcitrant and suspicious British. The lack of any other British personality link with the creation of the European Union and the immense power of Churchill over the British and world popular imaginary led to his nomination as a founder father of Europe.

Churchill was an Europeanist without any rational doubt, as has been shown in this research, but his model of Europe differed from the current European Union. Currently there are mainly two possibilities in the European debate, to be for or against the EU, but there were other options in the early stages of the integration, and Churchill was the main advocate of a third way. Nevertheless, Churchill's attitudes towards a united Europe cannot be understood without the historical context of his time and his well-known pragmatism and flexibility adapting his views to the social necessities.

Hence, the use of Churchill by the Eurosceptic is due to partial use of history, usually citing literally quotes from Churchill without contextualizing them and using them as absolute truths. Even those supporting a special British association with the European integration use Churchill for their political purposes when Churchill repeated in numerous occasion his will to commit the UK fully in the process. Just the political circumstances, as the Cold War, the intention to keep influence over the former members of the British Empire and the federal approach, made Churchill support a special relation of UK with the European Communities. Hence, it was a pragmatic approach rather than a dogmatic position.

On the other side, the inclusion of Churchill in the list of founding fathers of the European Union lacks respect to the own Churchill's proposals. It is a clear attempt to include UK through

his most iconic figure in the European building process based on integration. He was a supporter of Europe, but his ideas did not fully match with the current European Union.

Churchill's position should enrich the debate about the future of the European Union rather than being used in partisan fights. As the historical context of Europe has dramatically changed since Churchill's times, we cannot know what would be his position today towards the integration, but we still can learn from his visionary actions, his open mind to new creative solutions, his pragmatism and his dialogue capacity, to build a better world.

7. INTRODUCTION TO MARGARET THATCHER

Margaret Thatcher was born in October 1925 at Grantham, a small town in eastern England. Her childhood, lived in a small and religious community, could explain her conservative approach. During these years United Kingdom was still one of the major world powers, with colonies all over the world; by 1922 the British Empire held sway over a population of about 458 million people, one quarter of the world's population; also, more than 38 countries were included in the British Empire. Taking into consideration that during her childhood her country was the biggest in the world, it is easier to understand her pride and nationalistic approach.

During the Second World War Thatcher studied chemistry at Oxford, where she became president of the student Conservative Association, linking her life for always with this political party. In the '50s she ran unsuccessfully for Parliament twice and finally in 1959 was elected. She was given a junior office in the administration of Harold Macmillan between 1961 and 1964. The next conservative government lead by Edward Heath in 1970 gave her a more important position, Education Secretary, and she obtained cabinet rank.

Edward Heath and the conservatives were defeated in the elections of 1974, and Thatcher, a year later, became the leader of the conservative party. She was the first woman ever to lead a Western European political party in a major State. Some people thought of her just as a temporal substitute, a bridge towards a new leader, but she reinforced her position during the following years and won the next parliamentary elections in the United Kingdom, becoming the first woman Prime Minister of the UK.

Her first term, 1979-1983, was strongly influenced by the economic crisis and its solution in the UK. The Falklands War was another main point of hers first term, winning her the respect of many Britons. The second term, 1983-1987, was influenced by a huge strike by the British Trade Unions, who were defeated, reinforcing Thatcher's economic reforms and determination. Many reforms were done during this time trying to achieve a more privatized economy and reducing the role of the state in the British economy. Thatcher sold state assets during this period; the privatization was looking for a more liberal economic system and set a precedent that many other countries of the world were to follow. The Irish question and the IRA were also important in the domestic agenda. Even Thatcher herself suffered a terrorist attack in October 1984. Her third

term, 1987-1990, meant more reforms, especially in education, taxation, and the health system. The end of the Cold War was another milestone during these years of Thatcher as British Prime Minister.

Her tough behaviour, too strong personal leadership, and her ideas about Europe led to an internal revolt in the conservative party, with the result of substituting John Major for Thatcher in November 1990. After her Premiership she was a member of Parliament and made important interventions about Bosnia and about Maastricht, retiring officially from public life in 2002. (David, Ramiro 2009, 124 – 150)

8. MARGARET THATCHER AND EUROPE

The problematic relationship of United Kingdom with the European Communities was at its height in the '70s, when Labour's general election manifestos of October 1974 committed the Labour Party to allow the British citizens the opportunity to decide whether Britain should stay in the Common Market on renegotiated terms, or leave it entirely. After the elections, the new government led by the Labour party called for a referendum in 1975 to ask the Britons about membership in the European Communities. The government campaigned supporting the country's remaining in the EC, and Margaret Thatcher, as new leader of the Conservative party, also supported the membership of the UK in the European Communities. The result of the referendum showed that 67% of voters supported the UK's remaining in the European Communities (Alberto, Alesina 2008, 93). The renegotiation of the terms of the membership was mainly linked with the CAP and British contributions to the European budget, higher than that of other member states in relative terms. Harold Wilson, the Prime Minister, obtained some minor reductions in the British contribution, but the change was minimal and the problem was still there (David Ramiro, 2009 124 – 150).

As Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister in the following elections, she wanted to change this situation, arguing that the UK was spending too much money in the EC and getting so little back, so she put this issue at the top of the Council agenda. Many of those meetings, where the heads of the member states' governments met, faced difficult times because of the stubborn behaviour of Thatcher, and her personal confrontation with Helmut Kohl and Mitterrand, leaders of Germany and France respectively. The president of the Council, who was the president or Prime Minister of the State that held the rotating presidency of the European Communities, made up the agenda of the meetings, the issues that were going to be discussed, and the British problem was often not included. Thatcher still spoke about it anyway, not respecting the established protocol. She even threatened to withdraw her country from the European Communities if the situation was not solved. As an example of these difficulties, we see the following words of Helmut Kohl: "*The British prime minister, who had completely isolated herself with her position, temporarily lost her nerves and completely lost her temper with me. She argued that Germany had to support Britain because British troops were stationed here*" (Wolfram, Kaiser, 2008, 418)

After some years of struggling, she obtained the reform, thanks to her determination and her commitment with the Communities and the future Single European Act. The system was based on a reduction of British net contribution to the European Communities of 2/3. It meant that UK still paid more than it obtained, nowadays the British net contribution after the reduction is around 5.5 billion euro. The problem of this agreement was the reduction of the European budget, because the EC were going to lose the money sent back to the UK. The discussions were focused in the negative of the German government, one of the main net contributors to the EU finances, to increase its contributions (David Ramiro, 2009 124 – 150).

Finally an agreement was reached, and all the member states of the EU each year paid the British rebate, in a complicated system that makes France the biggest contributor to the rebate, because France is also the biggest beneficiary of the CAP.

This whole solution was the work of Margaret Thatcher, and even nowadays the system is still working. The agreement can be changed only by unanimity, and the British are not willing to do so. The problem currently is that the CAP is just 40% of the European budget, when before represented 80%. Also, the previous undeveloped British farming sector has increased and modernized, obtaining important incomes from the CAP, reducing the negative effects of this policy on the British economy in terms of financial discrimination inside the European Union, and increasing the European contributions to the UK. Also the differences of the British economy with the rest of the member states have been reduced as after the last enlargement and British economic growth, the UK is no longer a relatively poor country inside the Union (Andrew, Moravcsik 1993, 473-524) The UK was the third poorest member of the Community of 10 in terms of average income, but belongs nowadays to the top states of the Union. The previous president of France, Chirac, tried to adapt the British rebate to the current situation, but the British Premier, Tony Blair, rejected the reform under the unanimity required for any change.

9. THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT

The Treaty signed in 1986 was the first profound and wide-ranging constitutional reform of the European integration process since the 1950s. The SEA introduced measures aimed at achieving an internal market plus institutional changes related to these, such as a generalization of qualified majority voting and a cooperation procedure involving the European Parliament. It also provided a legal form for European Political Cooperation (David Ramiro, 2009 124 – 150).

Margaret Thatcher's idea was to have a real single market working in the European Communities, because there were still many barriers to free trade between states, but she did not think about the consequences or her action in terms of European integration, because the increased integration of the European market led finally to the common currency, and to other, minor, side effects, as the expansion of the qualified majority system and more power to the EU institutions (Elizabeth, Bomberg 2008, 234). These reforms are a consequence of the SEA and increased European integration towards the procurement of a European state. Thatcher's agreement to these changes is surprising, even if she did obtain the British rebate, a minor compensation for the loss of sovereignty of the British Parliament, the legitimate source of power for her.

A miscalculation of the cost meant by this treaty, or an over-calculation of her own power and ideas could explain this big mistake of Thatcher's betraying her own political beliefs. She also made an identification of her position with the British position, and subsequent premiers followed other positions, not using the veto possibilities that for sure Thatcher would have used, as we can see with her complaints as member of the British parliament about the Treaty of Maastricht and the Common Currency, reforms unthinkable without the Single European Act (David Ramiro, 2009 124 – 150).

Nevertheless, still today there are members of the British Parliament following the nationalistic approach of Thatcher in terms of Europe, and the UK's adopting the Common Currency is not clear; a step that can speed up after the current economic crisis if the Eurozone area achieves a higher economic growth than the UK.

10. THE GERMAN REUNIFICATION

The end of the Cold War meant the possibility for German reunification, and possible problems inside the European Union because a bigger and stronger Germany would break the balance of power between the main members of the organization, France, the UK, and Germany. Margaret Thatcher had an important concern related to a German power renaissance and its domination over Europe, and she opposed reunification. Her ally in this issue was Mitterrand, the president of France, formerly a declared enemy of Thatcher. Helmut Kohl convinced the French leader of committing Germany closer to the European Communities, avoiding the problems of a strong Germany outside the EC by having the country inside it, controlled by the European institutions and the qualified majority voting system. Thatcher was alone when the United States blessed German reunification, and could not prevent it happening, losing her last major battle in office (Mark, Leonard 2006, 35).

Currently we can see that the whole approach of Thatcher was wrong, because it was based on the false premise of a repetition of the German economic miracle after WW II, and German reunification created many still unsolved problems to the German state in different fields, as economy, society, and politics. Still today the differences between West and East Germany are clear, and a real reunification will need much more time (David Ramiro, 2009 124 – 150). On the other hand, the agreement between Mitterrand and Kohl of tying Germany more closely to the European Union in order to avoid a strong and independent German power has been working perfectly, facts that show the mistakes of Thatcher's approach to European issues.

11. IDEAS OF THATCHER ABOUT EUROPE

The main ideas of Margaret Thatcher about the European building process have been taken completely from a speech by the British Premier at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, on 20 September 1988.

a. Europe and the EU

Margaret Thatcher thought that Europe was much more than the European Union, and complained about the identification of both. She complained about the use of the adjective anti-European for people who did not support European Integration following the model of the European Union, mainly because Europe was a wider concept, and because other kinds of Europe were also possible. According to Thatcher, Europe is its history, religion, culture, language, and politics.

- **History:** Because Europeans have had similar historical development, influencing each other, similar goals, similar threats, growing together, spreading the ideas of Europe all over the world.
- **Religion:** Because of the Christian roots of European society, because once Europe was united by a religious link which transfers to Europe the ancient wisdom of Greece and Rome, and especially because the recognition of Christianity of the unique and spiritual nature of the individual. On the other hand, this affirmation is polemic in the frame of the rejected European Constitution and the intention of some countries, especially Poland, to include in the preamble of it a reference to the Christian roots of Europe, and the supporters of secularism in Europe, plus the possible enlargement of the EU to Muslim countries like Turkey. The debate is not about the Christian roots of Europe, because it is a historical fact, but about its influence nowadays in politics.

- Culture: Thatcher speaks about European cultural movements that spread similar ideas and similar tastes all over the continent. It is clear that this idea of a European culture is not homogeneous, but it is real.
- Language: Even though Europe has many different languages, most of them come from the same family, the Indo-European, with roots in Anatolia or Central Asia, divided into five main groups: Baltic, Celtic, Germanic, Romance, and Slavonic, plus other languages like Finno-Ugrian, Maltese, and Basque that belong to other families. Nevertheless, in this diversity, we find European influences that show our common roots, like Latin, once a common language for millions of people living in the Roman Empire, and still nowadays many European languages, such as French, Spanish, Italian, and others show the important influence of this language.
- Politics: The French Revolution, the development of the national states, the concept of democracy, are mainly European ideas not developed just in one country, but all over the continent. Napoleon spread the ideas of the French Revolution all over Europe with his wars, and even when he lost against an alliance of European powers, he won the fight of the ideas, changing Europe for always. The rise of the national state is a European creation, and with the expansion of Europe all over the world this idea also was adopted by other states, and even the concept of state itself is European. Many countries in Europe contributed to the creation of all these political concepts and structures that nowadays seem universal for us.

According to Thatcher, the idea of Europe rest in these five main pillars, much wider than the concept of the European Union and its European building project, and being participant in these pillars means that you are part of Europe, no matter whether you support the EU or are against it. To prove it, she spoke about the links of the UK and the rest of Europe: that Celts, Saxons, and Danes, the ancestors of the current British came from Europe, as did also the Normans, the religion, the rule of law, etc. Also she thought that the commitment of the UK to Europe was also clear, with the numerous wars where Britain fought in Europe (Booker, 2005). Thatcher emphasized the role played the by United Kingdom to protect freedom in Europe against different powers that tried to conquer the continent and unite it under one sole power. Napoleon and his wars in Europe, the First World War, and the Second World War are examples of her idea (David Ramiro, 2009 124 – 150).

These wars devastated Europe and were won thanks to, among other factors, the help and the sacrifice of the British. Of course Margaret Thatcher, as the British nationalist she was, thought about the role of the UK as a determinate factor, but no one can deny the involvement of the UK in the European affairs as a major actor.

This idea of Thatcher about the usurpation of the concept of Europe by the European Union is very clear, and was used to defend herself from the attacks by integration supporters to her policies towards the EU. But it also shows the manipulation by the European Union supporters, calling the followers of other ways of integration, as cooperation or just national supporters, anti-Europeans, when they are just against a specific model of integration, the European Union.

b. The Cold War, USA and the European Union.

The ideas of Margaret Thatcher about this topic made clear her position in the Cold War and her alignment with Ronald Reagan, president of the USA, and her intransigent position towards the USSR. The Prime Minister of the UK declared that the European Communities were one manifestation of the European identity, but were missing an important part of Europe that was behind the Iron Curtain. Thatcher made clear on numerous occasions that Europe was divided by force, as against the people who accepted the status quo of the Cold War and thought of Europe as Western Europe, as Charles de Gaulle, president of France, who, in his attempt to make France a third and independent power in the context of a battle between the USA and the Soviet Union, accepted the division of Europe as something natural in his obsession of distancing his country from the influence of the USA.

Nevertheless, the influence of USA is clear in the creation of the European Communities and in their development. First of all, it was the American government and its intention to liberate West Germany from the occupation of the Allies that was the principal motor of the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the embryo of the current European Union. The USA wanted to have a strong Germany in the context of the Cold War as it would be, in case of war, the first European battlefield against the Soviet Union; there was also the necessity to help the Germans to have economic development strong enough to block the expansion of the communists in Europe. In order to achieve that, the USA decided to give West Germany full control of the Ruhr area, rich

in coal and steel, the basic elements for producing weapons. France was against that plan, and wanted to repeat the system after WW I, international rule over the Ruhr area, but after WW II the power of France had decreased. As the intentions of the USA were clear, the French government had just one option by which to control in some way the problematic area: the creation of a European Community. Also about the USA at this time of the XX Century, it is important to remark that it was the country that held the Soviet Union in its position, keeping free France itself, as well as the rest of Western Europe.

So, these historical facts, plus the traditional link between the UK and the USA, made Thatcher a strong supporter of collaboration with the Americans (Simon, Hix 2005). She even called the Americans the Europeans of the other side of the Atlantic, even proposing some kind of Community between Europe and the USA. It would have been difficult to have a Community between both powers in terms of equality, but the ideas of Thatcher were based more on a Free Trade Area, and political cooperation based on the same cultural values (David Ramiro, 2009 124 – 150).

c. The European Community Belongs to all its members

Margaret Thatcher was against the domination of any one state over the EU, or a privileged position of any country inside the Community. The influence of France in the Communities since their foundation was clear with decisions as to the CAP and the Lomé agreements. The first, the agricultural policy, was designed for the benefit of France, where at that moment 25% of the labour was employed in the farming sector, and the state was near bankruptcy because of the payment of huge subsidies to farmers to keep the social peace of France and avoid the movement of workers from the countryside to the cities with the consequent lack of work, social unrest, and communist movements. The second was an agreement between the European Communities and the ex-colonies of its members, France being almost the only founding member state with ex-colonies. The concept was clear: to keep the influence of France in the world using the means of the European Communities because France could not afford it alone.

According to Thatcher, this was inadmissible; all the members should have the same duties and the same rights, all of them should benefit from the European organization, and all of them should have the same obligations. This thought can be linked with the discussions that Thatcher had in the meetings of the European Council, especially with the representatives of France, with the intention to increase the benefits for the UK from the European Communities, to equalize them with the benefits France was getting. On this issue it is important to point out that the influence of France since the creation of the European Communities until the present day has been decreasing with each enlargement, depending nowadays completely on its bilateral cooperation with Germany. The more countries there are in the Union, the less important is the individual position of each single member.

d. The Community is not an end in itself

Thatcher's ideas of the meaning of the organization were quite clear: the European Communities could not become the objective of an intellectual concept, a tool for the creation of the European State. The European Union should be, according to her, just a practical means for Europeans to enjoy prosperity and security in a world of powerful nations and groups of nations. It shows the practical approach of Thatcher; in improving the life of the people of Europe, the Communities have a sense of being, and the way to do it is by promoting individual initiative and enterprise, in other words, encouraging private action and reducing the role of the state to a supervisor of the system. The other two pillars of her conception of development were trade and industry. Thatcher thought that progress in Europe could be achieved just by promoting the economy to increase the wealth of Europeans. The creation of any political entity should not be the main aim in the European building process, and Europe had to focus on providing Europeans enough and fair chances to develop their private initiative.

On the other hand, the issue of European security supported by Thatcher, a clear bet on a European Defence Community, but not of the kind of the '50s when France proposed a Security Defence Community among the members of the European Communities with common institutions, but finally was rejected by its own French Parliament. Thatcher believed more in a close cooperation between European states and the USA, where no common independent institutions

could be found, and where the decision making would be unanimity or consensus in a way to protect both Europe from external threats and the national sovereignty from international institutions (Simon, Hix 2008). Also, security should be a way to keep Europe independent from rising powers like China, India, or Russia, a way to have a say in the international world, and enough muscle to back European decisions (David Ramiro, 2009 124 – 150).

e. National Power against supranational constructions

Margaret Thatcher assured that there were not substitutes for national states, and hence, Europe should be built on a union of European states, and not on the concentration of power in the European institutions. This means a clear attack on other theories of integration, mainly Federalism and Neo-Functionalism and a support of intergovernmental cooperation. The three models of integration have the same targets, avoiding wars in Europe and creating a peaceful and harmonious social system, but they differ in their way to do it. Federalism and Neo-Functionalism are based on the creation of European institutions that will outweigh national states, because the latter have proven ineffective in keeping peace and have not been able to create an international structure to keep away wars and miseries, because the essence of nationhood is building on the differences between people, emphasizing the divergence instead the common needs of people. In order to achieve a society where people can live together peacefully it is necessary to transfer the loyalty of the people of Europe from the national level to the European level.

Margaret Thatcher, as de Gaulle did before her, attacked both theories of integration and actively supported the third option, Intergovernmentalism. This theory is based on agreements between states, good faith between them, common institutions as common forums, and always agreements and consensus, even unanimity. It means that there is not a voting system, there are just agreements, or, in case there is any voting system, unanimity would be required.

One of her main objections to Federalism and Neo-Functionalism was based on the national state because she thought it was the only institution that really had the loyalty of the people and hence the only one keeping values as important as freedom.

Thatcher also thought that a concentration of power in some kind of supranational institutions would be highly damaging and could jeopardize the objectives of the European process

because the real power of European integration was the sum of the strong points of all the nationalities that took part in the process. As each nation in Europe had its own traditions, customs, and identity, it would be a mistake to build Europe on a European identity that did not exist instead of on something real, as are the nations, according to Thatcher.

She was, as well, against the ideas of the fathers of Europe, and mainly the idea of the USA as a model of integration, because for her the history of the United States was different, because the USA was built on emigrants from Europe that were escaping intolerance and looking for the creation of a new society. This purpose helped to create a new unity and pride in being American, a process never developed in Europe, where the unity and pride are still united with the national state. Thatcher thought that some kind of integration was needed in Europe in order to keep some predominance in world affairs, and she wanted Europeans working in the same direction, but through national pride in each country and parliamentary powers of the states, not through the European Parliament or other European institutions. This raises the questions of the good faith of the states and their natural egoism in order to reach a solution of their own problems, as we have seen nowadays when some important countries of the EU are trying to face the world crisis with a nationalist approach, not respecting their compromise with the European Union, as the French government promoting a plan to help their car industry with the condition that the companies cannot reduce the workers on French soil, thus affecting other countries of the Union, such as the Czech Republic or Slovakia.

Nevertheless, the title of the speech Margaret Thatcher gave at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, has the illuminating title of A Family of Nations, expressing all her ideas about European integration.

f. Weak Bureaucracy

Another point of her criticism against Federalism and especially against Neo-Functionalism was the role of civil servants. The idea of Margaret Thatcher about any kind of government, national or international, was based in supervisory powers. The state was merely a supervisor of the social and economic systems; it established the rules and looked after the social and economic

agents. The state provided just the legal and social framework whereby the society could develop by itself; the state provided the structure whereby the people could develop and grow, the state was just for giving the citizens the same chances to succeed, and after that, it was a matter related to individual capacity to utilize these chances. So, the state provided security to private initiative. This idea of society is similar to the USA model, but not exactly the same, because Thatcher took power from minor institutions, as counties or city halls, to increase the weight of the British central government, something unthinkable in the USA, where the powers of the federal government and the states are more defined.

Nevertheless, the vision of Thatcher was very different from the model of the member states of the European Communities in the '80s, especially France and Germany, where the conception of the state was very different, not as a supervisory power, but as a proper agent of the system. The State tried to provide equality, not the same chances, which meant a bigger state, more technocracy and bureaucracy, more enrolment in the system, reducing the role of private initiative and regulation of the market by itself, increasing the role of the state.

The institutions of the European Communities were small in the first Community, the ECSC, but afterwards the implementation of new treaties and the inclusion of more and more policies on the European level, made the European institutions grow bigger. At the moment the European Commission counts a staff of 33,000 people. In reality this is not a huge number if we compare it with the number of civil servants in the member states, as in France, where there are around 2 million, as there are in Germany. Civil servants nowadays in the United Kingdom, more than half a million, are considerably fewer than in Germany and France, but more than in the EU. If we consider that the EU is dealing on the European level, much wider than the national level, the number of civil servants working in the European institutions does not look excessive. Nevertheless, as Margaret Thatcher was decreasing the role of the regional institutions of UK, and increasing the power of the central state, she did not like the idea of growing numbers in the European institutions because her domestic policies were boycotted on the European level (Kaiser, 2005). Her dislike of the European institutions was also related with her idea of the central role of the national states in the European Building process. It made no sense to give power to a European technocracy that was not elected by the European people, that did not respect national positions, and that could become an alien power to the people of Europe, forcing and leading them towards

the creation of an artificial political structure. So, according to Margaret Thatcher, the institutions of the European Union should be minimal, enough to assure that the common system is working, but never a substitute of the national institutions (David Ramiro, 2009 124 – 150).

g. Policies of the European Union

Margaret Thatcher had a clear idea about which policies should be European and which ones national. The main reason for having a European policy should be the benefit of the states, and hence, the benefit of the people of Europe represented by the states. Thatcher thought that any policy that was ineffective or benefiting only a non-representative portion of European states should be at the national level. She wanted a reform in the existing policies of the European Communities, mainly the Common Agricultural Policy, that was spending most of the money of the European Union budget, transferring the money just to some countries, and of course, not to the United Kingdom. The situation was clear for her: if this policy cost the European Union a great deal of money, and the United Kingdom was an important contributor to the finances of the European organization, and the British did not get any benefit from it, this policy was wrong. According to this idea, a reform was needed inside the EU and its policies, reducing the policies included in the area of influence of the Communities, and giving back the sovereignty on these policies to the member states. Her intentions were obvious and simple: the European Union should not move towards the creation of a supranational state, taking more and more policies from the member states as it was clear that these were not effectively managed on the European level. The European power should be just a structure to deal with the commonweal, in the policies where common agreement between governments would provide a benefit for all of them, in other words, a pragmatic union, never political.

h. European Market

Margaret Thatcher wanted the European Communities to encourage enterprise to improve the economic situation of its members. For doing so, the best option for her was giving power to

the market; it could develop itself in a more effective way than if it were to be highly regulated by political institutions. Her ideas about the market changed radically with the last economic crisis that Europe is still enduring. Nevertheless, from the time of Thatcher's governance until the present, her proposal for the economy has been the most popular and also important, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the lack of alternatives to the extreme capitalism of our days (Mark, Leonard 2006, 231).

Her main proposal for the European Union was the creation of a real interior market in Europe, to improve the effectiveness of the Common Market approved by the Treaty of Rome, that in reality was just a free trade area in industrial production and a highly regulated market in agricultural production. Thatcher wanted free enterprise within a framework of European law, a much better way, according to her, to speed up the growth of the European economy.

Thatcher's aim was clear: deregulate and remove the barriers to trade, most of them national. The barriers built up by the member states of the European Communities in order to protect the national economical agents were numerous and were a brake to the economic development of Europe and its members. Thatcher was one of the promoters of a new treaty, the Single European Act, thinking that it would lead to a minimum legal agenda to improve economic integration and dismiss the political influence of the European institutions (David Ramiro, 2009 124 – 150). It was a great miscalculation on the part of Thatcher, because what she thought would be mainly economic became eventually highly political. The Single Market approved in the Single European Act in 1986 meant, because almost all economic fields were then under the supervision of the European institutions, great powers to the European institutions, that, instead of deregulating and removing the barriers to trade, as Thatcher had thought, engendered deeper regulation of the Market to end the national distortions to it (Richard, North 1991, 1).

Moreover, the Single European Act meant bigger responsibilities for the European Commission, something translated in a huge increase of civil servants working for the organization, something against the will and beliefs of Thatcher.

The last consequence of the Single European Act and the creation of the Single Market has been the adoption of the Common Currency by most of the members of the European market. Thatcher in her great miscalculation did not pay attention to the consequences of her actions and the power of European integration. The Single Market was created to eliminate barriers on trade

between the member states of the European Communities, the same reasoning can be applied to the creation of the Common Currency, the Euro: to eliminate any distortion in the market produced by the exchange rate of the European currencies, or the uncertainty of the future rate of the currencies, something that reduces the trade between holders of different currencies, among other reasons. The British premier, after leaving office, became a bitter enemy of the Euro and the inclusion of the British currency, the Pound, in the European Common Currency.

Another consequence of the Common Currency, hated by Thatcher but a consequence of her policies, is the proclaimed end of the economic integration in Europe and the beginning of political integration, another nightmare for Thatcher. The creation of the Euro meant a Common Currency for most of the members of the European Union, but the European market is not fully integrated, in some sense the market is still divided into national markets, with some economies more integrated, and others much less so. This means a great danger of an asymmetrical crisis, as Europe is facing currently, a crisis that could affect just a part of the market, but not spread to all the members of the market. In that case the European Central Bank establishes a monetary policy for the majority of the system, not helping the affected economies, because doing so could damage the rest of the European economies (David Ramiro, 2009 124 – 150). The problem is the loss of sovereignty in the monetary field of the member states of the euro zone, reducing the number of tools to be used in case of a national crisis. The next logical step in the European building process will be the creation of some kind of European economic government, a step closer to a European state. It is clear that Thatcher did not want that when she supported the Single Market, or that the Euro and a possible European federal government is not only a consequence of the Single Market, but the SEA can be considered a basic and necessary step in order to achieve European political integration.

i. European Defence

Margaret Thatcher thought that the European Communities should focus on two main points, economy and security. The UK has one of the main armies of Europe, and its role in a future European Union army would be predominant.

Margaret Thatcher, a great supporter of a close alliance with the USA, also thought of the idea of the European Army, but controlled, of course, by the national states; for her it would have been unthinkable that someone in Brussels could send British soldiers to fight, and maybe to die, in an external war. She proposed to develop the army through the Brussels Treaty, signed in 1948 between the Benelux countries, France, and the UK as an expansion of the Treaty of Dunkirk signed the previous year between France and the UK. Originally this was a defence Treaty against possible aggression by Germany, but as the Cold War intensified, it became an instrument against Communist expansion. The parties of the Treaty decided to create the Western Union Defence Organization. Its main institutions were a Committee at Prime Ministerial level, and a WU Combined Chiefs of Staff committee, including all the national chiefs of staff, which would direct the operative organization; clearly an inter-governmental organization where collaboration substituted for integration, as Thatcher liked (Neill, Nugent 1999). In 1954 other countries, West Germany and Italy, joined the organization that was renamed the Western European Union. Its main institutions were a council and an Assembly. The most powerful institution and leader of the organization was the Council of Ministers, assisted by a Permanent Representatives Council on the ambassadorial level. Again, we can see that no supranational institutions were created, and the main role was played by the states. Social and cultural aspects of the Brussels Treaty were handed to the Council of Europe to avoid duplication of responsibilities within Europe. The Assembly was just an advisory organ, without any real power (David Ramiro, 2009 124 – 150).

This organization was fully acceptable to Margaret Thatcher and her ideas, because developing a European army through the Western European Union and not through the European Communities would prevent any control by any supranational body, such as the European Commission, and would keep all this process under the supervision of the national states, plus resolving the problem created by some members of the EU that were neutral and did not desire to develop any defence policy.

The difference between Thatcher and other supporters of the European Army is the relation with NATO and the USA; Thatcher imagined WEU as a complement to NATO, and never as a tool against the predominance of the USA in the world. Nevertheless, the idea of Thatcher is still alive, and the WEU is getting more attention from some states of Europe as the best way to develop the European Army and the common defence.

j. Relations between Europe and the USA

Thatcher was a supporter of a close alliance between both sides of the Atlantic, between the Europeans of Europe and the Europeans of the other side of the Atlantic. For her, one of the most important issues in the political agenda of the European Communities was keeping the traditional ties between the USA and Europe. She clearly disliked the idea of building Europe against the power of America in a futile attempt to become the next world power. Margaret Thatcher was a loyal ally of Ronald Reagan, and supported fully his approach against the Soviet Union, his far from mild positions. She was thankful for the effort of the USA in defending Europe, and thought the roots of American values were European. So, the similarities between both areas were much more numerous than were the differences.

Many Europeans, especially in Western Europe, wanted to build Europe as a power balance to the USA in the world, an alternative, complaining about the unilateralism of the American government, and a unipolar world where the USA decides and Europe has no influence; France has been a champion of this vision, starting with de Gaulle until almost nowadays, with the politics developed by Chirac.

Meanwhile in Central and Eastern Europe, the views about America are different and friendlier. These differences were clear in the last war in Iraq, when many countries of Western Europe, like France and Germany, were against the war, and new members of the EU and the UK supported the Americans. These differences can be explained by the fact that the new members of the EU achieved their independence thanks to the USA, because of its victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold War.

The UK, before Thatcher and after her, has had a special relationship with the USA, sharing language, cultural aspects, economic similarities, military cooperation, and a constant transfer of people and ideas between both sides of the Atlantic. It was even one of the reasons given by Charles de Gaulle to reject twice the intention of the UK of joining the European Communities. Thatcher, following with this tradition, supported the creation of a European defence system (Ben, Rosamond 2000, 237-254.), but working closely with the USA, never as an antagonist. This debate is still alive in the European Union.

CONCLUSIONS

The influence of Churchill and Thatcher in the current development of the British politics is important, as one was involved in the early stages of the European Integration, and the second was a key actor in the negotiations of the Single European Act, a major milestone in the EU. Both of them were clearly involved in the European integration, even though their vision about Europe differs from its current shape. Their influence can still be felt in two main fields related to the relations between United Kingdom and the European Union, Intergovernmentalism and free trade. The central role of the member states in the current Union supports this idea of Intergovernmentalism, as the Council is the central institution of the Union, with a key role in most of the decisions. Nevertheless the increasing majority system versus unanimity is decreasing the national sovereignty of the member states leading to a Union closer to a federal idea. This development is already development problems in the British-EU relations. On free trade, the current EU market fulfils the British expectations, even though the regulation of the market has a big impact on the national sovereignty. Nevertheless, even if UK decides in the coming referendum to leave the EU, it will still be part of the EU market, as Norway, because otherwise the economic negative impact on the British economy will be too high.

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