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**MIGRATION CRISIS IN THE EU: A NEW THREAT FOR
ESTONIA?**

Master's Thesis

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I declare I have written the master's thesis independently.

All works and major viewpoints of the other authors, data from other sources of literature and elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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ABSTRACT

Estonia has always considered being a member of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a security guarantee. However the recent migration crisis has shown that the absence of a joint understanding has made it very difficult for the EU to deal with the crisis decisively and therefore has not only led the Union in to a solidarity crisis in general, but has created problems for the Member States as well. The main threats associated with refugees are the increased risk of conflict, burdening of the social system and the possibility of becoming a threat to the cultural identity of the nation.

These topics have evolved into security issues through the process of securitization. The securitization process can take place on multiple levels, but in this case it was used only on the local not on the EU level. Refugees and migration issues were not considered to be a topic of high interest for Estonians, but that all changed after the EU established a mandatory quota system and the government failed to use the media in order to shape the public opinion. The conservatives took advantage of the situation and made themselves to be perceived as the protectors of Estonia's independence and sovereignty by making the acceptance of refugees seem like an existential threat to those core values. The Estonian government is yet to take any action in order to help to alleviate both the international and internal tensions that have developed as a result of this crisis.

The greatest security threat that the Estonian government should focus on is the growth of anxiety, tension and aggression inside the society. Those elements do not only destabilize the situation internally, but can also be used by external actors in order to reach their political goals. Hence the underlining value of this paper is to draw attention on the topic and suggest to focus not only on the short-term problems that stem from this crisis, but as well as on the long-term international ones that might occur due to the passive approach.

Keywords: securitization, hybrid threat, European Union's migration crisis, solidarity crisis, Estonia's response to the refugee crisis

INTRODUCTION

Estonia first set their sights towards Europe right after the restoration of their independence in 1991 and in 2004 the two main foreign policy goals: becoming a member of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were accomplished. Being an active member of the international community as well as a member of key, strong, capable international organizations has been seen as a security guarantee to avoid losing their independence or sovereignty to neighbouring Russia. The perception of one's security is interlinked with the strength of the international organisation in question, which in turn means that it is in the interest of Estonia's national security for the two organizations to be strong, decisive and unified in their actions.

The migration crisis has however effected the European Union's perception both internally and internationally. Until recently it seemed like the European Union's Common Asylum System worked and all the nation states fulfilled the set rules and regulations without major complications. As a result of this crisis it has become evident that there is no common understanding on how to meet up with the international expectation to guarantee the protection of human rights without endangering the wellbeing of the state itself. In addition to the lack of uniformity in the EU, the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and in Brussels have reduced the overall feeling of security and enhanced the perception that the migrants coming from the Middle East and Africa are in fact a security threat, regardless of their reasons for leaving. Estonia has always had a very conservative approach in regards to refugees and it has not radically changed since the beginning of this crisis, even though the Union has made a political call for change.

The hypothesis that this thesis is based on, is that the biggest threat to Estonia's national security is not the migration crisis itself but the lack of actions Estonia has taken in order to alleviate it both internally and internationally.

In the quest of validating or refuting the presented hypothesis, the thesis will consist of three main chapters. The first chapter will compose a theoretical foundation that will be used in order to determine if and how has the migration crisis evolved to a threat to Estonia's national security. The world of classical security studies has defined security threats through military power and force. Others, like the theorists of the Securitization theory look at it from a broader perspective. In addition to analysing the origin of the perceived security threats, the author has

added the conception of hybrid threats to this thesis, because it is a term often used in order to describe situations that visibly do not fit into any classical definitions of conflict, war or crisis.

The second chapter will create an empirical framework to the thesis by answering to the subsequent research questions: What is the migration crisis about and what are the core reasons for it? What kind of actions has the EU taken in order to alleviate the situation and what have the responses of different Member States been in general? The overview, proposed actions and the responses of Member States will illustrate the international scene in which the Member States are currently operating in and create an understanding of the reasons behind the EU's failure.

The third and final chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the presented hypothesis. The chapter will start with giving an overview of Estonia's response to the migration crisis. The second subchapter is focused on finding out if and who has in fact securitized the migration issue by conducting an analysis of media coverages from the time period 01.05.2015-31.07.2015, searching for article that associate with Estonian keywords like refugee "pagulane", "põgenik"; migration crisis and mandatory quotas and comparing the results with the elements of the securitization theory. The financial section will analyse if the exposed weaknesses of the state and society can be used as a political weapon against the nation by an external actor and if so, than what should one do in order to contest them.

The main method of research is qualitative: using both the existing theoretical and empirical literature, comparing and associating them on the given subject and analysing it through using the case study method.

The EU's inherent approach to the crisis at hand seems to be how to make the states carry the burden solidarily and the focus point of the states is to fulfil their international obligation with their own reservations and objectives in mind. Everyone in question is focused only on the instant effects of the crisis rather than the long-term ones, which is in fact the reason why this question should be in the interest points of international relation's researchers and of states themselves.

1 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Traditionally there are two opposing schools of thought in security studies which understand the essence of security very differently: the traditionalists' associate security only with military issues and force, wideners however see it in a bit more broader view than just military power (Buzan, Weaver, Wilde 1998, 7). The desire to associate more aspects with the concept of security, led to the creation of a new school of thought, known as the Copenhagen School or as the Securitization theory in international relations. In short securitization is the process of transforming subjects into matters of security, thereby legitimizing the use of extraordinary measures against them (Ibid.). To be able to determine if Estonia is indeed facing a new security threat stemming from the European Migration crisis, it is thus important to distinguish what actually constitutes as a security threat and how has the topic evolved to what it is today. A few years ago many Estonian's did not even know who a refugee is, now it has however become a hot topic of discussion. Migration and its potential effects on the perceived security of others, is not a security issue in the context of traditional security studies, which explains the reason behind the author's choice of using Securitization theory as a vital part of the thesis.

The second part of this chapter is written with an aim to add another dimension to the theoretical framework by including the hybrid threat concept in order to later on be able to additionally analyze if the vulnerabilities exposed by the migration crisis might in fact become weapons of unorthodox methods.

As a whole the chapter will form a complete theoretical framework by giving an overview of all the main components of the Securitization theory in general, the securitization specifics of the migration issues, the key components of the hybrid threat concept and how to contest them by introducing the works of researchers like Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and other international relations authors.

1.1 Politicization vs securitization

In order to understand what the securitization of an issue actually means, it is important to distinguish between two prima facie concepts. As already stated, securitization in

international relations is the process of actors transforming subjects into matters of security, i.e. an extreme version of politicization that enables extraordinary means to be used in the name of security (Buzan, Weaver, Wilde 1998, 7). Securitization on the international level means to present an issue to be urgent and existential and so important that it should not be exposed to the normal handling of politics but should be a priori dealt by top leaders. (Ibid., 29). On the other hand politicization is used to make an issue appear to be open, a matter of choice, something that should be decided upon and that should be approached with responsibility. To put it in a simpler context, if attention is drawn on a certain topic that needs to be discussed and that is in the interest of a lot of people then it is considered to be politicizing that issue. If attention is drawn with associating it with an urgent security threat, then it is considered to be securitizing that issue.

Any public issue can change from being not politicized (meaning that the state is not interested in dealing with it and it is not made an issue of public debate and decision making) through politicizing (meaning the issue becomes a part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations) to a securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal boundaries) issue. (Ibid.) This is a very important element of the theory because it indicates that the process is constant: issues that initially do not seem as topics that can be perceived as existential threats might still evolve to it through time and through different approaches. This has for example definitely been the case with many classical threats that are considered to be of a hybrid nature. A decade ago no one would think about associating e-information systems to be of a critical importance in regards to the national security of the state. Nowadays however the security of our national information systems is definitely perceived as a security threat to the nation in general and it is for that reason why certain rules and regulations have been created in order to prevent the threat from actually happening. Same is the case with refugees in Estonia. Until recently, Estonian's did not show significant interest in the matter, but according to a web opinion survey conducted in June of 2015, after the publication of the Commissions first official measure packages, 48% of the people thought that accepting the refugees would influence Estonia in a very negative way (Vaitmaa 2015). The result of a similar survey, which was conducted in 2014, showed that only 12 % of the people thought that the acceptance of refugees would influence Estonia in a very negative way (Saar Poll OÜ 2014). Illustrating that there has been a very high increase of negative associations in regards to the refugees and their

contribution to Estonia in a year. This will be further discussed in the third chapter of the thesis and was used as an example in order to illustrate how the importance of an issue can change. It is important to keep in mind that the same could happen vice versa, meaning that an issue that has once been perceived as an existential security threat can lose its importance.

1.2 Components of securitization

In order to form an understanding of the method of securitization, it is necessary to understand what does the concept of security mean, who securitizes, on what issues (threats) for whom (referent objects), why, with what results and under what conditions. This subchapter will consist of defining all of the above mentioned elements of the theory.

Security is a generic term that has a distinct meaning but various forms. Security means survival in the face of existential threats, but there is no universal understanding in what actually constitutes as an existential threat and what not. Security is thus a self-referential practice, because whether the issue becomes a security issue or not, is dependent on the practice itself. It is also important to note that one does not actually have to be a real existential threat, but it might be perceived in that way because the issue is presented as such a threat. The meaning of the concept lies in its usage and in the way how people use it. (Buzan, Weaver, Wilde 1998, 27) Making the way the issue is in fact approached as important as the issue itself, thereby constituting the approach to be the first key factor of the securitization process.

The invocation of security has been a key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it is a way for the state to mobilize and use special powers, in order to handle these kind of threats. Traditionally if a state representative declares a “security” situation or an emergency condition, it in fact gives a right to use whatever means necessary to block or prevent the threat. (Ibid. 21). Consequentially in certain situations the concept of a security threat can also be seen as a presented label in order to justify the proposed actions. If you are able to convince your audience that you are taking the necessary action only in order to protect them from the perceived security threat, your actions will not fall under intensive questioning, because there is a sense of urgency and a need to act decisively.

However one needs to note that this is only the case if the audience accepts your presentation of the issue. If the securitizing actor’s argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat has managed to break free of the procedures that they would otherwise be

obligated to follow, it is a case of securitization. (Buzan, Weaver, Wilde 1998, 27) If something is presented to the referent object as an existential threat- it is a securitizing move, but without the acceptance of the audience, the topic itself will actually not be securitized. The acceptance does not mean that the audience will perceive the threat directly to themselves but they need to form an understanding why this topic can be seen as a security threat. (Ibid., 25). A successful securitization has therefore three components: existential threats, emergency action plans and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of the set rules. (Ibid., 26). However there have been some critiques to this subject that now act as an additional feature for this theory. For example Holger Stritzel pointed out that the securitization theory has put too much weight on the semantic side of the speech act and not enough attention has been appointed to the speaker-audience relations. One cannot always figure out which audience is when and why the most relevant one, what implications it has if there are several different audiences and when exactly is the audience persuaded thus making the securitization move successful. (Stritzel 2007, 358) Thierry Balzaq argues that the positive outcome of securitization lies with the recognition, including the integration of a threat by the masses is facilitated. A popular audience will accept securitization of threats differently to an elite or scientific audience. (Balzaq 2005, 182) Meaning that you have to know your audience and present the threat in a way that is best suited for them in order to persuade them that the issue at hand is in its essence a security threat.

The next element in understanding the method, is defining the different types of actors participating in the securitization process, i.e. giving an answer to the presented question of “who securitizes”. There are three types of actors that all influence the process. The first one is the referent object (things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim for survival). The second ones are the securitizing actors: actors who securitize issues by declaring something- a referent object- existentially threatened. They are the ones who perform the speech act, f.e. an individual, a group, or various political, social, and economic elites, including but not limited to political parties, governments, or religious leaders etc. The third and final type of actors are functional actors: actors who affect the dynamics of the sector. This is an actor who significantly influences the decisions in the field of security, without actually being a securitizing actor. (Waever, Busan 1998, 23)

After understanding who are the actors involved in the securitization process, it is important to look at the distinctive characters and dynamics of the five sectors that according to Buzan, Weaver and Wilde construct the general concept of a state security. Disregarding the

intertwinement of the sectors, the concept of a fundamental existential threat and referent objects varies significantly across different sectors. In the military sector, the referent object, i.e. the person or institution that is the object of the threat, is usually the state. Traditionally security studies tend to see all military affairs as security issues, but that actually might not be the case. For many democracies, defence of the state is the militaries only function. The military is trained and called upon to support routine activities that can hardly be seen as an existential security threat. (Waever, Busan 1998, 22) This is also another example on how the importance of issues changes through time, as discussed in the previous subchapter.

In the political sector, existential threats are defined in terms of the constituting principle of sovereignty, sometimes it can also be the ideology of the state. Sovereignty can existentially be threatened by anything that questions recognition, legitimacy or governing authority. For example the EU can be existentially threatened by events that might undo or harm its integration process. In a broader context international regimes and societies can be existentially threatened by situations that undermine the rules, norms and institutions that constitute those regimes. (Ibid., 22)

In the economic sector the referent objects and existential threats are more difficult to determine. Firms are most commonly existentially threatened by bankruptcy. However in the market economy firms are expected to come and go, as it is the norm and as a result firms themselves very rarely securitize their own survival. Unless the survival of the population is in question, the status of the national economy, whether it is doing better or worse cannot be seen as existentially threatening. (Buzan, Weaver, Wilde 1998, 22)

In the environmental sector the range of possible referent objects is very wide: from relatively concrete things such as the survival of individual species or types of habitat, to such as maintenance of the planetary climate. (Ibid., 23). It all depends on the issue at hand and to whom it is directed to.

The final sector to be discussed in this subchapter is the societal sector. Due to the fact that this sector is the most influenced by the challenges of the migration crisis, the overview of it is a bit more detailed than of the others. In the societal sector, the referent objects are large scale collective identities that can function independently from the institution of state such as nations and religions. It is extremely hard to differentiate existential from lesser threats. Collective identities naturally evolve and change in response to internal and external developments. Such changes may be seen as invasive and their sources pointed out as existential

threats or they may be accepted as part of the evolution of the identity. Thus whether migrants or rival identities are securitized depends upon the type of approach of the holders of the collective identity, whether it is in fact closed or an open-minded view on how their identity is constituted and maintained. The abilities to maintain and reproduce a language, a set of behavioural customs, or a conception of ethnic purity can all be cast in the terms of survival. (Ibid., 23) In addition to the general concept Buzan and Waever have also specifically addressed the situation between the East and the West, coming up with an explanation why the two differ from each other in the context of the societal sector.

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of new states and to their efforts to pursue to be accepted as a member of the European Union. The new order called for a conceptualizing of Europe and European security which challenged the traditional way of thinking about security as only something that took place between states. (Waever, Busan 1993, 23) The emergence of different conceptions of nation states is in its essence the difference between the East and the West. In the West the nation and the state are concepts furthering away from each other as Member States seeking more integration accept some loss of their sovereignty in order to move forward. As international institutions assume increased influence over domestic affairs, the communities perceiving their identities to be threatened by this integration, can no longer depend on the protection of the state. Hence the division between the security needs of the state and society has emerged. (Waever, Busan 1993, 26) Thus making the people still reliable on the state as an integral institution in protecting their security. Even though quite some time has passed, this can still be seen as the case comparing the eastern countries to the western ones.

To conclude the elements to analyze if an issue was generally securitized, it is first necessary to determine if the issue has been politicized or securitized. Secondly one needs to look who securitized; on what issues; for whom; why and with what results and under what kind of conditions in order to make the final decision whether the issue was attempted to be securitized and with what results.

1.3 Securitization of migration

Due to the reason that migration, with a number of other cotemporary security challenges has emerged as a significant issue at the international security agenda level, the

author of this master's thesis will address this topic in a more detailed way, thus specifying the general framework composed in the previous subchapter. Migration has been associated with various problems, including terrorism, criminality, and social unrest (Huysmans 2000, 755). The international relations discussions have dealt with both the nature and causes of migration as well as their political, economic and social effects and implications on the host countries. (Themistocleous 2013). This subchapter is however dedicated to finding out how, who and on what levels actually securitizes the issue of migration not to the discussion of the nature of threats.

The securitization of migration is a process which can be analysed on three levels: the international, regional, and the local level. At the global level, the securitization of migration occurs in a limited extent, because of the differences of the institutional regulations and political conditions that exist due to the relationships of different international actors. The emergence of migration as a security threat does not mean that it is a shared common strategic priority, for all actors. It is argued that one example of the securitization of global migration, has been achieved to a relative extent, as a consequence of the terrorist attacks on 9/11. This is due to the direct reaction of the U.S. through the infamous War on Terror declaration. Combined with the unipolarity that characterized the international system at the time, the U.S. managed to securitize international terrorism. However, the securitization of it also has had a side effect of "incrimination" of Arabs and Muslims, cultivating the perception that every Muslim or Arab is perceived to be a potential terrorist threat. (Ibid.)

At the regional level, although migration is securitized to a larger extent, the institutional and political situation slightly differs in comparison to the global circumstances. The determination of a "regional level" refers to entities and actors which act within a prescribed policy framework, with common institutional provisions. A perfect example of a regional actor is the European Union. However, in the case of migration, the possibilities for a successful securitization process are extremely limited, for three main reasons. The first reason is the different political and economic interests that exist among individual actors, making the creation of a common line extremely difficult. The second reason results from the different impact degrees of migration in each state, due to the asymmetry created by the migratory flow. The third reason is the heterogeneity among the audience. The heterogeneity is due to the fact that locally, the securitization of issues varies greatly from one country to another, thereby creating different perceptions among the audience. (Themistocleous 2013)

In contrast to the global and regional level, the securitization of migration locally is observed to be a quite common event. The securitization of migration as a process occurs mainly in countries with intense migratory flows, but however others might engage in this process too if they find it necessary. It has been observed that securitization occurs either by one actor, for instance a political party, or by a group of actors such as a political party, the media, and a religious organization. The most common arguments used by the internal securitizing actors, are related with the fields of economic, social cohesion and political stability. More specifically, regardless of the different types of migrants that are entering in the host country, the most common argument that presented, is the extremely negative effects on the economy. That is, the increasing unemployment due to the unfair competition against to the domestic labours, given that immigrants are a cheap labour force. Simultaneously, the securitizing alarms include a number of other sectors related to the social and political structures, such as the risk of changing the demographic and cultural traditions of the country. In several occasions, it has also been argued that there is a potential for the spreading of diseases among the local populations, and the potential increase of violence and delinquency. (Themistocleous 2013)

In practical terms one of the most negative consequences of the securitization of migration is the growth of racism and xenophobia amongst the locals. Securitization actors, create deeply phobic syndromes within the community against anything “different”. In this way, the conservation of the society increases dramatically with extremely negative medium and long term implications. This phenomenon can be established by empirical evidence from a number of cases worldwide; where due to the securitization of migration, the domestic political balances have changed to a large extent, favouring the rise of right-wing and neo-Nazi parties and movements. (Huysmans 2000, 765)

In the context of this master’s thesis the author will thereby analyze if the issue of migration has been securitized on the regional level (EU) and on the local level (Estonia). The need to look at more than just the local level stems from the fact that it is a problem of the Union not just a problem of different Member States. The global level will however not be analysed in this thesis because it would require another large scale research to be conducted in order to get an overview of the global migration crisis. This constraint will however not affect the results of this research because like with any other international relations issue the range of analysis

can differ from a very narrow perspective to a global one and each piece acts as a component in the formation of the bigger picture.

1.4 Defining hybrid threats and contending them

The final subchapter is written about the concept of hybrid threats. The author of this master's thesis has added this concept to the theoretical part because it will support and compliment the already existing framework on securitization, thus enabling to analyse if the weaknesses exposed by the migration crisis could have the characteristics of being used as a hybrid threat against the national security of Estonia and giving the framework an international measure. It is however important to note that there is no official doctrine on the hybrid threat concept, meaning that it is not a complete international relations theory (Freier 2009, 81). For many strategists, the defence challenges titled as hybrid are actually examples of cunning leaderships in opposition to western superiority, making it difficult to determine whether the threat is in-fact hybrid or not. (Ibid, 82) There are some independent researchers of international relations like Frank Hoffman who have taken an interest in this subject but since it is not a complete doctrine, it still causes quite a lot of controversy in determining whether it is indeed a new concept or just a new, convenient label on events that have actually occurred throughout history. According to the opinion of the author, the fact that there are researchers who criticize the concept does not make the concept invalid but it actually helps the doctrine to develop. The main sources that have been used in order to construct this subchapter are the opinions of independent researchers, strategists and strategical documents created as action plans in order to counter these threats, for example the European Union's Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats.

In order to start with the introduction of this topic, it is first important to start with the meaning of key terms. Linguistically speaking the word "hybrid" means that something was made or is being affected by multiple elements. In the context of international relations, the term is being used to identify the seemingly increased complexity of war, the multiplicity of actors involved, and the hardships that states are facing with using traditional categories of conflict trying to identify them (Hybrid Threat . . . 2010, 5). Something is perceived to be a threat if it is anticipated that it will harm either political, economic, environmental and cultural dimensions of security. Security in this context does not only mean protection against foreign

military attacks, but even more so on the physical and psychological perceived safety of a state's regime, citizens and their way of life. The important aspect that needs to be emphasized is that the perceived threats usually have more significant impacts on international relations between states than the actual real threats. (Mandel 1997, 80). If you put those two definitions together, then the simplified explanation of the term is that it is the perception of something that is not simply understandable and that seems to oppose a threat to your perceived feeling of safety. The idea that security has more than one dimension is the same as was the securitization theory's approach on defining ones security.

Hybrid threats, hybrid conflicts and hybrid wars are often used as synonyms, but there are actually distinct differences if you compare them by levels of intensity and the intentionality of actors involved. A hybrid threat is a phenomenon that stems from convergence and interconnection of different elements that form a complex and multidimensional threat, used by a state or another actor in order to achieve its strategic or political goals. Hybrid conflict is a situation in which parties do not use armed forces against each other and rely on the conflict to be resolved using the combination of military intimidation, exploitation of economic and political vulnerabilities and diplomatic or technological tools in order to achieve the set goals. Compared to the hybrid threat level, the identification that there actually is a conflict is necessary in order to label it a hybrid conflict. The third and the highest level of intensity is the hybrid war level, which is a situation where a country uses armed forces against their opponent in addition to a mix of other means (economic, political and diplomatic). (Understanding Hybrid . . . 2015) In order to use the correct term it is thereby important to acknowledge the magnitude of the situation, however these three terms are very intertwined with each other and present the escalation levels of one another. Nevertheless it is very difficult to distinguish between those levels because of the way how hybrid threats, conflicts and wars have been constructed. It intentionally blurs the distinctions between the neatly separated categories of war and peace. This blurring is achieved by using a wide variety of means, in a carefully planned way without unnecessarily breaching the threshold of war, even if the level of escalation varies. As a result it is very hard for the targeted countries to devise policy responses in a proper and timely manner or be able to use the correct term about the situation (Cederberg, Eronen 2015, 2).

Not only is it difficult to distinguish the levels of hybrid conflicts, but the very nature of them is also very fragmented. There are authors who argue that hybrid warfare is in its essence

winning or achieving the set goals with very little or no fighting at all (Cederberg, Eronen 2015, 2). The most famous saying about war is by Carl von Clausewitz, who said that:” War is the continuation of politics (policy) by other means”. So it is in essence nothing more than just a method of achieving the set goals without declaring themselves to be in a conflict, or even at war, as a matter of fact, making the concept not new to the world of politics and it is in its core nothing more than a general label for threats in situations that are being perceived as threatening and that do not seem to fit under the classical terms like conflict or warfare. Another approach is that the concept of hybrid wars or threats cannot be associated with a specific tactic or a strategy, but they actually are the result of actions that have been conducted by a hybrid nation. In order to determine if you are in-fact dealing with hybrid threats, you therefor need to be able to understand if you are dealing with a hybrid nation or a hybrid actor. The only way you can define it, is to understand the historical, social, cultural, political, economic and military aspects of the named nation or actors. Without this understanding, you cannot grasp the bigger picture and therefore it is more difficult to counter the threats threatening you. (Neneth 2015) The third and the most common conceptualization of it, is that the term hybrid threat is used to capture the interrelated nature of challenges (for example ethnic conflict, terrorism, migration and weak institutions); multiplicity of actors involved in the conflict (regular and irregular forces, criminal groups, states) and the variety of used methods (military, diplomatic, technological etc.) (Hoffmann 2009). According to the author of this thesis, all of the three approaches are in fact complementing each other thereby creating a more complete conception of the term itself. Hybrid threats can be identified as threats that combine several threats into one; is used by multiple actors and is conducted using different methods simultaneously. The end goal of using hybrid threats is to achieve the set goals with as little use of traditional military powers as possible, and in order to contest against them it is necessary to have a deep comprehension of the actor using this kind of tactics. Without this understanding you would be only countering the symptoms not the root causes.

History is full of examples of how an opposer has used his relative perceived strengths against his opponent’s perceived weaknesses, making the concept not actually de facto new (Hybrid Threat . . . 2010, 8). However they have and will continue to be ever- evolving and will use both conventional and unconventional equipment and tactics to create complex dilemmas. Opponents will be forced to conduct mixed counter measures and the adversary will continue to shift effort and emphasis to make all the choices seem like bad ones. (Hybrid Threat . . .

2010, 10) As a result the most difficult challenge in combating hybrid threats is their ability to keep transitioning. The opposer will use the same difficulties that the opponent is facing in identifying it, in their advantage. Without a clear understanding if it really is a threat or not, it is very hard to come to terms if and how you really should or could act against it. (Ibid., 15) With the use of securitization however, actors can convince the public that they actually need to be seen as existential threats, thus legitimatizing the use of countermeasures, even though the very nature of the threat is yet to be distinguished.

The same difficulties rise in defining the actors who are the participants of the conflict. In today's complex international scene, there are many types of actors all participating in it at the same time. Some of them are nation states who remain the dominant international actors, but the power of non-traditional actors (for example terrorist organizations) is also growing. Nevertheless not all actors can be seen as threatening. To be a threat, a nation or organization must have the capabilities and the intention to challenge the recipient. The capabilities in question are not necessarily purely military, but involve all of the elements of power available to the nation or organization. (Hybrid Threat . . . 2010, 13) Non-military hybrid threats can emerge as purposeful acts focused specifically against the state or its interests: f.e terroristic attacks and some emerge without specific anti-state purpose: e.g. natural or human catastrophe or civil unrest (Freier 2009, 85). These activities can be conducted by separate units or even by the same unit but are coordinated with each other to achieve the effects of the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict. (Hoffman 2010, 443)

In addition to the two classical actor categories (states and non-states), there is a third type of actor that needs to be acknowledged, a third- party actor that may not be hostile to others but have a different value in the context of hybrid threats. They can be used in order to achieve the ultimate goal. For example refugees and internally displace persons, international humanitarian relief agencies, transnational corporations and the media- all are considered to be third-party actors and potential methods to construct a hybrid threat against your opponent. (Hybrid Threat . . . 2010, 15)

According to the EU's adopted Joint Framework of countering hybrid threats, the range of measures used to achieve political goals is very wide: from cyberattacks on critical information systems to undermining public trust in government institutions or exploiting social vulnerabilities. Critical vulnerabilities may differ from Member State to Member State, as do levels of protection ensured nationally. Hybrid threats can also target vulnerabilities in societies,

challenging core values and liberties, or targeting more vulnerable groups. (Joint Framework . . . 2016) Coherently meaning that if the opponent is aware of certain weaknesses of the adversary, than they will use every opportunity they get in order to target that weakness and use the situation to their advantage.

As stated in the introduction of this subchapter, the topic at hand is very controversial and there are opposing opinions in using the term hybrid threats or hybrid warfare. According to Yves Winter, the real reasoning behind referring contemporary conflicts either irregular or asymmetric is to differentiate them from previous ones. It is a conveniently vague term that can be used to describe almost everything and that also enables to moralize and depoliticize the differences between states and non-state actors. (Winter 2011, 488) The same views have also been shared by Dan G. Cox, who claims that the concept of hybrid threats (or hybrid warfare), as defined by its main proponents, is indeed unclear, incomplete, and often an unhelpful concept (Cox, 2011).

The reason why the use of this term is so common or why it is perceived to be as efficient is the fact that it allows states to present themselves as vulnerable to strategic constellations that they cannot win, because of their non-traditional nature and moralize the difference. According to the critique, it is nothing more than an example on how states have learnt to turn certain vulnerabilities into advantages by broadcasting themselves as victims. The discourse of asymmetry allows states to present themselves not just as victims but as targets of a different kind of power that has the potential to destroy the existing political order. The asymmetric enemy by contrast can be depicted as a universal threat to peace and security, thus making it legitimate to use force against them. (Winter 2011, 496) Furthermore the critics conclude that this concept is often used in order to imagine the enemy with almost mystical powers (Cox 2011).

In brief the main argument against the use of this term, is that there is nothing new about this concept and that it is actually being used as a tool in order to legitimate some of the actions that the opponent wants to take against the adversary or vice versa. There is some truth to this statement, seeing how the terms hybrid threat, hybrid conflict and hybrid warfare are continually being used by the international community describing very different situations, but in the opinion of the author of this thesis, this criticism is actually aimed more about the way how we label some situations and use them to our advantage not arguing that there is no threat in the so called hybrid threat. The real value of using this kind of concept is to make actors

(especially states) aware of the potential methods of using irregular threats against them in a way that you cannot really distinguish who is behind it all. If the use of this concept increases then at one point it might develop into a term also used in securitizing some issues in order to present them as existential threats.

The final part of this subchapter focuses on how to tackle hybrid threats. The first key part is to determine if you are dealing with a hybrid actor (state). There are 5 different topics that need to be addressed: political, military, social, economic and strategic communication. It is important to note that even though they have been written down as characteristics of a hybrid state, concluding from a general approach that only a hybrid actor uses hybrid threats, they can also be applied for non-state actors.

The first characteristic is that the composer of hybrid threats is an entity who does not let oneself to be constrained by modern political norms and regimes, meaning that they might interpret international laws in a way best suited for them. They offer financial support to political and civil society entities that act with a desire to undermine the undesired system. (Neneth 2015) All of this could not be done if a strong political leader would not be in place, equipped with both the will and ability to dedicate resources for the operations on short notice, as well as in the longer run (Cederberg & Eronen 2015, 7).

Secondly, an effective and wide-ranging intelligence apparatus is needed to scan the target countries and create a list of identified vulnerabilities. The list of identified vulnerabilities, or the list of targets, is based on the acquired knowledge of the key vulnerabilities and weaknesses that exist in the society of the target country. (Cederberg & Eronen 2015, 7) In addition it is widely used in order to keep in touch with the process of the current operation (Neneth 2015).

Thirdly the hybrid state will always pursue the creation of an alternative political/economic/social system that is more beneficial for themselves (Ibid.) They increase the military's status and prominence via flashy and high-visibility trainings and operations; use snap exercises in order to distract the attention from where the military will actual be located; use the military as a method to influence and instigate fear internationally and use Cold War military tactics in order to influence political decisions. (Neneth 2015)

The final characteristic of a hybrid nation is the existence of a strategic communication platform. Before the actual hybrid operation, there are information campaigns launched at raising support for the operation both internally and in the target country, Information

operations will also continue to take place during and after the active phase of the hybrid operation. (Ibid.) In order to achieve the set goal, you need to have control over the media, you need to have created a suitable narrative of being evil and running with it, and you need to push the independent media out and knowingly engage in spreading disinformation. (Neneth 2015).

Political support, the application of an intelligence apparatus, and information operations are all crucial throughout the preparations, execution, and follow-up phases of hybrid operations (Cederberg & Eronen 2015, 7). As a result these are also the signs that the opponent must be looking out for and paying attention if and when some topics are portrayed more than they have been before, potentially hinting the possibility of using it to achieve some political goals.

As has already become evident, it is not easy to fight against hybrid threats. The first difficulty of them is to define who the adversary actually is and conceptualizing their responsibility and intentionality of their actions. This definition is important to be able to ensure that the policy response is legitimate and proportionate. However it is not an easy task because of the limitations of international law, technological constraints or the diffusion of actors which increase the opportunities for deniability. (Understanding Hybrid Threats . . . 2015) So as result if you cannot define without any doubt who is responsible for the situation in question, it is very hard if not impossible to respond to the attack. If the opponent keeps denying their participation in the situation and you only have indirect evidence against them, then there will always be an element of uncertainty that acts in favour of the opponent because there is no final conviction that eliminates all of the doubts and therefor justifies your response.

The second challenge is the existing international legal framework and global governance. If force is indeed used, then there are rules and principles that regulate armed conflicts, such as international humanitarian law and human rights law. But at the same time the application of the existing international law and the functioning of global governance institutions have become increasingly complicated because the boundaries of sovereignty, legitimacy and legality are very blur. (Ibid.) In what circumstances is it actually up to the state to respond to the threat independently and when does it actually need the permission or the support of an international organisation or other states because they cannot go in to direct contradiction with objectives set out by the international organisations, is still very vague.

As a result of the presented difficulties, to fight against hybrid threats there is a need to blend in all of the different actors and available instruments: diplomacy, humanitarian aid,

political processes, economic development, and technology, if necessary than even military forces. (Understanding Hybrid Threats . . . 2015) Keeping that mind, several approaches stand out that have all been taken in action to fight against both the existing and potential hybrid threats. The first one is the shift in conceptualizing the security concept. Government-led comprehensive approaches are increasingly complemented by whole-of-society strategies aimed at managing risks and building resilient societies. The focus on resilience helps to decrease the risks that might lead to hybrid conflicts in the future (i.e. over energy or access to water), and improve associated resource-management practices. (Ibid.) This approach needs to be combined with an objective vulnerability analysis to understand the potential pressure points in one's own society, access to reliable intelligence, and robust counterintelligence efforts (Cederberg, Eronen 2015). Following the institutional trends need to be developed as well. For example many countries have adjusted to hybrid threats by expanding the missions of existing institutions (i.e. new powers for intelligence agencies, or creating new organisations (i.e. the Ministry of Truth in Ukraine) that have a goal in fighting against hybrid threats. (Understanding Hybrid Threats...2015)

To conclude, the key questions that should be taken into account when devising national defence plans against hybrid threats include:

What are the key national vulnerabilities that one should be paying attention to? How could an adversary take advantage of those vulnerabilities? Are all the necessary sectors of society engaged in the defensive efforts and have they been adequately prepared to act in their respective sectors against the perceived threats? Is there a shared understanding of the situation in times of both peace and crisis that can be utilised to lead activities in various sectors of the society? Are the intelligence activities providing early warning, ongoing situational awareness and analysis? If all the answers to the presented questions are positive then the state is as ready as it can be to counter hybrid threats. If not then there is work to be done in order to become prepared. The question if Estonia needs to be prepared and what is the level of preparedness today will be analysed in the third chapter of this thesis.

2 THE EUROPEAN MIGRATION CRISIS

Migration flows are not a new concept for the European Union. There are different types of possible migration, but the current crisis is usually associated with forced and irregular migration. Forced migration is a term that is used to describe a movement that is driven by an element of compulsion, for example threat to life and livelihood arising from either natural or man-made causes. Irregular migration is a concept used to define movement that takes place outside of the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries. (Key Migr . . . 2015) For example, all of the people who are searching protection against different threats and are indeed entitled to it, are identified as members of forced migration flows and if they have entered the receiving country illegally, then they are also members of the irregular migration flows. It is important to emphasize those two terms because there are also people who are not using illegal ways to enter the EU and are in fact just looking for better conditions or better ways to live their life. This kind of movement is also a part of migration flows entering Europe, but it is an entirely different research subject and that kind of movement is not a part of the crisis at hand.

One of the main, if not the most important, pillar of the European Union is human rights and the organisation's commitment to do everything in their power to guarantee the existence of these rights. Until recently it seemed like the European Union's common asylum system worked and all the nation states were in agreement with the set rules and regulations. However the sheer volume of people currently travelling to the EU using illegal methods for border crossings, whether it is in search of international protection or just for a better life, has made it clear that there is no common understanding on how to meet up with the international expectation to guarantee the protection of human rights without endangering the wellbeing of the state itself or its citizens. The fact that the EU has not been able to deal with the crisis decisively has led the Union into a solidarity crisis in general.

This chapter is written to give the reader an overview of the current crisis and the international situation surrounding this problem i.e. form an empirical international framework to the master thesis in general. In order to achieve the constructed objective, the chapter will give answers to subsequent research questions: what is the crisis about and what are the core reasons of it's arise? What kind of actions has the EU taken in order to solve or alleviate the situation? What have the responses of the Member States been to the crisis in general?

In addition, the final subchapter will analyze if the migration issue has in fact been securitized on the regional level according to the theory presented in chapter 1, or not, thus indicating if the EU has attempted to legitimize the use of extraordinary measures in order to find permanent solutions to the migration crisis.

The chapter is written by using different sources of international law and associating them with each other, by analysing and contrasting other authors opinions, by comparing and analysing official documents and press releases of the Council of the European Union and by using the method of statistical analysis in order to illustrate specific examples or to give an exact overview of the situation in question.

2.1 Overview of the crisis and it`s reasons

There are three key components to this crisis that need to be addressed in order to give a complete overview. This subchapter will begin with explaining where the right to ask and the obligation to offer international protection (asylum) comes from. It is an important understanding because without this perspective it is hard to comprehend why the European Union has to deal with the problems of third country citizens. In order to identify the volume of the problem, the second part of this subchapter will be focused on the statistical numbers and the third and final section will introduce the core reasons of Europe`s divided and undeceive reaction to the situation at hand.

The right to seek asylum is a fundamental human right. There are many levels of international law that have incorporated this right: starting from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the EU`s Common Asylum System as an integral whole.

The most important source of international protection of refugees is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. All others derive from it. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 14, paragraph 1 “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution“. This article gives people the right for protection from other countries and morally compels states that have vowed to respect human rights, to provide it. (Universal . . . 2016)

All of the members of the United Nations have taken on a responsibility to respect human rights, as it has been stated in the preamble of the Charter of UN: “we the peoples of the United Nations determined to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights . . .“. This is a general

principle which states, that have ratified the Charter of UN in order to become members, must uphold. (Charter of the . . . 2016) The organization has 193 members, which means that almost every existing country has made a promise to respect and to ensure the protection of human rights (Member States . . . 2011).

However the reality is that there is no cohesion amongst states in defining human rights nor are their capabilities or desires to protect them at the same level. States vary enormously between one another in the terms of fundamental values, economic and political circumstances. Nevertheless, the international community has decided that no human being should endure inhumane conditions just because of the geographical location where he or she has born in. As a result human rights should be protected by every member of the international community and if one fails to fulfil this obligation, no matter the reasons behind the failure, than others shall step in and offer it if the person at hand has asked for it.

Similarly to defining human rights, there was no coherence between states in determining who a refugees actually is. In order to help states define them and the minimum rights that they are entitled to, the 1951 Refugee Convention was created by the United Nations. This document was a post Second World War utensil that was created in order to help states deal with displaced people. The document was originally limited, only regulating people who fled their origin states from events that happened before the 1 of January 1951 within Europe. The 1967 Protocol to the Convention removed those limitations, thus making the Convention universally usable. (Achiron 2001, 8) The most important article from the Convention in the context of this thesis, is the one that has defined who a refugee is. According to the Convention's article 1A (2) a refugee is a person who is outside his or her country and has a factual reason to fear persecution because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion and is unable to avail her- or himself to the protection of that country (Geneva . . . 2016). There are 142 states that have ratified both the 1951 Convention and it's 1967 Protocol (States Parties . . . 2015). Which means that the majority of existing countries have agreed upon the same criterions to what a person's condition, whose application for asylum is being handled, should answer to. However the Convention itself does not create a joint understanding in what does the "factual fear of persecution" clause actually mean or how should one determine if the fear is indeed factual or not, which in turn leads to different decisions amongst states.

The European Union started working towards the creation of a Common European Asylum System already in 1999. The reasoning behind the creation of a joint system is that the Member States have a shared responsibility to welcome and treat the asylum applicants in a standardized, dignified and fair way, so that no matter where the asylum applicant will hand in his claim, they will receive the same treatment and outcome. The system consists of rules on how to make quality asylum decisions (Asylum Procedures Directive); rules that regulate the reception conditions for example housing (Reception Conditions Directive); rules that clarify the grounds of granting international protection (Qualification Directive); rules that clarify the responsibility of handling the received applications between states (Dublin Regulation) and rules that allow law enforcement access to the EU database of asylum (EURODAC Regulation). (Common European . . . 2015)

To conclude, the compendious version of the international protection model is that the right to ask and the obligation to offer it stems from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 protocol is the document that was used as a basis in order to create the European Common Asylum System, which was established in order to achieve a cohesive approach in accepting and handling the asylum applicants amongst Member States. However these directives only describe what the general outcome should be, leaving the determination of exact implementation methods up to national governments (Langford 2013, 213). Therefor making the applicants vulnerable to the policy making of national governments.

After understanding where obligation to handle this topic comes from, the next step is to look at the numbers that have been the triggers of this crisis. The statistical trend of asylum applications was relatively stable in the EU until year 2012. After that the numbers started to grow more rapidly: in 2013 the EU received 431 000 applications from non-member countries, in 2014 627 000 applications and in 2015 the number doubled and the EU received close to 1.3 million asylum applications (Asylum statistics . . . 2016).

The top three origin nationalities of all the asylum applicants in 2015 were Syrian (29%), Afghan (21%) and Iraqi (10%) (Ibid.). Even though almost 30 % of 1.3 million seems a very high number at first, then the altogether situation of Syrians is much worse. It is estimated that approximately 9 million Syrians have left their origin country since the civil war started in March 2011. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, over 3 million have taken refuge in the neighbouring countries like Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, however most of them are still displaced within Syria itself. (Syrian refugees . . . 2016) The

main reason behind the movement of Afghanis and Iraqis is due to the growth of violence and instability in their country (Mixed Migration Flows . . . 2016).

The main entry points for irregular migrants are Greece and Italy. In 2015 Greece received 853 650 arrivals by sea and only 3713 by land. Italy received 153 842 arrivals by sea and 0 by land. However the highest number of arrivals by land was received by the Bulgarians, almost 32 000 people. Spain, Cyprus and Malta are also frequently used as entry points. (Ibid.)

Theoretically the EU should have been ready to handle the increase of people entering the Union: joint regulations had been drafted, enforced and Member States have had years of practice in handling asylum claims. It is evident that the common asylum system has actually not worked because of internal contradictions in the system itself, the incomplete nature of the Unions integration and because of the different interests of Member States (Bagdonas 2015, 7). Those three are the key elements in understanding the reasons why the EU has not been able to act unanimously and decisively. The first two reasons will be discussed in the following part of this subchapter, the third one will be addressed in the third subchapter.

One of the foundations of the European asylum system, the Dublin regulation, is in fact also the main example of the Union's incomplete and superficial nature of the approach to refugees. The nature of the system: it is the entry point country's responsibility to handle the asylum claim, is creating inequality amongst Member States because it has always put more pressure and responsibility on the Border States than on anyone else (The Dublin . . . 2016).

At first the system was created to prevent asylum shopping and to shield wealthy EU states (like Germany) from asylum seekers. However this protection came from the expense of the Border States. For example the Greek island of Lesbos, that has a native population of 86000 people and a reception capacity of 2800 people, received over 350 000 migrants in 2015. Under those circumstances it is very difficult to ensure the basic living conditions for the migrants, let alone to ensure applying the set out procedure rules. (Bagdonas 2015, 9) Thus making it impossible for the country to be able to handle the situation individually. Furthermore, the state does not only have to take responsibility of the refugees who lodge their asylum claims to them, but also for all the asylum seekers who are physically sent back from other Member States where they have applied for asylum if they entered the EU from another country. The movement of people is tracked by EU's fingerprint database that raises alerts if an asylum seeker has already been entered into the system, meaning that they have entered the EU at another official border. (Langford 2013, 225) This is however only the case when the asylum applicant has been

registered correctly, without it, it is not possible to positively identify where the applicant did actually enter the EU and the responsibility to handle the claim is at the hands of the state where the applicant is currently positioned.

It was expected that through eliminating the confusion and conflicting decisions that surfaced when it was realized that the asylum applicant had made applications in different states, the new system would actually increase solidarity between states. In practice it has had a reverse and negative outcome on the EU's solidarity. The reason is as was already stated due to the fact that all of the burden has fallen on the hands of Border States and the other Member States have not been actively participating in any burden sharing mechanisms or compensating inequality. (Langford 2013, 225)

Another example of the contradictions in the system, is the fact that it is quite a large financial burden for states to handle and provide the minimum standards set out in the European rules for asylum applicants. There are very large indifferences between the financial situations of Member States, meaning that there are very big differences with the financial instruments that a state can use. Theoretically all asylum applicants are entitled to the same rights, yet in practice the wellbeing of asylum applicants varies enormously. (Bagdonas 2015, 12-13) Ironically the Border States who have the biggest burden to carry, are the ones who do not have their financial situations under control, f.e Greece. However it needs to be noted that the international protection model does not take the situation of the receiving country into account, because the desire to ensure the protection of human rights should ideologically be above everything else and states should be able to finance it.

The different situations of Member States in turn leads to another problem that creates a cycle even inside the EU itself. Because of the differences of the economic situations of Member States and the disparity of the national asylum regimes, it is possible that one member state can be held liable for human rights violations of another (Langford 2013, 218). This would however be unacceptable for the EU as a whole, because each Member State should be able to carry and respect all of the main principles of the EU and if not then it is a problem of the Union's core values as a whole.

Peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights are the founding principles of the EU. They are not just political phrases but the norms of the EU as a political entity and together they compile the backbone of its identity. It would be a lot easier to lower some expectations in regards of self-imposed human rights standards and to deal with crisis this way.

But in doing so, the EU would reduce its legitimacy and undermine its international reputation. (Boswell 2000, 550) Meaning that the expectations for the EU are not high only inside the Union but in the international scene as well. As a result, it is not an option for the European Union not to take action. Since the beginning of this crisis, the EU faced a great challenge due to the inability to maintain some of the existing rules due to their ill-advised nature. As the crisis has evolved through time, the situation has only worsened. If existing rules and regulations do not alleviate but rather deteriorate the situation, the only logical step is to change the set rules. However it is not easy to radically change rules in the European Union due to self-imposed constraints and disagreements about what and how should actually be changed.

2.2 Proposed actions to solve the crisis

The Council of the European Union has declared seven strategic priorities in order to tackle the migratory pressures that the Member States are under. Those seven priorities include both dealing with the root causes of illegal migration as well as tackling the problems that stem from the Union's Common Asylum System itself. (Finding solutions . . . 2016) The crisis has been and will continue to be ever evolving and as a result the proposed actions of the EU have also changed through time, even though the foundations have always remained the same. This subchapter is written with an aim to act as an abstract on what the EU proposed to do and how have the Union's proposed approaches gradually changed in the quest to find a permanent solution not only to the crisis at hand but also to the general problems of the Common European Asylum System as a whole. One cannot be solved without another because there does not seem to be a permanent solution in the near future for the situation in the origin countries, for example in Syria, which in turn means that there is no reason to predict that the amount of people trying to reach EU will show signs of decreasing. The underlining value of this overview is to create the empirical context of the international actions that have had an impact on the Member States in dealing with this crisis.

The actions of the EU have been divided into two categories. The first part of this chapter is dedicated to the main actions inside the Union and the second will give an overview of co-operation plans with non-member states.

The foundations of the strategic priorities plan was created on the 23rd of April in 2015, when the European Council had their first special meeting in order to address the migration

crisis. This was around the time that the media started to publicly cover more stories and statistics about the people who had died in the Mediterranean attempting to reach the EU, thereby increasing the need for a public in-depth response. (Special meeting of the European Council . . . 2015)

The leaders of the EU agreed on four priority areas for action: Firstly to fight traffickers by disabling the usages of vessels by smugglers, increasing cooperation to work against smuggling networks and to offer EU immigration officers help and knowledge to the countries that are unable to control their borders. Secondly to strengthen the EU's presence at sea by tripling the resources available to the EU-s border mission in the Central Mediterranean. To prevent illegal migration flows by enhancing general cooperation with the countries of origin and transit, with a focus on countries surrounding Libya. And finally to reinforce internal solidarity and international responsibility, by offering more protection for refugees and setting up a first voluntary pilot project of resettlement all around the EU. (Special meeting of the European Council . . . 2015) In brief, the actions of the first meeting were mainly focused on finding ways to stop the illegal migration into the EU by targeting the ones that enable the hazardous journeys on the Mediterranean. There was a political call for taking responsibility of the already arrived refugees by creating a relocation program, but the participation in it was voluntary.

A few weeks later (13.05), the European Commission published an official European Agenda on Migration. In general, it is a detailed version of the Council's agreed fundamental actions. According to the Agenda, there are again four main components to create an effective EU migration policy, which all fundamentally support the goals set out by the Council. The main specifications of the document were the proposals on how to achieve a strong common asylum policy. It consists of different actions that need to be conducted in order to tackle the weaknesses exposed by the crisis. One of the first visible weaknesses is the lack of mutual trust between Member States, a result of the continued fragmentation of the implementation of asylum systems. This has had a direct impact on asylum seekers who asylum shop as well as on the EU's public opinion that sees the system itself fundamentally unfair. In order to create trust, it is therefore necessary to ensure a full and coherent implementation of the Common European Asylum System that is supported by a systematic monitoring process with a purpose to oversee the implementation and application of asylum rules amongst the Member States. In addition, it is necessary to create coherent decisions on asylum applications and to speed up the

process of handling the applications by the creation of a joint safe country. (A European Agenda . . . 2015, 12) Thereby finally reaching the final goal of a joint EU's approach of refugees, that was set out already in 1999 when the Union first started working towards a common system.

The next step is the evaluation of the Dublin Regulation. In 2014 5 Member States dealt with 72% of all asylum applications EU-wide. (Ibid., 13) As it has been already stated, the system creates inequality amongst Member States, which in turn creates dissatisfaction and consequently has a negative impact on the European solidarity as a fundamental principle of the EU.

The third weakness that needs to be addressed, is that the EU's return system meant to return irregular migrants or those whose asylum applications are refused, does not actually work. Instead, it has become one of the incentives of irregular migration. Smuggling networks pray on the fact that relatively few return decisions are enforced, for example only about 40% of return decisions were effectively enforced in 2013. (Ibid., 8) Even though the topic was acknowledged the Agenda did not have a specific action plan in order to tackle this weakness.

The fourth and final pillar of the Agenda is the goal to reinforce internal solidarity and responsibility by triggering an emergency response system. The Agenda includes a proposal of a temporary distribution scheme for persons in need of international protection that would distribute the people according to the set out criteria. The redistribution criteria consists of GDP, size of population, unemployment rate and past number of asylum seekers and of resettled refugees. In addition, the Commission also emphasized that it is the EU's duty not only to take responsibility of the people already on the EU soil but to help others in need as well. (Ibid., 4)

The relocation and resettlement schemes were created to divide 40 000 places for refugees amongst all Member States. Relocation means moving a refugee from one Member State to another, but resettlement means to move a refugee from a third country to a Member State, thus fulfilling the international expectation to help with the global migration crisis. The total number of relocated people was estimated to be 20 000, as was the number of resettled people. (Ibid., 19)

In the Commissions initial proposal to relocate people from one Member State to another, the highest total number of people to be received was Germany with 3684 people. The second was France with 2864 people and third Italy with 2368. In total those three countries would take 44% of total people in need to be relocated. (Appendix 1) The three lowest numbers of people to be received were Cyprus with 78 people, Malta with 138 and Luxembourg with

170 people. It is important to draw attention to the fact that the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark were not a part of the relocation scheme distribution because of their restrictions of ratifying the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, under which the relocation scheme would be called to life (Ibid., 21).

The highest number of people to be resettled from a third country was again handed to Germany with 3086 people, followed by France (2375) and United Kingdom (2309). The top three countries are responsible for 38% of the total number of people in need to be resettled. (Appendix 1) This is a bit smaller rate, compared to the relocation scheme, meaning that the people were divided a bit more evenly due to the reason that more states were marked as participants than in the relocation scheme. The three lowest were the same as in the relocation scheme: Cyprus with 69 people, Malta with 121 and Luxembourg with 147 people. The resettlement scheme was formed as a recommendation not as an official measure, which in turn is the reason why United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark were also included in the division (A European Agenda . . . 2015, 22).

The distribution key itself is of an interesting nature because it does take the previous experience of the country into account, but not the reasons of the countries lack of experience. As a result, the distribution key does not actually eliminate the fundamental inequality amongst Member States because the ones that have more experience i.e. have been willing to accept more refugees in the past, are still the ones who are carrying the most weight in tackling this problem. In 2014 Germany was the recipient of the largest number of asylum applications, followed by France, Sweden, Italy and the United Kingdom (UNHCR sub regional operations . . . 2015). All of those countries, except Sweden, were at the top of the recipients' lists in the proposed scheme as well. The proposal does however make everyone, with a few exceptions, participate in the distribution scheme, which in its essence is a step forward in the relinquishment of inequality.

A few weeks after (27.05) publishing the European Migration Agenda, the Commission created the first official package of measures to address the migration crisis. It consisted of the following actions: an emergency relocation proposal for 40 000 people in need of international protection from Italy and Greece; a recommendation asking Member States to resettle 20 000 people in need of international protection outside of the EU and an action plan against migrant smuggling. (European Commission makes progress . . . 2015)

In comparison to the Agenda, the first measure package is another step onward for more concrete actions. There were a few major specifications in the document that were new: the relocation scheme would focus on Syrian and Eritrean nationals and who have arrived in either Italy or Greece after 15 April of 2015 or that arrive after the mechanism is launched and the number of recipients doubled and rose up to 40 000 people. To help with the financial burden of accepting people, it was also proposed that the Member States will receive 6000. - EUR for each person relocated on their territory. (European Commission makes progress . . . 2015)

The top two recipients did not change: they were still Germany and France but due to the fact that Italy is not participating in this redistribution, then the third one was Spain, positioned in the fourth place in the previous relocation scheme. Those three countries were assigned with additional 11465 people, which is 57% of all the people recognized to be in need to be relocated. The three lowest remained the same: Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg with a burden totally equal to only 833 people (2% of 40 000). The recommendation to participate in the resettlement program did not change neither in numbers nor by participating states. (Appendix 2)

The first official agreement between states was made in the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting (20.07) where the ministers agreed on the contribution by each Member State to the relocation and resettlement program. The agreement was made on the relocation scheme for 32256 persons with an aim to continue the discussions of the remaining people. An agreement on the resettlement scheme was also made and the number of people rose from to 22504 people. (Justice and Home Affairs Council 20/07/ . . . 2015)

As a result of the negotiations, the top three countries participating in the relocation scheme that decreased the number of refugees were Spain -2988, Poland – 1559 and Austria - 1213. The only country to increase their participation was Germany who agreed to take in additional 1734 people, making Germany's total number of received people 10500 which is 33% of the total number of people in need to be relocated. A positive trend that needs to be noted is Ireland's wish to participate, in the previous proposals they were left out due to their provisions on the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. The bottom half did not change, Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta were still the ones receiving the least people and furthermore Malta even decreased their share of people in a significant amount. (Appendix 3)

The most positive aspect in the resettlement scheme is the fact that non-member states as Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland all chose to participate in this program

voluntarily (Outcome of the Council... 2015, 6). Norway seemed to be the most active participant by taking on 3500 people to be resettled from a third country. Germany however decreased their participation in the scheme, which indicates that Germany opted to focus more on the relocation than on the resettlement scheme, i.e. more on the refugees that are already in the EU not on the ones currently positioned outside of it. Austria did the exact opposite and was the only state who was included in the previous proposal and increased their part by 1456 people, meaning that they chose to contribute more to the resettlement not to the relocation program. (Appendix 3)

Almost four months after the Commission's first package of proposals, a second one was delivered to the Member States (09.09). The second package included an emergency relocation proposal for 120 000 people from frontline countries; a permanent relocation mechanism for all Member States; a common European list of safe countries of origin; a more effective return policy; measures to address the external dimension of the refugee crisis and a trust fund for Africa. (Refugee Crisis: European Commission . . . 2015)

In comparison to the first package, the main differences were the additional 120 000 people that needed to be relocated and the fact that Hungary was added into the list of frontline countries. The relocation scheme was created in order to relocate 15600 people from Italy, 50400 from Greece and 5400 from Hungary. The distribution key remained the same. But due to the increase of people, the Member States were promised additional 780 million EUR for participating in the program. In addition the nationalities that would be relocated were not only Syrian and Eritrean but Iraqis were also added to the list. (Refugee Crisis: European Commission . . . 2015)

According to the Commission's second proposal package, the highest number of people to be received was again behind Germany, France and Spain. On the bottom of the table was Malta and Cyprus and a newcomer Estonia. (Appendix 4)

A new approach was also introduced in the second package of proposals, the temporary solidarity clause. If – for justified and objective reasons such as a natural disaster – a Member State cannot temporarily participate totally or in part in a relocation decision, it will have to make a financial contribution to the EU budget of an amount of 0.002% of its GDP (Refugee Crisis: European Commission . . . 2015). This is a mechanism that does not justify any reasons, not even force majored ones, not to participate in the relocation scheme unless you have become one of the frontline countries.

The concept of a permanent relocation mechanism for all Member States was also specified in the second package of proposals: the Commission is proposing a structured solidarity mechanism which can be triggered any time to help any EU-Member State experiencing a crisis situation and extreme pressure on its asylum system. The same objective and verifiable distribution criteria would apply as in the emergency relocation proposals. (Refugee Crisis: European Commission . . . 2015)

Two weeks after the Commission's second proposal package, another Justice and Home affairs Council gathered (22.09). They reached an agreement on 66 000 people from Italy and Greece, leaving Hungary out, because they voted against the relocation scheme in general (Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting 22/09 . . . 2015). Surprisingly no alterations were made compared to the Commissions second action plan proposals.

A third package of proposals was launched in December 2015 that was aimed at securing the EU's external borders and managing the flows of migration more efficiently. The Commission proposed to establish a European Border and Coast Guard to ensure a strong and shared management of the external borders. (A European Border . . . 2015) This was the first time that the EU opted to take specific actions against the problems of the Union's external borders, previously the Union had chosen to focus more on the people that had already arrived and to the prevention of indicating a focus shift.

In February 2016 The Council adopted a recommendation on addressing serious deficiencies identified during an evaluation of Greece's application of the Schengen acquis in the area of external border management. (Schengen evaluation of Greece . . . 2016) This action is again worth being noted because it is the first time, since the crisis started, that the Union publicly acknowledged the responsibility of certain border state's involvement of the escalation of this crisis, meaning that they have not been able to secure their borders and have thereby not entirely fulfilled their international obligations.

In March 2016, the Council's Permanent Representatives Committee agreed on an emergency support mechanism in response to the difficult humanitarian situation caused by the refugee crisis notably in Greece. This enables the EU to help Greece and other affected member states to address the humanitarian needs of the large numbers of arrivals. The EU's humanitarian assistance is aimed at meeting the basic needs of refugees by providing food, shelter, water, medicine and other necessities. The Commission estimates that a total of €700 million will be needed in 2016-2018 to address the needs of refugees, of which €300 million will be required

in 2016. (Refugee crisis: Council shows . . . 2016) This measure is created in order to help tackle the economical inequalities that the current Dublin system deteriorates and thereby offering compensation (help) to the Border States for the unequal burden sharing of refugee flows.

To conclude, the overall evolvement of the EU's actions started with a focus on how to stop illegal migration by targeting the smugglers. It was noted from the beginning that there is a need to relocate people entitled to international protection and to share the burden amongst states, but it was introduced as a voluntary action. Soon it became very clear that the situation has gotten too out of hand in order to wait for the Member States to show initiative, which meant that the element of voluntarism disappeared quickly, shifting the EU's focus more on the existing refugees not only on the prevention of their arrival. Even though the relocation plan was designed to help the frontier countries and to tackle the problem solidarily, it still did not actually increase solidarity or make the states share the burden in a more equal way. The states that were on top of the list took on most of the burden whilst the other states were more focused on how to decrease the number that was initially calculated for them. There have not been any actual and permanent changes to the Common Asylum System leading the author to come to the conclusion that the EU has not been able to actually improve the internal contradictions of the system itself nor has the Union improved its integration or joint approach on this topic. The Union has focused only on the short-term solutions, which in turn means that the crisis will actually continue to exist seeing as there is no cohesion or joint understanding between the Member States on what actually needs and should be done. However it is important to note that until the Union is still just an alliance of sovereign states, commitment to reforming the asylum regime must ultimately begin at a national level (Langford 2013, 220).

The external actions of the European Union range from giving civilian missions new aims to achieve, joint conferences between origin and transit countries, to giving additional funds to developing countries in order to tackle the root causes of illegal migration.

Turkey was appointed as one of the focal countries already in the European Migration Agenda, as it was defined as an important transit country for illegal migration. The first step in order to enhance cooperation between the transit countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and the Western Balkans) and the EU was the Western Balkans route conference in October 2015. (High Level Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean . . . 2015)

All of the partners agreed on the following actions: support Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey by increasing development support by economic initiatives; ensure that persons in need of international protection receive the necessary information, documentation and assistance, including legal assistance to register in host countries; improve refugees access to education and access to labour market and employment opportunities and to basic services; work in close cooperation with the UNHCR and IOM to ensure that the international community provides more resettlement opportunities to refugees, particularly for Syrian refugees. (High Level Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean . . . 2015) The logic behind this initiative was that when the situation improves for the refugees in the named countries, then it might decrease their desire to come to the EU. However it was still recognized that the share of refugees currently in their countries is too big, which is why there is a need to help with the resettlement program. There is 2.1 million Syrians registered by the UNCHR in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon and 2.7 million Syrian refugees registered in Turkey alone (Syria Regional . . . 2016).

The initiative to address the root causes of forced displacement, means that it is necessary to intensify the diplomatic engagement with all relevant international partners to reach a political solution to the conflict in Syria. In addition, there is a need to intensify efforts for the development of Afghanistan's institutions and to support the Iraqi government in order for them to stabilize their country. (High Level Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean . . . 2015) Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq need to be receiving special attention and help because they are the top three origin countries of refugees. If there is no need for people to fear for their lives, there is no need to apply for international protection elsewhere. However there does not seem to be a cohesive agreement on how to restore peace in those countries and eliminate the reasons for people flee from Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan or on how involved should the EU be in order to achieve these set goals.

In October 2015, EU and Turkey declared a joint action plan, establishing an even more special focus on Turkey as the key player in order to help decrease the migration flows to Europe. This Action Plan reflects the understanding between EU and Turkey to step up their cooperation on support of Syrians under temporary protection and migration management in a coordinated effort to address the crisis created by the situation in Syria. The Action Plan, addresses the current crisis situation in three ways: (a) again by addressing the root causes leading to the massive influx of Syrians, (b) by supporting Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey and (c) strengthening cooperation to prevent irregular migration flows to the EU.

The most important aspects of the action plan were to return all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into the Greek Islands with the costs covered by the EU; to resettle, for every Syrian readmitted by Turkey from Greek Islands, another Syrian from Turkey to the EU Member States, within the framework of the existing commitments; to work with Turkey in any joint endeavour to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria which would allow for the local population and refugees to live in areas which will be safer. (Statement of the EU Heads of . . . 2016)

Some however believe that the EU's action plan with Turkey is the first sign that the Union is starting to take actions that do not prioritize human rights. For example, the collective expulsion of Syrians that arrive to Europe is prohibited under the European Convention on Human Rights, making this agreement not in accordance of international law. Secondly, exchanging a refugee to be resettled from inside Turkey for each Syrian asylum seeker returned from Greece to Turkey raises concerns because it might make way to substitute the right to seek asylum against resettling an already recognized refugee. Thirdly, the EU's proposal to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria that would allow for the local population and refugees to live in areas which is safer, is dangerous. The real reasoning behind is to stem the migration flow to Europe not to really protect Syrian civilians from harm. (EU: Turkey Mass-return Deal . . . 2016)

On the African routes, the EU has also enhanced their cooperation with their African counterparts. In order to discuss migration issues and to come to a joint action plan the Valletta Summit on migration was summoned. They agreed on similar actions that need to be in focus: addressing root causes; improving work on promoting and organising legal migration channels; enhancing the protection of migrants and asylum seekers; tackle the exploitation and trafficking of migrants; improve cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration. In addition an EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa was also formally launched at the occasion of the Valletta summit. The EU Trust Fund will complement existing EU aid assistance to the regions amounting to over €10 billion until 2020, which aims to support inclusive and sustainable economic growth. (Valletta Summit on migration . . . 2015)

EU's external actions have been focused more on the transit countries for example Turkey not so much to the origin countries as Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq. On one side this is understandable because of the complexity of problems that prevent those three countries to

resolve those issues independently, but on the other side until those countries will become more stable there is no end to the influx of refugees, which in turn means that there are no permanent solutions, only temporary ones. Due to the pressures that the Member States are under, than even the temporary solutions might come in handy in order to restore a somewhat normal situation which is in the interest of everyone. This desire however makes the EU somewhat vulnerable to the political abuse of the migration crisis.

2.3 Responses of the Member States

There are 28 Member States in the EU (Member Countries . . . 2016). It is evident that the experiences and different approaches surrounding the obligation to offer international protection to those who need it, vary enormously between states. As a result the EU has not been able to come to a joint and decisive agreement on solving the migration crisis. This subchapter will give an overview of the main approaches and the states individual contribution in handling the refugee influx, in order to be able to identify the differences of opinions inside the Union and thereby come to a deeper understanding why the EU has failed in the quest for a permanent solution. Furthermore, some Member States are feeling that for the second time in a short period of time, they are facing the dilemma whether to support the countries that have broken the set out rules and agreements or not. It occurred first during the Greek debt crisis and reoccurred with the current EU-wide refugee crisis. (Veebel 2015, 29) According to the author of this thesis, there are signs of specific groups formulating on the basis of their approaches, as well as states that are falling to side-lines and do not really belong to any of the mentioned groups.

The Visegrad Group are the ones who are the most opposed to the EU refugee quotas. It consists of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (About the Visegrad . . . 2015). According to their official statement they fully support the EU's initiative to improve the EU's external borders, including cooperation with third countries but they are opposed to the automatic permanent relocation mechanism. The Group is convinced that the proper control of the EU's external borders will reduce illegal and uncontrolled migration thus stabilising the situation. In addition, the Group has called all EU Member States to take common, rapid and decisive action of the situation by regaining control of the Union's borders. (Joint Statement . . . 2016) Individually the state that has had the most serious struggle with the migration crisis is

Hungary. In 2015 Hungary received 174 435 asylum applications, which is 133 000 applications more than they received in 2014. In addition they had the highest number of applicants per million inhabitants in the EU, 17 699. (Asylum in the EU Member . . . 2016) As a result of the sharp increase of refugee applications, Hungary was also declared as a frontline state, however in the Justice and Home affairs Council, Hungary voted against accepting mandatory quotas and of being identified as a migrant frontline state (Traynor, Kingsley 2015). In addition, Hungary has also made it clear that they are going to challenge refugee quotas in EU Court of Justice. Their main objections is that Hungary believes that they should be the ones who decide who they want to let in their country not take in just anyone (Zalan 2015). In addition they have built a fence on the border of Serbia as well as on the border of Croatia and is prepared to build one with Romania as well (The Migration Wave . . . 2016). Compared to Hungary, Poland did not receive as many applications (10255) but however it was still an 83% increase compared to 2014 (Asylum in the EU Member . . . 2016). Poland gradually decreased their participation in the relocation and resettlement scheme throughout the year. Furthermore, Poland's new government that was elected on an anti-immigrant platform, which declared that it could no longer participate in the relocation scheme due to the possibility that migrants may include terrorists (Bagdonas 2015, 16). Making their opposition on the given subject even clearer. The Czech Republic only received 1235 asylum applications, which is 625 applications more than they received in 2014 (Asylum in the EU Member . . . 2016). But they have still worked against the Commission's proposals, constantly decreasing their share of the burden. Out of the four, Slovakia received the lowest number of applications, only 270 and has also one of the lowest numbers of applicants per inhabitant (Ibid.). They have however been quite vocal on the fact that they prefer Christian asylum seekers (Bektas 2015). Building fences between neighbouring countries does not help to solve the problem internationally, it only increases tensions between neighbours and makes it harder to tackle the problem jointly. Creating criterias on the characteristics of a desirable refugee is also very controversial because a refugee is a person who has an actual fear of persecution based on their race, religion, nationality, and membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The idea behind offering international protection is that you protect the person against this kind of persecution not create it in another form by only taking in those who are "acceptable" to you. In the context of the Union, this would be unimaginable that the EU would choose between people for example

according to their religion because it would directly contradict the very essence of the equality of every human being.

Romania is not a part of the Visegrad group, but they share their opinion on the EU's migration quotas. Romania received 1225 asylum applications, which is 275 applications less than they received in 2014. Also they are a country with one of the fewest number of applicants per inhabitant country in the EU (Asylum in the EU Member . . . 2016).

Another visible group is the group of states who are in the frontline and that have been declared as the beneficiary states: Greece and Italy and the ones that are the hot-spots of the migration flows. In 2015 Greece received 11370 asylum applications, which is 3785 applications more than they received in 2014 (Ibid.). Most of the asylum applicants clearly do not lodge their claim there because the number of entries is significantly higher than the number of received applications: in total 850 000 migrants arrived to Greece in 2015 (Mixed Migr . . . 2016). Italy received 83245 asylum applications, which is 19590 applications more than they received in 2014 (Asylum in the EU Member . . . 2016). Bulgaria has not need made to a beneficiary state yet, but they were the main entry point to the EU by land. Bulgaria received 20165 asylum applications, which is 9360 applications more than they received in 2014 (Ibid.). As a result of high illegal migration flows stemming from Turkey, they built a fence along the Turkish- Bulgarian border (Migration Flows . . . 2016). Even though Croatia only received 140 asylum applications in 2015, they registered 555 761 migrants and asylum seekers that arrived and let most of them just pass through without stopping them, which is also the reason why Hungary chose to build a fence on the border (Ibid.). Slovenia became a hot-stop after Hungary closed its borders with Croatia and as a result the flow shifted towards them, in October the number grew to 12616 person per day and as a result Slovenia also built a fence between them and Croatia (Ibid.). Malta is historically also seen as one of the entry points, however their number of received applications was not very high in 2015: 1695 asylum applications, which is 330 applications more than they received in 2014 (Ibid.). Malta has always been at the bottom of the list in regards to the Commission's proposals of relocating and resettling people, due to their size and their already existing burden.

The third group of states consists of states who have been very active in participating in the burden sharing and have now reached the end of their capacities. Those two countries are Sweden and Austria. In 2015 Sweden received 156 110 asylum applications, which is 81130 applications more than they received in 2014. (Asylum in the EU Member . . . 2016). Sweden's

relocation and resettlement numbers did not change significantly throughout the year, meaning that they were ready to carry their international burden. But in December, it was announced that Sweden was given a temporary suspension from the European Commission from its obligations under the EU relocation scheme due to the fact that Sweden had experienced a sharp increase of asylum applications and needed time to be able to handle the asylum applicants accordingly before accepting new ones (Commission proposes . . . 2016). Sweden is ranked second in having the most number of applicants per million inhabitants (Asylum in the EU Member . . . 2016). Austria received 85 505 asylum applications, which is almost 60 000 applications more than they received in 2014 (Ibid.). Austria was considered a solid contributor to the Commission's proposal packages, but they too asked for a temporary suspension in the relocation scheme. Similarly to Sweden, Austria justified their request with a sharp increase of applicants. Austria had the third highest number, after Sweden, of applicants for international protection per capita. (Council Implementing . . . 2016) Furthermore, Austria has adopted a new law that will allow the police to reject the asylum seekers at the border. It will enable the Austrian government to declare a state of emergency in times of significant irregular migration. (Kingsley 2016) Thus indicating that they are searching for ways on how to secure not to become overloaded by the influx of refugees.

The fourth group consists of countries that have ratified the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with additional clauses, thereby giving them a special status by being able to choose if they want to participate in the schemes or not. They are the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland. The United Kingdom received 38370 asylum applications in 2015, which is 6250 applications more than they received in 2014 (Asylum in the EU Member . . . 2016). The UK was not a participant in the relocation scheme due to the fact that they have "opt-in" rights under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. They have not expressed their desire to participate in the relocation scheme, but have been included in the resettlement scheme. Denmark received 20825 asylum applications, which is 6290 applications more than they received in 2014 (Ibid.). Denmark has an opt-out right under the Treaty, meaning that it will not participate in the relocation scheme. Similarly to the UK, Denmark has also been included in the resettlement scheme. Ireland received the lowest number of asylum applications from the three, 3270, which is 1830 applications more than they received in 2014 (Ibid.). Ireland is under the same conditions as the UK, meaning that they have a chance to decide if they want to participate in the relocation scheme or not and Ireland has actually chosen to do so in the

summer of 2015, taking on 600 refugees to be relocated from Italy or Greece (according to the table visible in appendix 3).

The fifth group consists of Germany, Spain and France- the three countries that had the largest number of people to be relocated. In addition, in 2015 Germany received 441 800 asylum applications, which is almost 270 000 applications more than in 2014 (Asylum in the EU Member . . . 2016). As it was already stated, Germany was one of the few states throughout the Commission's proposals (which has been more specifically illustrated in chapter 2.2) who constantly agreed to take on more people and offer them international protection. In addition Germany itself declared that they would take in every Syrian refugee that will apply for asylum there and has received a lot of criticism for their actions both from other Member States as well as internally (Connolly 2015). France received 70570 asylum applications, which is 19590 applications more than they received in 2014 (Asylum in the EU Member . . . 2016). Spain received 14600 asylum applications, which is 9164 applications more than they received in 2014 (Ibid.). Compared to Germany or France, the number was quite low as well as their number of applicants per inhabitant (Ibid.), however that seemingly has not had an effect on their willingness to share the burden.

Located very close to the fifth group is The Netherlands, Belgium and Finland who all have participated in the relocation scheme rather largely as well as generally being willing to offer international protection. In 2015, the Netherlands received 43035 asylum applications, which is 21255 applications more than they received in 2014 (Asylum in the EU Member . . . 2016). Netherlands have also played a substantial role in the proposal packages with agreeing to take quite a large number of refugees, for example according to the 22.09 agreement made in the Justice and Home affairs council, their share was 3900 people from Hungary and Greece, which is almost 6% of the total number of people. In addition it has been reported that the Dutch government held discussions on the creation of a mini- Schengen that would consist of the Benelux, Germany and Austria (Bagdonas 2015, 16). Belgium received 38990 asylum applications, which is 24945 applications more than they received in 2014 (Asylum in the EU Member . . . 2016). In addition, Belgium gradually increased their share throughout the year in the relocation scheme, thereby showing their will to participate in the burden sharing mechanism. Finland received 32150 asylum applications, which is 28660 applications more than they received in 2014 (Ibid.). They did not fight against the assigned quotas and have been solid participants in the proposed schemes. That is actually quite surprising because they are

currently in the fourth position in the EU if you compare the number of applicants per million inhabitants (Asylum in the EU Member . . . 2016), thus indicating that their share is already very large.

Luxembourg, Portugal and Cyprus have not been very active participants in finding solutions to the migration crisis or in the burden sharing mechanism. In 2015 Luxembourg received 2360 asylum applications, which is 1330 applications more than they received in 2014 (Ibid.). Luxembourg has always been at the bottom of the list in regards to the Commission's proposals and burden sharing mechanisms. Cyprus received 2105 asylum applications, which is 625 applications more than they received in 2014 and were also at the bottom of the list (Ibid.) Portugal received 830 asylum applications, which is 390 applications less than they received in 2014. Portugal also has one of the lowest number of applicants per inhabitant in the EU (Ibid.), which taking into account their size is also surprising.

The Baltics do not really fit into any of the existing categories as well. They did not receive a lot of asylum applications nor did they show significant will to participate in the burden sharing mechanisms. The highest number of applications was received by Latvia, 330 applications, which is 35 applications less than they received in 2014 (Ibid.). Lithuania received 275 asylum applications, which is 110 applications less than they received in 2014 (Ibid.). Estonia however received 225 asylum applications, which is 80 applications more than they received in 2014 (Ibid.).

There are five distinct groups that all vary enormously amongst themselves: there are groups that support the cause entirely (group number five); there are groups that oppose the mandatory quotas and have already built or plan on building fences in order to protect their border and see border management in general as a solution to this situation (group one, partially group two) and there are groups who are in the frontline and who are entirely dependent on the help of other Member States in order to be able to cope with the situation. The only decisive action that the EU has taken is the creation of mandatory quotas, however there is no cohesion amongst states on this subject and it is evident that there are certain groups forming that cooperate with each other more than they do with other Member States on the EU level and who are taking decisive action for example building fences, thus making it very difficult for the EU as a whole to take further actions. The unwillingness of states to take collective action is weakening the Union as an integral entity and harming its international reputation because the will to take decisive and joint action needs to come from the states themselves.

2.4 Securitization analysis

According to the Securitization theory presented in the first chapter of this thesis, an issue becomes securitized only if it is presented as an existential threat and the audience accepts the issue and the necessary actions as such. This subchapter is written to analyze if the EU has in fact utilised the securitization method in order to justify the measures used in order to fight against the migration crisis. This knowledge is of an important nature because it is needed to determine if the securitization process in Estonia started already from the European Union level or was it conducted (if it actually was conducted) sole on the local level.

Since the beginning of the migration crisis, there have been 8 European Council meetings where the leaders of the EU have discussed the topic at hand (Timeline . . . 2016). The European Council is considered to represent the highest level of cooperation amongst Member States, indicating that the president of it can be seen as the leader of the EU in general thus making him a political leader with an audience.

There were 5 key elements to address in order to analyze the use of securitization: who securitizes, on what issues, for whom, why, with what results and under what conditions. The backbone of this analysis will therefore be to determine if the Council's president (who) has attempted to securitize the migration crisis by presenting it as an existential threat to the Union's essential nature (what) for the public of the European Union as well as to the Member States in general (whom), in order to unify the Member States (why) to act decisively and to find permanent solutions to the different parts of this crisis. The author of this thesis will analyze if the Council's president issued an official press releases after each of the Council's meeting and if the contents of them refer to any threats or long-term consequences that might be effecting the Union as a whole as a side effect of the unresolved migration crisis.

The first official Council meeting on this topic took place on the 23rd of April 2015. The official press statement released after the meeting did not contain any indications of securitizing the issue at hand. There were however signs of politicising the issue, f.e: "Let me be clear. Europe did not cause this tragedy. But that does not mean we can be indifferent. We are facing a difficult summer and we need to be ready to act." (Remarks by . . . 2015) Hence emphasizing that there is an element of responsibility to react to the situation at hand, but there were no existential implications on threats to the Union as a whole if the situation is not solved. The president presented the same approach after the second meeting which took place on the 25-

26th of June 2015 and after the third one (23rd of September 2015). The third meeting was held after the third package of proposals was introduced to the Member States, even though the Member States had just reached an agreement on how to relocate and –settle the number of refugees declared in the second package of proposals. “We all recognized that there are no easy solutions and that we can only manage this challenge by working together, in a spirit of solidarity and responsibility. In the meantime we have all to uphold, apply and implement our existing rules, including the Dublin regulation and the Schengen acquis.” (Informal meeting . . . 2015) By that time it was already evident that not all of the Member States were eager to constantly take on more people to be relocated and –settled and the ones who had previously been acceptant were starting to reach the end of their capacities. As a result the president did see the need to address the difficulties presented by this crisis, but not the need to present it as a threat to the Union. The fourth meeting took place on the 15th of October, right after some details of the EU-Turkey joint action plan had been agreed between the two parties, making the press release cautiously optimistic about starting to get a step closer in finding a solution to the problem. (Remarks by President Donald Tusk after . . . 2015). The fifth meeting took place on the 12th of November, after the Valletta summit on migration. This is the first time that the president made an attempt to securitize the issue by stating: “Let there be no doubt: the future of Schengen is at stake and time is running out.” (Press remarks by President Donald Tusk after the informal meeting of EU heads of state or government . . . 2015) Hence indicating that the disjointness of member and as a result the insolvability of the crisis could pose a threat to the free movement of people, which is one of the four freedoms of the European Union. By the time of the sixth (17.18th of December) and seventh (17-18th February) meeting the migration crisis was not the focal topic of the official press releases. (European Council conclusions . . . 2016) The final meeting to this date took place on the 17- 18th of March 2016. The main theme in the press release were the final conditions of the EU- Turkey action plan, therefore making the press statement quite optimistic and without any signs of securitization or politization. (Remarks by President Donald Tusk after the meeting . . . 2016)

To conclude, from 8 press releases only one had any associations with the long-term effects of the crisis to the Union, which mean that the EU has not chosen to use extraordinary measures in a form of securitizing the issue. To the author of this thesis the finding is actually quite unexpected because even though the theory itself has already stated that it is extremely difficult to securitize issues on the regional level, it is still surprising that the EU did not chose

the path of securitization to unify the Member States. This can however be explained with the fact that the reason the EU chose not to securitize the issue because there is no common existential threat to the citizens of the EU. If the migration crisis would have been successfully securitised then the nation states would have left their different interests aside and obliged to the set proposals without creating big controversies or using individual methods in an attempt to better the situation for themselves, thus worsening it actually for others. Examples of it are the Visegrad group who contested the mandatory quotas in the European Justice Court and the border fence building done by several states, for example Bulgaria. According to the securitization theory, one might argue that in order to have successfully securitized the issue on a regional level, all of the member states should have been exposed to the same level of migration flows. However this argument is invalid in this situation, because Hungary is one of the frontline states but they have still contested the mandatory quotas that would actually have made their burden a lot smaller than it currently is.

3 ESTONIA'S CASE STUDY

Estonia has always been a small nation whose foreign policy is very reliant on others. Since the restoration of independence in 1991, the main foreign policy goal was to become a member of the two most important international organisations: NATO and the EU. The membership was and is still seen as a security guarantee. It has been stated even in the nation's foreign policy objectives that Estonia will work for a stronger and more solid European Union (Foreign . . . 2016). The theory behind this objective is that only a strong and united Union can act as an additional security guarantee, otherwise in a crisis situation they would not be able to react quickly and decisively enough, thus making the situation of the Union in general an interest of national security. As previously discussed in the second chapter, the migration crisis has weakened the Union both internally and internationally because of its inability to find a permanent solution to the crisis at hand. The most decisive internal action that the Union has taken is the system of mandatory quotas. Estonia's response to this proposal was at first quite reluctant but now it has become a bit indifferent and invisible in the international context. In the domestic political scene this is however definitely not the case. Refugees and the mandatory quotas are perceived to have a very negative impact on the society as a whole, some even associate it as a threat to their own security. As a result of this contradiction, the author of this thesis created a hypothesis which stated that the biggest threat is not the migration crisis itself but the lack of actions in order to alleviate it both internally and internationally, meaning that the government's indifference of the topic is the actual security threat. In order to validate or refute this hypothesis, the chapter will start with giving an overview of Estonia's general response to the migration crisis and of the internal perceived tensions that this topic has created. The second subchapter will analyze if the topic has evolved to be what it is now through the use of securitization and if so then who securitized what, according to the framework described in chapter 1. The final subchapter will focus on examining if the exposed weaknesses of the migration crisis could in fact be used to destabilize the situation by an external actor and if so than what should the countermeasures be to contest them according to the hybrid threat concept described in subchapter 1.4.

3.1 Estonia's response to the migration crisis

Estonia has always had a conservative approach to the national refugee policy. In the early years of re-independence, the approach was mainly motivated by the fear that due to its geopolitical location, Estonia might become a transit country for asylum seekers between Russia and the Scandinavian countries. Until 1997, Estonia did not ratify any international documents that would guarantee protection for refugees and as a result they were treated according to the same principles that were used with illegal immigrants. The lack of internationally recognized legal guarantees for the asylum seekers in Estonia received negative attention from the international community and motivated particularly the neighbouring, Sweden and Finland to put pressure on Estonia to establish the foundations of the national refugee policy. (Veebel, 33, 2015) Estonia has been a member of the United Nations since 1991, meaning that even though the nation had already declared their willingness to do everything in their power to guarantee the existence of human rights, it took 6 more years before the country finally ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 NY protocol, thus finally confirming their will to fulfil their international obligation of offering protection to those in need and to start treating the applicants in a standardized, fair and dignified way. (Pagulased Eestis . . . 2016)

During the time period of 1997- 2015, Estonia has received 821 applications for asylum and only 88 of them have received the official status of a refugee and 84 have received the complementary protection status, meaning that they are not officially recognized as refugees but it has been determined that sending them back would pose a threat to their life, hence they have permission to stay here. In 2015 Estonia received the biggest number of applications so far, 226 asylum applications, which is 79 applications more than on the previous year. The majority of the applicants have been from Ukraine, Russia and Georgia. (Pagulasküsimus . . . 2016) However comparing our numbers with the numbers of other Member States, it is clear that Estonia is amongst the bottom of the list when it comes to the number of received asylum applications. There are multiple reasons that explain the low number of asylum applications: for example the geographical location, the fact Estonia is not a popular transit country for smugglers and that there are very few people from the same nationality as the most popular majorities of the refugees are (Varjupaiga . . . 2014). One of additional reason is however the fact that the Estonian government itself has done everything in their power not to become

attractive for the refugees. Estonia has always interpreted the foundations to grant international protection very firmly and there have been no signs on its wish to expand them. For example it has always been possible to grant international protection on the basis of humanitarian necessities, but even when the war in Ukraine started, Estonia still refused to offer international protection to them because they could relocate in their own origin country, thus there was no need to ask for asylum from another country. (Varjupaiga . . . 2014) This mind-set was illustrated by the representative of the Interior Ministry who stated that Estonia will continue its conservative approach to refugees, meaning that we will do everything that is demanded by the European Union but nothing more (Männi 2014).

After the migration crisis became a hot topic of discussion, the Government of Estonia created the official webpage dedicated to the refugee question. If you open the webpage today, in its preamble is an official statement of the Estonian government: “Estonia is a part of Europe and it is the country’s moral duty to help the people in distress and the Estonian state is strong enough to accomplish this. Estonia is participating in resolving the crisis voluntarily and in proportion to its weight within the European Union. Our goal is to help some refugees integrate into Estonia and contribute to our society.” (Pagulasküsimus . . . 2016) This however has not always been the case since the beginning of the migration crisis. After the European Commission proposed the mandatory refugee quotas for the first time in May 2015, Estonia strongly opposed to the idea that all EU Member States should share the burden of the refugee crisis. In addition, Estonia opposed against the number of the calculated displaced people that they would be responsible of. According to the official national statistics, Estonia itself had evaluated that they would be capable to resettle 84 to 156 refugees in the next two years. However the proposals exceeded the country’s capabilities more than 3 times. (Veebel 2015, 31)

Shortly after the publication of the Commission’s Migration Agenda, the press officer of the Ministry of Interior issued a press release. Estonia’s official response was that, like almost half of other Member States, they are against the idea of mandatory quotas. The press officer also declared that the similar subject has been on the table for years now and that Estonia’s opinion on the subject matter has not changed. Furthermore they emphasised that solidarity in handling this crisis does not only mean the physical relocation of refugees nor can it be seen as a final solution to the problem, it is only one of many potential solutions. Estonia will continue

to support the member states currently at the frontline, but will show their solidarity with offering technical and financial support to them. (Mihelson 2015)

In the beginning of June, the prime minister took a very harsh and official stance validating the presumed assumption that Estonia strongly opposes the mandatory quotas and that the focus should be on the root causes that create the influx of refugees. The Government even presented a thought that the Commission's proposal is of a precedent nature, because the Union wants to force the Member States to take in a certain amount of people against the will and opinion of the state itself (Einmann 2015). The Estonian government was not the only one verbalizing that kind of thoughts, there have been others as well who expressed these kind of views as was already introduced in subchapter 2.3.

Looking at the statistical numbers presented in appendixes 1-4, it is evident that Estonia achieved its political goals in decreasing their share in the burden sharing program. In the initial proposal, the European Migration Agenda, Estonia's share was 352 people to be relocated and 326 people to be resettled. Compared to other Baltic States, Estonia received the highest number: Latvia's share was 242 and Lithuania had to become responsible of relocating 232 people. In the first official Commission's measure package, the number of people to be relocated was doubled and as a result Estonia was asked to relocate 738 people, while Latvia was accounted to be responsible for 517 and Lithuania for 503 people. After the first Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting, it became however very evident that Estonia had been successful in radically decreasing their share of the burden, because the agreed number of people to be relocated was 130 and only 20 people were agreed to be resettled. Latvia had also been able to decrease their burden by 317 people and Lithuania by 248 people, making the ranking vice versa than it was before: Estonia was responsible for accepting the lowest amount of people out of the three Baltic States and Lithuania the highest. In the fall of 2015 the Commission had issued a second package of proposals requesting 120 000 people to be relocated and Estonia's share of it was proposed to be 373 people and at another Justice and Home Affairs Council, no alterations were made. Probably due to the fact that Estonia with Cyprus and Malta were already at the bottom of the table, meaning that they were the states who had been appointed with the lowest number of people to be accepted. (Appendixes 1-4) It is still important to note that the mandatory quota regime was not lifted from the countries, which in fact means that the nation state did not achieve the ultimate goal which the diminishment of the plan entirely. After the summer of 2015, the Government has not issued

any official statements about the desire to contest against the plan and has very slowly been fulfilling its obligations.

On the international level, Estonia has been acting alone. There have been no joint Baltic endeavours on the topic of the migration crisis as well as was evident in subchapter 2.3 that Estonia does not really belong to any of the formed groups and has taken more of a passive role on the migration crisis topic. This can however only be explained with the fact that the level of exposure is still relatively small hence it is possible to be passive. If the border with Russia would be suddenly influxed by migrants then Estonia would not be able to handle this situation. Until there is a very sharp increase in the number of applicants, the Estonian government will likely not take a very active international role on this topic, even though it actually is in the best interest of the state to try to help to alleviate the situation.

According to the public opinion polls, there has been a significant shift towards associating the refugees with negative impacts. The Interior Ministry of Estonia ordered a public opinion survey to monitor the knowledge and attitude of Estonian citizens towards refugees in 2014 (Saar Poll OÜ . . . 2014). The results of the survey were that 31 % of citizens associate the arrival of refugees in Estonia more with negative than positive thoughts. The top three answers in order to reason the negative opinions were that they burden the social system of Estonia (79%); that they will increase the levels of unemployment (64%) and that the risk of conflicts will rise (60%). The fourth most common argument was that they are perceived to be a threat to their identity both in a linguistically and cultural context (43%). (Saar Poll OÜ . . . 2014, 22). A similar study of this magnitude has not yet been issued, but there however have been some, not so methodological but still presentable public opinion surveys that can be used in order to illustrate the mind-set in regards to the migration crisis issue after the migration crisis has emerged. A webinar was conducted by Eesti Päevaleht and Delfi and with the help of the MTÜ Pagulasabi in order to map the opinions of Estonians. It took place in June 2015 and got almost 13 000 answers. The results however were surprising. Almost 60 % of the respondents confirmed that the issue is at the utmost importance to them. 74 % of people thought that there are no positive side effects in bringing the refugees to Estonia. 32, 4 % expressed their unwillingness to participate in the integration process. And over 80% of respondents claimed that they see as the arrival of refugees as a very negative or a negative issue. Unfortunately people were not asked to argument their responses, which makes it difficult to contrast them to 2014 survey. (Veebiuuring . . . 2015) Statistically comparing the survey

conducted in 2014, the difference of results is very high. However it has to be taken into consideration that the first one was conducted as a telephone interview, meaning that it is more uncomfortable for people to express their negative thoughts opposed to sitting at the privacy of your computer. A third survey was also conducted in November 2015 with an aim to understand the rate of support of the actions of the government in regards to the refugee issue. The results were that 62 % do not trust the government handling the refugee issues. (Most Estonians . . . 2015)

In conclusion Estonia has never been a destination country for a lot of refugees and as a result of this, the country does not have a lot of experience in handling big volumes of claims or integration processes. The same applies to people in general, the society is not used to a wide array of people and cultures. After finding out that the Union is forcing member states to fulfil their international protection duties in a more obligatory way, the natural response was to oppose the idea. For the nation (both state and society) the perception was that the EU wants to artificially place people here even though Estonia is not ready for the amount of people proposed or to accept new culture representatives in large numbers. In regards to the historical context of the state, the unresolved situation with the non-citizens and of the failed integration process in general, the thought was considered to be unacceptable. However as it turned out, there was no opportunity not to participate in the proposed program, leaving the people with a feeling of injustice and confusion.

3.2 Securitization analysis

According to the Securitization theory presented in the first chapter of this thesis, an issue becomes securitized only if it is presented as an existential threat and the audience accepts the issue and the necessary actions as such. There were 5 key elements to address in order to analyze the use of securitization: who securitizes, on what issues, for whom, why, with what results and under what conditions. The results of the analysis conducted in subchapter 2.4 were that the issue had not been securitized on the EU level. There is no doubt that the migration crisis has evolved into a security issue taking in to consideration the results of the public opinion surveys. Contrasting the key arguments why are the refugees seen as a security threat to the securitizing components of the theory (fields of economic, social cohesion and political stability) it is evident that they are same, thus indicating that they are in fact security issues for

the public. The referent object that is perceived to be threatened is the collective identity of citizens. There are multiple factors which all have led to the creation of the threat perception. Firstly, Estonian citizens have not entirely accepted the western way of thinking, meaning that they still perceive the state as their main security guarantee and due to the incomplete nature of the European Union, the citizens have not fully accepted the range of influence and right of decision making in regards to the domestic affairs. As a result citizens are still very reliant on the state to protect their sense of security. It has always been considered as the right of a sovereign state to decide who to accept and who not. The European Union's proposal was initially understood as if one of your far relatives would order you that you need to host and cover all the expenses of 20 foreigners who will be staying at your home. The second factor in this threat perception is the fact that Estonians in general are naturally quite close-minded, meaning that they do not have a lot of experiences in living with different cultures and all other are perceived as rival identities that pose a threat to the cultural identity of the local citizen.

Most of the information on this subject has been handed to the public by the media. As a result, in order to be able to analyse if an issue has been securitized it is important to look at the media coverage of this topic. The search period is selected to be 01.05.2015- 31.07.2015 and the object of the search is all of the articles from Postimees (one of the main media sources in Estonia) that were associated with Estonian keywords like refugee "pagulane", "põgenik"; migration crisis and mandatory quotas. The author chose this time period because the European Migration Agenda was published in May 2015 and the first official agreement between states on who will accept how many refugees was agreed in the first Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting held in July 2015, hence this time period includes the first emotions after the topic was made public to the impressions after the first agreement was made. All of the key words were searched independently and the results of the search were included in the list of articles that can be seen in appendix 5. The reasoning behind only choosing postimees.ee to be the search engine was because the website cross-references to all of the major news coverages in Estonia, hence giving the author a very wide article database.

In total there were 60 different articles that were published on postimees.ee during the selected time period. The contents of the articles were very diverse as were the statuses of people whose opinions were published (it included both political leaders as well as members of the public themselves). The main method of analysis used was qualitative text analysis, meaning that the author of this thesis analysed if the statements in the article were either positive

meaning that they were in favour of accepting the refugees and of the proposal; negative meaning that they were against the proposal and informative/explanatory meaning that did not have a specific tone. There are however some weaknesses to this research. The first weakness is the fact that because the author is using published articles then some of the thoughts might be altered by the media. The second one is the fact that the research will convey only the articles written in Estonian. This will however not eliminate the validity of this research because it is still possible to form an overall feel of the tone used in the article and it is applicable to the Estonian society as a whole because the conducted surveys have not indicated that the opinions would differ according to nationalities.

According to the securitization theory everyone could securitize an issue if he or she has an audience who accepts their interpretation of it. The first step in determining who securitized the issue is to look at the way the government of Estonia communicated it, then other political actors and finally will analyze if there were other actors trying to securitize the migration crisis or not.

The statements issued by the members of the Estonian government (including the members of Parliament) were published 17 times during the selected time period. 6 of them were negative but however none of the negative articles were constructed with an aim to securitize the issue. They did state clearly that Estonia opposes against the mandatory quotas and that it is not acceptable that Estonia should suddenly have to take in more people than their capacity enables. 4 articles out of the 17 were issued by the Prime Minister and the tone of his statements were negative at first, expressing his views to oppose to the mandatory quotas, but in June the focus shifted and his statements started to be more of a public call for tolerance and act as a reminder of our international obligations. To conclude the government did not actually make the securitization move but however according to the opinion of the author the lack of communication from the official government helped to plant the seed which grew into a security threat. After the publication of the European Migration Agenda, the only member of the government who issued a brief statement on the same day was the Minister of Interior Affairs, arguing that mandatory quotas are not the solution. The next day the Ministry of Interior issued another statement publicly claiming that the presented number is too big and that the European Union should not make the quotas obligatory. The Prime Minister did not take an official stance until 21.05, a week after the proposal had been published, and when he did it was also a negative approach on the topic. As a result of the approach taken by the government or lack of it, the

public was under the first impression that the government will strongly contest the plan, because Estonia has always had a conservative approach. The results however were that even though Estonia managed to decrease the number significantly, the mandatory quotas were still going to be enforced thus leaving the public feeling like the government has not protected their interests and because of the lack of official information on the topic, the public opinion was left in search of someone who would perceive themselves as the protectors of the public's and of the national interests of Estonia.

This situation was used by opposing political parties such as the Estonian Conservative Party (EKRE) and the People's Unity Party. Both of the parties and their representatives issued statements that claimed that Estonia does not have to pay the price if some countries are unable to control the borders and that the question is of utmost importance because the influx of refugees and the mandatory quotas of the EU pose an existential threat to the sovereignty and independence of Estonia as well as on the existence of the nation itself. EKRE and Kristiina Ojuland, the representative of the People's Unity Party, organized public meetings and gained support from the audience. The government however did not participate in any of the discussions, thus leaving the persuasion of the public opinion entirely in the hands of others.

To conclude, the perceived security threats on this issue in the eyes of the public opinion are that the refugees will burden the social system, increase the unemployment levels; increase the risk of conflicts and because of their different cultural identity there is also a risk for the preservation of the local cultural identity. In addition the current example also created an existential threat by making the people lose faith in the governments will to protect the interests of its citizens. However the real threats stemming from this migration crisis are the side effects of the securitization of this issue.

The main issue relating to the subject of migration is fear caused by ignorance, which has created a growth of anxiety, tension and aggression in the society. Opposition to the EU and support for populists and extremists has also showed signs of growth. Anti-refugee groups were created on social media and public meetings were organized. Amid increased public and media attention, the accommodation centre for asylum-seekers in Vao was also repeatedly attacked. Such sentiments show signs of xenophobia and the wish to oppose the state and society and defy the authorities' actions. These signs damage the security of society and the international stability as well. The national populists that use the refugee crisis to instigate fear are generally opposed to a European liberal and tolerant world view, as well as to Europe, the

USA and NATO, thus making them a suitable ally for the Russian special services that continue to search for situations in order to cultivate tension in the Estonian society. The greater the irrational fear and contrasting- the more open the public is to hostile propaganda and likely to forget the differences between imaginary threats and real ones. This is a welcome situation for the current leadership in Russia, who uses every opportunity that is presented to them in order to damage the integrity of the EU and NATO and to pave a way to extend its sphere of influence in Europe. (Annual Review . . . 2016)

Media projects are the most visible part of Russia's influence operations. The main messages were again accusing Estonians favouring Nazism and discriminating against the Russian-speaking population. But a new subject was the use of the migration crisis in order to instigate tensions amongst Estonia and the EU. (Ibid., 4) Russian state media actively covered the anti-refugee protests and sentiment in the EU. Journalists were sent to Estonia to cover anti-refugee meetings and this background was used to convey propaganda messages about Estonia as an intolerant and hostile country. The xenophobic sentiments conveniently support the Kremlin's claims that the inhabitants of the Baltic countries hate foreigners- implying both refugees and Russians. (Ibid., 6).

3.3 Potential to be used as a hybrid threat and recommendations for action

The government of Estonia should take more initiative and responsibility of the situation at the national level. It is believed that the current low support of refugees in Estonia is related to the poor communication of the national government in explaining the underlying causes of its decisions to the public. Until recently the government itself declared themselves to be following the conservative lines of the asylum politics and now there has been a quick mind shift without explanations to the public.

There is no doubt that our closet neighbour Russia is a hybrid nation using unorthodox methods in order to achieve their political goals. There are numerous versions of them interpreting the international laws in a way best suited for them. KGB is a very active and wide- ranging intelligence apparatus. Russia has publicly declared their special interest sphere of former Soviet Union countries and is constantly countering themselves against NATO. The final characteristic was that they have the means to a very strategic communication platform as has already been exemplified. (Neneth 2015) The weaknesses that the migration crisis has

exposed and that might be used in order to construct a hybrid threat against Estonia, are the weakening of the EU, the xenophobic approach to refugees and the distrust in the actions of the government. In addition to those weaknesses, Russia has already been accused of directing the refugee flows. For example the Finnish- Russian border started suddenly to receive more refugees than they have ever before. The official statement of the Russian side is that they cannot influence the movement, because it is the work of smugglers, but the Finnish defence minister stated that “no one moves forward in the Russian border zone without Russian authorities being aware of it”. (Standish 2016) As is common for the use of hybrid threats, it was never proven if it actually was a hybrid threat or not because there were no opportunities to find a final answer to that question.

In order for Estonia to be able to fight against this kind of threat they have to be able to accept that they need to work hard on the perception of an identity threat amongst people; Estonia needs to incorporate all the necessary sectors of society in order to prepare them to be able to identify whether they are in fact dealing a hybrid threat and the Estonian intelligence apparatus has to work over time.

As a result of the media’s large role the government should support the media by constantly sharing information on this subject, thereby reducing uncertainty and opposing to the extremist views or potential perceptions of threats. So far it has done a terrible service to the public and the decision-makers by confusing the relation between asylum seekers and terrorist threats and blowing the latter out of proportion. (Bagdonas 2015, 20) The main weakness that Estonia needs to tackle is the fact that the conservative approach of the refugees is actually a result of the government’s own policy making throughout the years and that in order to start being more open the government needs to communicate the issue to the public more, giving them adequate and constant information and leading by example themselves. There can be no mixed signals or confusing statements, this will only decrease the trust of people and thereby opening the door for them to be used by others.

CONCLUSION

The main goal of this thesis was to either confirm or refute that the biggest security threat to the national security of Estonia is not the traditional threats associated with migration: increased risk of conflict, additional burden on the social system and the threat to the cultural identity of the nation. The hypothesis of the author was that the most important factor that needs to be in the centre of focus is the lack actions that Estonia has taken in order to alleviate the tensions both on the international as well as on the internal level.

Since the refugees and the migration issues were not considered to be a hot topic of discussion before the publishment of the EU's plan to establish mandatory quotas, the author presumed that the evolvement of the political issue to a security issue might be the result of using the securitization method. In order to be able to analyse the question at hand, the first chapter of the thesis consisted of an overview of all the main components of the securitization theory. According to the framework in order to determine if something has in fact been securitized there are five key elements that needed to be examined: who securitizes, on what issues, for whom, why, with what results and under what conditions. In addition, since the migration crisis is an international problem, there are three different levels of analysis to be taken into account: global, regional and local. Since the topic of this thesis is the EU's migration crisis then the author only analysed the securitization process on the regional and local level.

The empirical overview of the European migration crisis exhibited that the main reasons behind the EU's failure are the contradictions inside the Common Asylum System itself, the incomplete nature of the EU's integration and the different interests of Member States. Even though the crisis has now lasted over a year, the EU has still not been able to alleviate the situation, furthermore there are signs of different interest groups that cooperate with each other in order to gain more impact and who do not follow the Union's prescribed action plans. Even though the EU is very disjointed the method of securitization has never been used in order to take extraordinary measures.

Not all Member States have been included or participating in the formation of smaller co-operation groups as described in chapter 2.3. One of the states who does not belong to any specific group is Estonia. At first when the crisis erupted and the Commission proposed the mandatory quotas plan, Estonia was very openly and actively against the quotas. However when it became evident that there is no way out of accepting more refugees, the main approach of

Estonia has been passive both internally and internationally. The government did not issue many public statements on the topic and as a result the main media coverage was in the hands of others who securitized the issue by making not only the refugees seem as an existential threat but also the actions of the EU. As a result of the negative securitization of the issue, there is a growing indication of anxiety, tension and aggression inside the society itself. Those elements however do not only destabilize the situation internally but can also be used by external actors.

According to the concept of hybrid threats the weaknesses of a state can be used against themselves in order to achieve political goals. For example Russia has publicly declared that the former Soviet Union countries are in their special sphere of interest. The greater the irrational fear and contrasting, the more open the public is to hostile propaganda and likely to forget the differences between imaginary threats and real ones hence opening the door for manipulation from third parties. Russia has already been accused of using refugee flows as a means to an end and as a result Estonia should be prepared to tackle this kind of tactics before they are put into practice.

The key element in contesting these threats is the acknowledgment of their existence. Estonia cannot continue to exercise the passive approach of this topic. They need to cooperate in order to help the Union find a solution to this problem jointly and they need to actively address the issues at hand and form the public opinion through constant communication. There is no reason to believe that the refugees would be a big financial burden to the economy of the state because the EU also partially funds the acceptance of the refugees. Nor is there a reason to assume that every refugee is a terrorist in disguise who wants to take over the nation. Estonia has never been a destination or transit country for refugees, thus it is the perfect opportunity to gradually gain new experiences in integrating different members of society, an action that has failed in the past.

RESÜMEE

RÄNDEKRIIS EUROOPA LIIDUS: UUS OHT EESTILE?

Liis Luuk

Alates iseseisvuse taastamisest oli Eesti peamiseks välispoliitiliseks eesmärgiks Euroopa Liidu ja NATO-ga ühinemine. Väikeriigina on Eesti alati väärtustanud nii rahvusvahelise kogukonna kui ka organisatsioonide liikmeks olemist eelkõige seetõttu, et seda nähakse julgeolekugrantiina riigi iseseisvusele. Eelpool toodust tulenevalt on nimetatud organisatsioonide tugevus ning ühtsus olnud alati riigi julgeoleku tagamiseks alati võtmetähtsusega tegurid.

Alates 2015. aastast kestav rändekriis on aga mõjutanud Euroopa Liidu kuvandit nii rahvusvahelisel, liidu sisesel kui ka riiklikul tasandil. Ühise asüülipoliitika sisemiste vastuolude, mittetäieliku integratsiooni ning liikmesriikide erinevate huvide tõttu ei ole Liidul õnnestunud aasta jooksul kriisile püsivat lahendust leida. Traditsioonilise käsitluse kohaselt nimetatakse migratsiooniga kaasnevateks negatiivseteks nähtusteks konfliktiohtu, lisakoormust sotsiaalsüsteemile ning ohtu kultuurilisele identiteedile. Käesoleva magistritöö autori poolt püstitatud hüpoteesi kohaselt ei ole Eesti julgeolekule suurimaks ohuks aga hoopiski mitte traditsioonilise käsitluse kohased ohud vaid riigi tegevusetus nii siseriiklikul ka rahvusvahelisel tasandil.

Eesti on pagulasi vastu võtnud juba alates 1997. aastast, kuid mitte kunagi varem ei ole antud temaatika olnud inimeste jaoks niivõrd oluline kui nüüd. Sellest tulenevalt analüüsis autor vastavat teemat läbi julgeolekustamise teooria selleks, et mõista kas ja kes on selle teema julgeolekustanud. Julgeolekustamine võib paralleelselt toimuda mitmel erineval tasemel. Selle töö kontekstis analüüsiti regionaalset ehk Euroopa Liidu ning siseriiklikku taset. Uurimustulemustena selgus, et rahvusvahelisel tasandil ei ole teemat julgeolekustatud. Siseriiklikul tasemel on seda teinud aga konservatiivsete erakondade esindajad valitsuse enda abiga.

Pärast esialgset kvoodiplaani avalikustamist kinnitas valitsus avalikult, et ta ei nõustu selle plaani kohustuslikkusega ning Eesti jätkab oma asüülipoliitika samasuguse konservatiivse joonega nagu ta on seda senini teinud. Juulis selgus, et kuigi valitsus suutis esialgselt ettenähtud vastuvõetavate põgenike numbreid olulisel määral vähendada, ebaõnnestusid nad selle plaani likvideerimise vaatest. Veelgi enam, valitsuse esindajad ei kasutanud ära vaba meedia olemasolu, et inimestele oma suunamuutuste põhjuseid selgitada, mistõttu tekkis avalik arvamus, et valitsus ei ole tegutsenud lähtuvalt kodanike huvidest. Tekkinud olukorda kasutasid koheselt ära konservatiivsed erakonnad kes esitasid ennast kui Eesti rahvuslike huvide kaitsjaid ning julgeolekustasid seeläbi rändekriisi. Kuna Eesti ühiskond ei ole avatud sest, et tal puudub laialdane edukas kogemus erinevate kultuuridega kooselamise osas, siis olid kõik vajalikud eeltingimused rändekriisi julgeolekustamiseks täidetud.

Kõige selle tulemusena on Eestis kasvanud toetus populistidele ja äärmuslastele. On ilmne, et ühiskonna mentaliteet soosib ärevuse, pingete ja agressiivsuse kasvu kõige ja kõigi vastu mis on tavapärasest erinev. Ühiskondlikke pingeid on aga võimalik ära kasutada nii siseriiklike kui ka väliste tegutsejate poolt. Mida suuremad on irratsionaalsed hirmud, seda avatumad ollakse vaenulikule propagandale, kaotades seeläbi piir tegelike ja kujutletavate ohtude vahel. Selleks, et vältida nimetatud olukorra juhtumist peab valitsus eelkõige mõistma, et tema ülesandeks on läbi kõikide kanalite kommunikeerida ühiskonnale vajalikku informatsiooni selgitaval viisil selleks, et antud teemat dejulgeolustada. Ainult nii tegutsedes kaitseb riik ennast potentsiaalsete taktikaliste hübridohtude eest, mille ainuülesandeks on olemasolevaid nõrkusi enda poliitiliste huvide saavutamiseks ära kasutada.

Seetõttu ei peaks esimeses lõigus nimetatud traditsiooniliste ohtude ennetamine olema riigi fookuses sest, et nende tõekssaamine on väga ebatõenäoline. Eesti ei ole kunagi olnud ning tõenäoliselt ei muutu ka lähiajal põgenike ega migrantide sihtriigiks, mistõttu puudub igasugune alus nendeks hirmude realiseerumiseks. Veelgi enam, Euroopa Liit toetab pagulaste ümberjaotamise programmis osalejaid ka rahaliselt. Ühiskonnas valitsevad pinged antud temaatika puhul aga on soodsaks võimaluseks kõigile kes otsivad viise kuidas oma eesmäärke võimalikult vähese jõu kasutamisega saavutada soovivad. Sellest tulenevalt on magistrirühma autor arvamusel, et just nimelt Eesti senine tegevusetus ning selle jätkumine on hetkel riigi julgeolekule suuremaks ohuks kui traditsioonilised migratsiooniga seonduvad ohud.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1 The European relocation and resettlement scheme 13.05.2015

European relocation scheme 13.05.2015			European resettlement scheme 13.05.2015		
member states	key (%)	number of people to be received	member states	key (%)	number of people to be received
Germany	18,42%	3684	France	1,87%	2375
Greece	1,90%	380	Germany	15,43%	3086
France	14,17%	2834	Finland	1,46%	293
Italy	11,84%	2368	Hungary	1,53%	307
Lithuania	1,16%	232	United Kingdom	11,54%	2309
Spain	9,10%	1820	Italy	9,94%	1989
Romania	3,75%	750	Slovakia	1,60%	319
Portugal	3,89%	778	Poland	4,81%	962
Poland	5,64%	1128	Spain	7,75%	1549
Czech Republic	2,98%	596	Netherlands	3,66%	732
Belgium	2,91%	582	Malta	0,60%	121
Slovakia	1,78%	356	Czech Republic	2,63%	525
Netherlands	4,35%	870	Belgium	2,45%	490
Austria	2,62%	524	Portugal	3,52%	704
Slovenia	1,15%	230	Luxembourg	0,74%	147
Sweden	2,92%	584	Austria	2,22%	444
Estonia	1,76%	352	Romania	3,29%	657
Hungary	1,79%	358	Slovenia	1,03%	207
Finland	1,72%	344	Denmark	1,73%	345
Croatia	1,73%	346	Greece	1,61%	323
Latvia	1,21%	242	Estonia	1,63%	326
Bulgaria	1,25%	250	Croatia	1,58%	315
Luxembourg	0,85%	170	Ireland	1,36%	272
Malta	0,69%	138	Sweden	2,46%	491
Cyprus	0,39%	78	Bulgaria	1,08%	216
			Latvia	1,10%	220
			Lithuania	1,03%	207
			Cyprus	0,34%	69

Source: (A European Agenda ... 2015, 21-22)

Appendix 2 Relocation: Distribution of refugees 27.05.2015

Member State	Overall Key	Number of people to be received from Italy	Number of people to be received from Greece	Total number of people	Compared to the initial proposal made on the 13th of May
Germany	21,91%	5 258	3 505	8763	5079
France	16,88%	4 051	2 701	6752	3918
Spain	10,72%	2 573	1 715	4288	2468
Poland	6,65%	1 595	1 064	2659	1531
Netherlands	5,12%	1 228	819	2047	1177
Romania	4,26%	1 023	682	1705	955
Portugal	4,25%	1 021	680	1701	923
Sweden	3,42%	821	548	1369	785
Belgium	3,41%	818	546	1364	782
Czech Republic	3,32%	797	531	1328	732
Austria	3,03%	728	485	1213	689
Hungary	2,07%	496	331	827	469
Finland	1,98%	475	317	792	448
Slovakia	1,96%	471	314	785	429
Croatia	1,87%	448	299	747	401
Estonia	1,85%	443	295	738	386
Bulgaria	1,43%	343	229	572	322
Latvia	1,29%	310	207	517	275
Lithuania	1,26%	302	201	503	271
Slovenia	1,24%	297	198	495	265
Luxembourg	0,92%	221	147	368	198
Malta	0,73%	175	117	292	154
Cyprus	0,43%	104	69	173	95

Source: (Annexes accompanying the Proposal for... 2015, 1-3)

Appendix 3 Relocation and Resettlement distribution after the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting 20/07/2015

Member State	Number of people to be received from Italy or Greece	Compared to the 27.05 proposal	Member State	Number of people to be received from a third country	Compared to the 13.05 proposal
Austria	0	-1213	Austria	1900	1456
Belgium	1 364	0	Belgium	1100	610
Bulgaria	450	-122	Bulgaria	50	-166
Croatia	400	-347	Croatia	150	-165
Cyprus	173	0	Cyprus	69	0
Czech Republic	1 100	-228	Czech Republic	400	-125
Estonia	130	-608	Denmark	1000	655
Finland	792	0	Estonia	20	-306
France	6752	0	Finland	293	0
Germany	10 500	1737	France	2375	0
Hungary	0	-827	Germany	1600	-1486
Ireland	600	600	Greece	354	31
Latvia	200	-317	Hungary	0	-307
Lithuania	255	-248	Ireland	520	248
Luxembourg	320	-48	Italy	1989	0
Malta	60	-232	Latvia	50	-170
Netherlands	2 047	0	Lithuania	70	-137
Poland	1 100	-1559	Luxembourg	30	-117
Portugal	1 309	-392	Malta	14	-107
Romania	1 705	0	Netherlands	1000	268
Slovakia	100	-685	Poland	900	-62
Slovenia	230	-265	Portugal	191	-513
Spain	1 300	-2988	Romania	80	-577
Sweden	1 369	0	Slovakia	100	-219
			Slovenia	20	-187
			Spain	1449	-100
			Sweden	491	0
			United Kingdom	2200	-109
			Norway	3500	3500
			Iceland	50	50
			Liechtenstein	20	20

			Switzerland	519	519
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Source: (Outcome of the Council Meeting...2015, 4-8)

Appendix 4 Relocation distribution proposal according to the Commissions second package of proposals 09.09.2015

Member States	Italy	Greece	Hungary	TOTAL
Germany	4088	13206	14149	31443
France	3124	10093	10814	24031
Spain	1941	6271	6719	14931
Poland	1207	3901	4179	9287
Netherlands	938	3030	3246	7214
Romania	604	1951	2091	4646
Belgium	593	1917	2054	4564
Sweden	581	1877	2011	4469
Austria	473	1529	1638	3640
Portugal	400	1291	1383	3074
Czech Republic	387	1251	1340	2978
Finland	312	1007	1079	2398
Bulgaria	208	672	720	1600
Slovakia	195	631	676	1502
Croatia	138	447	479	1064
Lithuania	101	328	351	780
Slovenia	82	265	284	631
Latvia	68	221	237	526
Luxembourg	57	185	198	440
Estonia	48	157	168	373
Cyprus	36	115	123	274
Malta	17	56	60	133

Source: (Refugee Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action 2015)

Appendix 5 Results of the postimees.ee article search

Name of the article	Author or the person being interviewed	Tone	Date	Potential threats
Lugejakiri: Eesti riik peaks kindlasti rohkem pagulasi vastu võtma	Reader	Positive	3.05.2015 18:44	
Väitlusblogi: ebaküpsuskirjand	Reader	Critique of a opponent's opinion	5.05.2015 14:56	
Juhan Saharov: pagulaste ümberasustamine ja kohanemine Eestis – müüdid ja faktid	Board member of a refugee centre	Explanatory	8.05.2015 18:41	
Ramon Loik: migratsioonikriis pannakse proovile Euroopa turvalisus	Scientist	Neutral	11.05.2015 10:30	
Ka ümberjagamise korral ootaks Eestit vaid mõnikümmend pagulast	Reporter	Informative	11.05.2015 23:59	
Dag Kirsebom: Rootsi immigratsioonipoliitikat ootab kokkukukkumine	Entrepreneur	Negative	12.05.2015 13:11	
Põgenike probleem nõuab pakilist lahendust	Estonia's representative in the Union	Positive	12.05.2015 23:59	
Täna avalikustab Euroopa Komisjon plaani põgenikeprobleemiga tegelemiseks	Reporter	Informative	13.05.2015 11:16	
Eesti võib saada 326 põgenikku	Reporter	Informative	13.05.2015 15:43	

Ümberasustamine puudutab vaid väljaspool ELi asuvaid pagulasi	Leader of the HR Centre	Positive	13.05.2015 17:02	
Europarlamendi Eesti saadikud: pagulasi peab aitama	Estonian representatives in the Union's Parliament	Positive	13.05.2015 20:24	
<u>Pevkur: kohustuslik kvoot ei lahenda kunagi midagi</u>	Interior Minister of Estonia	Negative	13.05.2015 23:03	"Mandatory quotas have never solved issues before"
Vao külas on põliselanike ja põgenike suhted olnud seni sõbralikud	Reader	Positive	13.05.2015 23:11	
Sudaani pagulane: alustan Eestis oma uut elu	Refugee	Positive	14.05.2015 19:32	
Juhtkiri: Põgenikeprobleem ehk enesepeetuse mõttetus	Reporter	Positive	14.05.2015 10:31	
Rait Maruste põgenikekvoodist: oleks isekas nina kirtsutada	Politician from the Reform Party	Positive	14.05.2015 16:01	
326 pagulast näib Eestile üle jõu käivat	Interior Minister of Estonia	Negative	14.05.2015 23:59	
Müüdid ja tegelikkus: kas pagulane on harimatu kurjategija?	Director of the Research Centre for Migration studies in the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences	Explanatory	15.05.2015 16:39	
Kvoot paika ja korras?	Reporter	Informative	16.05.2015 0:51	

Liibüa ametnik: Islamiriigi võitlejad saabuvad Vahemere kaudu Euroopasse	Representative of Libya	Negative	17.05.2015 10:19	"ISIS fighters are travelling to the EU as refugees"
20 tähtsamat küsimust ja vastust pagulaste kohta	Estonian Refugee Council	Explanatory	18.05.2015 15:38	
Kuidas kujuneb Eesti lõplik seisukoht põgenike küsimuses?	ELAK representative	Neutral	18.05.2015 21:30	
Majandusministeeriu m: ka madalapalgaliste sisseränne võib majandusele kasu tuua	Representative of the Ministry of Economic	Pro refugees, against quotas	19.05.2015 15:05	"Each state must be able to determine independently how much and who will they accept as refugees"
Videointervjuud: algas arutelu Eesti seisukoha kujundamiseks põgenikeküsimuses	Comments from different members	Mixed reviews	21.05.2015 15:08	A Member from the Political Party of EKRE" stated that we do not need to pay the price if some countries cannot guard their borders"
Rõivase sõnul on pagulaskvoodi arvutamisel tehtud loogikaviga	Prime minister	Negative	21.05.2015 15:29	"It is not acceptable that suddenly the share of Estonia is multiple times bigger than is our capacity and proportionally even bigger than some of the larger states share"

Marika Kirch: pagulaste kvoot ja kodakondsuseta inimesed	Psychologist	Negative	25.05.2015 19:58	"Brussels calculates a quota, makes it mandatory and we are just supposed to fulfil it"
Pagulane: olen tänuelik Eesti riigile	Refugee	Positive	25.05.2015 23:59	
Rõivas: Eesti ei tohiks olla põgenike suhtes allergiline	Prime minister	Negative	26.05.2015 0:10	"The current mandatory approach will create reluctance and will make the society not willing to participate in the matter"
Vassiljev: ka töötav pagulane peaks saama tasuta keeleõpet	Member of the Government	Explanatory	26.05.2015 23:59	
Euroopa Komisjoni esialgne kava tooks Eestisse üle tuhande põgeniku	Reporter	Informative	27.05.2015 10:12	
Üleskutse: kuidas mujal riikides välismaalastele riigikeelt õpetatakse?	Reporter	Informative	27.05.2015 14:57	
Kui palju Eesti ühe pagulase aitamisele kulutab?	Representative of SOM	Informative	28.05.2015 10:31	

Ojulang: tunnen valge inimesena, et valge rass on ohus	Former foreign minister Kristiina Ojulang	Negative	28.05.2015 8:17	"Being a member of the European Union does not mean that they can burden our social system with Afro-Americans. Estonia needs to clearly say not to the mandatory quotas. It is an existential question for Estonians and if we let them in then there is no going back"
Mae Merusk: põgenikevoolus lasub süü Itaaliale	Reader	Negative	28.05.2015 16:24	"A regular refugee will not start to learn here, they will start demanding"
Rahvas on pahane! Pagulaste vastane Facebooki leht kogub fänne	Reporter	Negative	29.05.2015 11:37	"We are opposed to the acceptance of refugees from another cultural background and we will stand for our nations sovereignty and independence"
Eerik-Niiles Kross: Eestit ei ohusta «islamistide massid», vaid täielik provintsistumine	Politician from the Reform Party	Positive	8.06.2015 14:01	"Estonia is not threatened by the mass of Islamic warriors. The real threat is that the Estonian nation is aging and

				thus slowly extincting"
Justiitsministeerium: põgenike ümberasustamine saab olla liikmesriikidele vaid vabatahtlik	Ministry of Justice	Negative	8.06.2015 19:04	
Märt Avandi: Kristiina Ojulandi sõnavõtt pagulaste teemal on absurd kuubis	Actor	Positive	10.06.2015 18:15	
Fotod ja video: sajad inimesed kogunesid Toompeale immigratsiooni vastu meelt avaldama	Member of the political party EKRE	Negative	10.06.2015 18:20	"The refugee question is of upmost importance because the amount of them might be potential dangerous to the existence of the nation"
Yana Toomi hinnangul on pagulaskvoodid Eesti suhtes õigustatud	Estonian representatives in the Union's Parliament	Positive	11.06.2015 21:37	"Estonia has done anything in years to help solve this problem, so as a result the mandatory quota is the only way"
Kalle Palling: pagulased vankrit vedama, mitte järgi lohisema	ELAK representative	Positive	12.06.2015 16:29	
Itaalia ähvardas Euroopale migrantide küsimuses «haiget teha»	Reporter	Informative	14.06.2015 14:21	
Tartu kaalub suutlikkust pagulasi vastu võtta	Reporter	Neutral	17.06.2015 9:30	

ÜRO pagulasamet: ülemaailmne sundränne kasvab kiiresti	Reporter	-	18.06.2015 8:11	"Warnings that the situation with refugees will only decline if something is not done now"
Kristina Kallas pagulaste vastuvõtmisest: Eestil on hea stardipositsioon teiste vigadest õppimiseks	Expert	Positive	26.06.2015 14:36	
Pagulaslaagris töötanud eestlased: tuleks vältida getode tekkimist	Reader	Positive	30.06.2015 15:37	
Rõivas: me ei tohi olla tõrjuv ja tige väikeriik	Prime minister	Positive	30.06.2015 23:59	
Nele Sillaots: Eesti vajab pagulasteemal jõulist positiivset sõnumit	Reader	Positive	1.07.2015 13:16	
Pagulased Eestisse ei kipu — kliima on halb ja narkomaane vähe	Citizen from Greece	Negative	1.07.2015 23:59	
Olen pagulane, osta mulle õlut	Member of the Estonia Parliament	Negative	2.07.2015 10:31	
Anne Ōuema: kuidas Vao külas konflikte vältida	Reader	Positive	2.07.2015 13:01	
Sõjapõgenik on inimene nagu meie	Chancellor of Justice	Positive	2.07.2015 22:06	
Kes on põgenik, kes pagulane?	Representative of Ministry of Interior	Informative	3.07.2015 23:59	

Peapiiskop Urmas Viilma: kohustuslik religiooniõpetus muudaks meid sallivamaks	Arch Bishop	Positive	10.07.2015 10:11	
Roberts Zīle: pagulasplaani vastamata küsimused	Latvia's representative in the European Parliament	Negative	20.07.2015 17:35	
Pagulaskoosolek pakkus abilinnapeale üllatuse	Assistant Major of Tartu	Positive	22.07.2015 9:32	
Riik kaardistas sisserändajatega seotud võimalikud ohud	Ministry of Interior	Informative	22.07.2015 9:37	
Euroopa riigid otsustasid ära, mitu pagulast igaüks võtab, ÜRO aitab neid nüüd valida	Ministry of Interior	Positive	22.07.2015 14:57	
Mida uurisid omavalitsusjuhid ministritelt pagulaste kohta?	Reporter	Informative	22.07.2015 18:25	
Taavi Rõivas: mul on hea meel, et ELis jäid pagulasküsimuses peale Eesti seisukohad	Prime minister	Positive	23.07.2015 12:50	