DOCTORAL THESIS

Non-Western Public Administration in Context: Contemporary Islamic Cases from Morocco

Salah Chafik

TALLINNA TEHNIKAÜLIKOOL
TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
TALLINN 2022

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53/2022

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TAL TECH PRESS

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This dissertation was accepted for the defence of the degree 25/07/2022

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Defence of the thesis: 14/09/2022, Tallinn

Declaration:
Hereby I declare that this doctoral thesis, my original investigation and achievement, submitted for the doctoral degree at Tallinn University of Technology has not been submitted for doctoral or equivalent academic degree.

Salah Chafik

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signature

ISSN 2585-6898 (publication)
ISBN 978-9949-83-885-1 (publication)
ISSN 2585-6901 (PDF)
ISBN 978-9949-83-886-8 (PDF)
Printed by Auratrükk

TALLINNA TEHNIKAÜLIKOOL
DOKTORITÖÖ
53/2022

Avalik haldus väljaspool läänemaailma: nüüdisaegsed islami juhtumiuuringud Marokost

SALAH CHAFIK

TAL TECH
KIRJASTUS

To my parents

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List of Publications

The list of author's publications, on the basis of which the thesis has been prepared:

I **Chafik, S.**, & Drechsler, W. (2022). In the Semi-Shadow of the Global West: Moroccan *zawāyā* as Good Public Administration. *Public Administration Review*, 82 (4), 747–755. **ETIS 1.1**.

II Reinert, E., **Chafik, S.**, & Zhao, X. (2022). Geography, Uneven Development, and Population Density: Attempting a Non-Ethnocentric Approach to Development. In Reinert, E.S. & I. Kvangraven (Eds.), *A Modern Guide to Uneven Economic Development*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. **ETIS 3.1**.

III **Chafik, S**. (2022). Plan Bee: The Case of an Islamic Honey Cooperative in Morocco. *Halduskultuur: The Estonian Journal of Administrative Culture and Digital Governance*. **ETIS 1.1**.

IV Drechsler, W., & **Chafik, S**. Islamic Public Administration in Sunlight and Shadow: Theory and Practice. *NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy*. [In Press] **ETIS 1.1**.

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V Jachimowicz, J.M., **Chafik, S**., Munrat, S., Prabhu, J.C., & Weber, E.U. (2017). Community trust reduces myopic decisions of low-income individuals. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 114 (21), 5401–5406. **ETIS 1.1**

Author's Contribution to the Publications

Contribution to the papers in this thesis are:

I The starting point and core arguments of the paper were based on the prior work of the author of the thesis. Both authors equally contributed to the manuscript adaptations, peer review revisions, and editor correspondence required for publication.

II The first author and the author of the thesis jointly developed the overall argument of a non-ethnocentric approach to development. The author of the thesis was responsible for the research, development of the argument, and write-up of the Islamic world case study within the book chapter.

IV The author of the thesis was responsible for the Morocco case study and for developing the Uzbekistan cases study, as well as for the theoretical points section. Both authors made equal contributions to the design and framing of the research, selection of case studies, and the conclusion.

Introduction

و أن الرئاسة التي بها تمكن في المدينة أو في الأمة السير و الملكات التي تنال بها السعادة القصوى و تحفظها عليهم هي الرئاسة الفاضلة

"**As for the rulership that establishes in a city or nation and preserves *the ways of life and dispositions* by means of which *ultimate human flourishing* is obtained – that is virtuous rulership.**"

Abu Nasr Al-Fārābī (870-950 CE), *Book of Religion* (1986, 54-55; author's translation and emphasis)

What the eminent philosopher Al-Fārābī, building on Aristotle's concept of *eudaimonia* (1095a), is referring to in the statement above is, from an Islamic perspective, the existence of true human prosperity and indeed happiness: living and doing good. As a Muslim, Moroccan, and American, my personal and academic interest in what is and how to – contextually – arrive at "ultimate human flourishing" began over a decade ago, in the sophomore year of my undergraduate studies in Philadelphia. I was exploring the possibility of doing a semester abroad and accordingly needed to confirm whether or not my university, UPenn, would recognize and provide equivalent academic credits for the coursework I was interested in taking. I asked a senior economics professor, who was in charge of such decisions at the department at the time, what he thought about courses on Islamic Political Economy or Islamic Governance. He looked at me, unsure of whether I was even being serious, and replied "Islamic Governance? Islamic Economics? What is that? That's like saying there's such thing as Buddhist Economics or something. Of course I can't give you credit for that."

His response did not age well regarding Buddhist Economics, given the (Western) mainstreaming of its fundamental concepts in the form of sustainable development or Gross National Happiness (Drechsler 2019b). Today, however, I would predict that one may still comfortably scoff at the notion of studying contemporary Islamic Governance or Economics as a worthwhile endeavor within wide mainstream circles of Western academe – that is, I would have predicted as much until I arrived in Estonia to pursue my graduate studies.

Tallinn is, among other things, a hub for innovation and governance research. In particular, it is the home of one of the few remaining non-Marxist heterodox economics departments globally, i.e. the Other Canon, which, in embracing the inescapable normative aspect of social sciences, is a tradition that, following the German Historical School of Gustav v. Schmoller and Adolph Wagner, regards both neoliberal market fundamentalism and communist state-planning as entirely undesirable extremes (Reinert & Daastøl 2004). Rather, the role of the state is an essential one in the pursuit of "ultimate human flourishing", and perhaps most significantly in a techno-economic context (Perez 2002), its formulation and implementation of an innovation policy that advances key sectors and industries that concurrently develop the economy and address pressing societal challenges (including the globally salient environmental and inequality crises). Empirically, even within the US (despite the startup and heroic entrepreneur rhetoric), we know this has been accomplished through immense public sector support, i.e. the entrepreneurial state (Mazzucato 2018), and along with it, a highly capable administrative system, i.e. state bureaucracy, to implement this support (Kattel et al. 2022).

To return to Al-Fārābī and Aristotle (*Pol.* 1309a), because societies are not identical with regards to their institutions and systems of governance (nor the "ways of life and dispositions" they reflect), the pursuit and even understanding of "ultimate human flourishing" must also legitimately vary. Indeed, from such a perspective, the diverse range of historical and contemporary administrative and economic traditions must surely

contain valuable lessons, successful institutions, and insightful practices – meaning there is no such thing as a (Western) monopoly in defining societal and individual happiness. It was in this academic context that I was able to pursue my long-standing interests not only as a worthwhile endeavor, but rather, seeing as Islam is a (if not *the*) defining element of nearly a quarter of humanity's daily lives, as a critical one.

The initial focus and main objective of my doctoral work was the exploration of extant administrative arrangements rooted in Islam, which meant engaging with the core theoretical framework of this dissertation – Non-Western Public Administration or NWPA (Drechsler 2013a; Drechsler 2015; Drechsler 2019a) – alongside an active research group within our department in Tallinn. For Islamic Public Administration (hereafter PA) in particular, the academic literature mostly features recent case studies from Central Asia (e.g. Urinboyev 2014) and South Eastern Europe (e.g. Drechsler 2018b), together with one classic theory piece from a quarter century ago (Kalantari 1998). My aim therefore became to contribute to the empirical grounding and discussion of the underexplored theory of Non-Western and Islamic PA within the group, from a context I have ancestry in and know well (Morocco), which came to fruition in the form of two co-authored journal articles: a case study on extant institutions (**I**) and a fresh theory piece (**IV**).

In parallel, a critical aspect of furthering the theory of Non-Western and Islamic PA has been highlighting and recognizing the positive contributions of the broader Islamic scholarly tradition in governance, economics, and beyond, which in my case resulted in another collaborative publication, i.e. a book chapter (**II**). Furthermore, because Islamic systems of administration have a tendency towards the bottom-up (Peters 2021), I sought to understand the dynamics of significant autonomy on local communities, their institutions, their livelihoods, and their identity vis-à-vis the central state, for which I wrote a journal article presenting the case study of an indigenous Islamic cooperative in Morocco (**III**). Finally, prior to my doctoral studies, I worked in the field of decision-making and behavioral economics and a perennial interest in community-level perspectives led to another co-authored journal article based on a collaborative governance field experiment (in the Islamic world) on how community trust can safeguard individual livelihoods (**V**).

As such, the overall aim of this thesis is exploring how "living and doing good" can unfold in the paradigm of Islamic Administration, Governance, and Economics – and how this formulates a legitimate alternative to the global Western mainstream. Specifically, the following research questions guided my investigation:

- Can traditional Islamic institutions and practices constitute "good" public administration? Or are we waiting for them to modernize, i.e. Westernize? (Section 3)
- How is the Islamic scholarly tradition relevant/legitimate to statecraft, administration, and policy today? What are the legacies and contemporary applications of the Islamic natural and social sciences? (Section 4)
- How can Islamic cooperatives be successful on the community, state, and global levels? (Section 5)

The remainder of the thesis therefore proceeds with an overview of Non-Western and Islamic PA in Section 1, followed by a discussion in Section 2 of the research methods utilized. Subsequently, Sections 3-5 each explore the respective research questions above, before Section 6 concludes by summarizing the main findings and areas of further research that the thesis surfaces.

1 Decentering: Taking Up the Theories of Non-Western & Islamic Public Administration

في اختلاف المسالك راحة للسالك

"**It is in the variety of paths that the wayfarer finds respite**"

Sidi Ahmed Zarruq (1442-1493), *The Principles of Sufism*, Principle 58

Despite recent setbacks and no longer being the world's singular superpower (i.e. the end of unipolarity), the United States still enjoys "a position of primacy that is unique in modern history", in terms of its economic, military, and soft power (Walt 2006, 22). One of the many consequences of American (and by extension Western) primacy is the unidirectional nature of how mainstream academic and scientific knowledge is defined, understood, and 'created' in the West and subsequently transferred to the rest (Smith 2021). The fields of Governance and Public Administration (PA), both in scholarship and practice, are no exception (Raadschelders 2003; Bouckaert 2017). Take, for instance, a concept as basic as "international" standards or practices being a euphemism for *Western* standards or practices. Whether consciously or not, by convention Western PA is considered to be the only good PA, and by extension, the only modern PA, resulting in an implicit and formulaic understanding (Drechsler 2013a):

Western = global = good = modern

For decades, this "drive towards global uniformity" (Latouche 1996) has defined the core – largely unsuccessful – strategy and agenda, not only for public management and administration reform, but it also has a direct parallel in the Washington Consensus approach to economic policy in the form of aid and international development efforts (Reinert 2006). One of the most problematic effects of this approach is that in assuming ubiquitous and perpetual Western superiority, one is required to jettison any social values, cultural traditions, and institutions that are non-Western and potentially better in specific contexts. Otherwise, to refer back to the formula, one is just stubbornly holding onto values, traditions, and institutions that are provincial, bad, and outdated (Drechsler 2019b).

The dominance of the Western PA paradigm is, however, increasingly in question (Bertelli et al. 2020, Moloney et al. 2022). Two salient reasons are the questionable track record of exporting this paradigm, and the rapid economic and political shifts occurring at the international stage, e.g. the success and rising influence of regions outside of the Anglosphere (Pollitt 2014). More broadly, a third factor is the ethnocentric status of global Western PA (Raadschelders 2003, Hummel 2019) in a post George Floyd protests world, i.e. a world where uprooting ethnocentric colonial legacies has become a priority. Indeed, the mainstreaming of decolonizing research has rendered the perspective that non-Western values, traditions, and institutions are provincial, bad, and outdated as (virtually) untenable. There are now calls in the mainstream PA literature (Althaus 2020) to recognize the validity of and even (respectfully and responsibly) take up non-Western ways of knowing and being (for an example in the Australian context, see Milroy 2019).

In an attempt to do so, I took up Drechsler's framework of Non-Western Public Administration (NWPA) (2013a; 2015), which, instead of a wholesale transfer of Western models of governance to the rest of the world, calls for recognizing some aspects of governance that are universally applicable, and others that are not. In the case of the

latter context-specific solutions, NWPA leaves space for working with what is already present and functioning in a particular paradigm.

But firstly, how can one understand or evaluate what "good" PA is exactly? If we assume with Bouckaert that PA can be heuristically reduced to two elements: mechanics (implementation) and ethics (goals), then good PA could be conceived of as having efficient mechanics without sacrificing ethics (Drechsler 2013a; Bouckaert 2011). This accounts for a working definition of good PA – but where does one actually find it, i.e. what are the potential sources?



***Figure 1**: paradigms of good PA (from Drechsler 2013a)*

NWPA taxonomizes good PA into four distinct sources (Figure 1). First, a small set of administrative principles and practices that are meant to be implemented as is, regardless of place or time – perhaps thought of as a "shared human PA" (represented by circle a). Many such principles and practices are readily found in fiscal administration, specifically public accounting, where the fundamentals of how to keep track of assets and liabilities are able to be legitimately and rapidly transferred regardless of context (for the telling case of China, see Lin 1998). Second, a wider set that must be adapted or tweaked to succeed in a particular context (represented by shuriken b). Third, a set that work in overlapping paradigms but not elsewhere (the c areas), and fourth, a set that only work in a specific paradigm (the d areas) and do, and perhaps should, not work in others (Drechsler 2013a).

Therefore with such an approach, good PA inherently encompasses elements from multiple paradigms (thereby decentering the Western one), and moreover, apart from a few exceptions (circle a), is highly contextual (requiring a paradigm-specific understanding). Arriving at a paradigm-specific understanding of good PA, both theoretical (Kalantari 1998; **IV**) and empirical (**I**, **III**), in the Islamic context (*d-Islamic* area) – and why this is a concern of global relevance and importance (**II**) – is a matter we now turn to.

1.1 Islamic PA though?

Islamic PA is controversial and (not unrelatedly) interesting. The unquestionable success of Confucian countries, with their various configurations of the development state (Amsden 2001), makes Confucian PA an obvious (and competitive) alternative to the Western paradigm (Minh Chau 1996; Drechsler 2018a). This certainly cannot be said of the Islamic paradigm, seeing as no such overall track record exists within Muslim-majority countries. Furthermore, prior to the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, the main theatre of violent international conflict for the previous two decades has been the Islamic world, apart from occasional but prominent spillovers of violence in the West. However, these events and dynamics are only a (recent) part of the larger Islamic tradition, which spans more than fourteen centuries. As Edward Said reminds us, the Orient, referring to the Islamic world,

> is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe's greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the other (1978, 9).

Altogether, a relative lack of contemporary success from constituent countries combined with a complex legacy of inspiration, hostilities, and quintessential otherness vis-à-vis the West – which is still enjoying its primacy – means that one must address three challenges (each a proverbial elephant in the room) when discussing the notion of Islamic PA outside of the few who know and deal with it in scholarship or practice. Namely, most people (including Muslims) would at best acknowledge the existence of Islamic PA but regard it as fundamentally inferior to other paradigms (1. the challenge of recognition), or more harshly, question the existence of any good PA that is Islamic (2. the challenge of evidence/documentation), or most harshly, see it as an existential threat to be neutralized, let alone recognized as valid or supported (3. the challenge of appreciation).

Overcoming each of these challenges is a necessary step for Islamic PA to become a genuine alternative paradigm – in policy, practice, and academe – at the global level. The present thesis is a modest attempt to preliminarily address all three and thus contribute to the emergence of *maghrebi* (Northwest Africa) Islamic PA as a subfield. Indeed, immense socio-cultural and geo-political diversity exists within the *ummah* (global Islamic community), and, therefore, one can only expect significant intra-paradigm elements of contextuality within Islamic PA. It should be noted, however, that while the topic is controversial, inner-Islamic (i.e. Muslim) perspectives and mainstream scholarship stress the validity of Islam as a general, encompassing, and significant element (Drechsler 2013b, 58-60). After outlining the methodological approach taken in Section 2, Section 3 documents a functional and successful case of good Islamic PA in Morocco. Sections 4 and 5 take on the challenges of recognition and appreciation, respectively, before Section 6 concludes.

2 Methodological Approach

This thesis is an amalgamation of four original pieces: three articles in peer-reviewed journals and one book chapter in a handbook of a prominent press. Two of the articles are empirical case studies that combined fieldwork alongside desk research (**I**, **III**), whereas the other paper (**IV**) and book chapter (**II**) are theoretically oriented and therefore required only the latter. Appendix II contains a fifth publication that utilized a set of methods quite far removed from all other works that make up the dissertation; however, it is included due to its topical relevance and pertinent insights (**V**).

In its overall methodological approach, the thesis was fundamentally inspired by two concepts. First, in the face of global Western academic hegemony, the approach of decolonizing methodologies – whose origins can be traced back to over two decades when Linda Tuhiwai Smith's watershed book was first published – calls not for a blanket dismissal or rejection of Western knowledge, but rather for approaching it on non-Western (in particular indigenous) terms, and in parallel bringing forward alternative "epistemic approaches, philosophies and methodologies" (Smith 2021, xii). Second, the strong emphasis in Islam on the pursuit and generation of knowledge not for its own sake but rather for a specific telos: so that it can be acted upon to improve the human condition (both in this world and the hereafter).

The primary research focus of the thesis is on PA, which at its core is not about policy per se but all about its implementation (Peters & Pierre 2006). To explore the paradigm of Islamic PA in particular, one must surely be familiar with the theology of Islam; however it is Islam *in practice* (even dating back to the early days of its establishment) that is of paramount importance. Accordingly, this thesis epistemologically assumes that meaning and understanding stem from the interpretation of lived reality, epitomized in the Islamic context by the centrality of the Prophetic *sunna*. This means that the overall methodology is premised on classical Hermeneutics (Gadamer 2013). The theoretical pieces (**II**, **IV**) are written from this perspective, whilst the empirical case studies (**I**, **III**) are within it.

In terms of tactics for the latter pieces, this thesis takes up a discursive approach to ethnographic field research (Zittoun 2009), that is, it tries to understand the subjective role and perspectives (i.e. discourses) of embedded actors to understand a social phenomenon. While one must acknowledge that the discursive tradition of Islam(ic PA) is far from homogenous, a semblance of coherence is possible and, given the impossibility of formulating a universally acceptable account of a living tradition, the best one can aspire to (Asad 2009).

As such, there were two primary sources of data collection, both of which required familiarity with the local language and customs, as well as the upholding of culturally sensitive research methods (Smith 2021, Archibald et al. 2019, Chilisa 2019). First, embedded participant observation in both the daily and occasional activities and rituals of communities and their institutions, informed by the well-established "go-along method" of ethnographic fieldwork (Kusenbach 2003). Second, *in situ* and remote semi-structured interviews with community/institution members, leaders, and neighbors that allowed participants to relay their perspectives around what is happening and how, as opposed to justifying why things are as they are.

This resulted in a detailed – almost "thick description" (Geertz 1973) minus the cultural essentialism (Matin-Asghari 2004) – case study of a village community and their cooperative (**III**), alongside a meso-level case study that presents shorter vignettes (i.e.

mini-cases) of how an institution of Islamic PA manifests itself across not only space, but various domains of public service delivery (**I**). The cases were selected to represent the regional diversity across Morocco as well as, pragmatically, the ability to coordinate in-person fieldwork, which itself required establishing trust through referrals and personal rapport. Although, hopefully, the case studies are both indicative and sufficiently representative, this is the one element of this thesis that might have been more expansive had it not been for the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic during which it was written, and so fieldwork was more limited than would have otherwise been the case.

3 Documenting: "Good" Islamic Public Administration

Contemporary Islamic administration is largely overlooked in mainstream academia. Important exceptions include the argument for its existence at all (Drechsler 2013a; Samier 2017), and empirical contributions from Central Asia (Urinboyev 2011; Urinboyev 2014; Klebleyev 2014), the Gulf (Samier 2014); South East Asia (Noh 2014), and South East Europe (Drechsler 2018b). However, this general disengagement has deprived most students and scholars from understanding extant and evolving systems of governance and administration that, in many instances, have been operational for centuries. As Wolfgang Drechsler emphasizes in his NWPA lectures, if any PA institution has been functional for that long, and survived the likes of colonization and/or globalization, surely it would be difficult to deny (at least certain elements of) its success and classification as good PA.

How is it then the case that so little of Islamic PA is well documented, let alone understood? Perhaps part of the challenge is that institutional Islamic PA is quite often operating at an informal or semiformal level – what Guy Peters refers to as alternative (non-state) actors and arrangements "governing in the shadows" of the state (Peters 2019). Moreover, there is an overall tendency within Islamic PA institutions towards the communal, the participatory, and the bottom-up in terms of the crafting and implementation of service delivery (Peters 2021) – for which Mahalla and Aul in Central Asia, Khanqah in Turkey and Iran, and Dargah in South and Southeast Asia are notable examples (see Knysh 2010; Urinboyev 2014; **IV**). The fact that these grassroots alternatives can operate in the shadows of the state has allowed for them to avoid not only scholarly attention, but also the impasse of choosing between wholesale integration into a formal (global-Western) state PA paradigm or dissolution. In fact, many of these institutions are able to choose a distinct third path: to be the carriers of traditional public administration within their own contexts and co-exist with the state (Drechsler 2013a).

3.1 Introducing *Zawāyā*

The existing contributions in the literature on such institutions, however important, do not include a perspective from African Islam. We sought to remedy this (**I**) by looking at centuries-old institutions in Morocco known as *zawāyā* (singular: *zāwiya*), which are physical spaces of worship – virtually indistinguishable from a mosque to the unfamiliar eye – found throughout the *maghreb* region. However, *zawāyā* can also refer to the lived community of people whose values, objectives, and practices are fundamentally rooted in the local understanding of Islam, in particular the service to others and inner refinement dimensions, i.e. Sufism (**I**). (Sufism is commonly understood to be the Islamic process of character refinement through worship and good deeds.) Z*awāyā* have been investigated, mostly coincidently, as part of a larger anthropological fascination with how religious (Islamic) institutions and beliefs evolve in a changing world (classically, Eickelman 1981).

The depiction of *zawāyā* as decrepit dome-shaped mystical sanctuaries where pilgrims occasionally visit to pay respect to a deceased saint entirely neglects the wide array of public service domains that these institutions autonomously operate in up to the present day, such as infrastructure, education, healthcare, and social services. These activities reflect the (self-understood) role of *zawāyā* in helping create a space where human dignity can be preserved and life can thrive – not from the vantage point of Washington or Paris, but from that of the local Islamic tradition.



***Figure 2**: the scene from a non-festive day in a zāwiya (photograph taken by author, Spring 2019)*

3.2 The Context of Moroccan Administration

Naturally, the initial question one may have is how *zawāyā* have been able to preserve this alternative (to global Western mainstream) arrangement? We argue that it is due to the symbiotic nature that defines the relationship of *zawāyā* vis-a-vis the Moroccan state (**I**). For context, Morocco is home to a monarchy that first established its rule in 1666; making it the oldest monarchy in the Arab world. Morocco's political system can only be accurately described as an executive constitutional monarchy, that is, despite the existence of an elected legislature, independent judiciary, and of course a constitution, the monarchy is far from ceremonial, i.e. it wields political power and authority (Naguib 2020). The legitimacy of the monarchy is characteristically Islamic: the Alawites have the dual claim of being descended from the Prophet (ﷺ) and being the sole inheritors of the Andalusian Ummayid dynasty – and thereby possess the most authentic claim to any potential Islamic Caliphate (Esposito & Kalin 2009). The particular formulation of Moroccan Islam – Maliki jurisprudence, Ashʿari creed, and Junaidi Sufism – is such that traditional Islamic institutions and their members, e.g. *zawāyā*, are loyal to the monarchy not only as a matter of principle but as a matter of faith (Švedkauskas 2017).

Yet, like any other contemporary monarchy, the Alawites are faced with The King's Dilemma, i.e. whether to consolidate power, which generates (at times forcibly) social cohesion and stability, or, expand power to include other "modern" groups, which empowers popular consent via elections, parties, and legislatures (Huntington 2006). The two common responses to this dilemma are either to transition to a purely ceremonial monarchy or, conversely, for the monarchy to continue as the sole authority. Unlike most other contemporary monarchies, however, Morocco exemplifies a third possible response to the dilemma: a coexistence of the traditional and modern.

Thus, by "ritualizing its soft power", which is rooted in Islam, the monarchy's sacred status is bolstered in the popular mind – as is its legitimacy and stability (IV). In terms of PA, this position of strength affords the monarchy the opportunity to concurrently fit in to global Western standards (and rhetoric) of PA with a Rabat-based bureaucracy, and allow an already delivering traditional administrative system to proceed uninterrupted in the periphery. Morocco therefore has a bifurcated PA system: an official system representing urban elites and reflecting global Western standards and objectives, and a traditional, indigenous system representing municipal areas throughout the country and reflecting Islamic standards and objectives. This arrangement grants *zawāyā* the autonomy to continue to govern "in the semi-shadow" of the state, meaning not as a part of the formal state bureaucracy nor as a rogue enterprise. Rather, *zawāyā* are service-delivering Islamic PA institutions that the Moroccan state relies upon as a source of sacred soft power. The new (or previously neglected) elements of Islamic PA found in the practices, values, and goals of *zawāyā* must now be addressed.

3.3 The First Take: Preliminary Findings on *Zawāyā*

Our field research (**I**) consisted of three original case studies focused on one unique service domain that each of the three *zawāyā* is renowned for: infrastructure, education, and social services. Without fully recapitulating the cases, the following list highlights some of the more salient insights and characteristics of an Islamic PA observed in all three *zawāyā*, and how each aligns with existing theoretical literature:

- Non-hereditary selection of a *zāwiya*'s primary leader (principle = merit-based leadership; Kalantari 1998)
- Immense trust and respect for *zāwiya* senior leadership based on their knowledge and practice of Islam (principle = higher the role, more rigorous standard for observation; Kalantari 1998)
- Mentorship aspect of being a student or member of a *zāwiya*, and humility-inducing discussion and advice seeking done even by *zāwiya* leadership (principle = consultative nature of decision-making, i.e. *shūra;* Samier 2017; **IV**)
- Organizational structure that facilitates unwavering execution of any requests, assignments, or spiritual practices issued by *zāwiya* bureaucrats (principle = non-transferability of responsibility; Nizam al-Mulk 1960; **IV**), while leaving room for improvisation or change to ensure that things get done (principle = imperfection within limits; Findley 1980)
- Implementation of a service (*khidma*) as both a civic obligation to one's community, i.e. *zāwiya,* and a form of divine worship (principle = concurrent social-spiritual obligation; Kalantari 1998; **IV**)

- Two-way observation between leaders and followers in an attempt at mutual understanding (principle = user-centric or co-produced service delivery; Bovaird 2007), albeit for the common purpose of cultivating Islamic character development (principle = self-betterment through faith as a collective responsibility; Samier 2017)

Altogether, the results from our novel field research on Moroccan *zawāyā* demonstrate that a traditional Islamic PA system can strengthen the larger state by providing soft power in exchange for governing in its semi-shadow (i.e. be concurrently supported and uninterrupted). This is a generally valuable PA lesson, as it displays how (very) alternative service providers can still work with, rather than against, the mainstream.

Moreover, the success of this indigenous Islamic model provides a clear answer to the question of whether good PA that is not Anglo-American can exist in the first place. Surely, such a model is worthy of recognition by mainstream scholars and practitioners as a valid, legitimate alternative despite having markedly different objectives and mechanics from global Western PA. Recognition – its challenges and its fundamental importance – of the vast Islamic intellectual and practical tradition (not only for PA) is the topic of the next section.

4 Recognizing: The Legacy of the Islamic Tradition

The socioeconomic history of the world since the industrial revolution, at least at the macro-level, can be seen through the surge and collapse of four "techno-economic paradigms"; we are now somewhere in the middle of the fifth (Perez 2002). Each paradigm is accompanied by an overall direction and cadence of technological change and innovation and, subsequently, a global transformation of industries, economies, and even societies.

Techno-economic Paradigm	Popular name for the period	Core Country or Countries	Watershed event	Year
First	The 'Industrial Revolution'	Britain	Arkwright's mill opens in Cromford	1771
Second	Age of Steam and Railways	Britain (spreading to Continent and USA	Test of the 'Rocket' steam engine for the Liverpool -Manchester railway	1829
Third	Age of Steel, Electricity and Heavy Engineering	USA and Germany forging ahead and overtaking Britain	The Carnegie Bessemer steel plant opens in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania	1875
Fourth	Age of Oil, the Automobile and Mass Production	USA (with Germany at first vying for world leadership), later spreading to Europe	First Model -T comes out of the Ford plant in Detroit, Michigan	1908
Fifth	Age of Information and Telecommunications	USA (spreading to Europe and Asia)	The Intel microprocessor is announced in Santa Clara, California	1971

***Figure 3**: Five Techno-economic Paradigms (adopted from Perez 2002)*

Crucially, all five techno-economic paradigms have thus far begun in and emanated from the West, the latter three the US specifically (Figure 3). Apart from the brutal dual-legacies of imperialism and colonialism, the status of the West as *the* global techno-economic paradigm leader has not only contributed to its primacy, but for many (consciously or not) called into question the importance or even worth of other human traditions and their (past and ongoing) scientific and intellectual accomplishments (Seline 1997) – especially the Islamic (Said 1978, Islahi 2014), since the Confucian one, e.g., has become fully competitive again in the current surge.

This perspective has manifested itself within contemporary Muslim-majority countries in various ways, including in governance and administration: modernization = Westernization is the common theme to an otherwise diverse range of public management reforms happening at a global level for decades (Drechsler 2005; Pollitt 2014; Bouckaert 2017). Before one can support, in theory or practice, Islamic PA systems and arrangements (IV), a necessary first step therefore becomes catching up to the wisdom of the (original) Western tradition from over two millennia ago by recognizing "there must be different ways that all are legitimate – as Aristotle points out in *Politics*" (Drechsler 2020, 298; *Politics* 1309a; V9).

4.1 Attempting a Non-Ethnocentric Approach

We suggest (**II**) that even more recently, in the Renaissance for instance, a prevalent Western view was that non-European peoples and their civilizational achievements were not only legitimate, but admirable – especially given the fact that the European Renaissance was not achieved as an independent European development. The paragon of this perspective is the Italian Jesuit priest Giovanni Botero (1544-1617), who in his survey of world geography and ethnology *Relazioni Universali* (1592) unabashedly declared the sophistication and merit of non-European economic and socio-political structures in particular.

My individual contributions to and within **II** were therefore twofold. First, I co-developed the general argument that acknowledging the non-Western "other" is not novel and, as such, neither is acknowledging the existence and validity of qualitative differences (i.e. contextuality) in understanding and approaching development. Second, I shaped the specific argument that recognizing the legitimacy and value of the Islamic tradition in particular is a matter of rediscovering – for Muslims and non-Muslims alike – the immense scholarly, scientific, statecraft, and economic contributions Islamic civilization put forth to the world, but especially the West, through direct "pathways of transmission" to Europe (Saliba 2007). Notably, the medieval period is now regarded by some historians of technology as more technologically inventive than the Renaissance (Gimpel 2016) – surely not unrelated to the contributions of the Islamic Golden Age.

4.2 Islamic Contributions and Their Characteristics

Perhaps the cornerstone of such contributions is the first systemization of the scientific method itself, attributed to Hasan Ibn Al-Haytham (965-1040) for his pioneering work on optics and the mechanics of human vision (Smith 1992). An earlier scholar by the name of Muhammad ibn Musa Al-Khwārizmī (780-850) is singlehandedly responsible for the invention of Algebra (named after his treatise that was used as the central text in European universities until the 16th century) and the mathematical concept of zero (Afridi 2013). Within healthcare, Rufaida Al-Aslamīa, a 7th-century female nurse and surgeon, put forth the first known code of nursing conduct and ethics (Jan 1996); Ibn Sīna's *Al-Qānūn* (Canon) of Medicine, written in 1025, only ceased to be used as the main text for teaching medicine at European universities in the 18th century (McGinnis 2010); while *bimaristan* (early Islamic healthcare institutions funded by pious endowments i.e. *awqāf*) are now recognized as the world's first hospitals (which at times actually paid patients, although never vice-versa), with the oldest being built in 805 (National Library of Medicine 1994). The oldest continually operating university and first degree-awarding educational institution in the world was founded in Morocco by a 9th-century pious aristocrat, Fatima Al-Fihrīa (Cherradi 2016); such institutions later served as the model of university development in Europe (Makdisi 1981). In the realm of economics, the polymath Abu Hāmid Al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) theorized on topics as diverse as specialization of labor, stages of production, currency debasement, and flexibility of public borrowing and expenditures for ensuring broad societal goals (Ghazanfar & Islahi 1990) – the latter of which foreshadowed John Kenneth Galbraith's concept of "public purpose" by 900 years (1973). As for governance and especially PA, the rapid expansion of Islam since its earliest days led to an overstretch with regards to governability and administrative capacity that could only partly be countered by innovative decentralization and the inclusion of local

elites, which resulted in the existence of diverse cultural and ethnic groups even within the bureaucracy (Samier 2017).

Despite the wide-ranging nature of these contributions, one can identify perhaps two defining characteristics with regards to the nature of knowledge in the Islamic tradition – both of which retain immense contemporary relevance. First, the non-discriminatory nature of acquiring and developing knowledge (Al-Khalili 2011; Rosenthal 2007). There exists an oral tradition (*hadith*) of the Prophet Moses (عليه السلام), considered authentic in Islam, that summarizes aptly:

قَالَ موسى فَأَيُّ عِبَادِكَ أَعْلَمُ قَالَ الله عَالِمٌ لا يَشْبَعُ مِنَ الْعِلْمِ يَجْمَعُ عِلْمَ النَّاسِ إِلَى عِلْمِه

Moses said (to Allah): Who are the most knowledgeable of your servants? Allah said: A scholar who remains unsatiated with (their) knowledge, and (accordingly) adds the knowledge of others to their own (Sahīh Ibn Hibbān, 6184; author's translation).

The Golden Age of Islam embodied this approach through a proactive and intentional effort to appropriate the knowledge of earlier traditions, in particular that of Ancient Greece. This is very well known, but less so that this took place, not as "a re-enactment of the glories of ancient Greece" via translation, but rather as a basis for furthering intellectual thought and scientific innovation within an Islamic worldview (Saliba 2007, 2). Which brings us to the second defining characteristic: that knowledge is not pursued for its own sake, but that it is of some larger benefit or purpose (al-Attas 2013; Ahmed 2018; **IV**). The very first revealed verses of Qur'ān begin with:

ٱقْرَأْ بِٱسْمِ رَبِّكَ ٱلَّذِى خَلَقَ

Read! In the name of your Lord who created (96:1; author's translation).

A leading contemporary Mauritanian scholar, Shaykh Alhajj Al-Mishrī, highlights that although ulema unanimously agree that the literal meaning of the verses were directed to the Prophet (ﷺ) via the Archangel Gabriel, the spirit of the verses are traditionally understood to be an imperative of pursuing knowledge (i.e. "read!") for the sake of (i.e. "in the name of") benefiting creation without violating or encroaching upon divine edicts (2016). In the Islamic context today, as ever before, such an approach effectively demands an Islamically-informed set of concurrent goalposts and guardrails for academic research, technological innovation, and economic development. Notably, there is now recognition in the West that the economy has not only a rate but a *direction* of growth (Mazzucato 2017), and therefore environmentally and socially oriented goalposts and guardrails are increasingly gaining traction at the policy level (Heins & Pautz 2021; Nersisyan & Wray 2019). In an Al-Fārābīan sense, living and doing good requires this *direction* to be informed by and embedded within a contextual system of Islamic social order premised on fulfilling divine expectations.

In summary, this section presented the case for why recognizing not only the achievements but the enduring value of the Islamic tradition of scholarship and innovation as a legitimate alternative is a critical first step in the long and perilous journey of mainstreaming good Islamic governance and PA. However, what about those who regard Islamic societies, institutions, or Islam as such as a (or the) problem? The issue here would not be recognition, which is based on achievements or performance but, arguably, appreciation, which is based on inherent value or worth (Robbins 2019). The latter is therefore the topic of the next section.

5 Appreciating: The (Contextual) Pursuit of Living and Doing Good

وَلَا تَسْتَوِي الْحَسَنَةُ وَلَا السَّيِّئَةُ ادْفَعْ بِالَّتِي هِيَ أَحْسَنُ فَإِذَا الَّذِي بَيْنَكَ وَبَيْنَهُ عَدَاوَةٌ كَأَنَّهُ وَلِيٌّ حَمِيمٌ

The good and the wicked cannot be equal. Repel (the wicked) **by that which is better*, and he with whom mutual enmity exists will become as close as a dear old friend*** (41:34; author's translation and emphasis).

Appreciating the inherent worth or value of oneself and others is perhaps one of the few recurring, ongoing, and fundamental parts of being human. The Qur'ānic verse above obviously, if it needed to be stated, rules out any approaches to the challenge of appreciation that increase enmity. More subtly, however, this verse hints at a way to overcome the challenge: a consistent and proactive effort of living and doing good. Indeed, it is difficult not to appreciate the value or worth of any model that has been able to successfully navigate the big, pressing, and interrelated societal challenges of today e.g. food and water security, economic inequality, sustainability, etc.

Such non-Western models of living and doing good often operate at the local, community level in the form of indigenous institutions, i.e. cooperatives (Gadgil et al. 1993). The theory of the commons is based on empirical insights of these institutions successfully managing common property resources, and more broadly societal well-being, in resilient ways (Ostrom 1990). Following this tradition, I explored an Islamic indigenous cooperative whereby rural villagers tend to their bees, generate a livelihood from artisanal honey, whilst enhancing the biodiversity of their picturesque landscape – and argue that the inherent value of such a case ought to be appreciated at the local, national, and global levels (**III**).

5.1 An Apiary, a Village, an Islamic Commons

Taddaret Inzerki, constructed in 1520, is said to be the oldest and largest traditional apiary (place where honey beehives are kept/honey production takes place) in the world (Afriyad 2013). Almost emblematic of the need for decolonizing research, this apiary is virtually absent from the academic literature; apart from a handful of publications in French that mention it in passing. Located in the village of Inzerki, which itself is part of Morocco's 2.5M hectare Argan biosphere reserve, one of the first essential qualities of the apiary that became immediately apparent over the course of the research is that it was founded upon and maintains an Islamic worldview – in fact through the direct involvement of a *zāwiya* (**I**) – which regards the status of bees, and consequently their craft of beekeeping, as sacred.

The cooperative, which is highly autonomous due to a municipal devolution policy by the central state, does not charge fees for laying hives nor take commissions on honey produced, but is instead run as a community-led natural resource commons – following the general principles empirically observed in similar traditional institutions elsewhere (Cox et al. 2010; Ostrom 1990). The rules of the commons are not written down, however are preserved orally and in practice, and are related to three high-level imperatives: 1) the wellbeing of the bees, 2) the rights of apiary colleagues, and/or 3) the Islamically-sound status of beekeepers. Because all three are consciously and scrupulously rooted in Islam, *Taddaret Inzerki* forms a real-world conception of an Islamic indigenous cooperative.

But what does that entail exactly? To answer, one can take the illustrative example of harvesting honey at the apiary. Work begins only when sunset draws near, since that is when the beekeepers find the bees to be most tranquil, and honey is delicately extracted from a single hive at a time up to a maximum of only 5-7 hives per day. This slow and almost meditative process is deliberate so as to minimize disturbance to the bees from the hive at hand as well as the nearby hives of others. When first approaching a hive, beekeepers use a small amount of smoke produced from burning a mix of dried cow manure and the leaves of olive trees to calm the bees and make sure the beekeeper does not startle them. Throughout, a mix of crushed onions and water is immediately sprayed on the bits of honey that inevitably fall during the process of honey extraction, so that the nearby bees do not violently swarm on the honey, which would otherwise occur and potentially agitate and attract thousands of bees. After extraction but before the traditional hive is used again, it is sterilized and purified by burning incense. The above practices are indicative of the profound respect the beekeepers of Inzerki have for both the bees and their traditional craft of beekeeping.

The apiary is not strictly a vocational association, however, but rather more akin to the concept of a *collegium* put forth in the early 17th century by German jurist and philosopher Johannes Althusius (1995), as it envelopes and manages social life itself, i.e. colleagues live and are ruled by it. Indeed, *Taddaret Inzerki* is a source of active character development and refinement, as well as a setter of social norms and customs, regularly through its senior members and occasionally, although principally, through the regional Nasiri *Shuyūkh* and their prayers and guidance during annual festivals or impromptu visits. The villagers are driven by the belief that upholding proper etiquette means one is being considerate to others and is respecting divine guidelines for human behavior – both of which are considered fundamental parts of being a good Muslim (even outside of the context of the apiary).

5.2 The Triple-Benefit

Overall, this particular arrangement results in what I call a "triple-benefit" (**III**). First, the Moroccan state's devolution policy to an indigenous bee cooperative not only legitimizes its rule but garners it support and popularity. The case of *Taddaret Inzerki* demonstrates that this is due to the by-now familiar dynamic of sacred soft power of the Monarchy as a principle of faith (**I, IV**), but also administratively, because of the mechanics of a successful devolution policy. Namely, the villagers, in their autonomous capacity, consciously turned to the state for support in a particular area that it has higher competency in, i.e. the principle of subsidiarity. Notably, this dynamic is reminiscent of our earlier findings on local populations who fruitfully navigate community-level decisions and provide input into local governance: such groups exhibit higher levels of community trust and social harmony and lower levels of temporal discounting in decision-making, i.e. less myopic (**V**).

Second, the villagers benefit first and foremost because of the ability to shape, administer, and preserve their over 500-year-old Islamic apiary as they see fit. In a very real way, the story of Inzerki shows how Islamic Economics can and does unfold at a local-level. Consequently, the villagers generate a reliable livelihood from, cultivate social harmony and identity in, and enhance the biodiversity of a place they consider (and cherish as) home. Third, the world is better because of the mere existence of such a model today. The apiary showcases how sacred beekeeping can all at once generate

high-quality honey, economically empower local populations, tread lightly (and even enhance) the environment, and compassionately sustain biodiversity.

Although only a starting point, the preliminary findings on *Taddaret Inzerki* also raise a diverse set of future research themes and questions in public administration, economics and beyond. Moreover, I would posit that for most, appreciating the Islamic apiary and its successes will not be as challenging as retaining a decolonizing spirit when doing so, i.e. respecting the self-determination of such peoples "to decide what they wish to share or not, why, and how" (Althaus 2020, 187). Dealing with this latter issue, however, is surely a better place to be – as one must already appreciate the inherent value and worth of "the other" (**IV**).

6 Concluding Remarks

This thesis attempted, through contemporary case studies from the Moroccan context (**I**, **III**) and broader theory-focused contributions (**II**, **IV**), to uncover and engage with an otherwise underrepresented and underexplored paradigm of governance, PA, and economics – the Islamic. The central argument of the thesis does not call for a blanket rejection of the Western paradigm as a whole – NWPA generally does not – nor does it offer a critique of its specific elements, but rather, by exploring the legitimacy and value of the Islamic paradigm, it emphasizes the need for *decentering* the former as the one and only approach to all things good or modern. In doing so, this thesis hopefully contributes, not in an abstract or rhetorical sense, but in real and substantive way to the importance of context in public administration, management, and policy in the sense of the late Christopher Pollitt (2013).

At the same time, one may generalize and say that still in 2022, all (or at least most) things Islamic face a level of *prima facie* skepticism or even suspicion relative to the other great non-Western traditions, such as the Confucian and especially Buddhist ones. Simply put, the intellectual study or moral practice of Islamic PA, the core focus of the thesis, remains an uphill battle. As such, the thesis took on a specific approach in response to what were identified as three key challenges.

First, the challenge of documentation means affirming the existence of good Islamic PA at all. It was therefore necessary to identify and empirically contribute real, functional examples – which was done from a context (North/West Africa) that had been previously neglected in the nascent Islamic PA literature (**I**). Second, the challenge of recognition means acknowledging the achievements and therefore legitimacy of Islamic PA (and the larger tradition). It was argued that the recognition of the Islamic tradition in particular is not the acknowledgement of accomplishments in isolation, but how those accomplishments directly and significantly contributed to the (especially original) Western tradition (**II**). Third, the challenge of appreciation means seeing the inherent worth or value in "the other", which, it was argued, is difficult not to in the case of a traditional apiary whose successes range from the administrative, socioeconomic, and environmental (**III**).

The biggest limitation of the thesis is that its contributions are truly preliminary, that is, a significant amount of further work must be done to arrive at a thorough understanding of and to decolonize Islamic PA in Morocco, let alone in the *maghreb*, Africa, or beyond. However, one must begin somewhere, and these preliminary contributions can hopefully encourage others to pursue scholarship and policy that will in time create and prepare the field of Islamic PA as a legitimate and appreciated alternative.

In turn, an important caveat for doing this is that one has to (at least attempt to) retain a sense of authenticity for Islamic PA and, therefore, to acknowledge the paramount and inseparable role of Islam as such. Otherwise, one risks losing the essence of a paradigm. The general trajectory of Islamic Finance is telling in this regard, as initially the exclusive focus was on being "Islamically-compliant", which in effect is an attempt to retrofit the conventional practices of global Western finance into Islam, but subsequently shifted to being 'Islamically-based', where the departure point is remaining authentic to Islam itself – especially its commonweal or public interest (*maqāsid*) objectives (Calder 2020; **IV**). In this spirit, an important anchor for further research is the rich classical tradition of Islamic scholarship on governance and statecraft dating as far back as the first generation of Islam, in genres ranging from social ethics (*futuwwa*) and practical philosophy (*hikma*

al-ʿamaliyya), to political jurisprudence (*siyāsa al-sharʿiyya*), public value (*maslaha*), and bureaucratically-informed and/or Sufi-inspired Mirrors for Princes (*siyasatname*, *nasihatname*).

Altogether, the cases of Non-Western PA explored in the thesis featured institutions that craft, coordinate, and deliver public services for and with their constituents for a better life based on their localized Islamic tradition. The success of these institutions is akin to a gentle nudge: to reflect deeply on an alleged global Western monopoly on "best-practice" governance and administration. Perhaps even more importantly, these institutions show and showcase working Islamic models of cooperation and "virtuous rulership" that could in the best case serve as models to learn from, but at the very least contribute positively (even in the West) to the timeless pursuit of living and doing good. One might even say that carrying forth the wisdom and insight on human flourishing from not only the likes of Al-Farābī and the Nizam al-Mulk, but also the likes of Botero and Althusius, is the truly Islamic thing to do.

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Acknowledgements

الحمد لله

First and foremost, I want to express my utmost gratitude to and for my mother Naima, who for as long as I can remember was tireless in her encouragement of my aspirations even when it often meant her own self-sacrifice, as well as my father Ahmed, who did not always understand or agree with my journey or parts thereof, but always supported and was proud of me anyway. This thesis is dedicated to them.

Special thanks to my wife Shorok for her compassion, loyalty, and patience throughout my pandemic-era doctoral studies – especially considering her microbiology background didn't quite prepare her for the macro-nuisance of having a social scientist, or just me, as a husband. I am also very grateful to my sisters Manal and Madiha and my daughter Saleka for their love and support, to Tony Cordero for relentlessly pushing and inspiring me since our West Philly days (CDA), and to my dear teachers in Morocco, Mauritania, and Oman – especially Shaykh Saleck, Shaykhna Ma al-Aynayn, and Shaykha Dr. Muna al-Muqaibal – whose *nur* is felt in their presence and absence.

As for my academic family, I would firstly like to extend my heartfelt appreciation to my supervisor Professor Wolfgang Drechsler, who took me on formally as a PhD student, but in reality gave me the wonderful (and increasingly uncommon) opportunity to be an apprentice meticulously learning from a true master craftsman of academe. The apprenticeship featured high expectations but also high amounts of nurturing, stern challenges balanced out by gentle guidance, and rich discussions accompanied by tacit understanding – all of which I benefited and grew immensely from in the craft and beyond. Thank you for somehow recognizing and always trusting in my potential.

I am also greatly indebted to both Professors Erkki Karo and Ringa Raudla who, since my arrival to Tallinn as an MA student, were consistently generous and graciously flexible in their support of my circuitous academic journey. I would be remiss in not also thanking Professor Erik S. Reinert, whose exceptional work is the reason I came to Estonia in the first place, and after getting to know him as his TA and co-author, I can confirm that he himself is an exception to the alleged wisdom of "never meet your heroes".

Our department, the P2P lab folks, the NWPA research group, and Shobhit Shakya in particular all helped create a stimulating and thoroughly enjoyable work environment that was a privilege to be a part of. In fact, RND is the place where – for the first time in my professional life – I felt not only welcome, but genuinely appreciated for a core aspect of who I am, i.e. a(n aspiring to be) devout Muslim scholar. I was able to find my stride in Tallinn because of you all, and for that I will always be grateful.

Abstract
Non-Western Public Administration in Context: Contemporary Islamic Cases from Morocco

This thesis is an attempt to chime in, from an Islamic perspective, on the age-old question and challenge of structured human living together: living and doing good. To do so, the thesis aims to empirically ground and theoretically contribute to the framework of Non-Western Public Administration, based on various Moroccan case studies. Although a largely underexplored area of public administration (PA), and more broadly governance, these contributions are likely timely and generally valuable, considering the increasing importance of decolonization in both academia and policy.

The core argument of the thesis is that Islamic PA is modern, legitimate, and valuable and thereby calls for decentering, not dismantling, the global-Western paradigm. However, one must recognize the current uphill battle that is the Islamic paradigm; certainly relative to the other great non-Western ones, i.e. Buddhist and Confucian. The thesis therefore identifies and addresses three distinct challenges to the Islamic paradigm, and as such, the research is focused on uncovering and analyzing the functionality, workability, and even existence of Islamic models of administration, governance, and economics – so as to simultaneously 1) showcase contemporary non-Western examples of, and 2) question the global-Western monopoly over, human flourishing.

The case studies (**I**; **III**; and partially **IV**) focus on the service delivery, organization, objectives, and values of Moroccan institutions that were previously neglected in the PA literature and therefore required both desk research and *in situ* ethnographic fieldwork guided by culturally appropriate methods, whereas the theory contribution (**II**) required only the former. Methodologically, the thesis is based on classical hermeneutics so as to focus on Islamic PA in practice, and influenced by decolonizing methodologies and the Islamic injunction for beneficial knowledge so as to bring forward non-Western insights and lessons that are both positive and helpful to the human condition.

The thesis concludes with a broader reflection on how Islamic PA can move forward, in both research and practice, and why the field would hopefully be better for it.

Lühikokkuvõte

Avalik haldus väljaspool läänemaailma: nüüdisaegsed islami juhtumiuuringud Marokost

Käesoleva doktoritöö eesmärk on kaasa rääkida inimeste struktureeritud kooselamise igivana küsimuse ja väljakutse – kuidas elada ja teha head – teemal, lähtudes islami vaatenurgast. Selleks püüab autor empiiriliselt põhjendada ja teoreetiliselt panustada läänevälise avaliku halduse raamistikku, tuginedes erinevatele Maroko juhtumiuuringutele. Kuigi tegemist on avaliku halduse ja laiemalt valitsemise valdkonnas väheuuritud teemaga, on käesoleva töö panus tõenäoliselt õigeaegne ja üldist väärtust omav, arvestades dekoloniseerimise kasvavat tähtsust nii akadeemilistes ringkondades kui ka poliitikas.

Doktoritöö põhiargumendiks on, et islami avalik haldus on tänapäevane, legitiimne ja väärtuslik ning seega oleks vajalik globaalse/lääne paradigma detsentreerimine (mitte lammutamine). Siiski tuleb arvesse võtta praegusi islami paradigmaga seotud suuri väljakutseid; iseäranis seoses teiste suurte lääneväliste paradigmadega, nt budism ja konfutsianism. Doktoritöös tuuakse välja kolm erinevat islami paradigmaga seotud väljakutset ning käsitletakse neid, keskendudes islami haldus-, valitsemis- ja majandusmudelite funktsionaalsuse, toimivuse ja isegi olemasolu tuvastamisele ja analüüsimisele, et samaaegselt 1) esitleda nüüdisaegseid näiteid rahva õitsengust väljaspool läänеriike ja 2) seada kahtluse alla globalistlik-läänelik monopol inimeste heaolu määratlemisel.

Juhtumiuuringud (I, III ja osaliselt IV) keskenduvad teenuste osutamisele, korraldusele, eesmärkidele ja väärtustele Maroko institutsioonides. Sellele teemale ei ole varasemas avaliku halduse alases kirjanduses kuigivõrd tähelepanu pööratud, mistõttu olid vajalikud nii olemasoleva materjali läbitöötamine kui ka *in situ* etnograafilised väliuuringud, milles lähtuti kultuuriliselt sobivatest meetoditest, samas kui teoreetilise panuse (II) puhul oli vajalik vaid esimesena nimetatu. Metodoloogiliselt tugineb doktoritöö klassikalistele hermeneutilistele põhimõtetele, et keskenduda islami avalikule haldusele praktikas, ning on mõjutatud dekoloniseerimise metoodikast ja kasulike teadmiste tähtsusest islami kontekstis, et esitleda lääneväliseid arusaamu ja kogemusi, mis on inimeseks olemise seisukohast positiivsed ja kasulikud.

Doktoritöö lõpetab laiem mõtisklus selle üle, kuidas islami avalik haldus saaks edasi areneda, seda nii seoses teadustööga kui ka praktikas, ning kuidas see valdkonda loodetavasti paremaks muudab.

Publications

Publication I
Chafik, S., & Drechsler, W. (2022). In the Semi-Shadow of the Global West: Moroccan *zawāyā* as Good Public Administration. *Public Administration Review*, 82 (4), 747–755. **ETIS 1.1**.

PAR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

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In the Semi-Shadow of the Global West: Moroccan *zawāyā* as Good Public Administration

Research Article

Abstract: *The 2020 international protests addressing structural racism and colonial legacies have also questioned Western ascendancy on defining (good) governance. Non-Western traditional forms of governance surviving today, despite not receiving much academic attention, pose an obvious alternative. This study analyses key indigenous institutions in Morocco known as zawāyā, and in doing so, fills some of the lacunae on Islamic-African public administration. Drawing from novel data collected via ethnographic fieldwork across three domains of public service provision, the authors, apparently for the first time in such a context, present a public administration that is functional in its operation, delivering on its goals, and on both counts markedly different from the global-Western mainstream. Our results uncover a public administration that (1) coexists with a larger state, (2) delivers coproduced services, and (3) merits recognition.*

Evidence for Practice

- Decenters public administration models taken for granted by showing them to be global-Western, rather than universal, allowing for greater contextuality in analysis and reform.
- For development administration, justifies looking for and, if needed, improving indigenous models and truly listening to stakeholders.
- Displays how (very) alternative service providers can still work with, rather than against, the mainstream framework.

In a world where Anglo-American public administration (PA) reigns supreme (Pollitt 2015), the history of "traditional" public administration in the corresponding mainstream literature only dates back to the late 1800s United States (Bryson, Crosby, and Bloomberg 2014). We argue for a different view of PA history, in this case beginning with Peters' notion of "governing in the shadows," which posits that governance and PA are carried out not only by the state, but also through alternatives such as the market, experts, and more generally social actors and institutions (Peters 2019). The fact that these alternatives can operate in the shadows of a (global-Western) state has allowed for them to be carriers of traditional public administration within their own contexts (Drechsler 2013; for Africa generally, Lund 2006).

However, these instances of non-Western PA have been largely overlooked in Western academic literature, although hopefully not for much longer. The protests of 2020 began in resistance against police brutality in the United States and then broadened to the global North, first via the United Kingdom, to oppose racial, ethnic, and even colonial disenfranchisement and marginalization—meaning, they started in Anglo-America (Dalton 2020). The likely result for PA (and many other fields) is a decentering of the Western approach and, in tandem, a consideration of previously neglected alternatives (Althaus 2020). This is especially significant in our field, given that PA is a central form of power and coercion in modern times (Weber 1922).

In particular, the Western neglect of, and ignorance about, Islamic governance institutions and their extant and evolving systems that have been operational for at least 800 years is problematic in many ways. At the level of public discourse, including some of the Muslim world, any non-state organization involved with governance that can be classified as Islamic would likely and, to state the obvious, falsely draw links to contemporary terrorist organizations. But administration emphasizes normalcy, and extremists generally, as well as in this specific case, abhor bureaucracy (Kadri 2011). The eminent legacy of maximally neutral, professional, realist, and highly sophisticated people-centric PA in Islamic countries, while a standard view for historians by now, is not a mainstay of contemporary mainstream PA knowledge

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Public Administration Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 4, pp. 747–755. © 2022 by The American Society for Public Administration.
DOI: 10.1111/puar.13475.

(Drechsler 2018). This disengagement has deprived scholars, and not least students, from understanding instances of already functioning and robust PA in practice, which differ in many regards from Western standards. Those who wish to cover their own legacy risk serious alienation, especially from compatriots, perpetuating as it does the image of Northern-White supremacy and its (allegedly) objectively beneficial PA legacy.

But a fundamental question remains: can traditional Islamic PA institutions actually contribute any generally valid lessons or knowledge that can inform the larger field of PA today? Or are these institutions marginal cases that are far too specialized and therefore should be confined to religious and anthropological studies? After all, while it is obvious that non-global-Western, let alone Anglo-American, institutions led their regions and the world across the millennia, the challenge seems to be to find well-working systems or examples of Islamic PA today that corroborate contemporary relevance. This is not difficult as regards the second great non-Western tradition, Confucian PA, which is not only the original model for the functioning modern state, but also so successful today that to dismiss it off-hand would look merely bizarre—although how Confucian some Asian countries are is a matter of ongoing debate (Bice et al. 2018). For Islamic PA, however, the question must currently be addressed.

This article explores a working model of alternative service provision in Morocco and, in turn, contributes to the nascent scholarly work on Islamic PA from an African perspective. It is, therefore, not the argument that Moroccan PA is non-Western, but that within Moroccan PA, non-Western elements and indeed a non-Western structure exist. What is alternative is twofold: (1) the lack of strict regulation by the Moroccan state (i.e. governing in the shadows), which allows for (2) the unusual absence of international (i.e. Western) governance standards as a departure point, but rather, service provision that is designed and administered with respect to locally informed beliefs and practices. Due to its geostrategic location, political stability, and status as a spiritual leader in African Islam (Muedini 2015), Morocco is both important for and potentially indicative of Islamic PA.

The institutions in Morocco responsible for this kind of alternative service provision are known as *zawāyā* (singular: *zāwiya*), which are local organizations that were historically organized around professions (i.e. guilds), and which provided lodging all along the pilgrimage route from West Africa to Mecca (Eickelman 1981). The spiritual dynamics of *zawāyā* culminate in what are known as Sufi paths. Sufism is commonly understood to be the spiritual, non-legalistic current of Islam that outwardly manifests through routine supererogatory devotion and more generically, everyday social affairs and interactions (Lings 1975). Put simply, Sufism can be defined as the Islamic process of character refinement—and it is also a defining feature of both the informal practice and the state-sponsored version of Islam in Morocco (Muedini 2015).

However, there has been, and continues to be, another dimension to *zawāyā* apart from the strictly spiritual: the arrangement of (a) education systems, (b) public works (e.g. roads, schools, bakeries, mosques), and (c) social services (care of socially marginalized). These services were historically organized and implemented to varying degrees by local non-state institutions. In fact, all three were rarely seen as the responsibility of the government before the appearance of the modern welfare state, which subsequently reversed this perception on a global scale (Derlien and Guy Peters 2009). This reversal of perception may partially be due to the much wider range of services that fall under the responsibility of governments today as opposed to 100 years ago (Raadschelders 2003). But does this dimension of *zawāyā* constitute a body of PA knowledge and practice that is valuable to scholars and practitioners more broadly?

To answer, this article proceeds accordingly: We begin by exploring the theoretical foundations of Islamic PA, the origin and diverse institutional history of *zawāyā*, and the contemporary configuration of the Moroccan state—all necessary to situate the research question, especially as even basic knowledge of the context cannot be assumed. After discussing our methods, we then present the case studies themselves. The final section highlights three key contributions to the literature. First, how a system of traditional PA external to the state can exist alongside it, and deliver results that even strengthen it. Second, how the "citizen-centric" component of service delivery can materialize by understanding the context of citizens, rather than an expectation that they will, or should, eventually arrive at a global-Western understanding. Third, based on the preceding points, that institutions of traditional, Non-Western PA deserve recognition as valid alternatives—in the interest of both those who receive and those who give it (Drechsler 2013).

Background

Non-Western Public Administration

The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a new unipolar era in world history, namely, one in which the Western (i.e. Anglo-American) economic and political paradigm stood unchallenged at the global level (Pollitt 2015). From the PA perspective, this resulted in an implicit and formulaic understanding (Drechsler 2013):

Western = global = good = modern.

One of the most problematic consequences of this approach is that in assuming ubiquitous and perpetual Western superiority, one is required to jettison any social values, cultural traditions, and institutions that are non-Western (Drechsler 2019). In addition, highly competitive non-Western models and the decline of Western PA's prima facie supremacy during the last quarter century have arguably made this approach factually somewhat quaint (Drechsler 2019). Eliminating existing institutions and lived traditions is particularly difficult in the case of majority Muslim countries, which generally—religiosity of people and theological differences aside—regard Islam as unambiguously important (Feldman 2012).

Instead of the standard, wholesale transfer of Western models of governance to the rest of the world that still characterizes mainstream PA approaches, Non-Western PA (NWPA) calls for recognizing aspects of governance that are universally applicable (and indeed there exists much overlap between paradigms), and others that are not (Drechsler 2013). In the case of the latter, non-universal, context-specific solutions, NWPA insists on working with what is already present and functioning and "good" in a particular paradigm. But what is "good" PA exactly? If we assume that PA can

be reduced to mechanics (implementation) and ethics (goals), then good PA could, for our purposes, be defined as having efficient mechanics without sacrificing ethics (Drechsler 2013, with further references). More generally, this reflects the idea that there must be multiple ways of understanding "good" and "modern" that are not Western (Matin-Asgari 2004).

To understand what is already present and good in Morocco, we now turn to the overall history of *zawāyā* and their status as organizations of Islamic PA in academic literature.

History of Zawāyā

Proto-*zawāyā* first appeared in Morocco in the late 12th century CE, and were known as "houses of generosity," which were essentially places of religious education, worship, and accommodation. Carrying over the same institutional qualities, the earliest known place in Morocco bearing the name of *zāwiya* was constructed by Shaykh Abi Mohamed Salih (d. 1,234) in Asfi (Al-Harraq 2015).

Rapid propagation of *zawāyā* began throughout Morocco in the mid-15th century under the Maranid monarchy. By this time, another common trait of *zawāyā* was their autonomous financial creation and operation through an endowment (*waqf*), whose overall purpose, be it charity, education, or religious observation, should not be altered *ex post* (Barnes 1987) and which can be state or privately held. The *waqf* has recently been re-embraced, if not uncontested, as an alternative form of endowing, administering, and securing public services in light of administrative fashions geared toward cutting them down or even eliminating them (see only Deligöz 2014). As for the Maranids, they devised a novel administrative solution to allow these decentralized institutions to continue to exist: monarchs begin visiting even the most remote areas with troops and bureaucrats to personally receive an oath of allegiance (*bayʿa*) from tribe and *zawāyā* leadership to the sultan—the temporal and spiritual leader (Eickelman 1981). Along with tax collection, *bayʿa* therefore cemented the power of and loyalty to the central Moroccan state, while in tandem setting the stage to afford a degree of political autonomy to *zawāyā* for centuries to come (Miller 2013).

At the turn of the 17th century, although continuing to organize their core activities in Islamic education, worship, and hospitality, *zawāyā* debuted into the realm of full-fledged statesmanship. Most saliently, the Dila *Zāwiya* successfully launched military campaigns to establish themselves as the unchallenged rulers of Northern Morocco, and in 1637 a new Shaykh was appointed not only the leader of the Dila *Zāwiya*, but as the Sultan of Morocco (Al-Nasiri 2001).

By 1666, the Alawites defeated the Dila and, in so doing, united Morocco under one dynasty that continues to the present day. A strong, consolidated central Moroccan government meant the removal of any serious threats to the throne, in turn allowing loyal (i.e. *bayʿa* pledging) *zawāyā* to not only continue to exist but also be empowered to manage the affairs of their local constituents (Eickelman and Salvatore 2002).

Through the centuries, the Alawite dynasty openly supported *zawāyā* in their traditional core activities, and in parallel utilized them as local agents of administration. The 1870s overhaul of the Moroccan state bureaucracy was largely made possible by the recruitment of public servants from *zawāyā*, whose members brought forth qualities such as a strong command of Arabic, adherence to codes of conduct, dress, worship, and an overall sense of self-confidence (Miller 2013). The self-confidence of *zāwiya* educated bureaucrats in the face of encroaching Western culture and values certainly reflected a sense of obligation toward the preservation of tradition, which was (and still remains) one of the fundamental institutional goals of *zawāyā* (Al-Nasiri 2001).

This history highlights the versatile nature of *zawāyā* as historical institutions, ranging from guilds, lodges, repositories of theological knowledge and mystical practices, and even preparatory academies for state bureaucracies. However, studies on contemporary *zawāyā* have focused on their spiritual aspects (Diaz 2014; Eickelman 1981) and largely ignored the public service provision perspective of how *zawāyā* function as institutions of PA.

Moroccan Monarchy, Bifurcated PA, and Zawāyā *Today*

Today, two distinct but parallel systems of PA exist in Morocco. The first is a "modern" system—whose origin traces back to colonial French PA, however due to waves of sweeping reforms since the early 2000s, and in the case of France itself since the 1990s (Bezes 2008), is very much integrated into the Anglo-American mainstream (Zemrani 2014). Take for instance the multi-stage PA reform program in partnership with the World Bank, where Morocco received a loan in exchange for the successful implementation of NPM-inspired reforms e.g. introduction of performance measurements, a shift of focus from effectiveness to efficiency, etc. (World Bank 2010). Or the 2019 OECD-EU-led conference in Rabat, which assessed how the Moroccan state performed according to a set of principles designed for European Neighboring Policy countries to bring about good, democratic, governance that is based on "international standards" (SIGMA 2015). Finally, despite an ongoing process of Arabization since independence in 1956, there is the example of l'Ecole Nationale Superieure de l'Administration, the official body responsible for educating and training Moroccan civil servants, which offers bachelors, masters, and short-term continuing education opportunities (ENSA 2020) in French—the de facto second language that only 35% of the population are proficient in (OIF 2018). Unsurprisingly, the modern Moroccan PA system has proved unable to build partnerships with local community-based organizations (Bergh 2010).

The other system is that of traditional PA, which is based on traditional authority, namely elites and loyal subjects to the King (e.g. *zawāyā*) that operate under a set of largely informal rules (Naguib 2020). This bifurcated nature of Moroccan PA can be regarded as a consequence of The King's Dilemma, which according to Huntington is a problem faced by monarchies involving the relationship between the centralization of power (which brings social cohesion and stability), and the expansion of power to include other "modern" groups (which empowers popular consent via elections, parties, and legislatures) (Huntington 2006), at least in non-small countries (Corbett, Veenendaal, and Ugyel 2017), such as Morocco. Of the three classic responses to the dilemma—full transition to a ceremonial monarchy, continuation of the monarchy

as the sole authority, or coexistence of the traditional and modern—Morocco is a paragon of the latter.

Indeed, Morocco is home to a constitutional, albeit executive, monarchy that has been in power since 1666, making it the oldest in the Arab world. The nature of the Alawite monarchy's legitimacy is inherently Islamic: due to this unbroken dynastic chain of sharifan (i.e. descendancy from the Prophet) genealogy, all kings of Morocco carry the title "Commander of the Believers" (Joffe 1988). The Alawites therefore hold a legitimate claim to the Prophet's temporal and spiritual authority, which is reinforced by shared core beliefs, by sovereignty codified in the constitution—and by traditional institutions such as *zawāyā* (Naguib 2020). Up to the present day, Moroccan sharifan rule employs soft-power-building strategies directly (e.g. patronage of the countryside and the poor via *zawāyā*) or symbolically (e.g. pledges of *bayʿa* to the King). This ritualization of soft power ultimately bolsters the sacred status of the Monarchy in the popular mind and allows it to yield tremendous "religious and charismatic capital" (Daadaoui 2011, 141).

The current King, Mohammed VI, fully embraces Sufi Islam, and its institutional representation in *zawāyā*, as a moderate and authentic understanding of Islam that facilitates social and political stability, and directly challenges Islamist extremism (Muedini 2015). This dynamic enables *zawāyā* to provide successful public service provision, and do so with fervent support and approval from their constituents, without being perceived as a threat by the central state—as oftentimes non-state peripheral success is perceived to be, especially regionally (Bekkaoui and Larémont 2011).

In this way, the Alawites have carried forward the historical legacy of "relaxed centralization," i.e., a firmly established central government that can subsequently be comfortable enough to allow traditional institutions in the Moroccan periphery room to play and persevere. In contrast to the *Ersatzvornahme* model, which is the resurgence of alternative service provision in light of a larger state failure, which Urinboyev has impressively demonstrated regarding *mahalla* (traditional Islamic local governance in parallel to the "official" one) in Uzbekistan (Urinboyev 2014), the Moroccan monarchy has purposefully allowed the *continuation* of centuries-old public service provision autonomously led by overtly loyal ex-state institutions.

The Moroccan variant of the coexistence solution to The King's Dilemma can therefore be summarized as (1) a modern system that represents urban elites and reflects global-Western standards or at least objectives, alongside (2) a traditional, indigenous Islamic PA system embodied by *zawāyā* that operates throughout municipal areas in the semi-shadow of the Moroccan state (to adapt Peters' concept). Put differently, the latter system is simultaneously supported and left to be, but relied upon as a source of sacred soft power. The next section outlines the methodological strategy of our fieldwork aimed at capturing how *zawāyā* autonomously craft and implement alternative service delivery for and with their constituents.

Research Design

We studied traditional *zawāyā* in Morocco through a multi-site case design, researching their historical and contemporary status as institutions generally, and in particular the dynamics that pertain to their provision of services for constituents—which to our knowledge is the first such study of its kind. Three *zawāyā* were chosen based on geography and language to represent the regional diversity across Morocco, as well as the ability to coordinate in-person data-collection trips. Although each *zāwiya* provides multiple services, we selected one unique service domain that each of the three *zawāyā* is renowned for. Our approach to public administration field research was discursive (Zittoun 2009), in that we focused on the subjective role and perspective of embedded actors to understand a social phenomenon.

As a result, our research design accommodated two different sources of evidence. First, we collected data through systematic participant observation of *zawāyā* rituals and activities during and outside of their annual festivals. Our approach was informed by the well-established "go-along method" of ethnographic research (Kusenbach 2003), which allows fieldworkers to "actively explore their subjects' stream of experiences and practices as they move through, and interact with, their physical and social environment" (Kusenbach 2016, 154), and aided by one of the authors' intimate knowledge of the local language and decorum. This allowed us to capture and reflect upon idiosyncratic communication such as body language, deferential silence or gestures, and other social cues. Second, we conducted in-person interviews with *zāwiya* leadership and veteran members that we semi-structured around the service provision activities of that particular *zāwiya*. Allowing narratives to emerge around the "what" and "how" instead of the "why" (Zittoun 2021) meant interviewees were not justifying, but rather feeling at ease to relay their perspectives as *zāwiya* bureaucrats.

In total, we conducted 12 focused interviews, each lasting at least 1 hour, over the course of a year. They were held in a mix of Classical Arabic and Moroccan dialect, and all quotations of interviewees are the authors' own translation. Setting up the interviews required establishing trust through referrals and personal rapport, part of which was seeking and receiving informed consent for participation and sharing generic details such as approximate age, gender, and relation to the *zāwiya*. Drawing from established guidelines of ethnographic fieldwork (Sangasubana 2011), we identified and specifically sought to interview *zāwiya* leadership and senior members as they are the individuals responsible for planning, organizing, and often even implementing service provision activities. Therefore, their thoughts and perspectives were paramount in the gathering of the data—they are, and were treated as, the experts. The limitations that such an approach and focus may have are, in our view, clearly outweighed by the advantages of gathering new (or forgotten or neglected), and newly-frameable, insights and even approaches to PA knowledge within the global discourse, especially at the current, more exploratory stage.

Results

In this section, we present our empirical field research on *zawāyā* across three areas of public administration that are today, as previously mentioned, considered to fall under the purview and responsibility of the state. We begin with the foundational aspects of *zawāyā* that are shared across our three cases. In terms of infrastructure, all *zawāyā* have what can be described as a headquarters, which is the actual (adobe) brick and mortar space erected in the hometown of the *zāwiya*'s founding Shaykh, which

can be a male or female. *Zawāyā* with a larger number of followers have branch locations operating in every major urban center in Morocco, while those with provincial followings suffice with one main location (i.e. headquarters) (W2, S2).

Administratively, *zawāyā* inherited their historical system of management: a leader in the form of a charismatic Shaykh and numerous prominent members (*mqadam*) who together form the *zāwiya*'s administrative body. A *mqadam* can either be chosen by a Shaykh, or by a council of *mqadam* who operate with the Shaykh's blessing. Although the unequivocal final decision-maker, a Shaykh will consult on decisions with one or many *mqadam*, following the normative Islamic injunction to do so (W4). All *zawāyā* are required to ceremoniously pledge their *bayʿa* to the King and in return are recognized and given the right to exist, as well as the right to receive monetary gifts given by the monarchy. This gift is one of three sources of income, the other two being member contributions and land/business owned partially or fully by a *zāwiya* (D1, W3, W4, S1).

Infrastructure—Darqawi* Zāwiya, *High Atlas

Since its inception in the late 18th century, the Darqawi *Zāwiya* has been and still remains one of the largest and most prominent in Morocco. This is in large part due to the *zāwiya*'s unambiguous praise of asceticism and focus on reliably delivering the essentials of (a modest) life and the subsequent traction this has with working-class Moroccans (Al-Nasiri 2001).

Public service provision in the form of infrastructure began early in the Darqawi *Zāwiya*'s history, with the construction of a well and basin in the main *zāwiya* for public use. Still functional today, the construction of the well was overseen by the founder's son, but carried out with the help of senior and everyday members of the *zāwiya* (D3). As his great grandson explained, this communal approach to public works is a common feature of all *zawāyā*, as it is an opportunity to take part in a *khidma*, i.e., a menial service or task for the public good (D2). Apart from inducing humility and promoting social cohesion, participants in *khidma* are undergoing a spiritual exercise in that they perceive it as an opportunity to tip the scales of divine accounting toward the good (D1).

Within the Darqawi network of *zawāyā*, the authors conducted research on a branch that was established in the late 19th century as one of the earliest structures in the then village of Beni Mellal (D1). Today, the Darqawi *Zāwiya* sits at the epicenter of the city of Beni Mellal, at the head of the main street adjacent to a public bathhouse (hammam) and bakery. This triumvirate of *zāwiya*/hammam/bakery is characteristic of *zāwiya* public works. The basic idea is that the heat of the ovens used for bread making in the bakery is harnessed to heat the water of hammam, as well as the water in the ritual washing area of the *zāwiya*. All three spaces are considered essential parts of any civilized place (i.e. of the daily public lives of locals), and therefore seen by the *zāwiya* as an important responsibility (D2).

The local building tradition throughout Morocco is one that involves adobe brick, stone, and rammed earth construction, although the Darqawi *Zāwiya* in Beni Mellal is now a hybrid of the traditional construction method along with cement bricks and metal (D3). The local tradition of construction requires annual renovation, usually nothing foundational, just a re-plastering of the external walls or roof repair. As a female member of the Darqawi *Zāwiya* for over 50 years explained, these renovations were historically communal in nature, bringing together locals in another instance of *khidma* (D1).

A Shaykh explained that the nature of this type of construction is also symbolic of the *zāwiya*'s relationship with human beings. That is, it is the role of the *zāwiya* to build up people with a solid foundation of knowledge and character that will only require regular communal renovation or polishing (D2). Altering the construction process in a way that suspends renovation, explained a *mqadam*, results from the assumption that one can in a single instance build something that will remain solid forever (D3). He was referring to both the rapid and expansive influx of cement and metal architecture that had become the default even for *zawāyā*, as well as the prevalence of the view that one can construct an enduring spiritual and ethical foundation by and for themselves. Both of these perspectives are foreign and mutually exclusive to that of the *zāwiya*.

Education—Sidi Waggag* Zāwiya, *Anti-Atlas Foothills

In much of the rural Maghreb and West Africa, *zawāyā* have historically served and still remain the nooks (last bastions) and pillars (backbone) of literacy and Islamic knowledge transmission (El Hamel 1999). All *zawāyā* more or less share a common pedagogy, rooted in a set of sequential texts in the form of prose and poetry known as the Timbuktu Syllabus (W2). After memorizing the Qur'an, a student continues their intellectual formation with the first part of the classical trivium (i.e. grammar/morphology). This is followed by theology, jurisprudence, and a completion of the trivium (i.e. logic and rhetoric) (El Hamel 1999).

Although al-Qarawiyyin in Fes is the oldest continually operating university in the world, the Sidi Waggag *Zāwiya* in the Sous region of Morocco has its own distinction: it is the oldest continually operating madrasa in the country (W1). The *zāwiya* still provides approximately 100 students with a traditional Islamic education that lasts around 12 years (W2). The *zāwiya* is the only madrasa in Morocco whose students are given a tertiary level degree (undergraduate equivalent) upon graduation (W2).

The doors of the *zāwiya* are open to students, regardless of age, to study and receive free room and board. Historically, *zawāyā* throughout Morocco provided a place to live, food, and a monthly stipend to support their students, all of which was regarded as a sense of pride for the local population. Today, Sidi Waggag is one of the last educational *zawāyā* still in operation, with others having declined due to the formal, French-based education system (W4).

The success of *zawāyā*'s traditional education system is in no small part due to the dynamic role of women: as students, teachers (as the first providers of early education to children), and savants/Shaykh, such as Khadijatu bint al-'Aqil, who was famous for her commentary on the most widely studied treatise on logic in the Muslim world (El Hamel 1999). The largest contemporary *zāwiya* festival in Morocco in terms of attendees, Ta′lat, is named after the woman who founded a small *zāwiya* focused on education (W2).

In terms of pedagogy, core instruction is done by a handful of teachers and a Shaykh who offer brief but daily 1:1 time with

students—much more along the lines of mentorship (W3). Students use their time with teachers to summarize and present their understanding and ask any questions they may have. The rest of the day is for student review, reading, teaching, and memorization—all of which are done both individually and with fellow students across cohorts (W4).

Much of the learning in the *zāwiya* is tacit in nature, through the observation of teachers and especially the Shaykh, and focused on how students should carry themselves in the world—one senior student summarized the experience as: "learning more from what they do than what they say" (W5). This character development is also taught through infrequent 1:1 consultation of students, which is unlike daily lessons, as well as ritual practice made up of a daily group litany (above and beyond the required minimum for all Muslims).

> *The practice of dhikr (litany recitation) grants a sincere person respite and resoluteness in the face of worldly agitations and challenges. It also grants them an intimacy with the Divine – the ultimate goal of an education* (W1).

This practice links back to the traditional architecture notion encountered in Beni Mellal with regards to consistently refining a structure (or one's character) in a group manner and also highlights the importance of communal engagement. One *mqadam* boiled down the *zāwiya* educational emphasis to be "your relations and how you treat others" and the desired outcome to be individuals who "are a mercy upon others" (W3). Seemingly, *zawāyā* are not in the enterprise of producing recluse scholars.

Social Services—Shaquri Zāwiya*, Rif Foothills*

The Shaquri *Zāwiya* is an offshoot of the Darqawi *Zāwiya* and, similarly, focuses on minimalism, providing basic essentials for its constituents and neighbors, and continually welcoming guests by day. Today, the disadvantaged of Chefchaouen surrounding the Shaquri *Zāwiya* are able to expect regular support in the form of food or money (S1). Charity in the form of money is mostly stipends that are earmarked for the needy and widows. As for food, once a week, the *zāwiya* offers a free meal and additional takeaway snacks for anyone who attends—in older times it used to be three times a week (S4). There is a large kitchen on the roof of the *zāwiya* where both men and women were observed preparing food, and ultimately serving it in gender-segregated areas.

Before the meal is served, members recite the Quran as well as traditional poems in characteristically Islamic Andalusian melodic scales (S1). One middle-aged female member of the *zāwiya*, who since her childhood was trained in this tradition of recitation, explained:

> *These poems are a joint expression of gratitude to God and a joint expression of love for the Prophet as much as they are a protection against gossiping and other unscrupulous social behavior when we gather together at the zāwiya. This is why it is so important to preserve them* (S3).

At the time of writing, the Shaquri *Zāwiya* is led by a Shaykh who is a direct descendant of the original founder. He is a visibly charismatic leader who operates with immense trust and admiration of his followers: they attempt to observe him and emulate his character (S2). The observation is not one-way, however, as the Shaykh sees it as his responsibility to observe and know the state and challenges of individuals so that he can provide appropriate guidance:

> *Just as a father or mother cannot always advise, teach, or guide all of their children in a uniform way, the Shaykh gives every person precisely what they can understand, act upon, and succeed – with proper intention and perseverance* (S4).

A notable example of this dynamic is the efficacy and reach of the Shaquri *Zāwiya*'s professional networking capacity. If a member is currently a job seeker, the Shaykh will take the time to learn about his or her qualifications, and either recommend they get more experience, education, or training, or personally contact someone in the public or private sector to hire them. Out of deference to the Shaykh, the people who are contacted to find a position for a Shaquri member do indeed follow through (S4). This is not perceived as corruption, because all parties involved start from the understanding that the Shaykh will not make a request arbitrarily (S2).

Another example of bold intervention in social affairs by the Shaquri Shaykh is that of communal reconciliation in the face of any large disputes (e.g. personal falling-outs, inheritance, debts, etc.). The Shaykh hears out the concerned parties and ultimately makes his own judgment call (S4).

Because all involved parties believe that the Shaykh is able to and will make the fair decision (i.e. cannot be corrupted), the Shaykh's assessment is invariably respected (S2). Citing a Quranic injunction, the Shaykh explained that because harmonious families are the building blocks of a harmonious *zāwiya* and community, it is the onus of the *zāwiya* to meticulously preserve kinship ties in both the pleasant and challenging aspects of family life (S3).

In informally speaking to many non-senior members of the Shaquri *Zāwiya* as part of our participant observation, nobody viewed any of these services as intrusive, but instead spoke proudly to us of what they regarded as their well-functioning and Islamic-observant *zāwiya*. This was telling of the underlying trust and respect members have for the *zāwiya*, as well as the fact that involvement is entirely voluntary. The Shaquri, nor any of the other *zawāyā* studied in our fieldwork, engage in any member recruitment activities nor do they approve of it.

In one sentence, the Shaquri Shaykh summarized both Sufism and the reality of *zawāyā* as "one working with one," highlighting the importance of cooperation and mutual help among peers for the commonweal. This sentence has a double meaning, however, and could also be understood as "The One working with one," emphasizing both everyone's reliance on God and, in the end, *zawāyā* amounting to vessels of God's tailor-made guidance and help (S4).

Discussion

We view this study as a timely extension of the scant literature on NWPA from an Islamic-African perspective. Our fieldwork gathered

evidence of Moroccan *zawāyā* crafting and delivering alternative service provision for their members and neighbors. These findings bring three important insights to the surface concerning PA more broadly.

State Coexistence

Our findings presented the workings of *zawāyā* not as mystical sanctuaries, but as indigenous institutions of traditional PA—a strategically sanctioned alternative to that of Morocco's modern system of PA. This bifurcation of Moroccan PA is due to the underlying mutually beneficial dynamic between *zawāyā* and the Alawites. From the perspective of the monarchy, the strong and unwavering allegiance of *zawāyā* affirms the throne's legitimacy via the ritualization of authority and thus provides it with an enduring solution to the issues suggested by The King's Dilemma.

Put differently, the monarchy can comfortably experiment with modernizing its formal PA system based on global-Western standards, because in reality it relies on the traditional PA system to provide legitimacy and stability. On the other hand, the Moroccan monarchy provides in-kind reciprocation to *zawāyā* via support and autonomy, which allows them to carry on governing in its semi-shadow without interruption. Ultimately, a *zāwiya* successfully delivering service provision translates into satisfied local constituents who are loyal to both the *zāwiya* and the state.

This dynamic has certain parallels, in theory, to the NPM-style privatization of public services typically seen in global-Western PA (e.g. Hood 1991; Peters 2001). In an ironic sense, like NPM, the *zawāyā* is akin to the government outsourcing some of its essential public services. However, in complete contrast to NPM, the goals and subsequent mechanics of *zawāyā*'s PA are not rooted in abstract principles of neoclassical economics aimed at promoting competition and maximizing efficiency (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017), but a lived tradition that forms a local understanding and practice of Islam maximizing cooperation and effectiveness—a fitting example of the self-governing capacity of indigenous institutions (see Ostrom 2010).

Coproduction as a Means of Service Provision

The second key insight our findings surface is that *zāwiya* bureaucrats—whether through periodic communal architectural renovation, individual education and mentorship of students, or various interventions in social life—are actively involved in generating and implementing service provision that is both centered on and requires input from local constituents. We therefore argue that *zāwiya* bureaucrats embody a core component of any public servants' craft, which is "the ability to learn from experience and alter the mix of skills to fit both the specific context in which they work and the person for whom they work" (Rhodes 2016, 645). These results complement the stream of PA research on coproduction, which focuses on the improvements to public service provision that arise when citizens are involved in its design and implementation (Bovaird 2007). Global-Western PA has seen a revived interest in coproduction, as Bovaird argues:

> *there is a need for a new type of public service professional: the coproduction development officer, who can help to overcome the reluctance of many professionals to share power with users and their communities and who can act internally in organizations (and partnerships) to broker new roles for coproduction between traditional service professionals, service managers, and the political decision makers who shape the strategic direction of the service system* (Bovaird 2007, 858).

Based on our findings, the operational heart of *zawāyā* are its temporal and spiritual leaders, namely a Shaykh and various *mqadam*. Both are directly and heavily involved in individual member engagement, counsel, support, relationship management, and education, which results in personalized service delivery. In this way, although their official title is not "coproduction development officer," it is apparent that the role of a Shaykh or *mqadam* in the context of *zawāyā* fits Bovaird's concept quite neatly.

Call for Recognition

There are outstanding calls to recover both the traditional skills of bureaucrats, such as counseling, stewardship, practical wisdom (Rhodes 2016), and the inherent, though forgotten, moral perspectives present within all PA (Lynn Jr 2002). Therefore, the third contribution of this study is a potential non-Western response to these calls. Although they span diverse geographies and ethno-linguistic groups, our three case studies point to shared elements between *zawāyā* in terms of real and functioning traditional administrative structure, values, and practices that, accordingly, merit recognition.

After all, "public administration reflects the political and social values and practices of a country … The public sector is an essential element in *maintaining a society's cohesion and prosperity*; the way in which it serves the state and wider society may be seen as a manifestation of its social and political '*conscience*'" (Massey 2010, 196, emphasis our own). Our findings therefore further substantiate the need for diversity within the PA discourse for two reasons.

- First, as institutions of indigenous and traditional PA, *zawāyā* are surely more qualified to understand and represent the "conscience" of their Moroccan constituents than a Western counterpart or Westernizer (i.e. Morocco's formal PA system), which would naturally be "grounded in Western values … Western Public Administration has been accused of being ethnocentric, especially when its concepts, theories, and models are used as a blueprint for reform in non-Western countries" (Raadschelders 2003, 4).
- Second, in terms of experience and knowledge, an uncontroversial place to start would be institutions who have, for 800 years without interruption, worked within the grain (Booth 2011) of, and helped maintain, Moroccan society's "cohesion and prosperity."

Only a first attempt in studying *zawāyā* as instances of NWPA in the Maghreb region, our findings contain certain limitations. Most salient is the scope of the study in terms of the number of *zawāyā* studied, confining only one domain of public service provision per *zāwiya*, and the lack of long-term observation, leaving the possibility that our data could be intermittent. Much of this could (and we hope will) be remedied and addressed by further research on *zawāyā* in their capacity as public administrators within Morocco and regionally.

In terms of policy implications, from the perspective of security and combating extremism, attempting to create new or hybrid PA institutions and values has a track record of failure, and creating more pockets of failed or failing states is not in anyone's interest (on Afghanistan, see already Barfield and Nojumi 2010). Our findings support the notion that "allowing" cases of genuine Islamic PA to not only survive, but to evolve and strengthen, may pose a serious threat to extremist ideology, just as has been argued by some of the most distinguished contemporary ulema about Islam as such as well (Al-Yaqoubi 2015; Murad 2020). But this also requires—and may also pose a serious hurdle for some in—the global West to accept Islamic PA as a valid alternative in the first place.

Conclusion

This article theoretically situates, historically contextualizes, and carefully examines the contemporary service provision activities of indigenous, community-based Islamic institutions in an African context. We suggest, and the results from our novel field research on Moroccan *zawāyā* demonstrate, that a traditional PA system can (1) strengthen the larger state by providing soft power in exchange for governing in its semi-shadow (i.e. be concurrently supported and uninterrupted), (2) reliably deliver essential services that are coproduced by and for local constituents, and accordingly (3) legitimately be regarded as valid by scholars and practitioners despite having markedly different objectives and mechanics from Anglo-American PA. It is our hope that further research will continue to empirically ground the NWPA approach, both for its own sake and as it decenters the Western paradigm. After 2020, this would be an important step in the ongoing development of public administration both in scholarship and practice.

Acknowledgments

We are grateful for the assistance of Imami Ma al-Aynayn, Shaykhna Ma al-Aynayn, Samira Laouina, and Aicha Rahmouni in making the field research possible. We would also like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback.

Field Data Bibliography (all in Morocco)

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D1: 1 February 2019—next-door neighbor and 50-year member, F, ca. 70s
D2: 14 June 2019—Shaykh, M, ca. 40s, university professor
D3: 14 June 2019—*mqadam*, M, ca. 60s

Sidi Waggag *Zāwiya*:

W1: 9 July 2019—Shaykh's son, M, early 30s, Arabic instructor
W2: 9 July 2019—Shaykh's son, M, early 20s, graduate student
W3: 10 July 2019—*mqadam*, M, ca. 70s
W4: 11 July 2019—teacher, M, ca. 40s
W5: 11 July 2019—senior student, M, ca. 18

Shaquri *Zāwiya*:

S1: 11 October 2019—Shaykh's grandchild, M, early 20s, graduate student
S2: 9 November 2019—*mqadam*, M, ca. 40s
S3: 9 November 2019—40-year member, F, early 50s, seamstress
S4: 16 November 2019—Shaykh and other senior members, M, ca. 70s

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Publication II

Reinert, E., **Chafik, S.**, & Zhao, X. (2022). Geography, Uneven Development, and Population Density: Attempting a Non-Ethnocentric Approach to Development. In Reinert, E.S. & I. Kvangraven (Eds.), *A Modern Guide to Uneven Economic Development*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. **ETIS 3.1**.

Geography, Uneven Development, and Population Density: Attempting a non-Ethnocentric Approach to Development

Erik S. Reinert, Salah Chafik, and Xuan Zhao

'In every inquiry concerning the operations of men when united together in society, the first object of attention should be their mode of subsistence. Accordingly as that varies, their laws and policies must be different'

William Robertson (1721-1793), *The History of America*, 1777.

At the very start of his bestselling book *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations* (Landes 1998), Harvard economic historian David Landes laments the loss of geography as an academic discipline. "When Harvard simply abolished the geography department after World War II, hardly a voice protested…. Subsequently a string of leading universities – Michigan, Northwestern, Chicago, Columbia – followed suit, again without serious objection. These repudiations have no parallel in the history of American higher education…"

One general explanation for this would be that 'the hardening of the paradigm' of development economics (Jomo & Reinert, 2005, p. xxii) increasingly left out qualitative issues, much as happened to history – the so-called historical schools virtually died out – giving way to mathematics. However, as regards geography, Landes has a more specific explanation, one that hits much harder today than it did when the book was written in the 1990s: "Geography had been tainted with a racist brush and no one wanted to be contaminated" (Landes 1998, p. 4).

Landes emphasizes the role of Yale University professor Ellsworth Huntington (1876-1947) who – "in spite of much useful and revealing research" (Landes 1998, p. 3) – went too far in connecting the physical environment and human activity. It became a defense of eurocentrism and, in the end, racism. That this was, in the words of James M. Blaut, *The Colonizer's Model of the World* (Blaut 1993; see also Blaut 2000) & Krugman 1991).

We certainly agree with Blaut that the model of geographic diffusionism is essentially not based on the facts of history and geography, but on the ideology of colonialism. As indicated in the initial quote in this chapter, we believe that the arrow of causality tends to go from 'mode of production' to social structures. Still – as we shall try to show here – distance and other geographical features play important roles.

German economist Franz Oppenheimer (1864-1943) uses the concept *Transportwiderstand* – *transport resistance* – as a mechanism that prevents goods, activities, and welfare from spreading evenly (Oppenheimer 1923). Traditional service activities – like haircuts – have an *absolute transport resistance* – production and consumption must take place simultaneously. The effects of *transport resistance* on industrialization work in two different ways. The high cost of transporting electricity – the energy lost for every kilometer – gave Norway for about 100 years a considerable comparative advantage in energy-intensive industrialization (e.g. artificial fertilizers, aluminum production). On the other hand, the extremely long distance and high transportation costs from England to its colonial outposts in Australia and New Zealand, for a long time made local industrialization easier for the settlers there.

If all economic activities had been like haircutting, geography would hardly have mattered. When we look at early advanced economic development later in this chapter, we shall see that both in Europe and in the Americas the *proximity of radically different geographical niches* seems to have been a key to understand economic progress. We find the footprint of Oppenheimer's *transport resistance* in the earliest processes of development.

Friedrich List (1789-1846), the great promotor of industrialization, insisted on combining policies of industrialization with heavy investments in railroads[1]. High transportation costs combined with important economies of scale in manufacturing made the reduction of transportation costs within Germany a key priority for List: in other words, he wanted to reduce

[1] Christopher Freeman (1921-2010), the inspirator of modern evolutionary economics, argues that Friedrich List is the originator of the idea of *national innovation systems* (Freeman 1995).

the *Transportwiderstand*. Industries in latecomer countries needed economies of scale – large volumes of production – to achieve the low costs of production that England had achieved. Also in Russia the idea of industrialization was intimately tied to the idea of railroad building in one single person, Sergei Witte (1849-1916), who was both finance minister under two Tsars and Russia's first Prime Minister. Already in 1889 Witte wrote a book promoting the ideas of Friedrich List, and he later organized the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway (von Laue 1963).

Attempting to avoid the unintended byproducts of studying economic geography, Alfred Chandler's framework of *Scale and Scope* (Chandler 1990) allows us to understand the geographical elements contributing to uneven development from this framework. Economies of scale – or increasing returns to scale – is a key to lower unit costs in industrial production, but also a key factor producing human agglomerations, as Henry Ford's factories once represented for Detroit.

In industrial terms, Henry Ford's assembly plant created huge economies of *scale* that lowered unit costs, gave market power, increased the barriers to entry into this economic activity, thus leading to increased profits, higher wages, and high population density. Economies of *scope* create similar effects, but independent of geographical proximity. McDonalds' almost 39.000 geographically very spread restaurants gain similar advantages by the economies of scope of their operations, but *scope* does not affect wages and population density to the same effect as *scale.* While Ford innovations and economies of scale was a 'wage setter' – as when he doubled his workers' wages to $5 a day in January 1914 – McDonald employees are 'wage takers'. They tend to be paid the minimum wage wherever they happen to be located. The point here is that economies of scale, and the accompanying barriers to entry into an activity, have geographical dimensions that contribute both to economic development being uneven, to the patterns of human settlements and thus the variations in population density. One could even mention that there is a connection between the economies of scale in industry and possibility of caring for the environment: the productivity and wage explosion at Henry Ford's factories created an economy that could afford the US for President Woodrow Wilson to found the US National Park Services two years later, in 1916.

Geography, Climate, and Development

The 'climate thesis' posits that tropical climates are, *ceteris paribus*, poor candidates for development. One of the factors mentioned has been that the tropics have maiming diseases (e.g. malaria) that leave people unable to work while colder climate have diseases which kill outrightly (heart attacks). The most cited work in this area seems to be Gallup, Sachs & Mallinger (1998). Historically however, a country like Switzerland also had malaria (Italian: mal aria = foul air) but it was eradicated by draining the sumps to create agricultural land and hydropower (Bircher 1992). Also, the indisputable success of Singapore – located slightly more than 1 degree from the Equator – is a counterexample suggesting that industrialization and technology beat climate as a main explanation for generalized wealth.

One of the theories resurrected in Landes' work is the 'hydraulic thesis' expressed in Karl A. Wittfogel's *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*. The many books written by Terje Tvedt [2] show the same points: how rivers tie cultures together by essentially facilitating transport and communication. This will reduce *transport resistance* and lead to

[2] See Tvedt, Terje & Terje Østgard (2006), *A History of Water*, 3 volumes, New York/London: LB. Tauris.

possibilities for larger scale of production, but it does not necessarily lead to despotism. We shall see that geographical proximity of different ecological niches may also have the same centralizing and synergetic effects.

Geography affects the degree of transport resistance and thereby the efficient scale and size of an operation, and – secondly – variations in geography affect the scope of economic operations. When the European explorers gradually came to understand the Americas, they found it somewhat contradictory that what to them looked like huge fertile prairies in North America had a relatively small population, while the seemingly inhospitable Andes probably had the largest population density on the whole continent. Estimates of 1492 population are as low as 3,8 Million for the contiguous US 48 states + Canada, while the population of the apparently inhabitable Andes was as high as 15,7 million (Denevan 1992). Clearly the population density is also related to technologies used: North American natives were hunters and gatherers, while the cultures in the Andes had reached the agricultural stage. One could argue that the concept of sustainability as it relates to populations only becomes meaningful after the technology variable is introduced.

A good explanation for this high population density is found in the landscape ecology of extreme climates as explained by German geographer Carl Troll (1899-1975). Troll envisioned a world consisting of a huge number of ecological niches, which with differences in altitudes would form what he called landscape belts (*Landschaftsgürtel*). On the North American prairies, one could travel weeks inside the same climatic niche, while in mountainous areas like the Andes very different ecological niches – like those fit for growing cotton and those fit for growing potatoes – are found geographically relatively near to each other (Troll 1966).

Carl Troll's work was continued by anthropologist John Murra (1916-2006).[3] Studying a huge number of Peruvian court documents from colonial times and present annual migration patterns, Murra found thar Peruvian labour had been highly mobile between the different ecological niches, sequentially following the seasons where harvests and other work was found. Murra developed the concept of a 'vertical archipelago' of ecological niches that - due to the great variations in climate from sea level to more than 4.000 meters above sea level - are relatively close to each other in terms of kilometres and travelling time (Murra 1975 & 2002)). If we look at the cradle of European agricultural civilization – in places like Armenia and Georgia – we can observe the same short geographical distances between climate zones, e.g. between a climate suitable for cotton and a climate suitable for potatoes (seen in today's crops).

Moving between different ecological niches is the key to traditional nomadism, also in the Andes and for the reindeer herders in Northern Eurasia. Moving according to where nature produces food is the very key to survival.[4] The more extreme the climate, the number of ecological niches needed to survive will increase. In other words, the more extreme the climate the longer the annual nomadic migrations will tend to be.

Geography is of course closely linked to temperature. In Carl Troll's 'geography of extreme climates' *one particular range of temperature,* the days of the year when the temperature is both above and below zero during the same 24 hours, is crucial. Whether it is 20 or 30 below zero is normally not important, however what German geographers refer to as

[3] One of the authors, Reinert, studied under Murra at Cornell University.
[4] Francis Bacon in his *Novum Organum* (1620) states in translation: 'Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed'.

Frostwechselhäufigkeit – how often you find freezing and thawing in the same 24 hours – is *extremely* important.

In the Andes, a high *Frostwechselhäufigkeit* would allow the production of a staple food like the freeze-dried potatoes (chuño), freezing the potatoes every night and subsequently drying them in the sun during daytime It has been argued that the nutritional importance of *chuño* explains why the three main pre-Columbian cities in present Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia all are located above 3.000 meters: Quito, Cuzco, and the area around Lake Titicaca. At this altitude the frequency of *Frostwechselhäufigkeit* is sufficient to make the production of *chuño* possible. (Troll 1931 & 1966, Murra 1975[5], Gade 1996 & 2016)

Karl Polanyi (1944) is the one who most efficiently contrasted capitalism to pre-capitalist societies. The pre-capitalist societal organization of herders are extended family groups, in the Andes called *ayllu* and in Saami called *siida.* Work inside a *siida* is divided and shared as a kind of *joint venture* inside a family group. It is important to note that the ownership of reindeer is individual, but the management of the herd is done by the *siida* 'joint venture'. If the tasks so require, the *siida* can also be split according to seasons.

Karl Polanyi has pointed to what he calls the three *fictitious commodities* of capitalism, that are all missing in pre-capitalist societies: *money*, *labour as a commodity*, and *private ownership of land.* This still today essentially applies inside the Sámi production system, while their relationship with the outside world of course is organized according to the market system. Instead of land ownership, pre-capitalist societies – including the Sámi herders – have well-organized sequential usufruct of land. The different groups have the right to use and benefit from the land at different times of the year.

[5] Particularly chapter 3 'El control vertical de un máximo de pisos ecológicos en la economía de las sociedades andinas', pp. 59-117.



Figure 1. The Geographical Proximity of widely Different Ecological Niches (or landscape belts) in the Andes: The proximity of qualitatively different niches – from sea level to 4.000 m. above sea level – allowed for a very high population density in the Pre-Columbian cultures here. Different products would dominate niches at different altitudes: fish and cotton near sea level, fruits higher up, then maize and further up potatoes, and at the top level around 4.000 meters, *quinua,* a key crop related to millet (millet was an important crop in Europe before the arrival of potatoes and maize from the Americas), and the herding of different types of animals, llamas, alpacas, vicuñas. In the Arctic such ecological niches are even closer together. The efficient management of herding across this 'archipelago' of different ecological niches is *the very core of reindeer herding.* (Illustration Troll: 1931/32, reproduced in Troll 1966, p. 111).

This difference in population density between the prairie and the Andes allows us to bring in another important factor, that of diversity. From Giovanni Botero (1592) onwards, manufacturing has been seen as the key to wealth. However, the argument is generally not one of manufacturing per se, but again and again the diversity of the manufacturing sector is emphasized. Rephrasing the understanding of development at the age of Botero we could say that if you would like to know the wealth of a city, go into the city and count the number of professions: the larger the number of professions (the larger the division of labour), the richer the city. The first description we have of virtuous circles of development (Serra 1613) has the diversity of manufacturing activities (the number of different professions) + the increasing returns to scale in these industries at its core.

The surprisingly high population density in pre-Columbian times has similarly been convincingly explained as the result of diversity. The apparently inhospitable Andes are home to a variety of climatic niches in close geographical proximity to each other (Troll 1931, Murra 1975). At a time when large distances impose high costs – what Oppenheimer (1923) calls high *Transportwiderstand* – the extreme climate of the Andes reduced this cost of time and transportation by bringing widely divergent climatic niches close in time and distance. The importance of diversity as a key to having a high population density and prosperity recently returned to the economic debate with Hausmann and Hidalgo's *Atlas of Economic Complexity: Mapping Paths to Prosperity* (2014). By showing the importance of economic diversity, Hausmann and Hidalgo vindicate a key and very influential argument in early economic theory.

We and 'the others': From Monsters in Antiquity to Admiration during the Renaissance and on to the Intolerance of the Enlightenment

The types and degrees of European ethnocentrism have varied over time. We can essentially distinguish between three stages: The Non-Europeans as 'Monsters' (from the Romans until the Age of Discovery), the Non-Europeans as Admirable Cultures (Renaissance), The Age of Eurocentrism (Enlightenment, starting around 1750). It is indeed notable that the so-called Enlightenment was not enlightened when it came to racial issues. Voltaire, probably the most famous philosopher of the Enlightenment, was openly anti-Semitic.

Roman natural historian Pliny the Elder – who died during the eruption of Vesuvius in year 79 – influenced Western ideas for centuries. Pliny described the monster-like beings that supposedly lived where no European had ever set foot. This appealed to people's curiosity and their sense for the grotesque. We find these in books as late as in the 1600s.

Figure 2. Examples of human 'monsters' which Pliny the Elder (23-79 BC) thought inhabited the world that had not yet been 'discovered'. The category 'monsters' still existed in the works of Linnaeus until the 1740s.

These myths slowly died out with the Great Explorations, starting around 1450, when information about geography and ethnology from the rest of the world reached Europe.[6] Italian Jesuit Govanni Botero (1544-1617) was the first who collected a work on global geography and ethnology, *Relazioni Universali,* in 1592.

Botero – a Jesuit - worked in the Vatican, in a group producing the index of books that were prohibited in the Catholic Church (*index librorum prohibitorum*). He therefore had almost exclusive access to many books that were not generally available. A fundamental feature of Botero's 1592 work – which had enormous influence all over Europe over the next more than a century[7] – was not just a mere acknowledgement of, but rather, a fundamental celebration of the *diversity* in the creation as it could be observed across the globe. Botero unabashedly proclaimed and appreciated the sophistication of the economic and socio-political structures, traditions, and innovations of his known world.

Looking for a copy of Botero's *Relazioni Universali* in a Florence bookstore in the 1980s provided a surprise. The bookdealer immediately asked the customer (Reinert): 'with or without monsters?' After Botero passed away in 1617 at least one edition was illustrated with the monsters that had lived in human fantasy since Pliny the Elder had created them about 1500 years earlier (Figure 2). The customer ended up buying one with monsters and one with more ethnographically correct illustrations.

One of the many sources Botero had access to was that of another Jesuit, Matteo Ricci (1552-1610), the missionary to China. Ricci represented the two-way communication Jesuits were keen on between Europe and the rest of the world. In China, Ricci did not only translate the Bible into Chinese, he also translated the Chinese philosopher Confucius into Latin. Much later Swedish clergyman Lars Levi Læstadius (1800-1861) played a similar role in cultural bridgebuilding in Northern Fennoscandia. He preached to the local Saami in their own language, but also translated part of their mythology into Swedish (Læstadius, 1997).

From our point of view today, the Renaissance thirst for knowledge and relative lack of prejudices seems remarkable. There was an attitude of positive curiosity. Cultures that later easily would be called 'primitive races', were seen as sophisticated users of extremely diverse and often challenging geographic surroundings. Sciences were of course less sophisticated than they are now, but they have what in our view is a very healthy focus on the *context* in which events took place: a deep and qualitative understanding of the connection between *nature* and *culture.* The contrast to the Eurocentric way in which Europeans and North Americans later would treat China and Japan is scaring (see chapter 7 in this volume).

With one of the authors (Reinert) having worked as an adjunct professor in the economics of reindeer herding at Saami University College in Kautokeino in Northern Norway, it is interesting to compare the present official Norwegian interpretation of this activity being 'backward' (Reinert 2006) with that of Botero. In the *Relazioni Universali* [8] Botero packs in a lot of information on the Saami on just over one page on what he calls the Saami nation (Botero 1622, pp. 96-97), which he calls *Lappia* and *Lapponia*, which 'borders to Norway' (*confina con la Norvegia*). He describes their great abilities in archery, and admires their ability to build

[6] There were of course also earlier contacts, like Marco Polo's stay in China from 1271 to 1295.
[7] Interestingly, early translations in Germany from the original Italian text were both into Latin (1596, 1599, 1620, 1664 and 1670) and into German (1596, 1599, 1604, and 1611).
[8] Botero, Giovanni, *Le Relationi Universali, Diviso in sette parti,* Venice: Alessandro Vecchi, 1622. This is the 5th edition. The first edition was published in 1592.

boats without nails. 'They have had a long war against the Norwegians' Botero writes about the nation Lapponia, [9] and informs us that they gradually have had to yield their independence and that they pay taxes to Norway in the form of animal hides (Botero 1623: 97). As always Botero describes the relationship between nature and culture when he describes the Saami: 'Instead of horses, Nature has given the Saami the reindeer'[10]. He attempts to describe the reindeer: the size of a mule, hide like a donkey, and horns like a deer, but with fewer branches. Botero admiringly describes the enormous distance, 50 *miglia*, that the Saami are able to cover in 24 hours.

Renaissance man saw himself as created in the image of God, herefore had a duty pursue creative excellence and beauty, just as the Lord had done when he created the earth and all its creatures (see Reinert & Daastøl 1998). With this followed the duty to respect the enormous variety that could be observed in Nature. All human beings were equal in the eyes of the Creator. The difficult balance between duty-bound human beings as part of a *Ganzheit* (an indivisible whole) and the later Enlightenment focus on individuals driven by their own self-interest is clearly still with us today. With the Enlightenment, particularly from 1770 and onwards, we see a sharp contrast in the attitude towards aboriginal cultures.

As we see in the above quote from Botero, 'Nature' is the generous spirit that provides resources, not a specific deity. Non-European cultures were often pictured as utopias that showed Europeans alternative ways of organizing society: the existing diversity widened the realm of the thinkable. Admiration for things Chinese started with Marco Polo (1250-1324) and continued for centuries. In Germany the admiration for China was strong and probably lasted longer than in English-speaking countries.

In his 1750 work, Christian Wolff – an important German philosopher - expressed his admiration for China and its institutions,[11] but in Justi (1762) also for the Inca Empire in the Andes. The Inca empire was particularly difficult to classify for Europeans.

Wolff (1679-1754) came to personally experience the conflict between the previous tolerant Renaissance view on other cultures and the new Eurocentrism. In 1721 he held a lecture on 'The Practical Philosophy of the Chinese' at the University of Halle, in Prussia, where he held a professorship. Here he used the texts of Confucius as proof that ethics and civilization could be created independent of Christendom. As a result, he was banned from Prussia, with a threat of death penalty if he did not leave the country within 48 hours. Here the fragmentation of Germany into small states came to his rescue. Wolff could get on his horse and ride to Marburg in the neighboring state of Hesse, where he was received as a hero at the university. At a time of more or less enlightened regimes, the multiplicity of small states represented provided diversity inside which a 'best practice' often slowly developed by trial and error. Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) – Nietzsche's 'educator' – was also influenced by Asian philosophy.

In Sweden – which for a long time had been an important political and intellectual power in Europe – probably the most famous intellectual at the time, Carl von Linné (1707-1778), still held the Renaissance view of the Saami as 'noble'. In a country where economics at the time – as in Germany – was called Cameralism, Linnaeus describes the Saami as 'the ideal cameralists', and one of his best-known portraits shows him dressed as a Saami (Aslaksen 2007).

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[9] 'Hanno guerreggiato lungamente co i Noruegi' he says in his old-fashioned Italian .
[10] 'In vece di cavalli, la natura gli ha dato il rangifero..'
[11] The English title of Wolff (1750) is interesting, see bibliography.

The Renaissance admiration for the diversity of the creation changed relatively abruptly over a few decades during the latter part of the 1750s. Aboriginal cultures should no longer be understood within the logic of divine creation, rather, they were *subjugated to the interest of other cultures.* From the 1500s the Jesuits had functioned as cultural bridgebuilders. Matteo Ricci's double translation – the Bible into Chinese and Confucius into Latin – has already been mentioned. In Latin America the Jesuits gathered the natives into villages – *reducciones* – which sometimes were run by the native *caciques*, or chiefs, rather than by Europeans. This project recalls the idea of Jesuit Giovanni Botero that wealth was best created in urban-like surroundings.

But the tolerance of the Jesuits stood in the way of a Europe in search of colonies and labour. They were thrown out of Portugal around 1760, out of the Spanish colonies in 1767, and in 1773 the Jesuit Order was prohibited by the Pope, a prohibition that lasted until 1814. The present Pope Francis is the first Pope ever from the Jesuit order, which was founded in 1534.

So, during the 1770s the Jesuits, who had been the defenders of the original inhabitants in Asia and America, were thrown out of these continents. The Jesuits believed in education for all and also taught the natives to paint and to play music. The *reducciones* – their settlements for the natives – can still be seen as impressive ruins in Argentina and Paraguay.

We can observe the same change of attitude towards the native inhabitants elsewhere. In the 1775 draft of the US Constitution, they are referred to as 'indian nations', but when the Constitution was approved the next year, they had been reduced to 'indian tribes'.

The same pattern was observed in Northern Fennoscandia. Also here, the conscious destruction of aboriginal language and cultures starts in the 1770s. In Norway the *Seminarium lapponicum*, which had been established to teach Saami to the priests, was closed in 1774. It was ordered that the language spoken by the Saami should be scrapped, 'the Norwegian language introduced, and children will learn their Christendom in Norwegian' (Friis 1933, 73). This policy has continued in Norway until very recently.

So we can observe that the changing mentality towards non-European inhabitants of the world changed fairly rapidly and simultaneously around the world. An important economic consequence, which was identical on both sides of the Atlantic was that legal ownership was only given to settled farmers. The sequential usufruct of land which dominated outside Europe did not classify for legal ownership. This turnaround in policy away from the ideals of Giovanni Botero provided the Europeans a) land that could be taken from the natives for free and b) cheap labour, once the protection of the Jesuits became outlawed.

The paradox of the Enlightenment was that it was apparently dominated by reason and tolerance, but that – compared to the Renaissance – it also represented worsening conditions for minorities and a massive growth of slavery, which came to an end in France only in 1840 and in the US in 1865. Voltaire, probably the most respected philosopher of the Enlightenment, in 1763 wrote *A Treatise on Toleration*, while at the same time being an antisemite. [12] In the same vein, Enlightenment philosopher Jacques Rousseau, who excelled in abstract arguments for human rights in his work on the Social contract (Rousseau 1762) – nevertheless pictures women almost as inferior beings. The Enlightenment gives us the modern mainstreaming of the

[12] Volume three of the history of antisemitism carries the title 'from Voltaire to Wagner'. (Poliakov 1975).

ethnocentrism of the West and the demeaning stereotype of 'the others', as Edward Said expressed in *Orientalism* (1978).

One important point here is that the Enlightenment coincided with the collapse of the old empires – that by definition consisted of many ethnic groups – and the consolidation of new nation-states. Inside the old empires, the minorities were often allowed to have their own institutions and their own language. Be they Armenian, Basque, Jews, or Saami, they suddenly represented a threat against the consolidation and unity of the new nation-states. Two of the largest genocides in history, against Jews and Armenians, as well as the most recent genocide in Europe, against Bosnians, came about where ethnic minorities stood 'in the way of' new or potential nation-states.

If we create a categorization of the relationship between us (the West) and 'the others' there are three very different periods: 1) From Pliny the Elder (AD 23/24-79) and his 'monsters' to the Middle ('Dark') Ages, then 2) an ambivalent period of rapid European colonial expansion on the one hand, and on the other the Great Discoveries (and the consolidation of the knowledge collected by the discoveries) alongside extraordinary interest, tolerance, and respect for non-European cultures (e.g. Giovanni Botero in the late 1500s until around 1750), which is then followed by 3) an unequivocal period of exploitation and racism which we still live with today.

European ethnocentrism seen from the Islamic world.

The period between classical Greco-Roman civilization and the Great Discoveries – commonly referred to as the 'Dark Ages' of Europe's history – is something Joseph Schumpeter, in his *History of Economic Analysis* (1987), referred to as the 'Great Gap' in terms of philosophical and scientific contributions, especially with regards to economics. Although Schumpeter gives high praise to the practical aspects of governance and policy in this period, namely Charlemagne and the Eastern Empire (Byzantines), his view is that intellectual questions were simply not addressed, and if they were, the writings did not survive – therefore declaring 'we may safely leap over 500 years to the epoch of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–74)' (1987, 70). If we do indeed take this leap to Aquinas, it follows that the European Renaissance was achieved as an independent European development.

Such a leap, however, requires overlooking the tremendous and far-ranging accomplishments resulting from the Golden Era of the Islamic world (discussed below), and by extension, the direct 'pathways of transmission' of science and thought of the former to Europe (Saliba 2007).

To start, the scientific method itself was developed and systematized by Muslim scholars during the 'Great Gap' period, with Ibn Al-Haytham (965-1040) being the earliest and most prominent example of utilizing systematized empirical experimentation for his revolutionary work on optics. Through a series of experiments, Ibn Al-Haytham put forth the first known description of physical light reflecting from an object and its subsequent reception by the eye (not vice-versa), and the first theory of how light received through the eye is transmitted to the brain through an optic nerve (i.e. the mechanics of human vision) (Smith 1992).

In governance, the rapid expansion of Islam since its early days led to an overstretch as regards governability and administrative capacity. This could only partly be countered by decentralization and the inclusion of local elites (which resulted in the existence of diverse cultural/ethnic groups) – already well-described by the historian Abu Al-Hasan Al-Baladhuri (820-892) in his 9th century work *Futūh al-Buldān*. The Golden Era period featured similarly

important developments in terms of statecraft and administration (Samier 2017). Take for instance the vizier and scholar Nizam al-Mulk (1018-1092) and his *Siyāsatnāma*, which, despite being over 900 years old, presents a detailed, workable, and weirdly current concept of state administration such as the need for superiors to avoid interference in routine administration (or in today's parlance: not to micro-manage), and the non-delegatability of responsibility for those over whom one rules (Drechsler 2015, Nizam al-Mulk 1960).

Within mathematics, although numerous Muslims put forth major contributions to the field, the example of the Persian polymath Muhammad ibn Musa Al-Khwarizmi (780-850) alone suffices as a rebuttal to the 'Great Gap' narrative: his treatise *Hisab al-Jabr wa al-Muqabala* took (often complex) scenarios from Islamic inheritance laws to outline the first systematic solution to linear and quadratic equations – introducing the mathematical concept of *sifr* (zero) along the way and making him the founder of Algebra i.e. the second word of the title of his treatise = *al-Jabr* (Afridi 2013). The Latin translation of Al Khwarizmi's *Hisab* was used as the foundational text in European universities until the 16th century, and another Latin translation of his work on arithmetic introduced the decimal numeric system to Europe, which are today known as Arabic numerals.

In Islam, there are various Quranic and Prophetic injunctions to seek and develop knowledge regardless of its origin – what is imperative is that the knowledge benefits creation without violating or encroaching upon divine edicts. The House of Wisdom, founded in the late 8th century by Caliph Harun Al-Rashid, was a paragon of this imperative and embodied the translation movement of texts from Greek, Roman, and Hindi into Arabic which introduced ancient thought and science to Islamic civilization (Lyons 2011). This was a proactive and intentional effort to appropriate the knowledge of earlier traditions, in particular that of Ancient Greece – not as 'a re-enactment of the glories of ancient Greece' via translation, but rather as a basis for furthering intellectual thought and scientific innovation (Saliba 2007, 2). Similarly, the 9th century pious aristocrat Fatima Al Fihri used the fortune she inherited to build what became the oldest and continually operating university and first degree awarding educational institution in the world: al Qarawiyyin in Fes, Morocco.

In the realm of medicine, the United States National Library of Medicine recognizes the *bimaristan* (early Islamic healthcare institutions) as the first hospitals, with the oldest being built in 805 – also under the reign of Caliph Harun Al-Rashid (National Library of Medicine 1994). The work of Muslim physicians from the 'Great Gap' period not only laid the foundations for Western medicine, but at times proved to be remarkably precocious. The encyclopaedic *Cannon of Medicine,* written in 1025 by Ibn Sina (Avicenna), was the main text used to teach medicine at European universities until as late as the 18th century (McGinnis 2010). Today the area of mind and body wellness (i.e. the integration of physical and behavioural health) has increasingly, especially since the start of the COVID pandemic, captured the attention of contemporary medical scholars and practitioners. Over 11 *centuries* ago, Abu Zayd al-Balkhi (850-934) asserted that prophylactic and treatment approaches must focus on both the body and mind, because they are together the foundation of wellbeing (Awaad et al. 2019).

An important precursor to the Eurocentric 'Great Gap' narrative was the systemic borrowing of ideas by European scholastics from Muslim scholars without acknowledgement. There are three key reasons for this lack of credit: 1) the denigrating view of Islam and Muslims that scholastics held and by extension, the impossibility of acknowledging anything of value or merit originating from the former 2) the opportunity for scholastics to take self-credit (some

even viewed this as a way to 'emancipate knowledge from the clutches of Arabs' (Sezgin, 1984, p. 127) and 3) that borrowing without acknowledgement was a widespread and accepted practice (Islahi 2014). Despite this, the reality of 'pathways of transmission' is clear, as illustrated by the *Escuela de Traductores de Toledo* (Toldeo School of Translators) founded in the 12th century to translate texts (most prominently those of Ibn Rushd/Averroes who was known in the West simply as 'The Exegete' for his commentary on Greek classics) from Arabic into Latin, and later into what became an early standardized version of Spanish.

Indeed, thousands of Arabic words have made their way into Western languages. In Venice the residence-warehouses of foreign embassies were, and still are, called 'fondaco' (Arabic for warehouse). The names of professions in Spanish (*alfarero* = potter, *alfaiate* = tailor, and many more) show that the division of labour took place when the country was under Arab rule. This applies to some degree also to Portugal: a key institution was and is *alfandega* = customs office. The Spanish word for the same thing, *aduana*, comes via Persian and Arabic. The word algorithm comes from the Latinized version of the aforementioned Al-Khwarizmi's name, and the Arabic word he used for zero, *sifr* is also the origin of the words cipher and decipher.

As for economics, to turn back to Schumpeter's mention of Saint Thomas Aquinas, we agree that he was one of the most influential Western thinkers and perhaps the single most important scholar in the transition from the European 'Dark Ages'. What is often overlooked is that Aquinas was deeply influenced by, and borrowed generously from, Muslim thinkers before him, in particular Ibn Sina and Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (Smith 1944). The latter is considered one of the greatest scholars of Islam, from any time period.

Among various other topics, Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) theorized on key aspects of economic development such as the stages of production and specialization of labour (he uses needles as an illustration of his argument, which is uncannily similar to the pin-factory example of Adam Smith seven centuries later), market regulations (e.g. via an oversight institution known as *al-hasbah*), currency debasement (notably predating early Renaissance scholar Nicholas Oresme's *Treatise on Money*), and flexibility in public borrowing and public expenditures for the purpose of ensuring broad societal goals e.g. socioeconomic justice, security, and *developing a prosperous society* (Ghazanfar & Islahi 1990).

Nearly three centuries later, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) – who is recognized as a founding father of social science writ large, and specifically of sociology, historiography, and economics – expanded on Al-Ghazali's economic thought. In his *Al-Muqaddima* (Arabic for The Introduction), he discusses how specialization of labour is a result of no one human being able to do everything, and more importantly, the greater specialization of labour, the more industries and crafts flourish, and in turn the more wealth is generated (Ibn Khaldun 2004) – which foreshadows Botero's heuristic of counting the number of professions in an area to know how wealthy it is. Continuing Ibn Khaldun's argument: greater wealth in a society results in governments having more revenues to spend on people's well-being and creating economic opportunities, which results in both a natural rise in the population and the arrival of immigrants of varying backgrounds, which subsequently diversifies and boosts human and intellectual capital, increases demand for goods and services, builds up industries, raises incomes, augments the sciences and education, and ultimately, spurs further development (Chapra 2006, Margoliouth 1932). We believe that although a brilliant economist in his own right, Schumpeter's suggestion to safely leap over such contributions is an incorrect one.

European ethnocentrism seen from China.

It seems that when the Roman world was under the rule of the 'Five Good Emperors', China for the first time heard about this civilization at the other end of Eurasia from the Arsacid Persia (Yü 1986, 461; He 2017, 173). Compared with the European image of 'the others' as monsters, China highly praised the wealth and civilization of Roman Europe, and named it *Ta Ch'in* (or Da Qin, 大秦, literally 'the Grand China') (ibid, 175). This name implied that the Chinese thought so highly of this civilization that it was deemed worthy of being treated as an equal of China, as 'Ch'in' meant and was the origin of the word 'China' (ibid). However, there was hardly any direct contact between China and Rome, because the Pathian intentionally blocked them in order to keep its position as the monopolist of the Silk Road trade (Yü 1986, 461). In the following centuries, China's contact to the European civilization was limited to the occasional communication with *Ta Ch'in*, namely, Rome and its eastern successor, the Byzantine Empire. Only after Genghis Khan's offspring merged crowns of the Mongolian Khan and Chinese Emperor, the Catholic Church started to reach out to Chinese emperors, seeking to convert this vast empire to Catholicism (He 2017, 507-513). The Mongolian khans/emperors showed great interest in this religion, and asked the Church to dispatch a cardinal to China (ibid, 513). This plan was never fulfilled due to the overturn of Mongolia's regime in China.

Starting with the Great Discoveries, Europe found direct access to China. Chinese emperors started to receive European diplomatic representatives with different objectives (Wills 1998; Wills & Cranmer-Bying 2016; He 2017, 836-878). Among them, they welcomed the Jesuits the most. Unlike Mongolian emperors, Chinese emperors' interest in European missionaries now did not lie in religious curiosity but in the useful knowledge mastered by the Jesuits: astronomy, mathematics, medicine, mechanics, map-making, fine arts, and especially, firearm-making (He 2017, 634-636; Wills 1998, 363-366; Witek 2016). However, after 1722, the Jesuits were expelled from the imperial court due to their alliance with what ended up being the wrong side of the princes' competition for the throne (Witek 2016, 361).

Jesuits' activities 'led to some fascinating interactions in religion, scholarship, science, literature, and art' (Wills 1998, 363). This list also included economic thoughts. To the Renaissance Continental economic thinkers, Chinese economy and economic thoughts provided a strong supporting case proving that their ideas could actually work. Giovanni Botero was a high-profile Sinophile. He regarded China as the most developed economy from which principles of economic development could be learned. Above all, Botero noticed that China had 'countless multitudes of artisans and merchants' (Botero 1956 [1589], 143). Clearly Botero took China as the living example of his principle of making a country rich: the more diversified a country's manufacturing activities are, the richer the country will be. He also made this observation regarding European cities (Botero 1588).

Christian Wolff was also an enthusiastic Sinophile. Wolff's natural law theory provided the philosophical foundation of the Continental enlightened despotism and the German cameralism (Haakonssen 2006; Tribe 1988, 30-34). His economic doctrines were typically mercantilist (cameralist), which were common at the time (Wolff 1736a, 212-590). Yet the most striking characteristic of Wolff's economic thought was that he followed in the footsteps of Leibniz in spreading Scientific Revolution and the spirit of innovation in the German world (Reinert & Daastøl, 1998). Wolff advocated that it was a natural obligation of humans to acquire as much knowledge as possible and to invent as much as possible (Wolff 1736b, 165-168; 191-202). Wolff wrote: 'those who are able to invent useful human arts or improve inventions are obliged to do so' (Wolff 1756, 170). Therefore, in addition to his mercantilist/cameralist policy

program, Wolff proposed that the state should create academies of sciences, aiming at generating and spreading inventions useful to industries (Wolff 1736b, 241-249). In Wolff's thought, it was the state that should play the key role in generating industrial innovations.

Just like Botero, Wolff referred to China as the evidence supporting his ideas. Wolff believed that China was a living example of the rational and prosperous civilization which was built on the principles agreeing with his philosophy (Wolff 1985[1721]; Kanamori 1997). Especially, Wolff found that China provided the evidence supporting his proposal of state as the innovation generator. Wolff regarded the ancient Chinese as the people enjoying happiness under the rule of philosopher kings (Wolff 1750). Wolff believed that these ancient Chinese emperors 'settled that model of government, where in it now excels all other models in the world', and this model of government continued flourishing until Wolff's time (ibid, 15). The characteristic of this model of government was that the ruler engaged in making inventions useful to the economy and society and acted as the 'master of the time and opportunity requisite for the business of invention, and of philosophical reasonings, without neglecting the affairs of a vast empire' (ibid). Wolff's observation was largely accurate, for it was a common function of the Chinese state in history to act as the key promoter of crafts and inventions. In the *Rites of Zhou* (周礼), a Confucian classical text about the ideal organization of a monarchy, there is listed a ministry named "司空" (*Si Kong*) which was in charge of manufacturing and artisanry and their skills ("百工"), and the task of this ministry was 'to make the country rich' ("以富邦国"). In medieval China, namely the Tang and Song Dynasties (618-1279), one of the imperial government agencies was 少府监 (*Shao Fu Jian*) which managed all state manufactories, 'concentrated all crafts under the heavens' ("聚天下之伎"), and was specifically in charge of 'policies regarding crafts' (掌百工伎巧之政令).

From these cases, we could say that two key elements behind the European economic development in the early modern period—the pursuit of maximizing the diversity of the manufacturing sector and the state policy promoting innovations and the progress of skills—both were discovered by European economists (Botero and Wolff) with reference to the Chinese cases. This explains that after the decline of imperial China as well as its pursuit of manufacturing and innovation, when the last group of Chinese Confucian literati thought about catching up with the West, they actually found the reason for European development was that they practiced what their ancestors believed, but this was abandoned later (e.g., Xue 1994, 164-165; Zheng 1994 [1894], 241; 246). To a certain degree, we could say that from a Chinese perspective, compared with the late imperial China, European economies were more developed, which is a key pillar supporting the eurocentrism, because in some key respects they were more 'Chinese'.

The Elephant in the Room: Understanding Population Density.

Human history has for a long time been related to 'stages' of economic development, typically a stage of hunting and gathering, a stage of herding and nomadism, a stage of agriculture, and a stage of industrialism. (Bücher 1893, Ely 1903, Hildebrand 1864 & 1876, Kalveram 1933, Rostow 1960, Reinert 2000, Schefold 1988 & 1994/95, Sombart 1928, Sommer 1948). This is a mechanism already suggested by Botero.

Related to these stages is the historically irrefutable fact that to these different economic stages corresponds a carrying capacity – a level of sustainability – in terms of population. Clearly very fertile and well irrigated areas like China would have a very much higher carrying capacity than

most others in an agricultural society, but if we refer to countries in general the suggested relationship between technological stage of development and population density will hold. Among hunters and gatherers in the Amazon 1 to 2 persons per square kilometres is a lot, in an advanced industrial and service economy like that of Holland 400 persons per square kilometre does not mean 'overpopulation'.

In the spring of 2015, Reinert found himself as an advisor to the government of Eritrea. Somewhat unusually he was invited to a government cabinet meeting. Eritrea had found itself in an exceptionally industry-friendly colonial period under Italy until 1941[13] when it came under British military administration. Migration was an important issue and came up in the cabinet meeting. Seemingly when the national population density approached 40 persons per square km, migration from Eritrea increased, and migration went e. g. to Holland which has over 400 persons per square km. The economic structure of Holland: an advanced industrial sector combined with an advanced service sector and an agricultural sector with high barriers to entry (e.g flower bulbs) made this possible.

In the meeting it was suggested that Eritrea should try to industrialize in order to slow migration, there were still some manufacturing plants left. The elderly guard in the cabinet meeting, largely veterans from the war, were fairly enthusiastic to the proposal. What killed the idea completely was a cabinet minister who had been working with the World Bank, who – with this convincing authority – single-handedly killed the idea. Reinert was subsequently invited to talk at a meeting in a park outside Stockholm where over 10.000 Eritreans resident in Europe gathered for a meeting; a truly amazing event.

Economic Stages and Typical maximum Population Density

Hunting and gathering societies	1-2 persons / km2
Agricultural societies	40 persons / km2
Industrial societies, e.g. Holland	400 persons / km2

At the beginning of the Cold War the Morgenthau Plan and its successor, the Marshall Plan, give us a very important insight into the relationship between economic structure and population density. When it was clear that the Allies would win WWII, the question of what to do with Germany, which in three decades had precipitated two world wars, came on the agenda. Henry Morgenthau Jr., US Finance Minister from 1934 to 1945, formulated a plan to keep Germany from ever again threatening world peace (Morgenthau 1943). Germany, he argued, was to be entirely deindustrialized and turned into an agricultural nation. All industrial equipment was to be removed or destroyed; the mines were to be flooded with water or concrete. This program, the Morgenthau Plan, was approved by the Allies during a meeting in Canada in late 1943 and was immediately implemented when Germany capitulated in May of 1945.

[13] Apparently fairly different from other Italian colonies.

During 1946 and 1947, however, it became clear that the Morgenthau-plan was causing serious economic problems in Germany: deindustrialization caused agricultural productivity to plummet. This was indeed an interesting experiment. The mechanisms of synergy between industry and agriculture, so key to Enlightenment economists, also worked in reverse: killing industry reduced the productivity of the agricultural sector. More people on the same land created diminishing returns. Former president Herbert Hoover – who at the time played the role of the old and wise statesman – was sent to Germany with orders to report to Washington what the problem was. His investigation took place in early 1947, and Hoover wrote three reports. In the last, dated 18 March 1947, he concluded: '**There is the illusion that the New Germany left after the annexations can be reduced to a "pastoral state". It cannot be done unless we exterminate or move 25.000.000 out of it'.**

Observing the dark consequences of deindustrialization, Herbert Hoover had reinvented the old mercantilist theory of population: an industrial state could feed and maintain a far larger population than an agricultural state occupying the same territory. The practical result of this was seen when Germans moved from the British, French, and American sectors of Germany – all subject to the Morgenthau Plan – into the Soviet sector where manufacturing industry was still permitted. Less than three months after Hoover's warning, on June 5, 1947 George Marshall – then US Secretary of State – delivered a speech at Harvard announcing what came to be called the Marshall Plan, completely reversing the Morgenthau Plan. West Germany was to re-industrialize, and – in the period that followed – this industrialization plan created 'a sanitary belt' of wealthy countries from Western and Southern Europe all the way to Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. This industrialization clearly contributed to stopping communism.
The fact that famines tend to occur only in countries specialized in agriculture underlines the power of industry, of the division of labour, and of the importance of the intersectorial synergies that create and maintain welfare. But today's neo-classical trade theory does not allow a theory simultaneously employing increasing and diminishing returns – like Herbert Hoover implicitly did – that would not be compatible with the core notion of equilibrium. If the West is interested in stopping migration, industrializing the Third World would be the simplest measure (Reinert 2003). It would require the kind of industrial policy that Donald Trump re-invented for the Unites States, but refused to African countries. One problem in the West in general seems to be that the same people who are **most vigorously against immigration** are also the people who are **most fervently in favour of free trade.** This is truly a contradiction that could be solved by a better knowledge of the underlying mechanisms of economics. We seem to be stuck with the analysis of Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) that poor counties simply lack the right institutions, without seeing that these right institutions were once lacking in the rich world as well – until they were created as an outcome of industrial development.

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Publication III

Chafik, S. (2022). Plan Bee: The Case of an Islamic Honey Cooperative in Morocco. *Halduskultuur: The Estonian Journal of Administrative Culture and Digital Governance*. **ETIS 1.1**.

Plan Bee: The Case of an Islamic Honey Cooperative in Morocco

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Abstract

Taddaret Inzerki is an indigenous honey cooperative (i.e. apiary) in rural Morocco that has operated autonomously for centuries. To understand the devolved status of the apiary, and accordingly, explore the often overlooked field of (non-Western) traditional community-based administrative systems and practices, this essay first provides a brief summary of devolution theory (based on Althusius' *Politica*) and the track record of similar policies in the context of natural resource management. The case of *Taddaret Inzerki*, which is the core contribution of the essay, is then presented along the lines of a Geertzian thick description, revealing both the apiary's historical foundation and its three enduring institutional goals stemming from the rules of the commons: ensuring the welfare of bees, properly treating fellow beekeepers, and fulfilling Islamic requisites. The result for the villagers upholding their sacred craft of Islamic beekeeping is that they are able to generate a reliable livelihood and preserve their shared natural resource commons. However, this essay argues that this administrative arrangement also proves beneficial at the national and even global level, and concludes by suggesting potential avenues of future research.

Keywords: Devolution, Althusius, Natural Resource Management, ICCA, *zawāyā*, Islamic Indigenous Cooperative, Islamic Beekeeping, *Taddaret Inzerki*

1. Introduction

This essay aims to contribute to research on local devolution, i.e. extensive municipal autonomy or "immunity from interference from the centre" (Føllesdal 2011, 337; see Drechsler 2008, Drechsler 2013a), in an Islamic context by exploring the case of a rural indigenous honey cooperative (i.e. apiary) in Morocco, which in itself is the focus of what follows. Located in the western High Atlas, and founded in the 16th century as an offshoot of a *zāwiya*[1] (a dynamic Islamic institution of both worship and public service provision; see Chafik and Drechsler 2022), Taddaret Inzerki is the largest and oldest traditional apiary in the world (Afriyad 2013). Drawing on data collected between autumn 2021 and spring 2022 from extensive ethnographic research, this essay examines how the apiary is organized and run by the local community as a highly autonomous commons with unmistakably sacred (i.e. Islamic) institutional goals, values, and practices, and how this alternative governance arrangement ultimately generates both globally relevant ecological benefits and local, otherwise sparse, economic opportunities. These successes make Taddaret Inzerki a clear example of when traditional and seemingly obsolete institutions that have managed to survive on the margins of society

1 All non-English (Arabic, Tamazight, Latin) words in the essay are italicized, with the exception of proper names and terms common in English.

are able to step up with readily available and resilient institutional answers to today's needs and challenges (for a Nepalese case, see Shakya 2021, 156-158).

What is particularly interesting from the administrative policy perspective is how and why this arrangement is made the way it is. The Moroccan government included the apiary alongside several thousand local initiatives in its ambitious ~€1.9 billion *Al-Maghrib Al-Akhdar* (Green Morocco) Plan to fund rural agriculture and farming, and granted the apiary national and international (alongside multiple stakeholders) cultural and ecological heritage status and related assistance (Hekking 2020). This support and recognition appear to be part of a broader (post-Arab Spring) national decentralization strategy that has occasionally been criticized for having led to mixed results (Houdret and Harnisch 2019). However, in the case of *Taddaret Inzerki*, this essay argues that the Moroccan state's conscious devolution policy to an Islamic indigenous cooperative has been a successful one indeed – resulting in a 'triple-benefit'. Specifically, the apiary is not only providing the local community with an alternative (Islamic), reliable, and sustainable economic livelihood, but it is through these alternative (Islamic) goals, values, and practices that the apiary cultivates content, exemplar rural citizens who are loyal to the Moroccan state as a matter of piety and identity. Beyond the benefit of local citizens and the state, the positive ecological impact of the apiary and the traditional model by which it is achieved are, perhaps counterintuitively to some, timely and beneficial contributions to our 21st-century world.

This essay therefore proceeds with a brief introduction of the theory underlying devolution policy, drawing in particular (from the global-Western perspective's context) on the late Renaissance jurist and philosopher Johannes Althusius, contemporary environmental and resource management efforts, and the role of local or indigenous cooperatives in managing the commons. Section 3 begins the case study by discussing the foundation and history of the apiary – the context of which is necessary for understanding both its enduring Islamic status and its suitability for devolution. Section 4 then presents the core findings of the ethnographic research in terms of the apiary's Islamic goals, values, and practices and how that translates into economic and environmental value for the local population. This is followed by Section 5, which argues that the triple-benefit is real, that is, the strategic and mutually beneficial nature of the Moroccan state's devolution policy vis-à-vis the apiary and its broader successes. Section 6 highlights important limitations, questions, and topics for further research raised by the findings (e.g. lessons for local devolution, principles of local-level Islamic Economics, the notion of an Islamic commons, investigating the ecological impact of sacred beekeeping) before Section 7 concludes.

2. Devolution, Indigenous Cooperatives, and Natural Resource Commons

Devolution is a governance principle that is focused on the scale of rights and responsibilities, namely, transferring them from higher to lower levels so as to bring "citizens, local groups and organizations into the policy and decision-making process" (Berkes 2010, 491). One of the earliest and most prominent theorists on devolution is the German jurist and philosopher Johannes Althusius (1563-1638), even to the extent of being credited with being the founding father of modern Western political theory through his conception of Governance (1995, ix).

His work *Politica Methodice Digesta* (1603) (Althusius 1981; Althusius 1995) is helpful both in understanding the origins of devolution theory within the present-day paradigm of governance and administration (Drechsler 2013b, Pollitt 2015) and in highlighting the commonalities in practice with the Islamic paradigm explored through the case of *Taddaret Inzerki*.

Althusius, as the Calvinist town syndic of Emden, adamantly "sought to maintain its autonomy vis-a-vis its Lutheran provincial Lord and the Catholic Emperor" (Føllesdal 1998). He did so by first positing that every human association concerning two or more people is political[2] and can be taxonomized as one of five types, with each successive association being a combination of the preceding one(s): family, *collegium*, city, province, and realm (i.e. the state) (Althusius 1995, xv-xxi).

Of most interest for the present essay is the *collegium*, which maps neatly with the modern term cooperative (apart from gender inclusivity), as it is defined as "three or more men of the same trade, training, or profession [being] united for the purpose of holding in common such things they jointly profess as duty, way of life, or craft" (Althusius 1995, 34). Members of a *collegium* (i.e. colleagues) "live, are ruled, and are obligated in their collegium by the same right and laws …, and are even punished for proper cause according to them, provided this is done without infringing upon the magistrate or usurping an alien jurisdiction" (Althusius 1995, 36).

As for how and why this autonomy exists, Althusius explains that the state and its leadership (in the form of a magistrate) do not hold supreme authority as in the unchallenged right to arbitrarily pursue and neglect matters of their choosing, but rather they are supreme in the sense of having subordinate magistrates or political associations, i.e. the provinces, cities, *collegium*, and families of the realm:

> The magistrate is called supreme because he exercises not his own power, but that of another, namely, the supreme power of the realm of which he is the minister. Or he is so called in relation to inferior and intermediate magistrates who are appointed by and depend upon this supreme power, and for whom he prescribes general laws (1995, 120).

For Althusius, this delegation to, and prescription of general laws upon, subordinate magistrates inherently restricts the direct action of the magistrate (the central state) since "by political understanding a magistrate sees, recognizes, knows, and comprehends the things that he is to do or *to omit* by reason of his office" (1995, 137; author's emphasis). More explicitly, as a matter of principle, the central state should have 'political prudence': the wisdom not to involve itself in matters concerning lower-level (self-governing) political associations, and indeed must recognize the say in and about their own community and its affairs, i.e. their autonomy (Drechsler 2013a).

Naturally, those in closer proximity to these matters should be able to address them in a more adequate manner. This brings us to the principle of subsidiarity, which despite the extensive debate surrounding the application of the concept (Golemboski 2015), is commonly understood to be that decisions and tasks should be taken at the most immediate or local level to where they can be implemented competently (Føllesdal 1998). Based on his observation of Burmese traditional society in the 1950s, the British-German economist E.F. Schumacher identified subsidiarity as the first principle by which large-scale organizations or even society as a whole can succeed (1973).

2 Althusius referes to politics itself as "symbiotics", or the art of living together (1995, xv).

However, Althusius stresses that with autonomy comes the necessity of respecting the general laws and higher sovereignty of the magistrate, so that it is not the case that "popular licence be permitted to the extent that it reduces respect for the king or upsets the affairs of the commonwealth" (1995, 175). He continues: "A reverent attitude toward the magistrate derives from imperium and a favourable opinion about the magistrate's exercise of authority. … This respect for authority is composed of the admiration and fear that arise from the ruler's form of imperium, his greatness, and his moral qualities" (1995, 154). To bring in the Islamic framework, the description put forth by Althusius of this 'reverent attitude' is a strikingly accurate summary of the sacred soft power attributed to the ruling Alawite Monarchy by the Moroccan public due to the Islamic nature of its authority, namely, descent from the Prophet PBUH (Chafik and Drechsler 2022; Daadaoui 2011). The dynamics of the central Moroccan state devolving power to a rural *collegium* in the form of an apiary will be explored shortly.

First, however, it is important to very briefly highlight various contemporary efforts to devolve decision-making authority and responsibility to the local level in the context of community-based natural resource management of forests, wetlands, protected areas, wildlife, etc. These efforts have faced certain recurring challenges, such as the fragmenting of management responsibility for ecosystems, opportunistic seizure of resources by elites and further marginalization of disadvantaged locals, insufficient understanding of the diversity of local institutions, which can range from positive to destructive in terms of natural resources and social relations, and, notoriously, insufficient transfer of powers to local institutions from central authorities (Kamoto et al. 2013; Berkes 2010; Ribot 2002). The common theme among these issues is an externally designed natural resource management devolution policy that ultimately does not value the importance of, nor trust in, local autonomy.

Moreover, although the rhetoric of devolution in the sense of shifting rights and responsibilities to indigenous people as an alternative to costly, ineffective, and aloof centralized control is by now ubiquitous in natural resource management, in practice there are often new institutions created that bear little to no resemblance to indigenous institutions, values, or goals (Natcher and Davis 2007). This runs in stark contrast to the theory of the commons, which empirically highlights and recognizes the role of indigenous institutions (i.e. cooperatives) in managing common property resources in resilient ways (classically, see Ostrom 1990).

Indeed over long historical periods, indigenous cooperatives have been found to conserve, restore, and enhance natural resources and at times even the biodiversity of the commons they populate and administer (Gadgil et al. 1993). This accumulation of traditional ecological knowledge is a lived process that is fundamentally based on honored – in many cases sacred – indigenous values and practices passed on through generations (Berkes 2018). One could argue that this alone warrants inquiry into the case of *Taddaret Inzerki*, especially due to, and this is one of the more striking characteristics of the apiary, its absence from the academic literature (apart from a handful of publications in French). More broadly, although the literature features cases of extant indigenous cooperatives that are intimately tied to a diverse range of belief systems, there is a notable dearth regarding cases of Islamic indigenous cooperatives that are neither historical (Sabrina 2015) nor theoretical (Mangunjaya 2013).

The obvious question for contemporary devolution policy concerning municipal Muslim populations and the management of their natural resources therefore becomes: instead of creating new institutions based on non-local contexts to transfer only limited authority to, would it not be more beneficial for a central state to support, resuscitate (if necessary),

and genuinely devolve power to Islamic indigenous cooperatives that are, and have been, successfully stewarding their local commons? In an attempt to answer, we turn to the case of *Taddaret Inzerki* – the core contribution of the essay – after a note on methods.

The following data were collected through *in situ* ethnographic fieldwork conducted between September and October 2021 in the villages of Inzerki and Tafilalt, in addition to remote follow-up interviews over the subsequent six months with half a dozen villagers. The author, aided by affiliation with and knowledge of the local language and customs, and committed to upholding culturally sensitive research methods (Smith 2021, Archibald et al. 2019, Chilisa 2019) with the indigenous community involved, utilized a discursive approach. The research design was therefore focused on understanding the subjective role and perspectives of embedded actors to understand a social phenomenon through 1) semi-structured interviews around what is happening and how as opposed to justifying why things are as they are (Zittoun 2021), and 2) firsthand participant observation of quotidian activities, i.e. the 'go-along' method of ethnographic research (Kusenbach 2003). As a result, the case is an attempt to assemble and relay the perspectives, history, values, and lived experiences of the indigenous villagers into an intricate, though readable, text; along the lines of, and almost forming, a thick description[3] in Clifford Geertz' anthropological sense (1973). Therefore, as customary, the author does not cite individual interviews and only occasionally brings in external references for elucidation or corroboration of larger matters of fact and context. Much of the information about the apiary itself is based on these interviews as well and must be read accordingly.

3. The Foundation of an Islamic Apiary

Taddaret Inzerki (the home of Inzerki) is said to be the oldest and largest traditional apiary (place where honey beehives are kept/honey production takes place) in the world. It was first constructed in 1520 using wood, rock, and adobe, i.e. a traditional building material made by mixing earth, water, straw and/or manure (Afriyad 2013). The story of the apiary begins with a man from the village of Inzerki who had some experience and a keen interest in beekeeping, wanting to seek the *baraka* (divine blessings) and counsel of a regionally esteemed *Shaykh*[4] in the matter.

3 Geertz formulated the ethnographic concept of 'thick description' through extensive fieldwork in the Islamic world, in Indonesia and, notably, Morocco (see Geertz 1971).

4 A *Shaykh* (plural: *Shuyūkh*) in this context, and others, is a person who both masters (in terms of education and scholarship) and embodies (in terms of practice and teaching) the Islamic sciences.



Figure 1: approximate location of Inzerki (original map source: NASA Visible Earth)

The Shaykh, Sidi Muhammad Bin Alhussein, led a local branch of the Nasiri *Zāwiya* in the remote and difficult-to-access mountain village of Tafilalt, which is 20 km from Inzerki by bird's flight. A *zāwiya* (plural: *zawāyā*) can refer to a centuries-old physical place of worship akin to a mosque, but the term also refers to the lived community of people making up an Islamic *collegium* – fundamentally driven by the self-purification and service aspect of Islam known as Sufism – that both frequent the physical place and Islamically design and deliver alternative public-service provision (Chafik and Drechsler 2022). After making the rugged journey to the *zāwiya* from Inzerki, the Nasiri *Shaykh* prayed (to God for assistance) for the man, and advised him on the paramount importance of first seeking out a location where the bees could be at ease and only then proceed with laying just a single hive.

Figure 2: a view of the village of Tafilalt from atop the *zāwiya* (this and all photographs taken by author Sept-Oct 2021)

But one may rightly wonder: Why would the *Shaykh* be so concerned about the welfare of honeybees? More generally, what good advice could a *Shaykh* who had no working knowledge of, or experience in, beekeeping possibly give? And why would *baraka* be relevant or important enough for the man to make the difficult trek to the *Shaykh* in the first place? Briefly answering these questions helps shed light on how the underlying worldview and ambitions of the apiary were (and as this essay will later demonstrate, are still) embedded within Islam.

The Nasiri *Shaykh* understood, as any educated scholar of the Islamic tradition, that although all animals have unequivocal rights in Islam, bees are given a special status. Indeed they are mentioned explicitly and have a namesake chapter in the Qur'ān, in verses that are cited regularly by the beekeepers of Inzerki today when describing how they understand the status and wellbeing of bees:

وَأَوْحَىٰ رَبُّكَ إِلَى ٱلنَّحْلِ أَنِ ٱتَّخِذِى مِنَ ٱلْجِبَالِ بُيُوتًا وَمِنَ ٱلشَّجَرِ وَمِمَّا يَعْرِشُونَ
ثُمَّ كُلِى مِن كُلِّ ٱلثَّمَرَٰتِ فَٱسْلُكِى سُبُلَ رَبِّكِ ذُلُلًا ۚ يَخْرُجُ مِنۢ بُطُونِهَا شَرَابٌ مُّخْتَلِفٌ أَلْوَٰنُهُۥ
فِيهِ شِفَآءٌ لِّلنَّاسِ ۗ إِنَّ فِى ذَٰلِكَ لَءَايَةً لِّقَوْمٍ يَتَفَكَّرُونَ

> And your Lord inspired the bees: 'Make your homes in the mountains, the trees, and *in what people construct*, then feed from the flower of any fruit you please, and *follow the ways your Lord has made easy for you*.' From their bellies comes forth *liquid of varying colors*, in which there is *healing for people*. Surely in this is *a sign for those who reflect* (16:68-69, author's translation and emphasis).

The logic behind the *Shaykh*'s advice can therefore be understood in three parts:

1. The verses affirm that not only mountains and trees, but any human-made structure can be divinely-sanctioned bee lodging,

2. Bees are divinely encouraged to pursue what is easy for them and in doing so produce a liquid (i.e. honey) that is a remedy for people, and therefore,

3. Surely one clear sign for the pious is that a human-made apiary that sees to the ease and comfort of bees can await the divinely-promised benefit of healing honey.

As for seeking *baraka* from pious individuals such as the Nasiri *Shaykh*, this is a widespread Sufi practice rooted in the belief held by *zawāyā* that blessings do not come from the individual themselves, but rather that this person is known to sincerely strive for the sacred path and, therefore, naturally attract divine blessings and grace. Accordingly, when such an individual gives their approval and prays for the success of something that they are approached for advice on, it is believed that the endeavor will not only be temporarily successful but also carry with it an abundance of *baraka* and protection in the future (in the context of an apiary from, e.g., drought, floods, communal strife, etc).

To return to the story of the apiary, the man returned to Inzerki and – heeding the *Shaykh*'s advice on the wellbeing of the bees – eventually chose the southern facing slope of a nearby valley surrounded by mountains and diverse flora to lay his first hive. This location also provided ample sunlight and protection against the wind. When it was time to harvest the

honey from the single hive, the man decided to once again make the journey to the *zāwiya* so that he could gift the honey to the Nasiri *Shaykh*. The *Shaykh* warmly received the honey and immediately divided it amongst his students at the *zāwiya*, and after making further prayers for Allah to grant *baraka* in the man's beekeeping efforts going forward, he promised to pay him a visit to Inzerki during the next season's honey harvest.

The Nasiri *Shaykh* kept his promise and upon seeing and appreciating the location that the man chose to lay his hive, he suggested that the beekeeper build a structure that could house multiple stationary hives. The man was grateful to oblige the *Shaykh*'s suggestion and proceeded to build a small adobe hut for his hives, along with the help of the other villagers. After having learned the story of the Nasiri *Shaykh*'s prayers and the man's visit to the *zāwiya* in Tafilalt to gift the honey, the villagers of Inzerki were eager to construct their own huts so that they too could take part in the blessed enterprise.

Figure 3: *Taddaret Inzerki*

Thus was born both the apiary of *Taddaret Inzerki* and the tradition of an annual festival whereby the villagers of Inzerki gift the first honey harvest of the year to the Nasiri *Zāwiya* of Sidi Muhammad in Tafilalt – whose reputation of feeding students honey is well known in the region to this day. In fact, the annual honey-gifting festival was discontinued only in 1980, when a series of annual droughts rendered the apiary nearly inoperative. However, in the last decade, both *zāwiya* and apiary have seen a parallel rejuvenation and concerted effort in restoring their institutional missions. For the former, this is running what is known as a *madrasa nizamiya* (Islamic school), where students live and study (named after the educational system established by the 11th-century Seljuk statesman and scholar Nizam al-Mulk), and for the latter, this is implementing traditional Islamic beekeeping and honey production (Ait Bounsar 2020). The leadership of both institutions remain in constant contact, are on good terms, and speak sentimentally about the prospect of re-establishing the honey gifting ritual. Additionally, the apiary leadership have plans of relaunching an annual festival to celebrate at least one of the various seasonal honey harvests.

Figure 4: traditional home in Inzerki

Another regional branch of the Nasiri *Zāwiya*, known as Sidi Abdullah Ou Said, also visits Inzerki on an annual basis for a different festival. In late summer, the leadership of the *zāwiya* arrive to Inzerki and throw salt on the villagers' houses so as to protect them from scorpions, spiders, snakes, etc. They also do a public reading of Qur'ān and prayer for the apiary and larger agricultural activities of the village to be fruitful and protected from drought, harmful insects, wild boars, etc. The villagers have long believed that there is a tangible difference (i.e. more blessings and protection) before and after the salt-throwing and prayers take place, and therefore gift the *zāwiya* leadership a portion of their summer harvest: the crops and trees in the valley apart from the honey, which is out of season at that time.

The intimate association of the villagers of Inzerki, and their *collegium*, with the Nasiri-affiliated *zawāya* and their beliefs and practices is indicative of the centrally embedded role of Islam in their identity and worldview. This was not only the case hundreds of years ago, but up to the present day – a topic we now turn to in the next section.

4. Rules of the (Islamic) Commons & Economic Empowerment

Located in the mostly rural Sous region of Morocco, the namesake village of Inzerki today has an Amazigh (indigenous people of north and west Africa) population of around 250, with unreliable access to grid electricity and water, and no access to a paved road. Unsurprisingly for such a remote place, the apiary serves as the sole economic opportunity for most of the residents of Inzerki. More broadly, the indigenous population of the village has experienced genuine and continuous autonomy over their affairs since at least the founding of the apiary, which predates the establishment of the currently ruling Alawite monarchy (the oldest of the Arab world) by over a century. Through the collaborative support of the Moroccan government, the UN Environment Program, the German BMUV, and the International Union for Conservation of Nature, the apiary today is recognized for its cultural and ecological value as an Indigenous and Community Conserved Area or ICCA (see also Figure 5).

Figure 5: infographic at the foothills of the apiary

Functionally, Taddaret Inzerki is structured so that each family in the village has a set allocation of huts in the apiary where they (or any person they choose to allow) can lay their bee hives, harvest honey during one of the various times of year (depending on the nectar season), and consume and/or sell it (although in reality it is mostly small children who focus on the former). The collective apiary contains approximately 150 huts, with each hut containing 4 levels and the capacity to hold 15-20 traditional hives, with the population of honey bees having access to a diverse range of flowers for nectar: Acacia, Date Palm, Carob, Juniper, Lavender, Oregano, Prickly Pear, Thyme, and – exclusively to the region – Argan.



Figure 6: annual Honey Harvests of *Taddaret Inzerki*

The apiary does not charge fees for laying hives, nor does it take commissions on the honey produced, but it is instead run as a community-led natural resource commons – following the general principles empirically observed in similar traditional institutions elsewhere (Cox et al. 2010). However, a distinctive set of 'rules for the commons' have remained intact in Inzerki for more than half a millennium, not in written form, but passed down for generations both orally and embodied in practice:

General Rules

- Only traditional cylindrical hives are allowed to be used at the apiary.
- One is free to set down hives in their own huts, or in other huts if given explicit permission to do so by the hut owners.

- It is forbidden to set down hives outside of the known nectar/bee foraging seasons.

Beekeeper Rules

- Pre-conditions for a person harvesting the honey include:
  - They must be an upright person (be deemed to have good character) by Islamic standards.
  - They must not have any outstanding conflicts with community members.
- During the time of harvest, the person harvesting must:
  - Invoke the name of God (say '*bismillah*', i.e. in the name of Allah) before beginning.
  - Be dressed in white because it both keeps the bees calm and represents purity in Islam.
  - Be in a state of ritual purity as if one is about to pray, which means performing Islamic ablution (i.e. *wudu*) beforehand.

Respectful Etiquette Rules (and Expectations)

- One is expected to give a portion of the first honey harvest of every season to the apiary guardian, which serves as his salary.
- One is expected to give honey or extra space to lay hives to community members if asked, just as reciprocity is an honored social norm.
- When harvesting, one is expected to:
  - Harvest only one hive at a time.
  - Only harvest between the third and fourth prayers of the day (which corresponds to the few hours leading up to sunset) since that is when the bees are believed to be calmest.
  - Not harvest too many hives or harvest outside of that time period.
  - Minimize disturbance to bees from the hive at hand and neighboring hives.

Categorically, these rules safeguard either 1) the wellbeing of the bees, 2) the rights of apiary colleagues, and/or 3) the Islamically sound status of beekeepers. The villagers believe that if they fail to uphold even one of these three imperatives, the *baraka* present within their apiary, and perhaps the apiary itself, would certainly fade away (along with their livelihoods). Because these prioritizations are all consciously and scrupulously rooted in Islam, *Taddaret Inzerki* forms a real-world conception of an Islamic indigenous cooperative.

This point becomes clear when examining even the first rule of the apiary: a ban on any other type of hives apart from the local traditional ones, and it exists for two reasons. First, by experience, the beekeepers of Inzerki find it significantly more challenging to work with bees residing in modern hives (which are square shaped, i.e. a lidded box) because they are more quickly distressed and agitated as opposed to the traditional cylindrical ones, where they find the bees to be calm and composed. Second, and what the beekeepers see as directly related, the quality and taste of the honey from traditional hives is believed to be fundamentally

better than that of boxes.[5] Notably, box hives a decade ago used to sell for ~€150 each and traditional ones for the equivalent of only a few Euros. Today, however, the Moroccan honey market is undergoing shifting consumer preferences towards the local and artisanal, e.g. most people prefer to (and indeed do) purchase honey straight from beekeepers, the honey's floral origin and flavor being the two most important characteristics (Khaoula et al. 2019). Accordingly, box hives now sell for ~€100 and traditional ones for a minimum of €200.



Figure 7: bees of Inzerki (left) and a traditional cylindrical hive (right)

The ban persists despite the fact that the beekeepers are fully aware of two significant advantages that come with utilizing box-based hives: an individual box can produce up to 40 kg of honey annually (and contains 60k bees), whereas a traditional cylindrical hive averages just 10 kg (and contains up to 30k bees); boxes can be stacked one on top of the other and are therefore easily transportable, whether along the supply chain or for the bees to have access to different nectars. The beekeepers of Inzerki made it clear that an institutional goal of their apiary is to specifically not compete at scale, i.e. produce the most amount of honey possible. Instead, they seek to preserve the reputation of *Taddaret Inzerki*, dating back to its genesis, namely, that beekeeping is a sacred craft in which the wellbeing of bees is regarded as paramount and, in doing so, ultimately produces high-quality, healing honey that is also believed to have *baraka*.

The apiary also does not practice any selective breeding of queen bees. Because the villagers regard bees as sacred, they believe it would be invasive and inappropriate to interfere with their reproductive process. Moreover, they believe in an almost Darwinian sense that if they let (Allah's) nature run its course, the healthy and hearty queen bees and their offspring will be the ones to survive and flourish, and therefore the apiary will be resilient against the elements and pathogens.

Another salient example of the Islamic nature of the commons in Inzerki is the honey harvest. Work begins only when sunset draws near, since that is when the beekeepers find the bees to be most tranquil, and honey is delicately extracted from a single hive at a time up to a maximum of only 5-7 hives per day. This slow and almost meditative process is deliberate so as to minimize disturbance to the bees from the hive at hand as well as nearby hives. When first approaching a hive, beekeepers use a small amount of smoke produced from burning a mix of dried cow manure and the leaves of olive trees to calm the bees and make sure the beekeeper does not startle them. Throughout, a mix of crushed onions and water

5 The difference in quality between the two is also attributed to the traditional way of harvesting the honey, which uses a clay pot slow-drip technique that inevitably includes bits of the pollen with the honey.

is immediately sprayed on the bits of honey that inevitably fall during the process of honey extraction, so that the nearby bees do not violently swarm on the honey (a process locally known as *timingit*, Tamazight for 'the assault of the bees'), which would otherwise occur and potentially agitate and attract thousands of bees. After extraction but before the traditional hive is used again, it is sterilized and purified by burning incense. The above practices are indicative of the profound respect the beekeepers of Inzerki have for both the bees and their traditional craft of beekeeping.

Figure 8: levels of the apiary with rows of terraced huts

The Economics of the Indigenous Cooperative

In terms of the livelihood of the beekeepers, those that were interviewed were unanimously aligned on the perspective that the apiary allows them the economic means to remain in Inzerki and avoid emigration. This is especially so considering that the only other potential source of income in the valley, other agricultural produce, is insufficient and would restrict or even damage the ecosystem of the bees – something they regarded as an entirely unacceptable outcome. At the time of writing, a single traditional hive at the apiary will produce, as was already stated, around 10 kg of honey, which sells for an average of 300 dirhams per kilogram (roughly €30), meaning that if a villager lays 20 hives annually (a very feasible amount), they can expect around €6,000 of annual income – which they are manifestly grateful for. By way of context, €2,900 and €8,700 are respectively the minimum annual wage and average public-sector annual wage in Morocco (Eliason 2019). The prevailing view is that although there are some issues where central-government (or other external) help is welcomed, which will be discussed below, the villagers are content living self-sufficiently through their indigenous cooperative.

It is therefore understandable why the perseverance and success of the apiary is regarded as a vital part of their livelihood and even their overall identity. In fact, the villagers believe in the

material and immaterial conservation and rejuvenation of their common natural resource that is the apiary. This explains why *Taddaret Inzerki* takes a strictly 'B2C' approach to the sale of its honey: by forgoing any intermediaries and selling directly to customers, the beekeepers feel that they can avoid any potential counterfeiting or foul play (e.g. mixing with other honey, dilution with sugar or syrups, etc.) and subsequently preserve the reputation of quality that their apiary is known for. Logistically, this requires the beekeepers to make, at minimum, a 15 km trek to the nearest paved road, where they link up with truck drivers heading towards particular cities in Morocco, and arrange delivery with individual customers mostly through social media.

The perseverance and success of the apiary will, on rare occasion, even prompt the villagers to seek external assistance. A notable example was their desire to address what they saw as an insufficient number of functioning boreholes and solar panels at the apiary. This occurred in the backdrop of the government's decade-long Green Morocco Plan launched in 2008, with one of its core objectives being the development of local (rural) products, and eventually supported 720 domestic cooperatives (Agency for Agricultural Development 2022), including *Taddaret Inzerki*. The villagers wanted to be included in the initiative because they recognized that they were unequipped in terms of know-how and capital regarding the drilling of boreholes and the installation and maintenance of solar panels, which offered a low-impact (i.e. green) route to upgrading the water and energy infrastructure of the apiary. As such, they took the initiative to register *Taddaret Inzerki* as an official cooperative at their local council – a necessary step to receive support via the Green Morocco Plan. The villagers subsequently received funding and technical support from the Moroccan government (and in close collaboration, international NGOs), which had years of experience directly or indirectly implementing rural public-works projects utilizing recent, environmentally conscious, technologies.

The Apiary, Recapitulated

As is evident from the rules of the commons concerning the rights of apiary colleagues and the piety of individuals, the villagers of Inzerki are concerned not only with decorum vis-à-vis the bees, but also with others, as well as with the divine. The apiary is therefore not a strictly vocational association, but rather much more along the lines of an Althusian *collegium* that envelopes and manages social life, i.e. colleagues live and are ruled by it. Indeed, *Taddaret Inzerki* is a source of active character development and refinement, as well as a setter of social norms and customs (beyond beekeeping), regularly through its senior members and occasionally, although principally, through the regional Nasiri *Shuyūkh* and their prayers and guidance during annual festivals or impromptu visits.

The villagers are driven by the belief that upholding proper etiquette means one is being considerate to others and is respecting divine guidelines for human behavior – both of which are considered fundamental parts of being a good Muslim (even outside of the context of the apiary). Otherwise, if one is to remove the necessities of invoking the name of God, performing a ritual wash, and wearing white garments after making up with a neighbor from their Islamic context, it may appear as though the beekeepers have various idiosyncratic practices that are both trivial and rather inefficient to the production of honey. As all of the beekeepers that were interviewed affirmed, however, these idiosyncratic practices are an inseparable

and sacrosanct part of their indigenous craft of Islamic beekeeping. The status of Islam in *Taddaret Inzerki* is therefore as uncompromisingly paramount and central today as it was when the Nasiri *Shaykh* Sidi Muhammad gave his counsel and *baraka* five centuries ago.

5. Discussion: The Triple Benefit

> "The final cause of politics is the enjoyment of a comfortable, useful, and happy life, and of the common welfare – that we may live with piety and honour a peaceful and quiet life, that … true piety toward God and justice among the citizens may prevail at home" (Althusius 1995, 24).

The results of the ethnographic data collected suggest that the scope of decision-making power and responsibility devolved to *Taddaret Inzerki* is comprehensive, and that the villagers utilize this continued autonomy to run a centuries-old indigenous cooperative based on their local Islamic tradition. These findings indicate, preliminarily, that the devolution policy results in a triple-benefit: for the Moroccan state who implements it, the villagers who act upon it, and the globe who can learn from it.

The Moroccan State

Apart from its inherent remoteness, the case illustrated that the Inzerki villagers and their apiary proved to be a strategically well-suited candidate for the Moroccan state's devolution policy for two main reasons, both of which are of significant benefit. The first reason is the healthy interplay of local autonomy and state allegiance exhibited by *Taddaret Inzerki*, which is closely related to the nuances between devolution (which is focused on scale) and subsidiarity (which is focused on both scale and competence). To clarify, it was only because of the comprehensive transfer of responsibility and decision-making power over their own affairs (i.e. devolution) that the villagers were able to recognize the limits of their knowledge and expertise (e.g. in the case of upgrading water and energy infrastructure), and consciously turn to the state for support in a particular area that it has higher competency in (i.e. subsidiarity), which subsequently cements state legitimacy and authority. The case of *Taddaret Inzerki* suggests that the dynamic of a genuinely autonomous *collegium* that decides when, what, and how state support is appropriate – and by doing so implicitly recognizes the higher powers of the realm – is a positive one not only in Althusian, but also in Islamic terms.

The second reason as to why the apiary is a sensible choice for continued devolution relates to the manifest loyalty of the villagers to the head of the realm (in the Moroccan context: the king) as a principle of belief cultivated by the Nasiri *Zāwiya*. To be clear, all *zawāyā* in Morocco not only recognize the Alawite monarchy as legitimate, but ceremoniously pledge allegiance (*bayʿa*) to it and make regular public prayers (at least every Friday) for the king to be granted *baraka* (and by extension, the society he rules over; Chafik and Drechsler 2022). This ritualization of what Althusius describes as holding a 'reverent attitude' gives the Moroccan monarchy an indispensable amount of sacred soft power that not only legitimizes its rule but garners it support and popularity.

What is particularly noteworthy about the Nasiri *Zāwiya* is that it is one of Morocco's most prominent, with hundreds of branches in rural and urban areas and, at the headquarters

zāwiya, one of the oldest and largest manuscript libraries in the maghreb – that was funded and supported, not coincidently, by the Moroccan government. The Nasiriya are responsible for some of the most iconic manifestations of Moroccan Islam, e.g. the twice-daily *hizb* (1/60 section of the Qur'ān) group recitation done in every mosque in the country to this day, and Imam al-Darʿi's (d. 1674) *Prayer of the Oppressed*, which was recited so frequently and extensively throughout Morocco during the colonial period (adopted even by non-Nasiri *zawāyā*) that it helped inspire resistance to the French occupation (Ar-Radani 2014, 12). The benefit to the Moroccan government of having the allegiance of, and experiencing a 'reverent attitude' from, such a beloved *zāwiya* and its members, who are exemplar beekeepers and citizens, is quite evident.

The Villagers

Although the numerous benefits of the devolution policy for the villagers of Inzerki were apparent throughout the case, one can emphasize the four most prominent. First, and most importantly, the villagers have sufficient autonomy to shape, administer, and preserve their centuries-old Islamic apiary as they see fit. Second, through the apiary, the villagers are able to reliably maintain a respectable (both in terms of income and dignity) livelihood in an area (and even country) where such an accomplishment remains elusive for many. Third, the Islamic apiary is literally known as the home (*taddaret*) of Inzerki, which highlights the real sense of shared local identity and overall social structure and harmony that is cultivated through it – positive signs of a functional *collegium*. Fourth, the conservation and enhancement of the local environment surrounding Inzerki, which is something the villagers value immensely in itself and with regards to the quality of their local life. This, of course, makes the villagers of Inzerki one more example in a long tradition of indigenous stewardship of natural resource commons (Gadgil et al. 1993), which brings us to the third, i.e. planetary, benefit.

The World

In a techno-economic age driven by information and communications technology (Perez 2002), one of the *prima facie* more ironic insights revealed by the findings is that by pursuing an age-old local tradition of beekeeping, the apiary provides groundbreaking answers to various global challenges. Take for instance the well-established consumer preferences trend of preferring and even paying a considerable premium for products that are natural, organic, small-scale, artisanal, etc., or the increasing importance of concepts such as animal welfare, ESG (environmental, social, and corporate governance), and the triple bottom-line (profit, people, and planet) for businesses globally (for a Morocco-specific analysis, see Lambarraa-Lehnhardt et al. 2021). *Taddaret Inzerki* is not retroactively attempting to fit any of these standards or desired qualities into its practices, nor is the Moroccan government nudging or forcing it to get there through incentives or regulations (or the latest app), but rather, the apiary may already provide general principles – or at the very least perhaps a starting point – of how Islamic beekeeping can all at once generate high-quality honey, economically empower local populations, tread lightly (and even enhance) the environment, and compassionately sustain biodiversity. With regard to the latter in particular, the critical role of healthy bee populations for ecosystems (and life as such) due to their role as pollinators

is difficult to overstate, which makes, in the author's estimation, the successful model of the apiary a *globally* highly relevant and encouraging achievement.

6. Further Research

Before proposing directions for future research, the author acknowledges that at least two limitations exist with regards to the study's findings. The first relates to external validity: prior to generalizing or replicating any successes from *Taddaret Inzerki*, it is important to note that it required 1) an extant indigenous cooperative operating at the micro (village) level that is 2) deeply committed to a largely homogenous tradition of Moroccan Islam and 3) a realm (i.e. central state) that is stable and strong enough to trust the process and end result of devolution. It would therefore require further studies in other contexts before even getting close to (Islamic) paradigm-specific, let alone general, best practices. The second limitation concerns the punctuated nature of data collection (amidst the pandemic), even going beyond the usual issues of case studies based on stakeholder interviews within a somewhat immersive approach. Specifically, as the time horizon of the *in situ* ethnographic research was short (two months), the author was unable to observe and interview as many villagers as intended, nor attend the apiary's various festivals and honey-season rituals. However, to the author's knowledge, the present essay is the first contribution on *Taddaret Inzerki* to the English academic literature and, as such, can (hopefully) serve as an informative first take.

That being said, one can identify four broad areas of future research that are potentially fruitful and worth exploring through further empirical cases and theoretical analyses of the apiary itself, and similar institutions in Morocco and beyond. All four areas would require a decolonizing research approach, that is, not simply critiquing colonialism and its legacies (e.g. global Western academic hegemony), but "reimagining and bringing forward Indigenous epistemic approaches, philosophies and methodologies" (Smith 2021, xii).

1. Lessons for local devolution

The case of *Taddaret Inzerki* demonstrates that it may be possible to overcome one of the largest stumbling blocks to municipal-level devolution policies: working with what successful institutions are already present (whether indigenous or local) instead of creating new, ultimately unfamiliar, ones based on external principles. To do so, the first step for the state and its partners should be to identify, understand, and value local institutions and *their* principles. After all, "the basic unit of actual living together, the least imagined and most 'real' one, is the community in which one lives, and that is the municipality. To have a say in this community and about that community can easily be called the most basic idea of autonomy at all – today in the globalized world as much as it was already in the Middle Ages" (Drechsler 2013a, 163).

This raises another interesting topic of future study, which is the enduring relevance of Althusius, in particular his concept of the *collegium* in the larger taxonomy of societal institutions, not only for municipal devolution but, more broadly, as the basis for key contemporary concepts such as interactive (Torfing et al. 2012), network (Torfing 2005), collaborative (Ansell 2012), cooperative (Valentinov 2004), polycentric (Ostrom 2010), and public value (O'Flynn 2021)

governance. Carrying on the spirit of decolonizing research, which calls not for a blanket dismissal of Western theory and research, but for taking up and developing relevant parts of it from non-Eurocentric perspectives, values, and purposes (Archibald et al. 2019), *Taddaret Inzerki* demonstrated that Althusius's *collegium* is useful in understanding community-based governance and administration even within the Islamic paradigm. As we have seen, the apiary is much more than a group of professionals: it is an identity-generating cooperative that serves as the vehicle to the 'good life' and constitutes civil society itself for the villagers. Indeed, in a world of "globalization, … multiculturalism, and migration, the municipality becomes the citizens' genuine home" – which is one of the reasons why municipal autonomy is often seen as problematic or even threatening from the nation state's perspective (Drechsler 2008, 140). Perhaps, then, one remedy to this inherent conflict is to further understand, and if possible extract lessons from, *Taddaret Inzerki* and similar *collegia* that in spite of (arguably, because of) municipal autonomy, maintain a symbiotic, mutually-beneficial relationship with the state. Potential examples of such *collegia* range from the Sienese *contrade* (Drechsler 2006), which are from a Western urban setting, to *pesantren* (Fawaid 2016), which operate in a rural (Islamic) Indonesian context.

Finally, one may argue that centuries of local autonomy are simply a function of Inzerki's remoteness and size, which combine to make it a truly peripheral location from a public administration perspective – in other words, a policy of devolution by apathy. However, the Moroccan government was not apathetic when it chose to actively include Inzerki in its national rural development agenda, grant the apiary cultural and ecological heritage status alongside several international bodies, and respond to the local request for support with upgrading the local water and energy infrastructure. While it is true that the village and its apiary are relatively minor in the broader domestic affairs of Morocco, and may be regarded by many (especially urban) Moroccans as antiquated – this is exactly why the case of *Taddaret Inzerki* is interesting, i.e. that an indigenous cooperative operating quietly and inconspicuously in the periphery for centuries is able to be reliably called upon to address the societal issues and demands of today. Discovering where and how similar institutions exist is surely an important agenda item for future research.

2. Observed principles of local-level Islamic Economics

The findings on *Taddaret Inzerki*, although, again, not sufficient to theorize on Islamic Economics as such, do offer three general principles of a local-level economic structure inherently based on Islam, even if they share commonalities with other traditions. First, an unwavering emphasis on respecting the sanctity of a craft or livelihood. The Inzerki villagers have a strong sense of and live by certain Islamically-informed requirements and limits to their beekeeping activities, which keeps the actual craft intact despite clear economic incentives to change it. Therefore the not-very *homines economici* villagers demonstrate, in a Polanyian sense (1944), that profit is not the natural driving force of society but, rather, is embedded within (and subservient to) the culture, norms, and values of that particular society.

Second, economic livelihood is fundamentally linked to *baraka*. For the villagers, livelihood is believed to be ordained by God (*Ar-Razzāq* or 'The Provider' is one of the names of Allah), and as long as they are seeking to be on His path, the following is believed to be blessed and continue: forage (various flora) for the bees, water supply (annual rainfall), seasonal

harvests of honey, quality (i.e. taste and health benefits) of the honey, income from the honey, harmonious social relations, and the apiary itself. From such a perspective, disregarding bee welfare to maximize output (i.e. honey) or violating any other rule of their commons becomes not only sinful, but irrational, because of the prospect of removing *baraka* from all of the above. In essence, one's livelihood is a function of not only the labor they do, but ensuring that the labor, the nature of it, and its externalities, is divinely sanctioned. Or as Althusius put it: "May the supremely good and great God grant that while we dwell in this social life by his kindness, we may show ourselves pleasing to him and beneficial to our neighbour" (1995, 15).

Third, 'sustainable' is an upshot of (aiming to uphold) Islamic values, not the goal itself. The Inzerki villagers do not base their apiary on the worldview, however correct it may be, that a sustainability agenda is increasingly necessary as a consequence of late industrial capitalism threatening the planet's climate and biodiversity. Rather, the conservation of their natural resource commons in the form of an apiary is based on the worldview of Islamic stewardship – that creation, including nature, is not our possession but Allah's and must therefore be treated as a sacred responsibility. Once again, this is a key point to consider when designing devolution policies (especially in the context of natural resource management): instead of transporting an external, often secular, model of how and why sustainable practices should be achieved, one must first consider local or indigenous models that may ultimately result in sustainable (perhaps even regenerative) outcomes because of the broader set of ontological and theological views underlying them. To advance our understanding of such views within the Islamic context, *maqāsid* (higher objectives/purposes of Islam) is a particularly salient concept (see Auda 2007).

3. An Islamic Commons?

The case illustrated that the way by which *Taddaret Inzerki* is structured and managed can be distilled into a set of rules of the commons, which reflect the villagers' understanding of (public) value. There have been recent, sensible calls for understanding the contextual nature of, and empowering communities to collectively self-determine, value, i.e. "value as a commons" (Kostakis and Pazaitis 2020). One interesting avenue of future research may be to discuss the notion that all value is contextual, that is, to explore whether there are not some paradigm-wide principles that determine value. Regarding a potential Islamic paradigm of the commons, the apiary hints at universal (e.g. wellbeing of bees) and contextual (e.g. whether or not to charge membership or usufruct fees) elements of value as a commons. As a broader starting point, there also exist various notions of service to (and with) community that are rooted in traditional Islamic scholarship, e.g. *khidma* (task or service for another), *amāna* (obligation or trust relating to both the tangible and intangible), and *maslaha* (public interest).

4. Understanding the impact of Islamic Beekeping

The largest area of potential fruitful research is likely the ecological: how do the practices and perspectives of the beekeepers stand up to our current scientific understanding? Take, for instance, the lack of selective breeding for queen bees. Currently the most common reason for bee colony failure is poor queens, i.e. those that perish prematurely (within less

than a year) instead of after the natural 3-4 year lifespan (Kulhanek et al. 2017). Indeed, the majority of queens in the US are selectively bred by a handful of companies, which "raises concerns about a lack of genetic diversity and the spread of certain diseases" (Amiri et al. 2017). Although none have any scientific training, the beekeepers of Inzerki firmly believe that the phenomenon of poor queens could be avoided if one falls back on local natural breeding of bees and give this advice to any visiting Moroccan, American, or European scientist or beekeeper involved with large-scale commercial industry. The push for this local-level type production of queens, known as 'microbreeding', is something that is indeed underway globally, but remains underexplored in the literature (Amiri et al. 2017), and therefore it remains to be seen whether Inzerki's beekepers are indeed correct.

Apart from diseases, another topic where we have more questions than answers relates to the robustness of Inzerki's bees vis-à-vis the elements. In the period of autumn to winter of 2021-22, Moroccan honey production saw a significant downtick due to the worst national drought in forty years, with many beekeepers across the country reporting failure of all their colonies and the Moroccan government responding with over €12 million in aid (*Le Monde* 2022). However *Taddaret Inzerki*, despite losing several hives over this period, is still in operation and expects healthy spring and early summer harvests. What accounts for the discrepancy? Could it be that the practices of the apiary have a casual effect on colony survival and overall health, and if so, which ones? One of the factors may be something as simple as utilizing only cylindrical hives. As we now know from modern apiology, the language of bees is through various forms of dance, all of which share a circular element (von Frisch 1993). Perhaps then, the communication of bees (and by extension their temperament and health) in box hives is suboptimal?

Despite these promising research questions, one important caveat is that there are certain aspects of Islamic beekeping in Inzerki that are not amenable to investigation, but are instead sacred matters (pertaining to values and faith). For instance, although melittologists today can describe the intricate details of how the stinger's detachment post-sting results in the honeybee dying from what is effectively an abdominal wound (for a popular science account, see Hanson 2018), the head beekeeper pointed out that the realm of 'why' is not readily answerable by the scientific method. He did put forth an Islamic explanation regarding why (of the bees that are capable of stinging) honeybees are the only type of bee to die after stinging: "if a bee could sting a person and simply move on and return to the routines of honey production, that honey would surely be contaminated with impurities and diseases – thus not being a source of healing", referring back to the *supra* Qur'anic verses on honey bees. This anecdote reminds one of the inextricable knowledge-practice-belief structure often found in indigenous communities stewarding their local ecological systems and biodiversity (Gadgil et al. 1993) – and moreover, for the sake of both epistemic decolonization and successful natural resource management, the necessity of respecting and valuing the sacred elements within it.

7. Conclusion

Through *Taddaret Inzerki*, this essay investigated a case of devolution policy vis-à-vis an indigenous cooperative in the area of natural resource management. What is noteworthy about the institutional priorities and practices of the apiary (i.e. the rules of their commons)

which are Islamically based, is that there are built-in components that shape not only all aspects of the craft of beekeeping, but society itself in the small village of Inzerki. These findings demonstrate that this particular devolution policy is 1) insightful because it is actually successful and it emerged from the underexplored Islamic context, 2) beneficial to local, national, and global interests, and 3) (hopefully) encouraging as a starting point for a diverse set of future research themes and questions in public administration and beyond.

Acknowledgements

Firstly, the author greatly appreciates the encouragement and support of the Managing Editor and Editor-in-Chief. The author also thanks the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful feedback, which was mostly taken up and resulted in a significantly improved version of the essay. Samira Laouina's generosity, including her time, was instrumental in facilitating the fieldwork. Finally, the author is grateful and indebted to Si Ibrahim Chatoui for extending an entirely undeserved welcome to Inzerki and its community and sharing his wealth of knowledge in beekeeping and beyond.

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Publication IV

Drechsler, W., & **Chafik, S**. Islamic Public Administration in Sunlight and Shadow: Theory and Practice. *NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy*. [In Press] **ETIS 1.1**.

Islamic Public Administration in Sunlight and Shadow: Theory and Practice

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Abstract

The combination of theoretical principles and centuries old, yet still functional, practices and institutions that together form the Islamic paradigm of public administration (PA) have been customarily absent from both academic literature and PA reform policies, not least in the NISPAcee region. With e.g. the arrival of Peter's *Administrative Traditions* last year however, Islamic PA has now been positioned within the mainstream, that is, recognized as a legitimate, contextually-relevant alternative to the global-Western paradigm. Accordingly, this article aims to further delineate the Islamic PA tradition by discussing its positionality and significance within Non-Western PA, surveying its normative principles, exploring a set of contemporary case studies in Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Morocco, and concluding with a broader reflection on the importance of contextuality and heterogeneity for good PA.

Keywords: Islamic Public Administration, Non-Western Public Administration, *vakıf*, *mahalla*, *zawāyā*

Introduction

Non-Western public administration – NWPA – presents a fundamental yet fruitful challenge to the global-Western mainstream, despite hitherto not receiving much academic attention (Drechsler 2013a). One of the key non-Western paradigms, Islamic Public Administration, is a tradition replete with normative principles accumulated across centuries of scholarship. Yet it is also accompanied by a general dearth of contemporary scholarship of practice, which has somewhat hindered its potential to serve as a tenable paradigm in the academic literature. The current essay contributes to filling this lacuna by both laying out the theory and showing some real and functioning practices of various levels of public administration (PA).

This is especially relevant in and for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the Caucasus, and Central Asia – the NISPAcee region, in other words. As one of us already pointed out over a decade ago, ten of the countries it encompasses as Islamic in the sense of having a Muslim majority, and many others were influenced or indeed administered by Islamic empires for centuries, even half a millennium. (In fact, there are no Muslim-majority countries in Europe *outside* the NISPAcee region.) And yet, NISPAcee research generally and this journal in particular have featured very little research on Islamic PA (Drechsler 2013b, pp. 57–58; next to our work, Urinboyev, 2011 is a notable exception), perhaps not in small part due to the lack, or perceived lack, of a theoretical scaffolding.

But this intellectual situation has markedly improved by today. As a key example, we can now utilize B.G. Peters' recent very positive, if brief, treatment of Islamic PA in his "instant classic", *Administrative Traditions* (2021, pp. 163-166) – something that, given Peters' towering presence in the field of PA and public policy, not only academically but also regarding PA reform, and especially in CEE (see Randma-Liiv & Drechsler, 2019), makes eminent sense. Peters takes up several of our earlier discussions of Islamic (and other Non-Western) PA, and he focuses on the relevance of Islamic PA today, as the subtitle, *Understanding the Roots of Contemporary Administrative Behavior*, suggests. This fits the approach of this present essay very well, while at the same time giving us the opportunity to elucidate these points and add, in a reminding way, some concrete cases. Peters' observations (2021) that Islamic PA has a tendency towards the communal, the participatory, and the bottom-up dovetails with our choice of three highly relevant, contemporary institutions that broadly fall into these categories.

To do so, we first offer a survey of some of the theoretical principles of NWPA and Islamic PA. Then, we utilize a small but emerging niche of geographically diverse case studies on the practice of Islamic PA, and specifically on community- and cooperative-oriented institutions. Cases come from Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Morocco. Our results flesh out how theoretical Islamic principles of public administration play out in practice, and also inductively emphasize previously often un(der)-theorized ones.

From the perspective of moving beyond unidirectionality, this brief study therefore looks at both the operational mechanics and guiding ethics of a functional, real-existing paradigm of NWPA. Our findings support the idea that at least one of the reasons why already-existing administrative systems are successful is precisely because they emerged in and preserve a local (and Islamic) context – thereby contributing to the decentering of Western PA, which is a point that has recently moved, if not to the forefront of the agenda, then certainly towards it.

Context: Non-Western Public Administration

Unidirectionality in PA is the position that there is one global way of doing PA, that PA is not contextual, and that what is now global PA is without alternative. Moving beyond this perspective requires acknowledging that there exist different, valid paradigms of PA. This, in turn, implies that there is not one global best (practice of) PA, but that what we call global PA is actually Western PA, a perspective that seems to have taken ground around a decade ago, or more precisely, in 2013 (Drechsler, 2013a; Raadschelders, 2013; de Vries, 2013b; Pierre, 2013). If PA has – with Geert Bouckaert – two dimensions, ethics (goals) and performance (mechanics), linked though they may often be, “good PA” is both well working and ethical by its own standards (Bouckaert 2011). And as Jürgen Habermas has reminded us, “the moral conduct of a population is measured, as a whole, by those convictions and norms valid in their society” (2019, p. 789).

But there is a larger, indeed fundamental and actually truly wicked problem here. The underlying general question is whether all human beings are basically the same and will eventually end up in one global society with the same values, or whether large cultural differences will legitimately remain as they are, at least for a long duration, and that to respect this is crucial. The wickedness comes to fruition once values from the same system that prompt the former conflict with the latter. Implicitly, the former position extrapolates the Western model as the goal of convergence, and it

holds that empirically, globalization is the way thither, often in a somewhat folklorized version of Weber's Occidental Rationalism and Modernization theses (see Schluchter, 1979). This is the West's "project of modernity" not as one option, but as an umbrella, a roof under which other systems can and must accommodate themselves – and actually only as long as they do not challenge the ascendancy of the West itself (Siemons, 2020). Such an approach is reinforced by the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, which in turn is potentially somewhat delegitimizing for non-Western solutions, at least in the short-run, even though about all Russian ideology deployed in this case uses Western (in the sense of Christian, non- or even anti-Asian, i.e. "East of the West", not "West of the East") tropes (see e.g. the foundational Berdjajew, 1927).

Reagarding PA in particular, as we said, what we tacitly do is to largely equate good with global PA, and global PA with modern PM, and that with Western PA – and that, as PA usually has it, is contemporary Anglo-American PA; it is certainly so in scholarship (see only Drechsler, 2020a; Raadschelders, 2013; Pollitt, 2014). In other words, countries and places that do not adhere to or at least move towards the global-Western standard (even if this is allowed to include significant regional variations, which is not always the case) are somehow remiss; they do not provide optimal PA and thus governance. The only excuse they may have is that they are laggards, that they are in transition, but they are expected to eventually arrive at global (Western) PA. Much of the sad state of PA reform in non-Western countries is arguably related to this – countries were and are not allowed to develop their own strengths based on their own traditions, but were and are told to adopt Western formats, or else (e.g. otherwise they would not receive vital funding).

It is however a bold assumption to assume convergence, especially seeing that what constitutes good PA obviously hinges on public policy, government, governance, and indeed cultural context (Pollitt, 2013). Therefore, there really is no reason to believe that if one transfers what works in Boise, Idaho (if it works, which is not something one can assume *prima facie*) to Dhaka, it will work there as well. In fact, the track record of PA transfer, rather than PA learning, often pushed by the international organizations has at least been mixed; histories of failures abound, and it may even well be that there are more of these than successes (Andrews, 2013). The CEE region is arguably a prime example of this (de Vries 2013b).

Nevertheless, the alternative way of thinking, that is, recognizing that there is such a thing as NWPA, is only slowly (re-)surfacing and entering the mainstream PA discourse (Drechsler, 2020a). Certainly, there are no areas left in the world, including the carrier countries of NWPA, that are not hybrid –

one is almost tempted to say "contaminated" – by global-Western PA (Drechsler, 2013a, 2015a), and this makes recognizing non-Western features difficult. And yet,

> We should expect to find substantial movement toward a common model of administration… But the evidence, even among European countries, is not very strong in that direction. Indeed, one can make an equally strong case for the persistence of national patterns in the face of homogenization, and further that in some cases there has been divergence as well as convergence. (Peters, 2021, pp. 202-203)

At this point, we should note that global-Western PA is not homogeneous either but rather has a very wide, internally contradictory scope. For example, the anti-state destructionism of NPM versus state-affirming, citizen-focused approaches such as the Neo-Weberian State makes for very different contexts (and outcomes) indeed (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017; Peters, 2021; Drechsler, 2005). But depending on the level of abstraction, there is clearly such a thing as the, albeit moving, target of global-Western PA.

And in fact, it is precisely carefully considering NWPA alternatives to the global-Western mainstream that has, next to understanding these systems themselves, the dual effect of both qualifying and illuminating the latter, making it possible to have a more thorough and more relevant approach to global-Western PA, potentially enabling scholars and practitioners to reposition themselves regarding more appropriate advice and reform. And so, looking at NWPA allows those stuck in global-Western unidirectionality to recognize, at least, that what they see as globally valid, natural, and given is highly contingent at best (Drechsler, 2020a; 2015).

The Challenge of Islamic PA

The two most important NWPA traditions present today, that is, those that form genuine challenges to the universalism of the global-Western approach, are the Confucian and the Islamic one (Drechsler, 2013a; 2015; 2020a). Confucian PA is an obvious case, and – even before the Covid-19 response results – obviously successful (Drechsler, 2018a; Nemec et al., 2020). As Max Weber pointed out, it is indeed the one system of PA closest to "his", meaning here the rational-modern mainstream that, inspite of the variants and shifts mentioned *supra*, are still at the core of the global-Western mainstream (Weber, 1989; Drechsler, 2020b).

What makes Islamic PA special is that this is the main NWPA tradition physically bordering, and thus challenging, the West. Since this happened, in the form that survived until today at least, historically from Southwestern Europe, it is also *inside* Europe (Drechsler, 2018b). This is not the case with the Confucian tradition, nor is Confucian PA perceived (at least to the same extent as Islamic PA) as being based on a threatening ideology. Islamic PA is challenging indeed: its sheer existence calls out the non-connectedness of religion and PA as a choice (and a wrong one at that), not something "given", and it is something the West has to react to beyond insisting that it should not be so.

Compared to Confucian PA, Islamic PA is therefore the more tricky, the more controversial, and thus in some sense the more interesting alternative to the Western paradigm—not least because it also challenges the global West from the inside. As Hans-Georg Gadamer pointed out, 20th century changes such as the foundation of Israel as a state, oil money, and migration have basically thrown the challenge of Islam right back into Europe and thus the global West (1993, p. 271) – if less so, so far, into CEE.

Yet Islamic PA has in general suffered from a bad reputation in the global-Western realm, part because of propaganda, part because of the lack of serious, and serious-taking, investigation, ever since Max Weber intended to, but never came around to, write a book on the topic and only left us with some quite disparaging – if less so than usually cited – remarks in more general texts (Schluchter, 1987).

But how important can religion possibly be for PA (Ongaro 2021)? Surely it is not for global-Western PA nowadays. Once we accept that there is such a thing as NWPA, however, we must also realize that this is a very Western question to ask in the first place. One aspect that speaks for Islamic PA as such is that by and large, most people in most Islamic countries themselves would say that Islam – Islam as such, whatever their own tradition – matters, and that it matters very much (Drechsler, 2013a).

The obvious hypothesis would thus be that Islam – being such a strong determinant of context, of the world in which people live and the systems that they build there and that emerge – has had, and still has, a non-incidental, important and actually crucial impact on how the public sphere is organized and even managed. As Michael Cook has argued, Islam simply is the one true world religion that has

this influence on politics, international relations and the state today (2014). And as Noah Feldman has claimed, the demand of relegating history to history in public affairs may be Western, but it is not Islamic (2012). Thus, one of the most important variables for PA – not only governance – in Islamic countries would be Islam, not just the national tradition, even (albeit less so) if the society in question is quite secular (Drechsler, 2013a).

Theoretical Points

One is tempted to justify the absence of a catalogue or list of what Islamic PA as a paradigm is all about by saying that to create such a list would still force a global-Western set of categories and criteria on another system, or to say that like the "emptiness of the Mosque" (Otto, 1923), Islamic PA provides for a more contextual, less rigid approach to PA. But certain basic principles and general, cross-cultural tendencies both do emerge, and seeing globalized hybridization of PA as well as the competition issue, moving towards elements of an ideal type of Islamic PA (and in PA, it should never be more than that) is still of interest.

To start, the *Qur'an* is – famously for experts, less-known outside of them – not dealing with specifics of governance, let alone administration. The one PA principle established however, and of great and non-negotiable importance, is the consultative aspect of decision-making called *shura*, meaning that rulers cannot make decisions all by themselves, but that they need to discuss them in council. An inherently participatory and inclusive process, *shura* requires, at least to some extent, "freedom of thought and expression, right to assemble and converse, and encouragement to engage in healthy criticism and fruitful counsels among followers, be they rulers or subjects" (Iqbal & Lewis, 2009, p. 258). If the matter at hand goes beyond the expertise of the normal group of advisors or is particularly complex, the process of *shura* requires seeking qualified opinions of individuals with specialist knowledge and appropriate experience (Talaat, 2016). And while it is true that "consultation will extend only so far," because the decision can and may well go against the counsel received, "the presence of consultative methods does provide some checks on the hierarchy" (Peters, 2021, p. 165). This cannot be emphasized enough, with all its ramifications – rash, lonely, archetypically hero-businessman decision-making cannot be justified in Islamic PA.

Almost in contrast to this, ever since the Prophet's own days, the rapid, indeed explosion-like, expansion of Islam must have led to an overstretch as regards to governability and indeed

administrative capacity that could only partly be countered by decentralization and the inclusion of local elites, already well-described by the historian Al-Baladhuri (820-892) in his *Origins of the Islamic State* (2002). Therefore, the dependent areas would likely not deliver—and the idea of Islamic PA then would have been that this would not even be expected, as getting something is better than nothing at all (Drechsler, 2015a). The West expects the state, ideally, to be "a machine that would go of itself" (Kammen, 1986), a clockwork—that would not be the case in Islam. Shifts in how we see governance and PA have contributed to new possibilities of how to assess Islamic PA in this respect; Merilee Grindle's important concept of Good-enough Governance (2004, 2007; de Vries, 2013a on PA) is one of the most important ones in this context, underlining that very often, governance is about achieving minimal workability against the odds of heavy policy constraints, rather than perfection.

There is a large traditional and still viable literature, beginning with the Prophetic *sunnah* (precedent) and the Rightly Guided Caliphs, on the Islamic governance aspect, to be sure (see only Samier 2017; ElKaleh and Samier 2013). For instance, the Nizam al-Mulk (1018-1092) and his *Siyāsatnāma* (The Book of State Art / of Governance) (1960) present us with a specific, workable concept of state administration that may be as different from the usual Western recommendations for improving the governance of the Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries as it may be superior in realism and applicability, in spite of its great age. This includes, for instance, for superiors to avoid interference in routine administration, or in today's parlance, not to micro-manage (Nizam al-Mulk, 1960).

Another highly relevant example from the Nizam is a strong emphasis on the absolute non-delegatability of responsibility for those over whom one rules (1960) – as ultimately, one is only responsible for their own actions in Divine accounting (Kalantari, 1998). This was seen as a key feature of Islamic PA, even in the West, for centuries (Hebel in Stolleis, 2003). Its importance even today lies in creating direct responsibility of the ruler for his subjects, one that is crucial for him and his record, for how he will be judged. The idea is the same as in Confucianism: "An ethical doctrine designed to moderate the behaviour of rulers and orient them towards the interest of the ruled." (Fukuyama, 2012, p. 19)

An area where Confucian and Islamic PA differ is the basis for obedience to rulers, and more broadly, the legitimacy of rule. For the former, the Mandate of Heaven, and hence the performance of the government (Drechsler 2020b), is the ultimate criterion regarding whether rebellion against a ruler is sanctioned (indeed required), whereas the near-consensus of Islamic scholarship agrees that

the only context in which rebellion is possible is when a government "makes it impossible for believers to live in accordance with the *shari'a*" (Malkawi & Sonn, 2011, p. 120). It follows that the legitimacy of rule in the Islamic paradigm is based on the ability to create a society in which the *shari'a*, the immutable sacred law of God, is protected and upheld:

> *Shari'a* is founded upon wisdom and achieving people's welfare in this life and the afterlife. In its entirety it is justice, mercy, benefit, and wisdom. Therefore any ruling that replaces justice with injustice, mercy with its opposite, commonweal with corruption, or wisdom with nonsense, is a ruling that does not belong to the *shari'a*, even if it is claimed to be so according to some interpretation (Ibn Al-Qayyim, 1973, p.3).

A common misconception, however, even amongst Muslims, is the assumption that *shari'a* is Islamic law itself, or for that matter something that is able to be fully ascertained, let alone implemented (Auda, 2008).

In reality, *shari'a* is the articulation – through revelation (*Qur'an*) and Prophecy (*sunnah*) – of God's expectations or Will. The human (imperfect) interpretation of these divine expectations by scholars, utilizing various methodologies and sources, constitute *fiqh* which is the Islamic laws, jurisprudence, and rulings manifested in human society i.e. the application of the *shari'a*. In parallel, *maqasid* is the summarization and prioritization of the wisdom (i.e. telos) behind these divine expectations into the overarching goals of an Islamic society, which is a vastly underexplored source of Islamic PA ethics and values. The first scholar to put forth an elaborate *maqasid* framework, still utilized today, the Spanish theologian Al-Shatibi (1320-1388) in *al-Muwāfaqāt* ("*The Reconciliation*", 1997), identifies the highest-priority goal of the *shari'a* as the preservation of *din* or faith-based "binding customs or practices that allow communities to function" (Nongbri, 2013, p. 42).

In essence, *din* is a contextual system of Islamic social order premised on fulfilling divine expectations, and in so doing, yielding reward in both worlds i.e. on earth and in the afterlife. *Din* must be contextual precisely because the *shari'a* as such is held to be a comprehensive guide across time and space (Brown, 2011), and although there do exist (relatively few) divine expectations that must be implemented without alteration or attention to context, the new issues and circumstances that are continually unfolding within and across societies require human interpretation and best judgement (relying on *fiqh* and *maqasid*) of what God's Will would be in said cases (Auda, 2008). The legitimacy of rule in the Islamic tradition therefore does indeed rest upon the government's

ability to uphold a society living in accordance to *shari'a* – meaning, the ability to cultivate a space where *din* is paramount and can contextually flourish.

Finally, keeping *din* front and center, a rather salient, although contextually variant, value of Islamic PA institutions originates from concept of embeddedness – the notion that economic and political forces are existing within, and subservient to, a set of social norms, traditions, and customs (Polanyi, 1944; Peters 2021). Urinboyev argues that culturally embedded Islam shapes the practice of Islamic PA: normal, quotidian actions are given a significance when understood from an Islamic vantage point (2014). In particular, much of the literature has shown that notions of cooperation and mutual help are regarded as a fundamental requirement for qualifying as a good Muslim (Urinboyev, 2014). The question of why it is important to qualify as a good Muslim in the first place and the fact that one does so via cooperation is important for an Islamic PA perspective in that it reveals the underlying values. Namely, there are two benefits for partaking in constructive social relations: an overt benefit in the form of social deference, and a subtler benefit in the form of providing an immaterial purpose and motivation (i.e. favorable Hereafter). Kalantari arrives at the same conclusion from a different route, pointing to a set of underlying principles that define theoretical Islamic PA, which "align the organization, the community, and the political leadership in serving and satisfying God" (1998, p. 1836).

Practical Application

The latter must be seen together with, as Peters has pointed out, a "feature that emerges from an examination of Islamic PA is that like the Scandinavian (and to a lesser extent the Germanic) tradition there is a significant reliance on non-state actors for the delivery of public services" (2021, pp. 163-164). "Islamic administration appears compatible with the participatory strand of thinking about administrative reform" (2021, p. 165; Peters, 2010). "To the extent that there is a 'managerial style' it is consultative and does not emphasize control over others within an organization" (2021, p. 166).

This being the case, and seeing the contemporary relevance and even tendency towards such forms of administration and organization, especially in the context that arguing for the validity of Islamic PA today is still an uphill battle, we have chosen three cases of lived, relevant, and even striking examples that come from precisely this sphere. These three cases – the Turkish *vakıf*, the Uzbek

mahalla, and the Moroccan *zawāyā* – are all unambiguously Islamic and so recognized, but as a sample, they have further advantages as well.

First, the cases come from very diverse areas of Islam; one classically within the NISPAcee region (Uzbekistan), one from its newest member, which is somehow in the "semi-shadow" of NISPAcee and a special case (Turkey; see Drechsler 2013b, p. 57 FN1), and as a helpful comparison, one outside of it (Morocco).

Second, the three cases represent different levels of stateness. Although all three eventually contribute to a functioning state, the Uzbek example is one of *Ersatzvornahme*, i.e. an Islamic institution (re-)emerges because the national government cannot manage public service provision (and other features); the Moroccan example embodies a parallel yet more than just state-sanctioned PA system to the colonial-heritage, global-Western 'main' system; and the Turkish one is by now again a state-institutionalized arrangement. Coming back, once again, to Peters, and here his notion of "governing in the shadows", which posits that not only governance but also PA are carried out not only by the state, but also through alternatives such as the market, experts, and more generally social actors and institutions (2019; see Chafik & Drechsler, 2022), one could say that these are PA in the shadow, the semi-shadow, and right in the sunlight, respectively.

Case Studies

1) Turkey: Vakıf

Islam has made inroads into Europe from the South, but the Southwestern (Spain and Portugal) and Southern (Sicily) ones are distant memories. However, as already mentioned *supra*, from the Southeast, the Ottoman Empire came to dominate a significant part of Europe for centuries (1299–1923), and its core successor state, Turkey, has a European part with Eastern Thrace and key areas of Istanbul, a global megalopolis. Since the Empire had a highly sophisticated PA system and since it only dissolved relatively recently (in fact, shortly after Max Weber died), this is the main legacy of Islamic PA in Europe. In the last 25 years, the Ottoman Empire has been reassessed by historians and sociologists as 'not so bad' in many ways (Finkel, 2007). Ottoman PA is paradigmatic NWPA: a specific, different, highly sophisticated form of PA—in some respects, the radically other to Western PA, in others, exactly the same. The former is well known or assumed, the latter not so much. But

regarding the former, the relaxed attitude towards modest delivery that was mentioned as Islamic was a functional part of Ottoman PA (Ágoston, 2015; Barkey, 1997; Drechsler, 2018a).

But while Ottoman PA is gone, or better was removed, the religious charitable foundation, the *waqf*, *vakıf* in Turkish, is a specific Islamic PA institution, and one with great importance in the Ottoman Empire, is still here. It was perhaps the key Ottoman welfare institution: Inalienable private foundations, sometimes endowed by the rulers and their relatives, financed much of social care or charity as a religious institution, such as madrassas, soup kitchens, and the like (Barnes, 1987). In spite of their inalienability, the system as such changed over time, if slowly; in this respect, Çizakça and Deligöz stress its anti-colonialist resilience (Çizakça, 2000; Deligöz, 2014). As Deligöz has argued, the re-establishment of *vakıfs* in Turkey from the 1960s does belong into the context of the re-Islamization and indeed re-Ottomanization of the country (2014). The main reason for its most recent consolidation was, according to him, the creation of easily implementable options to deliver social services in the post-2001 crisis period (2014). Today, new *vakıfs*, state-funded and private, also cover education and public health aspects, such as through respective university foundations and endowments (Drechsler, 2018a).

Vakıfs have been heavily criticized, both for their inflexibility and conservative heel-digging generally (Kuran, 2013, 2016) and thus serving as a convenient justification for why colonial powers needed to take over their lands (Sait & Lim, 2006), the answer to the famous conundrum of why Islam was not competitive in or with capitalism (Rodinson, 1966), and for enabling the neoliberal state by moving charity outside of it, without taking responsibility (Isik, 2014) – in other words, for being both not sufficiently NPM and too much so. But as Peters has pointed out, “Islamic administration is almost diametrically opposed to the market-based values of NPM” (2021, p. 165), and by today, in light of health and hospital crises and the emphasis on infrastructure which Covid-19 has shown to be vital for a working response, the inalienability of endowments seems to be more attractive and indeed more modern in the sense of contemporary than too much flexibility. But in any case, what both directions of attack show is not so much what is wrong with the *vakıf* but that the *vakıf* is different and best understood from an NWPA perspective that takes Islamic PA and its principles seriously.

2) Uzbekistan: Mahalla

As for the Islamic PA legacy in Uzbekistan, for centuries the broader region of Central Asia – which included independent states such as Bukhara and Khiva, located in present day Uzbekistan – generated a long tradition of state administration, and more broadly, produced many of the most renowned and influential scholars and practitioners of the Islamic intellectual tradition, such as Al-Biruni and the aforementioned Nizam Al-Mulk (Starr, 2009). In more recent times, however, the general Islamic legacy of Uzbekistan faced a setback with nearly seventy years of Soviet-led "aggressive eradication of traditional value systems, institutions and practices" (Klebleyev, 2014, p. 149). Indeed, the Uzbek state still maintains a strong continuity with the Soviet era with regards to the heavy-handed tactics defining national identity and culture for social control (Adams, 2010), and even in terms of the same political elite retaining power (Klebleyev, 2014), although it has failed to preserve a Sovietesque social-welfare system (Urinboyev, 2011). And it is precisely because of this latter central government failure that the Islamic PA legacy of Uzbekistan lives on in the form of traditional local institutions known as *mahalla*.

Urinboyev defines *mahalla* as centuries-old Islamic neighbourhood-based communities "united by common traditions, language, customs, moral values and reciprocal exchange of money, material goods and services", which remain a ubiquitous part of life in Uzbekistan today, basically the form of Local Government (2014, p. 161). As well-documented by his ethnographic field work, *mahalla* leadership traditionally includes three leaders informally chosen by residents: "the *oqsoqol* (whitebeard, who is the informal leader of *mahalla*), *boylar* (a wealthy resident from the community), and *dasturhonchi* (a woman leader)" (2011, p. 40), with the *oqsoqol* in particular being judged on "personal reputation" i.e. character (2014, p. 165). Under this leadership team, local residents create "an informal *mahalla*-based administration system which is based on Islamic values and principles," the most salient of which in the present context is that "every Muslim is expected to share his or her economic resources with relatives and neighbors… this is a precondition for a "good Muslim" (Urinboyev, 2014, p. 174). This communal engagement is embodied in a well-established social norm known as *hashar* (mutual assistance), in which "under the absence of any legal mechanisms, *mahalla* residents cooperate with each other by providing labor for the construction of houses, for the preparation of the logistics of wedding and funeral ceremonies and many other informal services that are necessary for human livelihood" (Urinboyev, 2011, p. 48).

These informal but genuine *mahallas* therefore fulfil the dual role of maintaining the Islamic values and traditions that shape their service delivery to local constituents, as well as picking up the slack regarding the state's failure at providing the basic necessities of life for citizens – in other words, they provide the public services, and on a very Islamic level too. And although the informal *mahalla* is the paradigmatic (Islamic) PA in the shadow, it ultimately, and almost ironically, contributes to the socio-political stability of Uzbekistan.

3) Morocco: Zawāyā

Any search for the vestiges of Islam's inroads into Southwestern Europe would point to present-day Morocco, which is home to the largest monarchy in Africa and the oldest in Arab world – the Alawites. The legitimacy of the monarchy is rooted in Islam, in fact uniquely so, based on lineage from the Prophet and being the sole inheritors of Umayyad Andalusian legacy, such that any Alawite King "possess the only authentic claim to an Islamic Caliphate, if one were to be established" (Esposito & Kalin, 2009, p. 26). To reinforce the legitimacy of their claim to the Prophet's temporal and spiritual authority (apart from the genealogical), the Alawites employ a tactic known as "the ritualization of soft power" (Daadaoui, 2011), which involves direct support and religiously symbolic engagement of popular Islamic institutions in Morocco – the most salient of which are *zawāyā* (this section is based on Chafik and Drechsler 2022)

Zawāyā (singular: *zāwiya*) are local spiritual organizations, often indistinguishable from a mosque in form, that were historically organized around professions (i.e. guilds), provided lodging all along the pilgrimage route from West Africa to Mecca, and led by a charismatic Shaykh (male or female) alongside numerous prominent members (*mqadam*). However, there has been, and continues to be, another dimension to *zawāyā* apart from the strictly spiritual: the crafting and delivery of alternative public service provision.

Across various domains, the non-Western, specifically Islamic nature of the *zawāyā*'s service provision is unmistakable. Within infrastructure for instance, the construction of wells and basins for public use, carried out by *zawāyā* bureaucrats and everyday members alike, is not just a communal approach to public works. Rather, it is an opportunity to take part in a *khidma* i.e. a menial service or task for the commonweal that induces humility, promotes social cohesion, and qualifies as an act of worship. Essentially, participants in *khidma* are undergoing a spiritual exercise in that they perceive

an opportunity to gain the favour of the Creator by serving creation. Another example is that of *zawāyā*'s educational system not consisting of class and subject-based curriculums and learning, but rather a fundamental emphasis on personalized mentorship and character development through emulating spiritual masters (e.g. the Shaykh and *mqadam*).

But why and how can the Moroccan state allow *zawāyā* this much autonomy? Especially when *zawāyā* are not exactly following OECD, World Bank, or any other global-Western standards? The answer, we argue (Chafik and Drechsler 2022), is due to the bifurcated nature of Moroccan PA. Being a geographic, economic, cultural, and ideological crossroads, it is not surprising that there exists two distinct but parallel systems of PA in Morocco: (1) a "modern", formal system that represents urban Moroccan elites and reflects global-Western standards or at least objectives (Zemrani, 2014) and (2) a traditional, indigenous Islamic system embodied by *zawāyā* that operates throughout municipal areas.

The precise arrangement between the Alawite monarchy and *zawāyā* is as follows: in exchange for the *zawāyā*'s ceremonial pledge of allegiance (*bay'a*) and "brought to you by the generosity of the monarchy" attitude to their extremely popular spiritual and service provision activities, the monarchy grants *zawāyā* in-kind financial support and, most importantly, autonomy to conduct their own affairs. This is a process known as "relaxed centralization", that is, the concept whereby a firmly established central government can only then be comfortable enough to allow ex-state institutions to succeed and receive fervent support and approval from their constituents – without being perceived as a threat by the central state, as often times non-state peripheral success is perceived to be (Bekkaoui & Larémont, 2011). In fact, the Alawites benefit both from the ritualization of soft power and resulting stability of allowing *zawāyā* to operate as local agents of administration. Ultimately, this results in *zawāyā* governing in semi-shadow of the Moroccan state, i.e. simultaneously supported and left to be, but relied upon as a source of sacred soft power legitimacy.

As a result, the Moroccan government is able to experiment with modernizing its formal PA system based on global-Western standards, because in reality it relies on the traditional, truly Islamic and Islam-based PA system to provide legitimacy and stability. Therefore, unlike the Uzbek case, it is not that the Moroccan government cannot manage public service provision on its own, but purposefully allows the centuries-old delivery of it by overtly loyal traditional institutions in the periphery – which also work, work very well, and even with particular contemporary meaning given its more consensual, cooperative shape and nature.

Conclusion

Unidirectionality of PA is bad both for what the "good" messages of global-Western PA and its discourse are, and for the wider world on which it is imposed, especially when looking at how important a well-working and equitable PA is for human living-together. Recognizing this does not mean that everything will always stay the same:

> There may have been overlays of other ideas and different interpretations of underlying ideas over time, yet there is some DNA in administrative systems that continues to influence contemporary behaviors. … However, arguing that there is some level of persistence of traditions does not negate the possibility of change. (Peters, 2020, p. 214)

Yet, the history of Western Imperialism and of the effects of Occidental Rationalism on the world seem to suggest the pursuit of a modest approach, rather than one looking for, and emphasizing, change, especially when coming from an outside-positioned, aggressive perspective. The reality of Islamic PA, theoretically and practically, be it in full sunlight or the semi-shade, or even when hidden (and serving to prop up peoples' lives not supported by deficient versions of global-Western type governments), is something to recognize for all sides, and at their benefit. In the end, globalization is real, but so is specificity. As Gadamer has put it,

> It may not be too daring, to say … that perhaps we will survive as humans if we should manage to learn that we must not simply use our means of power and possibilities of impact, but that we learn to stop in front of the other as the other, of nature as well as of the grown cultures of people and states, and that we thus must experience the other and others as the others of our self, so that we can gain participation in one another (1985, p. 34).

And indeed, as the Islamic tradition would have it, not being mindful of both the existence of, and our inextricable connection to, others is tantamount to not being mindful of Allah, and thereby having missed an essential element of faith:

> And from Allah's signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the diversity of your tongues (languages) and colors (appearances). Surely in this are signs for the mindful (*Qur'an* 30:22).

Acknowledgments

This essay develops themes from Drechsler 2013b, 2018a, 2018b, and Chafik and Drechsler 2022. All translations from Arabic and German are the authors' own.

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Appendix

Publication V

Jachimowicz, J.M., **Chafik, S**., Munrat, S., Prabhu, J.C., & Weber, E.U. (2017). Community trust reduces myopic decisions of low-income individuals. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 114 (21), 5401–5406. **ETIS 1.1**

Community trust reduces myopic decisions of low-income individuals

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Edited by Carol S. Dweck, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, and approved March 16, 2017 (received for review November 9, 2016)

Why do the poor make shortsighted choices in decisions that involve delayed payoffs? Foregoing immediate rewards for larger, later rewards requires that decision makers (*i*) believe future payoffs will occur and (*ii*) are not forced to take the immediate reward out of financial need. Low-income individuals may be both less likely to believe future payoffs will occur and less able to forego immediate rewards due to higher financial need; they may thus appear to discount the future more heavily. We propose that trust in one's community—which, unlike generalized trust, we find does not covary with levels of income—can partially offset the effects of low income on myopic decisions. Specifically, we hypothesize that low-income individuals with higher community trust make less myopic intertemporal decisions because they believe their community will buffer, or cushion, against their financial need. In archival data and laboratory studies, we find that higher levels of community trust among low-income individuals lead to less myopic decisions. We also test our predictions with a 2-y community trust intervention in rural Bangladesh involving 121 union councils (the smallest rural administrative and local government unit) and find that residents in treated union councils show higher levels of community trust and make less myopic intertemporal choices than residents in control union councils. We discuss the implications of these results for the design of domestic and global policy interventions to help the poor make decisions that could alleviate poverty.

temporal discounting | poverty alleviation | trust | decision making | community

Low-income individuals are more likely to make myopic decisions that favor the short-term but neglect long-term outcomes (1, 2). People living in poverty are more likely to discount future payoffs compared with wealthier individuals, which can in part be attributed to the specific environment in which these decisions are made. From US households (3) to rural Ethiopian farmers (4), lower wealth predicts higher temporal discount rates. A myopic orientation, in turn, makes it less likely individuals escape poverty as they fail to engage in behaviors that benefit them in the long term, such as investing in education, health, and finances (1, 5, 6). This creates a vicious cycle: Poverty leads to short-sighted choices that in turn lead to poverty (7). But why are the poor more likely to make myopic decisions, and what interventions can be designed to shift their decisions toward the long term?

Three broad theoretical perspectives address why poor people appear myopic. An economic perspective views the poor as people who, like the rest of society, engage in actions that align with their goals in a rational manner (8, 9). Poor people make myopic decisions, then, because they lack the opportunities to alleviate their impoverished situation. They do the best they can, given their circumstances. A sociological perspective describes the decisions of the poor as emanating from a "culture of poverty" that often entails misguided goals and motives (10, 11). Low-income individuals make decisions contrary to their long-term interests because they value different ends. Finally, a recently proposed psychological perspective suggests that poverty affects how the poor process information (7). Because poverty-related concerns consume mental resources, they leave less capacity for other tasks. This in turn promotes higher discounting because poor people are not able to adequately plan for the future (1, 2). Common to all three perspectives is the assumption that low- and high-income individuals share a similar calculating logic when trading off intertemporal choices. They differ in the reasons provided for why this logic gets skewed, proposing a lack of opportunities, a lack of education, or limited mental bandwidth (1, 2, 8, 10–12).

We suggest a related but different possibility, namely that the poor are engaged in a different kind of mental calculus. To even consider accepting a delayed payoff requires both a belief that the delayed payoff will occur (13, 14) and the ability to forego the immediate payoff (15). Hence, whereas high-income individuals may ask, "Is a delayed payoff of $100 worth $85 today?", low-income individuals may instead ask, "Do I think I will really get the delayed payoff?" and "Can I afford to forego the immediate payoff?" Such pessimism or skepticism may have multiple origins: adverse past experience with delayed payoffs failing to materialize or the absence of good experiences to draw from (16) and the tendency for low-income individuals to worry more about their immediate needs because these needs loom larger (17). Intertemporal choice thus not only is a question of discounting delayed payoffs for their distance in time, but also depends on (*i*) trusting that delayed payoffs will occur and (*ii*) trusting that needs are sufficiently met to enable foregoing the immediate payoff.

Hence, we focus on a different, currently understudied, element of intertemporal decisions—trust—and use it to offer an alternative explanation that helps integrate and reconcile the

Significance

More than 1.5 billion people worldwide live in poverty. Even in the United States, 14% live below the poverty line. Despite many policies and programs, poverty remains a domestic and global challenge; the number of US households earning less than $2/d nearly doubled in the last 15 y. One reason why the poor remain poor is their tendency to make myopic decisions. With reduced temporal discounting, low-income individuals could invest more in forward-looking educational, financial, and social activities that could alleviate their impoverished situation. We show that increased community trust can decrease temporal discounting in low-income populations and test this mechanism in a 2-y field intervention in rural Bangladesh through a low-cost and scalable method that builds community trust.

Author contributions: J.M.J., S.C., J.C.P., and E.U.W. designed research; J.M.J., S.C., and S.M. performed research; J.M.J. and S.C. analyzed data; and J.M.J., J.C.P., and E.U.W. wrote the paper.

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.

Data deposition: Data and analysis scripts are available online at https://osf.io/smjsa/.

See Commentary on page 5327.

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This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1617395114/-/DCSupplemental.

three approaches above. Specifically, we argue that choosing delayed outcomes in intertemporal decisions requires trusting that future payoffs will occur, as well as trusting that immediate financial needs will be sufficiently met to make considering the long term possible. In the absence of trust, it might be rational to favor the short over the long term [as the economic perspective suggests (8, 12)]. Increasing trust can help change values, goals, and motives to favor the long over the short term [as the sociological perspective suggests (10, 11)]. Finally, the presence of trust may help reduce negative affect and stress, thus improving the quality of long-term decision making [as the psychological perspective suggests (1, 2)]. In all three cases, however, trust is the underlying driver of myopic decisions.

We present evidence from four studies using archival, correlational, experimental, and field data to provide support for the hypothesis that trust drives intertemporal choices. Further, as we detail below, we suggest that two types of trust matter: (*i*) generalized trust, which extends to the social environment more generally, increases with income, and influences the belief that long-term payoffs will occur, and (*ii*) community trust, which extends to an individual's community, does not vary with income, and influences the belief that financial needs will be sufficiently met. We specifically highlight the role of community trust and suggest that interventions designed to increase community trust among low-income individuals can reduce their myopic behavior, in turn helping them alleviate their impoverished situation.

Finding 1: Generalized Trust Varies with Level of Income

Investing in a long-term payoff implicitly involves trusting that promised long-term benefits will materialize (13, 14). Studies conducted with young children show that when they do not trust their environment, they are less likely to forego immediate payoffs (e.g., a small quantity of a desired snack) for a delayed, larger payoff [e.g., a larger quantity of a desired snack (18)]. Indeed, in a situation where the receipt of a delayed option is not guaranteed, investing in the short term is likely the rational thing to do (14). Trust can be seen as a mechanism to deal with the impacts of unpredictability that helps individuals cope with social uncertainty and complexity (19). This notion is reflected in the political science literature, which recognizes "generalized trust"—"a set of moral values [that] create regular expectations of regular and honest behavior" (ref. 20, p. 53)—as an important source of individually and socially valuable outcomes, such as health and happiness (21). Partly for these reasons, generalized trust plays an important role in economic growth (22, 23).

Evidence suggests that trust is unequally distributed throughout society. Trust can be thought of as a belief (24) that emerges from a number of observations or experiences over time (25). Individuals with higher incomes are more likely to have favorable experiences in their lives, whereas those with lower incomes are more likely to experience violations of trust (13, 26). Much of what poor people experience (e.g., negative income shocks) reinforces a lack of trust in their environment (27). The intertemporal decisions of low-income individuals may therefore in part merely be factoring in the perceived uncertainty of long-term investments paying off (14). To confirm these predictions, we analyzed data from the World Values Survey ($n = 220{,}145$), a nationally representative survey conducted in almost 100 countries (28). Generalized trust in this survey is assessed through the question "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" Respondents can choose between two possible options: "Most people can be trusted," (coded as 0) and "Need to be very careful" (coded as 1). Although this single-item, dichotomous measure of generalized trust is problematic (29), studies have found it to be related to other valid and relevant variables (30, 31). Income in the survey is self-reported on a scale from 1 (lowest group) to 10 (highest group), with respondents asked to consider "all wages, salaries, pensions, and other incomes" when responding. We estimate a logistic regression of income as a predictor of generalized trust and find that the coefficient of income is significant ($\beta = -0.07$, SE = 0.002, $P < 0.001$), indicating that high-income individuals have higher levels of generalized trust. Thus, low-income individuals may be more doubtful that a long-term payoff will materialize, which can reduce the appeal of a larger, later option.

Finding 2: Financial Needs Vary with Levels of Income

In intertemporal choices, low-income individuals also have to determine whether their current financial situation allows them to forego the immediate reward. A staggering proportion of US households—nearly 50%—are unable to come up with $2,000 over the course of 1 mo if they need to (15). When levels of savings are low, as is likely the case for low-income individuals, they may be unable to forego the smaller, sooner payoff because they require the money to alleviate their immediate needs (32).

To investigate this, we recruited 285 participants from the United States who were asked to imagine a situation where they had to choose between receiving $100 today or $150 in 1 y and probed to list some of the issues they would consider when making this decision (see *Online Pilot Study* for additional details). Participants additionally responded to a three-item scale that assessed financial need [e.g., "Given my current financial constraints, I need to take $100 today rather than wait for the delayed payoff ($150 in one year)"]. Next, we measured participants' levels of income and their levels of generalized trust through a six-item scale (33). Finally, we asked participants which of the two options they would choose: $100 today or $150 in 1 y.

A total of 116 individuals (40.7%) stated that their current financial situation constrained their choice. Unsurprisingly, we find that levels of income are related to financial need ($\beta = -0.035$, SE = 0.006, $P < 0.001$), such that lower income is related to higher financial need. When we introduce both financial need and income into a linear regression predicting the choice of delayed ($150 in 1 y) over the immediate option ($100 today), only financial need is a significant predictor ($\beta = -0.12$, SE = 0.0013, $P < 0.001$), whereas income is not ($\beta = 0.0011$, SE = 0.0014, $P = 0.41$). Crucially, generalized trust is not related to financial need ($\beta = 0.03$, SE = 0.102, $P = 0.76$): Beliefs regarding whether the long-term payoff will materialize do not influence participants' evaluation of their financial situation. Similar to data from the World Values Survey described above, generalized trust is positively related to income ($\beta = 0.008$, SE = 0.004, $P = 0.027$).

Taken together, findings 1 and 2 suggest that low-income individuals are both less likely to believe long-term payoffs will occur and less able to forego the immediate reward due to higher financial need. Does this, however, mean that low-income individuals are doomed to being myopic? We turn to this question next.

Finding 3: Community Trust Can Act as a Buffer for Low-Income Individuals

Prior research emphasizes the important role of the local community in influencing the experience of everyday life (21). Communities even shape an individual's willingness to take financial risks. For instance, one study found that Chinese participants were less risk averse than Americans, attributing this difference to cultural differences between the two groups. "In socially-collectivist cultures like China, family or other in-group members will step in to help out any group member who encounters a large and possibly catastrophic loss" (ref. 34, p. 1208). In contrast, in individualistic cultures such as the United States, individuals who make risky decisions are usually expected to face the consequences of their decisions. The social structure that reflects collectivistic societies therefore acts as a "cushion" against possible losses from risky decisions, allowing individuals in collectivistic societies to be less risk averse (34, 35). Such differences exist not only between, but also within, nations (36); one study suggests that nearly 80% of total cultural variation exists within, rather than between nations (13).

Supporting evidence for the important role of the community also originates from research conducted on the "buffering

hypothesis" that suggests that strong ties to close others have beneficial effects on individuals' well-being (37, 38). The perceived availability of support allows individuals to appraise stressful situations as less aversive, which makes it less likely such events will negatively influence them (39). Because greater financial need is often experienced as stressful (32), stronger support from the local community may also reduce the aversive impact of financial need.

Importantly, the experiences that give rise to community trust are based on an individual's interactions with his or her immediate surroundings and not with the general environment as a whole, as is the case for generalized trust. Thus, trust in one's local community to cushion against potential losses, or "buffer" against the stress of lower income, may be distributed more evenly across the income spectrum than generalized trust. To further investigate this, we again turn to the World Values Survey where individuals also respond to the question: "I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from your neighborhood. Could you tell me whether you trust people from this group?" Respondents have four possible options: (*i*) "Trust completely," (*ii*) "Trust somewhat," (*iii*) "Do not trust very much," or (*iv*) "Do not trust at all." We conducted an ordinal logistic regression of community trust against levels of income and find that levels of income do not predict levels of community trust ($P = 0.15$; *World Values Survey*).

In addition, in the pilot study for finding 2 above (with 285 US participants), we also measured levels of community trust using a 13-item measure (adapted from ref. 40). Example items included "I do a lot of good things in my neighborhood" and "There are advantages to living in my neighborhood." We regress community trust onto our measure of financial need and find a significant negative relationship ($\beta = -0.58$, SE = 0.136, $P < 0.01$), such that individuals with higher community trust reported lower financial need. This relationship also holds when adding income as an additional predictor ($\beta = -0.40$, SE = 0.126, $P < 0.01$). Hence, a higher level of community trust influences the choice of delayed payoffs by reducing low-income individuals' perceived constraints. The same level of actual financial need, based on an individual's current financial situation, may be experienced differently with varying levels of community trust. When individuals experience lower levels of community trust, actual financial needs are unlikely to be mitigated by the local community. However, when individuals experience higher levels of community trust, actual financial needs are alleviated by the buffering and cushioning the local community provides. In turn, when their needs are not felt as acutely, low-income individuals with higher community trust are better able to consider the long-term option.

Accordingly, we argue that it is important to consider the effects of generalized trust as distinct from community trust on the long-term decisions of the poor. Although a higher level of both generalized and community trust can theoretically support the choice of a delayed payoff, we propose there are at least three reasons why a focus on community trust is a more viable basis for an intervention to reduce myopic intertemporal choices among low-income individuals. First, because community trust does not covary with income whereas generalized trust does, low-income individuals may already have higher base rates of community trust, and this may make an intervention simpler and more effective. Second, personal beliefs are often resistant to change (41). Whereas interventions to influence personal beliefs exist (42), they require repeated, in-depth exposure and experiences that serve to reinforce the intended belief change. Generalized trust is a more entrenched belief and less amenable to change than community trust; the latter, based on interactions with one's immediate surroundings, has more touchpoints for possible interventions. Moreover, interventions that focus on community trust require fewer major changes to governmental institutions compared with treatments that aim to change generalized trust. Creating an intervention to change generalized trust requires more time, intense exposure, and systemic change than an intervention to change community trust.

Third, whereas generalized trust influences intertemporal choices by signaling to individuals how likely it is the long-term payoff will occur, community trust influences the level of financial need individuals experience and thus their ability to consider foregoing the immediate payoff. There may be instances when a lack of generalized trust is warranted, i.e., where the delayed payoff—should individuals choose it—does not occur. Thus, an intervention that increases generalized trust may backfire when low-income individuals choose the larger, later option and it does not materialize. Instead, a focus on community trust is less likely to backfire because its higher levels ameliorate the financial constraints low-income individuals face. We now turn to study 1, which seeks to establish the role of community trust in influencing temporal discounting by low-income individuals.

Study 1: Community Trust and Temporal Discounting by Low-Income Individuals

This study was an online experiment with 647 participants from the United States (see *Supporting Information* for additional details). We first presented respondents with the same 13-item scale of community trust as above (40). We then assessed their temporal discount factor (the multiplier that equates $100 in 1 y's time with the amount that an individual is willing to take instead, if received today) using Dynamic Experiments for Estimating Preferences (DEEP) (43), an adaptive testing platform where participants repeatedly choose between a smaller payoff that is received closer to the present (smaller/sooner) and a larger one that is received farther into the future (larger/later). Although decisions are hypothetical, temporal discount factors predict real-world intertemporal decisions, such as mortgage choices (44), and their consequences, such as credit scores (45). Indeed, decisions in other delay-discounting tasks are predictive of a wide range of long-term outcomes, such as health, education, and retirement savings (46, 47). Finally, respondents reported their current levels of income, as well as their gender, age, and education.

Replicating previous studies (1, 2, 7), we find that discount factors vary with levels of income ($\beta = 0.0034$, SE = 0.0015, $P = 0.021$), such that individuals with higher levels of income discounted the future less than those with lower levels of income. To illustrate this, we categorized participants with household incomes below $40,000 as low income and those with incomes above $40,000 as high income and found that low-income participants discounted the future more ($M = 0.131$, SE = 0.006) than high-income participants ($M = 0.159$, SE = 0.006), with lower discount factors indicating greater discounting. This cutoff point represents the median in our sample. Similar cutoff points are often used in prior research (48, 49). Cutoff points higher or lower than $40,000 do not significantly change our results.

Next, we regressed the discount factor on continuous income and community trust as well as the interaction between the two predictor variables. In addition to the main effect of income already mentioned, we find a main effect of community trust ($\beta = 0.0015$, SE = 0.0007, $P = 0.025$), such that individuals with higher levels of community trust discount the future less. Both main effects are qualified by a significant interaction between community trust and levels of income on temporal discounting ($\beta = -0.0052$, SE = 0.0023, $P = 0.026$). These effects also hold when we control for demographic variables such as age, gender, and education (Table S1). To better understand the interaction between community trust and income, we next conducted simple slopes analyses (50) and found that lower levels of income were related to higher discounting of the future only when levels of community trust were low ($t(643) = 2.86$, $P = 0.0044$) but not when levels of community trust were high ($t(643) = -0.032$, $P = 0.748$). Hence, only individuals with low incomes and low levels of community trust differ significantly from all other groups (Fig. S1). We now turn to study 2, which seeks to examine the impact of community trust on the temporal discounting of low-income individuals in a richer real-world context.

Study 2: Community Trust and Payday Loans

In study 2 we investigate whether taking out a payday loan—a typical form of myopic behavior displayed by low-income individuals—varies with levels of community trust (see *Supporting Information* for additional details). To do so, we combine state-level data from the Survey of Household Economics and Decision Making (SHED) with an additional survey that measured community trust, which we conducted among 5,721 US participants in 50 states. We recruited US participants through a stratified sampling method, such that ∼100 participants responded per state. Participants responded to questions assessing their levels of community trust, using the same scale as in study 1. Based on these responses, we created state averages. We also obtained state-level data of additional control variables, such as income, unemployment, and age. Through SHED, we accessed state-level data on payday loan use and matched both datasets at the state level.

An ordinary least-squares regression with state-level payday loan use as the dependent variable and state-level community trust as the independent variable finds that community trust predicts payday loan use ($\beta = -0.15$, SE = 0.041, $P < 0.001$). This effect also holds when we control for other variables such as age, income, and unemployment. Crucially, this effect also holds when controlling for levels of savings ($\beta = -0.11$, SE = 0.033, $P = 0.001$), a proxy for levels of actual financial need. This provides further support that higher levels of community trust reduce perceived financial need, even when levels of actual financial need vary. Although studies 1 and 2 suggest that community trust plays a role in buffering or cushioning low-income individuals against myopic discounting, this evidence is correlational. We now turn to a study that attempts to establish causal evidence for the proposed relationship.

Study 3: Exploring the Causal Link between Community Trust and Temporal Discounting by Low-Income Individuals in the Laboratory

We recruited 120 participants online and assigned them to one of four possible conditions in a 2 × 2 design. Specifically, the design involved manipulating levels of felt income (low/high) and levels of felt community trust (low/high). Imagining more severe financial implications has been shown to evoke feelings of having lower income (2). To induce low vs. high levels of felt income, we used previously developed and validated scenarios (2). Participants in the high felt-income condition were asked to imagine scenarios with relatively minor financial implications, whereas those in the low felt-income condition were asked to imagine scenarios with more severe financial implications. We manipulated levels of community trust by increasing the salience of this construct in the minds of respondents (51). We gave participants a definition of community trust ("the extent to which you trust your community"). We then asked them to list either 2 (low) or 10 (high) examples from their own experience where community trust was justified. In contrast to studies that use a similar design to manipulate difficulty of retrieval (52), participants in this study had to produce the full number of examples requested. Subjects did not experience difficulties in providing examples. Next we assessed temporal discounting, using DEEP (43). We also collected data on several demographic variables.

Consistent with what we would expect if our manipulation of felt income was successful, we found that participants in the low felt-income condition were more myopic ($M = 0.13$, SE = 0.015) than participants in the high felt-income condition ($M = 0.178$, SE = 0.017, $P = 0.044$). We examined whether community trust serves as a buffer or cushion for individuals with lower levels of felt income by testing for an interaction effect between levels of community trust and felt income on the temporal discount factor. An ANOVA with felt income and manipulated community trust as the independent variables and the discount factor as the dependent variable shows a marginally significant interaction ($F_{(3,116)} = 2.98$, $P < 0.10$). To further investigate which condition is driving this effect, we conducted pairwise comparisons. These revealed that three conditions differ significantly from a fourth. Participants in the low felt-income, low community-trust condition were more myopic ($M = 0.103$, SE = 0.019) than individuals in the low felt-income, high community-trust ($M = 0.178$, SE = 0.024; $P = 0.04$), high felt-income, low community-trust ($M = 0.176$, SE = 0.018; $P = 0.032$), and high felt-income, high community-trust ($M = 0.179$, SE = 0.03; $P = 0.045$) conditions. These results hold when controlling for additional control variables (e.g., age, gender, education, and actual income).

Study 3 provides laboratory-based causal evidence in support of our hypothesis that low-income individuals with higher levels of community trust discount the future less heavily than low-income individuals with lower levels of community trust. Although our previous studies show that community trust does not vary by income and that perceptions of such trust can be manipulated in a laboratory setting, we now turn to showing that community trust can be built in a real-world context and test if doing so reduces myopic intertemporal decisions.

Study 4: Exploring the Causal Link Between Community Trust and Temporal Discounting by Low-Income Individuals in the Field

In this study, we sought to replicate our findings in a field setting featuring a different cultural context and involving ultrapoor individuals (see *Supporting Information* for additional details). We collaborated with BRAC, an international development organization based in Bangladesh, and The Hunger Project (THP), a global nonprofit organization with headquarters in New York. In February 2014, BRAC and THP launched a 2-y intervention designed to increase community trust in 121 union councils (the smallest rural administrative and local government units) in four districts of Bangladesh (Kishoreganj, Habiganj, Sunamgonj, and Bagerhat). Sixty-one union councils received the intervention whereas 60 union councils were in the control condition (see Table S2 for demographic information and *Supporting Information* for additional details).

The intervention had two components. First, volunteers from the community were trained to act as intermediaries between the community and the local government. This required the volunteers to interact with other members of their community, provide input into local governance, and help residents access public services from the local government. Second, a platform was created for inclusive community-driven governance to change the way community-level decisions were made. This involved representatives from the community working with the local government to make community-level decisions, for example in the distribution of social benefits, the allocation of funds and resources for development projects, and the selection of people to use in publicly funded projects. At the end of the 2-y intervention, we surveyed individuals ($n = 1{,}447$) in all 121 union councils on their levels of community trust as well as assessing their temporal discounting. We measured temporal discounting using a pen-and-paper titration measure (53).

We first tested whether our intervention increased levels of community trust in treatment union councils. Our intervention was successful: We find a significant difference in levels of community trust between treatment and control union councils ($\beta = -0.14$, SE = 0.026, $P < 0.001$), such that levels of community trust (ranging from 1 to 5) are higher in treatment ($M = 3.45$, SE = 0.0015) than control union councils ($M = 3.31$, SE = 0.0013). There were no significant differences between treatment and control union councils for generalized trust. We next specified a hierarchical linear model, which nests union councils within condition and clusters SEs at the union council level. This allows us to account for differences between union councils and provides a more accurate analysis of the treatment effect. Our dependent variable is individuals' temporal discount factor. As Table S3 shows, participants in treatment union councils were significantly more likely to discount the future less heavily ($\beta = 0.081$, SE = 0.034, $P = 0.018$). In concordance with our prior studies, measured generalized trust, as shown in model 2 in

Table S3, is an additional significant predictor ($\beta = 0.54$, SE = 0.13, $P < 0.01$), such that those individuals with higher levels of generalized trust are more likely to discount the future less. The addition of further control variables does not significantly influence individuals' tendency to discount the future (model 3 in Table S3). This effect also holds when controlling for levels of income, a proxy for levels of actual financial need, providing further evidence that higher levels of community trust reduce perceived financial need even when levels of actual financial need vary. To further establish the role of community trust in reducing perceived financial need, we also conducted 42 qualitative interviews and 8 focus group discussions in 14 union councils, 7 treatment and 7 control (see *Supporting Information* for further information).

In sum, this field study shows that an intervention designed to increase levels of community trust successfully does so and, in the process, affects temporal discounting, such that individuals in treatment union councils are less myopic in their intertemporal decisions than individuals in control union councils.

Discussion

Low-income individuals are more likely to make myopic decisions. This can, in turn, make it more difficult for them to alleviate their impoverished condition. At least three broad perspectives have addressed why low-income individuals are more likely to discount the future more heavily. An economic perspective views individuals living in poverty as people who, like the rest of society, engage in actions that align with their goals in a rational manner (8, 9). A sociological perspective describes the decisions of the poor as emanating from a culture of poverty that often entails misguided goals and motives (10, 11). Finally, a psychological perspective suggests that poverty itself affects individuals' information processing (7). These perspectives share the assumption that low- and high-income individuals use a similar logic in their trade-off calculation.

In this paper, we focus on a different, understudied, element of intertemporal decisions—trust. We show that low-income individuals are more likely to make myopic decisions because (*i*) they have lower levels of generalized trust, thus reducing their belief that the delayed payoff will occur, and (*ii*) they have higher levels of financial need, thus constraining their ability to forego the immediate payoff. Because community trust reduces the felt impact of actual financial need, low-income individuals with higher levels of community trust make less myopic intertemporal decisions. Indeed, community trust reduces myopic intertemporal choices even when controlling for actual financial need as in studies 2 and 4, providing further support that higher levels of community increase levels of perceived financial need. By increasing levels of community trust, the myopic behavior of low-income individuals can be reduced, potentially helping them improve their financial well-being. Generalized trust, in our studies as well as in previous work, also affects people's delay discounting but may be more difficult to change. It is worth noting that our community trust intervention in study 4 did not impact levels of generalized trust.

This paper makes three primary contributions. First, we highlight that aside from the differential impact of time delay, intertemporal choice may also be influenced by beliefs about whether long-term payoffs will occur and the ability to forego immediate payoffs. Because low-income individuals are less likely to generally trust their environment, myopic decisions may reflect not just greater impatience, but also reduced belief that long-term payoffs will occur. In addition, because low-income individuals are more likely to experience greater financial need, myopic decisions may also reflect an inability to consider long-term options. This perspective allows us to integrate previous approaches that have attempted to explain why low-income individuals are more likely to discount the future more heavily and provides a single consistent explanation capable of reconciling differences between approaches. Specifically, in the absence of trust, it might be rational to favor the short over the long term (as the economic perspective suggests). Further, the presence of trust can help reduce negative affect and stress, in turn improving the quality of long-term decision making (as the psychological perspective suggests). Increasing trust can help change values, goals, and motives to favor the long term over the short term (as the sociological perspective suggests). Those low-income individuals who trust their community may be more willing to choose delayed payoffs because they are able to rely on their community to alleviate their financial needs, which in turn allows them to consider foregoing immediate payoffs. In all cases, trust is an underlying driver of the change in myopic behavior.

Second, we distinguish between generalized trust, which we and others show to vary with income, and community trust, which we show does not. Because community trust deals only with an individual's immediate social environment, and not with the general environment as a whole, interventions need only focus on an individual's direct social environment, rather than the general environment as a whole. Generalized trust reflects a more enduring mindset, whereas beliefs about one's community are drawn from people's transactions and interactions with their immediate surroundings, which are more amenable to targeted interventions. Third, our theoretical model generates a unique intervention strategy that we tested in the context of rural Bangladesh. Specifically, an intervention designed to increase levels of community trust was effective in shifting temporal preferences toward the long term. Such an approach has benefits over interventions based on prior perspectives on the myopic behavior of low-income individuals that have produced mixed results, for example through microfinance (54) or financial literacy programs (55). In contrast, because higher community trust reduces perceived financial need, this paper highlights a relatively low-cost, empowering, and scalable intervention.

Whereas each of our studies has its individual limitations, we deliberately adopted a multiple-study strategy that varies methods, types of data, and contexts to ensure that the strengths of each study would compensate for the weaknesses of the others and that, taken together, they would generate broad support for our theoretical model. Thus, in our laboratory and field studies, we focus on temporal discounting but do not examine whether changes in temporal discounting lead to changes in downstream behavior. However, study 2 shows that our model holds when predicting real-world payday loan use. And whereas this archival study did not use individual-level data, we attempted to provide that level of rigor in our controlled experimental laboratory studies. Finally, whereas our laboratory studies lack external validity, we aim to provide this through our 2-y field study that manipulates levels of community trust in rural Bangladesh. Due to field constraints, we were unable to collect data from the same individuals before and after the intervention in Bangladesh. Doing so would have allowed for a more powerful research design including a difference-in-difference comparison (56). We also did not incentivize our intertemporal choice tasks. Although it is preferable to use incentivized tasks, hypothetical choice tasks are widely used and predictive of real-world outcomes (45). Future research should incorporate a repeated-measures design that incentivizes intertemporal choices before and after intervention and tracks the impacts of the intervention for important real-world outcomes, such as levels of income over time.

Poverty is one of the world's most vexing problems. Although great progress has been made in alleviating poverty, there is still a long way to go, both domestically and globally. For example, in the United States, the number of households with less than $2/d per person has nearly doubled in the last 15 y (57). Progress is often impeded because low-income individuals tend to discount the future more than is advised. To tackle this challenge, our theory and results suggests policy should move beyond a sole focus on the low-income individual and instead provide additional emphasis on the low-income community. Policy makers could implement changes that give individuals in low-income communities more opportunities to develop community trust. This can be achieved, for example, by increasing the

opportunities for interaction or giving community members more say over decision making at the local level. The poor may lack in material wealth relative to the rich, but they possess social wealth in the shape of their communities upon which they can draw. Building and boosting community trust can help decrease myopic decision making and, in turn, contribute to reducing the incidence of poverty domestically and worldwide.

All experiments we report here were approved by the Columbia University Institutional Review Board and all participants provided informed consent.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. We thank Geun Hae Ahn for research assistance; Tuhin Alam, Andrew Jenkins, Maria May, and the rest of the team at BRAC and The Hunger Project (THP) for field support; and Christina Boyce-Jacino, Andrea Dittmann, Lilly Kofler, Stephan Meier, Rachel Meng, Anuj Shah, the White House Social and Behavioral Science Team, and participants at the Society for Personality and Social Psychology Conference and the Judgment and Decision-Making Conference for helpful comments on earlier drafts. This research was made possible in part by a Cambridge Judge Business School small grant, the research facilities provided by the Center for Decision Sciences at Columbia University, and the support of the German National Academic Foundation.

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ISSN 2585-6901 (PDF)
ISBN 978-9949-83-886-8 (PDF)