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THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Bachelor's Thesis

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I declare I have written the bachelor's thesis independently.

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ABSTRACT

A great deal of researches have been devoted to the Rwandan genocide and the international response respectively. The objective of this particular paper is to examine with a somewhat novel approach the quality of international response to the Rwandan genocide through the prisms of multilateralism- and realism-bound theoretical framework. The former concept of international relations will be tested in the framework of the UNSC-driven response to the atrocities also taking into consideration Belgium due to its colonial history. The latter theory, however, will be applied to the steps made by France to get the issues controlled from the international perspective. This paper concludes that the lack of political will within the UNSC would not allow the multilateral cooperation to promote peace in Rwanda.

Key words: Rwanda, genocide, the United Nations, the UNAMIR, The United Nations Security Council, realism, multilateralism

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Aim of this study

The historical facts of the Rwandan genocide, its pre-conditions and consequences have become endless sources of research for the last twenty years but a major part of those research materials are reports of what happened or who were the biggest culprits of the genocide. Some of the researches are indeed extensive (for instance, *Leave None to Tell a Story* written by Alison Des Forges) and have been an irreplaceable aid in writing this thesis. However, the problem with most of those works about the Rwandan genocide is that they are not examined through the lenses of international relations and the discipline-bound theoretical frameworks.

The objective of this research paper is to bring some academic ‘flavour’ to the vast amount of reports about the Rwandan atrocities, in cadre of international relations, for the further research about the Rwandan genocide and the international response. The aim of this thesis is therefore to study what was the international response to the Rwandan genocide of 1994. In this research paper, the international response is narrowed down to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and to Belgium due to its colonial history with Rwanda. Even though France is a permanent member of the UNSC, it has been singled out from the broader concept of international response into its own separate case study. The response is examined in cadre of international relations theoretical approaches such as multilateralism and realism. The concept of multilateralism was chosen because the UNSC is the universal promoter of peace and in addition to this the decision-making is a shared responsibility of the member countries multilaterally. Furthermore, the peacekeeping missions the UNSC enforced in Rwanda were multilateral. The realist theory is applied to the unilateral French intervention to describe the special ties France has had with francophone African countries and in particular how these relations affected the French unilateral intervention in Rwanda. Although, this special relationship will be covered only in regards of Rwanda. However, this

paper will not study the implications the genocide has had on Rwanda of today nor on the present-day UNSC and its member states. The main focus is on what happened in Rwanda of 1994 when the genocide took place.

Thus it is justifiable to question the international reaction and ask why did the multilateral response of the UNSC fail. It is also worth considering why was the multilateralism replaced by the French unilateralism. My hypothesis is that the international response was inadequate in terms of aiding Rwanda in which the UNSC with its general lack of political will had a decisive role. Therefore, the lack of political will hindered the multilateral cooperation from promoting peace like it was supposed to. In consequence, France took advantage of this continuing its own realist agenda in Rwanda.

The Rwandan genocide has intrigued researchers and generated numbers of studies; some of those studies will be utilised in this paper as well. Thus, the study method of this research paper is qualitative, based on various articles and books related to the topic. More specifically, the qualitative methods used are discourse analysis, historical representation and process tracing. Some elements of the discourse analysis will be applied e.g. when basing the research on a specific period of time in this case on the year of 1994 and the three months of the Rwandan genocide. When studying the international response of the UNSC in particular the discourse analysis will be applied since the genocide could have possibly been avoided if the early warning signs were taken more seriously. Discourse analysis and historical representation are combined when examining the reliability of the French case study sources. France in its official stance on the genocide denies most of the accusations as to its actions that were placed 20 years ago in Rwanda. The research published after the genocide has proven true many of the accusations on the French side. Historical representation is also discussed in a few sub-chapters on the history of Rwanda prior to the genocide. The final tool of the qualitative methods used in this paper is process tracing, which is utilised when talking about the causality of the events of the genocide. The first section of the research paper underlays the historical background for the Rwandan genocide. It is also proved that the member states of the UNSC and the former colonizer Belgium were aware of the mounting troubles Rwanda was facing before the genocide. The historical overview is crucial in terms of understanding the genocide itself and the underlying circumstances that in their own right enabled the genocide to happen. The second section introduces shortly the theoretical framework of this paper: a concept and a theory of international relations that are used in both

of the analysis of the international response and the French case study. In the third section the term genocide is defined and also the Rwandan genocide is presented. The definition of the term genocide is in essence here since this research is focused on the genocide as well. Furthermore, due to the fact that the international response was largely affected by the denial of the UNSC to admit that Rwanda was facing genocide in addition to the civil war. The fourth section discusses the international response, divided in sub-chapters that proceed chronologically retelling the genocide. The international response ends to an analysis that discusses what could have been done by the UNSC, and examines the response from the multilateral perspective. The fifth part is dedicated to the case study of France. It was separated from the international response due to the fact it was the only state willing to intervene in Rwanda. The case study is also followed by an analysis that discusses about the French motives, taking into consideration the realist theory of international relations. The final part concludes the study.

1.2. Foreign influence

Rwanda is a former colony of Belgium that gained independence in 1962. The country was poor and overpopulated and its economy depended on agriculture and foreign aid. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in the US dollars in 1994 in Rwanda was 125.7 ('GDP per capita', 2015). To contrast it to a European welfare state Finland, the GDP per capita in the US dollars in the same year was 20,305.6 (Ibid.). In addition, the area of Rwanda is 26,338 square kilometres and the area of Finland is 338,145 square kilometres ('Rwanda', 2015).

There are three main ethnic groups in Rwanda: 80% of the population are Hutus, 10% are Tutsis and 1% of Twas (Strauss 2008, 19). Tutsis and Hutus share the same language, Kinyarwanda. Culturally they do not differ as they live in the same regions and practice the same religion (Ibid.). The Tutsi minority was favoured by the Belgian colonizers e.g. getting better jobs and education and consequently more wealth than their fellow countrymen. It was the artificial hierarchy of the Tutsis and Hutus that had a crucial impact on these two ethnicities (Strauss 2008, 21). Also the notorious identification cards were introduced during the Belgian rule that would separate the ethnicities (Wallis 2007, 9). The unfair treatment of

the ethnic majority led to a deep-rooted jealousy that would manifest itself in the form of genocide.

Hutus became involved in the Rwandan Tutsi dominated politics slowly after the World War II because of the pressure the UN put onto Belgium. The Hutus already had a foothold in the politics when Rwanda gained its independence. The independence turned the Rwandan politics upside down and the Hutu Revolution forced the Tutsis out of the politics: there were two Tutsi representatives in the parliament and one minister and one Tutsi in the army (Prunier 1995, 75). Furthermore, some of the Tutsi were also pushed out of the country: the result was that the oppressed Hutus wanted to even out with Tutsis and hundreds of thousands were murdered and escaped. Tanzania, Burundi and Uganda were the destinations of the 700,000 Tutsi refugees (Wallis 2007, 11). In addition, Belgium began to support the Hutus. President Juvenal Habyarimana, an upper class Hutu, took office violently in 1973. His authoritarian rule held for 20 years until his death. In 1978, Habyarimana's party the *Mouvement Révolutionnaire Nationale pour le Développement* (MRND), was the only political party left in the Rwandan political system: a totalitarian party that forced every citizen to join regardless of their age (Prunier 1995, 76). The tentacles of the party reached to every nook and cranny of the country.

1.3. The Civil war

The sporadic violence and oppression continued decade after decade even though at the beginning of Habyarimana's regime the living circumstances for the Tutsi were in fact milder. In addition to the neighbouring countries some Tutsis sought exile from other continents as well. The Tutsi refugees thought that the exile would be temporary but in fact many refugees had to wait thirty years to return to their homeland since the refugee stream began flowing already in the 1960s (Prunier 1995, 68). As a response to the frustration of the Tutsi refugees living in exile, the Rwandan Patriotic Front party (RPF) was founded in 1987 in Uganda.

In 1990, the Rwandan political system had to be renewed due to the pressure imposed by the foreign donors and as a result the one-party system broadened into a multiparty system. Soon the new system was in crisis. Dissident politicians, journalist and students were killed.

As a result of the instability in the country, on October 1, the civil war began as the exiled RPF attacked Rwanda. Belgium ceased to arm Rwanda, as it did not want to be associated with the erupted violence (Fruchart 2007, 5). In contrast to the Belgian reaction France was quick to stand by Rwanda: in three days French soldiers were fighting with the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR), against the RPF. The first phase of the fighting did not last long due to the upper hand FAR had gained from its foreign aid, the French Operation *Noroît*. By October 30 the war had ended since the RPF soldiers had been exhausted, killed or returned back to Uganda (Prunier 1995, 86).

The RPF invasion gave Habyarimana's party a good reason to spread its anti-Tutsi propaganda and also arrest people under the suspicion they were rebels. The seeds for the genocide were planted when the civilian defence program began in 1990. It was an expansion of the army, which allowed civilians to be armed towards the RPF rebels. Interahamwe was a youth wing of the MRND that was trained 1992-93 (Strauss 2008, 26). The civil war continued as guerrilla warfare until the peace accords came into force, shadowed by massacres of Tutsis in Rwanda. The troops of the RPF had grown from around 5,000 men in 1991, into 25,000 in 1994 (Prunier 1995, 117). And as a contrast, the FAR had grown from 5,200 men since the breaking out of the civil war in 1990 and continued to grow into 50,000 by 1992. France provided the arms for the enlarging army with the help of South Africa and Egypt (Prunier 1995, 113). The UN involvement in the Rwandan crisis began on June 22 in 1993 in the form of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), to block military aid flowing from Uganda to Rwanda to assist the RPF troops (United Nations peacekeeping: UNOMUR). After the Arusha peace agreement, UNOMUR was mended to the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

1.4. The Arusha Accords

Ironically, France was one of the countries pressuring President Habyarimana to make a peace with the RPF and the French support was indeed vital. The peace negotiations began in Tanzania in September 1992. The Arusha Accords is a peace agreement that was signed by the RPF, the president of Rwanda, a Tanzanian representative, a UN representative and a representative of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The Arusha Accords

comprised of different sets of negotiations between the parties. The pressing issues of Rwanda that required immediate attention were dealt with such as human rights, the rule of law and the discharge of the refugees. Also uniting the separate armies of Hutus and Tutsis was covered and pursued for democracy by establishing a transitional government where the power should be shared between the ethnicities to prevent future conflicts. The Arusha peace treaty was also supposed to turn Rwanda into an arms-free area (Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide 2000, 50). The treaty was signed on August 4 1993. The UNAMIR troops were sent to Rwanda to monitor the implementation of the Arusha Accords. However, the terms of the treaty would never be put into practice ('The Arusha Peace Agreement', n.d.).

Notwithstanding the signing the Arusha Peace Treaty even within the same year the anti-Tutsi rampage was escalating. The murder of the Burundian Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye in October 1993 by the Tutsi militia provoked the Rwandan anti-Tutsi propagandists. According to Des Forges, the murder of the Burundian Hutu president gave an example to the Hutu extremists of how to act since the international community did not pay attention to the killings that followed or was not ready to condemn the criminals (Des Forges 1999, 101). In addition, the murder of the first Hutu president proved that the Tutsi were not interested in power sharing and wanted to dominate the Hutus (Strauss 2008, 30). This was the opposite of what had been agreed on the Arusha Accords. The massacres of Burundi spread quickly to the neighbouring Rwanda as well and the radio station *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLM), which became the voice of the anti-Tutsi propaganda. The radio station turned out to be a dangerous weapon as a large percentage (60%) of its audience were illiterate (Prunier 1995, 133). The set of early warnings of the impending genocide began in November 1993 and at the same time the Belgian UNAMIR troops realized their incapability to protect the people in need. In January 1994, General Roméo Dallaire requested for more soldiers as he feared the violence would continue to escalate. The answer of the Security Council was univocal: the Arusha Accords should be complied with the peacekeeping mission, UNAMIR, to continue (Des Forges 1999, 101).

2. THEORETICAL APPROACH

In this chapter the theoretical framework of the paper is presented. The practice of multilateralism and the theory of realism of international relations are portrayed in this chapter individually and later they are applied to the international response and the case study of France. The concept of multilateralism will be discussed again the Analysis section of the international response. Realism is the second theory, which will also be discussed in the case study of France, also in the Analysis section.

2.1. Multilateralism

The notion of multilateralism derives from two Latin words meaning many-sided and having many angles. After the Second World War, in the search for a more peaceful world, the practice of multilateralism has become more common as the growing number of international institutions and organizations imply. Although, in the setting of the Cold War and the bipolar world a purely multilateral cooperation was not easy. It was impossible for the UN and the UNSC particularly to develop the multilateral cooperation when the Western world was focused on fighting against communism with the United States of America taking the lead. When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union was dissolved, it was thought that the era of multilateralism would begin but the bipolarity that governed the world did not morph into a multipolar system. The bipolar system did not expand into multipolarity as expected but diminished into a unipolar system with the United States of America as the only major world power. Despite the failed expectations of the multipolar world, the concept of multilateralism was anyhow developed after the Cold War but it did not reach its full potential and lacks further research.

The most noted scholars that have studied and developed the theory of multilateralism are the institutionalists: Keohane, Caporaso and Ruggie. Keohane (1990, 731) defined multilateralism “as the practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions”. This definition is widely used and cited in the works of his colleagues. Caporaso (1992, 603) adds to it that “[m]ultilateralism, as opposed to ‘multilateral’, is a belief that activities ought to be organized on a universal (or at least a many-sided) basis for a ‘relevant’ group, such as the group of democracies”. Caporaso (1992, 601-603) states that there are three characteristics that separate multilateralism from others and they are “indivisibility, generalized principles of conduct, and diffuse reciprocity” - by the latter the author meant that the participants in the multilateral action do not expect to gain immediately, but in the long term.

The international relations theory of institutionalism studies multilateralism, proven by all the definitions used in this text are formed by institutionalists. Like institutionalism, multilateralism emphasizes the importance of institutions (Keohane 1990, 733). The relation between institutions and multilateralism is mutually beneficial. Once a multilateral organization is set some rules are enforced in the multilateral cooperation, which facilitates its action. Some of the issues born of the lack of institutions are eliminated such as “absence of trust, weak and unreliable information, incentives to defect, and renegeing on agreements when it is convenient” (Caporaso 1992, 610).

The challenges that multilateralism faces are similar to the ones people encounter in every-day life: cooperation without making compromises is almost impossible. And like people, states also have their own interests that often complicate the process of cooperation. Like Caporaso states, multilateralism faces challenges with the number of participants increasing as they all have differing interests and goals and consequently the decision-making process becomes more complicated (Caporaso 1992, 613). Also Keohane (1990, 740) conforms to Caporaso’s views and talks about “conflicting interests and power” in cadre of the difficulties of multilateral cooperation. In addition, according to Keohane (1990, 741) the reason for a powerful state to join an organization or an institution is not altruistic as they use their membership to gain their own interests. Although, smaller states can in fact do the same.

Institutionalism is the closest theory to multilateralism and both of them promote cooperation in joining and forming institutions and also interdependence. Unilateralism is the

total opposite of multilateralism as the term implies supporting one-sided activities. Realism is also quite the contrary to multilateralism in terms of the institutions since the realist theory ignores the importance of institutions and does not believe that states would be capable of cooperating without their own conflicting interests getting in the way. Although, multilateralism has taken into consideration the self-interested states it does not see it as a limitation to successful multilateral cooperation.

The UNSC operations are based on the principle of multilateralism; consisting of representatives of 15 different member countries: five permanent and fifteen non-permanent. The decisions are made together. Some of the non-permanent members were in 1994: Nigeria, Oman, Rwanda, Czech Republic and Argentina (The United Nations). Like collective security systems, it is based the principle “that peace is indivisible” (Ruggie 1992, 569).

Multilateralism as a tool for solving international security issues has worked occasionally. Some of the peacekeeping missions have been successful e.g. in Cambodia and some not, e.g. in Somalia. The Somali Civil War that began in 1988 led to the UN peacekeeping missions from 1991 until 1995. The missions were not successful due to ineffective decision-making in the UN, which was due the incompetent personnel and the tardiness of the decision-making (Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, 1996). In 1994 when the Rwandan genocide started, the Cold War had ended only a few years earlier and the multilateral cooperation in the UNSC was staggering due to its inexperience and bad memories from the failed past operations.

2.2. Realism

Realism is the oldest theory of international relations. The theory has distinct sub-categories such as classical realism, neoclassical realism, offensive realism, defensive realism and neorealism. Classical realism was a popular theory in the international relations until the end of the Cold War. However, since the theory of realism is applied in analysing the case study, it is not necessary to dig into any deeper to those sub-categories. In contrast to the concept of multilateralism, realism has been studied by many and for centuries.

Indeed the theory of realism is old and there have been many scholars developing it during a long period of time. However, Hans Morgenthau’s definition of realism is superior to

its predecessors (Reus-Smit, Snidal 2008, 136). Morgenthau represents the school of the classical realism, which is also used in this paper in order to analyse the motives of the French unilateral intervention in the latter chapters. His definition is based on six principles and power politics (Morgenthau 2006, 10):

Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place.

In a broader sense the theory of realism is based on four components (Reus-Smit, Snidal 2008, 150):

1. Anarchy. The absence of government makes international relations a qualitatively distinct domain of political action.
2. Egoism. Individuals and groups tend to pursue self-interest narrowly defined.
3. Groupism. Politics takes place within and between groups.
4. Power politics. Egoistic groups interacting in anarchy generate a politics of power and security.

Also, according to realism the states are the most significant actors in the system of anarchy. The states are self-interested and seek for more power thus resembling the human mind. In this power-seeking world international institutions and organizations are worthless since every state has selfish interests.

All of those aforementioned components can be applied to the French foreign policy in francophone sub-Saharan Africa from the beginning of post-colonialism to the end of the Rwandan genocide. Since the 1960s France unilaterally intervened in many of the conflicts of its former colonies in Africa. The unilateral interventions were enabled by military treaties signed post-independency of the colonies. Rwanda was not a French colony but it was a francophone country, which is why it was significant to France. They were allies. The motives of many interventions was that France had its own interests to protect e.g. in Rwanda the cordial relations presidents Habyarimana and Mitterrand had sustained until the beginning of the genocide. The French support for a government with genocidal aspirations was not

something of which France wanted to be remembered, and it became one of the reasons why France decided to launch its unilateral intervention. Realism was chosen to present the French motives of the unilateral intervention Operation Turquoise since France carried out the intervention to pursue its self-interested motives of protecting the sphere of influence in francophone Africa.

3. THE GENOCIDE

This chapter begins with the definition of the genocide since it is one of the central themes of this paper. The definition is followed by a description of the Rwandan genocide, which focuses on discussing the course of events of the genocide. The international response will be covered in the following chapter.

3.1. Definition

There are to be found various definitions for the term genocide but in this section only some of the most well-known are presented.

Raphael Lemkin (1944, 79) was the first to define the term genocide. He formulated his definition after the Holocaust to describe the horrors the Jewish experienced:

By 'genocide' we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group. [...] Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group.

The UN soon followed Lemkin's lead, taking some influences from his work and defined the term genocide in 1948 in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:

[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group;

causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

The French historian Dr. Gérard Prunier (1995, 238) retells Lemkin's definition:

[...] the systematic organization of the killing and the attempt at completely erasing the targeted group - in this case socially or politically unorthodox people.

On our particular case, the first two mentioned definitions were formulated before the Rwandan genocide. The Rwandan genocide was the first genocide after the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide held by the UN.

All of these definitions of the term genocide are accurate in describing the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The Hutu extremists' objective was demolish the whole Tutsi population by murdering and torturing its fellow citizens solely based on their ethnicity. The Rwandan genocide is still one of the most tragic ones in terms of its massive amount of casualties in a short period of time: 800,000 in 100 days.

3.2. The Rwandan genocide

Due to the guerrilla warfare tactics employed by the RPF, it had become a feared terrorist in they eyes of many Rwandans. This combined with an efficient propaganda machine such as RTL M blaming all the Tutsi population for the acts of violence carried out by RPF, the turmoil was guaranteed. The Hutu extremist militia recruited from the poorest parts of the population, most of them peasants, which suited both for the recruiters and the recruited: uneducated people and possibly illiterate were easy to steer to the direction they wanted with the peasants feeling they finally had a chance to be a part of something important and not be looked down by the society (Prunier 1995, 232). In the background of this were the jealousy and the inferiority complex that stemmed from the colonial times. The foundation for

success that the Tutsi had laid would be torn apart by the genocide. The radio station RTLM appealed to that side especially with its derogatory broadcasts. But the main reason to become a genocidaire was the state authority: people were afraid they would be killed unless they did not participate in the killings (Prunier 1995, 248).

The planning of the genocide unfolded on the governmental level and the main architect of the genocide was Colonel Bagosora who was backed by the *Akazu*, which translates into a small house. Akazu comprised of the closest ranks to the president; his most trusted Hutu extremist friends, the president's wife and her brothers.

On April 6 1994, the plane of the Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana was shot down. Even today the knowledge of his killer is unknown. The death of Habyarimana was the last straw to the restless Rwanda and gave a reason for the Hutu extremists to blame the RPF of killing the president. On the same night the Presidential Guard put up roadblocks and the shooting in Kigali began. The Hutu extremists took advantage of the colonial Belgian invention of having one's ethnicity marked on their identification cards. Once a person was recognized to be a Tutsi, they were killed instantly. To fasten the killing spree at least in the first days of the genocide the Interahamwe along with the other militia were using death lists that would have the names of the people that should be killed. They were mostly Tutsi names but some opposition Hutus as well who were against the MRND. Also liberal-minded politicians and journalists ended up on to the black lists of the Hutu. The first phase was to kill the political opposition beginning with the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana. She was protected by the Belgian UNAMIR troops but almost all of them were killed in attempt to protect her.

Even on the next day of president Habyarimana's death, on April 7, the killing had spread like a wildfire out of Kigali to the interior of Rwanda. The power vacuum that was left after Habyarimana's death was soon filled when the new interim government took office on April 9 and as a consequence the multiparty system was buried as the most significant ministerial positions were given to the extremist Hutus (Prunier 1995, 233). Colonel Bagosora took the lead of the country. On top of the massacres the civil war had erupted again, and on April 12 the troops of RPF and FAR were combatting in Kigali. The Tutsi massacres were executed on the largest scale in April and the violence slowed down in May and June becoming more disorganized, with the exception of the southern parts of the country.

The role of propaganda plays a significant role and it was indeed a major perpetrator of the massacres. As aforementioned, RTLM had a major impact on advancing the progress of the genocide as a racist radio station. A large portion of the nation being illiterate, the radio was the only source of news and it was fuelling the fear of the RPF and also nourishing the Hutu inferiority complex. In addition to its racist propaganda, it also worked as an informer to the genocidaires where to strike next to find the Tutsis, which in turn made it a kind of an executive organ of the genocide (James 2008, 97). Another means of propaganda was a newspaper called Kangura, which was founded in 1990 only to spread malicious anti-Tutsi message. The Hutus “Ten Commandments” were published which e.g. advised the Hutus not to do business with the Tutsi or marrying with the Tutsi (‘The Ten Commandments’, n.d.).

The genocide did not end due to an international intervention by the UN but because the RPF had conquered Rwanda from the governmental troops. In the background of the genocide it had been advancing since the beginning of April. The genocide was ended by the RPF in mid-July and the perpetrators of the genocide driven away to Zaire and Tanzania.

The Tutsi extermination was one of the fastest genocides in its tragic efficiency of the XX century as in 100 days 800,000 people had lost their lives. In many cases the victims had been tortured, their bodies mutilated and raped while still alive. And many of the women who were raped many got infected with HIV. In general, no Tutsi in Rwanda was safe from the genocide as the victims were children, women and men. In addition to this, some moderate Hutus were killed as well.

4. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

The international response to the Rwandan genocide is encapsulated by the words of Alison Des Forges: “The Americans were interested in saving money, the Belgians were interested in saving face, and the French were interested in saving their ally, the genocidal government”. (Rwandan Genocide Could Have Been Stopped, 1999).

4.1. Early warnings

Prior to the genocide there have been numerous early warning signs about the oncoming disaster that would face Rwanda. The Tutsi slaughtering began already in 1990, four years prior to the genocide and due to the concern of the human rights organizations that had evidence and the information was transmitted abroad as well. Belgium knew it, the special rapporteur for the UN Commission on Human Rights knew and even reported it but the reaction was next to nothing (Des Forges 1999, 19). Although the UN had already in August 1993 published a report on the situation in Rwanda revealing the massacres of Tutsis are equivalent to a genocide, still international response was fairly silent.

One of the early warnings before the genocide, in January 1994, was given by General Dallaire. He informed the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), of the possible genocide executed by the Hutus. Dallaire realised something had to be done and pleaded a permission to take over the weaponry that had been shipped to Rwanda. However, his plea did not convince the UN until February when Dallaire peacekeeping troops were authorised to help the Rwandan government to confiscate illegal arms, and although taking over the arms caches were off limits. Belgium was the first country to warn about the approaching genocide but their request for strengthening the UNAMIR mandate was refused.

4.2. Not a genocide

For a long time the word genocide was avoided by the UNSC as well as the OAU to describe the atrocities of Rwanda even though it would have been the most correct word. The Rwandan diplomats downsized the effects of the killings to the western authorities e.g. referring to “tribal violence” (Martin 2009, 284). This was not a surprise. After all the diplomats were representing a state that was murdering its own citizens. A more attractive way to describe the Rwandan genocide was claiming it was a civil war. This was true in the sense that it was in fact happening simultaneously. The genocide was far more destructive and organized than the civil war had ever been; in addition, the victims were the civilian population terrorized by the government. International governments shied away and only the NGOs and human rights organizations cared what was happening in Rwanda. Only as late as June 8, the UNSC used the word genocide for the first time (Des Forges 1999, 499).

On April 8, after the assassinations of the Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and the group of Belgian peacekeepers that were trying to protect her, General Dallaire, Force Commander of UNAMIR in Kigali, sent an alarming fax to the UN about the situation in Rwanda as soon as it began to escalate:

The appearance of a very well planned, organized, deliberate and conducted campaign of terror initiated principally by the presidential guard since the morning after the death of the head of state has completely reoriented the situation in Kigali. Aggressive actions have been taken – against particular ethnic groups (massacre of Tutusi in Remera), against the general civilian population (Banditry) and against UNAMIR. (Barnett, 2002, 114).

The fax would let Belgium, France, the UK and the United States to know right away that the Tutsis were slaughtered for the sake of their ethnicity. General Dallaire’s fax about the deteriorating situation formalized the Rwandan crisis (Des Forges 1999, 478). The death of the ten Belgian peacekeepers who were trying to protect the Prime Minister gave rise to the thought in Belgium that UNAMIR should indeed withdraw if the UNAMIR mandate was not be strengthened and if the peacekeepers were not given a more active role in protecting the civilians. Belgium was afraid of the opinion of its people after the death of the peacekeepers.

As a result of the discussions and the reluctance in the Security Council, the broader mandate was not accepted but the troops were not withdrawn either.

As an instant reaction to the slaughter of the ten Belgian peacekeepers the Operation Amaryllis began on April 9. The objective was to save the French and Belgian nationals from Rwanda at the time it was discovered the UNAMIR troops were useless in protecting the nationals or even themselves. The evacuation troops consisted of 1,200 troops from France, Belgium and the USA (Des Forges 1999, 467). The evacuation was derailing the UNAMIR peacekeepers away from their original mission of protecting the civilian population: “this task did become their priority mission” (Des Forges 1999, 470), referring to the evacuation of foreigners. The Operation Amaryllis was purely to a rescue mission of the foreigners since the specific order from the UN headquarters of New York stating that no locals would be boarding the aircrafts.

By April 10 the Belgians realized that the Security Council would not strengthen the UNAMIR mandate. This meant that the peacekeepers would remain to be in a more threatening danger without reinforcement of the troops and also they could not operate in the cadre of the demanded standards. So Belgium joined the opinion of the United States of the America, the United Kingdom on total withdrawal of the troops. Nigeria, a non-permanent UNSC member resisted the withdrawal. Later on April 21 due to the mounting pressure from the NGOs the Security Council decided against the complete withdrawal of the UNAMIR and it was agreed that a small amount of men would stay in Rwanda; 270. Their main task was to lock a ceasefire. But in fact the men never left Rwanda so the 540 peacekeepers stayed (Des Forges 1999, 23). The manpower was still far from sufficient to help everybody or even the majority.

4.3. The gradual recognition

By the end of April General Dallaire's pleas from Rwanda and the growing pressure from the human right organizations gave birth to a new strategy (Martin 2009, 285). On April 29, the Tutsi massacres were recognised by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and it was realised that the UNAMIR mandate had been insufficient to deal with both the massacres and the civil war. Hearing this some of the non-permanent members of the Security Council: Czech Republic, New Zealand, Spain and Argentina raised their voices and demanded the permanent Security Council members to take on a new course of action in order to save the Rwandans. The idea of UNAMIR II was born that day and on May 17, the resolution of the UNAMIR II became reality. Although the troops could not be sent yet for weeks since the USA demanded more time to plan the UNAMIR II (Des Forges 1999, 499). Consequently, the mission gained authorization on June 8 Also on May 17, the UNSC imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda, during the second month of the genocide (Ibid.).

UNAMIR II was intended to be an advanced and a better version of its precedent. Now the mandate was strengthened and the peacekeepers had the authority to properly defend the civilians and act against the aggressors when needed. The manpower was planned to be 5,500. The only problem was the lack of resources, which in this case meant the lack of funds. As the discussion of launching UNAMIR II continued the participants realized that embarking the new mission would take months, which may be too late to help the victims in Rwanda. Although, the impact of UNAMIR II to the killings was insignificant since the US government held off the process of creating the second part of the UNAMIR (Martin, 2009, 285).

On July 18 1994, the RPF had conquered Rwanda. The UNAMIR II troops reached Rwanda only in the end of October.

4.4. Analysis

When analysing the failure of the UNSC in terms of multilateral cooperation its responsibilities are important to be examined.

[...] the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. [...] The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security.

(The Security Council, n.d.)

The failure of the peacekeeping missions in Somalia from 1991 until 1995 affected the UNSC response to the Rwandan crisis. The Somali peacekeeping missions had been costly and the UNSC permanent members, for instance the United States of America did not want to participate another expensive operation. Also at the same the UN had its own difficulties in the Balkan. The foundation for an inadequate response had been laid as soon it was decided that the UNAMIR mission would be implemented at a low cost.

The UNSC had a more than a sufficient impression of what was happening in Rwanda because since the civil war in Rwanda and four years prior to the genocide the UN had been involved in the country. At first, on the border of Uganda and Rwanda (UNOMUR) and then after the peace accords (UNAMIR). The UN had its employees reporting often on the spot. The early warnings reached many of the permanent members of the Security Council and Belgium as well. When the assassinations began in the beginning of April 1994, first president Habyarimana and then Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana with the ten Belgian peacekeepers the talks about the UNAMIR mandate and its sufficiency in the UNSC began. Instead of broadening the mandate and protecting the locals Operation Amaryllis was launched to save the foreign civilians. This was a mistake, according to Martin, “witnesses deterred violence” (Martin 2009, 15). The genocidaires did not want their actions to come and haunt them for instance in the war tribunals (Ibid.). The Rwandan Hutu extremists were not

interested in killing the foreigners as their agenda was wiping out the Tutsi population. This was one of the most crucial steps in the beginning of the genocide that the UNSC could have stepped up but instead showed that it did not care about Rwanda.

The prevailing theme in the UNSC was the general unwillingness to call murdering of the Tutsi genocide rather than calling it ‘just a civil war’. This had a powerful impact on the management of the genocide. Different states within the UNSC had different motives for the “refusal to invoke the G-Word“ (Stanton 2009, 15). Some of the countries might have wanted to take an impartial stance but some just did not want to admit the truth ”because of the moral and legal imperatives attached to it” (Des Forges 1999, 21) referring to the Genocide Convention of 1948. In addition, the USA had a reason of its own to avoid the term genocide. After the peacekeeping failure operation in Somalia the US had restricted its participation in peacekeeping missions but there was a loophole in this new policy: genocide. If genocide takes place, the policy limitation is invalid which explains why the United States of America wanted to avoid using the term until June. Avoiding the use of the correct term in the UNSC was the second mistake.

There were a number of measures that the UNSC could have done to halt or slow down the genocide like e.g. jamming the RTLM and threatening to end the financial support in the years to come. Cutting diplomatic ties would have been an option as well. Rwanda was highly dependent of the foreign support and knew it could not survive without it. However, cutting the diplomatic ties would have been difficult since, ironically, one of the non-permanent members of the UNSC in 1994 was Rwanda. It was indeed peculiar that the Rwandan membership was not withdrawn since it was the governmental troops of Rwanda that were executing the genocide, which would mean that the UNSC had a representative that also supported the genocide.

There was not any political will to solve the Rwandan crisis in the UNSC and this was also the reason behind the Western world’s inattentiveness. Especially of the United States of America and the United Kingdom as well, although France has to be excluded from this equation since it had its own agenda. The researchers who have studied the Rwandan genocide have come to the same conclusion as well, like Stanton, Des Forges and also a research ‘Independent Inquiry’ by the UN about the lack of political will. All the aforementioned events resulted to the inadequate international response, beginning from the disregard of the early warnings, launching Operation Amaryllis, denial to call out the

genocide but also launching the second UNAMIR mission late. At any of these stages the UNSC could have made a great difference on the outcome of the genocide and saved lives.

Caporaso's concept of diffuse reciprocity, meaning that states expect to gain in the long run of the multilateral cooperation but not every time, was put into test after the Somali peacekeeping fiasco. It is possible that the UNSC permanent member states, especially the United States of America could not take a new risk and lose again in another costly peacekeeping mission. And it could not remember or still was too traumatized to remember that the gains of multilateralism would come in the long run.

It appears that the UNSC's practiced multilateralism ran out of fuel when it was the most needed. Since the Arusha Accords, a couple years prior to the genocide the multilateral tactics resulted in the peace agreement. Peacekeeping troops were also to monitor the implementation of the treaty, decision made in cooperation in the UNSC. When the peace agreement failed and the genocide erupted the self-interests of some states in the UNSC began to show. The UNAMIR mandate was not broadened, thus ignoring the UNAMIR General Dallaire's firm demands.

The fact that there are fifteen member states in one executive organ making decisions about the security issues of the world complicates the decision-making process quite a bit. In addition, five of these member states are better equipped to achieve their goals i.e. through the veto system. The prevalent use of the veto during the discussions by the United States of America and France in the UNSC on the Rwandan crisis crippled the decision making process from time to time. Like the theory of multilateralism, the UNSC was challenged as well by the conflicting interests of the states.

However, in addition to the signing the Arusha Accords, there is another success story to be found of the UNSC's practiced multilateralism. For instance, the first international reaction to the escalating Rwandan crisis in the beginning of April 1994 was the evacuation of the foreign nationals. The evacuation was implemented by the means of multilateralism and in cooperation of three states: Belgium, France and the USA. Unfortunately, this type of multilateral tactics would not help the Rwandans.

Not calling the genocide by its rightful term was another example of the self-interests, although referring to the crisis in Rwanda only as a civil war was not only an interest of one country, but many. In fact many states together decided to refrain from using the term so in a way multilateralism was used in reaching a common decision but not for the purpose it was

designed for in the UNSC. The purpose of the UNSC is not to retreat in a situation of crisis but to face it and try to solve it, even though this was not the way the situation of Rwanda was dealt with.

Another showcase of the self-interested states in the UNSC was on May 17, which was the date of the resolution to launch the UNAMIR II and finally acknowledging the inadequacy of the first UNAMIR troops. The United States delayed the deployment of the troops. As a powerful state there was not much to do in the UNSC than to wait for it. As the USA took its time, it was soon realized that sending the troops to Rwanda would take too long. At this point France offers to launch Operation Turquoise. The international response determined by the large number of victims, 800,000, was inadequate. Also after the genocide the UNSC has acknowledged its lack of contribution in dealing with Rwanda in 1994 in a correct manner. The UNSC could act multilaterally when it was desirable for the member states e.g. signing the Arusha Accords and launching Operation Amaryllis. Nevertheless, as soon as it was time for some serious and costly measures e.g. broadening the UNAMIR mandate, the UNSC became paralysed. The conclusion of the UNSC actions is that the multilateral cooperation was frozen by the lack of political will in the Security Council. Rwanda was a remote country in a remote continent that was not interesting enough for the members of the UNSC. The situation was partly enabled by the lack of legal framework to oblige the member states to take action.

5. CASE STUDY FRANCE: OPERATION TURQUOISE

5.1. Special relationship

After the Belgian colonial rule France was quick to tie relations to Rwanda based on the francophone connection. Rwanda became part of the French “*pre carré*”, backyard (Prunier 1995, 103). This was a type of special foreign policy France had for its former colonies and francophone countries. It was created in the 1940s by Charles de Gaulle in the fear of France losing its influence. France filled the void that Belgium had left providing military and political assistance, which was a typical move of France when recruiting new members to its growing group of francophone African countries. The military cooperation of France and Rwanda was cemented in the Rwandan civil war in the form of Operation Noîrot, launched in just days after the RPF invasion. However, the military cooperation and assistance did not end in the civil war. Officially, France continued to arm Rwanda until the suspension of arms deliveries came into effect. France was also the major supplier of arms in Rwanda (Fruchart 2007, 9). In addition to the military cooperation, the warm relations of the two countries were also due to the French president François Mitterrand and the Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana who knew each other on the personal level as well.

5.2. Operation Turquoise

France was the first country to use the word genocide on May 15. Although like its fellow member states in the UNSC France also avoided to use the term for a long time. Even though, the genocide had been acknowledged France pleaded the both parties, the governmental Rwandan troops and the RPF, to cease the violence. Operation Turquoise was supposed to be a humanitarian operation of President Mitterrand that would halt the genocide.

Under the UN mandate France launched the unilateral military intervention Operation Turquoise on June 22 in 1994. The troops comprised of 2,500 soldiers. The French objective was to prevent the RPF from conquering Rwanda and end the genocide by setting up safe zones for the victims. The UN mandate had eventually been strengthened and so the troops of Turquoise were allowed to use force to protect the civilians, unlike the UNAMIR troops (Quilés 1998, 324). France had fought against the RPF already in the Rwandan civil war. The RPF was perceived by the French as rebel guerrillas who did not have the right to the position of power since they did not represent the majority of the Rwandans. As an old enemy, the revolt against the RPF was so strong that the French would rather cooperate with the Hutu extremists in the fight against the RPF troops (Prunier 1995, 292). Still, in a fortnight France was ready to bury the hatchet with the RPF. A direct hotline between the RPF and the French Ministry of Justice was introduced and for the first time the leaders of the RPF could communicate directly with the French authorities. This led to understanding between President Mitterrand and RPF leader Paul Kagame: the RPF and the French troops would cooperate in the future.

Eventually France did establish a safe zone, *Zone Humanitaire Sûre*, but it was not successful since it would bring security only for 20% of the Rwandans (Prunier 1995, 297). Not only were the safe zones insufficient to protect the majority of the civilians, some of the members of the Rwandan interim government even entered the zone and France announced that it did not have the authority to arrest them. In effect, zones were used for escaping from Rwanda.

5.3. Arms deliveries

Resolution 918 of the UNSC imposed an arms embargo upon Rwanda on May 17 1994. However, the arms deliveries did not halt. According to Fruchart eyewitnesses have told that they had seen trucks full of arms heading to Rwanda from Zaire (Fruchart 2007, 14). In addition, a study by the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch states five counts of arms shipments crossing the border from Zaire to Rwanda in May and June. Also on July 18 a flight loaded with arms arrived from France to Goma, which is a Zairian border town on the border of Rwanda. (Ibid.) The official French statement denies any type of arms deliveries

after the embargo. In addition to the eyewitnesses' accounts of the arms deliveries, General Dallaire joined them in the article of AFP News Agency June 19 1994: "If they land here to deliver their damn weapons to the government, I'll have their planes shot down" (Prunier 1995, 287).

5.4. The outcome of the intervention

Operation Turquoise made it possible to save approximately 15,000 lives, which was only the twice as much as the UNAMIR had saved with minor resources (Des Forges 1999, 23). Since the Tutsi-led RPF had conquered Rwanda from the governmental forces, the Hutus, including people who had taken part in the genocide, fled. A million people escaped from Rwanda to Zaire (Prunier 1995, 229). The violence by the genocidaires did not end once the border of Zaire was reached but continued on the other side of the border as well. Later when the scale of the French cooperation with the state that had made a genocide became public, France was in trouble. According to Prunier, the genocide mixed with the civil war had taken lives an amount that constituted 10% of the population and in addition 30% fled the country (Prunier 1995, 299).

The sudden and the large number of refugees were to meet many problems even though they might have thought that they had left the troubles behind them in Rwanda. When crossing the border to Zaire the access to clean water was limited, not to mention any chance for a basic hygiene and some were wounded and many starving; a cholera epidemic was ready to burst out (Prunier 1995, 302).

During Operation Turquoise the new government took office on July 19 with president Pasteur Bizimungu taking the lead and vice-president Paul Kagame stood by his side and becoming the president himself later. Operation Turquoise ended on August 21 and was replaced by the UNAMIR II.

5.5. Analysis

The lack of political will does not apply to France as the French response was completely opposite. France had its very own objectives for the Operation Turquoise that can be applied to the realist theory. France did not want to act alone because of the bad implications and its history of numerous unilateral African interventions. Those interventions have mainly focused on sub-Saharan Africa in an effort to try to protect its interests on the continent. So, France paid Senegal and Chad to join the intervention (Wallis 2006, 129).

President Mitterrand delivered his 'La Baule Speech' in June 1990 and stated the official French view:

France does not intend to intervene in the interior affairs of friendly African nations. It has its say, it intends to pursue its work with aid, friendship, and solidarity. It does not intend to be questioned, it does not intend to abandon any African country.

The French actions supported President Mitterrand's words already in the Rwandan civil war as the Habyarimana's Hutu regime was the only legal one and the RPF troops were seen as intruders although they were Rwandan. Also his speech could be applied to the launching and ending of Operation Turquoise.

Mitterrand called Operation Turquoise a humanitarian operation but once faith in the humanitarian side of the intervention starts to crumble in the very beginning when he pleads both the RPF and the Rwandan governmental troops to halt the genocidal killings. If President Mitterrand believed sincerely that the massacres of the Tutsi civilians were executed by both parties proves more of the French realist thinking. Since France must have known that the massacres were done by its former and not the other way around.

The French intervention was not any more successful than the UNAMIR mission. The French troops of Operation Turquoise "saved 15,000 to 17,000 lives" (Des Forges 1999, 23). The intervention's efficiency can be questioned based on the fact that the UNAMIR peacekeepers doubled that figure with the manpower of 500 (Ibid.). In comparison, the French forces comprised of 2,500 elite soldiers (Ibid.). Although, undermining any saved lives is

irrelevant but the efficiency by the provided capacity of the Operation Turquoise is not. The French troops were highly trained and well-armed so it is perplexing that in proportion they did not succeed in saving more lives, especially after the mandate was broadened.

The ultimate reason behind the unilateral French intervention was that Rwanda belonged to the sphere of influence of France and it wanted to retain its influence and control over the francophone world. The fact that the RPF was anglophone had an impact as well. The linguistic francophone connection was a crucial factor that glues the francophone African world to France, which explains why the RPF was still contested by France in the beginning of the Turquoise. Like realism suggests the states are only interested in themselves in the world of anarchy. France indeed had its own interests on stake, the maintenance of the francophone world, and the anarchy is true in a sense, that the UNSC failed as the universal organ of promoting peace and security so it was up to France to save its former ally when nobody else cared. The rivalry of the francophone and anglophone Africa is confirmed by Huliaras (1998, 594) who talks about “anglosaxon conspiracy”: the USA wanted France’s influence in Africa to hinder, at least that is what the French politicians and diplomats thought. The reason why France was against the RPF was because it was said to be under the control of the Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni who in turn was said to be under the influence of the anglophone USA (Ibid.).

France got to show its might and power in the unilateral intervention; something that none of the UNSC members had not done. The notion of power politics is as an active component of the realist thinking. In addition another example of the power politics is that France did not want the RPF to conquer Rwanda and tried actively to block its advancing in the beginning of the Operation Turquoise and even though France and the RPF reached an agreement stop fighting with each other.

The speculation whether France had armed the FAR during a genocide or let some of the genocidaires to escape to Zaire happened and did not happen depending on the source. For instance Fruchart has concluded based on the interviews of the local eyewitnesses that the arms deliveries happened. Nevertheless, the limitation of these accounts are that even today they are denied by France. If the arms shipments were verified by France, the realist thinking would be further confirmed because then France would have ignored the sanctions the UNSC had imposed on Rwanda and chosen to act on its own. Also, ironically, they were sanctions that France itself had ordered with the other member countries of the Security Council. In

addition to this Bowman agrees with Fruchart, adding that France should be held in responsibility for participating in the genocide since it must have known about the genocide and by shipping arms there (Bowman 2005, 31).

The outcome of Operation Turquoise was disastrous for France. The accusations of aiding the killers instead of victims are a burden France still carries today. The Rwandan genocide was a turning point to its foreign policy and after 1994 almost all of the French interventions have been multilateral instead of unilateral (Siradag 2014, 115).

Although humanitarian interventions sometimes fail but France might have just masked the operation to seem humanitarian to get a mandate from the UN and also support from its own nation in order to protect its realist endeavours. Also France was aware that the close cooperation of Mitterand and Habyarimana would surface into the public knowledge once the genocide ended so a humanitarian operation might direct attention away from it. If the intervention was truly humanitarian, it could not be beneficial for Rwanda that France had its own agenda of hindering the RPF from forming a new government only because France wanted to keep its francophone world intact. The limitation of this case study is that France still denies largely the most blatant misdemeanours, so the official information is limited. Although, France has today admitted making some mistakes in Rwanda.

CONCLUSIONS

This research paper studied the international response to the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and in addition France was singled out from the international response into its own case study. The international responses, of the UNSC, and France were examined through the international relations theoretical frameworks of multilateralism and realism. The research questions were why did the multilateral international response of the UNSC fail and why was multilateralism replaced by the French unilateralism. My hypothesis was that the general lack of political will in the UNSC would not allow multilateralism to promote peace like it was supposed to. In consequence, the lack of political will allowed France to continue its own realist agenda in Rwanda.

The lack of political will in the UNSC was proved by presenting examples of the UNSC operations and decisions made about Rwanda. The members of the UNSC were capable of action when it was desirable for them e.g. when saving their own nationals from Rwanda in the beginning of the genocide. Broadening the UNAMIR mandate was not desirable since it would have been costly, although efficient in saving Rwandan civilians. When examining the international response from the perspective of the theory of multilateralism it became soon obvious that the member states of the UNSC had some conflicting interests that would cripple the efficient decision-making process e.g. the use of veto by France and the United States. Also as many as fifteen member states in the UNSC complicated the decision-making. As a conclusion the multilateral cooperation in the UNSC failed since the member states cooperated only in matters that were desirable for them in other words the lack of political will crippled the system. The hypothesis of this paper was correct. Leading to decisions such as avoiding to call the genocide by its proper term that had a negative impact.

The case study about France was studied from the angle of realism. The relations of Rwanda and France and the French African foreign policy were presented briefly. In cadre of Operation Turquoise the realist characteristics were proven to be intact. President Mitterrand

was afraid that his francophone world was in danger and launched Operation Turquoise to protect it. The objective of the French intervention was to be primarily humanitarian but in fact it did not impact on saving lives as much as it could have.

There are some limitations to this research, which were found in the process of studying the topic. The first limitation was the concept of multilateralism itself. It is not developed as extensively as some other theories, so probably some other international relations theory might have been better when studying the international response. The second limitation concerns the case study about France. The French cumbersome involvement in the process of solving the issue is the country's disgrace – moreover, France still largely still denies some of its mistakes made in 1994 e.g. the sources concerning the arms deliveries are based on eyewitness observations and are not verified by France itself.

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