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DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN ISLAM MAJORITY COUNTRY:
A CASE STUDY OF AFGHANISTAN

Master's thesis

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I hereby declare that I have compiled the thesis independently
and all works, important standpoints and data by other authors
have been properly referenced and the same paper
has not been previously presented for grading.

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ABSTRACT

The study attempts to provide an understanding if democratization mission in Afghanistan failed due to an incompatibility of Islam and the concept of thick democracy. Author chose the case study method, because of the importance of secondary sources, as it helps to make an in-depth understanding, why democracy promotion has failed in Afghanistan and to examine if there is a correlation between Islam and democracy compatibility. Used method allows us to analyse a certain time period from the past, compare it to the current situation, collect data from different years and explain the outcome through observation, analysis of a single case. This paper examined theorist, who argue that Islam and democracy are not compatible and those who say that they are compatible. Analyse of those two aspects, support the question whether democracy is possible in Islam majority country. Then there is an overview of democracy ratings from 2000-2021, when foreign troops were situated in Afghanistan and democracy promotion took place. Democracy indexes show us whether there was a democracy or progress towards democracy. Finally, there will be an overview of after the regime change and withdrawal on foreign troops, when The Taliban regained the control and what is the current situation of freedom rights and to what degree Afghan people have lost their civil liberties, which were gained in 2000-2021. This examination is fundamentally important, in order to conclude whether there is a democratic system after the withdrawal of foreign contributors.

The result of this thesis shows us that democracy promotion in Afghanistan was not successful because of underdevelopment, not because Islam and democracy are not compatible.

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between Islam and Western democracy in the modern world is broadly complicated. While the Muslim world is not ideologically complete, it still shows a wide scale of views ranging from those, who disclaim any link between Islam and democracy to those, who think that Islam needs a democratic system. Many Muslims, who live in the Muslim majority countries, consider that Islam is contributing for democracy, although their distinct political system is not clearly defined as Islamic political structure. Some people argue that democracy is a foreign concept, that has been forced by Westernizers and secular innovators upon Muslim societies, as it bans the fundamental Islamic confirmation of the sovereignty of God and is, therefore, a form of idolatry. On the other hand, there are many, who believe that Islam and democracy are compatible. Many scholars link historically relevant concepts from the Islamic tradition together with the main ideas of democracy in the contemporary world. (Esposito & Voll, Islam and Democracy, 2001)

Before 2000 Afghanistan was in never-ending civil conflicts, which brought, hunger, civilian deaths, growing instability, health care and economic crisis (Freedom House, 2000), but the suffering did not seem to end. In 2001 United States of America (U.S.A) led international mission, to invade Afghanistan, with the aim to destroy terrorist organisation Al Qaeda for their organised terrorist attacks on September 11 (Veit, 2002). The US - Afghanistan conflict in Afghanistan, began with the US military operation, Operation Enduring Freedom, which started on the seventh of October 2001(Quie, 2010). A year later in 2002, US President George Bush and Afghan Chairman of Interim Administration Hamid Karzai made a joint commitment, where they promised the Afghan nation to create a "representative and accountable national government in Afghanistan". Their statement described, how Afghanistan was aiming to become a democracy with more suitable institutional framework- a peaceful democracy. (Hill, 2010) Since then America has supported and guided Afghanistan in building stronger social infrastructures, strengthen the political system and foster equal rights for women etc. Nevertheless, even after all that effort, Afghanistan is placed on position 150 of 180 countries, as being a highly corrupt country (Transparency International, n.d.) with clear implication, that the vision, which was wished for, has not been delivered for the Afghan people. Even though, Afghanistan has been a corrupt country, according to Transparency International data, it still made progress regarding democracy promotion, but

after the withdrawal of foreign troops in 2021, when The Taliban took control over the power, the gained civil liberties on freedom, were yet again demolished due to The Taliban's interpretation of Islam.

The intention of this master thesis is to prove that democratization mission in Afghanistan failed due to incompatibility of Islam and thick democracy. Author chose this topic because of the appeal to observe the compatibility of democracy and Islam and to understand if it is even possible to promote democracy in Muslim majority countries. Concept of thick democracy is used, as it covers four important criteria: free and fair elections; inclusive suffrage; governmental accountability and freedom rights. If even one of these four conditions have not been met, then the country is seen as undemocratic (Taylor, Defining Democracy Through Thick and Thin, 2013). Author chose Afghanistan as a case study due to the influence and contribution, what was given to this country by different states, among which was also Estonia. Writer is interested, why democracy promotion has failed in Afghanistan, as it is still not a democratic state, even though the state has received humanitarian aid, financial and human resources from different international contributors. The country was chosen, because, the US and the EU have different approaches, on how democracy should be promoted and in Afghanistan, these two states work together, combining those "top-down" (focusing on state institutions) and "bottom up" (focus is on development of civil society and human rights non-governmental organizations) techniques (Adel, 2015). Also, in Afghanistan Muslims make up to 99% of the population (Swaminathan, 2016). Therefore, it is important to understand whether their cultural affiliation is coherent with promoting democracy. This is one of the reasons, why author chose Afghanistan to find out if Islam and democracy are compatible or not. This pushed author to seek further why the possibility of democracy spreading has not worked, whether it is because the Islam and democracy might not be compatible at all or the contribution and hope to help a state to develop democratic system is futile. So, the hypothesis of this paper is that democratization in Afghanistan failed because of the incompatibility of Islam and thick democracy.

The research will be conducted through a single case study (democracy promotion in Afghanistan). This focus allows for an in-depth investigation and a detailed comparison of the collected data and to analyse, why Afghanistan is not democratic. The case study methodology is chosen, because author is focusing on data used in Freedom House. The

importance of the usage of secondary source like newspapers and reports of official organizations as UN Women and other prestige authors works. Freedom House composes freedom reports of numerical ratings, with supportive content, using information from governments, news articles and other different sources, with combination of interviews with local contacts, on the ground research, and finally regional specialist, expert advisers with cooperation of Freedom House staff, who vet the analysts' conclusions (Freedom House, N.D.).

The case study helps to make an in-depth understanding, why democracy promotion has failed in Afghanistan and to examine if there is correlation with Islam and democracy compatibility. The method used allows us to analyse a certain time period from the past, compare it to the current situation, collect data from different years and explain the outcome through observation, analysis of a single case.

Thesis is divided into three major parts. In the first chapter the argument is raised, and the definition of thick democracy is introduced. As well, the later different definitions of democracy are discussed. Main part is a literature review on the argument, whether Islam and democracy are incompatible; it is followed by several discussions and examples, where many would agree with the argument and debate about those, who disagree and consider Islam and democracy to be compatible. Authors are chosen based on the topic of this work, as they are well-known, acknowledge and referred in their field. The aim was to choose writers with different background, views and opinions. Author of this thesis familiarized herself with different theories and chose the ones, who support this paper and contribute to it in different angles. The end of the first part analyses the different aspects, pros and cons of writers, who agree and disagree with the main argument of the current thesis.

In chapter two author gives a general overview of the fifteen biggest Muslim majority countries, at the same time evaluates their democracy scores and whether the majority Muslim in Muslim majority countries would like to have democracy or rather a strong leader. In the second part in chapter two there is an overview of a case study Afghanistan. Author reviews, how democracy promotion has been working in Afghanistan from 2001 until 2021, when the USA started democracy spreading, we examine freedom rating, political rights and civil liberties collected from neutral data sites as the Freedom House, the World Bank, the Pew Research Centre, the United States Instituted of Peace and The Economist Intelligence Unit, as basis to prove the hypothesis. In the fourth part of chapter two, there is analyses done on the question - how the situation has developed in Afghanistan over the years, starting

from the year 2001 till 2021, based on different indicators such as freedom rating, political rights, and civil liberties, what was examined in previous part. Time period was chosen because of the arrival of foreign troops, regime change and the start of democracy promotion and nation building, as it shows how Afghanistan has developed over the years and if there has been any progress towards democracy. Author examines different aspects of gathered results, in relations with what are important variables to establish working democracy and match it with in-depth explanation of thick definition of democracy from part one. This way author can substantiate that Afghanistan did not have a working democracy before year 2021.

In the third part of this paper, author examines the Afghanistan situation after the power change, when the foreign troops had left the country and ended the direct democracy promotion mission. The third part of this paper proves the hypothesis and substantiates, that the current form of democracy spreading has not been successful in Afghanistan, due to the incompatibility of Islam culture and democracy. Author gives an overview of how the situation has progressed after the post-out period and examines the current conditions of Afghan people and to what degree they have lost or currently have rights of freedom. When that is established, there is an discussion on how democracy promotion has not been successful in this chosen case-study, Afghanistan, with the suggestion why it is so.

1. WHAT IS DEMOCRACY

Democracy has never been a question about all or nothing, nor has it ever been perfect (A.Almond, Jr., Strom, & Dalton, 2004, p. 27). Nevertheless, yearning for democracy depends on the realization of its necessity. It is an opportunity for better life quality. Democracy is a tool given to people to make their voice heard. It symbolises freedom, basic human rights and opportunities for equality. It symbolises the equal right that is given to everybody from birth. Democracies commonly are the world's richest societies, the most open to innovations and new changes, as well are the least corrupt, and the most defensive of individual liberties. When people all over the world are asked about their wished political status, they own democracy's idea: free speech, accountable government, honest elections and effective legal constraints on institutions of authority. (Abramowitz, 2018)

The real meaning of democracy essentially originates from a Greek word *demokratia,* where *demos* mean the mob or the many and *kratos* means the rule (Crick, 2002, pp. 11-14). Essentially it meant the rule of the people, but over time the general concept has taken many variations and evolved into different branches. There is no single definition for democracy; it can be electoral, illiberal, delegative, deliberative or reflective democracy (Mair, 2011, pp. 87-88). It can also be defined with thin or thick definition. As thin concept of democracy means free, and fair elections, but thick democracy also has in addition to elections, the need to have series constitutional, social and liberal criteria (Geneva Graduate Institute, 2017). In this research paper, we will use the definition of thick democracy to measure the existence of democracy and to give a deeper insight, what are the general necessary points one should have, in order to be a democratic state.

Robert Dahl, who is the American political scientist and a leading theorist of a political pluralism (Munro, 2017), argues that approaching democracy by using the "thick" definition, allows to follow effectively the platform of democratic institutional values, that include equality between its entire people without any impairment against their process of development, meaning access to essential rights, freedoms, and protection (Philipps, 2017). Relying on Dahl's argument, we use the thick definition of democracy in order to conclude if Islam culture is or is not compatible with democracy. As related to the hypothesis raised in the introduction, we first need to establish the common base of democracy. Previously

mentioned, we will use the concept of thick democracy. There are four main characteristic, what we need to consider.

First is inclusive suffrage, as generally all adults should have the right to be elected and to vote. Secondly there should be a certain range of governmental accountability and the acceptance of the rule of law, as no one should be above the law. Thirdly it is important to have free and fair elections, as well as all votes are counted correctly, and voting is secret. Fourthly there should be civil liberties, where citizens can freely express their political preferences. There needs to be the free association of citizens, the freedom of expression and accountable government, who is accountable for its policies to parliament and is replaceable before its official term. (Mair, 2011, pp. 88-89) In order to be a democratic state, one needs to qualify in all four previously mentioned aspects. If any one of these conditions is regularly broken, the country is considered undemocratic, or at least less democratic than countries, which follow all the conditions (Taylor, 2013).

1.1 Muslim Democracy

Democratization, as a problematic topic in Islam majority countries, was first raised in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and over the years the new generation of Muslims have taken a direction towards more modernized way of life. As they are sophisticated, much more aware and connected with the foreign world. The women are generally as driven and determined as their male companions. As the young are more enlightened, they are also better in seeing and dismissing propaganda. They are appealed to freedom and the ideas of good governance, but it does not mean that younger generations are more secular or liberal than their ancestors. (Roy O., n.d.) The rise of the new generation of young Muslims, who are more aware about the foreign world, has created a new form of democracy, Muslim democracy. Muslim Democrats are making a revolution as they are changing Islam's association to politics. Muslim Democracy is more prone to develop, when Islamist and democratic forces see a joint interest in protecting the democratic process from the military and in Muslim communities, where private sector is very important, as they are tightly integrated into world economy and are not state-dependent. Muslim Democracy combines religious values of different civil classes with various policies, that are good to their economic interests. (Nasr, 2005)

Debate about democracy and Islam, has divided intellectuals and scholars into three groups. First group say that Western concepts: secularism and democracy are not worth to discuss about. This approach is extremely fundamentalistic view, as taking part in daily politics is religiously forbidden or haram. This approach is used by the Wahhabi clerics in Saudi Arabia, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and many Salafi schools. The second group says that rights beliefs of Islam, are the base for finest democracy. In this conservative view, religion is the ultimate truth and not debatable. These Islamist appeal to the idea of towhid, or as God is almighty and can never be substitute with the will of people. They also say that modern political ideology responds to main requirement of democracy. The third group defends *ijtihad* or reinterpretation of Islam to modernize it and make it more suitable with general concept of democracy. This approach is popular among intellectuals and have bigger audience in the Western countries, rather than in their own. (Roy O., n.d.)

For the author, democracy symbolises freedom, equality, opportunity to speak your mind, move freely, have a basic medical care, both physical and mental; have right to education and free will. In general, it means the right to choose how to live. There are plenty of definitions for democracy, scientific and everyday interpretations, but universal meaning stays the same – freedom to choose and religion should not be obstacle for that. Therefore, it is vital to have an open mind for different kinds of forms of democracy as a religion plays an extremely important role in many people's lives, whether they are Christians, Muslims, Buddhist or something entirely different. In a world with constant change, development and improving, where people many are considered to be citizens of the world, it is vital for non-democratic nations to have the freedom to choose, how and which scope they would like to foster democracy, so it can be coherent, with their religious views while having the possibility to choose, how they live their lives.

In this work author used the general democracy definition – thick democracy as it clearly shows, what makes a democratic state, but at the same time it does not limit or deny nation of the right to practice the religion of their choosing. In general, religion is not bind with the four aspects or the other way around. As in chapter one there was evident that it contains four topics and without all four one cannot be a democratic state, but whether Islam and democratic state can co-exist is complicated subject. Therefore, from author´s point of view, it is necessary for different religious countries to have a hybrid democratic system, which is intertwined with their religious views and at same time gives people equal rights, civil liberties and freedom.

As, we must keep in mind, that almost 750 million Muslims live in some kind of democratic societies, like Europe, Indonesia, India, Israel, Bangladesh, North America, and even Iran. Furthermore, there is historical precedent for mullahs controlling political power, but there are two exceptions. One is Iran and the other is the Taliban in Afghanistan. (Kubba, Khan, Monshipouri, & Hicks, 2002)

The idea, that democracy and Islam can coexist, has raised various thoughts among writers and theorists. As in one hand many theorists introduce significant empirical data to prove that many Muslim countries do have a very weak democracy or non-existent because of their religion. On the other hand, some writers and theorist say that the phenomena of the lack of democracy in Muslim countries cannot explain with religion. (Al-Samak, 2010)

1.1.1 Democracy and Islam are not compatible

In this chapter we are going to review some of the writers, who have stated directly or indirectly in their works, that democracy is not compatible with Islam culture. At the same time pointing out the relevancy of the arguments to the research question. Authors are chosen based on the topic of this work, as they are well-known, acknowledged and referred in their field. Theorists used in this chapter support the hypothesis that democratization in Afghanistan failed due to incompatibility of Islam and democracy.

Firstly, we discuss the argument of Samuel P. Huntington. He is a world known American political scientist, who has worked as a consultant for several the United States government agencies and is a political commentator in the debates on the United States foreign policy. Among his works, there is a well-known book, called "Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order", where he argues that conflicts are becoming between states or ideologies rather than between world civilizations. (Betts, 2016)

Huntington argues that countries that are heavily influenced by Christian and Western Cultures, have been most prosperous in democratization, as well as Southern and Central Europe countries, who were predominantly Catholic or Protestant and most likely they were stabilized by new democratic regimes (Huntington, 1996, p. 193). Huntington's statement shows that countries, who are mainly not Christians, are less likely to adapt with democratic regime, which implies that religion is playing significant role in democratisation.

Huntington also argues that the cause of centuries of on- going conflicts between Western Christian and Muslims are the product of difference, especially because of the Muslim concept of Islam as way of life, overcoming and uniting the politics with religion, rather than Western Christian version to separate realms of God and Caesar. Compared to Christianity, Islam is even more about the absolutist faith, as it connects politics and religion as well as makes a distinct separation among those in the *Dar al-lslam* and those in the *Dar al-harb*.(Ibid, 1996, pp.129) It is difficult or even impossible to find any statements from any kind of Muslims, whether they are state officials, scholars, politicians, businessmen or women or even a journalist, who has written anything good about Western institutions and values. Instead, they are emphasizing the disparity between both civilizations and the superiority of their culture. Muslims disapprove and fear Western authority and see it as a threat to their beliefs and their way of life. There are many Muslims, who tend to think that Western culture is bad with its corruption, immoral and materialistic lifestyle, but also tempting, and that is where the resentment comes from. They only see more reasons to preserve their way of life. Muslims attack the West more and more because West is not following any religion at all, and that's why for Muslims, this Western immoral secularism and un-devotion for any religion are even more sinful that the Western Christianity, what is the base for that behaviour. Muslims see their enemy as the godless West, who is materialistic, self-important, suppressive, inhumane and decadent. Not only imams think this way about West, also those, who West considers being their friends and allies. This negative reaction towards West can be seen in many levels like in the central intellectual drive of the Islamic Resurgence and in the attitudes of the governments in Muslim states. (Ibid, 1996, pp. 210-264) Nevertheless, the concept of independent nation states is controversial with the conviction of the sovereignty of *Allah* and the superiority of *ummah*. Islamist fundamentalism dismisses the nation state in advance of the solidarity of Islam as a revolutionary movement. (Ibid, 1996, pp. 175-177) If Muslim majority societies are to be shaped by Western democracies, it will only happen in the result of enlargement and impact of Western authority. (Ibid, 1996, pp. 311) However while Muslims do reject the possibility of becoming westernized, they still want to become more modernized (Ibid, 1996, p. 109), but question is where goes the line- between modernization and westernization? None the less, when democracy and modernization follow each other hand in hand, it raises a question, can Islam be flexible enough to become modernized, as its cultural peculiarity is that many things are forbidden, whereas the base for democracy needs more opportunities to implement changes. Huntington's previously mentioned statement, that the great conflict between civilizations will be cultural, strongly implies that Islam and West can never share similar values or stand on the aspect of politics, so due to that, we can say, based on Huntington's statement that democracy and Islam

cannot be compatible. He constantly emphasises that countries are not compatible with democratic development; therefore "underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, different civilizations whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power." (Ibid, 1996, p. 217)

Nevertheless, there has been much criticism about Huntington's work. As strongest counter argument is that culture clashes are happening within civilisations not between them, for example civil war in Syria (Richter, 2013). Another critique regarding Huntington's work is that he uses statistic, what are substantiating his views, as well as he interprets undefined information as supporting his arguments, for example Huntington writes "the world's billion or so Muslims are 'convinced of the superiority of their culture, and obsessed with the inferiority of their power", it simply raises the question, how he mapped the attitude of billion Muslims (Said, 2001).

Second argument we are going to examine is written by Victor Davis Hanson. He is an American military historian, scholar of ancient warfare etc. and he has been a commentator on politics and warfare for The Washington Times (Article Bio, 2016). The author of this paper examines his arguments about Islam and democracy, due to the relevance of his background and work. Hanson argues that there is no democracy, no equality of the sexes, no religious tolerance, no free press etc. and refers to Arab/Islamic culture a root to Islamic terrorism, which sprouts from the conditions of barbarism, that exist in the Islamic world. However, the conditions of barbarism are tied with shortage of political, social and economic development, but what mostly supports Islamic barbarism is the nature of the culture. (Khan, 2006, p. 152)

Second, major argument from Hanson is that Arab/Islamic culture must be defeated instead of changing it, because it is inherently barbaric and unsuitable for democracy that is why it is against democracy by nature. Therefore, democracy will not work in the Muslim world, simply because they cannot change their culture enough to be compatible with democracy. (Ibid, p.153) Hanson also states that democracy has not been a strongly held secret from the *mujaheddin,* on the contrary, Islam is welcomed to it, with heart-warming blessing from the West. Unfortunately, we cannot promote democracy in Muslim countries unless they want to accept and be part of it. They are the ones who can ensure its success. (Hanson, 2002)

There is also criticism about Hanson's work regarding his writings about Islam and democracy. L. Ali Khan states, that even though Hanson's work about Middle East has a trace of truth in it, it is still overly exaggerated, though and unfair. Same time as Hanson recognizes the power of Arabic/Islamic culture, he tends to see this power through ontological lens. As a scholar, his task

is to diagnose problems and establish solutions rather than to issue threats of a lethal war, but on the other hand his accusation that Arabic/Islamic culture causes terrorism, is most likely plausible and useful for propaganda purposes. (Khan, 2006, pp. 152-154)

A third argument to examine is written by Hamed Abdel-Samad. He used to be radical Muslim, but current day he is one of Germany's well-known critics of Islam (Scherrer & Knapp, 2023). "Abdel-Samad is the chief voice in Germany (and, probably elsewhere, as well) for the view that Europe ought to cease and desist concerning itself with Islam and whether it is compatible with Western values" (McCornick, 2015).

He argues that deep down Islamist strongly detest democracy. As well as the Muslim groups, who promote realization of Islam, like Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda and practices Islamic banking or protest about Gaza conflict, while doing nothing, as well as anyone, who think that *sharia* and democracy can be reconciled. Abdel-Samad is stating that those people are making a democracy a Trojan horse of political Islam. Also, he does not think that efforts for modernization and democracy in Muslim countries will come without a bitter price for Muslims, like a million of lives were lost when Europe overcame fascism. (Abdel-Samad, 2016, pp. 9-212) "Even if many Muslims oppose both Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood, they remain unwilling to burn bridges with the concept of an Islamic state, deeming the idea itself well and good, but undermined only by faulty implementation. Few see a connection between Islamism's mind-set and the claims of Islam itself. They are set on living in a democracy, but one shaped by Islam, which is the political equivalent of a Mercedes with no engine, drawn by a pair of donkeys instead." (Ibid)

There is criticism regarding Abdel-Samad work, as Daniel Bax points out, that Abdel-Samad chooses to ignore certain details, as fighting between Shia and Sunni Muslims in Iraq and Syria, and that Arabia supported the Egyptian military coup against the Muslim Brotherhood, because they do not suit with authors worldview. While writer links the phrase Islamic Fascism with the theory of feasible violence, which came from monotheistic religions. Moreover, the European case shows that, also monotheistic religions can allow themselves to be reconciled, then it should be also possible for Middle East, by the way most violence, that has happened in the 20th century has not born from of religion. (Bax, 2014)

The fourth writer, we are going to examine is Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, he is Moroccan philosopher and author of many philosophical and historical-philosophical books. He has tried to harmonise tradition and modernity in the contemporary Muslim world. (Reset DOC, 2011) Abdel al-Jabri argues that those, who demand democracy in Arab world today, are mainly members of

modern elite class, who have had the opportunity to be in a contact with liberal West on a various levels like as cultural, economic levels or even as a political refugees and therefore have received a basic knowledge about their political and civilizational awareness. On the other hand, there is a party called as traditional elite class, who is popular in every level. They are also called as the men of the religion or as the *salafis*. Even though, elite does not reject the concept of democracy, they insist to use the term *al-shura*. Same time author states, that *al-shura* and democracy are not the same. Even though he writes that elites aim to compare democracy and *al-shura* was just to assure the extremist, conservative *ulama* and rulers too, because democracy is nothing else than the name used by westerns for what the Arab world calls as *al-shura*. Also, he points out that solution to problems can be found in their own religions and intellectual tradition, therefore the whole subject rest on the way one should understand that certain tradition. Nevertheless *al-shura* is not binding upon the ruler, he just consults, and the decision is his own responsibility. So, the question of *al-shura* in Islam remains as a matter of counsel, therefore *al-shura* is one thing and democracy is another. (Abed al-Jabri, 2009, pp. 120-125)

Writer also emphasizes that while the essence of democracy is partnership in government matters, the Arab world denies the role of a partner in any aspect of the government (Ibid, 2009, p. 131). Abed al-Jabri says that „Arabs and Muslims, do not accept partnership in government and politics any more than in the field of deity and divinity, we cannot derive any meaning from democracy, nor any clear conceptual and social dimensions from its content (Ibid, 2009, p. 131)". Writer also criticises that democracy should change the mentality of an Arab individual, so the person can become more acceptant towards democratic practice as a real practice (Ibid, 2009, p 133). Nevertheless, he also states that in the contemporary Arabs thought, there are actually common and confusing doubts about the possibility to enforce democracy in society that has not yet achieved the level of capitalistic, industrial society. Also, the economic and social base of Middle East lacks the profundity to qualify for managing political democracy. Democracy also demands above all the respect for human rights, like rights to expression, right of equality; right to found societies and parties, right to work etc. For the writer it is hard to watch how people in the Arab world tend to overlook the basic core values of human rights, because they are afraid. This only means that human rights are missing from the Arab world, and they need to be established into the people's conscience, as well as individual and collective level, whether it is in the educational system or in every aspect of their lives. Authors aim was to prove that it is merely impossible to put democracy into practice under the current economic, social and cultural situation in Arab world, because of the inefficiency of their civil society institutions. (Ibid, 2009, pp. 145-168)

Criticism about authors' Abed al-Jabri book "Democracy, Human Rights and Law in Islamic Thought" is almost non-existent. A writer Max Rodenbeck discusses that author al-Jabri has presented his critique about present-day Islamism; basically, he tells to tear down Muslim thought of ahistorical dogmatism, and to adopt various modern paths. As alternative of seeing such openness to modern thought as submission, he argues that there should not be any cause, why Islam should not supply an ethical foundation for freedom. (Rodenbeck, 2004)

Fifth author, whose work was reviewed is Jocelyn Cesari. She is a professor of religion and politics and works at Georgetown University's Berkley Centre, where she directs the "Islam in World Politics" program, as well as she teaches contemporary Islam at Harvard Divinity School (University of Birmingham, n.d.). We focused on her book "Islam, Gender, and democracy in comparative Politics", because there, author states that development in Muslim world brings more complicated approach to democracy, that echoes with present debates in the political science on hybrid systems. Many Muslim countries qualify into term of hybrid systems, because there are some elements of democracy present; meanwhile others are weak or are missing a democratic element at all. In this prospect, the difference between procedural and substantial democracy helps to comprehend, how the states of civil liberties and human rights are marginal to women's rights in general. To be precises, while accepting elections, implementing the rule of law and individual rights, it still does not mean that there is complete functionary equality between men and women. As well as, when it comes to rights of religious minorities, freedom of speech or rights of women, one cannot automatically assume, that with adoption of democracy they are led into ideological liberalism. (Cesari & Casanova, 2017, p. 8)

Cesari also writes that scholars argue that Islam promoted women's rights in the subject of pre-modern tribal communities, but the development of Muslim polities from mediaeval to contemporary times, led to the isolation and solitude of women. In Muslim countries, the pruning and crafting of the outside norms, into local context, have mainly taken place through three aspects: nationalization of Islamic institutions, references to Islam in the constitution and the integration of Islam in the legal system. She also emphases, that after the Ottoman Empire downfall in 1918, the Muslim countries have accepted the nation-state, which has led to resolute political change and reshaping of Islamic values and institutions. These changes have interpreted into a brand-new status of the religion – the hegemonic status of Islam. (Ibid, 2017, pp. 16-19)

1.1.2 Democracy and Islam are compatible

This section provides brief literature overview of authors and writers, who think that democracy and Islam are compatible. This part helps to see hypothesis in a different angle, in case it is proven wrong, and democracy and Islam are compatible with each other. Authors are chosen based on the topic of this work, as they are acknowledged and referred in their field. Their argumentations can give another perspective to the raised hypothesis, as they believe, that Islam and democracy are connected, and both have fundamental similarities.

First author we examined was John Keane. He is Professor of Politics at the University of Sydney and at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (John Keane, 2017). As he is globally famous for his creative thinking about democracy (Ibid, 2017), then his book about "Life and Death of Democracy" gives a new viewpoint on how Islam and democracy complement each other and how they are connected.

Keane writes that in the beginning, the Islam was the religion of traders with urban network. It was a religion of peasants and estranged desert dwellers, who were aware of their insignificant nature. The civil societies in the early Muslim period were spectacular. They are remarkable, as they set the path to development of civil and private laws that covered the protection of merchandising and assets. These kinds of forms were called the partnership. Such economic cooperation was not even close to the later Europe employer - worker relationship and Muslims definitely were not behind of the rise of class inequality, which were highlighted by the differences between the non-owners of property and the owners. As regards to property, manufacturing, exchange of commodities and consumption in Muslim social life - those acts were deeply rooted in other social institutions, like neighbourhood, households and religious organs. The outcome was that those, who were involved in business, whether they were women or men, they regarded one another as owners, it did not matter if they promote capital or employment to the partnership. From the point of view of history of democracy, they had effect on two levels as they blocked the forthcoming of an extensive trading and producing firms-bazaar capitalism, like the ones which first emerged nearly a millennium afterwards in Europe's Low Countries. (Keane, 2009, p. 135)

Keane also argues that the mosque was a mighty forwarder of the spirit of assembly democracy and the access was for general service, which meant that all were equally welcome whether they were old and young, poor and wealthy, men and women. The mosque was more than a habitat- an asylum for the distress, a market square, a rendezvous point, a den for prayer and silent meditation. Also, it had a political purpose, as it was same to the empire of Islam, what the assembly was to

the Greek democracy. Roots for the tradition to link the political with the social and spiritual in the mosque, came from pre-Islamic time, where the meaning for Friday address or *khutbah* was taken from the Arab tribal customs, as the judge or an orator talks from a ground of authority. This kind of Muslim community of living resembled a lot with the function of the Greek *Demos*. Same time the religious, social and political views were guided in practice by the holy acts, the *shari'a*. There were regulations, and laws basically came from the *Qur'an* and *hadith*, but in reality, they arose through the work of its interpreters. Mainly from the experts in law or jurists, who were also known as *ulama*. The importance of the role of judges and interpreters of law played vital role throughout diverse independent legal organisations, such as schools and courts of law. It was only unique to Islam and its aim to secure that the laws of the political societies belonged to the entire community. (Ibid, 2009, pp. 138-141)

Next, author examined a book written by John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, called "Islam and Democracy". John L. Esposito is a professor of religion and Islamic studies at Georgetown University, also a consultant to governmental institutes on Middle East affairs and the Islamic world (Contemporary Authors Online, 2017). John O. Voll is a professor of Islamic History and Associate Director of the Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Centre for Muslim-Christian Understanding (Beyond Golden Age and Decline, n.d.). In their book "Islam and Democracy", authors' state there are three core concepts that provide a base for understanding Islamic political perspectives: *Tawheed* (Unity of God), *Risalat* (Prophethood) and *Khilafat* (Caliphate). Observing their reconceptualization in the modern context gives a vital basis for understanding the conceptual foundation for democratization in the Muslim countries. All Muslims agree that acceptance of *tawhid* is the basic concept of Islamic tradition, faith and practice. (Esposito & Voll, Islam and Democracy, 1996, p. 23) "Although it may be expressed in many different ways, *tawhid*, simply defined, is "the conviction and witnessing that 'there is no God but God,'" and the consequence of this is that at "the core of the Islamic religious experience, therefore, stands God who is unique and whose will is the imperative and guide for all men's lives." (Ibid, 1996, p. 23) Writers also state that the complete sovereignty of God makes any human hierarchy impossible to exists, since in front of God, all human beings are equal, therefore *tawhid* gives the conceptual and theological base for an active emphasis on equality within the political setup. Second essential concept to modern Muslim understanding of democracy is *khilafah*, whereas the literal meaning is general political system, also called as caliphate. Authors bring out philosopher *Mawdudis* argument that *khilafat* means representation, and as a man is a real representative of a God, then man is required to exercise authority within the limits prescribe by God. Therefore, *caliphate* is bestowed on the

entire group of people, who are ready to fulfil the conditions of representation after they agreed to the principles of *tawheed*. This is where democracy begins in Islam. Although these aspects may not fit into the framework of Western definition of democracy, they still show very important perspectives in the modern global context of democratization. Authors also points out, that much attention has been shown to Islamic concepts like consultation (*shurha*), consensus (*ijma*) and independent interpretive judgement (*ijtihad*), because they are central to the debates and discussions regarding democratizations in Muslim countries, as well as they provide and effective base for understanding the ratio between Islam and democracy in modern world. (Ibid, 1996, pp. 24-30) Authors state that the growth of prodemocracy movements and the claim for democracy has increased throughout the Muslim world. Also, they emphasize that there can be multiple interpretations of democracy, as well as alternative and rival uses of the term. Growing demand of popular political participation and the Islamic resurgence have come together as the two major developments of the late twentieth century and created new realities that affect the relationship between Islam and democracy. (Ibid, 1996, pp. 192-202)

Next we examined a book called „Democracy in Islam "written by Sayed Khatab and Gary D.Bouma. Professor Gary Bouma is the UNESCO Chair in Intercultural and Interreligious Relations and a renowned researcher in the fields of sociology and public policy (The Scientology Religion, n.d.).

Authors state, that the wish to find the start and motivation for democratic governance and human rights within Islam is very strong among Muslims; the desire is founded through writings of people who are from Muslim democratic states (Turkey or Indonesia) and from Muslim communities in Western or Oriental states. Unfortunately, those who are against human rights discourse in Islam are driven by their own agendas and they tend to interpret the Quran in different ways, that is beneficial for them. Writers point out that Islamic Law does not set apart religion from people's daily life, politics or politics from morals and final, or morals from the state. They argue that the system of government in Islam is obviously consistent with democracy, because as in Western world there are constitution, what rules and guides everyday life and in Islam *Quar'an* is consider as the unwritten constitution that governs Muslim everyday life and therefor both systems have many significant similarities, but also the difference is that elements that are commonly interpreted on religious basis are also similar to democracy. As well as the authority in Islam is Constitutional nor is it autocratic or theocratic and furthermore, changes in the structure of government, will not change the Islamic identity of the state while the government simplifies the regulations of the law. Also, writers bring out the arguments of the powerful modernist Islamic thinkers as Al-Tahtawi,

al-Afgani, 'Abduh and Rashid Rida, who think that reasonable reform and adoption from Western mind-set is in accordance with Islamic law and promotes Muslim societies. (Khatab & Bouma, 2007, pp. 2-41) Authors state, that Islam is clearly compatible with democracy with its special features of liberties, justice, freedom, human rights as well as the values of helping others and their compatibility has showed the Islamic system's tendency and ability to work the democratic ideology better (Ibid, 2007, pp. 91-93).

Finally, we examined Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri written book "Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam". Ahmad is a professor of Sociology and Anthropology and Mahmoud and Ahmad are twin brothers (Up Close, n.d.). Book is a collection of works and essays by Abodolkarim Soroush, he is Iranian and Islamist political philosopher and theologian (Sadri & Sadri, 2000, p. 9).

In the book, philosopher Soroush states that Islam and democracy can only be combined, when Islam is fully secularized, when religious government is born and that can only come from religious society. It means that practice of religion must be willing and sober, rather than forced and fearful. There can be a religious government, whereas sober and willing practice of the religion is the indication for a religious society, besides sobriety, democracy also needs liberty and willing participation. Important factor is also rationality, and the concept of rationality is understood when the interreligious and outerreligious fields are harmonized, this will allow various religious understandings. Recognition of these varieties of understanding and translation will bring tolerance and flexibility to the leadership and people. As a conclusion society will become more democratic, fair and open-minded. Society will continue to evolve, learn and develop their knowledge. The understanding of truth is constant journey, whereas the awareness of man as dull, untrustworthy and imperfect creature, who still possesses a set of natural human rights, have all been among the fundamental preconditions for and epistemological and anthropological base of democracy. When the same principles are combined into religious knowledge and respected by religious societies, only then the result will be religious democracy. (Ibid, 2000, pp. 133-135)

1.2 Conclusion of the literature review

In this chapter author evaluates the statements examined in previous chapters 1.1.1 and 1.1.2, from writers, so there will be discussion about their diverse attitudes toward compatibility of Islam and democracy.

Huntington argues that countries, who do not have a majority Christians, are less likely to adapt to democratic regime, whereas he is pointing out that religious beliefs play a major part in a countries path to democracy and therefore the difference between Western Christians and Muslims have caused conflicts throughout many centuries. Christians separate realms from God, but for Muslims Islam is absolutist faith, which connects religion and politics, but when religion is everything for Muslim. (Huntington, 1996) There is logic behind Huntington's statement, that they cannot be receptive to changes and democracy, as those changes need to be done in their religious views. This is proven with the argument what Huntington brings out, that Muslims see themselves as superior, therefore a nation, who thinks that they are better than everyone else is not capable of being taught or guided by nations, who are worse than they are (Huntington, 1996). By this statement there is already a conflict in the idea of democracy promotion in Afghanistan.

Also, while Huntington argues that for democracy, Islam needs to separate realms from God (Huntington, 1996), the Sadri brothers are convinced that democracy can only happen in Islam if Islam is fully secularized (Sadri & Sadri, 2000). Those two arguments are inherently against one and other, but we also need to keep in mind that Christianity and Islam are both Abrahamic religions, but nonetheless we cannot examine them as they are the same. Therefore, there is a need to consider that what worked for Christianity will not work for Islam. Christians separate god from politics but for Islam God is above all.

Hanson argues that Arab/Islamic culture is the base for Islamic terrorism, as there is no democracy and no equality, and those conditions are a root for Islamic barbarism. Due to the reason that Islamic culture is against Western democracy, Hanson says, that Islam needs to be defeated, because it is inherently against democracy, and no one can change it and emphasises that we cannot change it unless they want to. (Hanson, 2002)

Nevertheless, it is also said that Islam has elements, which support democratic policy, for example, the most cited command in the Koran by Islamic democratic figures is the one that tells, that there can be no compulsion in Religion, and this is known as *Sura* (verse) 256. It gives potential grounds for democratic practices and religious tolerance and in this signification, as all religions can be translated differently; no other religion is more customized to democracy (McGraw-Hill Global Education Holdings, LLC, n.d.). This argument pushes over also Huntington's statement, that Christianity is only positive effect on the making of democracy (Huntington, 1996). Also, writers Esposito's and Voll's, argument is against Huntington's and Hanson's arguments. Esposito and

Voll brought out the aspects, what are important to Muslims and what we can consider as democratic values as *khilafah, ijma, shurha* and *itjihad* (Esposito & Voll, Islam and Democracy, 2001).

Abdel-Samad argues that Muslims actually detest democracy and democratizations come to Muslims at a harsh price. Also, he brings out the term of *al-shura*, as elite does not use the term of democracy, but rather *al-shura*, but we cannot forget that *al-shura* and democracy are two different things. He emphasizes that partnership is the base in democratic governmental matters and for Muslims; they do not accept any partnership in government. (Abdel-Samad, 2016) Here we can see that writer is controversial, because *al- shura* in its nature is a consultative body, which works together with the leader, therefore we can say that there is a degree of partnership, and we can consider it as a democratic feature. He says that it is hard to see, how Muslims tend to overlook the basic human rights and as democracy especially demands human rights and it is impossible to foster democracy in countries where the economic, social and cultural situations is inefficient to do so (Abdel-Samad, 2016). He has a valid point there, but we also need to take into consideration that it is likely possible that, this kind of situation will not change, merely because they might not know how fix it or if it is even abnormal. So, it would be wise to introduce, teach and show, what democracy in real life and practice is all about. Whether they will accept it, is another question, but it is vital to give them the tools and make them understand that there are more ways how to live their lives, without disowning Islam. Nevertheless, it is well known fact, that the *Qur'an* and *hadith* includes several claims about killing pagans, but also the Bible implies on several occasions of God's people killing infidels and, nowadays Christians basically do not kill in God's name. (Owen, 2016) While, Abdel-Samad argues, that there is no partnership in Islam (Abdel-Samad, 2016), Keane again disapproves his statement, saying that Islam used to be a religion of traders and had high cooperation and different levels on partnership (Keane, 2009), as well as mosque was considered as a spirit of assembly democracy, therefore we can assume that also Islam may be capable for this kind of progress and we can call it a road towards democratic lifestyle.

Cesari argues that some Muslim countries have democratic elements present, some have few and other are missing them in general and overall, she calls many Muslim countries as hybrid systems. Also, she states that Islam promoted women's right in pre-modern tribal communities, but the development in Muslim polities has led to the isolation of women. (Cesari & Casanova, 2017) Her statement shows that Islam has had fundamental aspect for democracy and if they were centuries

ago, there might be a possibility that Muslim countries could have those aspects again or at least some sort of form of democracy, which would be more coherent with religion.

All indicators and the statements of the writers are pointing to the direction that Islam and democracy might work together. As Islam has many similarities and fundamental aspects of democracy, like *Shurha* - consultation; economic cooperation; in history Muslim community of living was similar to Greek Demos; experts in law- *ulama*; *kilafah* as general political system; consensus – *ijma*. Then again, some chosen writers are steadfast sure, that Islam and democracy are not compatible, but if we examine the arguments then we have more statements that they are compatible rather than they are not. True, most of those arguments are based on what Muslim countries used to have or authors have drawn parallels with early Christianity, where crusaders were killing in the name of God. Nevertheless, it does not make the statement that Islam and Democracy are compatible less true, as Islam used to practice ideologies that are vital for democracy and still now, there are many factors and indicators which shows us, that there can be religious government with democratic values. Therefore, we can conclude, that Islam is compatible with democracy. Most likely there will be a religious democracy, but how Muslim are going to get there is another subject and whether West should help and guide them, rather than forcing definite ideas about Western approach on democracy on them, is a research topic on its own.

2. DEMOCRACY IN MUSLIM MAJORITY COUNTRIES

The Muslim World can be divided into three distinctive aspects related to those who exercise Islam, and this concept is also frequently defined as Islamic world. Firstly, on religious scale, the Muslim World points to Muslims or persons who practice Islam. Second aspect is culture, as in the concept of Islamic World it refers to Islamic civilization. Third is geographical viewpoint. That is probably most frequently used, as it indicates to the states and other political areas, where Muslims are majority of the inhabitants. We can say that Islam is the one of the largest widely exercised beliefs around the world, as its practitioners are the second largest religious group. Muslims make up over 23% of the world entire population, with over 1.6 billion people. (Pariona, 2018) It means that basically every fourth person in the world practices Islam. (Gorski, 2009)


Figure 2.1 Where Muslims live

Source: (Swaminathan, 2016)

In figure 2.1, we can see that, biggest Muslim majority countries are Indonesia, where Muslims make up 88% (203 million) of the entire population, Pakistan, where 96% (174 million) of the population are Muslims, surprisingly in India Muslims make up only 13% (161 million), whereas Bangladesh has 90% (145 million) of Muslims of the entire population. In Egypt Muslims make up 95% (79 million) of the entire habitants, but in Nigeria there are around 78 millions of Muslims, that is about 50% of the entire population, Sudan Muslims makes up 71% about 30 million (without South Sudan) of the population and in Ethiopia only 34% (28 million). Iran (74 million), Morocco (32 million), Iraq (30 million) and Afghanistan (28 million) have almost only Muslims, as they make up about 99% of the entire population, but Turkey (74 million), Algeria (34 million) are not

far behind, as their population is made of 98% of Muslims and in Saudi Arabia there are 97% (25 million) of Muslims of the whole population. (Swaminathan, 2016)

Now author will examine whether the fifteen biggest majority Muslim countries are a democratic or authoritarian state, for that we are going to analyse data from a report, what is made by The Economist Intelligence Unit. The democracy index, what we analysed is based on five stages, the first is pluralism and electoral process, the second is the functioning of the administration, the third is civil liberties, the fourth is political culture and the fifth is political participation. Based on the results of these various categories of indicators each country is divided between four established regime types; there are full democracy, flawed democracy, hybrid regime and the last one is authoritarian regime. (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018) In figure 2.2 we can see that from the entire world there are 24 countries, which have full democracies, 48 countries that have flawed democracies, 36 who have hybrid regimes and 59 countries with authoritarian regimes. Nearly, one- half of the globe's inhabitants lives in some kind of democracy, however simply 8% lives in a full democracy and about one-third of the entire world's population resides below authoritarian rule (The Economist Intellingence Unit, 2023).

Democracy Index 2022, by regime type

	No. of countries	% of countries	% of world population
Full democracies	24	14.4	8.0
Flawed democracies	48	28.7	37.3
Hybrid regimes	36	21.6	17.9
Authoritarian regimes	59	35.3	36.9

Note. "World" population refers to the total population of the 167 countries and territories covered by the Index. Since this excludes only micro states, this is nearly equal to the entire estimated world population.

Source: EIU.

Figure 1.2 Democracy Index 2022

Source: (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2023)

We examined democracy index scores of the biggest Muslim majority countries from the entire world.

Indonesia is the biggest Muslim majority country in the world, but the same time it is a flawed democracy, overall democracy index score, 6.71 out of 10 and then is considered a fully democratic. Depending on the democracy index, the second country is India, who is the third biggest country of Muslim habitants, with a score 7.04 and also a flawed democracy. The third is Bangladesh, with democracy index score 5.99, that makes it a hybrid regime. Followed Turkey with a score of 4.35 and is also a hybrid regime, as well as Morocco with a score of 5.04, Nigeria

4.23 and Pakistan 4.13. Algeria, who is the ninth biggest Muslim majority country has an overall democracy index score 3.66, what makes it an authoritarian regime, then Iraq with a score of 3.13, next is Ethiopia with a score of 3.17, Egypt has 2.93, Afghanistan's score is 0.32, Iran's score is 1.96, Sudan has 2.47 and last Saudi Arabia has a democracy index score 2.08, being also an authoritarian regime. (Ibid, 2023)

From the fifteen biggest Muslim majority countries, only two have flawed democracy, five countries have hybrid regime, and eight countries have authoritarian regime. Still the overall tendency is that countries, with biggest Muslim majority population have hybrid or authoritarian regime and having a democracy score below average. Therefore, we can see a correlation between Muslim majority countries and underdevelopment, as underdeveloped countries have less chance to become democratic.

Nevertheless, after the start of the Arab Spring, policymakers and analysts have argued whether democracy would really have a place in the Middle East. One thing is certain: people in Arab countries want democracy, so they can live in a place where there are specific rights and institutions, (Wike, 2012), to have a better quality of life. Therefore, many of them yearn for even just some kind of democratic aspects. People want and need stability into their countries, without the need to abandon their religion and beliefs, what makes them who they are. The question is whether democracy and Islam are compatible. It has been seen as a hot topic for many years.

However, since 1970s, practitioners and scholars have been arguing about the subject when the third wave of democratization started. Perhaps political Islam is clearly disadvantaged according to certain democratic values, like as transparency, pluralism, equal rights and respect for human rights. On the other hand, Islam is not by nature antidemocratic or antithetical to democratization. Nonetheless, numerical data shows, that democratization remains an uphill battle in majority Muslim countries. Furthermore, while countries all through different regions of the world have undergone vital gains in freedom and democracy within the last 20 years, the Islamic world has in fact experienced a similar significant growth in the number of suppressive and authoritarian regimes. These kinds of statistics and general world happenings raise a question regarding democracy and Islamic world (Ibid) compatibility, as people from the Islamic countries and authoritarian regime are becoming more aware of the possibilities of different way of life of freedom and civil liberties. Majority Muslims all around the world show support for democracy and many say it is good when others have the liberty to practice their beliefs and religion, but the same time a part of Muslims want that their religious leaders do have for at least some authority

in political affairs (Pew Research Center, 2013). Even though majority Muslims support democracy, Islamist ideology, which is still dominating the general view, calls for the making of a utopian Islamic state, which mentally gives all sovereignty in God, and it is based on a strict translation of Islamic law, and favours an authoritarian, illiberal politics which leaves little space for cultural pluralism, civil liberties, democracy, the rights of women and minorities (Nasr, 2005). However, people in Muslim majority countries massively favour democracy, but they also have quite different and deeply traditional outlooks on sexual liberalization and gender equality, then from those individuals who are residing in non-Muslim societies (Driessen, 2017).

Many Prefer Democracy Over Powerful Leader

% of Muslims who say they prefer ...

■ Strong leader   ■ Democracy

Southern-Eastern Europe	Strong leader	Democracy
Kosovo	13	76
Albania	25	69
Bosnia-Herz.	51	47
Russia	52	35
Central Asia		
Tajikistan	20	76
Turkey	27	67
Kazakhstan	44	52
Azerbaijan	42	51
Kyrgyzstan	64	32
Southeast Asia		
Malaysia	30	67
Thailand^	32	64
Indonesia	37	61
South Asia		
Bangladesh	27	70
Afghanistan	51	45
Pakistan	56	29
Middle East-North Africa		
Lebanon	19	81
Tunisia	22	75
Egypt	36	55
Palestinian terr.	40	55
Iraq	42	54
Jordan	41	49
Sub-Saharan Africa*		
Ghana	12	87
Djibouti	15	79
Kenya	19	79
Senegal	17	79
Chad	21	77
Uganda	22	74
Mozambique	24	73
Ethiopia	26	72
Cameroon	20	71
Mali	22	71
Liberia	24	69
Nigeria	33	66
Guinea Bissau	37	61
Niger	25	57
Tanzania	40	57
DR Congo	35	55

*Data for all countries except Niger from "Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa."
^Interviews conducted with Muslims in five southern provinces only.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q14.

Figure 2.3 Many Muslims Prefer Democracy over powerful leader

Source: (Pew Research Center, 2013)

From figure 2.3, we can see that out of the 37 countries, in 31 of them, at least half of the Muslim population believes that a democratic government can better solve their countries problems, than a strong leader. In Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, the support for democracy is the highest. Also, in the North-Africa and in the Middle East, the support for democracy is high, as at least three-quarters of Muslims favour it. Attitudes differ in some other areas observed, where the population is Majority Muslims. In South Asia, Muslims opinions vary a lot, as 70% of the population in Bangladesh believes that democratic government is better choice for solving their countries problems, but in Pakistan the percentage is only 29 and in Afghanistan it is 45. Nevertheless, in Central Asia, over more than half of the Muslims in Tajikistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan favour democracy than a firm leader, but in Kyrgyzstan only 32% feel the same way. The support for democracy also varies in Eastern and Southern Europe, whereas in Kosovo and Albania, more than half of the Muslims prefer democracy, but in Russia and Bosnia-Herzegovina the support is under 50% and majority of Muslims prefer a strong leader. (Pew Research Center, 2013)

When we examine only the biggest Muslim majority countries, we can find nine of the on the figure 2.3. From those countries, over half of the Muslim population prefers democracy as a democratic government is better able to solve their country's problems in Indonesia, where the percentage is 61, in Bangladesh it is 70%, in Egypt 55% of Muslims want democracy, as well as 66% of Nigerians, 67% of Turkish, 54% of Iraqis and 72% of Ethiopians. But only 29% of Muslim population in Pakistan and 45% of the entire Muslim population in Afghanistan prefer democracy, it means that most Muslims prefer a strong leader. As all those nine countries examined, are also the biggest Muslim majority countries, we can conclude that even though most of those countries do have hybrid or authoritarian regime, they still prefer a democracy over a strong leader.

Therefore, the root of the problem is not Islam, but a legitimacy fault in majority Muslim countries over the suitable role of religion in economics, government and community- a crisis of legitimacy that has been happening for several decades and shows no indication of settlement. Whereas in nowadays Muslim world, the idea, that religious freedom and democracy are controversial, is most probably untrue. Although in different cultures and regions, it seems that self-government and general tolerations do work together in majority-Muslim communities. (Owen, 2016)

2.1 Case study - Afghanistan

Afghanistan had a strong constitution with hand in hand its Islamic identity, with responsibility to a broad selection of internationally acknowledged rights, within the context of an electoral democracy. Habitants of Afghanistan have never had the possibility to take pleasure on the core civic and political rights. Consecutive debated polls and a propensity towards haggles, between elites have made the democratic accountability fragile. High levels of restricted government authority, endemic bribery, violence and disputed ideas of Muslim identity in whole, restricts civil liberties and political rights. (Freedom House, 2017)

Author chose Afghanistan as a case study due to the influence and contribution, what is given to this country by different states, Estonia being among them. Author wondered why Afghanistan democracy promotion has not been a successful from 2001-2021 after all the received financial aid and human resources. This pushed author further to seek if there is a possibility that Islam and democracy might not be compatible at all and the contribution and hope to help Afghanistan has been futile. Therefore, as in chapter 1.2 based on reviewed literature, author established that

democracy and Islam can be compatible. Now, author will examine more closely, why Afghanistan does not have a functioning democracy, even though the USA with its Western allies have promoted democracy there from 2001 until the withdrawal of foreign troops in 2021.

First author needed to examine country`s economy, as democracy and economy are related, because economic growth does lead to possibility of better democracy (Treisman, 2014), therefore we need to examine Afghanistan's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita throughout the twenty-one years, starting from 2001. It gives us general overview of countries economic health and performance and "it represents the total dollar value of all goods and services produced over a specific time period, often referred to as the size of the economy" (Investopedia Staff, 2018). The GDP worth of Afghanistan features 0.03% of the global economy. (Trading Economics, 2018)

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
AFGHANISTAN GDP (BILLIONS)	0,00	3,85	4,54	5,22	6,23	6,97	9,72	10,25	12,15	15,63	18,19	20,20	20,56	20,55	20,00	18,02	18,90	18,42	18,90	20,14	14,70

Figure 2.4 Afghanistan GDP 2001-2021

Source: (World Bank, 2022)

From the figure 2.4, we can see that from 2002 Afghanistan's economy went uphill, until 2014 where there is GDP's fluctuation, as one year it grows and another year declines. It indicates unstable economy in Afghanistan. "When the peak turns down, it symbolizes the start of a recession in an economic and there is a decrease activity in the economic (All Answers Ltd, 2017)." Even though country´s GDP has increased nearly five times more than it was 2002 and GDP per capita has grown 64% since 2002, Afghanistan still proceeds to face economic obstacles and continues to be one of the poorest countries in the entire world (USAID, 2018), as the more prosperous the country is, the better are the possibilities that it will sustain democracy, but that in return indicates that poor countries are less probable to become democratic (Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, 2009). It indicates that the possibility for democracy in a poor country, is in correlation with education, because to have a stable and prosperous economy it is vital to have well educated people, who successfully run businesses, monetary governmental institutions etc. "Education is a leading determinant of economic growth, employment, and earnings (Grant, 2017).

In chapter one, we examined closely the thick definition of democracy, where there were four general points: inclusive suffrage, governmental accountability, free and fair elections and civil liberties. In order to establish whether Afghanistan does have a democracy, author analyses data from the Freedom House from the period of 2000 until 2021. Author divides selected time period

into two different durations. Years 2000-2010, the beginning of democracy promotion and years 2011-2021 the end of democracy promotion. Even though the U.S troops arrived in Afghanistan in 2001, author started the examination on the time period from 2000, to show if there was improvement made comparing to the arrival. The time period is divided into two parts, so we can see, if there was a progress towards democracy promotion from the start and in the second period we will examine, if Afghans maintained the achieved improvements.

2.1.1 Democracy promotion in Afghanistan 2000 – 2010

In 2000 Afghanistan was not free, with freedom rating 7, civil liberties 7 and political rights 7 (Freedom House, 2001). Whereas 7 shows that country does not have any political rights or have few, because of the oppression of government, or suffer from authoritative violence or was ruled by regional warlords. Also, they do not have any civil liberties or had a few. Its forceful non-state actor allowed basically no freedom of association or expression, often regulated majority economic activity and did not protect the rights of convicts and detainees. (Freedom House, 2018) General conditions in 2000 in Afghanistan were harsh. Civil conflict, dry spell, sanctions, established by the United Nations and the Taliban's hard leadership continued to create heavy difficulties for normal Afghans. Also, there were no democratic institutions or approaches at any kind of level. The Taliban ruled through Kandahar-based clerics and local *shuras* (councils)**.** Those enforce decrees regulated all aspects of social affairs. Several civilian opposition parties operate secretly, but still faced harassment. Authorities also continued to impose severe Islamic tradition of purdah, even in city areas, as purdah demands that women are isolated from men, who are not their relatives, by their own families. The Taliban also prohibited majority of women from working and in addition, resumed to officially deny girls from going to school. Afghans were forced to accept the Taliban's extreme conservative Islamic customs, while the Taliban restrained religious freedom. (Freedom House, 2001)

In 2001, country was not free, with the freedom rating 7, civil liberties 7 and political rights 7. Afghanistan had the first real opportunity for peace in late 2001. Pashtun tribal leader Hamid Karzai, got into office, however his government had little power outside Kabul. Afghanistan was struggling with poverty, could not provide relief to those, who returned to their homes and with warlords, who were extorting money from people. At the end of 2001, there was only a nominal government in Kabul and majority of Afghans could enjoy few basic rights. With the new

government, women were freed from harsh restrictions and people were able to speak more openly. For Muslims in Afghanistan, the end of the Taliban power meant that they could go on with their daily lives, with no harassment, they did not need to follow ultraconservative Islamic practices and girls could go to school. (Freedom House, 2002) Even though the progress was slow and at times non-existent, the President Karzai was moving towards improvements.

In 2002, Afghanistan's status was not free, with a freedom rating 6, civil liberties 6 and political rights also 6. (Freedom House, 2003) From 2002, there is already a change in democracy ratings. Whereas rating 6 means, that countries have very limited civil liberties with the exceptions of few religious and social freedoms, and the rights of expression and association are heavily limited and often held political prisoners. In addition, country has restrained political rights, and is ruled by authoritarian regime, with leaders or parties that took authority force. Country has densely monitored elections with few political rights. (Freedom House, 2018) President Karzai's government struggled to strengthen security outside of Kabul. Developments in human rights were tempered by reports, especially infringement of women's rights, violence towards ethnic minorities and severe security concerns. Even though conditions for media, improved greatly and women's formal rights to employment and education were rebuilt and women could participate in public life again. (Freedom House, 2003)

In 2003, Afghanistan's status was still not free, with no signs of improving as freedom rating was 6, civil liberties 6 and political rights also 6. In 2003, Afghanistan struggled toward everyday normal life. President Karzai's Administration worked for safer country, prepared for national elections and was drafting a new constitution. First task for election commission was to register political parties and make a precise voters list. The Emergency Loya Jirga (ELJ) chose head of state and ministers. In 2003 political parties faced threats after speaking about political problems. Same time there was harsh police brutality, as security and police forces used unreasonable amount of force with public protesters. (Freedom House, 2004)

In 2004, Afghanistan's status was still not free, but freedom rating was 5.5, civil liberties 6 and political rights 5 (Freedom House, 2005). Whereas the rating 5 means, that country either protects moderately most political rights or intensely protect few political rights, while forgetting others and country fairly protects basically all civil liberties or intensely protects few civil liberties while forgetting others (Freedom House, 2018). Afghanistan made a big step towards establishing of base for an inclusive democratic state. New constitution guaranteed equal rights to women,

established Islam as official state religion and did not prohibit practicing different religions. Country was preparing first ever elections since 1969 and among candidates, there was a woman applicant. Although extended corruption cronyism and nepotism were increasing problems. However, government has not made any progress in prohibiting married women to go to school. Sometimes judges could not act accordingly, due to the threats from local power brokers, there were significant amount of complaints of rights violations as torture, kidnapping, forced marriage, land-grabbing etc. Still there is a problem regarding women's choices in marriage and ability to choose their partner. (Freedom House, 2005). As a foundation to start democratic country was created. There was positive impact on religious freedom, but negative one on women's rights, as married women couldn't attend school. Even though newfound constitution supports more equality between men and woman, but it only applies to partially.

In 2005 Afghanistan was considered as partly free. Freedom rating, as well as civil liberties and political rights were rated at 5. Nevertheless, over the year, numerous reports on human rights abuses were documented, as well as consistent violations of women's rights, including assault on foreign aid workers. In 2005 mostly peaceful elections were held. There were many attacks committed by the Taliban supporters. Also, government made significant changes in fighting against corruption, whereas officials now needed to provide documentation on used assets. (Freedom House, 2006)

In 2006 Afghanistan was considered as partly free, with freedom rating, civil liberties and political rights scored at 5. The plan for parliamentary democracy was more developed as the new parliament started with the changes at the end of 2005, and step by step got to be as the working arm of the government. Also, again in 2006 the violence from the Taliban and the anti-government supporters increased and this was considered a bloodiest year since 2001. Violent acts also happened between members of Parliament, as a result of rivalries. At the same time Afghan media resumed to grow, but many journalists were endangered by the government officials, due to their reporting. In 2006 there existed no working nationwide legal system. Violence against women remained high, as it happened in 95% of the households. (Freedom House, 2007) Also starting from 2001 until 2006, positive acts towards democracy seemed to be working, but starting from 2006 it went all downhill and violence against women was still high, without showing any progress.

In 2007 Afghanistan was considered as partly free. Freedom as well as civil liberties and political rights rated at 5. At the beginning of the year, warlords united and established incompatible legislation, giving immunity for preterit war crimes. Negotiations between USA the Taliban failed, as the Taliban wanted the foreign troops to leave Afghanistan and Islamic law re-established. The threats and deadly attacks on schools by the Taliban forces grew worse with every day, just to prohibit girls from going to school; over 150 schools were torched by the end of 2007. The government asked tribal leaders to protect the schools. In south, the Sharia courts were established by the Taliban, so they can exercise strong form of Islamic law. Prison conditions were extremely bad, as inmates were held illegally, and numerous cases of abuse were documented. (Freedom House, 2008)

In 2008 Afghanistan status was again not free, as the freedom rating was 5.5; civil liberties 6 and political rights 5. Also, corruption increased, reforms and developments failed. Yet again violence increased, influencing capital and more obstacles prevented work of local and international organisations, as they tried to rebuild the destroyed infrastructure. Suicide attacks became more frequent. There were concerns about the ability to conduct free and fair elections in spring of 2009. (Freedom House, 2009)

In 2009 Afghanistan's status was not free, with freedom rating, political rights and civil liberties scores at 6. President Hamid Karzai ensured his new term again in 2009, as his opponent withdrew from the race, because he stated that electoral and judicial systems were too corrupt, to ensure the righteous vote. During 2009, thousands of civilians, government officials, security personnel and humanitarian aid employees were killed by the Taliban insurgency. "Afghanistan was ranked 179 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International's 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index." International and Afghan non-governmental organisations (NGO) personnel were targeted in kidnappings and attacks, by insurgents and criminals. Even though there was a wide constitutional safeguard for workers, labour rights were still poorly defined, with high levels of child labour. Also, another huge backstroke to women's rights came with the new legislation, which left aside several basic rights for women, who were Shiite Muslim minority. It left issues like marriage, inheritance and personal freedoms decisions to conservative Shiite religious bodies. (Freedom House, 2010)

In 2010 Afghanistan was not free, with the same freedom rating, political rights and civil liberties as the previous year. In 2010, Afghanistan's institutional honour got another hit, when in

September parliamentary elections turned out to be damaged. The Afghan government failed to be transparent and accountable, largely, because of the failed elections. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission stated, that during first nine months of 2010, there 111 cases were documented, where women burned themselves alive, as they did not see any other possibility to free themselves. (Freedom House, 2011) It clearly shows, that there is a huge need to fight for equality for women. Nevertheless, Afghans were making progress towards a better life and for that they have made a positive framework, so they can stay on track and see their achievements, even though there was still much more to be done.

2.1.2 Did the democracy promotion work in Afghanistan in 2000 - 2010?

In previous chapter we examined, what were the major events in Afghanistan over the 10 years, when foreign troops entered the country and democracy promotion and nation-building started. Previously viewed data in chapter 2.1.1, from the Freedom House showed us that over the years the general status of Afghanistan has fluctuate from "not free" to "partly free" and again to "not free", it shows firm instability and little or even non improvement of becoming a free country with democracy.

Survey Edition	2000-01		2001-02		2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010		2011	
Year(s) Under Review	2000		2001		2002		2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010	
	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL
Afghanistan	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	5	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6

Figure 2.5 Afghanistan Democracy ratings from 2000-2010

Source: Freedom House (Freedom House, n. d.)

During 2001-2002 Afghanistan's status remained not freed. It is seen from figure 2.5; civil liberties dropped from seven to six. Even though Afghanistan's outlook continued to get better in 2002; the war-torn country struggled with serious food shortages, drought, and different small armed conflicts (Freedom House, 2003). Even though the progress was slow and at times non-existent, the President Karzai was moving towards improvements. In 2002-2003 Afghanistan's political rights score dropped from seven to six, because of the holding of the Loya Jirga and the formation of the Transitional Authority and civil liberties score got better, likewise from seven to six, because of the growth of personal freedoms (Freedom House, 2004). In 2003-2004 Afghanistan's political rights score dropped from six to five, because of the holding of a reasonably free and fair

presidential election (Freedom House, 2005) as a foundation to start democratic country was created. In 2004-2005 Afghanistan's civil liberties rating improved, because of the positive developments of civil society and better implementation of the rule of law (Freedom House, 2006), as they held mostly peaceful elections. Increased violence by the anti-government and the Taliban forces in 2005-2006 (Freedom House, 2007). Afghanistan security status got even worse in 2006-2007, which prevented the capability of civil societies and impeded humanitarian organizations to work freely. The threats and deadly attacks on schools by the Taliban forces got even worse, just to prohibit girls from going to school (Freedom House, 2008), because it was against their interpretation of Islamic law. In 2007-2008 Afghanistan was yet again considered as not free, because of the rising violence insecurity as well as growing corruption and ineffectiveness of government authorities (Freedom House, 2009). In 2008-2009 Afghanistan's political rights increased from five to six, because of the incorrect presidential election, that contained major fraud, weak voter turnout rate, because of habitants were frightened and discredited electoral management authority (Freedom House, 2010). In 2009-2010, there death rates of Afghan people was high, while administrative corruption, limitations on freedom of press, and terror towards women remained major issues (Freedom House, 2011).

In chapter 1, we viewed democracy's four main characterises: inclusive suffrage, free and fair elections, civil liberties, and governmental accountability and now we know that without all four there is no democracy. Now we will examine, which of the four elements had positive examples and which ones did not work in the years of 2000-2010.

First, inclusive suffrage:
Many women's formal rights were restored, they were able to participate in public life and almost 200 women participated in *loya jirga* in June 2002 (Freedom House, 2003).

Second, Free and Fair elections:
In 2004 Afghanistan's political rights rating improved, because of the holding of a reasonably free and fair presidential election (Freedom House, 2005) as a foundation to start democratic country was created.
In 2009 Afghanistan's political rights rating dropped from five to six, because of the incorrect presidential election, that contained major fraud, weak voter turnout rate, because habitants were frightened and discredited electoral management authority. (Freedom House, 2010) It was clear, that the 2009 Presidential and the 2010 parliamentary elections were massively undermined by

deceit. State institutions have not been transparent or ensured with effective governance. (Freedom House, 2012)

Third, Civil Liberties:

After the fall of the Taliban, there was a great improvement in different areas of civil liberties. Afghanistan's media improved significally in 2002, As new Press Law, guaranteed the right to press freedom. Many womens formal rights were restored, like the right to emplyment and education. (Freedom House, 2003) New adopted constitution in 2004 promised equal rights to women and men, with the right to practice minority religions (Freedom House, 2005). Nevertheless, Academic freedom was not absolutely restricted, but government regulations did not allow married women to attend high school (Freedom House, 2005). In 2005 Afghanistan's civil liberties improved, because of the positive developments of civil society and better implementation of the rule of law (Freedom House, 2006), as they held mostly peaceful elections. Also starting from 2001 until 2006, positive acts towards democracy seemed to be working, but starting from 2006 it went all downhill and violence against women was still high, without making any progress. In 2007 Afghanistan security status got even worse, which prevented capability of civil societies and impeded humanitarian organizations to work freely. The threats and deadly attacks on schools by the Taliban forces got even worse, just to prohibit girls from going to school (Freedom House, 2008). In 2010, high death rates of the Afghan people, while administrative corruption, limitations on freedom of press, and terror towards women remained major issues. (Freedom House, 2011) In 2010, compared to 2009 there was a 22% of increase in recorded cases of violence against women (Freedom House, 2011).

Fourth, governmental accountability:

In 2004, Afghanistan made great improvement to create the framework for an inclusive democratic state, where new constitution guaranteed equality for women and ensured presidential system of government with bicameral parliament (Freedom House, 2005). In 2005 government made a significant progress in corruption, as now officials need to provide documentation of property and other assets (Freedom House, 2006). Nevertheless in 2008 Afghanistan had growing corruption and ineffectiveness of government authorities (Freedom House, 2009), it raised distrust among people. In 2009-2010, there death rates of the Afghan people was high, while administrative corruption, limitations on freedom of press, and terror towards women remained major issues (Freedom House, 2011).

Based on the years from 2000 until 2010, it seems that overall direction for Afghanistan was towards democracy, as there were again established several rights, government was elected, women and religious freedoms were expanding, as well as media ones. There was adoption of a new constitution, and relatively free and fair presidential elections were conducted. Overall, we could see positive developments in the civil rights area. Progress was made in all four thick democracy characteristics, but still, we cannot state that Afghanistan had working democracy. Nevertheless, taking into consideration, the general picture from 2000 till 2010, we can say, that analysis of from chapter 1.1.2 is supported with the statistics, that democracy and Islam can be compatible, but it does not support the hypothesis of this paper, rather disproves it as democracy and Islam can be compatible. Even though, while examining years from 2006 till 2010, we can see a negative shift in the progress as corruption and violence increased. Afghanistan went from partly freed to not free again. It refers to growing in stability. There was a major setback on women's rights. These facts yet indicate a downward path to democracy promotion and nation-building, but it does not indicate that democracy and Islam are not compatible, rather it suggests to underdevelopment. As in previous years there was a progress towards democracy, but it was undermined by corruption, intimidation and violence.

2.1.3 Democracy promotion in Afghanistan in 2011- 2019

In this chapter we examine Freedom House of democracy indexes from 2011 to 2019, as formal agreement was signed for withdrawal of the troops in February of 2020. This helped us understand, if democracy promotion in Afghanistan was working or to what degree there was change in democracy indexes.

In 2011 Afghanistan status was not free, political rights 6, civil liberties 6. Countries political sphere was recovering from the 2010 unsuccessful parliamentary elections, whereas president also tried to alter the results. This is a clear indication of the weakness of the judicial system. There were many high-profile assassinations, which raised the question about the transfer of control over security to the Afghan police and army from, the foreign troops. (Freedom House, 2012)

In 2012 Afghanistan was still not free, with political rights and civil liberties score of 6. In 2012 there was many attacks on foreign troops, by the Afghan police and army. This deepened disbelief about the government's ability to maintain order. (Freedom House, 2013)

In 2013 Afghanistan had civil liberties and political rights rating at 6 and status was not free. In 2013 there was a triple increase in fatal attacks against aid workers and female public officials (Freedom House, 2014).

In 2014 Afghanistan remained not free, as the same ratings as 2013, political rights at 6 and civil liberties rating at 6. The new President Ghani was elected in 2014, , who signed U.S – Afghan bilateral security agreement (BSA). Announced NATO withdrawal, political uncertainty due to the protracted presidential election and increased violations towards civilians had increased instability. (Freedom House, 2015)

In 2015 civil liberties and political rights rating remained at 6, as well as freedom status was not free. In 2015 legislative elections were postponed. In 2015 the U.S kept approximately 9800 military personnel in Afghanistan and in October the U.S President Barack Obama extended counterterrorism and training mission, saying that the troops will remain same until 2016 or 2017. (Freedom House, 2016)

By 2016, political rights, civil liberties and freedom status has not changed, compared to 2015. The Taliban expanded their rule over the Afghan territory and increased violence against civilians. Corruption increased compared to previous years. Violent attacks on the media increased, with 14 journalists killed. the Taliban kidnapped two university professors from the American University of Afghanistan and later sent assassin to the campus, where they murdered 13 students and a staff. (Freedom House, 2017)

In 2017 political rights rating was 5, civil liberties 6 and freedom status remains not free. Political rating improved because of the intensified opposition political activity. The Taliban increased suicide attacks towards civilian and military targets. Attacks on journalist had intensified as 21 journalist and media workers were killed. (Freedom House, 2018)

In 2018 freedom status remained not free, civil liberties rated at 6 and political rights rated at 5. Finally, after four years, there were parliamentary elections in October 2018, where over 4 million people voted, regardless of the threats from the Taliban. In October the US Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad met with the Taliban members in order to find a solution to the long-lasting Afghan conflict; the Afghan Government had no knowledge about the encounter. (Freedom House, 2019)

In 2019 the Afghanistan Freedom Status remained not free, political rights ranked at 5 and civil liberties at 6 (Freedom House, 2023). Conflict between the Afghan Government and the U.S forces against the Taliban rebel movement continued, same time the U.S government, negotiated with the Taliban to find a way to end the conflict. In September of 2019 first round of presidential poll was held, where the President Ghani got over 50% of the votes, but international observes questioned the legitimacy of the results as voters were targeted on election day. Schools, which were situated in rural areas are under the Taliban control and they were teaching different topics, as many subjects have been replaced them with Islamic studies (Freedom House, 2020).

In 2020 according to the Freedom House, Afghanistan status remained not free, civil liberties rated at 6 and political rights rated at 6 (Freedom House, 2023). In 2020 march, the President Ghani was inaugurated for his second term as the President. At the same time his opponent Abdullah Abdullah did not accept the results and inaugurated himself. Both parties signed common understanding to work side by side in the office, led by Ghani. At the same time, the U.S signed agreement with the Taliban to end the conflict and agreed on conditional troop's withdrawal timetable. The U.S –the Taliban agreement did not end the conflict between the Taliban and the Afghan Government, even more, the Taliban increased attacks on Afghan security forces. (Freedom House, 2021)

In 2021 Afghanistan was still not free, political rights rating dropped to 7 and civil liberties remained 6 (Freedom House, 2023). In April the US President Joe Biden declared the withdrawal of foreign troops by September 2021. In august 2021 the Taliban closed country's political sphere after overthrowing elected Afghan government. After that the Taliban prohibited many political and individual freedoms and enforced their interpretation of Sharia law. (Freedom House, 2022)

By 2022 Afghanistan freedom status remain not free, political rights rating was 7 and civil liberties rating was also 7. Both ratings dropped down to seven, where they were before beginning of democracy promotion in 2000. (Freedom House, 2023)

2.1.4 Did the democracy promotion work in Afghanistan 2011- 2019?

In previous chapter we examined what were major events in Afghanistan over the 10 years, when foreign troops entered the country and democracy promotion started. Now we will discuss whether

those events had positive or negative effect on democracy spreading and if it was successful or not from 2011 to 2021.

Previously examined data from the Freedom House showed us that over the years the general status of Afghanistan remained "not free", and it showed instability and no improvement of becoming a free country with democracy.

Survey Edition	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016		2017		2018		2019		2020		2021		2022		2023	
Year(s) Under Review	2011		2012		2013		2014		2015		2016		2017		2018		2019		2020		2021		2022	
	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL
Afghanistan	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	7	6	7	7

Figure 2.6 Afghanistan Democracy ratings from 2011-2021

Source: Freedom House (Freedom House, n. d.)

From 2011- 2021, Afghanistan freedom status remained "not free", showing constant instability and no progress of becoming "free" or "partially free". From figure 2.6, we can see, that, from 2011 until 2016 political rights and civil liberties ratings were at 6. Whereas rating six means, that countries have very limited civil liberties with the exceptions of few religious and social freedoms, and the rights of expression and association are heavily limited and often held political prisoners. In addition, country has very restrained political rights, and is ruled by authoritarian regime, with leaders or parties that took authority force. Country has densely monitored elections with few political rights. (Freedom House, 2018)

From 2017 to 2019, political rights rating improved from 6 to 5, while civil liberties remained at 6. In 2020 both ratings were again at 6. In 2021 political rights score dropped to 7, whereas civil liberties remained at 6. By 2022 both civil liberties and political rights scores were 7.
Whereas 7 shows that country does not have any political rights or has few, because of the oppression of government, or suffers from authoritative violence or is ruled by regional warlords. Also, they do not have any civil liberties or had a few. Its forceful non-state actor allowed basically no freedom of association or expression, often regulated majority economic activity and did not protect the rights of convicts and detainees. (Freedom House, 2018)

Now we will examine the four pillars of thick democracy, and how Afghanistan have done in those four categories.

First, Inclusive suffrage -

During 2010 parliamentary elections about 16% were women candidates (69 females were elected), and approximately 41% of registered votes were women. Meanwhile in 2014 no women ran in the presidential election, 273 ran for provincial place (97 seats were secured). Female electoral involvement has been restricted by harassment, threats and social limitations as traveling alone. (Freedom House, 2015)

In 2018 percentage of registered women as voters decreased from 41 to 34 percent as women's face harassments and threats due to their political participation (Freedom House, 2019)

Second, Free and fair elections –

In 2011 country´s political sphere was recovering from 2010 unsuccessful parliamentary elections, whereas the president also tried to alter the results. This is a clear indication of the weakness of the judicial system. (Freedom House, 2012)

In 2014 election candidate Abdullah camp alleged voter fraud. As he said he had won and will overthrow the government (Freedom House, 2015). By 2017 the Taliban fully controlled many areas of the country, especially outside bigger population centres (Freedom House, 2018).

Third, Civil liberties -

In 2011 repression, insecurity and violence continued to restrict political activity. The Afghan media faced different challenges, including intimidation and physical attacks. Religious freedoms were restricted as blasphemy and apostasy were considered as crimes. The Afghan NGO and foreign staff members kidnappings had increased. Civil society activist faced harassment and threats. (Freedom House, 2012)

In 2012 there were many reports of different violations and torture of the rights of detainees (Freedom House, 2013).

During 2015, there were many kidnappings, victims were either killed or held for ransom by the Taliban. By the end of 2015, 1.2 million people were internally displaced in Afghanistan. (Freedom House, 2016)

LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) people did not have any legal defence as they faced social resentment and police brutality (Freedom House, 2017). According to the United Nations published report in 2018, large amount of cases of violence towards women had been dealt in traditional ways, rather than through formal criminal justice system (Freedom House, 2019).

Fourth, Governmental accountability –

In 2011, all levels of government there was vast cronyism, corruption and nepotism. (Freedom House, 2012) In 2013 opium production increased by 49%, showing the incompetence of Afghan police (Freedom House, 2014). As in 2014, newly elected president Ghani failed to compile the cabinet in the first 45 days, it implied government's ability to function (Freedom House, 2015). According to 2015 Asia Foundations survey, about 90% Afghans said that they experienced corruption in their daily lives, for example bribing government officials or police (Freedom House, 2016). Integrity Watch Afghanistan 2016 December report claimed that Afghans paid 3 billion dollars to public authority figures during 2016, and people think that corruption is worse than previous years of 2015 and 2014 (Freedom House, 2017).

According to the report from the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), senior officials who were accused of corruption were not prosecuted. At the same time many important positions in ministry and presidential office, could be obtained through corrupt payments. (Freedom House, 2019)During 2019, there was many corruption accusations made towards officials of the office of the president, like unfair distribution of official jobs and contracts, for exchange of sexual favours (Freedom House, 2020).

During the years of 2000-2010 the overall indication was that Afghanistan was heading towards democracy, then from 2011 until 2021 it seemed that general direction for Afghanistan had changed. Country struggled with intense corruption. Attacks on civil liberties got worse with every year, with rising killings of NGO personnel and minority groups. There was a decline in women voting. Kidnappings increased. Based on the years from 2011 until 2021, it seemed that democratization progress had stopped, as killings, kidnappings, harassment, overall corruption and governmental mistrust increased. These facts indicated a downward path in democracy promotion and nation-building, but it does not indicate that democracy and Islam are not compatible, rather it suggests an insufficient ability to conduct reforms and missing supervisory organ and underdevelopment, mainly because harassment, corruption, kidnappings are not related to Islam.

As theoretic Hanson stated that we cannot promote democracy in Muslim countries, when they are not willing to work for it and do not want to accept it (Hanson, 2002). Afghanistan tried to combine democratical constitution with their Islamic identity with different internationally recognized rights. In practice, the Afghan people, never had the opportunity to take pleasure of the promised freedom rights. Endless corruption, rampant violence and argued concept of Muslim identity, all restricted civil liberties and political rights. (Freedom House, 2017)

3. AFGHANISTAN AFTER POST-OUT

For almost twenty years the United States with close cooperation with allies had deployed their military forces and experts to Afghanistan to make sure that Afghanistan will not become again a place for international terrorism.

As the peace bringing war was vital and that time timely it was evident, that Afghanistan people needed help with democracy promotion as their former leaders, the Taliban, had been thrown from power. It was a possibility to change the old way of life and become more free, democratic and stable with equal rights, prosperous economy and just. One of many purposes of the war was to bring more peace, democratic views and liberal way of life, as well as long-term stability to Afghanistan people, while demolishing the safe haven for worldwide terrorists.

Like the joint commitment from the US President George Bush and the Afghan Chairman of Interim Administration Hamid Karzai said in 2002, where they promised the Afghan nation to create a "representative and accountable national government in Afghanistan". The Aim was that Afghanistan will become a democracy with more suitable institutional framework - a peaceful democracy. (Hill, 2010)

From the beginning the United States understood that there was only one approach to help build steady country with some resemblance of law and order. It was clear that Afghanistan was in desperate need for state institutions, experienced bureaucrats and working security force (Acemoglu, 2021) and for that, many years foreign experts have shared their knowledge and practices to introduce democracy to Afghan people and enhance the possibility that they will adapt democracy in some kind of form to their official authority and through it strengthen better life quality, equal standards, free speech, liberty and overall improved future opportunities for better life. The primary aim was to help establish some sort of state institutions so that democracy would have opportunity to form.

"In 2018, Afghanistan was the world's deadliest conflict, measured by those killed directly in fighting, with large numbers of civilians killed, injured and displaced. Even these effects do not fully encompass the human and other costs. Afghanistan, so long as the conflict rages, will be unable to achieve self-sustaining economic growth and will under-spend on development in favour of enormous security costs. "(International Crisis Group, 2021)

After more than 18 years of nation building and peace bringing, the United States President Donald Trump and the President Joe Biden declared that the US would withdraw their troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2021 and end the war along with democracy promotion but will keep funding the Afghanistan Government to avoid the collapse and humanitarian crisis.

3.1 Regime change

Since 2001 the United States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan have worked closely together, side by side to eliminate international threats and guide Afghan people towards more prosperous and democratic future. Both parties were highly motivated and thriven in building crucial institutions, which are necessary to establish democratic norms, preserve and protect the unity of Afghanistan and improve economic and social growth and the rights of its people.

For years, the United States with its Western allies had been the main power in Afghanistan; they were controlling the region and helping to maintain peace-like environment. It was also evident that, this kind of situation is not forever and is bound to change at some point. By the end of 2017 it was clear that even though the U.S and other Western allies have deployed number of troops and experts to stabilize the region, the Taliban was still not defeated. It was time to change the course of the actions and mission. It was time for change, there were too many lives lost and still no sight of ending the war. Finally in 2018, the US President Trump had enough and was discontent with almost the non-existence progress towards the Taliban and ordered direct and official the U.S – the Taliban talks for the first time, but still the President Trump´s frustration towards the U.S military mission continued, he expressed deep desire to bring home military troops as soon as possible. (Congressional Research Service, 2021)

During the first meeting of the Taliban and the United States in 2018, discussions mainly focused on the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan, as well as the United States wish to reconcile the Taliban and the central government of Afghanistan. Dialogues with the central government of Afghanistan were finally held in 2019, which laid grounds to an agreement on general principles for future talks. (Ali, et al., 2023)

„In February 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed a formal agreement in which the United States committed to withdrawing all of its troops, contractors, and non-diplomatic civilian personnel from Afghanistan, with a drawdown in military forces to 8,600 by mid-July 2020 and a complete withdrawal by the end of April 2021.“ (Congressional Research Service, 2021) Yet again it is vital to emphasize, that these talks were only held between the US and the Taliban, the Afghan

government, at that time was not yet included. Also, the US withdrawal obligation was not conditioned on the Taliban decreasing violence towards the Afghan government, making concessions in intra-Afghan talks. (Congressional Research Service, 2021)

The United States of America and Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, known as the Taliban, signed an agreement on 29th of February 2020, for bringing peace in Afghanistan, called DOHA Agreement (U.S. Department of State, 2020).

It was a major step towards ending the war. Agreement gave hope for permanent ceasefire and profound hope for the Afghanistan Government for better life quality for its people and opportunities to create stable country. The US-the Taliban agreement was the root for intra-Afghan talks on political settlement and complete end of ceasefire. (U.S. Department of State, 2020) Agreement was realistic chance for Afghan people to have prosperous, stable and secure future. For Afghan people there was finally a hope to gain control of their own future, as the tools have been handed to them by the Western countries. It was a real opportunity to move towards a democratic rule of life with social and economic growth and equal freedom rights to all. Unfortunately, joice was brief. On 15 of August 2021, the Taliban retook control of Afghanistan. Its military success happened, when the U.S and international forces were withdrawing their final troops. The Taliban did not waste a second and promptly appointed a new government, with complete control over it. (The United States Institute of Peace, n.d.) It was soon evident that all the promises, that the Taliban gave and conditions that were agreed on in the DOHA agreement, were just merely an excuse to create and opportunity to regain control over Afghanistan. The Taliban forces began to enforce rigid social restrictions. Their reign of terror was taking over the entire country. The Afghan economy crashed as soon as the Taliban arrived in Kabul. International military forces left with foreign aid, and that led to eminent destruction of what was built before. The United States tried to maintain an official peace process between the previous Afghan Government and the Taliban, but it ended when the Taliban took over Kabul. Peacebuilding efforts continued to remain critical after the collapse of the Islamic Republic. The Taliban's new government demeaned political and ethnic groups outside of its own membership. They removed women from politics and with every step tried to push them out of the public sphere. New profound government was losing country's largest foreign aid donors and had committed many war cruelties. (Ibid)

Hostile regime change has taken Afghanistan back for many decades. As in its core nature, the Taliban members are religious radicals, the Islamic fundamentalist, who do not agree with western democratic views, which means they will abolish founded democratic institutions at the first

opportunity they have and will exterminate all possibility for foreign aid. Even though, after the signed the Doha Agreement they promised more subtle rule and deeper involvement of former the Afghan Government, it did not happen. Instead, they ceased control over the country even before the last foreign troops were gone. This step already showed, which way the Taliban was heading with their rule. Promised peace, stable and more united Afghanistan was merely a dream. All the democracy promotion, established governmental institutions, progress with freedom and human rights were abolished as women rights and the rights of the minorities were basically annihilated as in the eyes of the Taliban as they do not have any opinion and are beneath them.

3.2 Changes after power change

With the Doha Agreement, the aim was that the Afghan Government and the Taliban will negotiate in good will and come to some kind of understanding. Unfortunately, neither of them was committed to that arrangement (Afzal, 2022), therefore after the power change, the Taliban took control over Afghanistan. They took full control over the country's judicial system, naming judges to military and civil courts (Freedom House, 2023). New power direction brought harshness to entire country, as political and civil liberties were even more limited. Everyone in Afghanistan were affected by the withdrawal of the foreign troops, as with the withdrawal left many international organisations, who gave humanitarian aid to the Afghan people. The most who suffered were women, children and minority groups as their civil rights taken back to stone age, because the Taliban is a fundamentalist group, who fosters the most Islamic law – sharia law. By the end of 2021, entire country was facing with humanitarian crisis and general economic collapse, over half the Afghan people, about 22.8 million, faced severe food insecurity. While implementing their own understanding of law and order, the Taliban struggled with significant resistance. Mainly because, their strict religious ideology meant brutally repressive regime, with almost total exclusion of women from public life, revived harsh criminal sentences and exercise strong form of Islamic law. (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, n.d.) "In late September 2021, the Taliban announced that they would enforce parts of the 1964 constitution that did not contradict their interpretation of Sharia, rejecting the 2004 constitution used by the republic "(Freedom House, 2023), because in 2004 accepted constitution gave more equal rights to women and minority groups and allowed to practice different religions.

In December 2022, the Taliban leadership, freshly accepted regulation banned women from working in non-governmental organisation (NGO), because they were inadequately covered. As

NGOs and U.N agencies provided food and other crucial aid, for country in suffer and therefore female workers were the only one who could help the children and the women. After the order, many international NGOs stopped all their operations in Afghanistan (Felbab-Brown, 2023), in return this meant, that starvation deepened as well as violence, health issues and general well-being of the people, especially women and children whose civil liberties are a strongly affected.

When we previously, examined Freedom House data in chapter 2.1.2, figure 2.5, about civil liberties, as it fluctuated from 5 to 6 after the USA military troops and experts arrived in Afghanistan and started democracy promotion, („One representing the greatest degree of freedom and seven the smallest degree of freedom "(Freedom House, n.d.)). Then in 2022, in chapter 2.1.4 figure 2.6 we saw that when the Taliban has been in power almost a year and according to the Freedom House data the civil liberties index is seven, as in the smallest degree of freedom (Freedom House, 2023). The Freedom House civil liberties index reflects the current situation in Afghanistan and how it is getting worse every year.

The UN Afghanistan's mission has proven various human rights violations, for example the Taliban has frighten journalists, limited press freedom rights which has led to closure of over 200 news groupings (Maizland, 2023). Minority groups, as LGBT+ people and other ethnic groups, are in desperate need for protection as their human rights are as well inextricably part of human rights. Unfortunately, under the Taliban rule, they face public discrimination and disapproval, and in some cases even an execution of men, who are involved in same-sex activity (Freedom House, 2023).

When the Taliban ceased power, their initial promise to women was, that they are permitted to implement their rights within Sharia law, including the right to study and work (UN WOMEN, 2022). Not only are their rights limited and fundamentally reversed by Sharia law, but they are also restricted by family, because of fear and disapproval of society.

With the Taliban takeover, the justice system has been largely dissolved and putting girls and women into disadvantage situation. There is lack of control for fair trials and strong need for institutional oversight, as individual interpretation of the law has increased. Mainly because women judges have replaced with the former the Taliban fighters, as they interpret Islam law to their conveniences, while putting women in a greater risk. (UN Women, 2022) Afghanistan is not a safe place for women and young girls anymore. With arrival of foreign troops in 2001, the Afghan women and children had new profound hope for more freedom rights, then now it is exact opposite. The Taliban has even restricted how long journey women can take unaccompanied, while females

who do not wear clothing as it is demanded, are forbid from entering the vehicle. Also, by the discriminatory and custom law, the women's freedom about marriage and divorce were severely restricted. Many young girls were forced to marry older men before the legal age of 16 and widows to their late husband's next male relations. (Freedom House, 2023)

They are denied of their fundamental rights to work, have an education, have a decent medical healthcare, walk freely in public or participate in different movements. When in 2014-2018 women had important job positions in Finance, Foreign Affairs and Mining ministries (Farahi & Guggenheim, 2020), then by the end of 2022 they were banned from working in different organizations. The Ministry of Women's Affairs was closed in September of 2021, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission in May 2022, along with those two, many women-led non-governmental organizations and women's rights organizations were closed in 2022 (UN Women, 2022). For many women, working or not working, is not something they have liberty to choose from. Unfortunately, there are hundreds of thousands of widows left in Afghanistan after decades of war and now they face a major problem, as they need to work, because they are sole breadwinners in their household (Nader, 2022) and without their almost non-existent pay check they would suffer from even more bigger food shortage.

Unemployment among women does not only mean severe food insecurity, but also creates a huge gap in access of medical care, as women are losing jobs in the health system and are pushed out of different organizations, who dispense humanitarian aid. It is a major problem, because of the restriction of movement, many young girls and women are not allowed to leave their households and therefore will miss out the important healthcare they need.

The health system, under the Taliban rule, has major service gaps and discrimination towards women. There is an extensive shortage of equipment, staff (midwives), supplies and specialized care for women, especially in reproductive health. Maternal fatality has raised, because of the restricted mobility for pregnant girls and women. Gender separation issue amongst health workers is a massive problem as there are not enough women doctors and males are limited treating women. (UN Women, 2022)

Meanwhile, when the Taliban is forcing women out of work field, limiting their movement and separating them from public sphere, they are also prohibiting girls from schooling. In September 2021, the Taliban regime announced that primary and secondary schools for female pupils will stay closed, while they were reopened for male students (Freedom House, 2023).

Sadly, the education of girls, fights different battles. Major problem is that the conservative and rural folks firmly think that girls should not be tutored, and because of the meaning behind the symbolic power of schooling. It is the strongest symbol of modernization, as the contemporary school is a result of Western political, religious and economic power. (Qargha, 2022) It is something that the anti-western people cannot stand for, they think that it is one way for West to gradually gain control over them and it has to be abolished.

There have been clear indications according to the Freedom House data, that the living standards for Afghans were improving after the U.S started their mission with Western allies as minority groups and women had some form of civil rights, with freedom of education, to work or to involve in different groupings, but also as well as freedom of speech and possibility for healthcare. But now, when the Taliban has gained control, it is clear, that those two decades, when there was a hope for a better future has been abolished as, the extremist groups have forbidden basically all the basic rights for women. They are not allowed to travel, work, study and are isolated. It is sadly a hopeless and devastating time for girls and women. The well-being of females cast aside, economy is frozen, there is a food shortage, restriction of basic education and overall, a fear terror. The Afghans are afraid to say something, rebel towards the Taliban regime as criticism of it is enough reason for arrest or even worse, death.

3.3 Failed democracy promotion

By the end of 2022, it was clear, that democracy promotion in Afghanistan had not been successful, as after the withdrawal of foreign troops, the Taliban again gained control over the country and restricted civil liberties and destroyed peoples fragile freedoms. Thousands of lives were lost, and millions of dollars had been waste. The question remains, why it failed, when many theorists argue that Islam and democracy are compatible and in chapter 2.1.1 gathered Freedom House data shows, that there was progress made in democracy index from 2000-2010, as we can see from figure 2.5 in chapter 2.1.2. At the same time author contemplates if some theorist, who we examined in chapter 1.1.1, who think that democracy and Islam are not compatible, are right as democracy promotion has not been successful.

At the beginning of democracy promotion and arrival of foreign troops to Afghanistan, in 2001, Afghanistan had made a progress regarding different civil liberties and freedom rights. People had

more right to choose what they want, whether it is decision about education, healthcare, working possibilities or even just participating in different social groupings. It was evident, that democracy promotion was slowly working. This argument is also supported by the Freedom House gathered data, where the freedom indexes clearly were improving (Figure 2.5), yes there were fluctuating, but nevertheless general picture was positively changing. There was a glimpse of hope for minority groups, women and pro-western people, who were opened to modernization and long waiting for it.

Democracy symbolizes equality freedom and the right to choose. Therefore, there should be a an choice how people want to practice it. In chapter 1.1.2, we observed authors, who think that Islam and democracy are compatible, as they have different basic aspects, which are similar. So, adaption to democracy in Islamic culture is possible, that was proven by the democracy promotion in years 2001-2021. Where women were appointed to government jobs, healthcare improved, economy activated, new constitution adapted, journalist had more freedom of speech etc. As it is shown that democracy promotion was in some way a success. All preconditions for successful democracy were in place, but the problem was that the Afghanistan Government leaders, did not trust their own reforms enough and left them without supervision for corruption and exploitation, which resulted that many uneducated and incompetent people took over important jobs and functions (Farahi & Guggenheim, 2020). It also created for the Taliban an opportunity for fast and easy takeover of the government, as people who were holding onto high-level positions, were not driven enough to stay in control and find a way to maintain achieved progress and development. When the Taliban was again in charge of the country, they reversed all the achieved democratization progress and took the Afghan people back to stone age.

The extremist grouping destroyed all the US democracy promotion efforts, in Afghans standards of living, that were achieved over the two decades. According to the UNDP 2022 October report, the economy decreased over 30 percent, almost all Afghans were living in poverty, about seven hundred thousand people have lost their jobs and over 90 percent of the inhabitants suffer under different degree of food uncertainty. (Maizland, 2023)

It has been clear; that the Taliban's moderation - was merely an illusion, with the promise for cooperation with the Afghan government. Same time the U.S was certain, that they can control the Taliban's actions with sanctions and foreign monetary aid, but it is evident, that the leverage is not working on the Taliban and pressure to change their radical policy is not effective. (Afzal, 2022) It only confirms that, at the moment democracy in any kind of form is not possible in Afghanistan, as the Taliban's interpretation of Islam is not coherent, to be opened for democratization and

modernisation. They are forcing their interpretation of religion on Afghanistan people, leaving no room for liberty to choose. For democracy and religion to be coherent with each other, the practice of religion must be free, willing and reasonable. Therefore, we can conclude that while the Taliban is forcing their interpretation and vision of Islamic religion, democracy is not possibility for Afghanistan nation. Luckily the Taliban faced with resistance as their rigorous religious world view meant inhumane repressive regime for the Afghan people, but it still did not stop them to exclude women from social sphere, forbid girls' education and exercise a rigid form of Islamic law. This is in total conflict with democracy, as in democratic state everyone has a right to for civil liberties, but when you ban one minority group, for example women, from all kinds of social life, working, education, or even move freely, it is opposite to freedom.

The Taliban's interpretation of Islam has been leading Afghanistan to underdevelopment, as for proper working economy, there is a need for adequate and well-educated people- traders, who have ability to run successful business, with profits, so country's economy could grow. For that to happen, there is a need for proper education, as it is a main aspect of economic growth, employment, and profits (Grant, 2017), but the Taliban is limiting schooling, like they did before 2000, and due to that country lacks current and future experts, personnel and entrepreneurs, who have the capability to help Afghanistan's economy towards growth. Lack of proper education is also a main problem, why democratization has not been successful, as Afghanistan does not have enough well- educated experts, who have the knowledge to execute reforms and changes. It is indicated by the failure of unsuccessful reforms from 2001 until 2021 and rampant corruption. Therefore, we can conclude that education and democracy are in correlation, as proper education is linked to economic growth and lack of it to poverty and underdevelopment. So, we can conclude that, country is not democratic because of Islam, but because of underdevelopment. As underdeveloped country has low productivity, poverty, widespread illiteracy and high rate of population growth (Roxas, 1955). So, the raised hypothesis, that democratization in Afghanistan failed, because Islam and democracy thick definition are not compatible, is overthrown and the root problem rather hides in underdevelopment.

The cause of democracy predicament in Muslim majority countries is not in the tradition of Islam, but in the context of country´s politics, culture and openness for modernity. The term Islamic is used too lightly, to describe nations, states or regions. Main problem is not about Islam, but about Muslims, and their openness for modernity. Muslim nations are influenced by variable degrees of traditions and values of Islam. (United States Institution of Peace, 2017) One of the root problems

is the openness for change and development. We cannot force promote democracy if Muslim majority countries are not willing to accept it, want it and work for it. They are the only ones who can guarantee democracy promotion success. Prosperous state can be built only with cooperation and compromise and as the Taliban is not willing to do both, there is no positive outcome for any kind of form of democracy. Therefore, we can firmly state that while, there is no room for negotiations, modernity, openness, cooperation and compromise, the nation building and democracy promotion from the past years has not been successful.

CONCLUSION

When author chose this topic, she had a keen interest in whether democracy promotion worked in Afghanistan during the years of 2001-2021 and to understand if democracy and Islam are compatible. Her original standpoint was, that democracy and Islam are not compatible, and the aim of this thesis was to prove it. So, the raised hypothesis is that democratization in Afghanistan failed because of the incompatibility of Islam and thick democracy. By now we know that democracy promotion was not successful. This is supported by the data gathered Freedom House and therefore the initial statement was overthrown by analysis of literature review and examination of data on Afghanistan and Muslim majority countries.

In chapter one there was different arguments from writers, who stated that democracy and Islam are not compatible and those, who thought that they are compatible. Overall, works of 10 writers were examined. One of the writers - Hanson says that we cannot promote democracy in Islamic countries, unless they want to be part of it, but in chapter two, we examined the statistics that in biggest Muslim majority countries, over half of the Muslim population would choose democracy over a strong leader. Also, Abdel al-Jabri argues, that the ones, who want democracy, are mainly modern elite class, who have been in contact with the West. Author of this paper is against this argument, because the statistics, examined in chapter two show, that people who prefer democracy over a strong leader are mostly over half of the population of the biggest Muslim majority countries and therefore are modern class elites who do not make half of the population in Muslim majority countries, this argument is invalid. As the result of the examination of the literature view, we can say that democracy and Islam are compatible as they have several elements that are considered democratic, as consultation (*shurha*), consensus (*ijma*) and independent interpretive judgement (*ijtihad*). Also, theorist Abdel-Samad emphasizes that Islam governments do not accepts any form of partnership, and as partnership of the government is base for democracy, Islam and democracy are incompatible. Nevertheless, the statement is inaccurate as Keane pointed out that Islam used to be a religion of trades with network. This is all supported by the Islam democracy definition, as it is hybrid system that has evolved and combined religion with democratic values.

In chapter two, the author collected the Freedom House data about democracy indexes as political rights, civil liberties and freedom status (shown in figure 2.5 and 2.6) about Afghanistan. Then she examined two time periods, first the beginning from 2000 to 2010 and the second period from 2011 to 2021. The first time period showed that there was progress towards democracy, as freedom indexes increased and Afghanistan was observed as not free, partly free and again not free and made little progress in freedom rights as the corruption, killings, kidnappings, and overall instability increased. Finally in chapter two author analysed thick democracy's four main characterises (inclusive suffrage, free and fair elections, civil liberties, and governmental accountability) to developments, what happened during 2001 until 2021 and whether the conditions for thick democracy have been achieved. In chapter one, it is stated that country is democratic if, one meets all four characteristics of thick democracy, but in Afghanistan's case, there were areas, where progress was made such as women's formal rights, but same time also many problematic topics like corruption, and electoral transparency. So, overall indications show us, that Afghanistan did not meet all characteristics of thick democracy, so we can say that democracy promotion was not successful. Therefore, we can conclude that problem does not lay in democracy and Islam, rather than in underdevelopment as corruption, kidnappings are not related to religion. In author's point of view, the key challenges were incompetent people, who occupied key positions, but did not have the capabilities to hold and develop further achieved changes. Author blames it on the lack of education, as people did not have the knowledge to successfully carry out much needed reforms.

In chapter three author examines the post-out period, when foreign troops left Afghanistan which led to the regime change and collapse of gained civil liberties and freedom as the Taliban gained control over Afghanistan.

After the Taliban gained power, they reversed all the democratization progress, that was made and took Afghan people back many decades. Mainly all because of their religious views as God is almighty and never be substituted with the will of people. They are Islamic radicals, who interpret Quran according to their personal beliefs. In author's point of view, the Taliban is nothing more than a large grouping, who enforces their ideas on everyone. In their eyes there cannot be any progress and development. The best example for that is education, as everything starts from education, so the more people are educated and thought, the greater their thirst will be for knowledge. In the Taliban's eyes, education is modern and a step closer to democracy as it shows opportunity for better and more prosperous life. As it does not suit with the views of Islamist radicals, it must be destroyed to prevent progress, development and uprisings. If people are

unaware of different ways of life, then they do not know to want more or do anything to have a better life. So therefore, for democracy promotion to work, one must start from the education, to make people more cognizant, then they are open-minded for change and willing to go along with it, embrace it and put an effort in developing it. Democracy promotion is something that cannot be forced, it does not work, when people do not want to adopt it. One cannot put a time limit on it, as it is a continuous progress. The Afghan nation had the opportunity to move towards some kind of democracy, whether it was more westernized, or an Islamic democracy. Author believes that, in some point Afghanistan received too much foreign financial aid at once, and their motivation to make reforms happen, was lost when they saw, how little they have to do, to get the money. Jobs were held by people with insufficient wisdom, sense of duty and lack of moral duty towards their country. Therefore, it made the governmental power takeover for the Taliban easy as well.

Throughout the research, author always ended up with a question: why do Western democracy think that this is only right way of living? In her eyes there is a place for secularized democracy, what could work as effectively as does the Western democracy. West should help Muslim majority countries to achieve that kind of democracy, what would best fit to their cultural needs, and of course only in case Muslims want the help. Whereas they have indicators to become democratic, as well as past democratic behaviour pattern, we should help them to achieve, what they used to have and is lost now. We cannot force our way of living on to someone, whose entire life is utterly different than ours. We need to help them to harmonize their everyday lives so people could get back their basic human rights. Statistics show that over half of the Muslims in Muslim majority countries are yearning for peace of mind and equality with basic civil liberties and freedom.

Based on the case study of Afghanistan, we can conclude that the reason why Muslim majority countries do not have democracy, is not because of religion Islam, but because of the underdevelopment. So, the raised hypothesis, that democratization in Afghanistan failed because Islam and democracy thick definition are not compatible, is overthrown. Nevertheless, the underdevelopment is a vicious circle, one that is hard to get out, as democracy, economy and development are all linked to each other. In order for all three to happen, there must be knowledgeable and educated people, who are able to carry out modernization, so democracy and religion could coexist together.

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