TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

School of Business and Governance

Department of Law

Ida Räsänen

# IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EIDHR

# WITH A FOCUS ON ZIMBABWE

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I declare that I have compiled the paper independently

and all works, important standpoints and data by other authors

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Ida Räsänen …………………………

          (signature, date)

Student code: 156112TASB

Student e-mail address: ida.rasanen@live.com


Supervisor: Antonius Notermans, Senior Lecturer

The paper conforms to requirements in force


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# ABSTRACT

The contemporary world is facing multiple crises regarding democracy and human rights, particularly in the countries with long-time authoritarian leaders, or in other cases democratic ways of governing are reversing. In view of this, the EU is implementing several policies and instruments to change the situation. This thesis analyses the work of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) in the case of Zimbabwe because the country is now in a turning point whether to have first truly democratic presidential elections in 2018 or to remain under authoritarian rule. The EIDHR is able to enter politically sensitive locations due to its unique characters and in that manner, the thesis will research how it has boosted the democratization process in Zimbabwe. It concludes that, due to numerous obstacles such as incoherent policies and limited effectiveness of its instruments, the EU democracy and human rights promotion approaches remains vague. The thesis recommends more specific concentration of funding areas of democracy and human rights. Also, the funding should be limited to the countries where democracy is most at risk, as currently the funding is allocated worldwide. In the case of post-Mugabe Zimbabwe, the EIDHR may have now an effective change to influence on democratization process and thus should centralize its focus there.


**Keywords:** EIDHR, Zimbabwe, democracy, human rights, instrument evaluation, democracy promotion

# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| AAP | Annual Action Programme |
| AU | African Union |
| CBSS | Country Based Support Scheme |
| CfP | Calls for Proposals |
| CoR | Committee of the Regions |
| CSO | Civil Society Organization |
| DG DEVGO | Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development |
| EAM | Election Assesment Mission |
| EAT | Election Assesment Team |
| EDF | European Development Fund |
| EEAS | European External Action Service |
| EEM | Election Expert Mission |
| EFI | European Funding Instrument |
| EFM | Election Follow-up Mission |
| EIDHR | European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights |
| EIU | Economist Intelligence Unit |
| EOM | Elections Observation Mission |
| EU | European Union |
| HRD | Human Rights Defender |
| LGTBI | Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex |
| MDC | The Movement for Democratic Change |
| NA | Not announced |
| NGO | Non-governmental organization |
| TEU | Treaty on European Union |
| ZANU-PF | Zimbabwean African National Unit - Patriotic Front |
| ZEC | Zimbabwean Elections Committee |

# INTRODUCTION

Over the past decades the European Union (EU) has been involved in promoting democracy and human rights in less developed countries, trying to achieve a stable democratization processes through several programmes, instruments and policies. As Gomez et al (2016, 1-2) state, since the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has improved its various democracy and human rights policies, instruments, guidelines and programmes and placed them in an important role in EU external relations. Hence, policies and instruments with external relations play a significant role in supporting countries towards political stability.

Factors like authoritarian leaders, poverty and lack of resources makes it difficult for the EU to deliver its instruments and policies all the way to the developing countries. Also, the willingness of the countries to participate in these is crucial. The EIDHR plays a highly unique role, for the reason that it does not require the approval of the host country and financing through EIDHR can be granted confidently in crisis situations, this is the only EU instrument that operates in such a way. By confidentiality, according to European Commission, the EIDHR ensures the well-being and privacy of civil society organizations (CSOs) and the identities of human rights defenders (HRDs), in order for them to keep operating in challenging surroundings (European Commission 2017, 12).

Many analyses and commentaries on EU democracy promotion have argued that the EU external instruments and policies are inconsistent and try to do overly much. For instance, Kamp argues in his report that the West is too complicated in its development cooperation and the policies towards developing countries are incoherent (Kamp 2017, 64). Every EU member state has its own approach to development work and the lack of a common approach remains an issue. Also, it has been argued, that the decision-making within the EU is slow and produces difficulties when implementing new initiatives for promoting democracy and human rights. This thesis seeks to evaluate the importance and effectiveness of the EIDHR in supporting democratization processes and human rights.

As the EU has funded multiple projects and spent billions of euros on supporting democracy and human rights in Africa through for example, the EIDHR, and decades of democracy promotion in Africa (Mavhiki 2016, 67) have had only a slight effect as still, only nine out of 49 Sub-Saharan countries and none in North Africa are classified as free electoral democracies. Therefore, this thesis

will look at the effectiveness of EIDHR and ways to strengthen the implementation of it through a case study.

The topic will be deepened by an analysis of the EIDHR beneficiary country in the Southern part of Africa: Zimbabwe. This country was chosen because, first of all, Zimbabwe is at a critical juncture due to the withdrawal of long-time leader Robert Mugabe where it will be decided whether it will develop into a democracy or remain under poor governance. Hence, the role of EIDHR in assisting the path towards democracy may be essential. According to Freedom House, the government in Zimbabwe is accused of being corrupt while restricting civil liberties, for example limiting access to information and Zimbabwe is accused of multiple human rights violations. Also, Zimbabwe´s status declined from "partly free" to "not free" for the way Robert Mugabe was forced to resign in 2017. (Freedom House 2018) Also, Sub-Saharan Africa still is the most aid dependent region in the world and democratization in Zimbabwe has not been success due to the authoritarian rule (Mavhiki 2016, 66 & 70). So, it is quite appropriate to examine the role of the EIDHR in all this.

The hypothesis of this thesis is, that the EU should put more emphasis on focused democracy promotion rather than trying to influence every area of development with the EIDHR. Also, the instrument would be more effective if it would focus on funding projects only in countries where democracy is most at risk. Currently, the EIDHR grants are allocated worldwide and it weakens the potentials of it. Nonetheless, the EIDHR may now have a chance to affect the democratization process in Zimbabwe with the upcoming elections and the end of Mugabe´s regime. For improving the effectiveness of the EIDHR, it should focus only into specific countries and projects. The amount of money given to these countries, especially Zimbabwe, which suffers from lack of freedom, has not influenced as much as the EU would have expected. The instrument should be more concentrated on the area's most in need and areas most crucial to democratization and human rights. Without concentration, EIDHR remains hazy and vague. To sum up, the EU puts a lot of money on these vague instruments and policies even though there are no guaranteed developments and getting local actors involved remains a challenge.

The research includes questions of: 1) how the EIDHR is implemented in Zimbabwe? 2) How effective the EIDHR programs there have been? 3) Has billions of euros of supporting democracy and human rights in Africa through the EIDHR really made a significant difference? The research questions will be answered by qualitative methods, such as evaluating EU reports on the instrument

of EIDHR as well as reports from other international organizations such as the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and Freedom House, and academic articles and journals. European Commission external evaluation report on EIDHR (Moran et al. 2017), working paper from Mavhiki (2016), book from Marchetti (2017), and other documents together with analyses from journals and books will be used to complement the topic.

The structure of the paper is as follows. The first chapter will provide a review on the effectiveness of EU policies on democracy and human rights promotion and gives a brief overview of the EIDHR. The second chapter takes an analytical approach to Zimbabwean democracy and the work of EIDHR there with the aim of understanding how funding and projects are implemented there. Thirdly, based on the findings of previous chapters, the research will provide recommendations for the country's future needs from the EIDHR.

# 1. EU DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

The EU itself states the importance of their external instruments and the work in the international field when it comes to democracy and human rights, and as the Treaty on European Union (TEU), article 21.1 declares:

> "The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law."[1]

Several countries battle with issues such as undemocratic governance, human rights violations and violations against civil society freedoms, in such manner, the relevance of this topic cannot be rejected. The importance of EIDHR to the EU is essential. As the Council of the European Union analyses, EIDHR is one of the major active funding instrument of the EU and it has a creative approach to work with CSOs in host countries (Council of the European Union 2017, 8). Some of projects funded by EIDHR are confidential, which might be a limiting factor of this research.

There have been several studies related to the effectiveness of the EIDHR, but these studies have focused more on the neighboring countries or other regions, not on southern Africa. For example, Freyburg et al affirm that the EU democracy support in central and eastern Europe has not fulfilled the expectations and neighboring countries are willing to cooperate in democratization processes only if they have a chance to access the EU (Freyburg et al. 2015, 1 & 8). In addition, even more books and journal articles have been written regarding EU Development policies and Neighborhood policy (see for example, Bassotti 2017, Bindi 2013 and Schumacher et al. 2017). Hence, there is a need for further research and analysis of the EIDHR in wider scope. Some foundations for the research problems exists, but they usually investigate other African states, not Zimbabwe. Therefore, a new approach to the study of the effectiveness of EIDHR is needed. Moreover, the case study lays the foundation for the understanding of the need for more through research that documents the work of the EIDHR globally.

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[1] Treaty on European Union (2007) Article 21.1

Even though, the EU is an important player in the international development field, there are some serious concerns about its capacity to actually assist the processes of democratization. Gomez et al estimate in their evaluation report that, the delivery gap of democracy and human rights policies and instruments from Brussels to the beneficiary country is too huge and impacts negatively on the effectiveness of implementation (Gomez et al. 2016, 2). Thus, the difference between actual implementation and what is written on paper may vary enormously and this policy evaporation is a common problem for the EU.

Another criticism of the EU regarding this field is the long-time taken from the decision-making to implementation. The EU decision-making is said to be slow and as Börzel and Risse assess, the EU democracy and human rights promotion agendas suffers from the same issues as most of the EU agendas, they are over-bureaucratized (Börzel and Risse 2004, 24). When the new instrument or project is ready to be implemented in the beneficiary country, it may already be out-dated since the contemporary world moves fast. Lengthy processes of decision-making are costly, thus the instruments on democracy promotion should be evaluated in order to achieve the greatest outcomes as possible.

In addition, Hackenesch (2015, 93) argues that the EU is capable to form several instruments, but when it comes to the implementation of them, the EU strategies are not so well-planned. Meaning that, even though, the EU has some good strategies, they might not know how to best execute them in developing countries. Also, one of the persistent criticism towards EU actions on democracy and human rights is the lack of consistency. As Gomez et al argue, the goals of EU are not always compatible (Gomez et al. 2016, 14). Likewise, according to Bossuyt et al, the EU needs one common guideline regarding democracy promotion and its absence creates incoherent policies and instruments (Bossuyt et al. 2015, 27).

Nonetheless, also the EU itself realizes that the EIDHR could be improved in many ways. As written in the EIDHR evaluation report, the EU Commission is hesitant to, for example, limit the EIDHR funding scope to only specific countries and the question is asked, if the EIDHR is accomplishing any changes given the budget and more than 110 countries covered (European Commission 2017, 38-39). According to Ioannides, the area which the EIDHR tries to influence might be too wide (Ioannides 2018, 41). Also, when it comes to EOMs, the European Commission (2017, 47) states that these

missions have led to reforms and open dialogue with developing countries, but the report does not specify any successful examples.

Additionally, the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) acknowledged that the application procedures for the EIDHR funding must be simplified so all levels can take full advantage of it (Committee of Regions 2008, 2). In terms of this, smaller and perhaps not so well-organized CSOs are not able to compete with bigger ones when it comes to Calls for Proposals (CfPs). According to Kurki, the EU sees CfPs as democratic method that filters out all untrustworthy CSO partners receiving EIDHR funding. However, this kind of application procedure creates a competition between the CSOs, and thus requires good planning and management assets from them. With good organizational skills, the CSOs remains appealing and competitive in CSO markets. (Kurki 2011, 359-360)

Nonetheless, other EIDHR beneficiaries, like Turkey, may also benefit from alternative EU assistance as well. For instance, Pre-Accession Instrument together with the EU Neighbourhood Policy are implemented in Turkey to reform politically, including establishing democratic rights and strengthening civil society participation. These are also priorities of the EIDHR and in that manner, there is some amount of overlap of aid. For example, in the years 2015-2016 alone (European Commission 2016b), Turkey has benefited from 44 EIDHR projects altogether over €8million and (Delegation of EU to Turkey 2018) for the period 2014-2020 €37,5million allocated only for HRDs in Turkey. Whereas, Zimbabwe in the years 2000-2017 implemented 38 projects, altogether just a little over €8,3 million (see table 6 and 7).

Besides, according to Gomez et al, the field of evaluating effectiveness of democracy and human rights promotion is quite under-researched which makes it problematic to measure the instruments of promotion (Gomez et al. 2016, 15). Evaluations of the EIDHR in diverse countries need to be conducted in order to better understand the effectiveness (Kurki 2011). Also, only little evidence exists that lessons learned from previous years are used to develop the current and future EIDHR (Ioannides 2018, 35).  In such manner, the topic of this thesis becomes more important.

Only little research exists on the effectiveness of the EIDHR in Southern Africa, as this part of the thesis indicated. This thesis focuses on the projects and developments made through the EIDHR funding regarding the most pressing issues in Zimbabwe. The aim of the case study is to add to the understanding of the functioning of the EIDHR in Southern Africa.

# 2. THE EIDHR

The EIDHR is a core element of the EU to promote the values of democracy and human rights globally. The instrument finances worldwide several CSOs and HRDs working with volatile issues. The instrument is unique because it does not need the consent of the host-country. This gives more flexibility and ability to address sensitive issues that the host-country´s authorities would perhaps otherwise not want to be addressed. The EIDHR has five specific objectives (SO), which work as priorities (Moran et al. 2017, 13); (1) Support to human rights and human rights defenders in situations where they are most at risk, (2) support to other priorities of the Union in the field of human rights, (3) support to democracy, (4) EU Election Observation Missions (EOMs) and (5) support to targeted key actors and processes including international and regional human rights instruments and mechanisms. To achieve these specific objectives, the EIDHR offers different types of support through grants. (Moran et al. 2017, 13) Whilst this instrument is not the main financial instrument the EU has on development, achieving democratic reforms is the main challenge to overcome before any other developments can be accomplished. Thus, it is worthwhile to study and evaluate the EIDHR, since questions have been raised about its effectiveness as the EU democracy promotion review substantiated.

The EIDHR is a diverse instrument and in addition to monitoring elections and supporting democracy it funds projects related to, for example, children, indigenous people as well as lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGTBI) persons. An example of EIDHR funded projects are (European Commission 2015, 7), support for CSO´s activities when preparing for elections and protecting democracy and human rights activists. The EIDHR funding's are controlled mainly through international or local CSOs.

Eligible for EIDHR funding, besides CSOs, are non-profit international or local organizations (NGOs), HRDs, parliamentary bodies, human rights institutions and networks for education as well as support to media. The grants for these beneficiaries are funded through CfP processes, which are administered and observed by EU Delegations. Emergency grants are granted for HRDs at risk, also confidential grants may be awarded for HRDs or CSOs if restrictions placed by state or non-state actors are making funding impossible or expose them to risk. Also, Annual Action Programs (AAPs)

are established with certain partners. Besides all these, service contracts are made with some service providers, such as one´s conducting EOMs. (Moran et al. 2017, 13)

The Council of the European Union identifies the distressing situation that both, non-state and state actors have put on CSOs and NGOs while trying to promote democracy and human rights during last decades. Increased restrictions and shrinking space for civil society has expanded worldwide. (Council of the European Union 2017, 22) The work of CSOs is highly important, as they express the interest and rights of entire civil society. The definition of civil society entails all citizens of the country and the non-state organizations excluding the government.

The EIDHR budget for the period 2007–13, was €1 104 million and for the 2014-2020 EIDHR allocation is €1 333 million and the implementation goes through the CfPs set by the Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) in Brussels in cooperation with Delegations (Marchetti Raffaele 2017, 203). So, the overall budget has increased by over €200 million. These amounts of funding are distributed with the five SO´s earlier mentioned. Below (see table 1), is provided the 2011-2013 and 2014-2017 funding for HRDs under SO one.  As seen, the amount of grants to HRDs has increased from €66,64 million to €76,39 million.

Table 1. SO: 1, Support to HRDs, commitments EUR Million

| Year | CBSS | Global | Target | Small Grant | Crisis Facility | Relocation of HRD | Total |
|------|------|--------|--------|-------------|-----------------|-------------------|-------|
| 2011 | 4,84 | 15,7 | 0 | 0,25 | NA | NA | 20,79 |
| 2012 | 3,44 | 20 | 0 | 0,38 | NA | 1 | 24,82 |
| 2013 | 5,6 | 15 | 0 | 0,43 | NA | NA | 21,03 |
| **TOTAL** | **13,88** | **50,7** | **0** | **1,06** | **NA** | **1** | **66,64** |
| 2014 | 10,35 | 15 | 0,6 | 3,6 | 3,5 | 0 | 30,65 |
| 2015 | 7,31 | 5 | 5 | 3,6 | 3,5 | 0 | 22,01 |
| 2016 | 2,47 | 4,65 | 3,4 | 3,6 | 3,5 | 0 | 15,22 |
| 2017 | NA | 5 | 0 | NA | 3,5 | 0 | 8,5 |
| **TOTAL** | **20,13** | **29,65** | **9** | **3,6** | **14** | **0** | **76,38** |

Source: Moran et al. 2017, 22-23

Table 2. SO: 2, Support to other Priorities of the EU in field of human rights, Expenditure EUR Million

|  | 2011-2013 | 2014-2017 |
|---|---|---|
| Dignity | 30,2 | 35,71 |
| Women | 39,1 | 35,82 |
| Discrimination | 8,8 | 10,05 |
| **TOTAL** | **78,1** | **81,58** |

Source: Moran et al. 2017, 25

Below (see table 3), the table separates different project types under SO three for the years 2011-2013 and the major category (41,06%) was funds granted for citizen observers. As for the year 2014-2017, most of the funding was allocated to civic education (28,83%). Also, the overall budget increased from €68,81 million to €70,75 million. Besides these, the EU considers the right to information and freedom of expression a basic human right and an important aspect of democracy. That is why restrictions put on media and press by state or non-state actors are tackled also by projects funded with the EIDHR.

Table 3. SO: 3, Support to Democracy

|  | Expenditure EUR million |  |  |  |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | **TOTAL** | % of TOTAL |
| Citizen observers | 11,18 | 7,73 | 9,34 | 28,25 | 41,06 |
| Civic and HR education | 4,63 | 5,9 | 9,05 | 19,58 | 28,46 |
| Local authorities | 0,68 | 0,71 | 0,65 | 2,04 | 2,96 |
| Media | 2,45 | 4,47 | 4,54 | 11,46 | 16,65 |
| Parliaments | 3,96 | 2,68 | 4,67 | 7,11 | 10,33 |
| Political Societies | 0,09 | 0 | 0,3 | 0,39 | 0,57 |
| **TOTAL** | 22,99 | 21,48 | 24,34 | **68,81** |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Year | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | **TOTAL** | % of TOTAL |
| Political society and pluralism | 0 | 0,35 | 0,16 | 0,51 | 0,72 |
| Domestic accountability | 9,24 | 8,15 | 0,8 | 18,19 | 25,71 |
| Fundamental freedoms | 5,56 | 8,4 | 0,85 | 14,81 | 20,93 |
| Parliaments | 0,83 | 0 | 5 | 5,83 | 8,24 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Electoral assistance, domestic observation | 8,37 | 2,34 | 0,3 | 11,01 | 15,56 |
| HR and civic education | 7,17 | 7,23 | 6 | 20,4 | 28,83 |
| **TOTAL** | 31,17 | 26,47 | 13,11 | **70,75** | |

Source: Moran et al. 2017, 28

Furthermore, EOMs are under SO four of the EIDHR and receives one quarter of the entire EIDHR budget (European Commission 2017, 30). In years 2011-2013, altogether 56 missions took place and 55 missions in years 2014-2017 (Moran et al. 2017, 30). The EOMs are a key pillar of all EIDHR projects and have become central when the years 2016-2017 saw several crises in democracies all around the world. All the EU EOMs are managed through the EIDHR funding and according to European Commission they include for example, technical support, providing voting materials, helping with political parties and registration of voters, education of citizens and assisting media. The goals of EOMs are to improve confidence in the elections, prevent fraud and to develop the future elections as well as promote democracy. (European Commission 2018) EU electoral assistance may include besides EOMs, smaller Election Expert Missions (EEMs), Elections Assessment Teams (EATs) or Election Follow-up Mission (EFMs) and according to European Union, 49% of all EOMs and EATs in 2000-2017 and 48% of all EEMs were conducted in Africa (European Union 2017, 13-16). And finally, SO five, to which was granted (2011-2013) €29,45 million including 15 actions and (2014-2016) €55million with 19 actions. This objective concentrate on supporting key human rights actors and institutions, such as the International Criminal Court. (Moran et al. 2017, 17 & 32)

Moreover, when it comes to the projects of the EIDHR, the European Commission (2011) separates EIDHR funding by regions and according to it, Sub-Saharan Africa, in the years 2007-2010, benefited from 195 projects whereas the neighboring countries of the EU had 258 projects (European Commission 2011, 10). Furthermore, the EIDHR starts yearly more than 185 projects in Sub-Saharan Africa (EuropeAid 2012, 14).

EIDHR has been revised many times and it was created in the year 2000, when the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (2000-2006) was established. The Initiative was transformed to an Instrument with EIDHR of 2007-2013. This was followed by EIDHR for 2014-2020. According to Lovitt & Řiháčková, the revision of European Initiative for democracy and human rights in 2006 implemented new aspects for the EIDHR 2007-2013, such as, the possibility to provide grants to non-

registered organizations and trend towards transparency. The aim of the revision was to create more flexibility for the instrument. (Lovitt, Řiháčková 2008, 5-6)

When the EIDHR was again amended for the 2014-2020 period, according to the Council of the European Union, the focus was converted to a more strategic approach, enabling it to address new phenomena, such as developing democratic and electoral processes and mechanisms to protect HRDs, as well as to improve the ability to respond to emergencies and to initiate EOMs (Council of the European Union 2017, 8). Likewise, the European Commission argues the 2014-2020 EIDHR to be more comprehensive. Though its budget is the smallest of all European Funding Instruments (EFIs) (see table 4), it can address directly democracy and human rights issues and the time frame from commitment to payment has improved. (European Commission 2017, 12, 21, 39) One of the weaknesses the European Commission recognized in 2007-2013 EIDHR was that the target of it was in less challenging issues, which made democracy support weak. Whereas, the focus should be on more sensitive matters of democracy and human rights. (European Commission 2017, 17)

Table 4. EU Foreign Policy Financing Instruments in 2014-2020

| European Development Fund | 30,5 billion |
|---|---|
| Development Coordination Instrument | 19,6 billion |
| European Neighborhood Instrument | 15,4billion |
| Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance | 11,7 billion |
| Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace | 2,4 billion |
| European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights | **1,3 billion** |
| Partnership Instrument | 0,96 billion |

Source: Moran et al. 2017, 12

To compare CfPs, in 2009 calls, priorities were set in the case of Zimbabwe to strengthen the role of civil society in fields of democracy and human rights and consolidation of political participation. However, CfPs of 2017 indicated new features for specific objects. For example, projects under specific objective one would now focus on strengthening HRDs in their capacity to tackle issues on land-related rights and climate change, including biodiversity. According to the Guidelines for application, most of the HRDs murdered in 2016 were working with environmental rights. Thus, there was a pressing need to facilitate the work on promoting these aspects as well. (European Commission n.a.) However, according to Moran et al, before 2014 matters related to environment and climate change were not addressed with the EIDHR, but since then, there has been increased focus in that

direction too (Moran et al. 2017, 15). Nonetheless, environment-related issues cause human rights issues, and therefore, the CfPs in 2017 allowed CSOs and HRDs to submit application for working with environmental issues.

# 3. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN ZIMBABWE

Several issues related to democracy are present in Zimbabwe. As Freedom House states, democracy is currently facing crises globally and antidemocratic practices are growing (Freedom House 2018). Despite vast amounts of money spent on democratization, the democracies in Africa are backsliding (Mavhiki 2016, 2). Moreover, the most pressing issue to the democracy in Zimbabwe nowadays is the state and its control (Mavhiki 2016, 88) as Zimbabwe is a police-state using coercive power to achieve its political goals. This section takes an empirical approach towards the contemporary issues regarding democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe. The study period covers from the beginning of 2000 to the present.

## 3.1. Democracy analysis

The reports "Freedom in the World" by Freedom House give an overview of the developments of democracy worldwide, and according to the reports, data is presented to indicate the developments and quality of it in Zimbabwe from years 1999 to 2018. Three indicators are presented, "Freedom", "Political rights" and "Civil liberties". By these, Freedom House measures the quality of electoral processes, political participation, functioning of the government, freedom of expression, organizational and individual rights as well as the rule of law.

As the data show (see figure 1), the developments in Zimbabwe are not improving and the quality of democracy remains close to the least free value. Even though, some developments have occurred since 2013, the status changed for the worse because of the recent events at the end of 2017. However, (Mavhiki 2016, 92) the ruling party in Zimbabwe argues that Zimbabwe has already met Western requirements, especially when it comes to non-violent elections and has adopted democratic governance.

Figure1. Zimbabwean democracy development, 1-7 when 1 is most free
Source: Freedom House 2018

Zimbabwean long-time authoritarian leader Robert Mugabe was forced to resign from office in November 2017 and was replaced with Emmerson Mnangagwa, who according to Human Rights Watch also has quite a history of rights violations. However, Zimbabwe will face elections in August 2018 but how democratic they will be, remains to be seen. (Human Rights Watch 2018, 1)

The situation on democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe is worrying and as the Council of the European Union declares in their report, the EU´s priority is to engage with CSOs (Council of European Union 2017, 254). Also, according to Human Rights Watch, the country suffers for example, restrictions on freedom of expression especially when it comes to HRDs and journalists (Human Rights Watch 2018, 2).  Even though, a new constitution was written by Mugabe and adopted in 2013 but (Human Rights Watch 2018, 3) the authorities kept on ignoring it and until this day, the government has not passed the new laws or amend the existing ones.

Moreover, the overall governance in Zimbabwe according to Mo Ibrahim foundation is ranked to be 40th of entire Africa with scores 45,4/100 in year 2016 and political participation and human rights are 42,8/100 in ranking as 34[th.] When it comes to accountability of public officials, Zimbabwe has scored only 7,1/100 and corruption in government has received zero points. (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2017, 161) Likewise, according to the Freedom House, the aggregate scores of the overall freedoms

is 30/100 and the widespread corruption and restrictive laws to the access of information remains an issue (Freedom House 2018).

## 3.2. Presidential elections

Recent presidential elections in Zimbabwe have been in years 2002, 2008, 2013 and the upcoming one in this year, 2018 so the sequence has remained regular. However, the cycle of elections may give rise to turbulence, and numerous security threats have occurred close to elections in many African countries. As Mackie et al declares, EOMs are an effective way to avoid violence before and after the elections (Mackie et al. 2017, 8). Also, typically foreign EOMs have been providing an outsider view and recommendations but in Zimbabwe, only the African Union (AU) has been allowed (Mavhiki 2016, 91).

Nonetheless, elections in 2002 led to violence, intimidation, vote rigging and eventually, a ban of international observers (Linfberg 2004). Accordingly, since the 2002 elections no western EOMs have been allowed in Zimbabwe. Also (Mavhinga 2018), political party violence in Zimbabwe is not unusual, in the 2008 presidential elections, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party used systematic violence to achieve their political goal. Today, also the opposition has been recorded using groups of youths who have engaged in violent riots in streets. (Mavhinga Dewa 2018) ZANU-PF party has been ruling since independence (1980) and the party has used violence against political opposition as well as civil society ever since.

Furthermore, the Zimbabwean government has been suspected of manipulating election results and overlooking several human rights violations in the country. For example, elections held in 2013, when Mugabe was re-elected, brought multiple accusations on lack of accountability of the elections and as BBC news expresses, many countries, especially westerns, condemned the elections (BBC 2013). Accordingly, the 2013 elections faced many accusations regarding fraudulence. Additionally, (Freedom House 2018), the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) has been accused of installing fewer centers to vote in urban areas, where notably more people are in favor of the opposition. Conversely, (Mavhira 2016, 109) the amount of polling stations was increased in areas of ZANU-PF strongholds.

Also, in the case of the 2002, 2008 and 2013 elections, the opposition had won more votes. For example, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), has been the main opponent of ZANU-PF since the 2002 presidential elections and gained more votes in urban areas but since the government has used vote rigging as a method, MDC was not declared the winner. (Mavhiki 2016, 94) Also, in 2008, after the opposition had won the first round, the military announced that the Zimbabwean army will not allow them to rule the country (Gavin 2017).

However, Cropley tells that temporary president Mnangagwa has declared that elections in 2018 will be credible, transparent and respect the opposition (2018). However, holding elections does not guarantee democracy since not all countries holding elections are democracies, as the case of Zimbabwe indicates. Moreover, (Mavhiki 2016, 139) typically, supporting transitional countries with elections is required for 12-15 years, but in the case of Zimbabwe, this did not happen either.

Finally, as table 5 illustrates, the voter turnout has not been high, around 50% of the voting population. Since western EOMs are perhaps now allowed to observe and assist in upcoming elections, these issues could be addressed properly.

Table 5. Voter Turnout in Presidential elections – Zimbabwe

| | |
|------|----------|
| 1996 | 32,30 % |
| 2002 | 54,33 % |
| 2008 | 42,37 % |
| 2013 | 54,38 % |

Source: International IDEA 2018

## 3.3. Civil Society and the media

Furthermore, the operations of journalists, HRD and CSOs have been endangered by state-actors even though it is allowed in Zimbabwe to organize peaceful protest and citizens have rights to political participation. However, as Frontline Defenders writes, Zimbabwe keeps ignoring the rights of citizens and multiple HRDs have been arrested and tortured when advocating for democracy and good governance (Frontline Defenders 2016) and several CSOs have tried to fight back the state-sponsored

harassment (Kode and Mawrire 2017). The government, to some extent, controls operations of CSOs. There are multiple CSOs in Zimbabwe, but they are under strict legal restrictions (Freedom House 2018). Due to several demonstrations in the streets, the government blocked internet access disallowing people to organize any further meetings (European Parliament 2016). Despite that, the supporters of ZANU-PF are however allowed to have political gatherings and demonstrate freely without police intervention (Freedom House 2018).

Zimbabweans are for the first time ruled by someone else than Mugabe and according to Kode and Mawarire, temporary president Mnangagwa has made no efforts towards democratization, as he appointed veterans from ZANU-PF party to the government and silenced actions of CSOs. The focus of Mnangagwa has been on strengthening the powers of the military and has not opened the space for civil society nor opposition regarding the upcoming elections. (Kode and Mawarire 2017)

During 2017, numerous journalists and other activist faced harassment, intimidation and arrests when they were protesting or reporting events (Human Rights Watch 2018, 1). The government has placed restrictions on the press and made threats against journalists. Also control over internet in Zimbabwe is not unusual. As Freedom House expresses, journalists may face long prison sentences and are under threat of violence constantly. The state dominates the broadcast media, newspapers and television. (Freedom House 2018) Also, according to BBC news, media in Zimbabwe were seen to be in favour of re-electing Mugabe during elections of 2013 (BBC 2013) and the media was limiting reports from opposition (Human Rights Watch 2018:2). Likewise, the EIU has scored Zimbabwean media to be largely unfree (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2017, 59).

Throughout 2002 and 2007 the government legitimized media controls over main media channels in terms of benefitting ZANU-PF, only they could campaign which led to harming opposition parties (Mavhiki 2016, 124). The latest violations against the freedom of expression, according to Misa education & production trust which is one of the EIDHR beneficiaries in Zimbabwe, are reported to be from March 2018 when journalists were attacked (Misa 2017). Moreover, Mugabe´s regime treated HRDs and basically any opponents brutally. There has been evidence of mass killings, widespread violations and political intolerance and all these, the current president Mnangagwa oversaw while working with the government nearly four decades. Therefore, the change of the regime in Zimbabwe may not be a change towards democratization. (Front Line Defenders 2018, 11)

Nonetheless, according to Mavhiki (2016, 120), one of the main issues in terms of civil society participation is, that the Zimbabweans are too adjustable to the worsening conditions. They are not keen to rise and have their voices heard since the government has been successful in intimidating people in fear and convincing that organizing mass protests does not improve anything but creates confrontations between police forces and civilians. Although, typically, in situations of poor governance mass action emerges and causes settlement between citizens and government. Despite this, Zimbabweans have not achieved this.

To sum up, the mains problems preventing democratization in Zimbabwe are the fact that the dominating party ZANU-PF is closely linked with the military and violent rule. And, also, Mnangagwa has worked with ZANU-PF and as right hand of Mugabe since 1980, therefore it is highly unlikely, that he will lead the country towards democratization. Also, restricting laws are preventing CSOs and HRDs to operate the way needed and citizens' rights are constantly ignored.

# 4. THE ROLE OF THE EIDHR IN ZIMBABWE

While the previous chapter specified the fundamental issues regarding democratization in Zimbabwe; problems with fraudulent elections, poor and restrictive conditions of both, CSOs and HRDs, as well as absence of independent media, this part will look how the EIDHR has worked to improve these. As the second chapter indicated, the priorities the EIDHR has set (five SO´s), this part will see if they coincide with the most pressing issues in Zimbabwe.

Between 2000 and 2018 four CfPs were issued in Zimbabwe under the EIDHR, each having a slightly different focus. The European Commission Online Services does not provide information on CfPs 2002. However, the emphasis of CfPs 2008 was put on assisting civil society in creating political pluralism, political participation and unity when working with human rights. This call highlighted the partnership amongst CSOs. Whereas the 2009 CfPs aimed to strengthen democracy and rule of law, also respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms was included in the objectives. (European Commission n.a) The latest, 2017 calls welcomed also proposals from HRDs working with environmental issues.

As the Council of the European Union expresses, the cooperation with CSOs is essential when encouraging citizens to understand and claim their rights and when questioning the measures of government (Council of the European Union 2017, 24). Therefore, assisting CSOs through EIDHR becomes vital. The shrinking freedoms and operations of HRDs and CSOs in Zimbabwe may possibly require confidentiality. The amount of confidential grants (see table 6) express the volatile situation in Zimbabwe since unrestricted environment would allow open financing. Before 2010 numerous confidential grants were awarded, most likely to HRDs in unpredictable situations and to organizations trying to enhance the conditions of civil society.

The following tables (see table 6 and 7) provide a full list of organizations that were awarded grants from the EIDHR together with the more specific information such as project title and amount of the grant. Also, some international NGOs have been awarded EIDHR funding regarding projects implemented in Zimbabwe. As the Roadmap Support Facility analyses, the EU is committed by the EIDHR to support CSOs in Zimbabwe and multiple projects are ongoing relating to transparency, accountability and democratic consolidation (Roadmap 2015). According of the tables (see table 6

and 7) this is not happening as the European NGOs are receiving vast amounts of the EIDHR money. Also, many of the grants awarded through the EIDHR have been confidential and from them, no further information can be found. Additionally, two of the grants were granted for Zimbabwean organizations to implement work in Lesotho, so the money did not go for promoting rights in Zimbabwe.

Table 6. The EIDHR funded projects 2007-2017 to Zimbabwean CSOs/HRDs

| Year | Receiver | Project | Amount € |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2007 | Confidential | | 97,703 |
| 2007 | Confidential | | 95,156 |
| 2007 | Confidential | | 86,294 |
| 2007 | Confidential | | 63,270 |
| 2007 | Confidential | | 78,703 |
| 2007 | Mass Public Opinion Institution | Constitutional reform interventions and Democratization | 82,373 |
| 2008 | Confidential | | 190,000 |
| 2008 | Confidential | | 190,000 |
| 2008 | Bulawayo Agenda Trust | Civil Society leadership development | 199,000 |
| 2008 | Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association | Enhancing political and legislative representation, public participation in environmental governance | 159,550 |
| 2008 | The Southern African Parliament Support Trust | | 157,520 |
| 2008 | Women and Law in Southern Africa research and education | | 146,960 |
| 2009 | Confidential | | 150,000 |
| 2009 | Confidential | | 150,000 |
| 2009 | Confidential | | 146,291 |
| 2009 | Confidential | | 144,000 |
| 2009 | Confidential | | 120,000 |
| 2009 | Confidential | | 5,897 |
| 2010 | Confidential | | 144,000 |
| 2010 | Confidential | | 119,036 |
| 2010 | Confidential | | 104,353 |
| 2010 | Confidential | | 90,000 |
| 2010 | Radio Dialogue Trust | Enhancing civil society´s contribution to debate through radio | 140,000 |
| 2010 | Justice for Children Trust | Respect, protection and promotion of children´s human rights | 60,000 |
| 2011 | Women and Law in Southern Africa research and education | Facilitating implementation of Anti Trafficking act 2011 in **Lesotho** | 284,921 |

| 2014 | Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights Trust | Strenghtening support to HRDs | 300,000 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | Africa Community Publishing and Development Trust | State and Civil Society constitution awareness project | 400,000 |
| 2015 | Women and Law in Southern Africa research and education | Preventing and eliminating early marriages, discrimination and violence against LGBTI persons in **Lesotho** | 337,077 |
| 2016 | Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights Trust | Contributing to Constitutionalism and Human Rights Accountability | 800,000 |
| 2016 | Several recipients | Strengthening Human Rights Monitoring and Protection | 900,000 |

Source: European Commission 2016b

Table 7. The EIDHR funded projects in Zimbabwe 2000-2017, International NGOs

| Year | Receiver | Project | Amount € |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | International Organization for Migration based in Switzerland | Strengthening the role of civil society in eliminating human trafficking in Zimbabwe | 150,000 |
| 2010 | Sofreco-societe Francaise de Realisation D´etudes et de Conceil sa based in France | EEM to Zimbabwe | 193,422 |
| 2010 | Catholic institute for international relations based in UK | Towards new Zimbabwe, sharing skills for dialogue on pro-poor policies | 149,824 |
| 2013 | Institut for Menneskerettigheder -Danmarks Nationale Menneskerettighedsinstitution*institute for human rights national human rights  based in Denmark | Capacity building of the Zimbabwe human rights Commission | 500,000 |
| 2013 | International Organization for Migration based in Switzerland | Strengthening the capacity of central and local government authorities to manage migration in Zimbabwe | 450,000 |
| 2013 | Sofreco-societe Francaise de Realisation D'etudes et de conseil sa* based in France | EEM to Zimbabwe 2013 | 187,688 |
| 2013 | Sofreco-societe Francaise de Realisation D'etudes et de conseil sa* based in France | EEM to Zimbabwe 2013 | 5,959 |

Source: European Commission 2016b

In addition to these grants (2007-2017), the European Initiative for Democracy and Human rights, 2000-2006, granted funding to Zimbabwe for promoting independent, free and responsible media, €744.600.00 for organization called Misa education & production trust in 2002 (EuropeAid n.a, 217).

But, grants before 2007 are not provided in the Commission´s Financial Transparency system (European Commission 2016b).

Also, one example of the EIDHR funded projects in Zimbabwe is a project implemented by the Irish NGO, Trocaire, which aimed among other things, to build capacities of NGOs and raised level of participation of local organizations in urban areas. This project recorded the situation on democracy and raised awareness among policy-makers. (EuropeAid 2011, 21) Trocaire works in Zimbabwe continuously, for instance, to advocate human rights, raising citizen awareness and assisting HRDs, and receives funding from the EU through, for example the EIDHR (Trocaire n.a.). However, the Financial Transparency System does not indicate this specific NGO either and thus it is not added into table 7. Therefore, some of the information may be incomplete.

However, the situation in Zimbabwe remains volatile and stabilizing the situation around the upcoming elections will be crucial. Since (Reuters 2018) the EOMs are most likely able to access Zimbabwe this year and Mnangagwa has declared to repair ties with the West (Reuters 2018), the importance of the EIDHR becomes crucial. Financing CSOs and monitoring elections to achieve fair elections is important. Fortunately, in March 2018, the EU was invited to Zimbabwe to conduct pre-election assessment and meet with people from MDC, ZEC and other stakeholders. According to European External Action Service (EEAS), the common work on electoral campaign and credible elections has already started together with ZEC. Besides this, the EU is assisting the local media in order for them to better deal with the elections as well as educating citizens. Moreover, Frederica Mogherini is hopeful, that this kind of co-operation could be enriched. (European External Action Service 2018)

Given the common critique of slow decision-making within the EU, it is interesting to see how the EU will be able to react to the new situation in Zimbabwe. According to a press release by the Council of the European Union, the EU would like to establish EOMs, if an invitation will be received from the government of Zimbabwe. Also, the EU recognizes that reforming Zimbabwe politically is the key obstacle to focus and confirms it will actively engage with civil society and political actors. (the Council of European Union 2018) Since the EU EOMs have been banned from 2002 on, it is crucial to see how they will manage to influence, if, and when the invitation from Zimbabwean government will follow. As table 7 showed, some European NGOs have been however allowed to exercise EEMs

to analyze the previous elections, and as the EU has already been able to start pre-election assessment, there might be some space for the EIDHR participate with the coming elections.

Regarding the projects implemented through the EIDHR, most of them are accurate when it comes to most pressing issues of Zimbabwe and the political agenda has been concentrated towards the right matters (SO 1-5), such as civil society awareness raising and participation, protection of human rights, support to HRDs, building capacities and establishing EEMs in order to at least analyse and report on the elections. Although, no actual EOMs were conducted, and in some years, no grants were received. However, these concerns have yielded no improvement during the Mugabe regime, and to illustrate this, the figure 1 confirmed the lack of proper developments during 1999-2018.

According to table 2 and 3, projects related to the support of democracy was funded over €10 million less than projects related to dignity, women and discrimination. The support of democracy (SO 3) includes undertakings such as educating civic society, media and fundamental freedoms. Given that more money was given to less challenging issues of democracy and human rights, it weakens the democracy support of the EIDHR. In the case of Zimbabwe, the focus should be on more sensitive matters of democracy and human rights and on fundamental freedoms the civilians now lack. As analyzed, more concentration is required towards democracy support (Human Rights and Democracy Network 2015, 2).

Overall, this chapter aimed to describe the EIDHR projects implemented in Zimbabwe in the years 2000-2017 and looking at its role directed to CSOs and HRDs. It also introduced the projects and beneficiaries and pointed out the variety of fields in which the projects were implemented, it is possible to identify 38 projects (about €8,3 million), including types such as, constitutional reforms, strengthening the support to HRDs, civil society awareness raising and few EEMs. In general, these recipients seem to be professional organizations but they all are not located in Zimbabwe. However, according to Marchetti, the EU must involve more small and local organizations into its EIDHR agenda. These kinds of organizations might be excluded because they lack the general experience or the knowledge on the application procedure and have low level of English skills. (Marchetti 2017, 210-211) As such, the European NGOs have much better abilities and contacts with the EU decision-making bodies than any organization in Zimbabwe which gives them an advantage.

# 5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EIDHR

This chapter will discuss possible improvements and recommendations for democracy promotion in Zimbabwe and ways the EIDHR could be amended for the upcoming 2021-2027 period in terms of advancing the democratization in Zimbabwe further. Regular revisions of the EIDHR adds value to it, as in that way, the EIDHR can develop its focus on the most pressing issues. The criticism of the EU development promotion and main challenges of Zimbabwe indicated before will be used as basis for the discussion.

As Mavhiki argue, whether international democracy promotion is really promoting democracy or not, is a complicated matter (Mavhiki 2016, 2). Also, in many cases the governments are reluctant to implement political reforms introduced by third actors, therefore the support from the EIDHR will be valuable since no consent from the government is needed. Also, in most cases, the change comes from people in that particular country, as stated by Civicus it is the civil society that makes authoritarian leaders feel insecure and challenges them (Civicus 2016, 72). Therefore, the interaction between the EIDHR and local CSOs is important.

The numerous projects and billions of euros spent to supporting democracy and human rights in Africa has not made as huge an impact as predicted. Many African countries still face several issues in these matters and Zimbabwe is one of these cases. As other EFI´s like the European Development Fund (EDF) do not acquire the same unique characteristics than the EIDHR, it could be used to better tackle these issues. Moreover, according to Gomez Isa et al, there is still a lot of space for improvements (Gomez Isa et al. 2016, 10).

As the hypothesis stated, the availability for worldwide projects might weaken the potentials of the EIDHR and thus it should be concentrated to the countries' most at risk. Some countries receiving EIDHR funding have already reached levels of being middle-income country, so perhaps the funding coming from the EIDHR is irrelevant. Whereas, Zimbabwe which is having hard times regarding democracy and human rights, has perhaps not received enough EIDHR support or has not managed the implementation well. The EU has not been able to interact with the Zimbabwean government since 2002 and during for example the year 2012 no grants through the EIDHR were granted for Zimbabwean democracy building even though the EU has said to be committed to engage with

Zimbabwean to strengthen the good governance and accountability of institutions. In 2016, the European Parliament insisted that the EU must ensure funding allocation to Zimbabwe (European Parliament 2016).

Also, the hypothesis specified, the EIDHR funding should be focused on the most crucial issues of democracy and human rights, since, currently, it tries to do overly much. Thus, to complement this, as the European Commission declares, less sensitive issues of democracy and human rights should be left to be covered by other EFI´s. Then, the EIDHR could make full use of its unique aspects and focus on support of HRDs and CSOs at most risk. (European Commission 2017, 49) In the case of Zimbabwe, the most pressing matters such as fundamental freedoms and operations of CSOs and HRDs should be taken into the priorities of the EIDHR before other important development targets such as environment can be focused on.

The international field of promoting democracy and human rights is a stage for numerous actors to be pursuing their own agenda. Even within the EU, numerous strategies exist, and lack of common guidelines remains issue. As Bossuyt et al express, international democracy promoters all have the same goal but different methods (Bossuyt et al. 2015, 21). Thus, according to Fioramonti, external actors who operate in Africa, should coordinate their policies rather than compete (Fioramonti 2009, 14). Also (European Commission 2011, 6), as the TEU assures to put democracy and human rights to the focus of its external policies, the EU´s responsibility is to ensure coherent and effective strategies towards it actions. Likewise, in 2006 organizations started to lobby for more straightforward instrument (Karnikova 2012, 95).

The EU´s common "one size fits all" strategy is outdated, and every recipient state requires its own approach. For the case of Zimbabwe, this would mean making strategies with local actors and taking local ownership into account, also long-term support and patience is needed. Also, (European Commission 2017, 49) further support for the EU Delegation must be provided for them to make full use of the EIDHR, its rules and unique features. More responsibility in case of EIDHR should be given to EU Delegations working on the ground, since they are the one´s knowing what the most critical matters are and what are most appropriate eligibility standards for upcoming CfPs. As Marchetti declares, the EU Delegations and the civil society must be involved when making the country-based strategies (Marchetti 2017, 200). CfPs managed through Brussels thus should be assign to the delegations.

Currently, the application process for the EIDHR funding is too complicated, time-consuming process prevents smaller local organizations from benefitting of it and requires too much resources from them. Therefore, it should be simplified in terms of smaller and perhaps not so well-organized organizations could take full advantage of the EIDHR. As mentioned before, local delegations should have more responsibility and having also this managed by them, might help to simplify the process. Also, as there is a lot of competition in applying the funding, several organizations have been re-funded. Thus, it raises the question if other (smaller) organizations stand even a change against them since they lack the knowledge and resources. After all, the (Karnikova 2012, 90) strategy for successful organizations is networking which gives access to new resources. Nonetheless, the average time taken from decision-making to implementation currently is 2,45 years (Moran et al. 2017, 39), and this should be accelerated.

Furthermore, the thesis raised an issue of the overlapping´s with other EU financing instruments, and the case of Turkey was set as an example. Therefore, the allocation of the EU EFI´s should be more equally allocated so that identical support (like the EIDHR and Pre-Accession Instrument) would not be committed to same country. Nevertheless, for improving the effectiveness of the EIDHR, more efforts should be made to avoid overlapping. According to World Bank and OECD, more thoughtfulness should be made regarding repetition of efforts and to have strategic approach in selection of projects (World Bank and OECD 2013, 152). Also, commitments should be made to increase the budget regarding restrictions towards civil society, currently, level of annual sums per country remains at a low level (European Parliament 2017, 36). Thus, if the EIDHR funding is not allocated more efficiently, the budget should be raised.

First thing, where the EIDHR should focus more now in the case of Zimbabwe is electoral assistance. More support should be concentrated on strengthening the opposition and if necessary fund confidently. For Zimbabwe to start truly a democratization process, the ruling party ZANU-PF should be challenged by opposition. Also, as Mavhiki expresses, the opposition parties usually work with similar tasks than most of the CSOs, and are dependent on financial assistance, (Mavhiki 2016, 93) currently, no opposition is thus able to challenge ZANU-PF without foreign financial assistance. To supplement this, (Mavhiki 2016, 155) every opposition party in Zimbabwe is either too weak or needs more financial assets and (Head 2018), there is no opposition at the moment in a place to actually challenge ZANU-PF. Therefore, the support of the EIDHR is much needed. However, the EIDHR

funding in the case of Zimbabwe has not supported opposition or other political parties in the years 2000-2017.

Also, since the amount of polling stations have been concentrated in areas where citizen support is towards ZANU-PF, the EIDHR election assistance could be used here. The EU assistance in these matters have a strong skills and resources, they could provide materials and observers. Moreover, the presence after the elections remains most crucial. Additionally, the EIDHR resources should be used to more effectively conduct follow up recommendations from EOMs, because very many things can be learned from the follow up´s. Also, not only providing materials for the elections, the EU should focus on training the local institutions for monitoring elections more efficiently. Subsequently, more resources and funding are required for the ZEC and its partners. ZEC is highly underfunded and needs help with resources and financial matters. As Human Rights Watch declares, there is no evidence that Mnangagwa is going to secure the independence of ZEC or to modernize the voting system (Human Rights Watch 2018, 1).

Nonetheless, the difficulty when it comes to EOMs is the fact that they require government consent. If, for some reason the foreign EOMs are not allowed to participate, the EIDHR can support other organizations working on the ground. It is highly important to realize what are the weaknesses and opportunities to better implement to upcoming EOMs. Accordingly raising the awareness amongst civil society is important, and (Mavhiki 2016, 116) Zimbabweans have not yet completely understood the helpfulness civil society participation could have since widely participated elections become more difficult to manipulate.

Moreover, the assistance to CSOs has been experienced successful according to representatives from CSOs in Zimbabwe. According to the interviews conducted by Mavhiki, several representatives benefited greatly from international support and their work has been able to strengthen the citizen concerns regarding the government and made media institutions more resistant (Mavhiki 2016, 127). The CSOs are competent in identifying the essentials when it comes to human rights and democracy issues (Marchetti 2017, 218), therefore, more funding for local CSOs is needed.

Furthermore, as there is no conditionality in the EIDHR like there is in other EFI´s for example in EDF, more cooperation between EIDHR and local CSOs should be created. Cooperation, as proven, works better than sanctions. And also, (Mavhiki 2016, 34) as there are at least 50 main CSOs occupied with democracy promotion and elections in Zimbabwe, the financial requirements are great.

Additionally (Fioramonti 2009, 8), the conditionality measures have faced hard criticism from the representatives of African CSOs.

As this thesis previously pointed out, the citizens have lost faith in mass activities and due to government intimidation, do not see the point of them. However, (Mavhiki 2016, 26) functioning democracy needs citizens who participate, are aware and have some amount of scepticism towards the actions of the government. Therefore, it is important for the CSOs and other activists to work from the bottom with citizens rather than engage the top level, democracy promoters play highly unique role since they are not associated with the government.

Ioannides introduces a perspective that, regular interaction with local CSOs and other partners is needed to implement required reforms. Expansion of local participation and local ownership must be taken into political discourse and carefully consider with whom to cooperate since prosperous implementing is still lacking. (Ioannides 2014, 23-24) When deciding to whom to allow the EIDHR grant, the EU must be strict that it won't finance organizations with differing values and priorities than the EIDHR has and the CSOs must be already reached some amount of independence, so it will not work only by the EIDHR funding.

The problem within development aid is that it creates dependency and disallows aid receivers to fully operate by themselves. As Mavhiki express, after 2013 when aid was decreased in Zimbabwe, multiple CSOs had to close their operations due to financial matters (Mavhiki 2016, 122). However, in the case of the EIDHR, the funding is only supplementing the functions of the receiving CSO, not financing the entire operations. The feature of the EIDHR of being a supporting organ is also unique, because it does not create dependency but rather helps recipients to become independent.

Also, more comprehensive research and evaluations regarding the EIDHR worldwide is needed in order to fully understand its effectiveness, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. The representatives of HRDs should be required to report annually on the progress for the EU to be more transparent on what has been done together with CSOs for the civil society (European Parliament 2017, 37). Therefore, some reporting system of the projects would be valuable and would enhance the further research of the EIDHR, and it would ensure that the projects funded are properly implemented.

Even though, a lot of criticism has been presented for the EIDHR capacities, there are some unique benefits for it. For instance, flexibility, emergency grants can be funded directly to HRDs at risk and

this has saved lives of many HRDs, confidently, no approval from governments are needed and this especially adds value to the EIDHR, the aid is able to enter volatile situations, and also, support to elections through numerous activities not just observation missions. These characteristics authorize the EIDHR to concentrate on politically sensitive matters (Ioannides 2014, 20).

These are all circumstances, where the EIDHR has specialized and can actually influence. Therefore, is it crucial to implement successful granting for CSOs in 2018 election cycle and most importantly, post-elections. For other EU instruments and development policy, it is not as easy to affect these kinds of matters because the government of Zimbabwe has been reluctant to cooperate. But, if the EIDHR does not manage to decrease the long-time taken from decision to implementation (currently 2,45 years), it will not be able to assist financially local CSOs for the election cycle and this will harm the democratization process the Zimbabwe could finally face.

To conclude, the EIDHR has now actually a chance to effect Zimbabwean democratization and thus should take these criticisms into consideration for the next revision period of EIDHR. As intended, the foreign assistance to Zimbabwean CSOs and HRDs is important, it would add more value to the EIDHR to truly specify its funding to these kind of matters as it does not require the consent from Zimbabwean authors. Mavhiki (2016, 127) conducted interviews in Zimbabwe with representatives of local CSOs, and as one respondent said, no one has never questioned the actions of the government, but the change of Zimbabwean story is about people.

# CONCLUSION

This research has examined the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and its characters. Also, the most pressing obstacles regarding democratization in Zimbabwe have been discussed and the role and effectiveness of the EIDHR in terms of these difficulties. The hypothesis at the beginning of the research claimed that the EIDHR is not able to address these issues well enough and due to its features, like global availability and scope of delivering financing to wide range of issues relating democracy and human rights weakens its potentials. Also, due to withdrawal of long-time leader Mugabe, the EIDHR may now have a chance to influence on Zimbabwe more. Then, the research moved to identifying the capacities of the EU democracy promotion. The EU democracy promotion overall has many limitations, and the main weaknesses were confirmed to be due to delivery gab, slow decision-making, incoherent strategies and overlapping's with wide range of development policies. These hypotheses were supported by the research done with the EU institutions reports as well as other related books, journals and articles.

The major discussion centered around the serious doubts against the EU capacities to deliver its multiple democracy and human rights policies, guidelines and programs to developing countries, in the case of Zimbabwe. As they are today, they are not fulfilling their purposes and critical amending is required. The journey of these from Brussels to receiver country is too time-consuming and diminishes the effectiveness of the policies. Also, as there are no common guidelines for democracy and human rights promotion towards EU external policy, some policies and instruments have similarities which causes overlapping´s. Within the EU development policies, the developing countries must be willing to participate and adapt the policies and projects, also these policies introduce some conditionalities. However, the EIDHR have a unique position for the reason that it does not require the consensus of the governments and it can work with partners confidently. This creates the advantage that the corrupted leaders cannot enhance their own well-being or pro-longing the poor governance. Also, if more local CSOs are funded, the local participation can be boosted, and Zimbabweans can find their own ways towards democratization.

Even thought, the EU has good strategies but still, for example, implementation lacks, and many commentaries have criticized EU´s external policies and instruments. Also, the EIDHR as it is

currently, is too wide to have enough impact to achieve democratic governance and basic human rights in Zimbabwe. As seen, the latest, 2017 CfPs invited applications towards environmental issues and in case of Zimbabwe, this kind of issues cannot be tackled before fundamental freedoms are established. Additionally, the EU promises to work closely with local actors regularly, but as the research showed, the EIDHR support were not given so much to Zimbabwe recently, and now due to the juncture situation, the support is crucial. When it comes to the five specific objectives the EIDHR has set, in the case of Zimbabwe, they are too wide as they are currently, and should be more specific. For example, SO two, support to democracy is not so specific as it could potentially cover everything.

The major problem of the EIDHR in Zimbabwe is that it has funded relatively much European NGOs over local ones recently, and no effort have been made to support political parties. Also, the overall amount of support is not sufficient in a country of this weak situation. In theory, Zimbabwe fulfills the requirements of democracy: it has regular elections and democratic constitution, but in practice, this is not the case. Zimbabwe altogether requires foreign assistance.

As this thesis has suggested some recommendations for the EIDHR in case of Zimbabwe, such amendments are possible. If the EIDHR wants to be valuable and strategic instrument, it should at least give most of the responsibilities to the local EU delegations in terms of simplifying the application process and make it quicker, enhance more local participation through local CSOs over European NGOs, and specify the priorities towards more fundamental issues. The needs of developing countries could be well addressed if these appearances will be taken into consideration when reviving the next EIDHR strategy. As studies have shown, only funding is not enough, dialogue with local actors, reporting system and some fundamental changes to the instrument are needed.

The future concerns regarding this topic is, that if countries like Zimbabwe are not taken fully into consideration, the democratization process may not continue but instead reverse. As the contemporary world faces severe crises related to democracy and human rights, the role of instruments like the EIDHR becomes more essential. Zimbabwe is known for its authoritarian rule and continuous violations of human rights, the focus of EIDHR projects should be concentrated more on geographical areas like these since the need is greater. As the EIDHR funds projects worldwide, it loses potentials to intervene with full competences to areas most in need. As most of the Sub-Saharan African countries face crises in matter where the EIDHR could focus but still, for instance, Zimbabwe has not received enough support through it to address these properly. Up to this point, the influence of the

EIDHR in Zimbabwe has not been as high as it could have been and thus more cooperation with local organizations is needed.

Accordingly, further research is required to clarify the relationship of democratization process and the EIDHR and the focus should be in countries most at risk. This thesis gives more significance to the research topic on the effectiveness of the EIDHR in Sub-Saharan Africa and implicates the need for the future study. The research revealed that there is an increasing need for the EIDHR support in Zimbabwe. With regards to relevance of the EIDHR, this research has proven that it could be highly important instrument for democratic reforms in Zimbabwe since it promises to engage with local actors and approve granting even to most sensitive issues. However, it lacks concentration and excludes certain local partners from funding due to practical issues.

To conclude; as Zimbabwean power has been centralized for the ZANU-PF party and no opposition has been able to contest it, the role of the EIDHR support becomes important. The perspectives of temporary president Mnangagwa may open a pathway for the support to be delivered to local CSOs as well as to assist in upcoming elections. It will be unfortunate, if the future democratization process in Zimbabwe will not be enhanced now and the backsliding of democracy and human rights continues. It remains to be seen what kind of role the EIDHR manages to play and if the upcoming elections will bring a new direction to Zimbabwe. The brutal authoritarian rule may or may not endure and it is yet unknown if the legacy of Robert Mugabe will resume.

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